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1. Crisis: Bureaucratic Politics, the Trump Administration, and Covid-19

Author:
Aaron Mannes
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM)
Abstract:
This paper investigates the interplay between bureaucratic politics and decision-making processes within the Trump administration during the COVID-19 pandemic. The pandemic response was shaped by the pulling and tugging between key players, including Vice President Mike Pence, Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin, the National Security Council, and President Trump himself. Despite facing resistance from some officials, Trump often achieved his preferred policy outputs, such as undermining public health measures, by relying on a cadre of supportive aides. However, in areas like drug approvals, bureaucratic resistance proved more effective in countering Trump's demands. The paper concludes that the administration's overall pandemic response was abysmal, highlighting how Trump's inexperience and management style exacerbated the challenges posed by a complex crisis that threatened both human lives and economic stability.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Leadership, Donald Trump, COVID-19, Management, and International Politics
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

2. Americans on War Powers, Authorization for Use of Military Force and Arms Sales: A National Survey of Registered Voters

Author:
Steven Kull
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM)
Abstract:
The question of when the United States should use military force is a profound question. There has been a long-running debate about the role of Congress and the President when it comes to making this decisions. The constitution gives Congress the power to fund the military and declare war, and declares the President as the Commander in Chief of the military. However, there are ambiguities about which branch of government has the power in a number of specific situations related to the use of force and the transfer of arms to another country. Currently there are a number of pieces of Congressional legislation that seek to give Congress greater power. One proposal seeks to give Congress greater influence over the use of military force outside of the framework of a declaration of war or in response to an attack on the US. Current law, grounded in the War Powers Act of 1973, requires that the President withdraw troops after 60 days unless Congress votes in favor of continuing it. However, since its passage, every President has considered this unconstitutional and many have not abided by it, keeping forces in place without Congressional approval. In order to stop such a military operation, Congress must gather a veto-proof majority, or bring the President to court. Neither has ever happened. A proposal that has been put forth in Congress is to ‘flip the script’ on this, and automatically cut off funding to such military operations after 60 days, unless Congress actively votes in favor of continuing the operation. (Based on H.R. 2108, H.R. 5410 and S. 2391) Another proposal deals with the termination of a Congressional authorization to use military force (AUMF). Shortly after the September 11 attacks Congress authorized the President to use military force against those responsible for the attacks, or who have aided those responsible. Since then all presidents have used this AUMF to justify various uses of force that some Members of Congress feel go beyond its original purpose. Currently there is a proposal to terminate this AUMF which requires an act of Congress. (Based on H.R. 255 and S. 2391) The last proposal seeks to give Congress greater authority over arms sales. Currently, all arms sales must be approved by the President, and Congress can only halt an arms sale with a majority vote, or more realistically a veto-proof majority. Members of Congress believe that it should be easier for Congress to halt an arms sale. They have introduced a proposal that would also ‘flip the script’ in this case by requiring that any arms sale over $14 million only proceed if Congress votes in favor. (Based on H.R. 5410 and S. 2391) To bring the American people a voice at the table of the current debate on these various pieces of legislation, the Program for Public Consultation (PPC) has conducted an in-depth on-line survey of 2,702 registered voters with a probability-based sample provided by Nielsen Scarborough.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Military Strategy, Public Opinion, and Civil-Military Relations
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

3. US-Russian Contention in Cyberspace: Are Rules of the Road Necessary or Possible?

Author:
Pavel Sharikov
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM)
Abstract:
In recent years, as news of U.S.-Russian tensions in the cyber domain has dominated headlines, some strategic thinkers have pointed to the need for a bilateral cyber “rules of the road” agreement. American political scientist Joseph Nye, a former head of the U.S. National Intelligence Council, wrote in 2019 that, even “if traditional arms-control treaties are unworkable” in cyberspace, “it may still be possible to set limits on certain types of civilian targets, and to negotiate rough rules of the road that minimize conflict.” Robert G. Papp, a former director of the CIA’s Center for Cyber Intelligence, has likewise argued that “even a cyber treaty of limited duration with Russia would be a significant step forward.” On the Russian side, President Vladimir Putin himself has called for “a bilateral intergovernmental agreement on preventing incidents in the information space,” comparing it to the Soviet-American Agreement on the Prevention of Incidents on and Over the High Seas. Amid joint Russian-U.S. efforts, the Working Group on the Future of U.S.-Russia Relations recommended several elements of an agreement in 2016, among them that Russia and the U.S. agree “on the types of information that are to be shared in the event of a cyberattack” (akin to responses to a bio-weapons attack) and prohibit both “automatic retaliation in cases of cyberattacks” and “attacks on elements of another nation’s core internet infrastructure.” Most recently, in June 2021, a group of U.S., Russian and European foreign-policy officials and experts called for “cyber nuclear ‘rules of the road.’”
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Military Strategy, Cybersecurity, Conflict, and Cyberspace
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, North America, and United States of America

4. Restoring and Improving Nuclear Forensics to Support Attribution and Deterrence

Author:
Steve Fetter
Publication Date:
12-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM)
Abstract:
Nuclear forensics is the analysis of nuclear materials, devices, emissions, and signals to determine the origin and history of those nuclear materials and devices. At the request of the Secretary of Energy, and in consultation with the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Homeland Security, Restoring and Improving Nuclear Forensics to Support Attribution and Deterrence evaluates the U.S. government's nuclear forensics capabilities. A 2010 National Academies report, Nuclear Forensics: A Capability at Risk, characterized the precarious state of the national technical nuclear forensics (NTNF) program at that time: NTNF relied almost entirely on staff dedicated to and residual funding from other related programs. This summary report addresses the current state of U.S. NTNF capabilities relative to the National Academies evaluation in 2010 and recommends ways to improve the NTNF program through improvements in policy, operations, and research and development efforts.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

5. Iranian Public Opinion at the Start of the Biden Administration: Report

Author:
Nancy Gallagher, Clay Ramsay, and Ebrahim Mohseni
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM)
Abstract:
This report covers findings from two surveys fielded in September and early October 2020 and late January through early February 2021 to assess how Iranians were faring as the covid-19 pandemic intensified the challenges their country was already facing, what they thought about the parliamentary election in Iran and the presidential election in the United States, and how the inauguration of Joe Biden impacted their attitudes towards nuclear diplomacy and regional security. Iran was one of the earliest countries to be hard-hit by the novel coronavirus, with the country’s first cases confirmed on February 13, 2020, two days before the parliamentary election, senior officials among those soon infected, and high death rates reported. Western reporting depicted widespread government incompetence and cover-ups exacerbating the pandemic’s toll. As in other countries, Iranian officials struggled to decide whether to close schools, curtail economic activities, and restrict religious observances in hopes of slowing the virus’ spread, but cases and deaths remained high through 2020. When we fielded the first survey wave, the daily number of new confirmed covid-19 cases in Iran was starting to climb sharply again after having been relatively flat since May. Some world leaders, including the U.N. Secretary General, called for an easing of sanctions on Iran as part of global efforts to fight the pandemic. The United States, which had withdrawn from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in May 2018, maintained that medicine, personal protective equipment, and other humanitarian supplies were exempt from the steadily increasing sanctions applied as part of its “maximum pressure” campaign. But, the United States’ designation in September 2019 of the Central Bank of Iran as a terrorist organization made most foreign suppliers of humanitarian goods reluctant to sell to Iran. A decision in October 2020 to also designate the few Iranian banks that were not previously subject to secondary sanctions further impeded humanitarian trade, caused another sharp drop in the value of Iran’s currency, and had other negative economic effects. The Trump administration’s stated objective was to keep imposing more sanctions until Iran acquiesced to a long list of U.S. demands articulated by Secretary of State Mike Pompeo. The original twelve points include the types of restrictions on Iran’s nuclear program that the government rejected during previous negotiations and that the Iranian public has consistently opposed. It also included stopping development of nuclear-capable missiles and ending support for various groups throughout the Middle East.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Public Opinion, and International Community
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

6. An Effect-Centric Approach to Assessing the Risks of Cyber Attacks Against the Digital Instrumentation and Control Systems at Nuclear Power Plants

Author:
Nancy Gallagher, Charles Harry, and Jor-Shan Choi
Publication Date:
02-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM)
Abstract:
Cyberattacks against the digital instrumentation and control (DI&C) systems in nuclear power plants (NPPs) are of grave security concern. The US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) requires all NPPs to protect critical digital assets that support safety, security, and emergency preparedness functions against cyberattacks.1 Other standards bodies like the International Society of Automation (ISA) and the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) have also developed standards that address cybersecurity for industrial control systems (ICS) including DI&C.2 Due to concerns for security, relevant stakeholders such as regulators, plant operators, information technology (IT) and operation technology (OT) staff, and equipment suppliers are sometimes reluctant to reveal in technical detail about vulnerabilities posed by DI&C systems. Yet, because some types of cyberattacks against an NPP may cause core damage or significant release of radioactivity, harming the plant, the public and the industry, the safety implications of potential cyberattacks should be evaluated. This divide between security and safety is a challenge for stakeholders focused in cyber security for NPPs. To bridge this security and safety divide, this study proposes and demonstrates a methodology for assessing and addressing the safety consequences of cyber events that disrupt one or more parts of the DI&C systems at NPPs. The methodology builds on the “effect-centric” cyber risk assessment framework developed by the Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM). It is used to analyze two historical cyberattacks and one hypothetical attack scenario. As the focus is on plant safety, these assessment, evaluation, and analysis can be candidly and openly discussed with the goal of finding the best defense to thwart the specific cyberattack.
Topic:
Security, Governance, Nuclear Power, Cybersecurity, and Regulation
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

7. Increasing Nuclear Threats through Strategic Missile Defense

Author:
Greg Thielmann
Publication Date:
06-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM)
Abstract:
Growing concerns about third-country nuclear threats led the United States to withdraw from the ABM Treaty’s constraints on the size and scope of ballistic missile defense arsenals in 2002. Inaccurate and alarmist projections of “rogue state” ICBM threats were critical in winning support for the decision to withdraw from the treaty and to sustain the multi-billion dollar annual price tag for developing, deploying, and expanding strategic missile defenses. But 18 years after Washington abandoned the treaty, North Korea is the only rogue state that could pose a near-term nuclear threat against the American homeland—and U.S. missile defense interceptors and radars have not even delivered high confidence of being able to protect against this threat. Meanwhile, the absence of limits on U.S. strategic missile defenses and prudent, worst-case concerns in Moscow and Beijing about their future expansion are fueling resistance to additional nuclear arms reductions and stability measures. The end result is that the exponential threats posed by Russia and China are getting worse and the chances of a disastrous nuclear arms race are increasing. This analysis argues that the nuclear threat confronting the United States is multilateral, three-dimensional, and interrelated. Unless the United States acknowledges the role of missile defenses in this complicated reality, it will not be able to realize the full benefits that arms control offers.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, Nuclear Power, and Missile Defense
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Asia, North America, and United States of America

8. Double or Nothing?
 The Effects of the Diffusion of Dual-Use Enabling Technologies on Strategic Stability

Author:
Alexander H. Montgomery
Publication Date:
07-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM)
Abstract:
Left unchecked, the diffusion of dual-use enabling technologies—such as additive manufacturing, artificial intelligence, and advanced communication technologies—may pose threats to strategic stability. The rapid development of these technologies by the United States and its allies and partners has taken place primarily in the private sector, and is largely stored and transported in easily-diffused digital formats. If diffusion occurs, it could lead to significant innovation in, or even transformation of, competitors’ military forces. Enabling technologies can be particularly dangerous since they can have a feedback effect by accelerating innovation itself. Rapid shifts in the balance of military forces due to adoption of these technologies by competitors can, in turn, threaten strategic stability. To counter these threats, the United States and its allies and partners need a common awareness of the factors that enable and constrain technological diffusion, adoption, and transformation. In order to deepen understanding of how these developments are most likely to impact international security and contribute to the creation of mitigating policies, this paper develops a model of the pathways through which enabling technologies could affect strategic stability, drawing on the literatures on technological invention, innovation, and evolution; nuclear proliferation; and conventional arms flows. Diffusion of inventions can occur through four pathways: buy, beg, steal or copy; yet none of these pathways guarantee successful diffusion of technological inventions, and are subject to a variety of countermeasures. Moreover, there are significant downstream hurdles to adopting these technologies and using them to transform military forces. Consequently, while some diffusions may have a significant multiplicative effect, many may have little or no net effect on strategic stability. Policymakers must carefully and consider specific technologies and strategically act to effectively limit those that pose the greatest danger.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Military Strategy, Strategic Stability, and Emerging Technology
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

9. The Common Ground of the American People: Policy Positions Supported by Both Democrats and Republicans

Author:
Steven Kull
Publication Date:
08-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM)
Abstract:
The Federal government is currently failing to address numerous problems. This failure is largely due to increasing partisan polarization resulting in government gridlock. One may well have the impression that there is virtually no common ground between Republicans and Democrats in America today. Some speculate that polarization in the American public is driving the polarization in Congress. However, there are strong reasons to believe that the polarization in Congress primarily comes from other sources. Over the last decades, concurrent with the increase of polarization in Congress there has been an extraordinary increase in the amount of money flowing from special interests into political campaigns as well as a dramatic increase in the number of lobbyists operating in Washington. As many of these special interest have competing objectives their increased efforts at influencing government decisions, and the increased access derived from campaign contributions can exert centrifugal forces on the policymaking process. Still the question stands as to whether there is common ground between Republicans and Democrats in the public—at least more than Congress. If so, the public would have the potential to become an arbiter between the parties, offering a pathway toward convergence. To find out if there is such common ground, a major multi-year study of the American people was conducted by the Program for Public Consultation with the support and participation of Voice of the People, and more recently Common Ground Solutions. Financial support was also provided by the Democracy Fund, the Hewlett Foundation, the Rockefeller Brothers Fund, the MacArthur Foundation and the Circle Foundation.
Topic:
Ideology, Political Parties, Polarization, and Party System
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

10. Alternative Approaches to Information-Age Dilemmas Drive U.S. and Russian Arguments about Interference in Domestic Political Affairs

Author:
Pavel Sharikov
Publication Date:
09-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM)
Abstract:
This paper investigates differences in Russian and American approaches to challenges of the information age, and explores some destabilizing effects on bilateral relations. The governments and societies in Russia and the United States base political and economic decisions about the development and use of information technology on different principles; in a globalized, interconnected world Russia’s collectivistic approach clashes with American individualistic approach. This exacerbates numerous problems in Russia-U.S. relations, including reciprocal allegations of information attacks as a form of interference in domestic affairs. Alternative approaches to information-age dilemmas make Russia and the United States particularly sensitive to different ways of using information technology to impact electoral processes and domestic politics, with little understanding of each other’s narratives and national priorities.
Topic:
Elections, Information Age, Disinformation, and Election Interference
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, North America, and United States of America

11. Iranian Public Opinion under “Maximum Pressure”

Author:
Nancy Gallagher, Ebrahim Mohseni, and Clay Ramsay
Publication Date:
10-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM)
Abstract:
The Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM) has been conducting in- depth surveys of Iranian public opinion on nuclear policy, regional security, economics, domestic politics, and other topics since the summer of 2014. Each survey includes a combination of trend-line questions, some going as far back as 2006, and new questions written to assess and inform current policy debates. This report covers findings from three surveys fielded in May, August, and early October 2019 to evaluate how the Trump administration’s “maximum pressure” campaign is affecting public opinion in Iran. The United States withdrew from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in May 2018, and began re-imposing sanctions on Iran that the Obama administration had lifted under the terms of the 2015 agreement it had negotiated with Iran, Britain, France, Germany, Russia and China. In the fall of 2018, it blacklisted hundreds of Iranian entities and threatened to impose secondary sanctions on anyone who did business with them. In spring of 2019, it tried to prevent Iran from getting any revenue from oil sales, its main export, by ending exemptions for key customers. In the summer of 2019, it tightened constraints on Iran’s access to the international financial system, including channels that had been used to pay for medicines and other humanitarian goods that were officially exempted from earlier sanctions. It also sanctioned Iran’s foreign minister, complicating his ability to interact with U.S. officials, experts, and media figures. The Trump administration’s stated objective is to keep imposing more sanctions until Iran acquiesces to a long list of U.S. demands articulated by Secretary of State Mike Pompeo. The original twelve points include the types of restrictions on Iran’s nuclear program that the government rejected during previous negotiations and that the Iranian public has consistently opposed. It also includes stopping development of nuclear-capable missiles, ending support for various groups throughout the Middle East, halting cyberattacks and other threatening activities, and releasing all U.S. and allied detainees. Pompeo subsequently added other demands related to civil liberties in Iran. The Iranian public enthusiastically supported the JCPOA when it was first signed, partly due to unrealistic expectations about how much and how quickly economic benefits would materialize. After the International Atomic Energy Agency certified in January 2016 that Iran had met all of its nuclear obligations and implementation of sanctions relief began, foreign companies were slow to ramp up permissible trade with Iran or to make major investments there before they knew how the next U.S. president would view the JCPOA. By the end of the Obama administration few Iranians said that they had seen any economic benefits from the deal and most lacked confidence that the other signatories would uphold their obligations. But a solid majority of Iranians (55%) still approved of the agreement.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, and JCPOA
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

12. Rethinking U.S.-China Security Cooperation

Author:
Nancy Gallagher
Publication Date:
08-2014
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM)
Abstract:
This paper argues that traditional arms control approaches no longer work well for even traditional security problems on the U.S.-Chinese security agenda for three reasons: Firstly, even when both states reason for arms control from the superpowers’ experience during the Cold War, they do so in different ways; secondly, a growing number of experts and policy elite in both countries do not think the benefits of formal arms control outweigh the costs and risks; and thirdly, those who think formal arms control has an important role to play lack a clear and compelling logic for why arms control is durable and achievable among highly interdependent states with unequal power, mixed interests, and dissimilar values. Past attempts find a new basis for U.S.-China security cooperation—e.g., by using voluntary measures or by relying on the economic interdependence of the two states—have proved insufficient. The second half of this paper suggests the basic elements of a cooperative security logic that could be a more appropriate and effective basis for cooperation. Instead of narrowly defining the objective of arms control as increasing deterrence stability at lower cost and risk, this logic aims more broadly to prevent threats from developing, provide reassurance, and promote consensual political order among states. Rather than trying primarily to set equal technical limitations on military capabilities, dialogue and negotiations should seek to ensure that whatever capabilities states have, including asymmetrical and dual-use ones, are used for mutually acceptable purposes and according to equitable behavioral rules. Issues related to transparency, verification, and compliance management would also be handled in ways that promote cooperation rather than competition. The paper concludes by examining how U.S.-Chinese cooperation in space, on nuclear weapons issues (including the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty), and on missile defense all stand to benefit from reliance on this new logic.
Topic:
Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Bilateral Relations, Deterrence, and Cooperation
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

13. Iranian Attitudes on Nuclear Negotiations

Author:
Nancy Gallagher, Clay Ramsay, and Ebrahim Mohseni
Publication Date:
09-2014
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM)
Abstract:
This survey is one in a series of surveys related to Iran that CISSM has conducted since 2013.
Topic:
Public Opinion, Nuclear Power, Negotiation, and Survey
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, and United States of America

14. Cybersecurity in Russian-U.S. Relations

Author:
Pavel Sharikov
Publication Date:
04-2013
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM)
Abstract:
Threats to cyberspace and to information security are emerging as central elements of Russian-U.S. security relations. As much as U.S. officials have expressed concerns about Russian-sponsored cyber-activities, Russia is equally concerned about U.S. military intentions in the cyber domain. Differing definitions of what activities pose a threat complicates relations on this issue. While the United States is concerned primarily with threats to technology and economic well-being, Russia is also concerned about activities that threaten interference in Russian sovereign affairs. Russian concerns have been heightened by repeated U.S. rebuffs on draft U.N. resolutions to address some threats. U.S. and NATO pronouncements about the need for collective defense against cyberattacks have raised similar concerns. Ongoing Russian-U.S. cooperation at the highest level demonstrates that the states recognize the common interests at stake, but officials will have to work on a mutually beneficial basis to make any level of cooperation work.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Science and Technology, Bilateral Relations, Cybersecurity, and Information Security
Political Geography:
Russia and United States of America

15. Media Coverage of Iran's Nuclear Program

Author:
Jonas Siegel
Publication Date:
04-2013
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM)
Abstract:
The manner in which news media frame their coverage of Iran’s nuclear program is critically important to public understanding and to policy decisions that will determine whether the dispute can be resolved without war. News coverage of the lead-up to the 2003 U.S.-led invasion of Iraq and of the justifications of that invasion was found to have had a profound, distorting effect on public understanding and the decision to go to war. Is news media coverage having a similar effect on U.S. and international discussions about Iran’s nuclear program? If so, how exactly is the framing of the dispute and the broader approach of news media to covering this issue affecting the choices available to policy makers? And how is coverage likely to affect the dispute’s outcome?
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Nuclear Power, Media, and News Analysis
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, and United States of America