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Begin New Search Topic Foreign Policy Content Type Working Paper Publishing Institution Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

1. No Water’s Edge: Russia’s Information War and Regime Security

Author:
Gavin Wilde and Justin Sherman
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
To the extent that any unified theory of Russian information warfare actually exists, its core tenet might well be that regime security has historically been indivisible from information warfare in Russian strategic thought. Rather than an aggressive or expansionist expression of Moscow’s foreign policy, the Kremlin’s so-called information war should primarily be viewed through a domestic and regime security prism—it’s as much a counterinsurgency as an expeditionary strategy, less an escalation than a projection. Analysts and decisionmakers should therefore avoid reflexively casting the United States and the West as Russia’s primary antagonists in its information war, as doing so risks reinforcing these insecurities and exaggerating Moscow’s degree of power in the information ecosystem.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Information Warfare, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, and United States of America

2. Four Contending U.S. Approaches to Multilateralism

Author:
Stewart Patrick
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
The era of U.S. president Donald Trump exposed the shortcomings of a unilateralist and hypernationalist approach to the pursuit of U.S. global objectives. Although that orientation still commands support in some Republican quarters, a more compelling foreign policy debate for the United States has emerged: What form of multilateralism is currently best suited to advance U.S. national interests and international stability? This historical moment is defined by two countervailing trends, as described in the 2022 National Security Strategy issued by U.S. President Joe Biden’s administration. The first is a profusion of transnational challenges that can only be addressed, mitigated, or resolved through collective action, such as climate change and pandemic disease. The second is a resurgence of geopolitical competition that hinders that very cooperation.1 The imperative for collective action has never been greater, yet the world remains, as United Nations (UN) Secretary-General Antonio Guterres bemoans, “gridlocked in colossal global dysfunction.”2 Biden has turned the page on Trump’s “America First” foreign policy, but the debate over alternative approaches to intergovernmental cooperation has just begun.3 Within the U.S. foreign policy establishment, four distinct models vie for primacy—and the administration’s attention. The first is a charter conception of multilateralism, focused on the UN’s model of universal membership. The second is a club approach, which seeks to rally established democracies as the foundation for world order. The third is a concert model, which seeks comity and joint action among the world’s major powers. The fourth is a coalition approach, which would tailor ad hoc frameworks to each global contingency. Each of the so-called four Cs lays claim to a respective virtue: legitimacy, solidarity, capability, and flexibility.4 As the Biden administration begins its third year—and as internationalists continue to advocate for different modes of multilateralism to tackle a daunting global agenda—the time is ripe for the United States to take a more strategic and intentional approach to international cooperation. Each of the four Cs rests on specific assumptions, makes distinct causal and normative claims, and poses real-world trade-offs for the pursuit of U.S. preferences and prospects for effective collective action. To be able to weigh their relative merits in specific circumstances, policymakers first need to better understand their conceptual underpinnings and practical implications.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Multilateralism, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

3. What Should India Do Before the Next Taiwan Strait Crisis?

Author:
Vijay Gokhale
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
In the next two decades, the Taiwan question is likely to assume increasing importance for the Indo-Pacific region. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) is becoming more assertive about unifying Taiwan with the mainland, and it is also making progress toward establishing the military capability toward this end. For a rising PRC seeking to establish itself as the dominant global power, it is untenable that a part of its territory remains outside its control. Possible endeavors toward establishing this control could lead to a response by the United States, which would have broader ramifications for the region and the world. For the United States, any endeavors by the PRC to this end would undermine the very core of the idea that the United States is the defender of freedom and democracy across the world, thus undermining its credibility. It might also deal a devastating blow to the United States’ global power. In this context, and given the significance of Taiwan to both countries, it is an issue that can rapidly escalate, making it a matter of concern in the Indo-Pacific. Further, a conflict over Taiwan would dwarf the global economic fallout that began when Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022. Short of conflict, Chinese coercion of Taiwan could disrupt the freedom of navigation and sea lanes of communication through the Taiwan Strait and will have severe consequences for Asian geopolitics and geoeconomics. Given India’s substantial geopolitical and geoeconomic interests in the region and its long history of exchanges with East and Southeast Asia, India should pay constant and careful attention to this issue. Further, a policy to respond to various contingencies must be thought through and put into place. This paper tries to look at the possible policy that India might adopt ahead of a major crisis in the Taiwan Strait. The paper proceeds in three parts. The first part analyzes the geopolitical and geoeconomic consequences of another Taiwan Strait crisis for India. While it is difficult to estimate the actual damage that would be dealt to the Indian economy, it is clear that all segments of the economy would be affected, with the impact possibly substantial enough to set India back several years. A crisis would also impact India’s geopolitical interests and national security, given that China is increasing its assertiveness both along the Line of Actual Control as well as in the Indian Ocean. The second part argues against a commonplace view that India played no role in crisis management during earlier periods of high tension in the Taiwan Strait—the 1954–55 and 1958 Taiwan Strait Crises, also known as the First and Second Taiwan Strait Crisis, respectively. By using archival material in the United States, the United Kingdom, and India, it seeks to dispel the above notion and that Taiwan ceased to be a matter of interest for India after it had recognized PRC’s claim over Taiwan in 1950. Further, it looks at the lessons for policymaking from India’s handling of the crises. The third part of the paper briefly traces the history of India-Taiwan relations following India’s transfer of its diplomatic recognition to the PRC till the present day. It provides an overview of India’s Taiwan policy. Given that a war in the Taiwan Strait is not beyond reasonable doubt, it then discusses the scenarios India might find itself in and the possible policies to respond to these scenarios. It recommends a close following of the U.S.-ChinaTaiwan strategic triangle, a whole-of-government assessment around impacts of a Taiwan Strait contingency, and an assessment of policy options. It also recommends mapping the expectations that China and the United States would have of India, along with undertaking consultations with key partners on the Taiwan question.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, Crisis Management, and Geoeconomics
Political Geography:
South Asia, India, Taiwan, Asia, and Indo-Pacific

4. Will the Invasion of Ukraine Change Russia-Africa Relations?

Author:
Ronak Gopaldas
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
With ties forged under Soviet rule, Russia has historically enjoyed warm relations with many African countries, as their economic and ideological ambitions often align and their ties are bolstered by a mutual mistrust of the West. The spread of Africa’s votes on United Nations (UN) resolutions to condemn Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, however, indicates three key themes. Firstly, many African countries are pulled in competing directions by broader global geopolitics—for many, abstaining was the rational choice. Secondly, Russia’s support on the continent may be overstated and is not unconditional. Finally, Russian influence is often limited by the extent to which it can influence the political elite of a country and in some cases co-opt that elite into patronage networks. The split in the way African countries voted to condemn Russia’s actions is an important departure point for an exploration of the changing nature of Africa’s ties to Russia. There have been myriad interpretations of the votes, most of which have focused on the failure of several African countries to denounce the invasion. Few have questioned whether the nonaligned stances of these countries were tacit refusals to be used as supporting actors in public displays of condemnation by the United States and European Union (EU), to distract from the inability to offer meaningful practical or military support. Fewer still have explored whether the nonaligned stances signal weakening Russian influence on a continent it has typically relied on for support. This paper examines political relations between Russia and Africa, delving into the legacy of independence, military support, diplomatic and foreign policy stances, aid, foreign direct investment, and trade. It will also unpack whether Russia’s invasion of Ukraine was a catalyst for what appears to be Russia’s diminishing influence or whether the former Soviet Union’s waning global standing and economic relevance precipitated a loosening of ties. The fluidity of geopolitics has left many African states between a rock and a hard place. What does this mean for Africa, not only in terms of its relationship to Russia but also more broadly on the geopolitical stage? Further, how would Africa be positioned on the global stage should Russia prevail, should the war drag on, or, more interestingly, should Ukraine emerge victorious?
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Africa, Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

5. China’s Response to Türkiye’s Volatile Authoritarianism

Author:
Ceren Ergenç and Kenan Göçer
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
This paper investigates Türkiye’s evolving relations with China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), a large-scale program of infrastructure investment and project financing proposed by Chinese President Xi Jinping in 2013. The paper digs deeply into cases from two sectors—transportation and energy—focusing on how heightened and changing local expectations among Turks for these prospective BRI projects have shaped choices and outcomes, including China’s. In so doing, it explores how these shifting Turkish perceptions affect the implementation of BRI projects in Türkiye. This paper has several goals: it seeks to understand the reasons behind these local changes, the role of the state and private sector in Türkiye in these changes, and the way China has responded so far. Of course, domestic factors are not the only ones that shape the implementation of BRI projects in Türkiye or elsewhere; regional and global trends have had an impact too.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Infrastructure, Authoritarianism, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and Investment
Political Geography:
China, Turkey, Middle East, and Asia

6. Sign of the Times: How the United Kingdom’s Integrated Review Affects Relations with Africa

Author:
Zainab Usman and Jonathan Glennie
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
In March 2021, the British government published a vision document: “Global Britain in a Competitive Age: The Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy.”1 Previously, the government had issued documents on security, defense, development, or foreign policy, but this integrated review bundled together all aspects of policy related to a vision of a so-called Global Britain. This newly integrated approach to policymaking mirrors a strategic consolidation within the UK government, specifically the merger of the Department for International Development (DFID) with the Foreign and Commonwealth Office to become a new Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO). While the review is framed as a necessary response to a changing global landscape, domestic political considerations around the British exit from the European Union (Brexit) weigh heavily. The review also points to the current UK government’s inclination to prize geopolitical competition over a previous emphasis on global cooperation. Steep cuts to the UK’s generous foreign aid budget as well as the abolition of DFID have already drawn significant academic, policy, and media attention. Yet these actions are part of a broader UK strategy to redefine the country’s relations to the rest of the world, with significant implications beyond the controversial foreign aid cuts for poor countries, including those in Africa. The review will shape relations with a continent that has deep historical ties from the colonial era, a large diasporic presence, and long-standing economic relations with the UK. This analysis draws out the implications of the UK’s 2021 integrated review for African countries and recommends next steps for African and other international stakeholders to navigate the UK’s overhauled external relations strategy.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Development, and Integration
Political Geography:
Africa and United Kingdom

7. Negotiating Local Business Practices With China in Benin

Author:
Folashade Soule
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Commercial negotiations between Benin and China demonstrate how both sides navigate the dynamics of Africa-China business-to-business relationships. In Benin, Chinese and local Beninese officials engaged in drawn-out negotiations on a deal to construct a business center aimed at deepening business links between Chinese and Beninese merchants. Strategically located in Cotonou, Benin’s principal economic city, the center aims to promote investment and wholesale businesses by serving as a hub for China’s business-to-business relations not just in Benin but regionally in West Africa, especially in the large and growing neighboring market of Nigeria. This paper relies on original research and fieldwork conducted in Benin from 2015 to 2021 and the author’s access to draft and final contracts from the negotiations, which allow for a side-by-side comparative textual analysis, as well as initial field interviews and follow-up interviews with key negotiators, Beninese businessmen, and former Beninese students in China. The paper shows how Chinese and Beninese authorities negotiated the establishment of the center and, above all, how Beninese authorities made Chinese negotiators adapt to local Beninese labor, construction, and legal norms and put pressure on their Chinese counterparts. This strategy meant that negotiations took longer than usual to complete. China-Africa cooperation is often characterized by speedy negotiations, an approach that in some cases turns out to be harmful—since this can allow vague and unfair clauses to be featured in final contracts. The negotiations over the Chinese business center in Benin is a good example of how well-coordinated negotiators that take their time and work in coordination with various counterparts throughout the government can help facilitate better outcomes in terms of high-quality infrastructure and compliance with prevailing construction, labor, environmental, and business norms, while also preserving a good bilateral relationship with China.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Development, Bilateral Relations, and Business
Political Geography:
Africa, China, Asia, and Benin

8. U.S. Strategy and Economic Statecraft: Understanding the Tradeoffs

Author:
Christopher S. Chivvis and Ethan Kapstein
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Few would dispute that U.S. economic policy has enormous consequences for America’s national security and role in the world. But economic policy is too often made without a clear picture of the strategic tradeoffs it entails. The purpose of this paper is to help clarify some of these tradeoffs by considering three alternative models of U.S. economic statecraft. The first model examined here, America First, has several national security and economic disadvantages. It would not only antagonize some of Washington’s key military allies but probably also undermine U.S. international competitiveness. It might even induce countries to turn their economic attention toward China, reducing the United States’ global influence accordingly. A better approach would be a blend of two other models, namely alliance economics and globalization 2.0. Together these approaches could help orient the United States for the geopolitical challenges of the next decade. By emphasizing commercial relations with U.S. military allies, such a blend would recall Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty, which calls for international economic cooperation among NATO member states. And by leading a reformed multilateral system, the United States would again put itself at the center of the rules-based global economic order that brought prosperity to millions.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, NATO, Geopolitics, Economy, Economic Cooperation, and Strategy
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

9. How China’s Foreign Aid Fosters Social Bonds With Central Asian Ruling Elites

Author:
Nargis Kassenova
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
China has become a global power, but there is too little debate about how this has happened and what it means. Many argue that China exports its developmental model and imposes it on other countries. But Chinese players also extend their influence by working through local actors and institutions while adapting and assimilating local and traditional forms, norms, and practices. With a generous multiyear grant from the Ford Foundation, Carnegie has launched an innovative body of research on Chinese engagement strategies in seven regions of the world—Africa, Central Asia, Latin America, the Middle East and North Africa, the Pacific, South Asia, and Southeast Asia. Through a mix of research and strategic convening, this project explores these complex dynamics, including the ways Chinese firms are adapting to local labor laws in Latin America, Chinese banks and funds are exploring traditional Islamic financial and credit products in Southeast Asia and the Middle East, and Chinese actors are helping local workers upgrade their skills in Central Asia. These adaptive Chinese strategies that accommodate and work within local realities are mostly ignored by Western policymakers in particular. Ultimately, the project aims to significantly broaden understanding and debate about China’s role in the world and to generate innovative policy ideas. These could enable local players to better channel Chinese energies to support their societies and economies; provide lessons for Western engagement around the world, especially in developing countries; help China’s own policy community learn from the diversity of Chinese experience; and potentially reduce frictions.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Foreign Aid, and Elites
Political Geography:
China, Central Asia, and Asia

10. A Historical Evaluation of China’s India Policy: Lessons for India-China Relations

Author:
Vijay Gokhale
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
The violent clash in the Galwan valley in eastern Ladakh in 2020 fundamentally altered the dynamics of the India-China relationship. China’s increasing transgressions and attempts at coercion in the border areas since 2008–2009 have put the boundary question to the center of the India-China relationship. The salience of this question has also increased because the geopolitical backlash to China’s actions in 2020 has been greater than in previous instances, and because India’s policymakers and strategic community are no longer willing to give Beijing the benefit of the doubt regarding its intentions and actions. This has prompted a comprehensive relook in India at the past, present, and future of the relationship. While much of this has focused on the relationship from the Indian perspective and on trying to understand India’s China policy, the current chill in ties has highlighted the necessity of understanding China’s India policy. Thus, using Chinese sources, this paper analyzes the drivers of that policy and the options available to Indian policymakers to engage with, adapt to, and mold it. This paper argues that from the time of Mao Zedong’s rise to the helm of the Chinese Communist Party and the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, China’s India policy has been shaped by its view of the larger great power strategic triangle of China, the Soviet Union (later Russia), and the United States. As this triangle has evolved, this has had a direct effect on the India-China relationship. For much of the past seventy years, China was the weakest corner of the triangle and therefore driven by goals of security and status. In that context, it saw India—another large, developing country in Asia—as a competitor for security and status alike. As a result, China always looked at India through the lens of its own relations with the Soviet Union and the United States. It did not view India on its own merits, or credit it with agency, but as unequal as well as untrustworthy. China’s objective during the Cold War was to keep India as neutral as possible. In the post–Cold War period, the goal evolved to limit through containment and coercion India’s capacity to harm China’s strategic goal of hegemony. This paper analyzes China’s India policy in three phases. In the first phase between 1949 and 1962, China viewed the United States as its primary adversary and its core objective was to keep India neutral and away from the U.S. camp on matters of concern to Beijing. Flowing from this was the secondary objective of utilizing India’s influence in the developing world to build “Asian solidarity” to stem U.S. inroads into Asia.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Territorial Disputes, and Military
Political Geography:
China, India, and Asia

11. Will France’s Africa Policy Hold Up?

Author:
Corentin Cohen
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
During his first term, French President Emmanuel Macron sought to revitalize his country’s diplomatic outreach to countries throughout Africa. Some aspects of this pivot were designed to more directly address the legacy of French colonialism in Francophone countries. He also sensed that the growing stature of non-Western powers like China has given African counterparts greater latitude to pursue ties amid heightened diplomatic competition among a host of other countries both in Europe and elsewhere. In pursuing this strategy, Macron has sought to promote a vision of French diplomacy with Africa through greater foreign aid and more robust people-to-people ties grounded in a spirit of partnerships between equals. While Macron’s efforts have created an opening for renewed relationships, this pivot has not been as seamless as he had hoped. Bureaucratic inertia and stovepiping in French foreign policy circles have at times meant that implementation of these policies has lagged. In certain cases, Macron’s own nationalistic appeals during his recent reelection bid have appeared to undercut his attempts to make amends for France’s troubling colonial history. Meanwhile the French president’s attempts to deepen economic, people-to-people, and security ties in more equitable ways have fallen short of lofty expectations, with past practices proving harder than expected to jettison. For Macron’s ambitions for French relations with African countries to keep their momentum, the president and his team must take an earnest look at what has worked well and what can still be improved.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Agriculture, Diplomacy, Partnerships, Emmanuel Macron, and Degrowth
Political Geography:
Africa, Europe, and France

12. Localization and China’s Tech Success in Indonesia

Author:
Gatra Priyandita, Dirk Van Der Kley, and Benjamin Herscovitch
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
On average, Indonesians distrust China and many Chinese firms. Yet Huawei and to a lesser extent ZTE have successfully positioned themselves as trusted cybersecurity providers to the Indonesian government and the Indonesian nation. This has been no easy feat given long-held Indonesian animosity toward China. Many Chinese companies have faced protests over concerns they were taking local jobs. Huawei and ZTE have suffered no such fate. Nor has there been a broad coalition of Indonesian voices against using Chinese technology in critical telecommunications infrastructure. In short, Indonesians care a lot more about Chinese cement plants than they do about Huawei involvement in 5G networks. Gatra Priyandita Gatra Priyandita is an analyst at the International Cyber Policy Centre at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, where he leads a project researching cyber-enabled intellectual property theft. He is a political scientist by training and specializes in the study of foreign policy and security in Southeast Asia. He holds a PhD in political science from the Australian National University. This is a vastly different conversation to those happening in rich liberal democracies. Huawei and ZTE have been able to achieve success in Indonesia, despite a sense of ambivalence among the Indonesian political and defense establishment about Chinese intentions and growing Western scrutiny over the use of Chinese technology in broadband networks. As other papers in this series have demonstrated, Huawei and ZTE needed to localize their strategies. Like elsewhere in the world, available evidence suggests that part of Huawei’s and ZTE’s value proposition is cheaper prices (compared to those of competitors) for high-quality technology. But that is only part of the story. Huawei has positioned itself as Indonesia’s cybersecurity provider of choice by offering enormous cybersecurity and other related training programs across the country for groups ranging from senior government officials to students in rural Indonesia. Much of this training is technically focused on practical vocational skills with a hope that students one day will become customers. In addition, the company offers an attractive maintenance and upkeep package. Since the mid-2000s, Chinese information and communications technology (ICT) firms have created training centers in partnership with local Indonesian telecoms companies and universities to train the next generation of Indonesian engineers and tech specialists. Government agencies are also increasingly targets of training and capacity-building programs, with Huawei claiming that 7,000 government officials have participated in its training programs. The Indonesian government, corporations, and ordinary citizens alike have welcomed Huawei and ZTE as essential partners in their efforts to build both the infrastructure and human capital necessary to prosper in the twenty-first century’s digital economy. What Huawei and ZTE offer is knowledge transfer, not technology transfer. The technology is still being built in China by Chinese firms. Huawei’s role in training relates instead to capacity building. Indonesians will install, maintain, and use the networks. China will build the hardware. There is also evidence that China has had some rhetorical success in pushing its version of cyberspace governance. Beijing’s preferred cyberspace governance language was inserted into a memorandum of understanding between Indonesia’s National Cyber and Crypto Agency and the Cybersecurity Administration of China. However, it is difficult to see how the memorandum has influenced Indonesia’s cybersecurity governance in practice. One of the concerns often leveled by rich liberal democracies is that reliance on Chinese tech will end up aligning the political interests of countries like Indonesia with those of China. Other key worries are China’s pervasive espionage and the enduring (though as yet unrealized) risk that Chinese companies with a dominant role in an ICT ecosystem could be used by Beijing to apply coercive political pressure. Despite Indonesia’s embrace of Huawei and ZTE, political leaders in Jakarta have not simply disregarded the hard security questions posed by upgrading ICT equipment, especially when foreign suppliers are involved. Indonesian officials simply rate the need for development and cybersecurity-related capacity building higher than the risk of using Chinese ICT hardware in their critical infrastructure systems. If rich liberal democracies are concerned about this trend, then they need to offer workable alternatives that place Indonesia’s enormous digital development needs at the heart of any value proposition. It is unlikely that Indonesia will stop using Chinese hardware in its infrastructure, but alternatives could prevent overreliance.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Science and Technology, Cybersecurity, Telecommunications, and Localization
Political Geography:
China, Indonesia, and Asia

13. Russia’s National Security Narrative: All Quiet on the Eastern Front

Author:
Eugene Rumer and Richard Sokolsky
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
The two defining features of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s foreign policy have been an increasingly adversarial relationship with the West and an increasingly close partnership with China. These drivers have been the salient feature of official Russian national security documents for the past three decades. Since the end of the Cold War, the U.S. national security community has viewed Russian strategic thinking as misguided because it failed to see China as the real threat to Russia. This view ignores the Kremlin’s preoccupation with Europe as the most important strategic theater where its interests are at stake, and where they are threatened by the West’s superior capabilities and ambitions. This view also ignores how unimportant—relative to Europe—the Asia-Pacific is for Russia. Russia’s partnership with China is secured, however, by a set of coherent and complementary strategic rationales, which supersede frequent concerns in the Russian strategic community at large about China and its growing capabilities and intentions vis-à-vis Russia. Those concerns appear to have little impact on Russian policy. Notwithstanding those concerns in Russia’s unofficial national security discourse, China’s footprint on its foundational national security and foreign policy documents is invisible—and China, as a source of military threat to Russia, does not appear to be part of the Kremlin’s calculus. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has long been the pacing challenge of Russian military modernization, and the main contingency for which it has been preparing has been future conflict in the European theater. For the Putin regime, there is no alternative to Russia’s “no limits” partnership with China. Moreover, even if Putin were no longer on the scene, a successor regime would have powerful economic, geopolitical, demographic, and military-strategic incentives to maintain this partnership. An adversarial relationship with China would pit Russia against two superior powers in two widely separated geographic theaters. The war in Ukraine has cemented the Russian-Chinese partnership for the foreseeable future.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, National Security, Bilateral Relations, Partnerships, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Eurasia, and Ukraine

14. Russia and India: A New Chapter

Author:
Rajan Menon and Eugene Rumer
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Russian-Indian relations are undergoing a major change. Throughout the Cold War, the relationship rested on three pillars: Soviet arms sales to India; shared public-sector-heavy economic philosophy and extensive Soviet aid; and the Soviet Union–India vs. United States–Pakistan–China geopolitical alignment. The fall of the Soviet Union, the rise of India and China, the U.S.-China tensions, the deepening of U.S.-India ties, and the Russian-Chinese partnership intensified by Russia’s break with the West and the war against Ukraine have had a profound effect on Russian-Indian relations. Of the three pillars of the Moscow–New Delhi relationship, only one remains: the arms trade. Russia remains a major supplier of weapons to India, and Russian equipment still makes up a vast portion of Indian Armed Forces’ force structure; but Russia is facing competition in the Indian arms market. India’s desire to diversify its supply of weapons and develop its own defense industry has resulted in declining Russian arms deliveries to India in recent years. Russia’s break with the West because of its war against Ukraine has accelerated its pivot toward China. Against the backdrop of U.S.-China and China-India tensions, Russia’s position as China’s junior partner will make it harder for Russia to preserve partnership with India. Moscow’s leverage versus both New Delhi and Beijing is shrinking as they have greater capabilities of their own than they had previously and have new partners that offer more than Russia. Still, the Russian-Indian partnership will continue. For India, Russia remains an important supplier of weapons and, most recently, oil. India has not joined the West’s sanctions on Russia. By doing so, it has demonstrated its independent foreign policy. For Russia, India is an important market for arms and oil. The Indian-U.S. security relationship is relatively new, whereas India-Russia ties have endured for over two generations. India has no reason to forsake the benefits of this relationship. Nor does Russia. It has been said that Moscow plays a weak hand well, but sustaining strong security ties with both China and India will become more difficult for it. The question is how China will react to Russian arms sales to India, and what Russia will do if pressed by China to curtail them. For reasons of geographic proximity, economic ties, and personal relations between Presidents Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping, the odds favor Beijing over New Delhi to have a bigger say in Moscow.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Cold War, History, Bilateral Relations, Partnerships, Geopolitics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, South Asia, Eurasia, Ukraine, India, and United States of America

15. Political Change and Turkey’s Foreign Policy

Author:
Alper Coşkun and Sinan Ülgen
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Turkey is heading toward a set of twin elections that could have momentous consequences for the country’s future. In June 2023 at the latest, Turkish voters will be asked to choose a new president and a new parliamentary majority. For the past two decades, the Turkish political landscape has been dominated by the Justice and Development (AK) Party and its uniquely successful leader, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. After having ruled the country single-handedly since 2002, Erdoğan became the first executive president of Turkey in 2018, following a tightly contested constitutional change. He has come out victorious in every round of elections since the start of his political career. And yet, after two decades, his popularity is faltering, raising the prospect of political change. The turning point for Turkey’s political system has been the transition to a presidential system with the constitutional amendment of 2017.1 Since the start of multiparty elections in 1946, Turkey had had a parliamentary system, and since 2002 it has had single-party governments. With Erdoğan at the helm, the AK Party has won nearly all elections over the past two decades. It only failed to win a parliamentary majority in the most recent elections,2 in June 2018, and since then has been forced to rely on the support of the hyper-nationalist Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) to secure control of the legislature.3 Alper Coşkun Alper Coşkun is a senior fellow in the Europe Program and leads the Türkiye and the World Project at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington, DC. @IACOSKUN The transition to the presidential system forced a realignment of the political constellation. The structural impact of this transition has led to the creation of two major political alliances. The Cumhur, or People’s, Alliance is led by the AK Party and includes the MHP and a small number of marginal parties. The Millet, or Nation, Alliance is led by the main opposition, the center-left Republican People’s Party (CHP); it also includes the center-right/nationalist İYİ Party as well as the Saadet and Demokrat parties, which appeal to a smaller electoral base. The first real test of this alliance-based politics was the municipal elections of March 2019, where the opposition alliance performed markedly better. Millet-backed opposition candidates won the electoral race in nine out of Turkey’s ten major metropolitan cities, including Ankara and Istanbul. These cities had been ruled by mayors linked to the AK Party and its predecessors since 1994. Now the alliances are gearing up to contest the critical 2023 elections. The ruling Cumhur Alliance’s candidate will be Erdoğan, who will try to win a third term as Turkey’s president. The candidate of the Millet Alliance is still unknown. Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, as the leader of the main opposition party, is intent on becoming the Millet candidate, but there are doubts about his electability against Erdoğan. Meral Akşener, the chairwoman of İYİ—the second-largest opposition party—has so far sidelined herself from the presidential race. Ekrem Imamoğlu, the mayor of Istanbul, and Mansur Yavaş, the mayor of Ankara, are also possible presidential candidates for the opposition. At present, all four potential candidates for the opposition are polling better than Erdoğan—fueling speculation about political change.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Politics, Public Opinion, Elections, and Political Parties
Political Geography:
Turkey and Middle East

16. Networks and Competitive Advantage in a Contested World

Author:
Jennifer Kavanagh
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
In an increasingly multipolar world and amid challenges from China, Russia, and elsewhere, the United States faces a complex set of foreign policy demands and the real risk of becoming overextended. Networks—of states, businesses, and individuals—offer policymakers a way to prioritize and reduce global commitments while advancing core U.S. interests. Leveraging the right networks in the right ways can extend U.S. influence, support the economic and physical security of Americans, and compete with adversaries at sustainable cost. Today’s policymakers understand the power of networks but need more guidance on how to build and employ them as tools of competition in a contested world rather than a world of open borders and markets. Influence networks—networks primed to spread and amplify U.S. power, enhance U.S. competitiveness, and protect national interests—have three characteristics. They are attraction networks, organized around places and issues where countries and corporations are already interacting, meeting common needs with customized resources. China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), for instance, is organized around a shared need for infrastructure across the Global South and embeds Chinese influence by tailoring agreements to each partner’s local conditions. The United States has used attraction effectively in the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program, but most U.S. foreign investment has been centralized and top-down. They are gated networks with clear criteria for entry, access, and exit. Gates capture network power and direct it toward specific goals. The European Union (EU) has used gated economic markets to build significant regulatory power and geopolitical relevance. The United States has tended toward universalism but employs gates in some security networks, like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and is turning toward gates in economic networks with friendshoring initiatives in some industries. Finally, they are distributed networks that have robust ties between members throughout the network, allowing influence to flow quickly along more pathways and facilitating collective action. The United States has often relied on less resilient hub-and-spoke networks to retain control. U.S. Indo-Pacific security alliances are hub-and-spoke, while NATO is more distributed, enabling more rapid, coordinated responses and wider spread of U.S. influence. Networks with these characteristics can help policymakers tackle their hardest problems. For example, better use of influence networks can support U.S. efforts to prioritize and fully resource the more significant challenge posed by China by pushing forward changes that advance European security autonomy and by building and mobilizing needed, distributed networks in the Indo-Pacific theater. Influence networks can inform U.S. strategies for building ties to hedging states that offer access to key resources or strategic locations—for example, by focusing on shared local needs of potential partners and U.S. comparative advantages and by creating distributed business or civil society partnerships. Finally, influence networks provide ways to approach the Russia-China relationship that support U.S. security and economic interests, including avoiding the isolation of either. These examples begin to illustrate how influence networks can improve U.S. strategies toward foreign policy challenges by offering policymakers a way to prioritize commitments, capitalize on U.S. strengths, and avoid overextension that harms U.S. interests. Additional exploration and application of these networks will investigate these and other foreign policy challenges in more depth.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Networks, Strategic Competition, and Multipolarity
Political Geography:
Russia, China, and United States of America

17. How Middle-Power Democracies Can Help Renovate Global Democracy Support

Author:
Rachel Kleinfeld, Thomas Carothers, Steven Feldstein, and Richard Youngs
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Middle-power democracies—countries which regardless of their geopolitical weight have made democracy support a sustained component of their foreign policy—will be crucial to reimagining democracy support strategies and policies to better meet the moment. Some of these states have crafted new initiatives and wielded diplomatic tools to deepen their impact in recent years. However, these states have on the whole punched below their collective weight. This paper suggests that middle-power democracies can maximize their impact on global democracy in the following ways: Enhancing solidarity: when a country acts courageously in defense of democracy, it needs to know that others will stand alongside it. Sharpening their focus: middle-power democracies should target policy areas aligned with democratic values on issues both at the top of the geopolitical agenda and at the top-of-mind for citizens around the world—for example, economic recovery, injustice and discrimination, corruption, digital repression, and climate change. Improving diplomatic cooperation: pursuing flexible and focused multilateral partnerships allows for collaboration on key policy interests and amplifies middle-power actions.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Democracy, Solidarity, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Global Focus and United States of America

18. How Do Indian Americans View India? Results From the 2020 Indian American Attitudes Survey

Author:
Sumitra Badrinathan, Devesh Kapur, and Milan Vaishnav
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Indian Americans are now the second-largest immigrant group in the United States. Their growing political influence and the role the diaspora plays in Indian foreign policy therefore raises important questions—about how Indian Americans view India, the political changes underway there, and the course of U.S.-India relations. Since coming to power in 2014, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi has made outreach to the far-flung Indian diaspora a signature element of his government’s foreign policy. Modi’s courtship of the diaspora has been especially notable in the United States, where the Indian American population has swelled to more than 4 million and has become the second-largest immigrant group in the United States.1 In two separate, large rallies on U.S. soil—in 2014 and 2019—Modi sought to highlight the achievements of the diaspora, outlining the many ways in which they can support India’s interests from afar while underscoring their increasingly substantial economic, political, and social influence in the United States. These high-octane gatherings, however, naturally lead to a series of questions: How do Indians in America regard India, and how do they remain connected to developments there? What are their attitudes toward Indian politics and changes underway in their ancestral homeland? And what role, if any, do they envision for the United States in engaging with India?
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Immigration, Public Opinion, and Survey
Political Geography:
South Asia, India, North America, and United States of America

19. The Road from Galwan: The Future of India-China Relations

Author:
Vijay Gokhale
Publication Date:
03-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
China and India struggle to comprehend each other’s international ambitions. The misperceptions that follow lead to a lack of trust, border skirmishes, and potentially worse. On June 15, 2020, Indian and Chinese troops engaged in a brawl that left twenty Indian soldiers dead while causing an unspecified number of Chinese casualties. The clash is a part of a broader border standoff along the Galwan River between the two forces on the Line of Actual Control that is yet to be resolved. The Indian strategic community is broadly in agreement that this border dispute marks an implacable decline in India-China ties. They argue that the very basis of relations that emerged after former Indian prime minister Rajiv Gandhi’s visit to Beijing in 1988 has been shaken, if not destroyed. Yet, how did the two countries manage to reach this nadir in ties, and furthermore, what does the Galwan clash signify for the future of Sino-Indian relations? This paper argues that, long before the present border dispute occurred, Sino-Indian relations had been steadily declining due to rampant misperceptions of the other side, contributing to a lack of trust. The most fundamental misperception between the two countries is the inability to comprehend each other’s international ambitions, yielding the fear that their foreign policies are targeted against the other. This paper traces the impact and development of these misperceptions on Sino-Indian ties through three different phases before considering the future of the relationship after the Galwan dispute.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Territorial Disputes, and Borders
Political Geography:
China, South Asia, India, and Asia

20. Russia in the Mediterranean: Here to Stay

Author:
Eugene Rumer and Richard Sokolsky
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Russia’s strategy in the Mediterranean is an integral part of its strategy for the wider European theater, which has long been the principal arena of its foreign policy triumphs and setbacks. Europe’s dominant position on Russia’s foreign policy agenda is a product of its strategic culture, which is in turn shaped by geography, historical legacy, and an elite worldview that considers the West a threat to the domestic political order. It is impossible to understand Russia’s current posture in the Mediterranean without viewing it within this larger context and against the backdrop of the country’s centuries-old involvement in the region and retreat from it during the quarter century that followed the end of the Cold War. Since Russia’s 2015 intervention in Syria, alarms have been sounded about the Kremlin’s ambitions and military capabilities in the Mediterranean. These alarms have been unfounded.; Russian capabilities in the Middle East and the Mediterranean region are modest, and the Kremlin’s ambitions there are constrained by geography and geopolitics, limited resources, a transactional approach to relationships, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO’s) formidable force posture on its southern flank. As much as Russia may aspire to regional domination, it lacks the means to achieve this goal. That said, the Russian military is now a presence to be reckoned with in the Eastern Mediterranean. It has complicated U.S./NATO planning and operations, and Moscow has developed good relationships with important regional powers. Given Russia’s limited means, its re-emergence in the region can be considered a success, but its effects should not be exaggerated. Moscow’s posture in the Mediterranean has been largely designed to protect its gains in Syria and defend against the threat that Russian leaders see from NATO land, air, and naval capabilities to the Russian heartland. The importance of Russia’s anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) “bubble” over Syria has at times been exaggerated. The systems that make up the bubble are limited in range and in a conflict with NATO would be vulnerable to countermeasures. Contrary to a widespread perception, Moscow’s ambitions in the Mediterranean are more than a matter of its vague pursuit to regain great power status—they are a product of enduring Russian national security requirements. The principal rationale for Russia’s return to the region has been the prospect of a military confrontation in the European theater and concerns about the vulnerability of its southern flank in a conflict with NATO. While Russia has sought, in fact, to regain its old Cold War footing—and has been skillful and opportunistic in exploiting openings to expand its footprint—it has acted with caution, avoiding undue risks and, most of all, an outright confrontation with the United States. The Kremlin may aspire to dominate the Mediterranean one day, but for now its aim is to deny this option to NATO. Russia is in the Mediterranean to stay, and its push for a greater naval, air, and land presence and increased political influence will continue as long as it remains locked in a tense standoff with NATO in Europe. This warrants heightened vigilance but not, as has often been the case, fears that Russia has replaced the United States/NATO as the key power broker in the region.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, NATO, Armed Forces, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, Syria, and Mediterranean

21. A Difficult Balancing Act: Russia’s Role in the Eastern Mediterranean

Author:
Paul Stronski
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Russia’s assertiveness in the Eastern Mediterranean is part of its broader strategy for undermining the cohesion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU) and thus complicating the Western alliance’s ability to operate, plan, and formulate policy. The Kremlin’s interests are geared toward enhancing dependencies on Russian gas and financial flows, cultivating governing elites, and stymieing the ability of NATO and, to a lesser extent, the EU to expand. While Moscow’s efforts in the region after its 2015 intervention in Syria are often described as a means to reassert Russia’s great power status, the Russian leadership more likely sees its actions there as part of a broader standoff with the West that stretches from the Atlantic to the Black Sea and from North Africa to the Arctic. This is certainly the case in Turkey, Greece, and Cyprus—three of the most vulnerable countries to Russian influence operations in the region due to a mix of relative geographic proximity to Russia, common cultural and historic legacies, and elites that have looked to Moscow and beyond to balance their countries’ foreign policies or gain leverage with transatlantic partners. While Europe today is generally thought of as more or less “unified,” this region is anything but. Economic turmoil, border and territorial disputes, migration flows, and a growing disenchantment with the EU and the United States have created numerous fissures within and between these three states, transforming them into receptive targets for Russia. They are also highly dependent on Russian hydrocarbons and keen to attract Russian investment and tourists. Russia uses a narrative of shared cultural and religious heritage, along with existing anti-American or Euroskeptic sentiment to cultivate the region’s populations, albeit not always successfully. Yet, its influence operations over the past decade have led to Turkey, Greece, and Cyprus being labeled as weak links in NATO or the EU, especially on key issues of concern to Moscow: expansion of Western political and security organizations, EU sanctions, and the promotion of democracy and good governance. However, while the behavior of some of these countries at times has proved troubling to Washington and Brussels, the Kremlin’s engagement there has not led any of them to formally break with their Western partners, although tensions between the latter and Turkey continue to grow. Russia has been skillful and successful in seeking opportunities to engage the region, cultivating rising political, economic, religious, or cultural decisionmakers in all three countries. It now has a clear presence in the Eastern Mediterranean that cannot be ignored. Russia has been able to compartmentalize its differences with Turkey to develop a working, albeit often unhappy, accommodation in Syria and the South Caucasus, even as the two countries operate largely as competitors in Libya and Ukraine. Ankara’s purchase of the Russian S-400 missile system exacerbated frictions with Washington, throwing NATO into an internal crisis and leading to Turkey’s expulsion the F-35 and Patriot missile programs. For Russia, the sale was not only a symbolic win for its arms industry; it succeeded in stoking fissures in the Western alliance and complicating its weapons development programs. Nonetheless, while the Russo-Turkish relationship might appear robust, it is neither deep nor wide, and it is largely dependent on the two countries’ authoritarian leaders. Russia’s engagement with Greece has been less successful. Once described as Moscow’s Trojan horse in Europe,1 Athens pivoted back sharply toward its European and NATO partners after the 2018 exposure of Russian attempts to interfere in Greek politics and to upend its rapprochement with North Macedonia. Despite its promises of financial assistance, Moscow lacks the economic clout to help address Greece’s decade-long financial crisis. President Vladimir Putin’s successful cultivation of his Turkish counterpart also unnerves many Greeks. Greece is a clear case of Russian overreach, but Moscow still has tools—hydrocarbons and cultural links—that it can use in the country should future opportunities arise. Like Greece, Cyprus remains wary of Russia’s enhanced security relationship with Turkey, which has opened the door to greater military cooperation with the United States, France, and other Western allies. Nicosia hoped that Moscow could come to the rescue during its 2012–2013 banking crisis, but the latter lacked the financial clout to do so and was not a viable alternative to a harsh EU bailout. As an offshore financial center, Cyprus is dependent on Russian financial flows, not all of them legal, to help prop up its economy, giving Moscow leverage that has paved the way for limited security cooperation, particularly in the form of naval port calls. Russia has increased its cultural outreach to the country, but much of this is geared toward the growing Russian-speaking expatriate community. In sum, Russia’s capabilities in the Eastern Mediterranean are modest, based largely on symbolic diplomacy, energy, financial promises, and the ability to cultivate elites, some of which are quite eager to engage with Moscow for personal or political gain. That approach, however, does not resonate widely beyond the narrow Russia-friendly constituencies in each country. Furthermore, there is not much ballast to these relationships, all of which have proven to be volatile, as the 2015 freeze in Russo-Turkish relations over Turkey’s downing of a Russian fighter or the post-2018 plummet in Greek-Russian relations illustrate. But, if Russia’s main goals are to stoke fissures within the West, to shore up vulnerabilities to NATO on its southern flank, and to be seen as a regional player, it has had success, especially considering its limited economic potential and the challenges it faces in balancing the competing interest of Turkey, Greece, and Cyprus. Russia also wants a seat at the table as a mediator in regional disputes, but that is mainly to preserve its own interests rather than to bring sustainable solutions. Moscow in fact is far more likely to take advantage of those challenges for economic or geopolitical gain than to try to remedy them. To manage Russia’s assertiveness in the Eastern Mediterranean, NATO and the EU should shift away from trying to combat every instance of Russian activity there, not all of which is malign. Instead, they should work to enhance local resilience and to stabilize countries in the wider Mediterranean such as Lebanon, Libya, and Syria. They should also help Turkey, Greece, and Cyprus address their economic, governance, political, and security challenges.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, NATO, European Union, Geopolitics, and Alliance
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, and Mediterranean

22. Grand Illusions: The Impact of Misperceptions About Russia on U.S. Policy

Author:
Eugene Rumer and Richard Sokolsky
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
A critical examination of U.S. policy misfires in dealing with Russia and its intentions and capabilities over the past several decades is long overdue. Three factors largely account for this problem. All of them continue to affect contemporary policymakers’ approach to a deeply troubled relationship with Moscow. By unpacking the analytical assumptions that underlie these misconceptions, President Joe Biden’s administration and other important policy players will be better equipped to ensure that U.S. policy going forward is grounded in the most realistic understanding of the challenge that Russia poses and the right kinds of tools that the United States should use to contend with it. The first factor is the lingering euphoria of the post–Cold War period. For many Western observers, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the implosion of Russian power demonstrated the permanent superiority of the United States. The perception that Russia’s decline was so deep and irreversible that it would no longer be able to resist Western initiatives made it difficult to accept Moscow’s pushback against Western policies. This was a particular problem when the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) pursued several rounds of enlargement in the 1990s and early 2000s under U.S. leadership. U.S. leaders ignored Russia’s objections and underestimated the lengths to which Russian counterparts were prepared to go to secure the homeland against perceived threats. Second, American policymakers and experts have long paid too little attention to the drivers of Russia’s external behavior. Russian threat perceptions are part of an inheritance heavily shaped by geography and a history of troubled relations with other major European powers. They are compounded by the trauma of the loss of its empire, the lingering ideology of greatness, and a sense of entitlement based on its sacrifice in World War II. President Vladimir Putin stokes all of them for domestic political gain. Third, U.S. policymakers have not fully internalized the lessons of the two biggest crises of the Cold War—the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 and the Euromissile crisis of the early 1980s. In both cases, the Soviet Union went to great lengths to counter what its leaders perceived was a unilateral U.S. threat to the Soviet homeland that could not be tolerated. In 1962 they almost triggered a nuclear war. In 1987, they agreed to eliminate an entire class of intermediate-range nuclear weapons to secure the homeland from U.S. missiles. In both situations, U.S. missiles deployed in Europe would deny the Kremlin the advantage of strategic depth and decision time in a crisis. The lessons of those crises were ignored as anachronisms when NATO embarked on its eastward expansion on the assumption that it would no longer need to worry about, let alone maintain the necessary capabilities for the territorial defense mission. After all, Russia was permanently weakened. When Russia proved otherwise, the alliance was caught by surprise. In another surprise for the United States and its allies, Russian foreign policy has become increasingly assertive, adversarial, and ambitious over the past decade. In the post-Soviet space, the Middle East, Latin America, and parts of Africa, Russia has deployed a diverse tool kit rich in hard, soft, and gray zone power instruments to assert itself as a global power. Russian foreign policy agility and even daring have repeatedly caught the West by surprise and sparked fears of its return as a major threat to Western interests. In reality, Russian gains and tools used to accomplish Moscow’s objectives have not been all that impressive. But Russia has made up for it by capitalizing on mistakes made by the United States and its allies or moving into power vacuums left by them. Still, Russian muscle-flexing and agility in deploying its tool kit, certain to be enriched as new and even more disruptive technologies become available, will remain a top-tier challenge for the president and his senior national security aides. Russia will also remain a serious national security concern for the United States because of its nuclear arsenal and conventional and cyber capabilities—and because of the U.S. commitment to NATO, which is locked in a tense standoff with Russia, in close proximity to its heartland, for the foreseeable future. Getting Russia right—assessing its capabilities and intentions, the long-term drivers of its policy and threat perceptions, as well as its accomplishments—is essential because the alternative of misreading them is a recipe for wasted resources, distorted national priorities, and increased risk of confrontation. In responding to this challenge, it is important to set priorities and differentiate between primary and secondary interests. Europe is the principal theater of the East-West confrontation where Russian actions threaten Western security. Beyond Europe, Russia’s gains have been considerably less than often portrayed and pose a less serious challenge to U.S. interests. The continued tendency to dismiss Russia as a “has been” or declining power whose bark will always be worse than its bite can lead to the United States overextending itself, making unrealistic commitments, and risking a dangerous escalation with the one country that is still its nuclear peer competitor. The push to expand NATO without taking into account the possibility of Russia reemerging as a major military power was an example of such thinking, which is to be avoided in the future. At the same time, the scope and scale of the threat that Russia’s global activism poses to U.S. interests will depend largely on how Washington defines those interests in regions where Russia has expanded its footprint over the past decade. Absent a sober assessment of Russia’s gains and tools for power projection, the United States will position itself to needlessly chase after the specter of Russian expansionism in distant corners of the world where major U.S. interests are not at stake.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, NATO, Power Politics, Geopolitics, Post Cold War, and Expansion
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, North America, and United States of America

23. Less Than a Full Deck: Russia’s Economic Influence in the Mediterranean

Author:
Joanna Pritchett
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Russia’s intervention in Syria in 2015, and then subsequently in Libya, marked its return as a major actor in the Mediterranean. Much has been made of Russia’s use of all elements of statecraft, including diplomatic, ideological, military, and economic instruments, to advance its interests in this region, a vital shipping and transit corridor. A closer look at Russia’s economic tool kit in this region, however, suggests concerns about Russian economic capabilities are likely overstated. Russia’s most important economic tools in the Mediterranean are its energy resources, arms exports, and ability to launder money through corrupt networks. These tools have complemented Russia’s diplomatic and military activities, particularly in areas where economic systems and rule of law have been weaker. Where Russia has been successful, it has increased a country’s dependence on Russian money, oil and gas, and/or arms, giving it a say in a country’s policymaking, particularly on matters of importance to Russia, and a way to undermine U.S. and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) influence in the region. In particular, Russia’s unique economic tools have helped it manage its otherwise difficult relationship with Turkey, which depends on Russian oil and gas and is a new customer for Russian nuclear power and weapons systems. Turkey is a unique example in the Mediterranean where Russia already had a substantial trade and investment relationship beyond hydrocarbons, and then used these newer, more subversive tools to build its influence. These same tools have allowed Russia to gain more influence in Egypt, Algeria, and to some degree Cyprus over the last decade. These tools have proved of limited utility elsewhere, however, as they have not been backed by the traditional instruments of economic statecraft: trade in non-energy goods and services, foreign direct investment, and development assistance. Russia has trailed the United States and Europe, and in some cases China, in deploying these fundamental economic elements of foreign policy in the Mediterranean region. Based on economic data available, Russia’s bilateral trade with individual Mediterranean countries is low, its investment levels in most Mediterranean countries are insubstantial, and it is not giving large quantities of development assistance to the poorer countries along the Mediterranean’s eastern and southern rims. The lack of these traditional economic ties is surprising, given Russia’s military and diplomatic efforts to increase its influence in the region. Without them, Russia’s economic diplomacy in the region is highly based on symbolism and the relationships lack sustainability over the long term, which undercuts its geopolitical ambitions in the Mediterranean. If Russia’s ambitions in the Mediterranean region are limited to maintaining access, currying favor with key decisionmakers, and remaining a nuisance to NATO, then its current level of economic ties is likely sufficient. If Russia aims to grow its influence and clout with more countries in the region, however, its current economic tool kit does not appear to be large or sophisticated enough to achieve this. Economic statecraft is an important tool in any country’s foreign policy. Trade and investment deals link countries together in vital ways to improve living standards in each country. They also build relationships between people—politicians, business leaders, students, tourists—that promote mutual understanding and respect for each other’s cultures. The United States and the European Union (EU) have generally excelled in building these types of economic ties in the post–World War II era, and economic data show they continue to be the dominant economic powers in the Mediterranean. Continuing this leadership in the economy will likely ensure that Russian influence in the Mediterranean remains a manageable, if persistent, problem for the West.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, Economy, Trade, Regional Power, and Energy
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, and Mediterranean

24. Redefining the U.S.-Turkey Relationship

Author:
Sinan Ülgen
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
At present, the relationship between Turkey and the United States is in a deep crisis. The meeting between U.S. President Joe Biden and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan at the margin of the June 2021 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Summit in Brussels raised expectations that the U.S.-Turkey relationship can be put back on track. And yet recovery from the present crisis is uncertain, as the underlying factors that previously shaped the relationship have changed. The end of the Cold War and the emergence of a more multipolar system have altered the nature of U.S.-Turkey engagement. In Washington, competition between global powers is now the overriding frame for U.S. foreign policy. Ankara, however, views the world very differently. The rise of Asia and the ascendancy of China are seen more as opportunities than threats. Ankara interprets these trends, as well as Russia’s growing regional activism, as signs of the lasting emergence of a multipolar world order. This understanding now shapes the strategic calculus of Turkish policymakers. Turkish political elites firmly believe that a successful repositioning of their country in this multipolar environment will benefit the nation in the long run. This growing divergence in terms of how Ankara and Washington see the world creates a challenging environment for constructively addressing the range of prevailing bilateral disputes. This paper examines five main areas of disagreement between the two countries and explores how the two sides might overcome these differences. At the top of the list of current disagreements are Turkey’s acquisition of the S-400 air and missile defense system from Russia and ongoing U.S. support for Syria’s Kurdish military and political factions. Also important are the consequences of the erosion of democratic norms in Turkey; the U.S. position on the self-exiled Islamic preacher Fethullah Gülen, who many in the Turkish government believe was the architect of the failed coup attempt in Turkey in July 2016; the possible impact of the Halkbank court case on grounds of past violations of Iran sanctions; and the Biden administration’s decision to use the word “genocide” to refer to the killings and deportations of Ottoman Armenians during World War I. Under these circumstances, it is clear that the Turkey-U.S. relationship is in need of redefinition. The Turkey-U.S. relationship has long been defined as a strategic alliance underwritten by NATO. Today, this definition has become obsolete and does not capture the new reality of this relationship. Turkey undoubtedly will remain a strong NATO ally, but its relationship with the United States will no longer be shaped by the power asymmetry of this military alliance. In other words, the reality of the United States being the main security provider will not be sufficient to override and contain the centrifugal trends that have shaped the relationship since the end of the Cold War and that have gained momentum in the past decade as a result of the growing divergences between Ankara and Washington. Yet differences with Turkey cannot be managed with the same clinical approach reserved for adversaries of the United States. Turkey is not an adversary, and therefore, a categorical separation of areas of agreement and cooperation from areas of disagreement is unrealistic. Unlike in the case of the United States and its true adversaries, the perpetuation of areas of dispute will always hinder the scope of U.S. collaboration with Turkey. The underlying alliance relationship has a built-in expectation of solidarity and mutual trust. Without these values, the bilateral relationship cannot function effectively. Neither will the “grand bargain” approach favored by Ankara be successful. Turkey wants a diplomatic process with the United States that would involve deliberations on all the disputed areas in a flexible manner. These deliberations could then lead to trade-offs that would create the conditions for a mutually beneficial reset. Ankara could also showcase its flexibility provided that Washington demonstrates its willingness for compromise. And yet there is little interest in Washington in undertaking such an enterprise with the Erdoğan government. A scenario of gradual rapprochement as an alternative to the grand bargain championed by Turkey or the principled engagement currently favored by Washington can be promoted. The gradual rapprochement would entail a series of confidence-building actions. Positive areas of engagement could include future negotiations with Iran, the reconstruction of Syria, the normalization of Libya, the stabilization of governance reform in Afghanistan given Turkey’s interest to operate the Kabul airport even after the U.S. and NATO withdrawals, the countering of Russian aggressiveness (especially toward Ukraine), and collaboration in Africa to dampen the influence of China. The Turkey-U.S. relationship may in that sense be in acute need of gradual but concrete steps that over time will set a new tone for a more positive and constructive strategic partnership and reestablish mutual trust.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, NATO, Bilateral Relations, Alliance, Multipolarity, and Military
Political Geography:
Turkey, North America, United States of America, and Mediterranean

25. Reassessing Russian Capabilities in the Levant and North Africa

Author:
Frederic M. Wehrey and Andrew S. Weiss
Publication Date:
08-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Russia may be back in the Middle East, but is it a truly strategic player? The picture is decidedly mixed. After abandoning most of its presence in the Levant and North Africa during the late 1980s, the Kremlin has alarmed Western policymakers in recent years by filling power vacuums and exploiting the missteps of the United States and the European states. Moscow panders to the insecurities and ambitions of local regimes, trying to enrich itself along the way. While Russian activism is part of a broader push for great power status, most of its policies are rooted more in opportunism than grand strategy. Yet Russian influence is formidable in many respects. In war-wracked states like Syria and Libya, Moscow has adroitly deployed military forces and engaged with actors that are off-limits to Westerners, thus positioning itself as a significant power broker. In Egypt and Algeria, it has pursued arms deals that are unencumbered by human rights conditions. Russia’s economic footprint is expanding in fields ranging from infrastructure to tourism to energy, contributing, in some instances, to the region’s cronyism and corruption. At the same time, a closer look at Russian activism reveals that its ability to shape events in the Middle East is far more modest than is commonly assumed. Russia has neither the tools nor the willingness to tackle the region’s deep-seated socioeconomic and governance problems. In Syria, the limits of the Kremlin’s military commitment have been exposed amid clashes with other powerful, outside players and a hardening stalemate on the ground. For now, Moscow is simply not in a position to achieve its desired military or political outcomes absent a significant investment of new resources. Russian economic penetration is driven mainly by short-term objectives and a search for outsized financial rewards that sometimes fail to materialize or to make Moscow an attractive partner. Russian inroads are further limited by regional factors like fractured politics and capricious local actors, who, despite being plied with Russian attention and support, do not behave as docile proxies. In many instances, Middle Eastern rulers exert far more power in shaping the extent of Russian influence than conventional narratives suggest. Successive leaders of Egypt, for instance, have perfected the game of soliciting Russia’s attention to gain leverage over other patrons, namely the United States. For their part, Israeli leaders have worked hard to ensure that Russia does not throw major obstacles in the way of Israel’s ongoing campaign against Iranian military encroachment in Syria—yet they surely take note when Moscow does the bare minimum in raising concerns about the situation in Gaza. The limits of Russian influence are similarly noticeable in the heartbreaking economic crisis in Lebanon, where Moscow is little more than a bystander. With these limitations in mind, Washington should avoid viewing the region through a zero-sum, Cold War lens that sees every development as a net gain or loss for Moscow or minimizes the agency of local actors. In the context of multiple policy challenges across the globe and at home, U.S. decisionmakers need to prioritize the areas of Russian influence that necessitate a response. In so doing, they should avoid playing the arms sales game on Moscow’s terms or letting themselves be instrumentalized by autocratic Middle Eastern rulers who point to Russian overtures to seek leniency and support from Washington. U.S. and European policymakers have ample tools at their disposal that can frustrate or slow the more malign forms of Moscow’s inroads. Yet the net impact of such pushback on Russian resolve should not be overstated. Instead, Washington should focus its energies on its biggest comparative advantage vis-à-vis Moscow in the region: namely, its abundant sources of influence and leverage in the economic and security spheres, its still-potent soft power, and its leadership of multilateral diplomacy and the rules-based global order.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Geopolitics, Economy, and Strategy
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, Middle East, North America, and Levant

26. China’s Digital Yuan: An Alternative to the Dollar-Dominated Financial System

Author:
Rajesh Bansal and Somya Singh
Publication Date:
08-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Central bank digital currencies (CBDC) are digital tokens issued by central banks. In a way, they are the digital version of cash; their value is guaranteed by a central bank. Unlike money held in credit cards and mobile wallets, CBDCs are not a mere representation of physical money stored elsewhere. Instead, they are a complete replacement for currency notes. While several countries are developing their digital currencies, China is well positioned to take the lead with the digital yuan. This paper highlights ways in which China can use its digital yuan to internationalize the renminbi (RMB) and gradually chip away at the hegemony of the dollar. The first part of the paper focuses on the dollar’s dominance in the global financial system and the privileges the United States accrues as a result of the dollar being the world reserve currency. The United States has a tight grip on the world’s payment rails, especially in the case of cross-border transactions. For example, the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunications (SWIFT)—the largest cross-border payment clearinghouse in the world—has to comply with and implement unilateral U.S. sanctions. These sanctions seriously hinder trade and damage the economies of the countries affected by them, as was the case with Iran, which lost $150 billion worth of revenue as a result of U.S. sanctions.1 Once a country is cut off from SWIFT’s network, it becomes extremely difficult for it to trade with the rest of the world. Thus, via the dollar’s dominance and its geopolitical muscle, the United States is positioned to maintain a tight grip on the world’s financial system. In an increasingly multipolar world, this outdated, decades-old system of the dollar as the apex currency and the United States’ position of power that allows it to pursue its own geopolitical interests has become outdated. The U.S. dollar’s hegemony has been challenged by economies like those of the European Union (EU), Russia, and China. Of all the countries, China finds itself in a dominant position to gain from this transition. In order to challenge the dollar’s hegemony and internationalize its currency, China will have to move away not just from the dollar but also from the payment rails dominated by the dollar. The best way to simultaneously do both would be to introduce a new payment rail like CBDCs. This paper analyses the way the launch of China’s CBDCs could greatly enhance its currency internationalization prospects. Considering China’s growing economy and influence over the world, the paper argues that China’s CBDC launch could bring a period of momentous change in the global financial system. In order to challenge the dollar, China will have to build the payments infrastructure required to facilitate the use of its digital yuan. It will also have to incentivize other countries to adopt its digital currency. China’s ability to successfully promote its currency using CBDCs will depend heavily on the country’s ability to relax capital controls and maintain the world’s trust in its institutions. China’s geopolitics will play a key role here. In the last decade, some of China’s major geopolitical efforts have set the stage for its CBDC launch. As China continues to use its foreign policy and technological capabilities to grow its influence in the global financial system, the launch of the digital yuan could be a significant step forward in this direction. This paper examines the reasons for China’s past efforts at currency dominance and explores ways in which the country can use its CBDC to further internationalize its digital yuan.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Finance, Economy, Central Bank, and Currency
Political Geography:
China and Asia

27. How Syria Changed Turkey’s Foreign Policy

Author:
Francesco Siccardi
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Between August 2016 and the present, Turkey has launched four military operations in northern Syria. Each operation has served specific objectives and was designed to respond to rapidly changing scenarios on the ground. It is possible to identify the key priorities that have informed Turkey’s Syria policy over the years. Boiled down to its core, the Turkish government’s activism in Syria has been driven by domestic politics and has helped Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and his Justice and Development Party (AKP) preserve power. Domestically, Ankara has used the Syrian conflict as a pretext to suppress the rights of the Kurds living in Turkey and limit their parliamentary representation to secure a landmark constitutional reform in 2017. In the following years, successive military operations in Syria have helped Erdoğan connect with increasingly nationalistic constituencies and drum up support around key electoral dates. Finally, after the failed coup in July 2016, the Turkish government’s Syria policy played a major role in rebuilding the credibility of the Turkish Armed Forces while redrawing the balance between civilian and military power. In foreign policy terms, Turkey’s military operations in Syria have resulted in increasingly tense relations with the United States. Washington’s support for the Syrian Kurds has alienated Ankara to an extent that U.S. policymakers failed to anticipate. The thorniest topic of the day in the U.S.-Turkey bilateral relation—Ankara’s decision to deploy the Russian S-400 missile system—is also deeply related to the Syrian crisis. This decision was made in the context of a strategic realignment between Turkey and Russia that has helped both countries pursue their respective objectives in Syria: the survival of Syrian leader Bashar al-Assad’s regime for Moscow and the weakening of the Syrian Kurds for Ankara. Finally, Ankara’s involvement in Syria has also given Turkey new leverage over the EU when it comes to the management of refugee flows. Solving the question of Syrian refugees in Turkey has been a priority of the Turkish government since the early stages of the Syrian civil war—and a main driver of Ankara’s policies toward both Syria and the EU. Overall, Ankara’s involvement in Syria has not only been a source of conflict—or rapprochement—with its traditional partners and neighbors across the region. It has also equipped Turkey with new tools for conducting a more aggressive, nationalistic foreign policy. The strategies Turkey has employed in Syria have boosted the country’s image and international role. These operations have secured a seat for Turkey at the negotiating table with Russia and the United States. Ankara has used these tools, these lessons learned, and its new capabilities to inform its revisionist foreign policy posture. Going forward, and with an eye on the country’s 2023 presidential election, Turkey will continue to use these tools to reinforce its position in the international arena.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, European Union, Syrian War, and Military
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, Turkey, Middle East, and Syria

28. India’s Fog of Misunderstanding Surrounding Nepal–China Relations

Author:
Vijay Gokhale
Publication Date:
10-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
India’s postindependence ties with Nepal were predicated on the intimate cultural and historical links between the two countries. As India’s first prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, noted, “though Nepal was an independent country, it was very closely allied to India in culture and tradition and we did not look upon it as a foreign country.” New Delhi also regarded China as an “interloper” in Nepal in 1950 who threatened India’s security and interests in the region, ignoring at least a century of Sino-Nepali history centering around Tibet. This paper argues that New Delhi’s close relationship with Nepal, bound in history and culture, and the misperception about China’s relations with Nepal before 1950 have contributed to a skewed understanding of Sino-Nepali relations. The Working Paper looks at the impact that New Delhi’s misperceptions of Sino-Nepali relations, termed the “fog of misunderstanding,” has had in the context of the triangular relations between China, India, and Nepal. The paper is divided into four sections arranged chronologically. The first section looks at the historical Sino-Nepali relationship from the mid-eighteenth to the mid-twentieth centuries. It establishes that this early relationship was centered on Tibet. While the Gorkha kings of Nepal sought to preserve their trade privileges in the region, the Chinese were concerned about the security of their southwestern frontier. Notably though, Beijing’s concern with security does not appear to have extended into any desire to conquer Nepal. This section also touches upon British India’s policy toward Nepal in the nineteenth century, and the subsequent approach that the government of independent India took in the first few years, without an adequate appreciation of Kathmandu’s history with China. As a consequence, India developed a suspicious attitude toward Beijing’s desire to re-establish ties with Kathmandu after the Chinese Civil War, and shaped its policy toward Nepal with this factor in mind. The second section delves into Indian and Chinese policies toward Nepal in the period from 1955 until the end of the monarchy in 2008. It showcases how, during this long period, the three kings of Nepal sought to leverage their ties with China in order to maintain some semblance of balance and how China, in turn, followed a limited but strategic approach that was centered on the kings. The fog of misunderstanding continued to shroud India’s attitude to Nepal-China relations during this period and, consequently, India’s Nepal policy lacked a working template to manage relations with a smaller neighbor sandwiched between India and China in a way that would preserve New Delhi’s influence in a positive way. In contrast to China’s political approach, New Delhi fluctuated between the monarchy and an assortment of democratic political parties, suggestive of a provincial approach in New Delhi’s dealing with Kathmandu. As a result, China’s approach ensured that its main objective in Nepal, namely the security of its southwestern frontier, was secured with a relatively low-risk and low-cost strategy. The third section deals with the aftermath of the fall of the Nepali monarchy, 2008 to 2016. During this important period, New Delhi had a fresh opportunity to reset ties by providing the support to democratic forces in Nepal, that could have resulted in a transformation of the Indo-Nepali ties. However, India appeared to hew to its traditional policy. China, on the other hand, quickly built new ties with the post-monarchical dispensation. India’s perceived actions as a result of the adoption of the new constitution of Nepal plunged Indo-Nepali ties to a nadir. It seems to have pushed Kathmandu to strengthen its relationship with China. This section of the paper also outlines the changing nature of China’s policy and objectives in Nepal, especially in the second decade of the twenty-first century, and its possible implications on the future course of the triangular relationship, as well as for India-Nepal relations. It postulates that under President Xi Jinping, China’s policy toward Nepal has shifted from protecting its periphery to a broader goal of bringing Nepal under its strategic control. This section highlights the political and economic levers that Beijing is using to build a preeminent position in Nepal. The paper concludes with an assessment of options available to all three countries going forward, and India’s options in Nepal in the face of China’s new policy in the region. It suggests that a decisive reset in policy toward Nepal is required to restore healthy relations that are based on mutual respect and mutual sensitivity. New Delhi may need to re-orient its thinking toward Nepal in the context of triangular relations, including on the boundary issue and the 1950 Treaty of Peace and Friendship that have been long-standing irritants in the India-Nepal relationship. Nepal, for its part, should also reflect carefully on whether its leveraging of China might become counterproductive in the light of changing strategic balance in its vicinity, and the implications of giving up the policy of balance for one that tilts decisively toward Beijing. The paper concludes that there is sufficient scope and opportunity for course correction by India, and that through sustained efforts India may be able to preserve its influence and security in Nepal and counter China’s expanding footprint.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:
China, South Asia, India, Asia, and Nepal

29. China’s Influence in South Asia: Vulnerabilities and Resilience in Four Countries

Author:
Deep Pal
Publication Date:
10-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
China’s economic and political footprint has expanded so quickly that many countries, even those with relatively strong state and civil society institutions, have struggled to grapple with the implications. There has been growing attention to this issue in the United States and the advanced industrial democracies of Japan and Western Europe. But “vulnerable” countries—those where the gap is greatest between the scope and intensity of Chinese activism, on the one hand, and, on the other, local capacity to manage and mitigate political and economic risks—face special challenges. In these countries, the tools and tactics of China’s activism and influence activities remain poorly understood among local experts and elites. Both within and beyond these countries, meanwhile, policy too often transposes Western solutions and is not well adapted to local realities. This is especially notable in two strategic regions: Southeastern, Central, and Eastern Europe; and South Asia. China’s economic and political profile has expanded unusually quickly in these two regions, but many countries lack a deep bench of local experts who can match analysis of the domestic implications of Chinese activism to policy recommendations that reflect domestic political and economic ground truth. To address this gap, the Carnegie Endowment initiated a global project to better understand Chinese activities in eight “pivot” countries in these two strategic regions. The project’s first objective was to enhance local awareness of the scope and nature of Chinese activism in states with (1) weak state institutions, (2) fragile civil societies, or (3) countries where “elite capture” is a feature of the political landscape. Second, the project aimed to strengthen capacity by facilitating a sharing of experiences and best practices across national boundaries. Third, the project sought to develop policy prescriptions for the governments of these countries, as well as the United States and its strategic partners, to mitigate and respond to activities inimical to political independence or well-balanced economic growth and development. To establish a comprehensive picture of China’s activities and their impact, this project dug deeply into Chinese activism in four case countries in each region—eight countries in total. We began by holding workshops, so that influencers across countries could share experiences and compare notes. Invited participants included policymakers, experts, journalists, and others—all with deep local knowledge, steeped in their countries’ politics, economies, and civil societies. In Europe, the four countries were Georgia, Greece, Hungary, and Romania, and in South Asia, Bangladesh, Maldives, Nepal, and Sri Lanka. Cross-national discussions among these regional participants aimed to raise awareness, discuss the implications of China’s growing activism in their countries, and compare notes on the diverse ways in which these various countries had managed the rapid influx of Chinese capital, programs, people, technology, and other sources of influence.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, Development, Economy, Engagement, Regionalism, and Resilience
Political Geography:
Bangladesh, China, South Asia, Sri Lanka, Nepal, and Maldives

30. China’s Influence in Southeastern, Central, and Eastern Europe: Vulnerabilities and Resilience in Four Countries

Author:
Erik Brattberg, Philippe Le Corre, Paul Stronski, and Thomas de Waal
Publication Date:
10-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
China’s presence has brought socioeconomic opportunities to Georgia, Greece, Hungary, and Romania. Yet it has exacerbated governance shortfalls, undermined elements of political and economic stability, and complicated the European Union’s ability to reach consensus on key issues.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Governance, European Union, Political stability, Resilience, and Economic Stability
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Greece, Romania, Hungary, Georgia, and United States of America

31. South Korea Beyond Northeast Asia: How Seoul Is Deepening Ties With India and ASEAN

Author:
Kathryn Botto
Publication Date:
10-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Under South Korean President Moon Jae-in and his administration, Seoul has undertaken its first unified diplomatic initiative aimed at advancing ties with India and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). This initiative is known as the New Southern Policy (NSP). Though Moon’s efforts toward securing inter-Korean peace have received the most publicity, the NSP has arguably sustained more momentum than any of the administration’s other flagship foreign policy initiatives. Looking beyond South Korea’s relationships in Northeast Asia, it is also important to assess the NSP’s progress toward its goal to “elevate [South] Korea’s relations with ASEAN member states and India in the political, economic, social and cultural spheres, among others, to the same level [South] Korea maintains with the four major powers (the United States, China, Japan and Russia).”1 The NSP is an extension of South Korea’s need to diversify its economic and strategic relationships amid the uncertainty posed by competition between its closest ally, the United States, and largest trading partner, China. By elevating ties with India and Southeast Asia, particularly in the economic realm, Seoul hopes to insulate itself from the risks posed by trade and strategic friction between the two great powers. Moreover, it hopes to advance its middle power diplomacy and improve ties with India and Southeast Asia commensurate with their growing economic and strategic importance. Though India and ASEAN countries have strong ties to South Korea and share many of the same values and interests, they have not featured as prominently in Seoul’s diplomacy as major powers around the peninsula in the past. While it has clear logic behind it, the NSP’s implementation and outcomes so far are mixed. Of the policy’s three pillars—prosperity (economic cooperation), people (sociocultural cooperation), and peace (political and strategic cooperation)—the prosperity pillar has received the most emphasis. Under this pillar, South Korea has initiated new negotiations for free trade agreements and launched an official development assistance (ODA) strategy aimed at six NSP partner countries. However, cooperation with India has often lagged while cooperation with Vietnam has outpaced attention to most other ASEAN member states. The peace pillar, by contrast, has been relatively underdeveloped and focused mainly on nontraditional security issues while avoiding sensitive strategic issues confronting the region. This pillar showcases how South Korea’s concerns about Chinese influence both motivate and constrain the policy—though Seoul wants to diversify its economic portfolio and strategic partnerships to mitigate its reliance on China, it also must tread carefully to avoid retaliation from Beijing. Even so, while ASEAN, India, and South Korea share common interests on freedom of navigation in the South China Sea, stability in the Taiwan Strait, and denuclearization by North Korea, South Korea’s main security concerns revolve around Northeast Asia, while those of India and ASEAN do not. Seoul’s hierarchy of priorities in the security realm will continue to differ from that of its NSP partners, posing another obstacle to security cooperation. That said, the policy has made progress in strengthening South Korea’s diplomatic infrastructure and institutional apparatus to devote more attention to NSP partner countries, even in just four short years and after being disrupted by a global pandemic. Considering this short period, many of NSP’s projects will take time to show results. Even so, the broad and far-reaching policy has sometimes struggled to define its goals or unify its wide range of elements under a clear strategy. It would benefit from a more well-branded approach to India and Southeast Asia that highlights core projects under each pillar.2 To that end, the Moon administration should strive to evaluate the outcomes of the NSP in its final year in office. Although it is typically difficult to maintain continuity in foreign policy due to South Korean presidents’ limit to one five-year term, the geopolitical and economic imperatives driving the NSP will remain under a new administration in 2022. Given the staying power of these drivers and the continuously growing importance of India and Southeast Asia, South Korea’s next president will have every reason to keep emphasizing these regional partnerships as well.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Regional Integration, and ASEAN
Political Geography:
India, Asia, and South Korea

32. Navigating the Democracy-Security Dilemma in U.S. Foreign Policy: Lessons from Egypt, India, and Turkey

Author:
Thomas Carothers and Benjamin Press
Publication Date:
11-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
As President Joe Biden and his team seek to put the defense of democracy and protection of human rights at the center of U.S. foreign policy, they confront the stubborn fact that the United States maintains cooperative security relations with a wide range of undemocratic or democratically backsliding governments. Powerful security interests, especially countering terrorist threats, maintaining stability in the Middle East, and managing competition with a rising China, underlie many of these partnerships. Such situations frequently give rise to a policy dilemma: confronting partner governments over their political shortcomings risks triggering hostility that would jeopardize the security benefits that such governments provide to Washington. Yet giving them a free pass on democracy and rights issues undercuts the credibility of U.S. appeals to values, bolstering the damaging perception that America only pushes for democracy against its adversaries or in strategically irrelevant countries. Already in the first year of Biden’s presidency, such tensions have emerged in relations with countries as diverse as Egypt, Hungary, India, the Philippines, Poland, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey. While the Biden administration has publicly and privately raised democracy and rights issues with various security partners, its cautious approach toward some of them has started to attract criticism from those who feel that near-term security interests have been too strongly prioritized compared to democracy and human rights concerns. This paper looks in depth at the democracy-security dilemma with a view to helping U.S. policymakers deal with it more systematically and effectively. Case studies of U.S. policy toward Egypt, India, and Turkey over the past twenty years highlight the complexity of the democracy-security dilemma. In Egypt, U.S. concerns with the country’s authoritarian politics have surfaced periodically over the years yet struggled to find a meaningful place in a relationship dominated by deeply rooted security cooperation, including extensive U.S. security assistance. In India, a strong U.S. push, warmly welcomed by Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s government, to further strengthen the U.S. -Indian security partnership has unfolded alongside a distinctly illiberal turn in Indian politics. By contrast, democratic decline in Turkey has coincided with—and contributed to—a major deterioration in Ankara’s relations with Washington, including significant divergence on a range of foreign policy issues.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, and Democracy
Political Geography:
Turkey, India, Egypt, and United States of America

33. The Humility of Restraint: Niebuhr’s Insights for a More Grounded Twenty-First-Century American Foreign Policy

Author:
Christopher S. Chivvis
Publication Date:
11-2021
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
The habits of primacy and exceptionalism that history has bestowed on today’s U.S. foreign policy elites are unlikely to serve the nation well in a more competitive twenty-first-century international environment. Fresh perspectives on America’s role in the world are needed. One such perspective can be found in the work of Reinhold Niebuhr, whose searching books and articles from the 1920s to the 1960s drew attention to the unintended consequences of U.S. power in the world, pointed out Americans’ naïveté, and called for greater restraint and humility in U.S. foreign policy. His intellectual corpus deals widely with the perennial issues of U.S. foreign policy, such as nationalism, the self-interest of states, empires, violence, technology, and the problem of peaceful change. He was a realist who diverged from other, especially later realists, in his skepticism about rationalism and his rejection of the nationalist realpolitik of the right and the left alike. He was an anti-Communist who nonetheless urged U.S. policymakers to proceed cautiously in its Cold War struggle with the Soviet Union. Most of all, his critique of American exceptionalism stands as the classic argument for greater humility in U.S. foreign policy. It is a reminder that, however important the country’s role in the world may be, it is too often undergirded by an idealistic naïveté that looks duplicitous to other societies and can undermine durable U.S. leadership. Niebuhr’s insights seem well-suited for the challenges facing U.S. statecraft today. His mix of realism, humility, and sensitivity to the broader moral framework in which the United States operates offer essential ingredients for a clear-eyed, healthy U.S. foreign policy. His warnings against the excesses of anti-Communist ideological competition during the Cold War seem increasingly relevant given growing tensions between the United States and China. The exceptionalism and national chauvinism that Niebuhr diagnosed in the 1950s is no less pervasive in the U.S. foreign policy establishment today, and this diagnosis seems especially important in light of Washington’s recent struggle to reckon with its failures in Iraq and Afghanistan and to manage its global alliances. Niebuhr’s insights speak volumes to the present historical moment the United States finds itself in—characterized by resumed domestic fractures, seemingly intractable international problems, and a role in the world that is again in flux.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Cold War, Exceptionalism, and Reinhold Niebuhr
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

34. Russia at the United Nations: Law, Sovereignty, and Legitimacy

Author:
Philip Remler
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
The central task for Russian foreign policy in the era of President Vladimir Putin has been to regain the undisputed recognition that Russia is a world power like the Soviet Union before it, a status to which Russia feels entitled.1 The United Nations (UN) is Russia’s most important venue for putting its global aspirations and achievements on display. Russia’s status as a permanent member of the UN Security Council boosts its claim to be part of a global oligarchy and grants it the power to veto or undermine initiatives that it deems contrary to its interests. The concepts underlying Russia’s use of the UN to promote its aspirations form the subject of this paper. Russia, like the Soviet Union before it, devotes great resources to its missions at the UN, especially New York and Geneva. It traditionally cultivates extensive expertise among its mission members, appointing them to UN postings several times over their careers and leaving them in place for long periods. Russian diplomats are noted for their abilities in drafting highly technical UN documents in English—none more so than Sergey Lavrov, currently Russia’s foreign minister and formerly its permanent representative to the UN from 1994 to 2004.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Sovereignty, Power Politics, Law, Geopolitics, and Legitimacy
Political Geography:
Russia and United Nations

35. With Friends Like These: The Kremlin’s Far-Right and Populist Connections in Italy and Austria

Author:
Andrew Weiss
Publication Date:
02-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
A blend of new threats and opportunities is causing Moscow to take greater risks and embrace more flamboyant policies in Europe. The Kremlin’s relationships with Italy and Austria shine a spotlight on how Europe’s domestic troubles have opened many doors for Moscow.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Politics, Populism, and Far Right
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Italy, and Austria

36. There Goes the Neighborhood: The Limits of Russian Integration in Eurasia

Author:
Paul Stronski
Publication Date:
09-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Eurasia is squeezed between a rising China and an aggressive and unpredictable Russia. The United States should remain engaged with the region to help it resist Russian advances. Since 2014, Russia has redoubled its efforts to build a sphere of influence, operating frequently under the flag of Eurasian integration. Its undeclared war in Ukraine and hardball tactics vis-à-vis other neighbors demonstrate the lengths to which it is willing to go to undermine their independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity. Moscow has pushed hard to expand the membership and functions of the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), the formal vehicle for cross-regional integration of political and economic activity. However, Russia’s limited economic resources and lack of soft-power appeal; the engagement with the region by other outside powers, including the European Union, China, Turkey, and the United States; and societal change in neighboring states are creating significant long-term obstacles to the success of Russian neo-imperialist ambitions and exposing a large gap between its ends and means. Russia’s ambitions in Eurasia are buffeted by unfavorable trends that are frequently overlooked by analysts and policymakers. Russia’s own heavy-handed behavior contributes to both regional upheaval and instability as well as to the creation of diplomatic headwinds that constrain its own room for maneuver.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Geopolitics, and Regional Integration
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, North America, and United States of America

37. Russia’s Stony Path in the South Caucasus

Author:
Philip Remler
Publication Date:
10-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
As the battle between Armenia and Azerbaijan heats up, Russia struggles to contend with a vastly more complicated landscape in the South Caucasus. Since shortly after the Soviet Union’s collapse, Russia’s aims and policies in the South Caucasus have been constant, but its capabilities to project power and influence have fluctuated. Russia’s engagement with the entire Caucasus region is best characterized as a tide. Its power and influence began to ebb at the start of the Karabakh conflict—with the February 1988 massacre of Armenians in the Azerbaijani city of Sumqayit being the key galvanizing event.2 After that, the tide receded rapidly, leaving even Russian possessions in the North Caucasus without effective central control. The First Chechen War marked low tide, which only began to rise with the Second Chechen War, beginning in 1999. Until about 2004, Russia was too weak and internally divided to project power and influence in the wider Caucasus region in a meaningful way. To be sure, Russian influence was never gone completely, even during the lowest ebb of the tide. Russia still marshaled greater resources than the new states of the Caucasus could muster, and it threw its weight around. But in the 1990s, Russia did not have a unified governing apparatus, but rather a mass of competing clans among which regional actors could maneuver. For example, after the Soviet collapse, Moscow left the Russian military units in the Caucasus to their own devices. Those units served as mercenaries, arms suppliers, and logistics providers to both sides in the Karabakh conflict. It took a decade for Moscow to reassert its so-called power vertical in the Caucasus, symbolized by President Vladimir Putin’s success in 2004 in finally ousting chief of the general staff Anatoliy Kvashnin.3 Russia’s assertiveness in the region grew steadily thereafter, with sharp upticks after the 2008 war with Georgia and Putin’s return to the presidency in 2012.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, History, Territorial Disputes, Conflict, Elites, and Soviet Union
Political Geography:
Russia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and South Caucasus

38. A Feminist Foreign Policy to Deal with Iran? Assessing the EU’s Options

Author:
Cornelius Adebahr and Barbara Mittelhammer
Publication Date:
11-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Applying a feminist approach enables a comprehensive, inclusive, and human-centered EU policy toward Iran that reflects international power structures and focuses on all groups of people. Disputed nuclear activities, regional proxy wars, and a regime built on discrimination against women and other marginalized groups: Iran hardly seems like a policy field that would be amenable to a feminist approach. Yet this is precisely what the European Union (EU) needs today: fresh thinking to help develop a new strategy toward Iran. Feminist foreign policy critically reflects international power structures, focuses on the needs of all groups of people, and puts human security and human rights at the center of the discussion. Applying a feminist lens to the EU policy toward Iran and the Persian Gulf region can improve foreign policy thinking and practice.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, European Union, and Feminism
Political Geography:
Europe, Iran, and Middle East

39. U.S.-Russian Relations in 2030

Author:
Richard Sokolsky and Eugene Rumer
Publication Date:
06-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
U.S.-Russia relations will remain frosty for years, but even Cold Wars eventually thaw. The United States should prepare now to act decisively when this one finally does, even if it takes a decade. U.S.-Russian relations are at the lowest point since the Cold War. Almost all high-level dialogue between the two countries has been suspended. There are no signs that the relationship will improve in the near future. However, this situation is unlikely to last forever—even during the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union maintained a limited but meaningful dialogue; the two countries eventually will reengage, even if mostly to disagree, and new U.S. and Russian leaders could pursue less confrontational policies. What is the agenda that they will need to tackle then—perhaps as far in the future as 2030?
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, North America, and United States of America

40. Russia in the Asia-Pacific: Less Than Meets the Eye

Author:
Eugene Rumer, Richard Sokolsky, and Aleksandar Vladicic
Publication Date:
09-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Russian foreign policy remains focused primarily on Europe. That said, Moscow’s diplomatic foray into Asia hinges on its burgeoning strategic partnership with China. Much has been written about Russia’s so-called pivot to the Asia-Pacific since its 2014 invasion of Ukraine and break with the West, but there is less to this supposed strategic shift than meets the eye. The country is and will remain a European—rather than an Asian—power by virtue of its history, strategic culture, demographics, and principal economic relationships.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Demographics, Diplomacy, History, Partnerships, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, and Asia-Pacific

41. Etched in Stone: Russian Strategic Culture and the Future of Transatlantic Security

Author:
Eugene Rumer and Richard Sokolsky
Publication Date:
09-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Russia will remain a formidable adversary for the United States, yet they have a shared interest in avoiding outright war. Time and patience will be needed to rebuild the relationship. Russian strategic culture is a product of several key factors: a long history of wars and adversarial relations with other European powers; an open geographic landscape that puts a premium on strategic depth; and an elite given to embracing a narrative of implacable Western hostility toward Russia. Historically, Europe has been by far the most important geographic theater for Russia, and it remains so to the present day. The national narrative of Vladimir Putin’s Russia emphasizes the legacy of World War II in Europe and the critical role Russia played in the defeat of Germany. Both support the Kremlin’s claim to special rights in the affairs of the continent.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Culture, and Transatlantic Relations
Political Geography:
Russia and Europe

42. Russia in the Middle East: Jack of All Trades, Master of None

Author:
Eugene Rumer
Publication Date:
10-2019
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
The 2015 Russian military intervention in Syria was a pivotal moment for Moscow’s Middle East policy. Largely absent from the Middle East for the better part of the previous two decades, Russia intervened to save Bashar al-Assad’s regime and reasserted itself as a major player in the region’s power politics. Moscow’s bold use of military power positioned it as an important actor in the Middle East. The intervention took place against the backdrop of a United States pulling back from the Middle East and growing uncertainty about its future role there. The geopolitical realignment and instability caused by the civil wars in Libya and Syria and the rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia have opened opportunities for Russia to rebuild some of the old relationships and to build new ones. The most dramatic turnaround in relations in recent years has occurred between Russia and Israel. The new quality of the relationship owes a great deal to the personal diplomacy between Russian President Vladimir Putin and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, but Russia’s emergence as a major presence in Syria has meant that the Israelis now have no choice but to maintain good relations with their new “neighbor.” Some Israeli officials hope that Moscow will help them deal with the biggest threat they face from Syria—Iran and its client Hezbollah. So far, Russia has delivered some, but far from all that Israel wants from it, and there are precious few signs that Russia intends to break with Iran, its partner and key ally in Syria. Russian-Iranian relations have undergone an unusual transformation as a result of the Russian intervention in the Syrian civil war. Their joint victory is likely to lead to a divergence of their interests. Russia is interested in returning Syria to the status quo ante and reaping the benefits of peace and reconstruction. Iran is interested in exploiting Syria as a platform in its campaign against Israel. Russia lacks the military muscle and the diplomatic leverage to influence Iran. That poses a big obstacle to Moscow’s ambitions in the Middle East.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Military Strategy, Geopolitics, and Military Intervention
Political Geography:
Russia, Iran, Middle East, Syria, and United States of America

43. Tehran Calling: Understanding a New Iranian Leadership

Author:
Cornelius Adebahr
Publication Date:
01-2014
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
After years of tension, sanctions, and deadlocked negotiations, Hassan Rouhani, Iran's relatively moderate new president, has provided an opening for improved relations between the Islamic Republic and the West. While Rouhani has not ushered in a new Iran, Tehran has adopted a more conciliatory tone on its nuclear program since he took office. This shift is more than just talk, but the West will have to carefully calibrate its response to determine whether Rouhani's changed rhetoric signals the beginning of a new direction for Iran.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Islam, and Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:
United States, Iran, and Middle East

44. The India-Australia Strategic Relationship: Defining Realistic Expectations

Author:
Frédéric Grare
Publication Date:
03-2014
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Mutual indifference has long characterized relations between India and Australia, but the two countries' interests are increasingly converging. In particular, New Delhi and Canberra are both wary of China's growing assertiveness in the Asia-Pacific region. Yet there are several constraints hindering the development of a strong India-Australia partnership, and both countries need to be realistic about the prospects for a closer strategic relationship.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:
China, Asia, New Delhi, Australia, and Canberra

45. Time to Reset the European Neighborhood Policy

Author:
Stefan Lehne
Publication Date:
02-2014
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Through its European Neighborhood Policy (ENP), the European Union (EU) aims to support the structural transformation of its Eastern and Southern neighbors, promoting democracy, the rule of law, and successful market economies. Ten years after the ENP's launch, it is clear that the policy is not working. Adjusting the ENP to the changing reality on the ground, sharpening its tools, and rebuilding its credibility should be a top priority for the EU's foreign policy leadership.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Democratization, Economics, International Trade and Finance, and Markets
Political Geography:
Europe

46. A Window of Opportunity to Upgrade EU Foreign Policy

Author:
Stefan Lehne
Publication Date:
05-2014
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
As the financial crisis recedes and the European Union (EU) regains a measure of internal stability, pressure in Europe\'s neighborhood is on the rise. The Ukraine crisis and turmoil in the Middle East and North Africa have elevated foreign policy to the top of the EU\'s agenda. Whether the EU can make its external action more effective will depend in large part on institutional decisions made in 2014—the selection of a new leadership team and the reorganization of the European Commission.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Economics, Human Rights, and Regional Cooperation
Political Geography:
Europe, Ukraine, Middle East, and North Africa

47. Qatar and the Arab Spring: Policy Drivers and Regional Implications

Author:
Kristian Coates Ulrichsen
Publication Date:
09-2014
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
During the Arab Spring, Qatar moved away from its traditional foreign policy role as diplomatic mediator to embrace change in the Middle East and North Africa and support transitioning states. Regional actors viewed Qatar's approach as overreaching, and skepticism of Doha's policy motivations increased. Qatar's new leadership, which came to power in June 2013, is adapting by reverting to a more pragmatic foreign policy and addressing the fallout from its support for Islamist movements in the region.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Democratization, and Diplomacy
Political Geography:
Middle East, Arabia, and Qatar

48. Balancing Without Containment: An American Strategy for Managing China

Author:
Ashley J. Tellis
Publication Date:
01-2014
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
China is poised to become a major strategic rival to the United States. Whether or not Beijing intends to challenge Washington's primacy, its economic boom and growing national ambitions make competition inevitable. And as China rises, American power will diminish in relative terms, threatening the foundations of the U.S.-backed global order that has engendered unprecedented prosperity worldwide. To avoid this costly outcome, Washington needs a novel strategy to balance China without containing it.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Economics, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
United States, China, America, Washington, and Asia

49. Why Defense Matters: A New Narrative for NATO

Author:
Judy Dempsey
Publication Date:
06-2014
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is in search of a new narrative. While Russia's involvement in Eastern Ukraine and its annexation of Crimea will not give NATO a new sense of solidarity, these events have highlighted what the alliance and its members must urgently do. It is time for all NATO countries to engage in a real strategic debate about why defense matters and what members should do to uphold the transatlantic relationship.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, NATO, Diplomacy, Territorial Disputes, and Reform
Political Geography:
Russia, North Atlantic, and Ukraine

50. Qatar and the Recalibration of Power in the Gulf

Author:
Lina Khatib
Publication Date:
09-2014
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Long a minor regional actor in the shadow of Saudi Arabia, Qatar wants to increase its influence. But Doha's expansionist foreign policy has been plagued by miscalculations, domestic challenges, and international pressure—all issues connected to Doha's relationship with Riyadh. As a result of these setbacks, Qatar's regional role has diminished, and for the foreseeable future, its external influence is likely to remain under the direction of Saudi Arabia.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Islam, and Power Politics
Political Geography:
Middle East, Arabia, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar

51. Merkel's Unfinished Business: Why Germany Needs to Act Strategically

Author:
Judy Dempsey
Publication Date:
09-2013
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
German Chancellor Angela Merkel will soon face parliamentary elections. On her eight-year watch, her governing coalition has failed to develop foreign policy, security, and defense strategies. This weakens Europe's ability to think and act strategically and limits the European Union's (EU's) influence in its immediate neighborhood and beyond. There is much unfinished business that the next chancellor, be it Merkel or someone else, will have to manage.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, and Political Economy
Political Geography:
Europe and Germany

52. Russia and the Arab Spring

Author:
Alexey Malashenko
Publication Date:
10-2013
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Russia has spent over a decade trying to recapture the influence the Soviet Union once enjoyed in the Middle East, but President Vladimir Putin's attempts to position Moscow as a key regional player have come up short. With revolutions across the Arab world overturning old orders and ushering in Islamist governments, Russia's chances for strengthening its position in the region look increasingly slim. The Kremlin must change course and ensure that its approach to the Middle East and Islamists reflects post–Arab Spring realities.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Islam, Post Colonialism, and Regime Change
Political Geography:
Russia, Middle East, Soviet Union, and Arabia

53. A More Pluralist Approach to European Democracy Support

Author:
Richard Youngs and Kateryna Pishchikova
Publication Date:
10-2013
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
European support for democracy is at a crucial juncture. Just as the eurozone crisis complicates the European Union's (EU's) efforts to support democratic reform around the world, new forms of political transition are confounding the EU's traditional approach to democracy building. The EU must embrace a wider variety of tactics, models, actors, and strategies, or it risks losing credibility and traction in the field of democracy support.
Topic:
Foreign Policy and Democratization
Political Geography:
Europe

54. Opportunities Unbound: Sustaining the Transformation in U.S.-Indian Relations

Author:
Ashley J. Tellis
Publication Date:
01-2013
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
The evolving U.S.-Indian strategic partnership holds great potential for both countries. India's economic growth and its ties to the United States can assist its global rise, which contributes to keeping the peace in Asia, provided New Delhi and Washington sustain concerted cooperation. And India's emerging markets promise to be the key instrument for enlarging India's power while remaining a rich opportunity for U.S. businesses.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:
United States, Washington, India, Asia, and New Delhi

55. Crux of Asia: China, India, and the Emerging Global Order

Author:
Ashley J. Tellis and Sean Mirski
Publication Date:
01-2013
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
The rise of China and India as major world powers promises to test the established global order in the coming decades. As the two powers grow, they are bound to change the current international system—with profound implications for themselves, the United States, and the world. And whether they agree on the changes to be made, especially when it comes to their relationship with the West, will influence the system's future character. A close examination of Chinese and Indian perspectives on the fundamentals of the emerging international order reveals that Sino-Indian differences on many issues of both bilateral and global significance are stark.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Military Strategy, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:
Japan, China, India, Taiwan, Asia, South Korea, and Singapore

56. U.S.-China Security Perceptions Survey: Findings and Implications

Author:
Michael D. Swaine, Rachel Esplin Odell, Luo Yuan, and Liu Xiangdong
Publication Date:
12-2013
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Public and elite attitudes in the United States and especially China are exerting a growing influence on the bilateral security relationship. The U.S.-China Security Perceptions Project analyzes the content of these attitudes through original surveys and workshops conducted in both countries. The project's findings have implications for policymakers seeking to reduce the likelihood of future bilateral conflicts.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:
United States, China, and Asia

57. Democracy Policy Under Obama: Revitalization or Retreat?

Author:
Thomas Carothers
Publication Date:
01-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Upon taking office in January 2009, President Barack Obama inherited a democracy promotion policy badly damaged from its prior association with the war in Iraq and with forcible regime change more generally. The Bush years had also seen a decline in America's reputation as a global symbol of democracy and human rights as well as rising fears of a broader democratic recession in the world.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Human Rights, and Reform
Political Geography:
Iraq and America

58. True Partners? How Russia and China See Each Other

Author:
Dmitri V. Trenin
Publication Date:
02-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
This report compares Russian and Chinese security perceptions and explains how they shape the two countries' policies towards each other. It argues that the modern relationship between the two countries, formed in the late 19th and 20th centuries, was turned on its head at the start of the 21st century. China has now become a powerful factor affecting a whole range of Russian policies, both domestic and foreign. The paper also argues that, while Russia is not central to China's foreign relations, and non-existent in China's domestic politics, good relations with Moscow are an important supporting element in Beijing's overall strategy of reclaiming China's 'rightful place in the world'. It concludes that while both countries need each other and would benefit from a stable political relationship and close economic ties, both Moscow and Beijing lack the long-term strategies to create such a bond.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:
Russia, China, and Asia

59. Nonalignment Redux: The Perils of Old Wine in New Skins

Author:
Ashley J. Tellis
Publication Date:
07-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Since the Cold War ended, India has been persistently criticized for lacking a grand strategy. Like many other complaints about India, this one, too, is curious because the country has been nothing if not the exemplar of excessive planning for much of its modern history. In fact, ever since India was incarnated as an independent state in 1947, it has always had a clear and arguably defensible grand strategy—even if it lacked a summary document that articulated its national aims.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Cold War, Development, and Post Colonialism
Political Geography:
South Asia

60. The Big Three in EU Foreign Policy

Author:
Stefan Lehne
Publication Date:
07-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
To an outside observer, Europe acts as a bloc with all 27 member states discussing issues and unanimously making decisions on foreign policy. But behind the scenes lies a tacit agreement that the largest member states with the most resources take the lead. Three of those states are in a category of their own: France, Germany, and the United Kingdom.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, and Regional Cooperation
Political Geography:
United Kingdom, Europe, and Germany

61. Waiting for the Taliban in Afghanistan

Author:
Gilles Dorronsoro
Publication Date:
09-2012
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
The withdrawal of international forces from Afghanistan will leave the country worse than it was before 2001 in some respects. There is no clear plan for the future. Washington will progressively lose its influence over Kabul, and drone operations in Pakistan are not a credible way to fight jihadist groups on the Afghanistan-Pakistan border. The situation will only worsen after 2014, when most U.S. troops are out of the country and aid going to the Afghan government steeply declines.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Islam, Terrorism, War, and Insurgency
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Afghanistan, United States, Washington, and Asia

62. China and the U.S. Nuclear Posture Review

Author:
Lora Saalman
Publication Date:
02-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
China is increasingly factored into U.S. nuclear strategy. When President Obama released the administration's Nuclear Posture Review (NPR)—a document that guides America's nuclear policy, strategy, capabilities, and force posture for the next five to ten years—in April 2010, China was named 36 times. By contrast, China was barely mentioned in the last NPR completed in 2002. The United States expressed its desire to enhance strategic stability with China, but there needs to be a better understanding of how China perceives America's nuclear posture.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Diplomacy, and Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:
United States, China, and Israel

63. Afghanistan: The Impossible Transition

Author:
Gilles Dorronsoro
Publication Date:
06-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
A combination of two critical problems threatens to undermine the mission of the United States-led coalition in Afghanistan: the failure of the counterinsurgency strategy and a disconnect between political objectives and military operations. If anything, the current strategy is making a political solution less likely, notably because it is antagonizing Pakistan without containing the rise of the armed opposition. That has put the coalition in a paradoxical situation, in which it is being weakened militarily by a non-negotiated and inevitable withdrawal while at the same time alienating potential negotiating partners.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Foreign Policy, War, and Counterinsurgency
Political Geography:
Afghanistan and United States

64. Low Numbers: A Practical Path to Deep Nuclear Reductions

Author:
James M. Acton
Publication Date:
03-2011
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
U.S. policy seeks to create the conditions that would allow for deep reductions in nuclear arsenals. This report offers a practical approach to reducing the U.S. and Russian stockpiles to 500 nuclear warheads each and those of other nuclear armed states to no more than about half that number. This target would require Washington and Moscow to reduce their arsenals by a factor of ten.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, Washington, and Moscow

65. Millennium Challenge Corporation: Can the Experiment Survive?

Author:
John Hewko
Publication Date:
03-2010
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
The Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) was established in 2004 to provide grants to a select group of developing countries that demonstrate a commitment to good governance by investing in the health and education of their people and adopting sound economic policies. The MCC has performed admirably in the face of a number of challenges and unrealistic expectations, but its future success depends on its ability to address important philosophical and operational issues, and on Congress reforming the mechanisms by which it funds and judges foreign aid programs.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Development, Emerging Markets, and Foreign Aid
Political Geography:
United States

66. Discourse, Meanings and IR Studies: Taking the Rhetoric of "Axis of Evil" As a Case

Author:
Liu Yongtao
Publication Date:
02-2010
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Using “speech act” theory as its starting point, the article ponders the sources of hostility and conflict in global politics, arguing that discourse as a social practice is an increasingly crucial but a more or less neglected source of (in)security culture, postuating that greater attention should be taken to it in international relations studies. The article states that the politics of (in)security, conventionally accepted as “objec Using “speech act” theory as its starting point, the article ponders the sources of hostility and conflict in global politics, arguing that discourse as a social practice is an increasingly crucial but a more or less neglected source of (in) security culture, postuating that greater attention should be taken to it in international relations studies. The article states that the politics of (in)security, conventionally accepted as “objective” and “natural”, are in fact a socially, politically and lexically (re)constructed and (re)interpreted by nation-States. Discourse and meanings, in turn, can help (re)produce the effects of hostility and conflict between Nation-States. This article illustrates the importance of designing a language policy in international relations by taking U.S. president George W. Bush's rhetoric of “axis of evil” as an example and thus revealing the extents of causal links between the improper use of language and the construction of antagonistic tensions between the U.S. and its lexically targeted counter-parts.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, and Communications
Political Geography:
United States

67. A Place in the Sun or Fifteen Minutes of Fame? Understanding Turkey's New Foreign Policy

Author:
Sinan Ülgen
Publication Date:
12-2010
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Turkey's vote against additional UN Security Council sanctions on Iran this year was viewed by many observers as a sign that Turkey is drifting away from the West. In reality, Ankara's relationship with the United States and the EU is much more complicated. Turkey's ambitious foreign policy and growing influence present the West with an opportunity to demand that Turkey play a more constructive role in the international community.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, and Power Politics
Political Geography:
United States, Europe, Iran, Central Asia, and Turkey

68. Russia's Policy in the Middle East: Prospects for Consensus and Conflict with the United States

Author:
Dmitri V. Trenin
Publication Date:
03-2010
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
This report is one in a series commissioned by The Century Foundation to explore issues of interest to American policymakers regarding Russia, aimed at identifying a framework for U.S.-Russian relations and policy options for a new administration and Congress that could help right the two countries' troubled relationship at a crucial juncture. The papers in the series explore significant aspects of U.S.-Russian relations, outlining a broad range of reasons why Russia matters for American foreign policy and framing bilateral and multilateral approaches to Russia for U.S. consideration. A high-level working group, co-chaired by Gary Hart, former U.S. senator from Colorado, and Jack F. Matlock, Jr., former U.S. ambassador to the Soviet Union, has provided direction to the project and offered recommendations for action that the United States might take.
Topic:
International Relations and Foreign Policy
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, America, Middle East, and Asia

69. Is a Regional Strategy Viable in Afghanistan?

Author:
Ashley J. Tellis, Martha Brill Olcott, Dmitri V. Trenin, Frédéric Grare, Jessica Tuchman Mathews, Christopher Boucek, Gilles Dorronsoro, Karim Sadjadpour, Michael D. Swaine, Aroop Mukharji, Haroun Mir, Gautam Mukhopadhaya, and Tiffany Ng
Publication Date:
05-2010
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
The Obama administration has made some decisive changes to the Afghan policy it inherited. Most significantly, in its first year it committed to a 250 percent increase in the American force on the ground (adding 51,000 troops to the 34,000 in Afghanistan when Mr. Obama took office) and lobbied hard to secure increases in non–U.S. coalition forces. It matched this large increase in force with a major reduction in the goal: from raising a democratic state in Afghanistan to the creation of a state strong enough to prevent a takeover by the Taliban, al–Qaeda, or any other radical Islamic group; and to “disrupt, dismantle, and defeat” al–Qaeda (which, of course, is not achievable in Afghanistan or Afghanistan and Pakistan alone). The third pillar of the policy was and is a greater emphasis on the need for a regional approach, a belief the Bush administration moved toward in its closing days.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Religion, Terrorism, and Reform
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Afghanistan, Russia, Iran, and India

70. The Arctic: A View From Moscow

Author:
Dmitri V. Trenin and Pavel K. Baev
Publication Date:
09-2010
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
The Arctic is emerging as the world's next hot spot for oil and gas development. The U.S. Geological Survey has estimated that the Arctic seabed could contain 20 percent of the world's oil and gas resources and Russia's Ministry of Natural Resources says the Arctic territory claimed by Russia could be home to twice the volume of Saudi Arabia's oil reserves. While accessing those reserves once seemed impossible, the melting ice cap now makes it more feasible and opens new shipping lanes for international trade. Countries around the world—particularly Russia—have noticed.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Economics, Bilateral Relations, and Natural Resources
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, Moscow, and Saudi Arabia

71. Iran: A View From Moscow

Author:
Dmitri V. Trenin and Alexey Malashenko
Publication Date:
10-2010
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Iran's emergence as a rising power is straining its relations with Russia. While many outside observers assume the two countries enjoy a close relationship, in reality it is highly complex. Although Iran and Russia have strong economic and military ties, Moscow is increasingly wary of Tehran's growing ambitions.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Bilateral Relations, and Nuclear Power
Political Geography:
Russia, Iran, Tehran, and Moscow

72. Toward Realistic U.S.–India Relations

Author:
George Perkovich
Publication Date:
10-2010
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
As he prepares to visit India in November, President Obama faces criticism that his administration has done too little to enhance U.S.–Indian relations. Pundits of this persuasion in Washington and New Delhi complain that Obama\'s team has tried too hard to cooperate with China in addressing regional and global challenges and has not done enough to bolster India.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Economics, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:
United States, China, Washington, India, Asia, and New Delhi

73. Indispensable Institutions: The Obama-Medvedev Commission and Five Decades of U.S.-Russia Dialogue

Author:
Matthew Rojansky
Publication Date:
11-2010
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Having fallen to a historic low after the 2008 Russia-Georgia war, U.S.-Russia cooperation is again on the rise, thanks to last year's “reset” of the relationship. The U.S.-Russia Bilateral Presidential Commission, launched at the July 2009 Moscow summit, aims to enhance cooperation between the two countries on a broad range of shared interests. Although the Commission appears promising so far, significant challenges lie ahead and the two sides must work closely to monitor both the structure and the substance of this new institution to ensure it continues to produce results.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, and Moscow

74. Afghanistan at the Breaking Point

Author:
Gilles Dorronsoro
Publication Date:
11-2010
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
The current strategy of defeating the Taliban militarily is unrealistic. The coalition is on the defensive across much of Afghanistan and, with current troop levels, can at most only contain the insurgency. On present course, the coalition is swiftly heading toward an impasse.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Military Strategy, and Insurgency
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, United States, and Taliban

75. Stepping Back From Democratic Pessimism

Author:
Thomas Carothers
Publication Date:
02-2009
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Pessimism about the progress of democracy in the developing and postcommunist worlds has risen sharply in recent years. Negative developments in a variety of countries, such as military coups, failed elections, and the emergence of antidemocratic populist leaders, have caused some observers to argue that democracy is in retreat and authoritarianism on the march. A broad look at the state of democracy around the world reveals however that although the condition of democracy is certainly troubled in many places, when viewed relative to where it was at the start of this decade, democracy has not lost ground in the world overall. The former Soviet Union is the one region where democracy has clearly slipped backward in this decade, primarily as a result of Russia's authoritarian slide. The Middle East has also been a source of significant disappointment on democracy but mostly in comparison with unrealistic expectations that were raised by the Bush administration. In most of the rest of the world good news with respect to democratization is found in roughly equal proportion to bad news and considerable continuity has prevailed as well.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Cold War, Communism, Democratization, Development, and Political Economy
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, and Middle East

76. European Conflict Management in the Middle East: Toward a More Effective Approach

Author:
Muriel Asseburg
Publication Date:
02-2009
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Since the Middle East peace conferences in Madrid (1991) and Washington (1991–1993), Europeans have gradually stepped up their political involvement in the Middle East. While Europeans have had strong trade and cultural relations with their neighboring region for decades, they have, in parallel with the Middle East peace process and the development of European Union (EU) foreign policy instruments, moved to assert their political interests more forcefully. These policies have largely been motivated by geographic proximity and geopolitical considerations—chiefly, the fear of security threats emanating from Europe's neighborhood (a spillover of conflict in the form of terrorism, organized crime, migration, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction), Israel's security, and access to energy resources. The implicit assumption has been that these different European interests can best be reconciled in an environment where there is peace between Israel and its neighbors (and therefore no contradiction between good relations between the EU and Israel and good relations between the EU and the wider, resource-rich region) and where the people of the Mediterranean and the Middle East find decent living conditions in their countries. As a consequence, Europeans have first focused their efforts on the realization of a two-state solution to the Israeli–Palestinian confl ict, which they consider to be the core of the region's instability. They have, second, aimed at supporting comprehensive peace between Israel and its neighbors. And they have, third, sought to provide an environment conducive to peace in the region as well as to deflect what were (and still are) perceived as security risks emanating from the region.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Energy Policy, International Cooperation, and Islam
Political Geography:
Europe, Washington, Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and Arabia

77. "Fixing Broken Windows": Security Sector Reform in Palestine, Lebanon, and Yemen

Author:
Yezid Sayigh
Publication Date:
10-2009
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
As they emerge from conflict, states can rarely commence the arduous task of reconstruction and consolidate their governments until they undertake extensive restructuring of their security forces. Palestine, Lebanon, and Yemen are all fractured, quasi-democratic states with divided societies, and deep disagreement over what constitutes the national interest. Successful reform in each will require security institutions that answer to democratically-elected civilian leaders, but the U.S. and European approach has thus far focused largely on providing military training and equipment, targeted toward counterterrorist capabilities.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Democratization, and Counterinsurgency
Political Geography:
United States, Middle East, Yemen, Arabia, and Lebanon

78. Iran, the United States, and the Gulf: The Elusive Regional Policy

Author:
Marina Ottaway
Publication Date:
11-2009
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Any effective diplomatic approach to Iran must involve a regional strategy. While Iran's nuclear program is presently the most urgent dimension for the United States and the international community to confront, unless the country can be reintegrated into a normal web of international relations, any progress made on that front is likely to be short-lived. Iran's neighbors — particularly the members of the Gulf Cooperation Council, which share a concern for Gulf security — can be important players in that process of reintegration. These six states, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Oman, are afraid of Iranian hegemony in the Gulf, but are too small or too timid to challenge their northern neighbor, so they seek to develop normal relations with Tehran while protecting their interests.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:
United States, Iran, Kuwait, Tehran, Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, and Oman

79. Preventing Conflict Over Kurdistan

Author:
Henri J. Barkey
Publication Date:
02-2009
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
The consequences of the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq will doubtless be debated for years to come. One result, however, is already clear: the long suppressed nationalist aspirations of the Kurdish people now dispersed across four states—Iraq, Turkey, Iran, and Syria—have been aroused, perhaps irrevocably, by the war. Already in Iraq, Kurdish regions, which have benefited from Saddam Hussein's overthrow, have consolidated themselves into a federal region. The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) is a reality and a force for further Kurdish empowerment as it seeks to incorporate other Kurdish-majority areas and the oil-rich Kirkuk province in particular into its domain. The KRG's existence and demands have already alarmed all of Iraq's neighbors and the Baghdad government. The issues are far from being settled. If ignored or badly handled, Kurdish aspirations have the potential to cause considerable instability and violence in Iraq and beyond at a particularly delicate time.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Nationalism, and Armed Struggle
Political Geography:
Iraq, Turkey, Middle East, and Kurdistan

80. Reforming the Intelligence Agencies in Pakistan's Transitional Democracy

Author:
Frédéric Grare
Publication Date:
03-2009
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
The purpose of the present report is to analyze the intelligence agencies' role in Pakistan's political life through a better understanding of the agencies' objectives and mechanisms. Because Pakistan's civilian governments have been victims of the agencies' manipulation in the past, the new and very fragile government cannot ignore the decisive role of the intelligence agencies in Pakistani politics if it wants to counter the direct and more subtle manifestations of military control. The domestic political role of intelligence agencies is always a combination of three elements: militarization, comprehensive political surveillance, and state terror. The intensity and relative importance of each component varies over time and according to the specific situations in each country, but all three are always present. Terror as it applies to individuals or groups can be carried out by proxies and is intermittent, but it remains an essential element of the system. An intelligence agency's reputation for ruthlessness is often as important as its actual efficiency.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Human Rights, Terrorism, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
Pakistan and South Asia

81. Reconciling With the Taliban?: Toward an Alternative Grand Strategy in Afghanistan

Author:
Ashley J. Tellis
Publication Date:
04-2009
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
The run-up to the announcement of President Obama's new "Af-Pak" strategy provoked a flurry of "new solutions" to the conflict. Promoting reconciliation with the Taliban is one idea that has reappeared—even in the administration's own White Paper on U.S. policy toward Afghanistan and Pakistan. While this notion would rightly have been considered ridiculous a few years ago, many in Europe and the United States obviously believe that stabilizing Afghanistan may require just that. In fact, it would be the worst approach at this time—and it is destined to fail so long as key Taliban constituents are convinced that military victory in Afghanistan is inevitable.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Terrorism, and Armed Struggle
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Afghanistan, United States, Europe, and Taliban

82. Turkey's Perspectives on Nuclear Weapons and Disarmament

Author:
Henri J. Barkey
Publication Date:
09-2009
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
In principle, Turkey would welcome the global elimination of nuclear weapons. For the current government, the possession of nuclear weapons by other states is a factor that, indirectly at least, reduces Turkey's regional (if not global) aspirations and power. However, in the medium term, it remains deeply ambivalent on the future of nuclear weapons and its own plans regarding nuclear energy and weapons development.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Nuclear Weapons, and Nuclear Power
Political Geography:
United States, Iran, Turkey, and Germany

83. Revitalizing Democracy Assistance: The Challenge of USAID

Author:
Thomas Carothers
Publication Date:
10-2009
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
President Obama and his foreign policy team are only just starting to confront the challenge of reformulating U.S. democracy promotion policy. Crucial to any such effort will be revitalizing democracy assistance, a domain that has expanded greatly over the past 25 years but risks not adapting adequately to meet the challenges of the new landscape of democratic stagnation in the world. As the largest source of U.S. democracy assistance, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) is a natural starting point for such a process of revitalization.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Democratization, International Cooperation, and Reform
Political Geography:
United States

84. Assessing Secretary of State Rice's Reform of U.S. Foreign Assistance

Author:
Gerald F. Hyman
Publication Date:
02-2008
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
The September 11 terrorist attacks on the United States engendered a variety of responses: some domestic, some foreign; some short-term, some long-term; some direct, others indirect. The assault on the Taliban in Afghanistan was clearly one direct, immediate, foreign response. The establishment of the Department of Homeland Security was direct, relatively swift, and domestic. Among the long-term, indirect, foreign responses was a serious review and consequent reform of U.S. foreign assistance programs, and the role they play in U.S. foreign policy and national security.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, and Government
Political Geography:
United States

85. Pakistan and the War on Terror: Conflicted Goals, Compromised Performance

Author:
Ashley J. Tellis
Publication Date:
01-2008
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
On June 24, 2003, at a Camp David meeting with his Pakistani guest, President George W. Bush declared that key al- Qaeda terrorists had been successfully neutralized thanks "to the effective border security measures and law enforcement cooperation throughout [Pakistan], and ... to the leadership of President Pervez Musharraf." Although Osama bin Laden was still at large, Bush nevertheless concluded that "the people reporting to him, the chief operators [of al-Qaeda], ... people like Khalid Sheik Mohammed, are no longer a threat to the United States or [to] Pakistan, for that matter."
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Terrorism, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:
Pakistan

86. The New Middle East

Author:
Marina Ottaway, Paul Salem, Amr Hamzawy, Nathan J. Brown, and Karim Sadjadpour
Publication Date:
02-2008
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
After September 11, 2001, the Bush administration launched an ambitious policy to forge a new Middle East, with intervention in Iraq as the driver of the transformation. "The establishment of a free Iraq at the heart of the Middle East will be a watershed event in the global democratic revolution," declared President Bush on November 7, 2003. In speech after speech, Bush administration officials made it abundantly clear that they would not pursue a policy directed at managing and containing existing crises, intending instead to leapfrog over them by creating a new region of democracy and peace in which old disputes would become irrelevant. The idea was summarized in a statement by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice during the war between Lebanon and Israel in the summer of 2006. Pushing Israel to accept a cease- fire, she argued, would not help, because it would simply re-establish the status quo ante, not help create a new Middle East. The new Middle East was to be a region of mostly democratic countries allied with the United States. Regimes that did not cooperate would be subjected to a combination of sanctions and support for democratic movements, such as the so-called Cedar Revolution of 2005 in that forced Syrian troops out of the country. In extreme cases, they might be forced from power.
Topic:
Foreign Policy and Diplomacy
Political Geography:
United States, Iraq, Middle East, and Lebanon

87. Reading Khamenei: The World View of Iran's Most Powerful Leader

Author:
Karim Sadjadpour
Publication Date:
03-2008
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
There is perhaps no leader in the world more important to current world affairs but less known and understood than Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the Supreme Leader of Iran. Neither a dictator nor a democrat—but with traits of both—Khamenei is the single most powerful individual in a highly factionalized, autocratic regime. Though he does not make national decisions on his own, neither can any major decisions be taken without his consent. He has ruled the country by consensus rather than decree, with his own survival and that of the theocratic system as his top priorities.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Nuclear Weapons, and Politics
Political Geography:
Middle East

88. Pakistan-Afghanistan Relations in the Post-9/11 Era

Author:
Frédéric Grare
Publication Date:
10-2006
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Taliban insurgents and their Al Qaeda allies, once thought defeated in Afghanistan, are regaining strength. Regrouped and reorganized, better equipped and financed, and more sophisticated tactically, they are threatening both the reconstruction process and the U.S.-led coalition forces on the ground. According to the U.S. Department of Defense, sixty-six U.S. troops were killed in combat in Afghanistan in 2005, more than in the previous four years combined.
Topic:
International Relations and Foreign Policy
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Afghanistan, United States, Middle East, and Taliban

89. Cambodia Blazes A New Path To Economic Growth and Job Creation

Author:
Sandra Polaski
Publication Date:
09-2005
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
A UNIQUE AND SUCCESSFUL INTERNATIONAL POLICY EXPERIMENT has been under way in Cambodia for the last six years. In the country's export apparel factories, working conditions and labor rights are monitored by inspectors from the International Labor Organization (ILO), an international public organization. The results of the inspections are published in credible, highly transparent reports that describe in detail whether the factories are in compliance with national labor laws and internationally agreed basic labor rights. These reports are published on the Internet, and a range of Cambodian and international actors use them. The U.S. government uses the reports as a key input for decisions under an innovative scheme that allows Cambodian firms to sell more apparel in the U.S. market if they improve working conditions and respect workers' rights. Private retail apparel firms that buy from Cambodian factories also use the reports. These buyers, conscious of their brand reputations, use the reliable information they find in the reports to steer orders toward compliant factories and away from noncompliant ones.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Development, Economics, and Government
Political Geography:
United States, Cambodia, and Southeast Asia

90. Integrating Democracy Promotion Into U.S. Middle East Policy

Author:
Michele Dunne
Publication Date:
10-2004
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
BETWEEN 2002 AND 2004, THE UNITED STATES ACCORDED new prominence to political and economic reform and democratization as policy goals in the Middle East. Continuing that trend and translating rhetoric into effective strategies both depend on whether reform and democratization become fully integrated into the U.S. policy agenda in the region. Can the United States promote change at the risk of instability in the region while it remains dependent on petroleum from Arab countries? Can it pursue Arab–Israeli peace and democratization at the same time? Can the United States still secure needed military and counterterrorism cooperation if it antagonizes friendly regimes by promoting democratization as well? Is it feasible for the United States to promote democratization effectively amid widespread grievances against the war in Iraq and serious questions about U.S. human rights practices there and in Afghanistan?
Topic:
International Relations and Foreign Policy
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, United States, Iraq, Middle East, Israel, and Arabia

91. Promoting Democracy in the Middle East: The Problem of U.S. Credibility

Author:
Marina Ottaway
Publication Date:
03-2003
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Since early last year, the Bush administration has paid unaccustomed attention to the issue of democracy in the Middle East. Following September 11, many U. S. officials have worried that the authoritarianism of most Arab regimes has bred frustration in their countries, and this frustration has in turn favored the growth of terrorist organizations. U.S. discussions about the need for democracy in the Middle East have triggered a strong negative reaction by Arab commentators and journalists, including in discussions of democracy in the Arab press. However, very little of this writing has dealt with the problem of democracy in the real sense—that is, with the issue of how Arab governments relate to their citizens now and how they should relate to their citizens in the future. Instead, Arab commentators have treated democracy as a foreign policy issue, asking why the United States is suddenly discussing democracy in the Arab world and what true intentions it is trying to hide behind the smoke screen of democracy talk. The debate in the Arab press reveals some of the obstacles that the United States faces as it attempts to define its new pro-democracy role in the Middle East.
Topic:
Foreign Policy and Democratization
Political Geography:
United States, Middle East, and Arabia

92. A New Equation: U.S. Policy toward India and Pakistan after September 11

Author:
Lee Feinstein, David Albright, James C Clad, and Lewis A Dunn
Publication Date:
06-2002
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
The shifting geopolitical furniture on the subcontinent since last September's terrorist attacks has placed the United States in the unaccustomed position of having good relations with India and Pakistan at the same time. This has helped to forge a consensus in the United States on some of the core challenges India and Pakistan face, and on the approach Washington must pursue to advance its long-term goals for the region.
Topic:
Foreign Policy
Political Geography:
Pakistan, United States, South Asia, and Asia