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Begin New Search Topic Defense Policy Political Geography North America Content Type Working Paper Publishing Institution Canadian Global Affairs Institute (CGAI) Publication Year within 10 Years

1. Toward Agile Procurement for National Defence: Matching the Pace of Technological Change

Author:
William Richardson, Kalen Bennett, Douglas Dempster, Philippe Dumas, Caroline Leprince, Kim Richard Nossal, David Perry, Elinor Sloan, and J. Craig Stone
Publication Date:
06-2020
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Canadian Global Affairs Institute (CGAI)
Abstract:
In the fall of 2019, the procurement theme of the Canadian Defence and Security Network (CDSN) convened a workshop on the challenges facing high technology defence acquisitions. The workshop brought together practitioners from the Department of National Defence and Canadian Armed Forces and researchers from universities and think tanks, including graduate students. The aim of this workshop was to give these researchers a chance to understand how those working in defence procurement are tackling the problem of acquiring high technological capabilities that are not obsolete before they are even delivered. The researchers, in turn, have prepared this report, in collaboration with the Canadian Global Affairs Institute (CGAI), on bringing greater agility to defence procurement in Canada. As the authors note, this should be a key part of the defence procurement debate in Canada once Canada and the world emerge from COVID-19 emergency.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Science and Technology, Armed Forces, and Procurement
Political Geography:
Canada and North America

2. From NORAD to NOR[A]D: The Future Evolution of North American Defence Co-operation

Author:
Andrea Charron and James Fergusson
Publication Date:
05-2018
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Canadian Global Affairs Institute (CGAI)
Abstract:
The North American defence environment is in the process of a major transformation, occasioned by dramatic changes in the geostrategic/political landscape and the development of new generations of weapon systems. As a result, the requirements to deter, detect and defend North America from a variety of new threats are transforming. In this context, Canada and the United States, through the Permanent Joint Board of Defense (PJBD) established the Evolution of North American Defense (EvoNAD) study, and tasked its execution to the North American Aerospace Defense (NORAD) command. EvoNAD considers a long time horizon and has been broken into subcomponents reflecting six domain priorities: air, maritime, cyber, aerospace, space and land. The overarching factor which binds the six components together is the recognition that the single-domain threat environment is evolving into a multi-domain one. In the past, the threat to North America resided largely on a single axis (north-south), within a dominant domain (air, combined with ballistic missiles), met by a bi-national structure. While this threat seemed to collapse with the end of the Cold War, NORAD continued and evolved to adapt to new threats as well as to continue to monitor the Cold War-styled air and aerospace threats. Subsequently, 9/11 created a new threat environment and forced NORAD to consider threats emanating from within North America as well as outside of it. In addition to a number of changes, including direct feeds from the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and NAVCANADA, NORAD expanded into the maritime domain via a maritime warning mission. Roughly at the same time, NORAD’s attention also turned to the cyber-domain and its common threat to North America. The air threat has now returned with the resumption of long-range Russian flights across the Arctic, and down the Atlantic and Pacific coasts. This threat, however, is of a different character because of the development of a new generation of Russian long-range air-launched cruise missiles, as well as sea-launched cruise missiles, which have direct implications for NORAD’s capacity to deter, detect and defend, as well as for its current area of operations and mission suites (air/aerospace warning and control and maritime warning). Not only will these new long-range capabilities diffuse to other potential adversaries, generating a global threat environment, but also the first generation of hypersonic weapons has set the conditions for the merger of air and missile defence, and the air and outer space domains. Finally, the consequences of an attack against North America, alongside potential catastrophic natural disasters relative to the role of military forces in support of civil authorities, raises issues for both Canada and the U.S., and thus NORAD, regarding the most efficient and effective means to respond. The multi-domain/multi-dimensional North American threat environment should drive both Canada and the U.S. towards deeper defence co-operation, and the functional demands of this new threat environment could lead to NORAD’s ultimate transformation into an integrated, multi-domain and dimensional North American Defense Command solution. Of course, this outcome is not inevitable, and numerous barriers exist. Nonetheless, the same logic which led to NORAD’s creation in 1957 (with the agreement signed in 1958), remains valid. Driven by the common recognition that the defence of North America is indivisible, a North American Defense Command would be a natural evolution in Canada – American defence relations.
Topic:
Defense Policy, International Cooperation, Regional Cooperation, Maritime, Land, and Cyberspace
Political Geography:
Canada, North America, and United States of America

3. Staying Ahead of Trump on Security Requires a Holistic Review of Canadian National Security

Author:
Alan Stephenson
Publication Date:
05-2017
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Canadian Global Affairs Institute (CGAI)
Abstract:
It is time for the Canadian government to conduct a holistic review of Canada’s national security complex. The Defence Policy Review is floundering as a consequence of an uncooperative world, Canada’s domestic security institutions require legislative empowerment, and the election of Donald Trump has placed increased pressure on Canadian security and defence. Securing the U.S.’s northern border is a no-fail mission for Canada as peace and prosperity depend upon it. However, this must be done within Canadian security norms and values. Only a ground-up examination of the Canadian national security system will elicit a comprehensive understanding of the current deficiencies that will allow focused alignment of government objectives, policies and public funds. Crisis management requires a strategic plan with clear objectives from which to conduct concurrent and coordinated activities. The Trudeau government has the team in place; now, it needs a new National Security Policy statement to assist in “lead turning” an unconventional U.S. administration steadfast in its stance over national security.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Government, National Security, and Donald Trump
Political Geography:
Canada, North America, and United States of America

4. Brexit and the Shifting Pillars of NATO

Author:
Julian Lindley-French
Publication Date:
11-2017
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Canadian Global Affairs Institute (CGAI)
Abstract:
Will Britain’s departure from the EU lead to the creation of an Anglosphere and a Eurosphere within NATO? Unfortunately, there are a range of challenges to such a formulation. First, if the EU continues to drive a hard post-Brexit relationship with the British, it may be increasingly difficult for any government in London to convince the British people that other Europeans are worth defending. Second, would the United States, Canada and others entertain such an idea? Third, France is not going to abandon its strategic relationship with Britain – Brexit or no Brexit. Fourth, there will be a Brexit deal and Britain will remain a key factor in European defence. Fifth, “events, dear boy, events!” However, Brexit or no Brexit, NATO’s pillars are shifting. The United States will demand more of its allies if Washington is to maintain a credible security and defence guarantee for Europe. The changing nature of conflict will tend to emphasize intelligence and power projection, both of which play to Britain’s residual strengths. Canada? It is hard for an outsider to discern Canadian defence policy, other than bumbling along in strategic suburbia with the desire to be seen as the good neighbour. This is a mistake. NATO’s shifting pillars will have profound implications for Canadian security and defence policy. A formal Anglosphere and Eurosphere within NATO? Most likely not. A U.S.-sphere and German-sphere? Quite possibly, but don’t mention it in polite company. Canada? Who knows?
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Brexit, and Alliance
Political Geography:
Britain, Europe, Canada, and North America

5. Beyond NORAD and Modernization to North American Defence Evolution

Author:
Andrea Charron and James Fergusson
Publication Date:
05-2017
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Canadian Global Affairs Institute (CGAI)
Abstract:
While most attention on NORAD and North American defence cooperation is focused on the modernization of the North Warning System (NWS), significant developments have occurred that suggest modernization will be accompanied by significant evolutionary changes to the Command. The new threat environment, centered upon Russian behaviour in Crimea, Ukraine and Syria, a new Russian strategic doctrine, and a new generation of advanced Russian long-range cruise missiles dictate not only layered, multi-sensor early warning system, but also changes in NORAD command arrangements. In addition, the maritime component of the cruise missile threat, alongside continuing concerns of terrorists employing freighters as cruise missile platforms, raise the question whether NORAD should evolve into a binational air-maritime defence command. These considerations are central to the ongoing Evolution of North American Defence (EVONAD) study, emanating from the Canada-US Permanent Joint Board on Defence, under the lead of NORAD, in collaboration with the Canadian Joint Operations Command (CJOC) and US Northern Command (the tri-command structure). The final result is difficult to predict. However, it is clear that both modernization and evolution will be driven by the militaries engaged, with civilian authorities guiding the process, and the public and Canadian government not paying attention.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Regional Cooperation, Modernization, and Non-Traditional Threats
Political Geography:
Russia and North America

6. Championing the Joint Force: a Job for the Public and our Political Leaders – Not Just Military Professionals Alone

Author:
Stuart Beare
Publication Date:
11-2015
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Canadian Global Affairs Institute (CGAI)
Abstract:
Canada’s security interests and the mission of our Armed Forces – to defend Canada, defend North America and promote peace and security abroad – largely remains unchanged and timeless. The nature of the security environment, however, has not – nor will it be in the years to come. An effective and relevant Canadian Armed Forces will continue to require capable, well-equipped and operationally ready maritime, air and land forces, which are largely raised and trained within our Army, Navy and Air Force. But in order for defence to remain relevant and effective in an era of increased instability, volatility and unpredictability, our Armed Forces need an increased understanding of what is going on and preparedness for what is to come. This is the business of our military’s Joint Force – those that include and that go beyond the tactical units that the services provide. Joint organizations and networks generate intelligence, provide understanding and lead the partnering, planning, force-posturing and practicing that is essential to anticipating, preparing for and conducting operations, particularly in a world of unrelenting complexity. A decade after former Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) General Rick Hillier’s extraordinary initiatives to transform our Armed Forces from a service-centric, machine-age force to one focused on the business of operations, which thinks and acts as Canadian Forces (joint) first, we see evidence of real progress in the approach to joint operations. There is also an improved appreciation of our military’s joint functions and capabilities. Unlike the political and public calls for strong services and the modernization of their major platforms, however, this progress has been realized largely through efforts internal to the Armed Forces themselves. The initiative has been without political leadership and external policy top-cover, rendering it vulnerable and reversible. This paper describes the functions of the Joint Force, advocates for the capabilities required to enable partnerships, enhance understanding and advance mission preparedness, and calls for unified leadership of the joint domain and over our military’s joint culture. Our traditional international partners have travelled this road. They too see that clarity on joint functions, joint capability, joint domain leadership and stewardship over joint culture are vital to the military’s relevance and operational effectiveness. This is also critical to its agility and flexibility in the years to come. Their progress is the result of internal professional transformation, as well as the requirement by political leaders and modern defence policy to make this so. Here in Canada, the forming of a new government this autumn calls for a new look at defence policy, providing an opportunity to invite that same political leadership and influence. Joint functions, joint capabilities and clear joint leadership are vital to our military’s relevance to, and effectiveness in, our national defence and operations. A Joint Force and the joint domain, like a strong and capable Army, Navy and Air Force, need to be led, resourced and fully engaged before planes fly, ships sail and troops deploy. Joint-ness requires external understanding and proponents, and, within the Forces, a clearly identifiable champion. In Canada, however, these range from ambiguous to absent.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Armed Forces, and Military Affairs
Political Geography:
Canada and North America

7. Canada, the Arctic Council, Greenpeace, and Arctic Oil Drilling: Complicating an Already Complicated Picture

Author:
Robert Huebert
Publication Date:
01-2014
Content Type:
Working Paper
Institution:
Canadian Global Affairs Institute (CGAI)
Abstract:
Canada and the Arctic Council finds itself facing one of its greatest challenges – supporting economic development for people of the north while protecting the fragile environment of the Arctic. 2014 will bring the possibility of exploratory drilling for oil off the northern coasts of Russia, the United States, Canada and Greenland. Development of suspected oil wealth in the region could redraw the very face of the entire region. Opposition to oil development is strongest in non-northern locations, and is increasingly represented by environmental NGOs such as Greenpeace. This issue, to develop or not to develop, is poised to become the most divisive issue facing the Arctic states in the coming years. Canada will need to negotiate a very delicate balance as it proceeds as chair of the Arctic Council. It will need to promote the efforts of the Arctic Council to protect the environment, while responding to increasingly vocal opposition against the large scale development of any oil resources in the region. Canada must be prepared to act against the inevitable protests that will occur against any exploratory drilling in Canadian waters. In order to protect development in the region, Canada must have the capability to ensure order in the region once permission has been granted to companies to proceed with exploration.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Oil, International Affairs, and Natural Resources
Political Geography:
Canada, North America, and Arctic