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3351. Yemen at the UN – April 2018 Review

Author:
Sana'a Center for Strategic Studies
Publication Date:
05-2018
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Sana'a Center For Strategic Studies
Abstract:
In April, Saleh Ali al-Samad, a senior Houthi official and the head of the Supreme Political Council in Sana’a, was killed by an air-to-ground missile strike in Hudaydah city. Al-Samad was one of the most prominent political figures within the Houthi leadership structure and is the group’s most senior member to have been killed thus far in the conflict. His death will likely have far reaching implications for both the Houthis and the UN’s renewed mediation efforts to end the Yemen conflict (see ‘The Killing of Saleh Ali al-Samad’). Just prior to al-Samad’s killing, Martin Griffiths, the new United Nations Special Envoy for Yemen, had briefed the UN Security Council on his multiple visits around the region since taking the post (see ‘New Special Envoy Briefs the UNSC’.) Among the threats to the peace process the Special Envoy noted were the renewed prospect of a large-scale military offensive on Houthi-held Hudaydah port (see ‘The Mobilization and Deployment of Tariq Saleh’s ‘National Resistance Forces’’ and ‘Anti-Houthi Forces Capture Midi city’), the near-daily Houthi ballistic missile attacks on Saudi Arabia (see ‘Escalating Houthi Missile Attacks’), as well as the increasing cost of the conflict borne by noncombatants in Yemen (see ‘Intensified Coalition Airstrikes on Civilians and Civilian Infrastructure’). Internationally, April saw governments in both the United States and Europe face continuing pressure regarding their roles in facilitating the Saudi-led military coalition campaign in Yemen (see ‘US Senators Raise Concerns Regarding Support for Saudi-led Coalition’, ‘MBS Meets Macron, and Protests, in Paris’ and ‘German Opposition Groups Challenge Arms Exports to Coalition Members’). Meanwhile in Yemen, restrictions on humanitarian and commercial access into and inside the country continued to hamper efforts to address the humanitarian crisis (see ‘Humanitarian Coordinator Briefs the UNSC’, ‘Declining Food and Fuel Imports’ and ‘Humanitarian Access Restrictions’). At the same time, Saudi and Yemeni government officials repeatedly accused the Houthis of holding hostage 19 vessels off the coast of Hudaydah — going as far as writing the UN Security Council regarding the alleged incident — even after a Sweden-based maritime transparency project and a vessel owner revealed the claims to be baseless (see ‘Saudi, Yemeni Officials Spread Misinformation Regarding Hudaydah Port Access’). In economic developments, Central Bank of Yemen (CBY) Governor Mohammed Zammam stepped up his efforts to restore central bank capacity, stabilize the exchange rate, ease the liquidity crisis and lift restrictions on the Yemeni financial sector’s ability to access global networks (see ‘CBY Governor Steps Up Efforts to Revitalize Banking & Financial Sector’). In Houthi-controlled areas, severe cooking gas shortages continued, while the authorities in Sana’a, in an attempt to accumulate enough liquidity to pay public sector salaries, instructed the Sana’a-based CBY to temporarily freeze the budget accounts of government agencies (see ‘Economic Developments in Houthi-Controlled Areas’). Also in April, Prime Minister Ahmed Obaid bin Dagher toured southern governorates on his first trip to government-controlled areas of Yemen since clashes had erupted in Aden three months ago (see ‘Bin Dagher Returns to Yemen With Visits to Aden and Hadramawt’).
Topic:
Development, United Nations, Economy, Conflict, and UN Security Council
Political Geography:
Middle East and Yemen

3352. Yemen at the UN – May 2018 Review

Author:
Sana'a Center for Strategic Studies
Publication Date:
06-2018
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Sana'a Center For Strategic Studies
Abstract:
In May, Houthi forces were clearly on the defensive across most of Yemen, in particular losing ground in Hudaydah governorate as various anti-Houthi groups, backed by Emirati airpower, advanced on Hudaydah city. A Saudi-led coalition plan for a military offensive on the city last year was derailed due to a lack of US support and international outcry over the likelihood of massive humanitarian fallout. Last month, however, a Western official confirmed to the Sana’a Center that Washington and London had given the green light for the current offensive to take Hudaydah city, but with the caveat that the ports were not to be attacked (see ‘Coalition-Backed Forces Advancing on Hudaydah Port’ and ‘Anti-Houthi Forces Make Gains in Taiz’). On May 8, United States President Donald Trump withdrew from the Iran nuclear agreement. Through the rest of the month, his administration significantly increased its bellicose rhetoric towards, and imposed punitive financial sanctions against, Tehran, often citing Iran’s supposed military support of Yemen’s Houthis as among the justifications (see ‘Washington Exits ‘Iran Deal’ and Escalates Tensions With Tehran’). Meanwhile in Europe, it became public that since February the United Kingdom, France and Germany – all co-signatories to the Iran deal – have been pursuing talks with Tehran to help end the Yemen war, with all sides reporting progress (see ‘EU Countries in Negotiations With Iran to End Yemen Conflict’). Media reports last month revealed that US military personnel were playing a more direct and extensive role in the Yemen conflict than the Pentagon had previously admitted, while a high-level Yemeni government official also confirmed to the Sana’a Center that the US was deploying military drones in direct support of anti-Houthi ground operations (see ‘US Special Forces and Military Drones Active in Anti-Houthi Operations’). Simultaneously in Washington, lawmakers in both houses of the US Congress were pursuing legislation to increase transparency and controls on US involvement in the Yemen war (see ‘Congress Scrutinizes US Role in Yemen Conflict and Detainee Torture’). Through the first half of May, the internationally recognized Yemeni government and Abu Dhabi traded barbs in public over the latter’s move to land troops on Socotra island and seize control of the airport and marine terminal. Yemeni Prime Minister Ahmed Obaid bin Dagher called it “an assault on Yemen’s sovereignty,” while the United Arab Emirates blamed the Muslim Brotherhood for launching a smear campaign against it. By mid-month, Saudi intervention had helped de-escalate the confrontation (see ‘UAE-Yemeni Government Standoff Over Socotra Island‘). In the second half of May, Socotra and parts of eastern Yemen were then hit by two cyclones, with coalition partners heeding subsequent Yemeni government appeals for the rapid deployment of humanitarian aid to assist the affected populations (see ‘Two Cyclones Flood Socotra’). In economic developments, President Abdo Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s March decision to liberalize fuel imports again led to market instability as a three-day fuel crisis gripped Aden (see ‘Fuel Crisis in Aden’). Meanwhile in Sana’a, the CEOs of the country’s largest banks gathered for a meeting, organized by the Sana’a Center at the Yemen Banks Association, seeking to address the country’s financial challenges (see ‘High-Level Banking Sector Meeting in Sana’a’). Also in Sana’a last month, the Saudi-led military coalition bombed the Presidential Office, located in a densely populated area with several schools nearby. The office was occupied by a full staff of civilian personnel at the time. At least six people were killed and 30 injured. A Senior Houthi official, in the building’s basement at the time of the strike, was unharmed (see ‘Coalition Bombs Presidential Office in Sana’a’). In an effort to head off the resurgence of cholera with the start of Yemen’s rainy season, the World Health Organization, the UN Children’s Fund and Yemen’s national health authorities launched a mass cholera vaccination campaign last month (see ‘Cholera Vaccination Campaign’). Also in May, high-level sources in both the Yemeni government and the Houthi leadership confirmed to the Sana’a Center that negotiations were underway for a large-scale prisoner exchange expected to take place at the end of Ramadan (see ‘Prisoner Exchange Slate for Eid’).
Topic:
Diplomacy, Economy, Conflict, Houthis, and Military
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Yemen, and United States of America

3353. Yemen at the UN – June 2018 Review

Author:
Sana'a Center for Strategic Studies
Publication Date:
07-2018
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Sana'a Center For Strategic Studies
Abstract:
In June, the Saudi-led military coalition and associated ground forces began their long-anticipated offensive against Houthi-held Hudaydah city. The ports of Hudaydah and nearby Saleef, along Yemen’s Red Sea coast, are the entry point for the majority of the country’s commercial and humanitarian imports. This creates the potential for catastrophic humanitarian fallout from the offensive given that 8.4 million Yemenis are already on the verge of famine. United Nations Special Envoy for Yemen, Martin Griffiths, spent most of June engaged in shuttle diplomacy with the belligerent parties to the conflict, and in consultations with the UN Security Council (UNSC), pushing a plan to preempt the attack by having Houthi forces turn control of Hudaydah port over to UN monitors (see ‘The UN Special Envoy’s Plan for Hudaydah Port’). Griffiths also revealed his new proposed framework for wider peace negotiations to the UNSC. While including some elements that differentiate it from previous UN-led peace initiatives, contentious items that led earlier efforts to fail were carried over into Griffiths’ latest proposed framework (see ‘The Special Envoy’s New Peace Framework’). The UNSC itself held three closed-door sessions regarding Yemen in June. The Swedish mission led calls for the UNSC to demand a halt to the Hudaydah attack, while the United Kingdom and Kuwait were at the forefront of pushing back against this effort, with the latter parties largely being successful. Council products regarding Yemen last month thus amounted to generic statements regarding respect for international humanitarian law and the need to protect civilians (see ‘UNSC Discussions on the Hudaydah Offensive’). In the United States, the White House appeared to give tentative approval to the Hudaydah offensive (see ‘White House Position on the Hudaydah Offensive’), while bipartisan opposition to the campaign was notable in Congress (see ‘Congressional Opposition to the Offensive’ and ‘Senate Passes Bill Making US Refueling of Coalition Aircraft Conditional’). In Yemen, the Hudaydah offensive, dubbed ‘Operation Golden Victory’, was launched on June 13, with the United Arab Emirates in primary command of the campaign, supporting and coordinating between various anti-Houthi ground forces (see ‘The Hudaydah Offensive’). These forces managed to take Hudaydah airport from Houthi fighters before Abu Dhabi announced that it would temporarily suspend the attack to allow the UN Special Envoy an opportunity to pursue negotiations (see ‘UAE Announces Pause in Offensive’). The Hudaydah offensive raised widespread humanitarian concerns and concerns regarding the safety of civilians in the city, while also prompting widespread price spikes for basic commodities. In economic developments last month, the Central Bank of Yemen finalized a framework to support the importation of basic commodities, the Austrian firm OMV restarted tests on wellheads in Shabwa governorate, and the Yemeni government launched a new Internet network in an attempt to supplant the Houthi authorities’ control over the national telecommunications. Also in June, Yemeni President Abdo Rabbu Mansour Hadi visited the UAE and met Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed al-Nahyan. Shortly after, Hadi flew to Aden, the Yemeni government’s current capital in the country, for his first visit in more than a year and a half.
Topic:
Security, Development, Diplomacy, United Nations, Conflict, and Military
Political Geography:
Middle East, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and United States of America

3354. Yemen at the UN – July 2018 Review

Author:
Sana'a Center for Strategic Studies
Publication Date:
08-2018
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Sana'a Center For Strategic Studies
Abstract:
At the end of July the Yemen conflict seemed poised to take on much broader regional and global dimensions, as Saudi Arabia halted oil shipments through the Bab al-Mandeb Strait off Yemen’s Red Sea coast. Iran declared the sea “no longer secure,” and Israel threatened military intervention if Houthi forces attempted to close the strait to shipping (see ‘Riyadh Halts Bab Al-Mandeb Oil Shipments After Houthi Attacks’). Earlier in July, the Saudi-led military coalition and associated ground forces had temporarily halted their campaign to dislodge Houthi fighters from Hudaydah city and capture Yemen’s busiest port. The United Nations Special Envoy for Yemen Martin Griffiths spent the rest of the month shuttling between the various stakeholders in the conflict in a flurry of diplomatic efforts to stop the campaign from resuming. European diplomats also stepped up their efforts to intervene in the Yemen conflict through July (see ‘European Diplomats Expand Outreach to Houthi Leaders’). By the end of the month, the positions of the warring sides appeared to be irreconcilable: Houthi leaders continued to insist that their forces would remain in the Red Sea city, though they had agreed to hand control of the port to the UN; the coalition and the internationally recognized Yemeni government, however, maintained their demand that Houthi forces unconditionally withdraw from Hudaydah city and governorate. In early August, Griffiths then told the UN Security Council (UNSC) that the situation in Hudaydah could only be addressed through a broader, comprehensive peace deal and announced plans for UN-led consultations between the main warring parties to begin on September 6 in Geneva, Switzerland (see ‘UN Special Envoy’s Shuttle Diplomacy’). The Hudaydah campaign’s wider ramifications became evident last month (see ‘Offensive Displaces More Than 300,000, Red Sea Imports Drop’ and ‘Attacks Against Civilians and Civilian Infrastructure’), while relief agencies readied themselves for the campaign against the city to restart (see ‘UN Prepares for Imminent Siege, Boosts Medical Supplies’). Meanwhile, international opposition to the coalition’s actions continued to build (see ‘US Democrats Pressure Coalition on Hudaydah’, ‘Congress Debates Bill Placing Conditionality on US Refueling of Coalition Aircraft’ and ‘French Parliamentarians, Civil Society Raise Pressure Over Arms Sales’). Elsewhere in Hudaydah governorate military actions continued in July, among them the coalition’s advance on the Houthi-held town of Zabid, a UN World Heritage Site (see ‘Fighting Continues in Hudaydah Governorate’). Houthi forces in turn claim to have deployed hitherto unseen military drone capacities against Yemeni government forces and the coalition (see ‘Houthi Forces Deploy New UAVs’). In southern Yemen, there was a wave of assassinations against high-level security officials in Aden, the Yemeni government faced continued opposition to its political and military authority – particularly from the secessionist Southern Transitional Council – and there were protests over the coalition’s presence in al-Mahra governorate. Also in Aden, scores of detainees were released from detention facilities run by Emirati-backed local forces. In economic developments, the Aden-based Central Bank of Yemen approved an official exchange rate with which to support the import of basic commodities, the Yemeni rial experienced steep depreciation, and oil exports from Shabwah governorate restarted. Also last month, the UNSC discussed the UN Secretary-General’s annual Children and Armed Conflict report. As with last year, every major belligerent party to the Yemen conflict was cited for grievous violations against the rights of children. And for a second last year, the document included an annex for those parties that had taken step to try and address their violations against children. The Saudi-led military coalition and the Yemeni Armed Forces were listed in this special annex.
Topic:
Diplomacy, United Nations, Conflict, Humanitarian Crisis, and Military
Political Geography:
Middle East and Yemen

3355. The Yemen Review – August 2018

Author:
Sana'a Center for Strategic Studies
Publication Date:
09-2018
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Sana'a Center For Strategic Studies
Abstract:
In the last six days of August the Yemeni rial entered one of its steepest and most rapid declines in value since the conflict began, resulting in sudden price spikes for basic foodstuffs. Given Yemen’s overwhelming dependence on imports to feed the population, such changes in the rial’s value have direct implications for the country’s humanitarian crisis (see ‘The Yemeni Rial’s Rapid Decline and Food Prices Surge’). Both the internationally recognized Yemeni government in Aden and the Houthi authorities in Sana’a took actions through last month targeting unlicensed money exchange firms – that have proliferated since the conflict began in 2015 – in an effort to curb their destabilizing effect on the currency market (see ‘Attempts to Curb the Influence of Unlicensed Money Exchange Firms’). A Saudi-led military coalition airstrike hit a bus in the Dahyan market in Yemen’s Sa’ada governorate, killing 54 people, 44 of them children. The coalition initially defended the strike as a “legitimate military action.” However, following mounting international pressure – including from the US Department of Defense – the coalition admitted that the strike was unjustified and said it would hold accountable those found responsible (see ‘Coalition Bombs a Bus Full of Children’). A group of international experts, mandated by the UN to investigate human rights violations in Yemen, published its first report. The group reported that it found reasonable grounds to believe that the governments of Yemen, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia, and Houthi and allied forces have all committed war crimes (see ‘Group of Experts Publishes Its First Report’). Throughout August, the UAE-backed Giants Brigades, supported by Saudi-led military coalition aircraft, made advances in al-Durayhimi district, Hudaydah governorate. The coalition’s bombing of al-Durayhimi killed dozens of civilians, including 22 children (see ‘Anti-Houthi Offensives in Hudaydah Governorate’). In Taiz, tensions between the UAE-backed Abu al-Abbas Brigades and Islah-affiliated units – both members of the coalition-backed forces fighting the Houthis – broke out in clashes. Dozens of civilians were reportedly killed. Meanwhile, suspected southern separatist gunmen attacked a military academy graduation ceremony in Aden, killing a cadet (see ‘Other Military and Security Developments’). The UN Special Envoy for Yemen Martin Griffiths told the UN Security Council (UNSC) he was planning to hold consultations with the main warring parties September 6 in Geneva, where they would discuss a framework for peace and confidence building measures (see ‘Special Envoy’s Plan for Consultations With Warring Parties in Geneva’). President Donald Trump signed National Defence Authorization Bill (NDAA) for 2019, which includes an amendment that requires certification that the coalition is taking efforts to avoid civilians casualties, is committed to ending the conflict, and is taking measures to alleviate the humanitarian emergency. In his signing statement, Trump said his powers as commander-in-chief override the amendment (see ‘Developments In the United States’). Also in August, the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF) warned that the education of 3.7 million children in Yemen’s north was at risk in the upcoming school year. Meanwhile, the World Health Organization (WHO), UNICEF and health authorities in Yemen launched the second of three phases of the first-ever oral cholera vaccination campaign in Yemen (see ‘Humanitarian Developments’).
Topic:
Human Rights, Food, Economy, Conflict, and Currency
Political Geography:
Middle East, Yemen, and United States of America

3356. The Yemen Review – September 2018

Author:
Sana'a Center for Strategic Studies
Publication Date:
10-2018
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Sana'a Center For Strategic Studies
Abstract:
In September, the Yemeni rial’s recent decline accelerated precipitously, with the currency’s value dropping to record lows by month’s end. While the rial has been under multiple, intensifying pressures stemming from the war for several years, a large increase in the money supply – through a 30 percent increase in civil servant salaries – and the collapse of peace talks last month appear to have spurred a rial sell-off in the market (see ‘Domestic Currency Hits Record Low’). A nation-wide fuel shortage ensued. Retail fuel stations closed en masse and prices for available petrol on the black market jumped an average of 130 percent relative to August, and as much as 230 percent in some areas (see ‘Fuel Shortages and Prices Surges Across Yemen’). The UN-brokered consultations between the main warring parties – the internationally recognized Yemeni government and the armed Houthi movement – collapsed before they even began due to logistics issues in transporting the Houthi delegation to Geneva for the talks (see ‘Failure of the Geneva Consultations’). The Saudi-led military coalition-backed assault on the Houthi-held port city of Hudaydah – which the coalition had “paused” in July – reignited in earnest. The coalition claimed that a victory in Hudaydah was necessary to force the armed Houthi movement back to the negotiating table (see ‘Offensive on Hudaydah City Resumes’). In southern Yemen, public protests that began in Aden in August grew and spread to other governorates, with protesters calling for measures to stem the rial’s plunge and tame rocketing prices (see ‘Protests Spread in Southern Governorates’). In northern Yemen, pro-government forces began an assault on Maran, Sa’ada governorate, which holds symbolic and strategic importance as the ancestral town of the al-Houthi family (see ‘Yemeni Government Forces Advance in Sa’ada’). Meanwhile, in the United States, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo certified that the Saudi-led military coalition was taking measures to reduce harm to civilians in Yemen, as was mandated by Congress in August for continued US support for the coalition. A former State Department adviser subsequently told the Sana’a Center that “objectively, [Pompeo’s] conclusion is false”, (see ‘State Department Certifies Coalition Efforts to Reduce Civilian Casualties’). In Europe, Spain annulled an arms deal with Saudi Arabia, then backtracked, Germany approved new arms exports to coalition members, and the UN Human Rights Council extended the mandate of an experts group investigating human rights violations in Yemen. Also in September, the Sana’a Center organized the largest foreign press delegation visit to Mukalla, Hadramawt governorate, since al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula was expelled from the city in 2016.
Topic:
Security, Economy, Conflict, Negotiation, Currency, and Military
Political Geography:
Middle East, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and United States of America

3357. The Yemen Review – October 2018

Author:
Sana'a Center for Strategic Studies
Publication Date:
11-2018
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Sana'a Center For Strategic Studies
Abstract:
In October, the United Nations warned that Yemen could become the worst famine the world has seen in a century, with some 14 million people – half the population – facing starvation. This crisis is primarily due to the collapsing value of the Yemeni rial: Yemen is overwhelmingly dependent on imports to feed itself and the rial’s depreciation has thus made foodstuffs vastly more expensive. The murder of Saudi journalist and Washington Post columnist Jamal Khashoggi at the Saudi consulate in Istanbul grabbed world headlines throughout the month. This in turn focused world attention on Riyadh’s role in the Yemen war, led the United States and the United Kingdom to call for a ceasefire, and prompted many Western governments to reconsider weapons sales to Saudi Arabia. Following a build-up of anti-Houthi forces towards the end of October on the outskirts of the Houthi-held Red Sea city of Hudaydah – a crucial entry point of commercial and humanitarian goods for Yemen’s largest population centers – the battle for the city reignited in earnest at the beginning of November. Yemeni President Abdo Rabbu Mansour Hadi fired Prime Minister Ahmed bin Dagher on October 15 and launched an investigation against him for corruption and negligence. Bin Dagher had held the post since the spring of 2016 and was replaced by Maeen Abdelmalek Saeed, who was until then the Minister of Public Works and Roads. A report from Buzzfeed News documented how the United Arab Emirates had paid US mercenaries to assassinate its political opponents in Yemen, primarily individuals associated with the Islah party in the southern Yemeni city of Aden. The internationally recognized Yemeni government’s Economic Committee implemented new fuel import regulations, which would disqualify many Houthi-affiliated traders from importing fuel. The Houthi authorities in Sana’a subsequently threatened the senior staff of Yemen’s commercial banks – almost all of which are headquartered in Sana’a – with imprisonment if they complied with the Economic Committee’s decrees. These developments – along with the Houthi authorities appointing new senior staff to the Sana’a-based branch of the central bank – have likely escalated the war’s economic and financial ramifications for the Yemeni population. Cyclone Luban made landfall in Yemen’s eastern Mahra governorate (picture above), with the UN estimating that 2,200 families were displaced by the storm. Meanwhile, the Islah party continued to consolidate political and military control in Taiz City, a development that began in August and one that threatens to complicate future conflict resolution efforts.
Topic:
Diplomacy, European Union, Arms Trade, Conflict, and Houthis
Political Geography:
Middle East, Yemen, and United States of America

3358. The Yemen Review – November 2018

Author:
Sana'a Center for Strategic Studies
Publication Date:
12-2018
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Sana'a Center For Strategic Studies
Abstract:
Representatives from Yemen’s warring parties sat at a negotiating table for the first time in more than two years at the beginning of December. The peace consultations – which took place in Sweden and were mediated by the United Nations Special Envoy for Yemen Martin Griffiths – followed international pressure for a ceasefire that began in October and intensified through November. Rifts between Saudi Arabia and its most important ally, the United States, over the former’s intervention in the Yemen conflict appeared to deepen last month with the announced end of US in-flight refueling for Saudi-led military coalition aircraft operating over Yemen, and a vote in the US Senate to debate a bill to suspend military assistance to the coalition. Various governments in Europe also took steps toward banning arms sales to members of the coalition. United Nations Security Council (UNSC) member states began negotiating a new draft resolution related to the Yemen conflict in November, calling for measures to de-escalate the war and address the humanitarian crisis. This was the first proposed UNSC resolution related to Yemen since April 2015. Lobbying from Saudi Arabia and the United States, however, appeared to postpone any vote on the text at least until after the negotiations in Sweden. In Yemen, the domestic currency rebounded sharply in value against the US dollar in November after a steep collapse in the months previous. While this had the potential to help mitigate the humanitarian crisis, most of the benefits of the Yemeni rial’s recovery were absorbed before they reached consumers. Acting as a cartel to manipulate the currency market, money exchangers profited significantly from the Yemeni rial’s appreciation and most commercial retailers refused to lower prices to match the rial’s recovery. Meanwhile, international humanitarian organization Save the Children released an estimate that some 85,000 children had died of hunger in Yemen since the conflict began. In military developments, a spike in violence around Hudaydah City at the beginning of November sparked a surge in suspected violations of humanitarian and international human rights law by the warring parties involved. Elsewhere, anti-Houthi forces made battlefield gains on multiple frontlines in both the north and south of the country. Also in November, one of the main fissures in the anti-Houthi coalition appeared to mend somewhat. Following a visit by representatives of Yemen’s Islah party to Abu Dhabi, it appeared that the party had reconciled long-standing differences with the United Arab Emirates. Despite this, however, tensions between UAE-backed forces and Islah partisans once again erupted in Taiz governorate, including a spree of tit-for-tat assassinations.
Topic:
United Nations, Economy, Conflict, Negotiation, UN Security Council, and Military
Political Geography:
Middle East, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and United States of America

3359. Fragile States Index 2018 – Annual Report

Author:
J. J. Messner, Nate Haken, Patricia Taft, Ignatius Onyekwere, Hannah Blyth, Charles Fiertz, Christina Murphy, Amanda Quinn, and McKenzie Horwitz
Publication Date:
04-2018
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Fund for Peace
Abstract:
The Fragile States Index, produced by The Fund for Peace, is a critical tool in highlighting not only the normal pressures that all states experience, but also in identifying when those pressures are pushing a state towards the brink of failure. By highlighting pertinent issues in weak and failing states, The Fragile States Index—and the social science framework and software application upon which it is built—makes political risk assessment and early warning of conflict accessible to policy-makers and the public at large.
Topic:
Oil, Sovereignty, Natural Resources, Authoritarianism, Counter-terrorism, Democracy, Fragile States, Economy, Domestic Politics, Conflict, Resilience, Regional Politics, and Illiberalism
Political Geography:
Africa, Europe, Middle East, Poland, South America, Hungary, Spain, Venezuela, Mexico, Catalonia, Qatar, Central Europe, Sahel, Global Focus, United States of America, and Gambia

3360. Why talk about carbon removal?

Author:
David R. Morrow, Holly J. Buck, Wil C. G. Burns, Simon Nicholson, and Carolyn Turkaly
Publication Date:
10-2018
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Carbon Removal Law and Policy, American University
Abstract:
Talk of removing carbon dioxide from the atmosphere is spilling out of scientific circles and into the realm of climate politics and policy. Civil society has a vital role to play in ensuring that this conversation is responsive to social needs and develops in constructive and appropriate ways. This report provides a starting point to help environmental and social justice non-governmental organizations (NGOs) engage in the growing conversation about carbon removal. Section 1 of the report argues that the world needs to grapple seriously with large-scale carbon removal and long-term storage, exploring both the rationale for considering carbon removal and the associated risks and downsides. Section 2 provides a brief introduction to the range of options for large-scale carbon removal. Section 3 surveys the existing conversation in different domains, from academia to philanthropy to civil society. Section 4 considers the relationship between carbon removal and mitigation. Section 5 sketches a research agenda for assessing various approaches to carbon removal.
Topic:
Civil Society, Climate Change, Science and Technology, NGOs, and Carbon Emissions
Political Geography:
Global Focus