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111. Professionalizing the Iraqi Army: US Engagement after the Islamic State

Author:
C. Anthony Pfaff
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:
Security cooperation with Iraq remains a critical component of the US-Iraq relationship. Despite neighboring Iran’s ability to limit US political and economic engagement, Iraq still seeks US assistance to develop its military and to combat resurgent terrorist organizations. This monograph provides a historical and cultural basis from which to understand the limitations and potential for US cooperation with Iraq’s armed forces.
Topic:
Security, Politics, Terrorism, Military Strategy, Armed Forces, Military Affairs, Islamic State, and Economy
Political Geography:
Iraq, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

112. The Intersection of Investment and Conflict in Myanmar

Author:
Priscilla Clapp
Publication Date:
02-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
United States Institute of Peace
Abstract:
Developing countries throughout Asia, Africa, and Latin America are grappling with how to deal with China's rising economic influence—particularly the multibillion-dollar development projects financed through China’s Belt and Road Initiative. Myanmar, however, appears to be approaching foreign investment proposals with considerable caution. This report examines the framework the country is developing to promote transparency and accountability and to reserve for itself the authority to weigh the economic, social, and environmental impacts of major projects proposed by international investors, including China.
Topic:
Development, Infrastructure, Economy, Conflict, Investment, and Peace
Political Geography:
China, Southeast Asia, and Myanmar

113. The “Green Diamond”: Coffee and Conflict in the Central African Republic

Author:
Fiona Mangan, Igor Acko, and Manal Taha
Publication Date:
02-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
United States Institute of Peace
Abstract:
Coffee production is a fairly small part of the Central African Republic's economy, but it plays an outsize role in the country's ongoing conflict. Armed militia groups that hold sway over the country's main coffee growing regions and trade routes reap millions of dollars in funding to sustain their operations. This report discusses how understanding the political economy of conflict in the Central African Republic can help national and international stakeholders break the cycle of violence.
Topic:
Agriculture, Natural Resources, Economy, Conflict, and Violence
Political Geography:
Africa and Central African Republic

114. The Impact of COVID-19 on Vulnerable Mineral Supply Chains

Author:
Thomas J. Duesterberg
Publication Date:
07-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
This report will concentrate on select examples of the growing US vulnerability to global competitors due to shortages of key mineral resources in our domestic supply base. Dependence on China for raw materials and competition with its manufacturing firms is also a key focus. Shortages do not always indicate a problem because our close allies in mineral-rich countries like Australia and Canada can mitigate gaps in domestic supply. However, China’s growing control over many basic materials, and its history of using that control as leverage for its own economic and political goals, makes this a cause of concern for the continued strength of the US manufacturing economy.
Topic:
Natural Resources, Economy, COVID-19, and Minerals
Political Geography:
China, Canada, Australia, North America, and United States of America

115. Nine Months of COVID-19: The Impact on South Asia

Author:
Aparna Pande and Husain Haqqani
Publication Date:
11-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Since February of 2020, the eight countries of South Asia have been contending with the devastating effects of the coronavirus pandemic. The region has seen the third-highest death rate in the world from the virus, which originated in Wuhan, China, and brought long-term health impacts the medical community is only beginning to recognize. The economic consequences of COVID-19 on South Asia are proving to be even greater than the healthcare challenges in the region. Different South Asian countries have dealt with the pandemic in various ways, but the economic costs overall seem to be higher than the healthcare consequences. A lot has happened in the world’s most populous region since the “Crisis from Kolkata to Kabul: COVID-19’s Impact on South Asia” report was published in May 2020. This document serves as an update on the progression of the pandemic in South Asia.
Topic:
Economy, COVID-19, and Health Crisis
Political Geography:
South Asia and Asia

116. Mexico and the United States: a new beginning | México y Estados Unidos: un nuevo comienzo

Author:
Agustín Barrios Gómez, Henry Cuellar, Juan Carlos Baker, and Kenneth Smith
Publication Date:
02-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Mexican Council on Foreign Relations (COMEXI)
Abstract:
North America started 2020 as a bloc of three democratic countries with shared values that trade freely in the context of regional peace and cooperation. We are nearly 500 million North American citizens who came together to sign the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) of 1994 and its successor, the United StatesMexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) of 2018, providing a legal framework for commercial freedom on our continent. The world often conducts its affairs with a zero-sum game mentality, meaning that one country’s gain is another’s loss. This is why agreements like NAFTA, in 1994, and the USMCA, today, are particularly valuable. It is also the reason that we must not take them for granted. The effort invested in creating the USMCA was born precisely from the understanding of a fundamental idea: restricting the liberty of our people to trade freely is a mistake. It was not an easy case to make. The current U.S. president based his political campaign on animosity towards Mexico, in particular, and against exchange with the world, in general. However, he was led to a position of saving free trade in North America by the millions of his fellow citizens who saw their economic livelihood threatened by protectionism and the possibility of severing close economic ties with their neighbors. At the same time, a sector of Mexican society that has always been antagonistic to two pillars of trade in our continent: integration with the United States, and economic freedom, came to power in Mexico. This raised the specter of a challenge to free trade from Mexican socialists. However, the overwhelmingly positive results and obvious benefits of NAFTA for Mexico were of such magnitude, that protectionism was not an issue in the return to power of the nationalist Left. It now looks like a given, but both in the case of the U.S. and in the case of Mexico, the survival of the framework of openness born on January 1, 1994, is a testament to enormous political and economic success. In a world that increasingly favors the Pyrrhic victories of political symbolism, the triumph of reason over nativist fervor is well worth highlighting. For each of the three countries, the USMCA was the way to protect these gains, but each country placed its own emphasis on their priorities. Canada, currently the most politically stable country of the three, clearly sought to uphold a system that provides the country with access to its main market, as well as to another market (Mexico) in which it has fewer interests, but which is still important. The United States, the former architect of the world order that promoted economic freedoms for 71 years (1945-2016), was set to become its spoiler. Fortunately for the general interest, despite the rhetoric, with the USMCA it was possible to find a compromise that safeguarded the gains made from economic integration since 1994. Sectors of society, such as farmers and border communities which had never organized to defend their markets, got together to successfully make their case directly to the Administration. Mexico’s interests were clearer: manufactured exports are the most dynamic and competitive part of its economy. They not only provide a major source of hard currency, but in conjunction with the imports made possible by income from exports, they support the internal market, as well. For Mexico, even more than for Canada, protecting free trade of North America was imperative. The result was an Agreement that protected the benefits of North American commercial freedom, at the same time as it brought certain aspects up to date. It also addressed a number of the concerns that had been raised by blue collar workers in the United States, particularly pertaining to the automotive sector. This document helps us understand these changes and provides perspective from three authors who were directly involved in making the USMCA a reality.
Topic:
Treaties and Agreements, Bilateral Relations, Economy, NAFTA, Free Trade, Trade, and USMCA
Political Geography:
North America, Mexico, and United States of America

117. America’s Use of Coercive Economic Statecraft

Author:
Elizabeth Rosenberg, Peter Harrell, Paula J. Dobriansky, and Adam Szubin
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
U.S. policymakers will continue to intensively use a growing array of coercive economic tools, including tariffs, sanctions, trade controls, and investment restrictions. The growing use reflects a desire by policymakers to use coercive economic tools in support of a growing range of policy objectives. Diplomacy around these tools has long been challenging and can require hard choices. To use these tools effectively, policymakers should focus on articulating clear objectives and measuring effectiveness and costs. U.S.-China competition raises the stakes for getting the use of coercive economic statecraft right. Policymakers in the next presidential administration and Congress would be well-served to spend at least as much effort focusing on the positive tools of statecraft. These include domestic economic renewal, international finance and development incentives, and positive trade measures, among others.
Topic:
Development, Diplomacy, Sanctions, and Economy
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

118. Sanctions by the Numbers: Spotlight on Iran

Author:
Abigail Eineman
Publication Date:
09-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
The June edition of “Sanctions by the Numbers” illustrated a decade of U.S. sanctions policy by using heat maps to show the countries with the largest number of designations. Across both the Trump and Obama administrations, Iran was always at the top of the list. This edition of Sanctions by the Numbers explores Iran sanctions further, tracking how designations and delistings have evolved over time, the dozens of countries affected by Iran-related sanctions programs, and the top types of U.S. designations. The data add to the existing consensus that sanctions have an inverse relationship with Iran’s economic health, and designations have far outpaced delistings in the last three years as part of the Trump administration’s “maximum pressure” campaign.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Sanctions, and Economy
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

119. A New Arsenal for Competition: Coercive Economic Measures in the U.S.-China Relationship

Author:
Elizabeth Rosenberg, Peter Harrell, and Ashley Feng
Publication Date:
04-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
The United States and China have long used coercive economic measures to advance both economic and foreign policy objectives. In recent years, however, both countries have turned to coercive economic measures as mainstream instruments of foreign policy and national security policy, and increasingly have deployed coercive economic measures against each other. For the United States, China’s economic scale and global interconnections make it a fundamentally different type of target for coercive economic measures than the comparatively smaller and less sophisticated economies that have been primary targets of U.S. economic coercion in the past. The United States cannot simply isolate China from the global economy. Instead, it must adopt a more strategic focus on limiting Chinese actions in areas significant to U.S. national security and shoring up economic and technology arenas where the United States maintains lasting leverage. Over the past several years, the United States has deployed an array of coercive economic measures against China. The most prominent of these have been the tariffs on approximately two-thirds of U.S. imports from China. The tariffs remain largely in place despite implementation of the Phase One trade deal that the United States and China signed in January 2020. But the United States also has developed and deployed an increasingly sophisticated set of other coercive economic tools that will play a prominent role in U.S.-China relations over the years ahead, regardless of whether the United States and China fully implement the Phase One deal and reach a broader Phase Two trade agreement. Those other coercive economic tools include export controls, restrictions on U.S. imports to secure U.S. supply chains, heightened scrutiny of Chinese investment in the United States, sanctions, and stepped-up law enforcement measures against Chinese intellectual property (IP) theft and other Chinese activities in the United States. This expanding set of measures serves a broadening array of U.S. policy goals, including economic objectives, foreign policy goals, and the maintenance of America’s technological edge. The U.S. record of success in the use of these coercive economic measures has been mixed. While tariffs and other measures have succeeded in putting some macroeconomic pressure on China, they have not extracted fundamental concessions from Beijing. Targeted sanctions and law enforcement measures similarly have had economic impacts on some Chinese companies, but other Chinese companies have demonstrated an ability to weather U.S. economic coercion. To be effective in translating economic coercion into policy change by China, the United States needs to better integrate its coercive measures with each other and with other policies, better signal intentions and escalation, more rigorously assess impacts and costs, and galvanize allied support and coordinated action. For its part, China appears to recognize a balancing act between limiting economic ties with foreign partners in some domains and maintaining them in others. China has sought to distance certain Chinese economic sectors, particularly high-tech manufacturing, from the United States in some areas, investing heavily in domestic capacity development. In other areas where China must rely on foreign partners for technology, IP, or manufacturing, or where China does not appear to see a clear interest in severing trade, Beijing has sought to keep trade and investment flows moving in an unencumbered fashion. As for the United States, this is a dynamic policy environment.
Topic:
Security, Bilateral Relations, Economy, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

120. Forging an Alliance Innovation Base

Author:
Daniel Kliman, Ben Fitzgerald, Kristine Lee, and Joshua Fitt
Publication Date:
03-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
This report presents a blueprint for a community of technology innovation and protection anchored by America and its allies. Unless the United States builds this community—an “alliance innovation base”—it will steadily lose ground in the contest with China to ascend the commanding technological heights of the 21st century. Given that technology will increasingly determine future military advantage, underpin economic prosperity, and function as a tool for promoting liberal and illiberal visions of domestic governance, the stakes could not be higher. To compete, China is leveraging its formidable scale—whether measured in terms of research and development (R&D) expenditures, data sets, scientists and engineers, venture capital, or the reach of its leading technology companies. The only way for the United States to tip the scale back in its favor is to deepen cooperation with allies. The global diffusion of innovation also places a premium on aligning U.S. and ally efforts to protect technology. Unless coordinated with allies, tougher U.S. investment screening and export control policies, for example, will feature major seams that Beijing can exploit. America’s current approach to allies on technology innovation and protection remains a work in progress. In recent years, animated by concerns about China, the United States has made a concerted effort to step up engagement with allies in both areas. Existing mechanisms for deepening innovation with allies include technology scouting programs, multilateral cooperative frameworks, rapid innovation initiatives, and bilateral projects. However, these mechanisms at times lack sufficient resourcing, move too slowly, or feature rigid constraints on participation. U.S. instruments for working with allies on technology protection also contain major points of weakness. Multilateral export control regimes, though inclusive, are ponderous. The extraterritorial reach of U.S. export control laws can generate unintended obstacles to technology collaboration with allies. Bilateral and minilateral consultations on protection lack positive incentives to motivate allies to incur immediate costs such as forgoing technology sector investments from China.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Governance, Economy, and Alliance
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America