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Begin New Search Topic Foreign Policy Content Type Special Report Publication Year within 3 Years

1. Informing Australia’s next independent intelligence review: learning from the past

Author:
Chris Taylor
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
The Australian Government commissions a review of its intelligence community every five to seven years. With July 2023 marking six years since release of the last review’s report and, with funding already allocated in this year’s federal budget, the next one is likely to commence shortly. The best starting place for the forthcoming review is the work that precedes it, so reflection on 2017’s Independent Intelligence Review proves valuable. This report, Informing Australia’s next independent intelligence review, reflects on the experiences of the 2017 review and the implementation of its recommendations, and draws lessons to inform the terms of reference, approach and suggested focus of the next review. In doing so the report identifies three broad topics upon which the next review can most profitably ground its work: attracting, building and retaining a skilled workforce; adapting to rapid and profound technological change; and leveraging more, and closer, partnerships. It also highlights how the past six years have raised important and challenging questions in relation to each of those broad topics and identifies opportunities to further advance the future performance of the National Intelligence Community. In addition, specific recommendations are made to inform government’s planning and preparation for the new review.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Intelligence, and Statecraft
Political Geography:
Australia

2. An inflection point for Australian intelligence: revisiting the 2004 Flood Report

Author:
Chris Taylor
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
The 2003 Iraq war, and more particularly intelligence failure in relation to Iraqi WMD, led to a broad-ranging inquiry into Australian intelligence conducted by Philip Flood AO. Flood’s July 2004 report has proven an inflection point between the Australian Intelligence Community (AIC) of the immediate post–Cold War period and today’s National Intelligence Community (NIC). Flood laid out an ambitious vision for Australian intelligence and forcefully advocated for sovereign intelligence capability. The scope of his review extended beyond more than ‘recent intelligence lessons’ – that is, Iraq’s WMD, the 2002 Bali bombings and the unrest that led to 2003’s Regional Assistance Mission Solomon Islands - to the effectiveness of oversight and accountability within the AIC (including priority setting), ‘division of labour’ between AIC agencies and their communications with each other, maintenance of contestability in intelligence assessments, and adequacy of resourcing (especially for the Office of National Assessments - ONA). It was in addressing these matters that Flood laid the foundation for the future NIC, upon which would be constructed the reforms instituted by the L’Estrange-Merchant review of 2017. Importantly, Flood’s recommendations significantly enhanced ONA’s capabilities—not just analytical resources but also the resources (and tasking) needed to address the more effective coordination and evaluation of foreign intelligence across the AIC. This was a critical step towards the more structured and institutionalised (if sometimes bureaucratic) NIC of 2023 and an enhanced community leadership role for, ultimately, ONI. In addition, the Flood Report identified issues that remain pertinent and challenging today – including the vexed issue of the public presentation of intelligence for policy purposes, the central importance of the intelligence community’s people (including training, career management, recruitment and language proficiency), intelligence distribution (including avoiding overloading time-poor customers), the need to maximise collaborative opportunities between agencies, and how best to leverage intelligence relationships (including broadening relations beyond traditional allied partners).
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Intelligence, National Security, and Iraq War
Political Geography:
Australia and Australia/Pacific

3. Incels in Australia: the ideology, the threat, and a way forward

Author:
Jasmine Latimore and John Coyne
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
This report explores the phenomenon of ‘incels’—involuntary celibates—and the misogynistic ideology that underpins a subset of this global community of men that has become a thriving Internet subculture. It examines how online spaces, from popular social media sites to dedicated incel forums, are providing a platform for not just the expansion of misogynistic views but gender-based violent extremism. It raises key questions regarding Australian efforts to counter misogynistic ideologies within our nation. If there’s a continuum that has sexist, but lawful, views on gender at one end and gendered hate speech at the other, at what point does misogynistic ideology tip into acts of gendered violence? What’s needed to prevent misogynistic ideologies from becoming violent? And how do we, as a society, avoid the epidemic levels of violence against women in Australia? This report doesn’t intend to provide answers to all of those questions. It does, however, seek to make an important contribution to public discourse about the increasing trend in misogynistic ideology through examination of a particularly violent community of misogynists, and proposes a range of policy options for consideration to tackle the threat that misogynistic ideology poses to Australia. This report makes six recommendations designed to reduce and, where possible, prevent the risk of future occurrence of incel and similar violence in Australia. The recommendations include greater awareness raising and policy recognition that incel violence can be an ideological form of issue-motivated extremism which would provide certainty that incels could formally fall within the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO)—in addition to law-enforcement agencies—and would encourage tailored education programs focused on engaging young males at risk from indoctrination in this extreme subculture (along with their parents).
Topic:
Foreign Policy, National Security, Law Enforcement, Counter-terrorism, Ideology, Threat Assessment, and Incels
Political Geography:
Australia and Australia/Pacific

4. Chinese foreign policy in 2023: Stepping back from the brink

Author:
Thomas Eder
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP)
Abstract:
When it comes to Chinese foreign policy in 2023, decision-makers in Austria and Europe have to most importantly consider three partly interrelated and highly topical questions that are and should be preoccupying China researchers. Will China escalate its support for Russia during the war in Ukraine? Will China invade Taiwan? How will China’s protest movement and exit from Zero-COVID impact foreign policy? Further trends in China research will address the need to employ digital methods due to a lack of access for fieldwork (COVID or political restrictions) (BCCN 2022), the importance of protests more broadly (labour issues or Hong Kong democracy) (Wei and Chan 2022; Cheng et al 2022), and the fragility of a centralized system around Xi Jinping with no succession plan as Xi enters his third term as president in March 2023 (Tsang and Cheung 2021). Following Russia’s full invasion of Ukraine, Beijing has supported Moscow in the informational and diplomatic domain, but has remained self-interested in the economic domain, and has not shifted from previous policies in the military domain (Chestnut Greitens 2022, 751). China needs Russia as a partner in mounting a (normative) challenge to US power and the liberal international order (Johnston 2022, 1307), gaining influence in multilateral institutions (Wang and Sampson 2022, 374), and preserving the Communist Party regime (Pavel, Kirchberger and Sinjen 2022, 295). The Chinese leadership would like to see a Russian victory, and dreads a defeatinduced regime collapse in Moscow (Lo 2022). Beijing has condemned the West for provoking the war and for imposing sanctions. In the UN, China abstained or voted for Russia. At the same time, since the beginning of the war, bilateral trade has grown significantly. Yet, Chinese companies and banks have partly withdrawn or broken off ties with Russian counterparts to steer clear of secondary sanctions. Moreover, while joint military exercises continue, there is no clear evidence for arms or equipment deliveries.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, Economy, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
China and Asia

5. Pressing Security Concerns in Southeast Asia: Next-Generation Perspectives

Author:
John Hemmings, Ariel Mota Alves, Attawat Joseph Ma Assavanadda, Fikry A. Rahman, Katrina Guanio, and Siu Tzyy Wei
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
Southeast Asia is a pivotal sub-region of the Indo-Pacific. Spanning 1,700,000 square miles, its total population is 676 million – around 8.5% of the world’s population – and has a collective GDP of US$3.67 trillion (as of 2022). Over the years, it has been associated with both economic dynamism and significant security challenges. As authors in this volume note, the territorial disputes in the South China Sea, disagreements over water rights in the Mekong Delta, and the current conflict in Myanmar highlight fault lines not only between Southeast Asian states themselves, but also between great powers such as China and the United States. There are many more – the EU, India, Japan, Australia, and South Korea – that pay close attention to developments in the sub-region. Maintaining peace and stability in a region that plays host to one-third of global sea-borne trade, hosts major undersea internet cables, and is a major thoroughfare for energy supplies from the Middle East to the advanced manufacturing hubs in China, Japan, and South Korea is both challenging and complicated. The primary mechanism for engagement with the individual countries in Southeast Asia has been through the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and its attendant bodies, such as the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the East Asia Summit (EAS), and the ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting (ADMM). Meanwhile, ASEAN member states have promoted the principle of “ASEAN centrality” as a means to prevent major power interference in the sub-region and to retain influence over security cooperation within Southeast Asia and beyond. As a result, the acknowledgement of ASEAN centrality has become a “boilerplate” for strategy and policy documents related to regional security. One example of this is the inclusion of the principle in the 2021 U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy. However, the increasingly pressing nature of challenges confronting the broader region, their speed and intensity, are beginning to outpace the evolution of institutions and processes associated with ASEAN. The ASEAN Way – an emphasis on informal consultation, non-interference, and consensus as the basis of major decisions – has been integral to creating internal cohesion and harmony within ASEAN decision-making and is an enabler of socio-political integration. On the other hand, it has also stymied efforts to develop effective collective responses to conflicts and has made ASEAN hostage to great powers able to use their influence over members to break consensus. While defenders of ASEAN point to its successes and remain confident that it will adapt to regional issues over time, others are increasingly skeptical that ASEAN can retain its status as the gatekeeper of regional security agenda. It is in this context that Pacific Forum carried out this extended study with support from the Luce Foundation to investigate Southeast Asian perspectives on the “biggest threats or most pressing security issues, now and in the foreseeable future.” We asked a group of our Southeast Asian cohort of Young Leaders (ages 21 to 35), what problems were most pressing to them, and asked them how they thought their countries should address these issues, noting which third-parties would be most important for them to leverage in doing so. We believe this publication, which cuts across a broad range of security issues, is a fair representation of the eclecticism and diversity that characterize the region itself and hope that our readers will find them as useful as we have here at Pacific Forum. The collection starts with traditional security issues and then moves to more non-traditional security issues, though this does not reflect any internal emphasis or prioritization on the part of the editors. The first essay, by Siu Tzyy Wei, is entitled “Caught in the Middle: The Measured Voice of Brunei’s Foreign Policy Amidst the South China Sea Dispute.” Beginning with the South China Sea is appropriate for any collective study on the region, but Brunei’s position as a “silent claimant” presents a perspective not often heard. The author’s assertion that it is China and external powers – AUKUS and the Quad are mentioned – that are adding pressure to the South China Sea and adding a dangerous complexity, compelling Brunei’s “neutrality,” a striking claim given the threat to Bruneian sovereignty. The second essay moves to another flashpoint, the political crisis in Myanmar; a national issue that has reverberated around ASEAN as well as further abroad in Washington and Brussels. Appropriately titled “The Coming of the Raging Fire: The Revolution in Myanmar,” Thiha Wint Aung analyzes the lead-up to the political crisis and concludes by calling for the international community to explicitly support the people’s “armed resistance” against the military. The third essay presents a bold national case for a region-wide issue: dealing with rising Chinese influence. In “Malaysia’s China Policy Amid China’s Growing Security Concerns,” Fikry A. Rahman argues that Malaysian policy elites will have to prioritize strategic concerns over economic ties vis-a-vis China if it is to adequately defend Malaysian sovereignty. The next group of essays focuses on non-traditional security issues, beginning with climate change, one of the most pressing global issues. Southeast Asia is particularly vulnerable to the effects of climate change, as noted in the fourth essay, “When it Rains, it Pours: Disaster Displacement and the Future of Human Security in the Philippines Amid Changing Climate.” Katrina Guanio calls for policymakers to be aware of gradual or even sudden human migrations due to inclement weather, such as typhoons, and the impact these have on national health, economic, and security dynamics. Taking an unusual and unique perspective, the fifth essay, “Climate Maladaptation: Migration, Food Insecurity, and the Politics of Climate Change in Timor-Leste” by Ariel Mota Alves, makes the provocative argument that international organizations can sometimes promote detrimental Western development narratives that undermine local solutions to local climate change effects. The sixth essay, “Human Trafficking in Vietnam: A Top-Tier Non-Traditional Security Threat in the 21st Century” by Thu Nguyen Hoang Anh, measures the impact of the scourge of human trafficking in Vietnam and offers practical policy solutions to mitigating its impact on victims. Finally, the seventh essay, by Attawat Assavanadda, looks at “Thailand’s Brain Drain Challenge: Trends and Implications,” noting the push-pull drivers of the phenomenon and its impact on Thailand’s overall development. As one can see from this summary, the range of topics chosen by our talented Young Leader cohort from Southeast Asia is as diverse, inspiring, and multidimensional as the region itself. Ranging from security issues that are well covered by regional and international media to those that take an eclectic look at local variations of international issues, we are pleased to showcase these essays. As ever, the mission of Pacific Forum only begins with the creation of such young leader cohorts, and empowering them to present their analyses and recommendations should only be a prelude to robust regional conversations and discussions. We have been since our creation – a forum for those discussions – and hope that our readers will take that engaging approach to these essays and their authors.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Climate Change, Migration, Brain Drain, and Human Trafficking
Political Geography:
Southeast Asia

6. Little substance, considerable impact Russian influence in Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Montenegro

Author:
Wouter Zweers and Niels Drost
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
This Clingendael report explores the role of the Russian Federation in Serbia, Montenegro, and Bosnia and Herzegovina. It examines Russia’s objectives in its relations with the three countries, as well the various sources of influence the Kremlin holds in each of the three countries. The report places this analysis within the changed geopolitical circumstances resulting from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Russia’s main objectives for the Western Balkans are threefold. First, the Kremlin seeks to project great power status globally. Second, it seeks to obstruct the Euro-Atlantic integration of the region by advocating against NATO and EU integration and by raising instabilities. Third, the Kremlin uses the Balkans, especially the Kosovo issue, as an argument for its foreign policy agenda elsewhere, particularly when it comes to defending its perceived dominance over its near abroad. Instead of building a sustainable, all-encompassing, and meaningful relation with Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), and Montenegro, Russia instead pursues an opportunistic approach depending on fragmented entry points for influence in each country. The Kremlin displays moderate ambitions for building positive relationships with the three countries, which is reflected also in the instruments it uses to influence the region. It nurtures contacts with, and influence through, a wide range of individual politicians, the Orthodox Church, the media and malign proxy groups, making use of energy links as well as local tensions and historical memories. Moscow pursues this approach deliberately, and it has proven relatively successful. At the political level, Russia’s clout stretches especially to (pro-)Serb politicians, who often make use of similar narratives and use Russia as an external supporter to promote their own ideas. In particular, its position on Kosovo, Russian support for Republika Srpska leader Milorad Dodik and its Orthodox Church links remain important entry points for Russia’s political influence in the region at large. Of the three countries, entry points for Russian influence are most widespread In Serbia, followed by Bosnia and Herzegovina. Economically, Russia’s influence is outperformed substantially by that of the EU, especially in terms of trade. Russia’s far-reaching influence in the energy sectors of BiH and Serbia, however, yield substantial political leverage, even if its investments often prove economically inviable. When it comes to military influence, Russia seeks to maintain its military cooperation with its main partner, Serbia, while also supporting the militarisation of Republika Srpska. Belgrade is satisfied with its current degree of cooperation with Moscow but seeks to avoid becoming Russia’s foothold in the Balkans. Factually, Russia is only one of multiple security actors in the Balkans, overshadowed by NATO and challenged by China. While presenting itself as a partner to Serbia and Republika Srpska in particular, Russia also resorts to malign instruments which have often proven to be effective in shaping the political environment of the Western Balkans. Lacking a military presence in the region, Russia supports far-right nationalist figures and organisations, which generally better resemble organised crime groups than paramilitary organisations, to attain its goal of destabilisation by stirring up polarisation and anti-Western sentiment. The Kremlin is perhaps most successful in the field of media and disinformation. Russian propaganda penetrates Serbia, Montenegro, and Bosnia and Herzegovina through Russian-funded portals, local media and social media. Russian disinformation and narratives have penetrated the region to such an extent that considerable sections of society hold a positive image of Russia and its political leadership. In all these fields, the Russian invasion of Ukraine has moderately affected but not fully altered Russia’s approach towards Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Montenegro. While the invasion has led to sharper dividing lines between Russia and the West and decreases in Russian financial and diplomatic capacities, we observe continuity in terms of Russian strategies and objectives. Russia’s sources of influence in the three countries have been moderately strained, among other causes as a result of BiH and Serbia’s first steps to diversify energy sources and Western pressure to diminish their political and security links with the Russian Federation. For the time being, this has not yet affected Moscow’s ability to act as a spoiler to the Euro-Atlantic integration of the three countries. The extent to which the European Union and NATO are effective in countering Russian influence in Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Montenegro will be part of a follow-up Clingendael report to be published in fall 2023. As part of the same research project, analyses of societal and political perceptions towards Russia in the three countries will be published in summer 2023 by Clingendael partners the Atlantic Council of Montenegro, the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia, and the Atlantic Initiative in BiH.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, European Union, Disinformation, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
Russia, Eastern Europe, Serbia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina

7. The EU in the South Caucasus: Navigating a geopolitical labyrinth in turmoil

Author:
Bob Deen and Wouter Zweers
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
The tectonic plates of geopolitics are shifting in such a profound way that has not been seen since the end of the Cold War. The Russian invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022 has not only increased tensions between the world’s major powers, but also severely impacted the regions in which they traditionally strive to project their power. This applies especially to areas in the wider Eurasian region that the Russian Federation unjustifiably considers as part of its sphere of influence, such as the South Caucasus. Russia’s failure to achieve a quick and decisive victory in its full-scale invasion of Ukraine has not only forced the Kremlin to limit its objectives on the battlefield, at least for the time being, to Ukraine’s east. It has also reduced the credibility of the Russian military that much of its power projection has depended upon – and has reduced its attractiveness as a security partner for countries that have traditionally regarded Russia as such. Russia has had to withdraw some of its troops and military equipment from the South Caucasus, its leadership is preoccupied with Ukraine, and it has not lived up to its security commitments to Armenia. This has contributed to a geopolitical vacuum and uncertainty in the South Caucasus that other actors are eager to exploit.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, European Union, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:
Europe and South Caucasus

8. Climate and Environmental Security in the Democratic Republic of Congo

Author:
Kira Vinke, Loyle Campbell, Dana Schirwon, Katongo Seyuba, Florian Krampe, Hafsa Maalim, and Guélor Isulu Mbungwal
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:
Climate change is compounding the Democratic Republic of Congo’s tangle of problems – a long-running civil war, weak governance, and deeply entrenched poverty and inequality. The country’s future is of global significance: its vast Congo-basin rainforest is a crucial carbon sink and a haven of biodiversity. DRC’s hydropower potential and its deposits of copper and cobalt could enable the energy transition, but a green resource looms over development prospects. Germany will need flexible and well-aligned national strategies to effectively support peace, human progress, and environmental protection in the DRC while putting the focus on the needs of marginalized populations.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Climate Change, Poverty, Inequality, and Hydropower
Political Geography:
Africa and Democratic Republic of Congo

9. Russia’s War in Ukraine: Rethinking the EU’s Eastern Enlargement and Neighborhood Policy

Author:
Guntram Wolff, Alexandra Gritz, Stefan Meister, and Milan Nič
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:
The stagnating EU accession process needs political will and procedural changes allowing eastern candidates to advance. In the meantime, they should be more supported to use the full potential of existing opportunities for gradual economic and sectoral integration with the EU. An upgraded Eastern Partnership needs a comprehensive security dimension linking resilience, connectivity, and defense policy, as well as cooperation in the area of the Common Security and Defence Policy. The protracted regional conflicts (in Moldova and the South Caucasus) require a more active EU engagement as existing OSCE formats continue to be blocked, and Russia’s role and military presence weaken. New openings for conflict resolution mean higher demand for the EU’s diplomatic, monitoring, and peacekeeping capacities. A new eastern Neighborhood Policy should be designed for the wider region, connecting the Black Sea and the South Caucasus with Central Asia and thus creating viable alternatives to the competing geoeconomic and governance “offers” of China, Russia, and Turkey.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Governance, European Union, International Order, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Central Asia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

10. US Trade Policy Options for Pacific Islands States Require Washington’s Political Commitment

Author:
Marcus Noland
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
East-West Center
Abstract:
The Pacific Islands have emerged as a zone of contestation in the ongoing rivalry between China and the United States. While the US has long been the dominant military power in the region, China is raising its profile through activities like port visits, military exercises, and establishing diplomatic and security ties with regional states like Kiribati and the Solomon Islands. In 2018, Chinese leader Xi Jinping visited Papua New Guinea for the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit. President Biden was supposed to visit PNG in May 2023, in the first ever visit of a sitting US president to the Pacific Islands, but that trip was scuttled due to the debt ceiling fiasco in Washington. In the economics sphere, the US has attempted to counter China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) together with Japan and Australia through the Blue Dot Network and the Indo-Pacific Infrastructure Trilateral to promote high-quality, transparent, and sustainable infrastructure development. The region contains considerable natural resources, and the US has been working with Pacific Island nations to promote sustainable resource management, in contrast to China’s alleged illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing in the Pacific. What has been missing, however, is a trade policy component to the US strategy to counterbalance China’s exploration of a free trade agreement with the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF).
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Economics, Politics, and Trade Policy
Political Geography:
China, North America, United States of America, and Pacific Islands

11. Sustaining Congressional Engagement with Southeast Asia

Author:
Erik Ashida
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
East-West Center
Abstract:
As a representative institution whose members can outlast presidential administrations, Congress plays a vital role in sustaining long-term US foreign policy commitments. The perception of long-term commitment is particularly important in Southeast Asia, where most states seek to maximize their strategic autonomy by balancing relations among great powers. Thus, expectations about the future behavior of great powers can significantly affect foreign policy choices. Congress speaks through the exercise of its formal powers but also in more subtle ways. Congressional actions on foreign relations operate along three channels. The first channel is support for policies initiated by the executive branch, e.g., passing appropriations, making requested statutory changes, or, at the very least, not obstructing what an administration seeks to do. The second channel is symbolic support for a relationship, such as meetings with foreign officials or public statements of support. Though these actions are generally nonbinding, they can be a more meaningful gauge of support than the first channel because legislators must seek them out and can define the terms of their engagement—something not always possible when voting on legislation. The third channel is policy advanced independently from the executive branch, such as standalone bills, conditions placed on funding, or rigorous oversight. Each of these tools is available to individual legislators, groups of legislators such as caucuses or committees, or the entire legislative branch acting collectively.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, Politics, and Governance
Political Geography:
Asia, Southeast Asia, and United States of America

12. What North Korea Has Been Learning From Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine

Author:
Tereza Novotná
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
East-West Center
Abstract:
A year ago, in February 2022, Russia invaded its neighbor, Ukraine. Russian aggression has upended the post-war security mechanisms in Europe and made the international multilateral system, including the UN Security Council, more fragile and ineffective than ever. Even though the war in Ukraine has implications for security in Northeast Asia, many Asian nations consider it a distant issue for Europeans to solve. However, this perspective mirrors what Europe’s Asian counterparts, especially the Koreans, have faced for decades. It serves as an apt analogy for explaining the dangers of North Korea to Europe. North Korea is also watching the war closely to discern what lessons or leverage can be extracted from the unfolding conflict. This short article reflects on two lessons and three opportunities that the War in Ukraine presents to Kim Jong Un and concludes with recommendations on what the Europeans could do in the near future.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Conflict, Russia-Ukraine War, and Invasion
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, Asia, and North Korea

13. Two Peripheries: The Ukraine War's Effect on North Korea-Russia Relations

Author:
Anthony V. Rinna
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
East-West Center
Abstract:
Spanning the Eurasian landmass, Russia’s actions in adjacent Ukraine invariably affect the geopolitical state of play on the similarly adjacent Korean Peninsula. Although ties between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) and Russia have been of largely secondary importance for both countries since their veritable rupture in the early- and mid-1990s, Moscow-Pyongyang relations became more mutually beneficial in 2022. Whereas most countries have outright condemned Russia’s invasion of Ukraine or taken up an ambiguous position, the DPRK has been vocal in its support for Russia. From the DPRK perspective, the Kremlin’s post-2022 diplomatic and economic estrangement from much of the world has provided Pyongyang with an opening to leverage ties with Russia to push for an easing of its own diplomatic and economic isolation. Meanwhile, strengthening its DPRK ties allows Russia to undermine US influence on its Asian periphery. In supporting Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, North Korea appears to be aiming toward obtaining economic benefits from closer ties with Russia, a country whose economy has managed to stay afloat despite heavy Western sanctions. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has provided the impetus for Pyongyang’s outreach to Moscow. However, the roots of the current upswing in Moscow-Pyongyang relations go back to the April 2019 summit between Kim Jong Un and Vladimir Putin. Kim received an invitation to meet with Putin in May 2018 yet waited eleven months to meet with the Russian leader, even as Kim regularly met with the leaders of other major players on the Korean Peninsula. Kim may have decided after the February 2019 Hanoi summit yielded few results that strengthening ties with Russia, which was more reluctant than China to support UN sanctions against Pyongyang in 2017, was a more viable option for sanctions relief. Aside from the fact that Russia has demonstrated a clear unwillingness to impose new sanctions against the DPRK, North Korean citizens are reported to still be working in Russia in contravention of UN Resolution 2397. North Korean workers’ earnings are said to have suffered because of Russia’s reduced access to hard currency. Yet, the ruble’s continued resilience may mean that earning currency in Russia is still worthwhile for laborers dispatched at Pyongyang’s behest.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, Economics, and Politics
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, Asia, and North Korea

14. United Kingdom Engagement with North Korea

Author:
Alastair Morgan
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
East-West Center
Abstract:
As one of the Allied Powers, The United Kingdom was involved in Post-World War II planning for the Korean peninsula, including the November 1943 Cairo Conference declaration that “… in due course, Korea shall become free and independent.” However, US President Roosevelt’s proposal at the February 1945 Yalta Conference did not establish a formal role for the UK in the trusteeship of Korea. Subsequently, the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to divide the peninsula at the 38th parallel in August 1945, and direct British involvement in the peninsula was limited prior to the Korean War. The United Kingdom’s Korean War contribution to the United Nations Command was second only to the United States, with significant deployments of maritime and air assets in addition to the provision of ground troops. Almost 60,000 British troops saw action, with nearly 5,000 killed, wounded, missing in action, or taken prisoner. Following the armistice, the United Kingdom has continued to send representation to the United Nations Command. The armistice agreement includes an obligation on so-called “Sending States” to respond to renewed hostility. Although there is no automatic UK commitment to send forces, the armistice agreement remains a consideration in engagement with North Korea.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, Economics, Education, Politics, and Strategic Engagement
Political Geography:
United Kingdom, Europe, Asia, and North Korea

15. North Korea-Germany Relations: An Ambassador's Perspective of Diplomacy with Pyongyang

Author:
Armin Schäfer
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
East-West Center
Abstract:
Germany established diplomatic relations with North Korea, also known as the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), in 2001 at the request of the South Korean government, which hoped that Germany and the European Union (EU) would play a more active role in supporting the “Sunshine Policy.” Since then, Germany, together with the other EU states, has sought to moderate North Korea through a “Policy of Critical Engagement” to convince it of the benefits of international cooperation, respect for the rule of law, and improving the political and economic situation of its people. In doing so, Germany could build on the long relationship between North Korea and the former East Germany. “Critical engagement” means being willing to talk and get involved, but without holding back on criticism—and, if need be, imposing sanctions. It also implies that comprehensive engagement is not (yet) possible because of the circumstances. There is ample cause for a constrained approach from North Korea’s aggressive foreign policy and systematic human rights violations to the absence of suitable economic and fiscal conditions for business and development cooperation. Moreover, the lack of will on the part of considerable segments of the North Korean regime to engage with other countries also hampers broader engagement.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Economics, Education, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:
Europe, Asia, North Korea, and Germany

16. North Korea-Guyana Relations in the Burnham Era

Author:
Moe Taylor
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
East-West Center
Abstract:
During the reign of Forbes Burnham (1923-85), the South American republic of Guyana (formerly British Guiana) became one of North Korea’s greatest foreign policy success stories. Pyongyang not only acquired a new trading partner in the Americas but also gained a vocal advocate for its position on Korean unification on the international stage. These close ties grew in large part from Burnham’s admiration for North Korea, where he saw a highly disciplined citizenry united around the Great Leader, willing to work hard and sacrifice for the collective good. Guyana perhaps did more than any other single actor to help North Korea become viewed as an economic model for developing countries. First elected Premier of the colony of British Guiana in 1964, Burnham became Prime Minister upon independence in 1966 and ruled until his death in 1985. A lawyer and trade unionist from the capital’s Afro-Guyanese middle class, his rise to power was backed by the United States, which viewed him as the only realistic alternative to the communists. While Burnham veered to the Left once in power and frequently irritated Washington, he was more or less tolerated because his pro-Soviet opposition would almost certainly fill his absence.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, Politics, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:
Asia, North Korea, South America, and Guyana

17. Normalizing U.S.–Pakistan Relations

Author:
Adam Weinstein
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:
The U.S.–Pakistan relationship is often portrayed negatively among the lawmakers, media, and general public of both countries, with a focus on mutual resentment and dysfunction. The early relationship was burdened by mismatched expectations regarding support in conflicts with India. Different priorities from the start of U.S. involvement in Afghanistan during the 1980s further strained the relationship. The United States also sanctioned Pakistan and India for developing nuclear weapons, which had a disparate impact on Pakistan, causing ongoing tension. Many in Washington’s policy and journalistic communities hold negative views of Pakistan, viewing it as an enabler of terrorism that seeks geopolitical rents but rarely delivers. Pakistanis often resent what they view as Washington’s use of the country as a “frontline state” in both the Cold War and the War on Terror, claiming tens of thousands of lives, only to discard it later. These grievances are largely dismissed in Washington as self–inflicted. Despite the negative public debate, serving officials in both governments generally hold a more nuanced view, recognizing the broad overlapping interests shared by the United States and Pakistan in areas like climate change, trade, and counterterrorism. There is already an exhaustive literature on terrorism in Pakistan, nuclear security, and potential conflicts along the Line of Control with India. This brief will instead focus on revitalizing U.S.–Pakistan relations through innovative diplomacy in areas that have received less attention, such as trade, regional integration, people–to–people connections, and climate change. Its principal recommendation is that Washington should resist viewing Pakistan through the narrow lens of the “War on Terror” or great power competition. Instead it should pursue its interests through more normalized relations, while recognizing U.S. limitations in influencing events in Pakistan or the region.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Counter-terrorism, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Pakistan, South Asia, North America, and United States of America

18. Less is More: A New Strategy for US Security Assistance to Africa

Author:
Elizabeth Shackelford, Ethan Kessler, and Emma Sanderson
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Chicago Council on Global Affairs
Abstract:
The US strategy toward Africa today is neither effective nor sustainable. It’s time to flip the script. US policy in Africa has for too long prioritized short-term security to the detriment of long-term stability by prioritizing the provision of military and security assistance. This is done in hopes that partner countries will use this capacity to suppress radical groups at home and reduce the likelihood that they will spread disorder in the region or create threats to US interests at home and abroad. Yet, this strategy has neither produced security in Africa nor reduced threats to the United States and its interests. Washington should rein in its use of security assistance with partners that fail to demonstrate commitment to the reforms necessary to build long-term stability. Partnerships and military assistance with illiberal, undemocratic countries have delivered little, if any, sustainable security improvements, and in many cases have prompted further instability and violence by building the capacity of abusive security forces. They have also provided harmful associations between the US government and the abuses committed by those we arm and assist. Since terrorism in Africa poses a low threat to US national security interests, there is no justification for focusing on short-term security issues at the cost of good governance, rule of law, and other factors that contribute to long-term stability. The costs of doing so are increasingly being recognized, with Congress today more likely to apply existing legal provisions to end security cooperation with abusive regimes. But these interventions typically come too late and are too inconsistent to influence behavior of illiberal regimes. A more systemic approach is needed to break the pattern of poor outcomes. The rise of great-power competition exacerbates the risk that the US national security establishment will double down on its security cooperation strategy in the region out of concern that doing otherwise would leave a vacuum that America’s competitors might fill. In reality, however, the argument for being more selective in distributing security assistance is even stronger with the return of great-power competition, as values and reputation become increasingly important in attracting support for the United States over other great powers. Security and military assistance will continue to play a role in the region. However, the United States would be better off being more deliberate and cautious, only pursuing it after completing a holistic assessment of the potential impact of such assistance on governance, human rights, and broader stability. Security assistance can and must be more closely scrutinized with enhanced US government oversight tools to ensure it does not undermine governance and stability, and Washington should be more willing to choose different tools when shaping relationships with weak partners, to condition assistance to ensure it does not facilitate bad outcomes, and to cut it off when partner countries use it to abuse civilians.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Strategic Competition, and Military Aid
Political Geography:
Africa, North America, and United States of America

19. The Quad's Next Chapter

Author:
Karl Friedhoff
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Chicago Council on Global Affairs
Abstract:
Advancing the group's pillars of prosperity and development will be at the very heart of competition with China in the coming decade. The Quad—the country grouping including the United States, Japan, Australia, and India—now stands at a crossroads as it enters its third phase. The Quad 3.0 comes as the grouping has established the dialogue as a meeting place for leaders of the four countries but must now decide what shape competition with China will take and how to best address that competition. Thus far the Quad has struggled to find function for its form. Statements issued by Quad leaders stress the importance of “development, stability, and prosperity” in an effort to roll back China’s influence across the Indo-Pacific. However, its most high-profile activities focus on stability via high-profile military exercises. Closer internal coordination along the security axis serves to highlight the lack of visible progress on the external delivery of development and prosperity to countries outside the Quad. Efforts to deliver development and prosperity are hemmed in by the Quad itself. Neither the United States or India are party to either of the major regional trade agreements—the CPTPP and RCEP. The Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF), held up by the Biden administration as America’s economic engagement with Asia, remains a mirage. Meanwhile, as the United States de-risks its economic relationship with China, it is effectively warning that doing business with Beijing may come at a cost to relations with Washington—an unpopular message across much of the Indo-Pacific. Additionally, any hint of security cooperation with China by smaller countries in the region creates a flurry of diplomatic reaction from the United States. To move forward, the Quad needs to better balance its portfolio and how it messages that portfolio. The overt promotion of the security agenda is actively undermining perceptions of the Quad’s ability to engage on development and prosperity. A first corrective step is to balance the group’s internal goal of improved security coordination and cohesion with the Quad’s external goal of delivering development and prosperity to countries in the region. Committing to an agenda that brings the people of the region, not its seas, to the fore of the Quad mission should be a top priority. This means rejecting the dogma that every China initiative in the region needs a Quad alternative. Instead, advancing Quad goals requires identifying China’s activities that can be co-opted for Quad purposes. This will mean working around, and sometimes with, China’s initiatives to better serve not only the Quad’s goals in prosperity and development but also the people of the region.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Development, Geopolitics, Trade, Strategic Competition, and Quad Alliance
Political Geography:
Japan, China, South Asia, India, East Asia, Australia, North America, United States of America, and Oceania

20. Turkey’s New Foreign Policy: Ankara’s Ambitions, Regional Responses, and Implications for the United States

Author:
Aaron Stein
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
For the past century, Turkey’s foreign policy has been driven by the need to preserve the achievements of the Lausanne Treaty in the face of often serious threats from major powers. As a result, Turkey was a predominantly status quo country, and its relations with neighboring states were largely shaped by its place in broader geopolitical struggles. With the end of the Cold War, however, and the subsequent growth of Turkey’s economic, military and diplomatic strength, this has changed. Turkish foreign policy has begun to focus on reshaping the regional order in accordance with its growing desire for influence. Going forward, the nature of Ankara’s efforts, and the response they provoke from Turkey’s neighbors, will be an increasingly crucial factor in determining Turkey’s relations with the United States and Europe. Turkey’s new dynamics will remain a source of tension under any future Turkish government, but they need not, if managed well by all sides, lead to a lasting rift between Turkey and the West. The more deeply embroiled Turkey becomes in disputes with key US allies from Western Europe to the Persian Gulf, the more difficult it will be for Washington and Ankara to have a cooperative, mutually beneficial relationship. And the more Turkey views itself as a revisionist power, the more it will come into conflict with America’s allies. As a result, it is more important than ever for US policymakers to understand the historic trajectory of Turkey’s place in its region. Turkey emerged from the collapse of the Ottoman Empire as a status quo power, an orientation that it maintained for the better part of the last hundred years. Though the new country had been shorn of its former territories in Southeastern Europe and the Middle East, it had also forcefully defeated foreign efforts to occupy the territory of Anatolia itself. For modern Turkey’s founders, the success in avoiding complete colonization far outweighed the failure to preserve the full geographic scope of the Ottoman Empire. As a result, they forged a pragmatic foreign policy tradition that prioritized preserving their achievement: a Turkish state sovereign and secure within its current borders. This goal remained constant over a long and turbulent 20th century, even as its implications changed, and allowed for Ankara to be flexible about which countries to work with to maximize its self-declared interests. In the inter-war period, when threats came largely from powerful European empires like France, Italy, and Britain, the defense of Turkish sovereignty called for a policy of neutrality and non-alignment. In the immediate aftermath of World War II, however, Turkey’s geopolitical position changed dramatically. Suddenly, the Soviet Union emerged as the most direct and dangerous threat to Turkey’s territorial integrity. In this new strategic context, seeking the support of the United States and NATO became the only feasible way to preserve the imperiled status quo, equip the country’s armed forces, and ultimately defend its borders. The result was a strong and mutually beneficial alliance with the United States and much of Europe. The success of this alliance, however, sometimes obscured the complex, constantly evolving and often paradoxical relationship between Turkey’s status quo orientation and its historically-grounded relationships with regional states. The circumstances surrounding the collapse of the Ottoman Empire created a bitter legacy, giving almost all of Turkey’s neighbors both emotional and practical reasons to feel hostility towards it. With other countries that shared a commitment to the status quo, however, Ankara had equally good reason to overcome this animosity. For countries that found themselves on the wrong side of Turkey’s geopolitical alignment, by contrast, these resentments and unresolved problems were consistently exacerbated. The history of Turkey’s regional relationships can be read through the ever-shifting dynamics of power politics and unsettled history. In the case of Greece, for example, Ankara and Athens began an ambitious rapprochement in the 1930s when they both felt their security was threatened by Italian irredentism in the Eastern Mediterranean. When this shared threat was supplanted by the Soviet Union, the two countries were brought into an even closer alignment under the NATO umbrella. Soon though, the growing rebellion against British rule on Cyprus rendered the status quo unsustainable, leaving Athens and Ankara with radically divergent views on what should come next. Only in this context were a number of longstanding questions re-opened, such as maritime borders and the status of historic minorities in both countries. Crucially, even as tensions over Cyprus worsened, both sides still had Washington to help remind them of their shared security interests. Throughout the Cold War, the United States was in a position to manage Turkish-Greek tensions in order to pre-empt the risk of an intra-NATO war between two allies that would benefit the Soviets. In other words, by acting as a forceful advocate for the status quo, Washington helped ensure that both Greece and Turkey maintained their shared commitment to it. With the end of the Cold War and the rise of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s Justice and Development Party, Turkey embraced not just a new foreign policy but a new foreign policy orientation. Ankara is no longer interested in maintaining the status quo—it now wants to transform it. Just as Turkey’s status quo orientation led to different policies as circumstances change, Turkey’s new anti-status quo orientation has also led Erdoğan’s government to pursue different strategies. But to make sense of these shifts, and the reaction they have provoked in the region, it is crucial to appreciate that, no less than in the previous century, Turkey’s neighbors have responded in light of their history but also, more importantly, their own orientation toward the regional status quo.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, NATO, AKP, and Regional Power
Political Geography:
Turkey, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

21. Fighting to Win: Ukraine, Russia, and the War for Survival

Author:
Philip Wasielewski
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
Both the Kremlin and Ukrainians see the war as an existential conflict, even as a “holy war,” and are prepared to fight for years to achieve victory. Russian war aims vis-à-vis Ukraine have morphed into creating a “frozen conflict” to maintain its land bridge with Crimea. However, its primary war aim remains weakening NATO to regain its sphere of influence in the former Soviet republics and Warsaw Pact states. To achieve this, Russia will conduct a prolonged strategic defense in Ukraine to demonstrate that Ukraine will never regain its territorial integrity and to show that American support will eventually end as it has for other client states. Ukraine’s primary war aim of restoring its territorial integrity is shared across its society. To achieve this, Ukraine’s strategy is to break the will of the Russian army and then reclaim Crimea, even if that takes several years. Ukrainians do not fear a long war but an inconclusive one that reignites in five or ten years. They want to settle this conflict with Russia once and for all, and see NATO membership as the only way to prevent it from happening again. For US policymakers, the dangers arising from the war overshadow opportunities. One opportunity is a Russian defeat that can serve both as a brake against further Kremlin aggression and as a catalyst for Russia to possibly change her imperial identity. Another opportunity is the chance to strengthen NATO’s conventional forces and geographic position to give it an overwhelming advantage against any possible future Russian aggression. For that to happen, Ukraine must enter the alliance.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, NATO, Armed Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, and Ukraine

22. The Frontline States: Conversations and Observations About Russia’s Other War in Europe

Author:
Philip Wasielewski
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
From late June to mid-July 2023, I visited Georgia, Moldova, Hungary, Poland, and Lithuania on a research trip. The analysis and conclusions in this report are based, in part, on conversations with a wide variety of individuals from former government officials, university students, academics, and members of non-governmental organizations to ordinary citizens. The Kremlin desires to reestablish a sphere of influence in former Soviet republics and Warsaw Pact states between the Black and Baltic Seas. To do so, it is fighting a conventional war in Ukraine and political wars elsewhere to remove Western influence and reestablish hegemony. Russia’s political warfare operations have a major flaw; they only offer people the past and not a future. However, US efforts against them could be more effective and citizens in frontline states facing Russian subversion have constructive criticisms to improve them. Resisting Russian subversion depends as much on the political health of the targeted state as Western countermeasures. Efforts to oppose backsliding on democratic norms are vital, even if they spark tensions with partners and allies. Several countries in the region will hold elections between the fall of 2023 and 2025 that will determine their geopolitical orientation. If the war in Ukraine is a battle of modern weapon systems, these elections will be a war of ideas between East and West. It is important that the United States not cede the narrative for these elections to Moscow and work with allies and partners to counteract anti-Western propaganda.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Regional Politics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Eurasia, and Ukraine

23. The Dragon and the Bear in Africa: Stress-Testing Chinese-Russian Relations

Author:
Robert E. Hamilton
Publication Date:
11-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
This report is based on a chapter of my forthcoming book on the relationship between China and Russia. For the US, this is arguably the most important bilateral relationship in the world today. A robust, resilient partnership between Beijing and Moscow has the potential to remake world order. It would usher in an era of international relations based on power and polarity, eroding the role of international law and institutions, and undermining the sovereignty and agency of smaller states. This world order would represent a serious threat to US interests, as currently defined. On the other hand, transactional, “thin” ties between China and Russia allow the US some breathing space. Instead of a revisionist authoritarian alliance, the US would confront two states that represent different types of challenges. In this case, Washington could deal with the acute, militarized threat of Russia in the near term, while remaining postured to confront the “pacing” threat of China—the only potential peer competitor to the US—over the longer term. The academic and policy worlds have been seized with the China-Russia relationship for almost two decades. Policy debates revolve around how to confront the two, with some arguing that the current focus on reversing Russia’s invasion of Ukraine puts the US at risk of being unprepared for the threat China represents. Others argue that Russia is not merely a disruptive power but represents a profound and immediate danger to US interests. Competition for resources often lurks in the background of this debate: US government organizations focused on Europe tend to argue for focusing on Russia first; those with an Indo-Pacific focus tend to argue that China should be the focus. What this debate often fails to consider is the nature of their relationship and its impact on US policy options. The scholarly debate fills this gap by focusing directly on the nature of the relationship: one camp defines it as a strategic partnership and the other defines it as an “axis of convenience.” Often missing from scholarly analysis, though, is an analysis of the implications for US policy. In other words, scholars often argue forcefully for one of these characterizations of the China-Russia relationship but then fail to advise what the US should do in response. Instead, their analysis focuses on the implications of the relationship for theoretical approaches to international relations. The book that will include this report aims to close this gap between the policy and scholarly debates. It aims to provide a better understanding of the nature of the China-Russia relationship and use that understanding to inform US policy options. It will do this through a novel approach. Instead of focusing on Chinese-Russian interaction at the level of the international system, as most approaches do, it focuses on their interaction “on the ground” in regions where both have important interests at stake. This report examines Chinese-Russian interaction in Africa; other chapters of the book focus on Central Asia, Eastern Europe, and East Asia. Africa and Central Asia provide good testing grounds for the China-Russia relationship because both have important but different interests there. How they advance and defend those interests and how they interact in doing so, can yield important insights into the nature of their overall relationship. These regions are also important because the US footprint is light. The US has been called the “binding agent” in ties between Beijing and Moscow. The idea here is that shared resistance to the US is the only major thing they have in common. In this view, removing the US from the equation will make China and Russia more likely to find reasons to compete rather than cooperate.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Africa, Russia, China, Eurasia, and Asia

24. Fighting into the Bastions: Getting Noisier to Sustain the US Undersea Advantage

Author:
Bryan Clark and Timothy A. Walton
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Airpower enthusiasts concluded after World War I that “the bomber will always get through.”1 Fast, high-flying aircraft seemed to hold a decisive edge over air defenses and offered commanders the assurance they could attack targets deep inside an opponent’s territory. But airpower advocates’ spirits were quickly dampened during World War II by the advent of interceptor fighters, radar-guided artillery, and electromagnetic warfare (EW), which together demonstrated that bombers could be stopped—often with devastating results. Air forces adapted, adding escort fighters, radar jammers and decoys, and higher-altitude bombers to sustain their ability to strike behind enemy lines. During the Cold War, this move-countermove competition continued. New surface- and air-launched missiles targeted bombers, and countries developed specialized aircraft and weapons to suppress and destroy enemy air defenses or use stealth to avoid detection and targeting altogether. Today, the US submarine force faces a similar challenge. The US fleet of nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs) has long been considered an asymmetric advantage against potential adversaries like the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Russia, which lacked robust and effective anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capabilities. Relying on this advantage, the US Department of Defense (DoD) has increasingly relied on SSNs to compensate for the impact of improved air defenses on the ability of bombers and strike fighters to execute attacks.2 However, the unfailing ability of US SSNs to reach their targets is eroding as emerging technologies and weapons proliferation combine in new approaches to ASW that could neutralize America’s undersea advantage. During the last decade, the PRC and Russian Federation began fortifying their undersea defenses in the South and East China Seas and Arctic Ocean, respectively. Leveraging geographic constraints, US adversaries have instrumented these bastions with networks of fixed and mobile acoustic and non-acoustic sensors, complemented by aircraft and ships capable of pouncing on contacts or deploying dense mine barriers.3 Improved adversary defenses could degrade or defeat US undersea operations, preventing US submarines from conducting critical missions such as sinking a Chinese invasion fleet or tracking Russian ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs). To sustain its offensive undersea advantage, the US Navy will need to take some lessons from air warfare and begin supporting submarines with systems designed to suppress or destroy enemy undersea defenses. This imperative will fundamentally shift the paradigm for US submarine operations from “alone and unafraid” to “it’s all about team.” Moreover, the emergence of new generations of capable long-range active sonars will demand that the US undersea force increasingly rely on jamming and deception to counter enemy sensors, much as their counterparts already do above the water. The US submarine force will need to learn how to use noise, rather than avoid it. The Navy should pursue four lines of effort, outlined below, to sustain its offensive undersea advantage. Except for features to be incorporated into the next-generation nuclear-powered attack submarine, the SSN(X), the concepts and capabilities proposed in this report leverage mature or maturing technologies and can be fielded within five years. Implementing these recommendations will require the US Navy to refine its use cases for offensive undersea warfare to use available uncrewed vehicle technologies, rather than continue pursuing purpose-built systems that may take a decade or more to be fielded.4
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, National Security, Armed Forces, Navy, and Maritime
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

25. Success in the Struggle against the People's Republic of China

Author:
John Lee and Lavina Lee
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
In April 2023, the Australian government released the officially commissioned but independently produced Defence Strategic Review. Intended to assist the government of Australia with its strategic and defense policies over the next decade and beyond, the report offered the fundamental assessment that the Indo-Pacific region “faces increasing competition that operates on multiple levels—economic, military, strategic and diplomatic—all interwoven and all framed by an intense contest of values and narratives.”1 The Biden administration’s National Security Strategy, which had been released several months earlier (October 2022), stated the challenge in even starker terms: “The People’s Republic of China harbors the intention and, increasingly, the capacity to reshape the international order in favor of one that tilts the global playing field to its benefit.”2 At the heart of these statements is the perception that China poses a systemic and comprehensive challenge, not just to the vital interests and values of the United States and Australia, but to the entire system and order that was cobbled together after the Second World War. These postwar rules, norms, institutions, conventions, practices, alliances, and security relationships have been underwritten by US material power. They constitute a liberal order that is under intense challenge from China.3 This report explores what success in relation to China looks like for the US, Australia, and allies such as Japan. Several substantial and thoughtful pieces have described what victory would look like for China,4 and there have also been many good efforts to describe what victory would look like for the US and its allies, given China’s goals and objectives. The current report focuses on a US and Australian vision of success in which the geopolitical contest and struggle are enduring and do not end with a victory for any side. Victory generally means defeating an enemy or opponent in a specific context or activity. Unsurprisingly, the term is commonly associated with defeating an enemy during a battle or compelling the unconditional surrender of the enemy when engaging in war. In victory, there is a clear winner and loser. By way of contrast, success or successful struggle means the accomplishment of an aim or purpose in general or specific contexts. It might include subduing an opponent and attaining victory over that opponent. But success can also be achieved without the strict formal requirement of victory, depending on one’s objective. The term success is used here because the scope of this report is broader than victory in a traditional war context (even if the use of force is always an option to achieve success or deny it to the opponent). It will be apparent that the Chinese notion of war is far broader than the Western notion. The West holds that war is fought within and across identified air, sea, land, space, and cyber domains, and that war has a discernible beginning and end. In the Chinese conception, war has no boundaries or restrictive form and does not necessarily involve the kinetic use of force. It is material, but also ideational, psychological, and structural.5 Indeed, for the Chinese, the apogee of conflict is to win without fighting, even if the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) sees the environment as one of perpetual struggle. Hence, war may have no formal beginning or end. For this reason, a US and Australian vision of success cannot simply be about achieving specific key objectives, like maintaining Taiwanese de facto independence or preventing further Chinese militarization of the South China Sea. To be sure, a vision of success is based on certain fundamental end states (such as preventing Chinese material and normative dominance in East Asia). However, it also accepts the likelihood of a constant struggle against a formidable China, just as China assumes the long-term existence of a formidable US with significant allies in the region. In other words, the authors work on the prudent assumption that China will be neither defeated nor terminally weakened, and that its expansionist ambitions and substantial capabilities will remain. Rather than focusing on a final victory or endpoint, a vision of success conceptualizes an advantageous and enduring state of affairs or system of arrangements in the region that supports the fundamental objectives of the US and its allies in the Indo-Pacific. This report is about successful struggle, but not in the context of a major war where one side wins decisively and the next step is to establish a sensible peace. This is not to discount the possibility that the use of force could be decisive in shaping the region. But the report focuses on scenarios of an increasingly tense competition and rivalry occurring over the next decade and explores what success looks like in that context. It does not discount the possibility or necessity of limited military action, but does not assume that any such action would be decisive in producing a permanent winner and loser.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
Japan, China, Asia, Australia, and United States of America

26. Strength in Unity: A Sustainable US-Led Regional Security Construct in the Middle East

Author:
Robert Greenway
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
China and Russia are exploiting US indifference toward the Middle East and efforts to integrate Iran into the region, threatening regional stability, Israel’s security, and global markets. The convergence of threats encompasses an Iranian nuclear threshold state controlling a constellation of terrorist groups, resurgent non-state terrorist groups including ISIS and al-Qaeda, and Russian and Chinese exploitation of receding American presence. We are reaching an inflection point at which the United States risks the irrevocable loss of a favorable balance of both trade and forces, resulting in instability that will threaten our vital interests and the global economy. This constitutes an unprecedented range of challenges beyond our capacity, and the capacity of our partners and allies, to address threats to global energy and trade as we struggle to recover from a global pandemic. We have not faced a similar period of risk in the Middle East since the turmoil following the Iranian Revolution, Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and storming of the Grand Mosque in 1979. The US shares vital national security interests with longtime partners in the region and, as a result, they prefer US leadership in both the economic and security domains. A sustainable US-led regional security construct in the Middle East that includes effective partners based on convergent interests is the most efficient way to address the unacceptable risk, which results from the disconnect between the vital national interests of the US and its partners and the resources both have committed. A constellation of mutually beneficial trade relationships providing both the resources and rationale for a regional security construct would strengthen such an arrangement.1 Establishing a US-led enduring regional security architecture comprised of more capable partners and allies is the most effective way for the United States to safeguard our vital national security interests in the Middle East. This architecture would provide five key benefits: Secure our vital interests. The US and global economies depend on the uninterrupted flow of energy from and trade through the Middle East, which remains a vital national security interest. Compete with China. China depends on the Middle East for energy to sustain its economy and military. Beijing is exploiting the vacuum created by US indifference to securing the Middle East. Manage risk and uncertainty. Threats in the region are approaching a quantitative military advantage over America’s partners, which creates unacceptable risk to US interests. Leverage our relationships. We retain advantages in the long-term diplomatic, economic, and security relationships that we have derived from convergent interests with partners. Build on a sound foundation. Historic efforts to build collective security constructs, many of which have occurred within the Middle East, provide valuable lessons.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Non State Actors, Strategic Competition, and Regional Security
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Iran, and Middle East

27. From Fueling Victory to Running on Empty: Lessons from American Energy Policy in War and Peace

Author:
Arthur Herman
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
The purpose of this study is to draw important lessons from how the United States has handled its national energy policy in the past in order to guide policymakers and industry leaders in the future. In the end, this is a study in contrasts. In the case of World War II, the federal government successfully used America’s energy independence and abundance to help Great Britain survive the Nazi onslaught and then to win a two-front world war, the greatest victory in history. In the case of the 1970s, the United States became dependent on others, specifically the Middle East, for its energy prosperity. As a result, America lost control over not only its ability to conduct foreign policy but also its economy. Construction of the Big Inch oil pipelines, the most extensive government energy project ever created, epitomized America’s successful national energy strategy in World War II. This project enabled the United States to literally fuel victory over the Axis. The Arab oil embargo of 1973 and the dramatic rise in the price of oil imposed by the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) severely damaged the US economy, set back global growth for nearly a generation, and symbolized the failure of America’s energy strategy in that decade. The end of this study will summarize the key lessons from these two contrasting approaches to a national energy strategy. However, two stand out: Energy independence—and having access to cheap, abundant energy—is an essential prerequisite for American national and economic security. A national energy strategy that relies on the expertise of leading energy executives and engineers in the private sector will tend to be successful; one that ignores their advice and assistance will tend to fail. Whether America will enjoy energy security as it faces the challenges of the twenty-first century will depend on many factors. But drawing the right lessons from these two contrasting historical eras can prepare the way for a new era of energy abundance and national power.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, History, and Energy
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

28. Turkey after the elections, what direction it will take

Author:
Vít Marek
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Europeum Institute for European Policy
Abstract:
On Wednesday, June 7, a debate took place as part of the Café Evropa cycle, on the topic: "Turkey after the elections, which direction will it go?". The invitation to the debate was accepted by Lucia Najšlová, political scientist and author of the book Turkey and the EU: The Politics of Belonging, as well as by Deník N journalist Dominika Píhová and Břetislav Tureček, head of the Center for Middle East Studies at the Metropolitan University in Prague. The debate was moderated by Žiga Faktor, the head of the Brussels office of the EUROPEUM Institute for European Policy.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Elections, European Union, and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan
Political Geography:
Europe and Turkey

29. Towards an Intersectional Feminist Development Policy for Germany

Author:
Aïssa Boodhoo and Damjan Denkovski
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Centre for Feminist Foreign Policy
Abstract:
In the development of Germany’s Feminist Development Policy Strategy, the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) conducted a consultative process which included online consultations, a high-level conference, and civil society dialogues. While the broadest consultative process by the German government to date, the BMZ process had limitations in terms of Global South participation and language accessibility. To complement the official BMZ-led process, the Centre for Feminist Foreign Policy (CFFP) initiated a comprehensive co-creation process involving diverse feminist civil society organisations from the Global South, Germany, and other Global North countries. Guided by position papers from various perspectives, desk research, and interviews, the CFFP feminist convenings process involved over 100 feminists from diverse backgrounds, spanned over 25 countries, provided compensation to small and Global South organisations, and incorporated intersectional perspectives. The process consisted of in-person and online convenings held in multiple languages, ensuring broad accessibility. This report is a summary of the rich discussions and recommendations of feminists. It aims to influence policymakers and initiate action in shaping Germany's Feminist Development Policy. This report opens by discussing five action areas in chapter 1, which serve as comprehensive guidelines for immediate transformative action across policy areas. The second chapter discusses feminist reflections in six thematic areas: economic justice, climate justice, food sovereignty and agriculture, sexual and reproductive health and rights, protecting minority rights, and education.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Agriculture, Climate Change, Development, Economics, Education, Minorities, Partnerships, Feminism, Reproductive Rights, Digitalization, Funding, and Food Sovereignty
Political Geography:
Germany and Global Focus

30. India-China Border Tensions and U.S. Strategy in the Indo-Pacific

Author:
Lisa Curtis and Derek Grossman
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
India-China border intrusions and clashes have become more frequent and threaten to lead to all-out conflict between the two Asian giants. In recent years, China has upped the ante in its border disputes with India through infrastructure development, military deployments, capability enhancements, and periodic efforts to encroach into territory controlled by India. The first deadly border clash between the two countries in 45 years occurred on June 15, 2020, in the Galwan River Valley, where 20 Indian troops and at least four Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) troops were killed. More recently, on December 9, 2022, Chinese and Indian forces clashed along the disputed border in the mountains near Tawang in the northeastern Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh after an estimated 300 Chinese PLA soldiers tried to cross the border. While the Chinese and Indian militaries have since pulled back forces from the most contentious standoff sites where the 2020 buildup occurred and established temporary buffer zones, both sides retain high numbers of troops forward deployed along the disputed frontier, and there are several flashpoints that could erupt into another border crisis at any time. The most recent clash that took place near Tawang is a reminder that, even though recent attention has been focused on the Ladakh region, there are multiple trigger points along the 2,100-mile-long Line of Actual Control (LAC) that bear monitoring.1 With both China and India enhancing infrastructure and introducing new and advanced weapons systems on their sides of the disputed border, combined with forward deployments and heightened lack of trust, the chances for continued standoffs that could erupt into local or even full-blown conflict remain high.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Military Strategy, Territorial Disputes, and Borders
Political Geography:
China, India, Asia, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

31. Resisting China’s Gray Zone Military Pressure on Taiwan

Author:
Jacob Stokes
Publication Date:
12-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
The People’s Republic of China (PRC or China) has sharply escalated its pressure campaign targeting the Republic of China (ROC or Taiwan) in recent years. Beijing appears likely to use Taiwan’s upcoming presidential election in January 2024 as a pretext to apply more pressure on the self-governing island, particularly in the “gray zone” using China’s military, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), along with other tools of state power. There is no precise and commonly agreed upon definition of what gray zone activities are and are not. In general, though, the concept refers to actions that fall into the space between, on one side, peace and, on the other, full-scale kinetic war.1 Gray zone activities are coercive and aggressive but designed to stay below the threshold of triggering major conflict. China uses gray zone operations as part of a comprehensive strategy to pressure Taiwan that spans the areas of diplomacy, information, economics, and security. This policy brief examines one major component of that campaign: gray zone military and security operations. It starts by detailing the capabilities and tactics China uses to put security pressure on Taiwan. Then, it explains what Beijing seeks to achieve with those actions. The paper concludes with recommendations for how U.S. and Taiwan policymakers can resist and counter China’s gray zone operations.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Diplomacy, Economics, Military Affairs, and Information
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, and Asia

32. Using Targeted Sanctions to Help Prevent Mass Atrocities: Results from Interviews with Experienced Practitioners

Author:
Tallan Donine, Kyra Fox, Daniel Solomon, Alex Vandermaas-Peeler, and Lawerence Woocher
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Simon-Skjodt Center for the Prevention of Genocide, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum
Abstract:
The Simon-Skjodt Center’s “lessons learned” project aims to understand better how policy makers, across all levels of government, can take effective action to prevent mass atrocity crimes and protect civilian populations in situations where they face serious threats of group-targeted, systematic violence. We have sought to identify, distill, and organize insights on a range of policy tools—ranging from “naming and shaming” to sanctions to prosecutions—which are sometimes used to help prevent or respond to mass atrocities. To complement our review of the empirical research literature on the use of targeted sanctions, we conducted interviews with people who had substantial policy or operational experience working in the US government on targeted sanctions prior to 2021. The premise for the interviews is that experienced practitioners have important insights about when and how targeted sanctions can be most effective in helping prevent mass atrocities.3 While one can find many ideas about how to use targeted sanctions most effectively, none that we are aware of are: (1) focused specifically on the use of targeted sanctions for mass atrocity prevention and (2) based on the collective perspectives of a set of experienced practitioners. This report summarizes the results of the interviews with experienced targeted sanctions practitioners. Details on the methods employed and the interview respondents are presented in appendices.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Economics, Sanctions, and Atrocity Prevention
Political Geography:
Global Focus

33. China/United States: Europe off Balance

Author:
Thomas Gomart and Marc Hecker
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
As French President Emmanuel Macron (accompanied by Ursula von der Leyen) is on a state visit to China, some twenty Ifri researchers decipher the stakes of the U.S./China/Europe strategic triangle. This 16-text study follows Olaf Scholz’s visit to Beijing (November 2022) and precedes that of Emmanuel Macron (April 2023). It comes especially one year after the beginning of a geopolitical and geoeconomic shock of a rare magnitude: the invasion of Ukraine by Russia. The War in Ukraine or the Return of Bloc Geopolitics? The war in Ukraine has broken ties between the European Union (EU) and Russia for the foreseeable future, particularly in the field of energy, though not without consequences in the Middle East, Africa, and the Indo-Pacific. Furthermore, this war has become the main show of active indirect confrontation between the United States—which has provided military support to Ukrainians, with help from its European allies—and China, which has supported Russia politically and economically. In February 2022, Moscow and Beijing declared their “no limits friendship”; in March 2023, Xi Jinping offered his personal support to Vladimir Putin after the International Criminal Court issued a warrant for his arrest. In its position on the political settlement of the Ukraine crisis, presented in February 2023, China stated: “All parties should oppose the pursuit of one’s own security at the cost of others’ security, prevent bloc confrontation, and work together for peace and stability on the Eurasian Continent”. China is no more of a mediator than the United States: it would be unrealistic to believe so. We appear to be witnessing a return of bloc geopolitics, albeit in a starkly different context than that of the Cold War (1947-1991). Globalization has produced strong economic and technological interdependencies that make any prospect of decoupling very costly, if not impossible. Economic partners are no longer necessarily military allies, and vice versa. In other words, a gap is opening up between geopolitical perceptions and geoeconomic realities. The term “decoupling” is popular in the United States, though much less so elsewhere. The rejection of bloc geopolitics is particularly acute outside of the West, where a “pragmatic” approach to foreign policy is often promoted. The Saudi foreign minister summed this up during the World Policy Conference in December 2022: “Polarization is the last thing we need right now. […] We need to build bridges, strengthen connections, and find areas of cooperation”. A few months later, China pulled off an extraordinary diplomatic coup by brokering a deal to restore relations between Riyadh and Tehran. For the EU, the situation is particularly delicate: Europe is in the Western camp, but a severing of ties with Beijing would cause a crushing economic blow. In 2022, China accounted for more than 20% of the EU’s imports, while the United States accounted for around 12%. By 2030, the EU’s GDP is expected to rise to $20.5 trillion, compared to $30.5 trillion for the United States and $33.7 trillion for China. In January 2023, the President of the European Commission declared at Davos: “We still need to work and trade with China, especially when it comes to this transition. So, we need to refocus our approach on de-risking, rather than decoupling”. For its part, Beijing has encouraged European aspirations of “strategic autonomy”, understood in China as a form of detachment from the United States. At the same time, the EU is constantly strengthening its military, technological, financial and energy ties with the U.S. This collective study notes a hypothetical search for balance on the part of the Europeans, faced with a war on their territory (the Western peninsula of the heartland), who cannot escape Sino-American mechanisms, and who do not form a monolithic whole. It also analyzes the strategy of several important actors outside our continent, and shows that, from Ukraine to Taiwan, via Africa and the Middle East, Europeans have little room for maneuver. This is why the study proposes recommendations to try, at a crucial moment, to reinforce their positioning.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Climate Change, International Trade and Finance, Science and Technology, European Union, and Industry
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and United States of America

34. Transatlantic Trends 2023: Public Opinion in a Shifting Global Order

Author:
Alexandra de Hoop Scheffer, Martin Quencez, and Gusine Weber
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
Transatlantic Trends 2023 presents the results of representative surveys conducted in 14 countries on both sides of the Atlantic: Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Sweden, Türkiye, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Divided into five chapters, this report assesses public opinion on contemporary structural issues impacting the world order, transatlantic relations, security and defense, China, and global challenges.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Public Opinion, European Union, Democracy, Geopolitics, and Transatlantic Relations
Political Geography:
China, United Kingdom, Europe, Turkey, Ukraine, France, Poland, Germany, Global Focus, and United States of America

35. Next Generation Perspectives on Taiwan: Insights from the 2023 Taiwan-US Policy Program

Author:
Bonnie S. Glaser
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
Taiwan faces growing threats to its security. The circumstances and factors that have deterred for decades an attack by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) on Taiwan and enabled its people to remain secure and prosperous are changing. The conventional military balance in the western Pacific has tipped in China’s favor, although its military, the People’s Liberation Army, is not yet ready to seize and control Taiwan. Apart from the military threats of invasion, blockade, and seizure of one of its small outlying islands, Taiwan is the target of Chinese economic and diplomatic pressure, disinformation, united front tactics, and other forms of psychological warfare. Most of the global focus on Taiwan centers on the risk of war, leaving insufficient attention to these gray-zone threats that are designed to sow doubts about US willingness to defend Taiwan if attacked and to induce a sense of deep psychological despair about its future unless it is integrated into the PRC. Beijing’s ultimate goal is to convince the people of Taiwan to lose faith in their democracy and to surrender sovereignty. China is more likely to succeed in that endeavor if Taiwan becomes isolated from the rest of the world. Only 13 sovereign states now maintain full diplomatic relations with the Republic of China, the official name that Taiwan uses to distinguish itself from its giant neighbor. Since President Tsai Ing-wen took office in 2016, Beijing has poached nine of Taiwan’s diplomatic allies and blocked Taipei from participating in international organizations, including the World Health Organization and its decision-making body, the World Health Assembly. On the economic front, Taiwan remains an active member of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), but it has been excluded from the ASEAN-inspired Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and the US-led Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF). Beijing is lobbying members of the Comprehensive and Progressive Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) to oppose Taipei’s application for membership. Easing Taiwan’s isolation and providing reassurance that the world cares deeply about the fate and well-being of its 23.5 million people are crucial to preserving the status quo in the Taiwan Strait. The Taiwan-US Policy Program (TUPP) was launched in 2017 to encourage young professionals to include Taiwan in their research and help Taipei expand its global networks. TUPP enables future leaders to acquire a deeper understanding of Taiwan and its relations with the United States through meetings with officials and experts in Washington, followed by a visit to Taiwan to gain first-hand exposure to its politics, culture, and history. Experiencing Taiwan influences how these future leaders approach their work and their writing. It impacts their worldview by imbuing them with an appreciation for Taiwan’s history and commitment to the principles of democracy and human rights that undergird the existing international order. It also reinforces the importance of maintaining robust bilateral relations and strengthening international support for maintaining peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, East Asia, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

36. Enemies Foreign and Domestic: Confronting Kleptocrats at Home and Abroad

Author:
Kelly M. McFarland
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University
Abstract:
As Putin and his kleptocratic regime of oligarchs wage a devastating war in Ukraine, the costs of corruption have never been so starkly visible. Beyond Russia, recent examples of corruption in China, Afghanistan, the Northern Triangle, the Solomon Islands, and elsewhere, prove that rampant corruption poses a significant threat to aspirations for a greener, healthier, more peaceful, and more democratic world. Countries such as Russia and China have elevated their brand of corruption into a distinct and powerful aspect of their foreign policy. They employ this strategic corruption abroad to stunt economic growth; prop-up fellow authoritarian regimes; exacerbate social inequality; erase political trust; accelerate pandemics and degrade healthcare systems; exploit the environment; and propel state oppression. As U.S. policymakers seek to counter this strategic corruption, they must first recognize the extent to which domestic laws and actors within the United States enable this corruption to fester. In the fall of 2021 and spring of 2022, ISD convened a series of New Global Commons working group meetings with participants drawn from academia, think tanks, government, international organizations, non-governmental organizations, and the private sector. The group crafted workable definitions of corruption, evaluated the unique political and related threats posed by corruption and kleptocracy, assessed Russia and China’s use of strategic corruption, and developed principles and recommendations for government and non-government entities to build a global, sustained, anti-corruption response.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Corruption, Diplomacy, Authoritarianism, and Kleptocracy
Political Geography:
Russia, China, North America, and United States of America

37. The Berlin Pulse 2023/24 (full issue)

Author:
Julia Ganter, Steffen Müller, Sarah Pagung, Norbert Röttgen, and Lila Roldán Vázquez
Publication Date:
11-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Körber-Stiftung
Abstract:
What do Germans und US citizens think about the most pressing foreign policy issues? Here are the highlights of this year’s public opinion survey, addressing Germany’s international role, biggest challenges and most important partners. A majority (57 per cent) of Germans believe that Germany’s international influence has declined over the past two years, despite Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s proclaimed Zeitenwende. As a result, only 38 per cent of respondents would like to see Germany become more engaged in international crises. This is the lowest figure since the start of the survey in 2016. 76 per cent believe that this involvement should preferably be of a diplomatic nature, compared to 65 per cent last year. 71 per cent of respondents are against Germany taking a leading military role in Europe.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Public Opinion, Military Spending, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe, Germany, North America, and United States of America

38. Suppressing the truth and spreading lies: How the CCP is influencing Solomon Islands’ information environment

Author:
Blake Johnson, Miah Hammond-Errey, Daria Impiombato, Albert Zhang, and Joshua Dunne
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is attempting to influence public discourse in Solomon Islands through coordinated information operations that seek to spread false narratives and suppress information on a range of topics. Following the November 2021 Honiara riots and the March 2022 leaking of the China – Solomon Islands security agreement, the CCP has used its propaganda and disinformation capabilities to push false narratives in an effort to shape the Solomon Islands public’s perception of security issues and foreign partners. In alignment with the CCP’s regional security objectives, those messages have a strong focus on undermining Solomon Islands’ existing partnerships with Australia and the US. Although some of the CCP’s messaging occurs through routine diplomatic engagement, there’s a coordinated effort to influence the population across a broad spectrum of information channels. That spectrum includes Chinese party-state media, CCP official-led statements and publications in local and social media, and the amplification of particular individual and pro-CCP content via targeted Facebook groups. There’s now growing evidence to suggest that CCP officials are also seeking to suppress information that doesn’t align with the party-state’s narratives across the Pacific islands through the coercion of local journalists and media institutions.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Propaganda, Disinformation, and Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
Political Geography:
China, Solomon Islands, and Asia-Pacific

39. Abe Shinzo: In Memoriam

Author:
Rob York, Jada Fraser, Stephen Nagy, Brad Glosserman, and Kei Koga
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
A famous, albeit fictional, statesman once said “A good act does not wash out the bad, nor a bad act the good.” As Japan’s longest-serving prime minister, Abe Shinzo left a legacy. Fair-minded individuals would be able to find grounds for criticism in that record: Abe climbed to leadership of the Liberal Democratic Party by stoking doubts about his country’s record in World War II, provoking outrage from neighboring countries. He relished sparring with his rivals in Japan’s other political parties and in the press; his country’s press freedom ranking consequently declined under his leadership. His efforts at addressing his country’s stagnant economy and moribund birthrate saw, interpreted charitably, only modest successes. But Abe Shinzo should be remembered for much more than that. Much as Winston Churchill should be remembered, both for his foresight regarding the rise of the Nazi threat and his record as ruthless defender of Britain’s colonial interests, proponents of the “free and open Indo-Pacific” vision that Abe championed should remember his record as a partisan, but also as an international institution builder in an age where both “freedom” and “openness” are under attack in the Indo-Pacific. In doing so, he revived Japan as an international player and helped set the stage for multilateral cooperation to preserve existing rules and norms, such as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (the “Quad”) and the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership. Such efforts make him one of the most influential statesmen of this era. Since Abe’s shocking assassination on July 8, the Pacific Forum has sought to ensure that the fullness of this legacy is remembered, and as such used our PacNet series to explain his impact from a variety of perspectives. In doing so, we reached out to many old friends whose names are familiar to the Pacific Forum’s long-time readers. In PacNet #37, Brad Glosserman, Pacific Forum’s senior advisor and my co-editor at Comparative Connections, identifies the specific attributes of Abe’s—specifically his strongly held opinions and behind-the-scenes advocacy—that made it possible for him to be this institutional builder and to restore Japan’s role on the foreign policy stage. In PacNet #36 Stephen Nagy of the International Christian University in Tokyo provides a comprehensive overview of Abe the diplomat, including his successful managing of relations with the PRC, which were actually at a low point before his lengthy stint as PM. In PacNet #39 Kei Koga of Nanyang Technological University demonstrates how under Abe, Japan countered the PRC’s growing influence in Southeast Asian countries through sustained engagement, winning their trust despite their unwillingness to match his hawkishness toward Beijing. Furthermore, in PacNet #43 Jagannath Panda of ISDP, Sweden explains how Abe’s dealings with India paved the way for the latter’s increased engagement with the outside world, including through the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue. In PacNet #40, I note that Abe’s tireless engagement with American presidents across changes in parties has made good relations with Tokyo that rarest of things in US politics: an area of bipartisan agreement that looks unlikely to change, regardless of the outcome of the 2024 election. The Pacific Forum also reached beyond its regular contributors’ list to acquire new perspectives. Shihoko Goto of the Wilson Center details Abe’s prescient vision for the defense of Taiwan, something the US would gradually awaken to. Jada Frasier—an MA student in Asian Studies at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service that we believe policy professionals will be hearing from more and more in the future—explains how despite causing tensions in the Japan-South Korea relationship, Abe also deserves credit for increasing the two East Asian democracies’ opportunities for security cooperation through his emphasis on minilateral groupings. Now that Japan has laid the former prime minister to rest last week, those who remember the darker side of his leadership will find grounds to do so, and some of those criticisms will be warranted. Abe, however, left a legacy far beyond those unpleasantries, especially if, as was the case with Churchill, his country and the international community rise to the challenge they presently face.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Leadership, Assassination, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
Japan and Asia

40. Navigating an uncertain future: An exploration of China’s influence on the Netherlands’ future maritime logistics hub function

Author:
Frans-Paul van der Putten and Xiaoxue Martin
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
The maritime logistics hub function is of strategic importance to the Netherlands as a trading country. The Netherlands positions itself as the ‘Gateway to Europe’ thanks to its advanced logistics network and plays an important role in the global economy. This position nevertheless faces an uncertain future: there is no guarantee that the Netherlands will remain a leader in the years ahead. Geopolitics, and particularly the influence of China, will have a major impact on the Dutch maritime logistics hub function. On behalf of the Ministry of Infrastructure and Water Management and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, this report examines China’s influence on the Netherlands’ maritime logistics hub function. The main question posed in the study is: How is China’s influence on the central position of the Netherlands’ maritime logistics hub function likely to evolve in the decades ahead and what possible actions could the Dutch government take in response to it? The purpose of this study is to assess scenarios as a basis for possible actions by the Dutch government and the Dutch maritime logistics sector, particularly with regard to the Netherlands’ central position and strategic autonomy as a maritime logistics hub.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, Maritime, and Logistics
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Asia, and Netherlands

41. The Future of Xi’s China. Scenarios and Implications for Europe

Author:
Alessia Amighini
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI)
Abstract:
At the upcoming 20th Party Congress, which opens Sunday in China, Xi Jinping is expected to be confirmed as the country's Secretary General for an unprecedented third term. At a time of international instability caused by the Covid pandemic and the war in Ukraine, as well as rising competition between international superpowers, the Chinese leadership is called to increase the country's international standing, while ensuring economic growth at the domestic level. However, achieving these goals will not be without challenges. This Report analyses China’s hard road to international prestige and development. Which prospects for China's economic growth? Which obstacles to its rise at the global level? To which extent can the Party steer the country’s direction?
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Development, Economy, Xi Jinping, and Instability
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and Asia

42. Strengthening Japan-ROK Relations: The Prime Time to Rebuild Relations Through Young Parliamentary Diplomacy

Author:
Hideshi Futori
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
East-West Center
Abstract:
South Korean President Yoon Seok-yeol began his remarkable administration by emphasizing the values of freedom and democracy, and the triangular Japan-U.S.-ROK relationship. Contrasting the previous administration, which prioritized reconciliation with North Korea, President Yoon embraced positive messages on restoring Japan-ROK relations even before taking office. On August 15, the National Liberation Day of Korea, President Yoon described Japan as a “neighbor that joins forces against the challenges that threaten freedom.” Such a posture clearly distinguishes President Yoon’s approach from that of previous South Korean administrations. Truly, even after the Yoon Administration’s approval rating began declining, Japan-ROK relations were not used politically to alleviate the pressure. One of the best takeaways from my recent visit to South Korea was Foreign Minister Park Chun’s assurance to “persistently work from a strategic perspective to improve relations with Japan, a partner that shares the universal values of freedom, human rights, and the rule of law.” Heretofore, Japan has not been able to capitalize on the precious opportunities it has been afforded to mend ties with Korea. Instead, Japan continues to take a hardline approach toward South Korea and is unable to flexibly respond, instead prioritizing Japan’s self-image, as suggested by the export control regulations toward South Korea. Since 2019, the Japanese government has tightened control regulations on exports of semiconductor materials to South Korea in response to potential seizures of Japanese assets as reparations for forced labor claims related to Japan’s 1910-1945 colonial rule of the Korean Peninsula. I believe Japan should consider changing its policies toward South Korea as South Korea has proactively improved its policies in response to Japan’s request, nonetheless, the effects have faded. From the perspective of economic security, it is also necessary to diversify Japan’s supply chain and strengthen trilateral cooperation between Japan, the United States, and South Korea. Similar voices have been raised not only from South Korea but also by Japanese experts.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, and Parliament
Political Geography:
Japan, Asia, and South Korea

43. After Hegemony: Japan’s role and dilemma in maintaining the rules-based order

Author:
Yu Inagaki
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
East-West Center
Abstract:
The phrase “rules-based order” has recently become a recurring theme in the Japan-US alliance . This is based on the recognition that the liberal international order (LIO)—which the United States built and maintained, and that Japan has significantly benefited from—is now being challenged. While the war in Ukraine has heightened the sense of crisis over global power dynamics, China has been considered the main threat to the LIO. The United States has identified China as not just a security threat but a “ most consequential strategic competitor and the pacing challenge ,” and Japan has come to view the current international environment from a larger perspective, international order. In fact, Japan has expected to play a leading role in maintaining the LIO as US international engagement weakened under the Trump administration. However, is it possible for Japan, a constrained middle power, to maintain the existing order in the face of a declining hegemon and rising challengers? This raises a classic question in international relations: What will happen to the international order after hegemony; and what can and will Japan, occupying a particular place and role in the international system, be able and willing to do regarding international order?
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, Politics, Hegemony, and International Order
Political Geography:
Japan, China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

44. US Arms Sales Reveal Discord in Taiwan's Defense Strategy

Author:
Ethan Kessler
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Chicago Council on Global Affairs
Abstract:
Washington has started selling arms that serve a "porcupine" defense strategy to Taiwan. Whether Taipei fully embraces this new approach remains to be seen. Taiwan, claimed by China as a rogue province and armed by the United States, is at a crossroads. Should it continue buying big-ticket US arms, such as advanced fighter jets and tanks, to counter Chinese forces in case of a blockade or invasion? Taipei’s longstanding conventional strategy, which calls for these kinds of arms, views the ambiguous US defense commitment as concerning. Since Washington may not intervene against a Chinese attack, conventionalists want to hold on to Taiwan’s traditional, long-range weapons. Conventionalists also claim that buying big-ticket arms strengthens Washington’s political commitment to Taiwan. However, officials and experts increasingly see another strategy as prudent. Recent Chinese economic growth and military modernization have greatly enhanced Beijing’s capabilities, to the point that many believe Taiwan could not hold out alone against a Chinese invasion. Reformers thus argue that Taiwan needs to start building its forces around small, easily distributed weapons such as mobile anti-ship missiles and patrol boats and make greater investments in reserve forces and territorial defense. This “porcupine” defense strategy can theoretically buy more time for US forces to arrive in a war. The fate of Taiwan’s military strategy, which also depends greatly on political relations between Beijing, Taipei, and Washington, will help determine the strength of deterrence in the Taiwan Strait. A breakdown in this deterrence could lead to US-China war. The United States not only influences Taiwan’s strategy, but has a great stake in its future.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Military Affairs, Budget, Defense Spending, and Arms Sales
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, Asia, North America, and United States of America

45. Finland in Afghanistan 2001–2021: From stabilization to advancing foreign and security policy relations

Author:
Katariina Mustasilta, Tyyne Karjalainen, Timo R. Stewart, and Mathilda Salo
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
Finland participated in the international stabilization and reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan for nearly 20 years, contributing around 2,500 soldiers and 140 civilian crisis management experts. During this period, Finland’s development cooperation funds and humanitarian assistance allocated to Afghanistan amounted to around EUR 398 million. When Finland made the decision to join the operations in Afghanistan at the turn of 2001 and 2002, the country was living in uncertain yet optimistic times. The Taliban regime had collapsed quickly after the US-led military intervention, and the international community was broadly committed to supporting the interim administration in changing the country’s course. Finland sent a CIMIC unit to Afghanistan to participate in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and support the stabilization and reconstruction efforts. It also began to channel development cooperation funds to Afghanistan, notably through UN and World Bank programmes, and soon allocated most of its civilian crisis management resources to the European Union Police Mission (EUPOL) in Afghanistan. In the second half of the 2000s, however, Afghanistan slid further into a devastating civil war. A decade into the international intervention, the early optimism had given way to Afghans’ growing distrust of their government and the international actors. The Finnish troops, now comprising around 200 soldiers, repeatedly engaged in combat as part of the military operation that was now led by NATO and had become a party in the conflict. While the security arrangements for the international actors required increasing resources, their room for manoeuvre became significantly more limited. After the ISAF mission ended, Finland continued to participate in the NATO-led Resolute Support Mission (RSM), which supported the Afghan security forces until the summer of 2021. Finland also remained one of the most important actors to support EUPOL until the end of the mission and took responsibility for co-hosting the 2020 Afghanistan pledging conference to support the country. Afghanistan was the biggest recipient of Finland’s development cooperation funds throughout the second half of the 2010s. In August 2021, Finland suspended its extensive activities in Afghanistan in chaotic circumstances as the international community left the country following the US decision to withdraw its forces and the Taliban’s seize of power. This research examines Finland’s activities in Afghanistan by focusing on why Finland decided to engage in Afghanistan, on what its activities were based, and what can be learned from them for future crises and conflicts. The research is based on the analysis of a broad set of qualitative data consisting of interviews with 64 people who were involved in the intervention in Afghanistan or employed in related activities. Workshop discussions were also held to hear the views of the Afghan diaspora in Finland and experts. In addition, the researchers analysed public documents and previous research literature and held background discussions with experts. This research report broadly examines the consequences of Finland’s objectives, the logic behind its activities and the key challenges from the perspectives of military crisis management, civilian crisis management, and development cooperation and humanitarian assistance. Our research findings suggest that Finland’s activities in Afghanistan were motivated by multiple objectives that were partly unclear and at times conflicting. Based on government reports and other public documents, Finland’s primary aim was to stabilize and support Afghanistan to enhance international peace and security. The proclaimed objectives highlighted Finland’s responsibility as part of the UN-led international community and its efforts to support the development of good governance and the rule of law and promote the rights of women and girls in particular. In our research, these objectives comprise a framework we call “Finland as a benefactor”. On the other hand, our analysis suggests that alongside – and over – these proclaimed objectives, Finland’s participation was primarily guided by its desire to maintain and strengthen its foreign and security policy relations with the US and other international partners, as well as its effort to deepen its collaboration with NATO. Within the limits of this “Finland as a partner” framework, Finland sought to position itself as a reliable benefactor but also to gain advantage by improving its national capacities. Finland’s multiple objectives in Afghanistan might not necessarily have posed a problem in terms of the appropriateness of Finland’s involvement. Indeed, at the beginning they worked in harmony as the operating environment allowed Finland to show solidarity with the US and support it in the fight against terrorism while also appearing as a humanitarian actor that promoted stability and development in Afghanistan. However, tensions emerged between the different rationales when the situation in Afghanistan deteriorated, and the nature and outcomes of the intervention became more conflicted. In the absence of clearly and transparently set objectives, it was challenging to build an action plan and assess the activities. One particular factor that made the planning and monitoring of Finland’s participation difficult was the effort to disguise the fact that it was motivated by a desire to foster transatlantic relations and partnerships. From the perspective of the international partnerships, it was enough that Finland participated in the intervention. In terms of Afghanistan and its development, the objectives of the various activities remained vague, unrealistic and unclear, and they received insufficient attention. Instead of critical analysis and strategic monitoring, both international and Finnish actors attempted to meet the stated objectives by highlighting the progress made in Afghanistan and keeping silent about the combats and difficulties. It is almost impossible to assess to what extent Finland achieved its objectives in Afghanistan, because no clear and transparent objectives had been set. Based on our interviews, Finland’s involvement benefitted its transatlantic relations, Nordic cooperation and position in the international community. Besides defence cooperation, Finland developed its national capacities and raised its profile within the EU’s civilian crisis management framework. It is however difficult to assess in retrospect how the different forms of participation deepened Finland’s relations with the US, for example, and whether Finland’s activities were cost-efficient in terms of its partnership goals and national capacities, because no expectations had been explicitly stated. While temporary successes were achieved in improving security and the conditions for education in some areas, for example, issues such as a lack of understanding of the context of the conflict, challenges related to local ownership and the absence of a coherent long-term strategy became stumbling blocks in the international intervention in Afghanistan. Previous research has already called attention to the negative impacts of the intervention: the civilian victims of the military operations, the changes in local power structures, the displacement of local activities and increased corruption are only some of the examples of the impacts for which Finland has also been partly responsible. During, and partly as a result of, the intervention in Afghanistan, Finland’s policy came to be underpinned by a comprehensive crisis management strategy. In Afghanistan, this meant that Finland participated in multiple sectors and placed emphasis on the interdependence between the development and civilian crisis management efforts and military crisis management. Overall, our interviewees assessed that the activities of Finland and Finnish actors in Afghanistan were of high quality and appreciated. Our research suggests that the comprehensive strategy adopted by Finland served to justify its participation in different areas of the intervention and especially its military participation. However, Finland failed to fulfil the strategy in terms of coordinating its various activities in Afghanistan. Finland’s experiences in Afghanistan provide lessons learned that can be used to guide its activities in future crisis and conflict situations. First, it is necessary to set clearer and more transparent objectives to enable the effective planning and strategic monitoring of activities. In the context of partnership and capacity goals, clear objectives would help to develop the resourcing and targeting of activities. As regards supporting peace and stability, clearer, context-specific objectives would make it possible to monitor the appropriateness and comprehensiveness of activities. However, adopting a comprehensive approach does not mean that Finland should engage in all activities or areas of assistance in the target country; rather, its activities should be targeted to support the overall international aid effort. It is also important to develop Finland’s advocacy and impact efforts in multilateral interventions, in particular in situations in which Finland contributes significant resources. While Finland is in principle a small player, playing an active role in issues such as drawing attention to the possible negative impacts of interventions is consistent with its value-based foreign policy. By collaborating with like-minded actors, Finland has the opportunity to promote its interests through interventions (as far as these interests have been identified). However, sufficient resources are required for effective outcomes: development cooperation funds and inputs from seconded experts will be wasted if the human resources allocated to the comprehensive planning, implementation and monitoring of Finland’s participation are insufficient. The setting and implementation of realistic objectives appropriate to the context require a continuously updated conflict analysis, which in the case of small players such as Finland must also include an analysis of the context of international aid and operations. After interventions, it is also important to effectively put to use the expertise of the people who return to Finland after working in crisis areas so as not to waste the cultural and linguistic knowledge they have acquired. The lessons identified in this research are also relevant for the future of Afghanistan and Afghan people. The international community, including Finland, has been involved in shaping the structures of Afghan society, as well as its conflict dynamics, for nearly 20 years. This means that it also continues to assume its responsibility after withdrawing from the country – all the more so because the decisions to start and terminate the intervention were primarily driven by interests other than those of Afghans themselves. In terms of Finland’s credibility as a foreign policy actor, it is particularly important that it continues to abide by its long-standing commitment to promote the rights of women and girls. In the present difficult circumstances, the cooperation and assistance efforts should be based on placing the needs and priorities of Afghans at the centre. This can be achieved by conducting a careful conflict analysis, listening to and discussing with Afghans, and promoting a strategically coordinated approach to setting the objectives and framework conditions of the cooperation at the level of the international community.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, NATO, Crisis Management, and Stabilization
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, South Asia, and Finland

46. Arms-production Capabilities in the Indo-Pacific Region: Measuring Self-reliance

Author:
Lucie Béraud-Sudreau, Xiao Liang, Siemon T. Wezeman, and Ming Sun
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
Abstract:
Armed forces in the Indo-Pacific region remain dependent on weapon systems imported from foreign suppliers. This is despite the efforts of many governments in the Indo-Pacific to implement policies that support the development of local arms industrial capabilities with the aim of increasing self-reliance. This report develops three indicators to give a score and regional ranking of self-reliance in arms production to 12 jurisdictions in the Indo-Pacific region: Australia, China, India, Indonesia, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, Pakistan, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand and Viet Nam. Overall, this report contributes to knowledge and debates on armament trends and military modernization in the Indo-Pacific. In a region where tensions among neighbours are rising, it further contributes to transparency with regard to levels of self-reliance in domestic arms production, allowing for an independent assessment of the region’s respective arms industries.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Arms Trade, and Imports
Political Geography:
China, Australia, and Indo-Pacific

47. What Strategic Posture Should France Adopt in the Middle East?

Author:
Héloïse Fayet
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
France has a historical presence in the Middle East, where it has many interests to defend: the fight against terrorism, the promotion of the arms industry, the dissemination of humanitarian values, etc. To this end, it has a number of resources at its disposal, notably military: French forces are deployed in Iraq, Syria and Jordan as part of Operation Chammal, in Lebanon for the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), and in the United Arab Emirates. This strategic posture, inherited from the history and "Arab policy" of the 20th century, is now being called into question by the geopolitical upheavals in the region. The resizing of the American presence in the Middle East, initiated by the withdrawal from Afghanistan, is accompanied by a growing assumption of responsibility for their own security by local actors. This evolution is embodied, for example, in the signing of the Abraham Accords, which redefine the place of Israel. The American pulling out also allows extra-regional powers such as China and Russia to become progressively involved in the area. These transformations require an adaptation of the French posture in order to position itself as a credible actor in the strategic competition. It is therefore necessary to move away from the sole focus on counterterrorism, which no longer gathers partners, and more broadly to redefine the partnership strategy and the mechanism deployed on the ground. A strengthened interministerial, or even European, dynamic also seems essential in order to mobilize all the levers available to France.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Armed Forces, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Iraq, Middle East, France, and Syria

48. A 'Bright Path' Forward or a Grim Dead End? The Political Impact of the Belt and Road Initiative in Kazakhstan

Author:
Anton Louthan
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
This report assesses the political impact of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in Kazakhstan. Specifically, it examines whether and how the People’s Republic of China can pursue a strategy of economic statecraft to further its foreign policy and political interests in Kazakhstan. Despite Kazakhstan’s importance for the success of the BRI’s overland trade corridors, the report argues that important financial, foreign policy, and political constraints limit Beijing’s potential to influence Nur-Sultan. Beijing’s concerns over upsetting its relationship with the Russian Federation and the fact that the value of bilateral trade, investment, and Kazakhstani indebtedness to China have decreased in recent years suggest that Beijing is less willing to, capable of, or interested in using the BRI to influence Kazakhstan. The perceived closeness in this bilateral relationship has less to do with the influence of the BRI and more to do with the alignment of both countries’ geopolitical interests before the initiative’s creation. The report does not suggest that Chinese influence has decreased, but rather shows how Kazakhstan has been able to maintain a degree of political autonomy. Nur-Sultan has played a proactive role in forming its relationship with Beijing through its pursuit of former President Nursultan Nazarbayev’s “multi-vector” foreign policy strategy. In diversifying Kazakhstan’s diplomatic, economic, and political ties with Russia, China, the European Union, and the United States, Nur-Sultan has been able to avoid complete dependence on one country. Furthermore, Kazakhstan has been able to shape the size and scope of Chinese economic activity by guiding the initiative’s investments and projects to further the government’s domestic development agenda, Nurly Zhol (translated as “Bright Path”). However, issues related to corruption and deepening ties between Chinese and Kazakhstani elites through the BRI have likely strengthened Kazakhstan’s authoritarian political structure.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Development, Bilateral Relations, Infrastructure, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Autonomy, and Influence
Political Geography:
China, Kazakhstan, and Asia

49. Turkey's Response to the Russia-Ukraine Crisis

Author:
Aaron Stein
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
On October 26, 2021, Ukraine’s Ministry of Defense released video of a TB2 unmanned combat aerial vehicle (UCAV) striking a separatist D-30 howitzer in Russian-occupied Donbas. The strike was Ukraine’s first confirmed use of the now ubiquitous TB2, the Bayraktar-manufactured drone that the Turkish military has used to great tactical effect in Syria, Libya, and Nagorno-Karabakh. The Turkish-Ukrainian defense relationship is understudied, but it could become an important factor in how Russian elites view North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) support for non-member Ukraine, and be used to justify an invasion to assuage Moscow’s concerns about a US-allied military presence along its borders. The Turkish support for Ukraine is not the main driver of Russian discomfort about the future of Ukraine. The TB2 is also not a decisive game changer, and the use of UCAVs is almost certain to have little impact on how Russian leadership weighs risk during debates about the efficacy of armed conflict in a neighboring state. Nevertheless, Turkish-Ukrainian defense ties are worthy of deeper study, precisely because Ankara’s relationships with Kyiv and Moscow have a secondary impact on American interests in Eastern Europe. The Turkish-Russian relationship is marred by bureaucratic distrust, which is papered over by a very functional leader-to-leader dynamic that enables the two Black Sea neighbors to cooperate and manage numerous regional conflicts. The Turkish-Ukrainian dynamic, in turn, is part of a broader Turkish effort to establish itself as an independent actor, committed to pursuing a foreign policy that often clashes with much of the NATO alliance. This paper will explore Turkish-Russian and Turkish-Ukrainian relations; the reasons for Turkey’s efforts to “fence sit” and establish itself as a neutral political actor in the Black Sea; and what these efforts portend for US interests in the region.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, NATO, and Crisis Management
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Turkey, Ukraine, and Middle East

50. How Will China Respond to the Russia-Ukraine Crisis?

Author:
Chris Miller
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
How will China respond to a potential Russian military escalation against Ukraine? Relations between Russia and China have intensified in recent years, with Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping holding regular summits and the two countries’ militaries participating in joint exercises and cooperating in some defense industrial efforts. Ties between Moscow and Beijing are now closer than any time since the days of Stalin and Mao, driven by a shared perception that the United States is each country’s primary foreign policy challenge. One top Russian official told media in December 2021 that the relationship now “exceeds an alliance.”[1] Chinese state media, meanwhile, have vocally backed Russia in arguing that the current crisis stems from the US “using NATO as a tool to cannibalize and squeeze Russia’s strategic space.”[2] The 2014 war in Ukraine and annexation of Crimea was an important factor driving Russia and China closer to each other, as Russia sought to reduce post-Crimea international isolation and as Beijing realized it could drive a hard bargain in its bilateral relationship with Russia on issues like energy. China’s response to the 2014 war, however, was generally to avoid taking sides. China accepted a narrative that placed blame on the West for causing the crisis, with top diplomats citing Western “foreign interference for causing the crisis,” but didn’t approve of Russia’s seizure of Crimea or its military actions in the Donbas.[3] China abstained from voting on the key United Nations resolutions regarding Crimea, for example, and it still declines to recognize Crimea as Russian territory. Similarly, it verbally rejected US and European sanctions on Russia though it let Chinese firms, including the country’s big state-owned banks, abide by these sanctions to avoid being cut off from US financial markets and the international banking system. Compared to 2014, however, China may find it more difficult to avoid involvement in an escalating crisis. Leaders in Beijing and around the world will see the US response to any military escalation against Ukraine as sending signals about whether the US could effectively respond to future crises in the Taiwan Strait or East or South China Seas. The success or failure of US efforts to impose meaningful costs on Russia if it escalates will be seen as a test of whether the US could do something similar in Asia. Moreover, after repeated summits between Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin, including Xi’s description of Putin as his “best friend,” China’s approach to Russia amid a crisis will also be interpreted as sending signals about China’s own capabilities and influence. Because of this, China will not see a new phase of war between Russia and Ukraine as a peripheral issue in its foreign policy, even though China has no core issues at stake in Ukraine itself. China is most likely to be implicated in the crisis by potential Western sanctions on Russia, which in contrast to 2014 will impose substantially more pressure on Beijing to take sides. China’s decision either to adhere to new Western sanctions or to help Russia avoid them will shape escalation pathways and determine the magnitude of economic and political isolation that sanctions impose.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Politics, Sanctions, Military Affairs, Economy, Crisis Management, and Escalation
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Eurasia, Ukraine, and Asia