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1. Kuwait Country Report 2024

Author:
Arab Barometer
Publication Date:
05-2026
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Arab Barometer
Abstract:
Since the last Arab Barometer survey in Kuwait, conducted in 2022, major changes have taken place, significantly affecting political stability in the country. While political life in Kuwait was saturated with crises, and its indicators were clearly visible in the dissolution of the National Assembly (Parliament) repeatedly before completing its term, the shifts, changes, and political instability that dominated the public arena, between late 2022 and the current period of 2024, included even more severe events. Kuwait faced the unconstitutional dissolution of the National Assembly and the suspension of some articles in the constitution, now for the third time in Kuwait’s history. The first two such crises were in 1967 and 1986. To summarize the events that took place from June 2022 until the dissolution of the Parliament and the suspension of the constitution in May 2024, they are as follows: On August 3, 2022, the National Assembly was dissolved constitutionally, in response to the sit-in of a number of MPs inside the Parliament and their overnight stay there. The Crown Prince (the current Emir) gave a speech in which he emphasized adherence to the constitution, and also presented initiatives in electoral reform. He emphasized that the government would not vote for the candidate for the speaker of the National Assembly, and that the elections would be through the national ID card (effectively changing electoral circuits). The protesting MPs considered these reforms a victory. As a result, Ahmed al-Nawaf was appointed Prime Minister
Topic:
Corruption, Education, Environment, Gender Issues, Health, Migration, Governance, Democracy, Economy, Discrimination, Institutions, Labor Market, Freedom, and Political System
Political Geography:
Middle East and Kuwait

2. Protecting the North American Arctic and Beyond

Author:
Mathieu Boulegue, Rebecca Pincus, and Madison Lipson
Publication Date:
11-2026
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:
The United States has quickly adapted to the new security environment in a changing Arctic, as the region must deal with geopolitical tension stemming from Russia, the impact of climate change, and NATO’s increased role and presence. Many unknowns remain, however. Turning current and future US strategic documents and concepts about the Arctic into reality does not have any easy solutions. This will require continued endeavor and patience. The US should ensure prevailing in the Arctic in terms of homeland security and forward defense. Forward defense in the Arctic will require forward-thinking, notably what constitutes Arctic-specific integrated deterrence through tailored and calibrated presence as part of the Joint Force. A large part of this endeavor falls on the leadership of USNORTHCOM. USNORTHCOM must be empowered to become the Department of Defense’s Arctic “capability advocate” under the Unified Command Plan (UCP) and the Total Force concept. USNORTHCOM must be emboldened to take the lead in associated challenges to defend the US homeland, secure the region, cooperate with allies, and bridge potential security gaps. This paper seeks to help USNORTHCOM leverage its influence in shaping the future of Arctic security for the US homeland. It offers plenty of innovative policy recommendations and action points aimed at streamlining the role of NORTHCOM to keep the Arctic safe and secure for the US and its allies. Future policy must address the need to enhance Arctic domain awareness and foster a new approach to Arctic-specific capabilities, technologies, and procurement tailored to the environment. Part of this endeavor is also connected to bridging potential gaps related to logistics, sustainment, maintenance, and transportation adapted to Arctic-specific requirements. This will ensure increased mobility and reach across the region. USNORTHCOM should ensure that regular Arctic drills and exercises under its supervision systematically include logistics and sustainment as essential parts of training. Policy must also clarify the role of the primary Arctic combatant command by identifying structural gaps and bridging them, especially in times of crisis or escalation. Better synchronization of efforts will help the US reach a common operating picture of the Arctic from a whole of government perspective.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, and USNORTHCOM
Political Geography:
North America and Arctic

3. After Ukraine: Prospects for a Russian Resurgence in the Middle East

Author:
Anna Borshchevskaya and Matt Tavares
Publication Date:
01-2026
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
Moscow has cultivated ties with U.S. adversaries and allies alike, and Washington must respond by advancing a holistic policy that empowers Ukrainian commercial interests and addresses deficits in sanctions policy. Russia’s position in the Middle East has faced major setbacks in recent years, including the fall of Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad, the weakening of Iran and its proxies, and the toll from Moscow's unending war of choice in Ukraine. But reports of a Russian retreat from the region are premature. Alongside traditional defense and economic relationships with Algeria, Egypt, and Iraq, Moscow has cultivated ties with a host of other countries—U.S. adversaries and allies alike. With Iran, it has reportedly begun assembling Su-35 fighters as part of a $6.5 billion deal that would boost the regime’s air force. With the United Arab Emirates, an American ally, Russia’s non-oil trade grew to $11.5 billion as of 2024. And in Syria, Russia’s pre-revolution military bases remain in place, while an October meeting between Presidents Putin and Sharaa indicated a cooperative spirit. In this comprehensive Policy Note, experts Anna Borshchevskaya and Matt Tavares argue that Russia is poised for a resurgence in the Middle East, especially once the war in Ukraine ends—a point they also make clear in a hard-hitting op-ed published in the National Interest. Washington, they argue, must recognize the multiple threats this would present to U.S. interests in the region and develop a vigorous counterstrategy in response—one that includes empowering Ukrainian commercial interests, refining sanctions policy, and rebutting Russian propaganda in real-time.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Sanctions, Iran, Regional Politics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Middle East

4. Toward a Fairer EU-Tunisia Agricultural Partnership

Author:
Imen Louati
Publication Date:
01-2026
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Arab Reform Initiative (ARI)
Abstract:
Tunisian policymakers approach agriculture as the main economic tool to improve the country’s trade balance. Optimizing the trade balance as the primary objective has led to a dual strategy for the agricultural sector: to promote exports of products for which Tunisia has a comparative advantage – olive oil, dates, citrus fruits, and fish – while reducing its dependence on imports of staple foods – cereals, milk, and beef – in the interest of safeguarding national food security. This dual strategy has created tension in the agricultural policy. The free trade liberalization facilitated by the country’s membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO) is counterbalanced by protections for domestic producers, using measures such as tariff and non-tariff barriers, particularly for sensitive foodstuffs (agricultural products that a country considers highly important to its national interests and therefore seeks to protect from full trade liberalization).1 The simultaneous goals of prioritizing food security and protecting national farming interests, while also integrating with international markets, prevent trade policies from effectively balancing export promotion and import needs. The inherent contradiction of these objectives has not only compromised Tunisia’s agricultural policy but also directly contributed to supply chain disruptions and the temporary disappearance of essential food items from the national market. The sustained dependence on imported staples has, in turn, exacerbated the wider economic crisis, contributing directly to a significant rise in Tunisia’s external debt and straining the foreign currency reserves needed for servicing that debt. As Tunisia is currently engaged in negotiations to update its trade agreement with the EU, there is an urgent need to reevaluate Tunisia’s trade policy framework to prevent the negotiation process from locking the country into unsustainable and irreversible policy choices. In that spirit, this policy analysis traces the roots of Tunisia’s agricultural trade policies, examining key multilateral obligations and the asymmetric outcomes of its trade agreements with the EU. It outlines how the deep power imbalance between the EU and Tunisia is affecting Tunisia’s agricultural policies and documents the critiques and resistance to deeper trade integration among Tunisian civil society, unions, and farmers. Building on the evidence gathered through analysis and semistructured interviews with stakeholders from civil society organizations, farmer unions, and the EU representative in Tunisia, this report proposes a six-point proactive strategy to redefine the EU-Tunisia trade relationship.
Topic:
European Union, Partnerships, Food Sovereignty, and Agricultural Policy
Political Geography:
Europe, North Africa, and Tunisia

5. Financing Water Justice: International Aid and Development in the MENA Region

Author:
Dana Abi Ghanem
Publication Date:
01-2026
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Arab Reform Initiative (ARI)
Abstract:
The need for water justice in the MENA region represents a pressing policy challenge, as governments confront pressures from climate change that threaten water resources. The region is considered one of the most water-scarce in the world,1 but its geographic diversity means that different countries in MENA face a litany of challenges when securing water and food for their populations in just and sustainable ways. Several of them must address systemic issues in water governance, including unequal allocation, inadequate infrastructure, and uneven access among rural, urban, and displaced populations. Others face increasing droughts, driving vast areas that rely on agriculture for their income into social and economic precarity. Climate change, population growth, and transboundary water tensions further complicate national and regional efforts to ensure fair and sustainable water management. Since the end of the Second World War, international aid and development organizations have launched technical cooperation projects, often focused on rural water supply and irrigation. Led by the WB and United Nations agencies over the last three decades, bilateral aid agencies and the EU, these international financial institutions (IFIs) have played a significant role in water development – promoting approaches like integrated water resource management (IWRM), as well as lending support for transboundary water management and water governance. This support can be traced back through reams of documentation and convenings that showcase technical assistance and financing for various water development efforts, including dam building, irrigation projects, and wastewater treatment plants, with claims often linked to sustainability principles and sound water management. Viewing these actions from a water justice lens, we argue that water development processes and structures pertaining to transparent decision-making, participation, and democracy are as important as equitability and fairness in access to water.2 In this context, the role that IFIs can play in enabling or hindering water justice across various countries in the MENA region warrants scrutiny. This report examines how IFIs might facilitate a just water future for the region, exploring how their practices, investments, and partnerships influence fairness in access, equity, sustainability, and transparency in water governance.
Topic:
Development, Foreign Aid, Water, and Climate Justice
Political Geography:
Middle East and North Africa

6. Land Tenure in Lebanon: The Elephant in the Room of Agricultural Policy Debates

Author:
Christophe Maroun
Publication Date:
01-2026
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Arab Reform Initiative (ARI)
Abstract:
“Land for those who work it.” This popular slogan, heralded by anti-colonialists and anti-imperialists worldwide, as well as by peasant movements such as La Via Campesina and the Landless Workers’ Movement in Brazil, encapsulates a global demand for agrarian reforms that put peasants at the heart of food systems. Yet while global conversations about food production and rural development have had to confront the uncomfortable issue of land tenure, in Lebanon land remains the elephant in the room of national agrarian policy debates. The question of land distribution and access in Lebanon touches on the very foundations of the country’s political economy, which is based on rent extraction, clientelism, and elite capture. A tangle of different land regimes has enabled political and economic elites to continuously convert land into speculative private assets, slowly eroding the social value of land while turning it into a commodity and a source of political power. The persistence of land-based power and elite resistance has historically blocked any meaningful structural reform. In parallel, by preferring donor-driven, technical interventions in agrarian and food policies that avoid the core issue of unequal land access, the Lebanese state functions as a guarantor of existing class structures. This article argues that reforming land access in Lebanon is the essential structural condition for cultivating a fair and sustainable agricultural system rooted in agroecology. It also proposes specific reformist policies and measures toward that goal. In the current political landscape, redistributive land reform – the transfer of tenure rights to new beneficiaries to provide more equitable access – remains distant. Nevertheless, pragmatic alternatives exist to improve land access to vulnerable communities and safeguard precarious agricultural lands. These include strengthening the use of communal amiri lands, protecting agricultural zones from speculation, and activating idle land.
Topic:
Environment, Transitional Justice, Land Tenure, and Agricultural Policy
Political Geography:
Middle East and Lebanon

7. A pivot or a saga? How Turkish foreign policy is torn between domestic pressures and economic needs

Author:
Başak Alpan
Publication Date:
01-2026
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS)
Abstract:
The EU must take proactive steps to address longstanding issues and cultivate a more trust-based and cooperative relationship with Turkey. Bilateral relations could be rejuvenated by addressing key issues such as democratic reforms, visa liberalisation, civil society engagement and the ongoing dispute over Cyprus. This CEPS Explainer explores the recent orientation of the Turkish foreign policy, focusing on its historical Western orientation and recent efforts to achieve ‘strategic autonomy’ by scrutinising the results of the fieldwork undertaken through the CATS Network project. Interviews conducted in Ankara, Istanbul and Brussels show that while Turkish policymakers aim to diversify the country’s foreign policy by forging security and economic partnerships with non-Western actors, such as the BRICS, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), China and Russia, its institutional and ideological foundation remains Western-oriented. Integrating Turkey into European security alignments, such as the SAFE framework, and modernising the Turkey-EU customs union would help to strengthen bilateral ties. Additionally, the EU should substantiate the people-to-people contact approach to rebuild trust and encourage further cooperation.
Topic:
European Union, Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Civil Society, Partnerships, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
Turkey, Middle East, and Europe

8. Economic implications for Europe of a potential reintegration of Iran into the world economy

Author:
Gabriel Felbermayr, Mahdi Ghodsi, Heider Kariem, Robert Stehrer, and Yoto V. Yotov
Publication Date:
02-2026
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies (WIIW)
Abstract:
How would fundamental political change in Iran, leading to a democratic system with a free and rules-based economic order, affect Germany and the EU economically? In the event of change, sanctions could be scaled back, allowing Iran to rejoin the global economy. This study quantifies the economic effects of such a transformation. It neither advocates for nor legitimises the lifting or easing of sanctions under the current regime or without far-reaching and credible reforms that fully address the concerns underlying the sanctions currently in place. Using the newest available data and quantitative methods, the results indicate that lifting EU sanctions alone could raise Iran’s real GDP by more than 80% in the long run while generating moderate but economically meaningful gains for Germany and the EU of around 0.3-0.4% of GDP. These gains are driven by expanded trade, lower energy and input prices, and improved allocative efficiency. When sanctions removal is combined with plausible scenarios of productivity catch-up with Turkey or South Korea, Iran’s GDP would increase by 240-388% and the gains for Europe would increase further, underscoring the strong complementarity between trade integration and productivity growth. Moreover, Iran’s reintegration would reduce energy price volatility, improve the security of maritime trade routes, and lower migration pressures. Overall, the findings suggest that a negotiated transition and rules-based reintegration of Iran would generate substantial mutual economic benefits while contributing to regional and global stability.
Topic:
Markets, Political Economy, Foreign Direct Investment, Sanctions, European Union, Economy, Inflation, Energy, and Trade Integration
Political Geography:
Europe, Iran, and Germany

9. Structural dependencies and choke points in GVCs: An industry-level analysis

Author:
Robert Stehrer
Publication Date:
02-2026
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies (WIIW)
Abstract:
Global value chains (GVCs) are intricate international networks in which the production and distribution of goods and services across multiple economies and industries is coordinated. Their complexity introduces strategic dependencies when economies or industries rely heavily on a limited number of foreign suppliers. Such dependencies can also create additional vulnerabilities, particularly at choke points (i.e. key links or nodes in the chain) whose disruption – whether due to political instability and geopolitical tensions, natural disasters, pandemics or policy shocks and trade restrictions – can halt production. This study builds on previous research by examining two factors: (i) size dependencies arising when an importing economy-industry pair relies largely on the inputs of a partner economies, and (ii) choke dependencies, where imports from one economy pass through another, creating potential choke points. Choke dependency is particularly concerning, as disruptions in the choke economy can impact not only its direct exports but also the flow of goods from other suppliers. Using the multi-country input-output tables (MC IOTs), this study introduces two indicators to assess dependencies: (i) ‘size dependency’, based on the share of an economy-industry’s foreign output sourced from a specific partner, and (2) ‘choke dependency’, based on the pass-through frequency (ptf) indicator, which reveals how often inputs from third economies are routed through a particular partner. An economy-industry pair is considered dependent if it meets thresholds for size dependency, choke dependency or both. This comprehensive approach aims to offer a deeper understanding of systemic vulnerabilities in global trade networks.
Topic:
International Trade and Finance, Global Value Chains, Vulnerability, Dependency, and Choke Points
Political Geography:
Global Focus

10. África ante la crisis de financiación para el desarrollo

Author:
Andrea Chamorro, Jaume Portell, Olga Namasembe, Luis García Blanch, and Romeo Gbaguidi
Publication Date:
03-2026
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Fundación Alternativas
Abstract:
La Fundación Alternativas les invita a debatir en Casa África en torno al Informe África 2026. En esta edición nos centramos en los retos y oportunidades que plantea un nuevo modelo de financiación al desarrollo a resultas de factores como la retirada de EEUU del sistema de la ayuda, con el desmantelamiento de la USAID y de las agencias de Naciones Unidas; la presencia creciente de China a través de su proyecto de la Franja y la Ruta; o nuevas prioridades en Europa como el aumento del gasto en defensa. Nuestro Informe ofrece un estudio en profundidad que reflexiona y elabora propuestas en torno a un nuevo modelo de financiación del desarrollo sostenible. Estamos en un momento crítico donde la UE y España deberían contribuir a la articulación de un nuevo modelo, más horizontal, participativo y eficaz. Abordaremos cuestiones como el estado actual de la deuda y el desarrollo en África: el nexo entre seguridad y desarrollo; las tensiones entre las agendas externas y los intereses africanos en el Sahel y África Occidental; el nuevo escenario de la cooperación española y europea; el papel del sector privado, o las perspectivas para el desarrollo africano tras la IV Cumbre de Financiación de Sevilla.
Topic:
Development, European Union, Geopolitics, Economy, and Financing
Political Geography:
Africa

11. Ciencia, Industria y Competitividad

Author:
Gonzalo León, Francisco Marín, Carlos Marti Sempere, Raquel Jorge, and María Peñate
Publication Date:
02-2026
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Fundación Alternativas
Abstract:
La Fundación Alternativas analiza la evolución del sistema de I+D en España en el contexto internacional y geopolítico, destacando los grandes cambios recientes en ciencia, tecnología e innovación. El informe subraya que España dispone de capacidades competitivas en áreas clave como biotecnología, comunicaciones, software o IA, y puede contribuir al fortalecimiento tecnológico de la UE. Ante el ascenso de China, la inestabilidad global y la creciente importancia de la seguridad y la soberanía tecnológica, el texto defiende la necesidad de reformar el sistema español de I+D, mejorar su gestión y alinearlo con una política industrial europea más ambiciosa. El objetivo final es reforzar la competitividad, la autonomía tecnológica y el papel estratégico de España en Europa.
Topic:
Science and Technology, European Union, Youth, Digital Culture, Industry, and Competition
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and Spain

12. Political Violence in America: Public Perceptions, Polarization, and Accountability

Author:
PRRI Staff
Publication Date:
01-2026
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
PRRI: Public Religion Research Institute
Abstract:
Two-thirds of Americans (67%) believe political leaders’ failure to condemn violent rhetoric contributes a lot to violent actions in society. Majorities of Americans also believe that false or misleading information generated by AI (64%) and public displays of hate symbols (61%) contribute a lot to violent actions in society, while smaller majorities believe easy access to guns and harsh and violent political language are also drivers (both 53%). While 51% of Republicans believe public displays of hate symbols contribute a lot to violence, 76% of Democrats do. Fewer than half of Republicans (46%) believe that harsh and violent political language contributes a lot to violence in society; white evangelical Protestants are the only group of religious Americans in which a minority (45%) share that view. Very few Americans support hostile and violent actions by their political allies to advance important political goals. Very few Americans justify imprisoning a political opponent without a trial if that person poses a clear danger to the country (12%); damaging or destroying property as a form of protest (7%); pushing, shoving, or punching a political opponent (6%); posting the home address or private phone number of a political opponent online so their family will be harassed (5%); or killing a political opponent if that person poses a clear danger to the country (5%). While very strong majorities of Americans over the age of 50 completely disagree that violent and harsh actions may justify political outcomes, such sentiments are less widely shared among younger Americans, especially those who are under 30. More than three in four Americans disagree that violence may be needed to save the country; views are similar across partisan groups, though they have shifted some throughout the year. Most Americans (77%) disagree that “because things have gotten so far off track, true American patriots may have to resort to violence in order to save our country,” compared with 20% of those who agree. Agreement about the potential need for political violence has decreased significantly among Republicans since President Donald Trump’s reelection in November 2024; agreement among Democrats has remained low over time but increased slightly in the past year. Since early 2021, support for political violence has varied across religious groups. Support among white Christians has declined since the 2024 election, though white evangelical Protestants continue to show higher support than white Christians overall. Support for political violence remains highest among Christian nationalism Adherents and lowest among Rejecters. Americans’ views on who is most responsible for political violence are deeply polarized, split largely along partisan and religious lines. Democrats overwhelmingly attribute most responsibility for political violence to right-wing groups (73%), while Republicans attribute most responsibility to left-wing groups (72%). While more Christians of color and non-Christians attribute most responsibility to right-wing groups for most political violence today, white Christian groups attribute most responsibility to left-wing groups. Most Christian nationalism Adherents (73%) and Sympathizers (64%) attribute responsibility to left-wing groups, while most Rejecters (72%) attribute responsibility to right-wing groups. Christian nationalism Skeptics are divided. Americans’ views are strongly divided by party and religion on whether National Guard deployments in American cities cause more violence than they prevent. A slim majority of Americans (52%) agree that deploying the National Guard to patrol American cities may cause more violence than it prevents. Democrats (80%) and independents (60%) are far more likely than Republicans (23%) to agree. Most Christians of color and non-Christians agree that these deployments cause more violence, while white Christian groups are far less likely to do so. Agreement is particularly lower among white evangelical Protestants (29%). Christian nationalism Rejecters (80%) are the most likely to agree, followed by Skeptics (54%), Sympathizers (37%), and Adherents (26%). Opposition to Trump’s Jan. 6 pardons is widespread, with notable exceptions among Republicans, white Christian groups, and Christian nationalism Adherents and Sympathizers. Most Americans (68%) oppose “President Trump’s pardoning of over 1,500 people convicted for their role in the attacks on the U.S. Capitol on January 6, 2021,” compared with 29% who favor it. Republicans (63%) are far more likely to favor these pardons than independents (22%) and Democrats (4%). White Christian groups, particularly white evangelical Protestants (58%), are more likely than non-Christians (24%), Christians of color (19%), and unaffiliated Americans (18%) to favor Trump’s Jan. 6 pardons, as are Christian nationalism Adherents (61%) and Sympathizers (49%), compared with Skeptics (25%) and Rejecters (8%). Opposition to stripping citizenship and deporting U.S. citizens deemed a threat is widespread, with notable exceptions among Republicans, white evangelical Protestants, and Christian nationalism Adherents and Sympathizers. Four in ten Americans (41%) favor “stripping U.S. citizens of their citizenship and deporting them if they are determined to be a threat to the country.” Republicans (60%) are roughly twice as likely as independents (38%) and Democrats (27%) to agree. White evangelical Protestants (56%) are the only religious group with majority support for stripping U.S. citizens of their citizenship and deporting them, compared with fewer Hispanic Protestants (49%), white Catholics (48%), and white mainline Protestants (46%). Support among other religious groups is notably lower. Christian nationalism Adherents (67%) and Sympathizers (57%) are notably more likely than Skeptics (40%) and Rejecters (23%) to favor stripping U.S. citizens of their citizenship.
Topic:
Political Violence, Accountability, Misinformation, and Polarization
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

13. Mapping Christian Nationalism Across the 50 States: Insights from PRRI’s 2025 American Values Atlas

Author:
PRRI Staff
Publication Date:
02-2026
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
PRRI: Public Religion Research Institute
Abstract:
Around three in ten Americans qualify as Christian nationalism Adherents or Sympathizers. One-third of Americans qualify as Christian nationalism Adherents (11%) or Sympathizers (21%), compared with two-thirds who qualify as Skeptics (37%) or Rejecters (27%). These percentages have remained stable since PRRI first asked these questions in late 2022, with a slight decline among Americans who qualify as Christian nationalism Rejecters, who peaked at 32% in June 2023 and declined to 26% by the end of 2025. White evangelical Protestants and Hispanic Protestants are most likely to hold Christian nationalist beliefs; Americans who frequently attend religious services, especially those who are white, are more likely to be Christian nationalists. White Christians (46%) are more likely than Christians of color (39%), non-Christians (13%), and religiously unaffiliated Americans (10%) to qualify as Christian nationalism Adherents and Sympathizers. White evangelical Protestants (67%) and Hispanic Protestants (54%) are the only major religious groups among whom a majority hold Christian nationalist beliefs. The majority of those who attend religious services weekly or more qualify as Christian nationalism Adherents or Sympathizers (54%), compared with 39% of those who attend at least a few times a year and 20% of those who seldom or never attend services. This correlation holds among those who pray outside of religious services and those who read religious texts. White Americans who attend religious services, pray, or read the Bible or other religious texts frequently are more likely than their Black and Hispanic counterparts to qualify as Christian nationalism Adherents and Sympathizers. Christian nationalism support is also strongly linked to party, media habits, age, education, and race. A majority of Republicans qualify as either Christian nationalism Adherents (21%) or Sympathizers (35%), compared with one-quarter of independents (7% Adherents and 18% Sympathizers) and less than one in five Democrats (5% Adherents and 12% Sympathizers). Two-thirds of Americans who most trust far-right news sources qualify as Christian nationalism Adherents (34%) or Sympathizers (31%), as do a majority of those who most trust Fox News (18% Adherents and 37% Sympathizers). Support for Christian nationalism is positively associated with lower education levels and older age; AAPI Americans are far less likely to be Christian nationalists than other Americans. Christian nationalist views predominate in the South and Midwest; support for Christian nationalism is strongly correlated in all 50 states with favorable views of President Donald Trump and the proportion of Republican representation in state legislatures. The states with the highest levels of support for Christian nationalism — which includes about half of their residents — are Arkansas (54%), Mississippi (52%), West Virginia (51%), Oklahoma (49%), and Wyoming (46%). Three states emerge with more than half of their white, non-Hispanic residents supporting Christian nationalism: Arkansas (59%), Mississippi (54%), and West Virginia (53%). The higher state residents scored on the Christian nationalism scale, the more likely they are to hold favorable views of Trump and the larger the proportion of Republican elected officials in their state legislatures. Christian nationalists are more likely than other Americans to support political violence and score high on PRRI’s Right-Wing Authoritarianism Scale. Three in ten Christian nationalism Adherents (30%) and one-quarter of Sympathizers (23%) agree that “because things have gotten so far off track, true American patriots may have to resort to violence to save the country,” compared with only 14% of Skeptics and 11% of Rejecters. Support for political violence among Christian nationalism Adherents was higher under President Joe Biden and declined after Trump’s reelection. Christian nationalism Adherents and Sympathizers score high on PRRI’s Right-Wing Authoritarianism Scale; scores for Skeptics are mixed, while Rejecters score low. Christian nationalism Adherents and Sympathizers overwhelmingly view Trump as a strong leader, while Skeptics and Rejecters overwhelmingly view him as a dangerous dictator. Christian nationalists also hold more extreme views about immigrants and are more likely to say mandatory vaccines for children should be illegal. Majorities of Christian nationalism Adherents (67%) and Sympathizers (53%) believe that “immigrants are invading our country and replacing our cultural and ethnic background.” Majorities of Christian nationalism Adherents (61%) and Sympathizers (54%) agree with “the U.S. government deporting undocumented immigrants to foreign prisons without due process.” While at least half of Christian nationalism Adherents and Sympathizers support birthright citizenship, majorities agree with “stripping U.S. citizens of their citizenship and deporting them if they are determined to be a threat to the country” (66% and 56%). Over four in ten Christian nationalism Adherents (44%) and one-third of Sympathizers (34%) say that mandatory vaccines for children should be illegal in all or most cases, compared with one-quarter of Skeptics and one in ten Rejecters.
Topic:
Politics, Religion, Ideology, and Christian Nationalism
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

14. Mapping Support for LGBTQ Rights Across the 50 States: Insights from PRRI’s 2025 American Values Atlas

Author:
PRRI Staff
Publication Date:
03-2026
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
PRRI: Public Religion Research Institute
Abstract:
LGBTQ Americans trend younger, Democratic, liberal, and more religiously unaffiliated than other Americans. One in ten Americans identify as LGBTQ. Two in ten Americans ages 18-29 (20%) identify as LGBTQ, compared with smaller shares among those ages 30-49 (11%), ages 50-64 (5%), and ages 65 and older (4%). LGBTQ Americans are more likely to identify as Democrats (40%), compared with 28% of all Americans, and are nearly twice as likely to identify as politically liberal (51% vs. 26%, respectively). The majority of LGBTQ Americans identify as religiously unaffiliated (51%), compared with 27% of all Americans. Views on LGBTQ rights differ strongly by state. Massachusetts (85%), Maryland (82%), and Alaska (81%), along with the District of Columbia (82%), hold the highest support for nondiscrimination protections for gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgender people, while Mississippi (60%), Wyoming (57%), and Arkansas (53%) show the lowest support. Massachusetts (72%), Hawaii (71%), Vermont (71%), and Connecticut (70%), along with the District of Columbia (70%), show the strongest opposition to religiously based service refusals, while West Virginia (44%) shows the lowest opposition. The only states without majority support for same-sex marriage are Mississippi (47%) and Arkansas (50%). Massachusetts (85%), Rhode Island (85%), and Vermont (81%) show the highest support. Except for Christian nationalism Adherents, strong majorities of Americans — including most people of faith — support nondiscrimination protections for LGBTQ individuals. Most Americans support nondiscrimination protections for LGBTQ people (72%), with Democrats (90%) being the most supportive, followed by independents (76%) and Republicans (56%). Majorities of most major religious groups support non-discrimination protections, though support is highest among non-Christians and the religiously unaffiliated. Christian nationalism Rejecters (91%) are the most likely to support nondiscrimination protections, followed by 77% of Skeptics, 61% of Sympathizers, and 42% of Adherents. Over the past decade, Americans ages 18-29 have shown a gradual decrease in support for LGBTQ nondiscrimination laws, from 80% in 2015 to 70% in 2025, largely driven by young Republicans, while seniors 65 and over have increased their support from 61% to 74% over the same period. Except for Republicans, Christian nationalism Adherents, and Sympathizers, most Americans continue to oppose religiously based service refusals for LGBTQ people. Most Americans oppose allowing small businesses to refuse service to LGBTQ people on religious grounds (59%), with Democrats (82%) more likely to oppose, compared with independents (60%) and Republicans (35%). Opposition among white Christians grew from 49% in 2015 to 55% in 2020, but has declined since to 46%. Opposition among Christians of color, non-Christians, and religiously unaffiliated Americans remains high. Christian nationalism Rejecters (83%) are the most likely to oppose religiously based refusals for LGBTQ people, followed by 62% of Skeptics, 44% of Sympathizers, and 32% of Adherents. Support for same-sex marriage remains high for most Americans, but partisanship, religious affiliation, and Christian nationalist views are linked to differing opinions. Support for same-sex marriage remains higher today (65%) than in 2015 (53%). Today, Republicans (49%) are notably less likely than Democrats (83%) and independents (69%) to support same-sex marriage. Majorities of most religious groups support same-sex marriage, except for Latter-day Saints (47%), Hispanic Protestants (45%), white evangelical Protestants (37%), Muslims (37%), and Jehovah’s Witnesses (19%). Nearly all Christian nationalism Rejecters (93%) and three-fourths of Skeptics (73%) support same-sex marriage, compared with 46% of Sympathizers and 22% of Adherents. Except for young Americans under 30, support for same-sex marriage has steadily grown across older age groups, gender, race, and education levels. While most Americans agree that transgender people deserve the same rights and protections as other Americans, just 40% oppose laws that require transgender people to use bathroom of their sex assigned at birth. Seven in ten Americans (71%) agree that “transgender people deserve the same rights and protections as other Americans,” including most Democrats (88%), independents (77%), and Republicans (57%). Except for Christian nationalism Adherents (40%), solid majorities across all religious groups, Christian nationalism groups, age, gender, race, and education levels agree that transgender people deserve the same rights as other Americans. The majority of Americans (56%) favor laws that require transgender individuals to use bathrooms that correspond to their sex at birth, with most Republicans (81%) in favor, compared with 55% of independents and 32% of Democrats. Americans who agree transgender people deserve the same rights and protections as other Americans are less likely to favor laws that require transgender individuals to use bathrooms that correspond to their sex assigned at birth than those who disagree that transgender people deserve the same rights (49% vs. 77%).
Topic:
Human Rights, Religion, Discrimination, LGBT+, Transgender, and Christian Nationalism
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

15. If China Attacks Taiwan: The Consequences for China of “Minor Conflict” and “Major War” Scenarios

Author:
Bonnie S. Glaser
Publication Date:
01-2026
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
Research on the possibility and likely outcome of a conflict in the Taiwan Strait has expanded rapidly in recent years. Studies have focused on a broad range of questions related to deterrence, potential conflict dynamics, and possible conflict outcomes. Tabletop exercises have been used to identify gaps in the capabilities of the United States, the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and Taiwan to assess potential escalation pathways and to better understand war termination strategies.1 Comparatively less attention has been devoted to the potential impact of cross-Strait conflict on the PRC itself and how that impact could shape President Xi Jinping’s risk calculus and decision-making about use of force against Taiwan. Xi’s risk calculus is crucial to understanding if and under what circumstances Beijing might take aggressive actions against Taiwan because any such decision would carry profound political, economic, and strategic consequences for the PRC and for him personally. Xi has tied his legitimacy to putting the PRC on an irreversible path toward the “China Dream” of national rejuvenation by 2049 and unifying Taiwan with the motherland is deemed essential to that goal. Yet a military conflict over Taiwan would risk massive economic disruption, catastrophic military losses, significant social unrest, and devastating sanctions, all of which could turn his dream into a nightmare and undermine his political authority. Xi’s calculus must therefore weigh the perceived benefits of using force to achieve unification against the potential costs. The centrality of Xi’s risk calculus to understanding future PRC decision-making about potential actions against Taiwan demands deeper investigation than has taken place so far. This report seeks to fill this research gap by examining how use of force against Taiwan would impact the PRC in four key areas: its economy, its military capabilities, its social stability, and international costs. Each issue set is evaluated in a separate paper, although all four are interrelated, a factor that the report’s conclusion addresses. Logan Wright and Charlie Vest assess potential implications for the PRC economy. Joel Wuthnow analyzes the possible impact on the Chinese military. Sheena Chestnut Greitens and Jake Rinaldi consider the potential risks for social stability. Zack Cooper examines the likely international responses and costs. There is a broad range of possible scenarios for PRC use of force against Taiwan. Potential actions taken by Beijing may vary in terms of intensity and duration. To make comparisons possible across the four papers, the authors were given two baseline scenarios, a limited conflict and a major war. Both are described in detail below. In outlining these scenarios, specific triggers were not established. They would nevertheless be important in determining international responses and subsequently would have implications for the PRC economy and possibly for social stability. Although the absence of a detailed trigger is a limiting factor, in any crisis multiple actors will draw their own conclusions about what sparked the conflict, so perceptions of who was at fault would differ across countries. The authors were also permitted to assess cases situated between a minor conflict and a major war, given that the economic, military, political, and international costs may vary discontinuously across a range of scenarios. All scenarios were assumed to occur between 2026 and 2030. The first scenario that authors assess is a minor conflict lasting several weeks. In this case, PRC ships and aircraft surround Taiwan after a series of deadly air and maritime confrontations between their forces. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) then attempts to conduct a “quarantine” of major ports in Taiwan. The United States intervenes and its warships escort commercial vessels through the blockade zone without incident. For the purposes of this scenario, dozens of PRC and Taiwan armed forces members are assumed killed in incidents in the air and at sea. There are no losses of foreign personnel. The conflict terminates when both sides agree to de-escalate the situation. This results in a relatively low intensity and short duration conflict. The second scenario that authors were asked to review was a major conflict of several months that ends in a PLA defeat. This conflict starts with an amphibious invasion of Taiwan in which initial PLA missile strikes target Taiwan’s military and US forces in Japan and Guam. PRC forces land on Taiwan but supplies and follow-on forces are hampered by sustained Taiwanese and US strikes on ships and aircraft crossing the Taiwan Strait. After several months of heavy fighting, PRC forces withdraw to the mainland after losing roughly 100,000 personnel. Taiwan suffers approximately 50,000 military casualties and 50,000 civilian casualties. The United States loses 5,000 military members and 1,000 civilians, while Japan loses 1,000 military members and 500 civilians. Beyond this, no substantial foreign losses occur. The conflict terminates when the PLA withdraws from the main island of Taiwan but retains control of the Kinmen and Matsu Islands. The purpose of these scenarios is not to assert that this is how a conflict over Taiwan would play out. The intention is instead to help describe in more detail what the costs would be to the PRC of a failed crossstrait operation. An important caveat is that the authors were asked to make their own assessments of the impact on the PRC in each of the four areas examined. They were not asked to put themselves in Xi’s (or his successor’s) shoes. Xi and his colleagues might underestimate (or overestimate) the costs that the PRC would incur in these scenarios. Even if Beijing anticipates that the costs of taking an action against Taiwan are high, they might proceed despite the perceived risks. National leaders often make choices that overlook high costs if the perceived benefits are high or overridden by political considerations. Xi might conclude that not acting is more costly for him personally than taking a risky action that he believes is necessary to demonstrate resolve. For example, if Xi views a step taken by Taipei as intended to permanently separate it from the PRC, and especially if he judges that Washington supports that goal, he is likely to move against Taiwan even if he expects that the PLA would suffer high casualties in attempting to seize it. Overall, the authors of these essays demonstrate that the costs to the PRC of a failed military operation against Taiwan would be substantial. As noted above, this is not to suggest that Beijing would necessarily be deterred from starting a conflict in the first place. But it would be a mistake to simply assume that the PRC would prevail in a conflict over Taiwan. The history of failed amphibious operations is long, and these essays demonstrate that an unsuccessful PRC-initiated conflict would have severe negative consequences for the country’s economy, military, social stability, and international standing.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, Armed Conflict, and Threat Assessment
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, and Asia

16. A Long Time Coming: Europe and India have discovered a strategic partnership

Author:
Garima Mohan
Publication Date:
01-2026
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
The relationship between Europe and India is on the cusp of change. Later this month, in a historic first, EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen will serve as guest of honor, a position reserved for India’s top partners, at the country’s Republic Day ceremony. At the subsequent EU-India summit, the two sides are likely to sign a long-elusive free trade agreement (FTA) and an expansive security and defense partnership. They are also expected to announce initiatives designed to boost skilled migration, and to foster cooperation between European and Indian industry to enhance economic security. There are several other positive developments. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz just undertook his first official visit to India, also his first to a non-NATO ally. Accompanied by a substantial business delegation, he secured many agreements on defense industrial cooperation, semiconductors, and critical minerals. Recent German governments have made a point of sending top leadership to India before official visits to China, and Merz’s visit continues that convention. French President Emmanuel Macron is due to follow in February to cement his own country’s ties with New Delhi on emerging technologies, thereby broadening an already substantial and critical strategic partnership. India’s foreign minister, in a breakthrough for India’s small-group diplomacy in Europe, just joined a Weimar Format meeting for the first time. Lastly, Prime Minister Narendra Modi is set to visit the continent in spring for the next India-Nordic summit. For some observers this momentum is the result of the rocky relationships that Europe and India have with the United States. In a world of fractured alliances and partnerships, Europe and India need each other like never before. But the groundwork for their current ties was laid over the last decade. Structural factors such as competition with China, and India’s policy of diversification that led it to focus on ties with the West, have brought them closer and raised bilateral ambitions. The relationship is, however, not without divergences, particularly on approaches to Russia. Based on interviews with policymakers in New Delhi, Paris, Berlin, The Hague, and Brussels, this piece will trace the evolution of the “India agenda” in European foreign policy and lay out Europe’s position among New Delhi’s foreign policy priorities.
Topic:
Security, European Union, Geopolitics, Trade, Transatlantic Relations, and Strategic Partnerships
Political Geography:
Europe, South Asia, and India

17. Conflicts and Trends to Watch in 2026

Author:
Jessica Anania, Vicka Heidt, Anna Tuohey, and Jessica M. Smith
Publication Date:
02-2026
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace and Security (GIWPS)
Abstract:
Entering 2026, the global security landscape is defined by record-high levels of armed conflict, democratic backsliding, geopolitical fragmentation, and an accelerating climate crisis—dynamics unfolding alongside unprecedented cuts to foreign aid and development assistance. These converging pressures are reshaping conflict environments in ways that disproportionately endanger women and girls while eroding the systems meant to protect them, even as women remain central actors in humanitarian response, peacebuilding, and civic resistance. Women, Peace and Security: Conflicts and Trends to Watch in 2026 integrates gender-responsive analysis into conflict forecasting by drawing on insights from the Women, Peace and Security Conflict Tracker and expert consultations. This report identifies three cross-cutting trends expected to shape conflict dynamics in the year ahead: the increasing weaponization of hunger as a tactic of conquest and control, with devastating gendered consequences; political transitions that intensify repression, violence, and women’s exclusion at critical decision-making moments; and worsening climate shocks that compound displacement, insecurity, and economic loss for women and girls. The report also profiles 10 settings—Colombia, Ethiopia, Iran, Israel & Palestine, Mali, Pakistan, South Sudan, Sudan, Ukraine, and Venezuela—where these dynamics are likely to be especially acute in 2026. By centering gendered risks as early warning indicators of instability, this report addresses a critical gap in mainstream conflict analysis and offers policymakers, donors, multilateral institutions, and civil society leaders a more inclusive framework for anticipating crises, protecting civilians, and advancing more durable and inclusive peace and security outcomes.
Topic:
Security, Women, Armed Conflict, Inclusion, Democratic Backsliding, Women, Peace, and and Security (WPS)
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Iran, Sudan, Ukraine, Israel, Colombia, Palestine, Venezuela, Ethiopia, Mali, South Sudan, and Global Focus

18. Monitoring Report | Public consultation in Albania: The illusion of inclusion

Author:
Institute for Democracy and Mediation (IDM)
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Democracy and Mediation (IDM)
Abstract:
The Institute for Democracy and Mediation (IDM) has released a new report: Public Consultation in Albania: The Illusion of Inclusion. This report presents the results of an in-depth monitoring of 50 laws, public policies, and strategic documents consulted by the central government during the years 2022-2023. The assessment covers 10 key government institutions, evaluating their public consultation processes in terms of: Transparency and accessibility of consultation documents; Effectiveness of the public consultation process; Public accountability during this process; Citizen participation in consultations; Ensuring inclusivity and non-discrimination. In addition to the qualitative analysis of public consultation previously conducted by IDM, this assessment for the first time provides statistical data related to this important governance process. The evaluation system applied in this report provides the opportunity to compare institutions’ performance in the consultation of different acts, in relation to the aforementioned principles. Ultimately, the findings highlight a ‘’long distance’’ between transparency and participation in government consultations. The goal of this study is to contribute to evidence-based advocacy for legal reforms and the improvement of institutional practices, so that public consultations fulfill their core function – citizens’ participation and impact in decision-making.
Topic:
Transparency, Inclusion, Monitoring, and Civic Space
Political Geography:
Europe, Balkans, and Albania

19. Lift the Sanctions: The Principal Danger in Syria Today is Instability

Author:
Carl Conetta
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Project on Defense Alternatives
Abstract:
The most critical international security goal regarding Syria today is the country’s stabilization – and that requires immediate and substantial aid and sanction relief. The question on which recognition of the new government should most hinge is whether it can achieve sovereign authority in the country and do so without the type of human rights abuses or cross-border militancy that pose a threat to regional peace. Given the urgency of stabilizing the country, the new government provisionally meets this criteria. Should it change course and pose a threat to regional peace, the international community can adjust policy accordingly. Two outstanding challenges to sovereignty and legitimacy are the presence of foreign troops – Israeli, Turkish, and US – and the status of Kurdish areas. Especially acute is the triangular relationship among Damascus, Ankara, and Syria’s Kurdish community, which is among the issues addressed in this viewpoint. As for foreign troops: 15,000-20,000 currently occupy the country. Affirming Syrian sovereignty entails expeditiously withdrawing all those forces not explicitly invited by the new government. A related concern is the remnants of the Islamic State (ISIL) in Syria, including the 40,000+ cadre, family members, and displaced persons interned in camps run by the Kurdish authorities. Going forward, the task of managing and combating IS remnants on Syrian territory should fall to Damascus, acting together with Kurdish and foreign partners as it sees fit. The threat that IS affiliates and aspirants pose to the United States and the broader international community have been and are most effectively addressed through measure of homeland security and law enforcement. Securing the US homeland does not require the ongoing deployment of US troops in Syria, which would inadvertently undermine the legitimacy of the new government.
Topic:
International Security, Sanctions, Syrian War, and Instability
Political Geography:
Middle East and Syria

20. Shipment of a Controlled Vacuum Furnace to North Korea via Multiple States: An HS Code Case Study

Author:
David Albright
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Security and International Studies (ISIS)
Abstract:
In tracking trade data and trade flows, Harmonized System (HS) codes are routinely used to aid searches for dual-use commodities and to help guide the identification of dual-use items that require a license or greater scrutiny. A recurring concern is shipper falsification of HS codes to evade detection or payment of duties. An illustration of such falsifications is a case we learned about via government sources from around 2022 that involved North Korea and a dual-use vacuum furnace suitable for uranium melting that wound its way from Spain to North Korea, via Mexico, South Africa, and China. Such a furnace is typically controlled under the Nuclear Supplier Group (NSG) Part 2 list and is banned for export to North Korea under United Security Council resolutions. This type of furnace is a mainstay of a nuclear weapons program, particularly one that uses weapon-grade uranium as the nuclear explosive material, as North Korea is known to do. With North Korea expanding its uranium enrichment program and producing greater quantities of weapon-grade uranium, this new furnace would be especially important.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Trade, and Dual Use Items
Political Geography:
Asia and North Korea