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121. Smoke and Mirrors: Israel Stronger or Weaker in 2025? Implications for Israel and its Neighbours

Author:
Osnat Lubrani
Publication Date:
02-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP)
Abstract:
Writing this 2025 trend report on a topic I am knowledgeable about has been a Sisyphean task. Every day I woke up to realize the ‘trend’ I confidently foresaw yesterday is questioned by a new development. I submit that by the time I complete this report, it will become outdated the next day. Since its colossal security/defense failure on 7 October 2023, Israel has been able to restore its reputation as a formidable military power with substantial military support from the USA and others, notably its neighbors (Bradley A, 2024). Gaza is destroyed and Hamas is still in charge, but Israel can point to its elimination of Hamas and Hezbollah leadership, the decimation of their military capabilities, and effective striking of Iran and the Houthis as impressive wins. Yet Israel at the start of 2025 is weaker as a state and as a society. The reasons are manifold. Some trace back to before the 7th of October, while others followed from it. All of the issues—from extreme political and social divisions to a plummeting international standing (Wintour, P. 2024) to grave economic losses (Ziady, H. 2024)—have worsened since. Israel’s choices and actions in 2025, both domestically and internationally, will not only affect its long-term security and stability, but also those of its neighbors and the broader Middle East. The polarized geopolitical landscape already is facing disruptions at the start of the year; the extent of their severity will depend on how the USA foreign policy will unfold under the new administration. What is clear is that in 2025, the United States has become even more significant in determining Israel’s path and the broader region’s trajectory. President Trump’s initial statements of intent to end all wars, with focus on the Middle East and Ukraine, and to secure a lucrative deal for Israel with Saudi Arabia hint at possible scenarios. However, as he adds outlandish items to his ‘to do’ list—even some which diametrically contradict his earlier wishes—one can logically assume that not all of his plans will come to fruition. Given Trump’s mercurial nature, many “known unknowns,” as Donald Rumsfeld once put it, remain.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Civilians, Atrocities, Ceasefire, Armed Conflict, and 2023 Gaza War
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and Gaza

122. The European Union and Critical Raw Materials: Juggling Geopolitical and Economic Realities

Author:
Dan Ziebarth
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP)
Abstract:
Over the past decade, critical raw materials (CRMs) have emerged as a crucial focus for governments and industries worldwide. These materials, which include rare earth elements, lithium, cobalt, and others, have gained strategic importance due to their essential role in modern technologies, particularly those related to clean energy, digitalization, and advanced manufacturing (CRM Alliance 2024). In particular, the essential role of CRMs in clean energy technologies and the global push for a green energy transition have led to a surge in demand for CRMs (World Economic Forum 24-05-2024). This surge has created substantial opportunities for green industrialization. According to the International Energy Agency, the market for these raw materials has more than doubled over the past five years, with expectations of "unprecedented growth" in the coming years (International Energy Agency 2023); current climate commitments could lead to a quadrupling of global demand for materials such as rare earths, cobalt, and nickel by 2040 (Findeisen & Wernert 30-06-2023). CRMs are of paramount importance for the European Union’s economy, industrial base, and strategic autonomy. These materials have a wide range of applications, contributing to the production of various goods across all supply-chain stages in Europe. The use of CRMs is also essential for the EU’s green transition goals, as these materials are necessary for technologies crucial to the EU’s green and digital transformations. This is particularly true for many technologies that support net-zero carbon emissions goals like wind turbines and electric vehicles. For example, the production of a typical electric car has been estimated to require six times the mineral inputs of a conventional car; an onshore wind plant requires nine times more mineral resources than a gas-fired plant (International Energy Agency 2022). This surge in demand has led to increased concerns about supply chain vulnerabilities in western countries as many CRMs are concentrated in a small number of countries or are produced as by-products of other mining operations (U.S. Department of Energy 2023). The European Union, recognizing the economic and strategic significance of CRMs, responded by publishing a list of critical raw materials in 2011, updating it every three years to reflect changing economic importance and supply risks (Gislev & Grohol 2018), while the European Commission produced a foresight study of CRMs in 2020 for strategic technologies and sectors in the EU (Bobba et al. 2020). In 2023, the European Critical Raw Materials Act (CRMA) was adopted, which aims to increase and diversify the EU’s critical raw materials supply, strengthen circularity and recycling efforts, and support research and innovation in resource efficiency and the development of substitutes (European Council 2024).
Topic:
Economics, European Union, Geopolitics, and Critical Raw Materials (CRM)
Political Geography:
Europe

123. Spring 2025 Snapshot on International Educational Exchange

Author:
Julie Baer and Nora Nemeth
Publication Date:
07-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute of International Education (IIE)
Abstract:
The Spring 2025 Snapshot on International Educational Exchange continues the commitment of the Institute of International Education (IIE) to map the current state of international educational exchange to and from the United States. The report presents data from 559 U.S. higher education institutions in two sections: (1) current trends and recruitment patterns with respect to international students for 2025/26 and (2) trends related to U.S. study abroad in 2024/25, as well as an outlook for 2025/26.
Topic:
Education, Students, Study Abroad, and International Exchange
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

124. Outlook 2030 Brief: Expanding International Study to the U.S.

Author:
Mirka Martel and Jonah Kokodyniak
Publication Date:
05-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute of International Education (IIE)
Abstract:
In 2024, over 1.1 million international students pursued their higher education in the United States. By 2030, increasing our efforts will ensure support for U.S. higher education, industries, and innovation. This is the second edition of IIE’s annual Outlook 2030 brief. The data-driven report focuses on key trends in academic mobility to the United States, comparing global findings and looking ahead at the next five years. The United States is the single largest host of international students in the world, attracting top talent from around the globe. International students pursue academic degrees in the U.S. due to the excellence of its higher education system, particularly in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM). U.S. colleges and universities, in turn, benefit from the innovation and global perspectives that students and scholars bring to their institutions. Attracting global talent is crucial for driving the U.S. economy’s growth and maintaining the country’s leadership in research and development. The U.S. will continue to drive the development of new industries, and building a domestic and global pipeline of talent will advance this pivotal role.
Topic:
Education, Innovation, Higher Education, Industry, Study Abroad, and International Exchange
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

125. Opening Space for Transitional Justice in Yemen

Author:
The International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ)
Publication Date:
03-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ)
Abstract:
This report explores pathways for transitional justice in Yemen, emphasizing victims’ experiences, political dynamics, and existing justice mechanisms. It examines national and local efforts, including mediation and reconciliation initiatives, and highlights the role of Yemeni civil society. Based on over 50 interviews, the report offers guidance on how to advance transitional justice in Yemen, including strengthening institutional cooperation, ensuring victim-centered approaches, supporting civil society and documentation efforts, and integrating justice and reconciliation into peace negotiations.
Topic:
Civil Society, Reform, Transitional Justice, Criminal Justice, Reconciliation, Reparations, and Peace Process
Political Geography:
Middle East and Yemen

126. Of Two Minds: Sanctions as a Form of Accountability and the Dilemmas for Transitional Justice

Author:
Elena Naughton
Publication Date:
02-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ)
Abstract:
This report provides an analysis of international economic sanctions from a transitional justice perspective. Sanctions are a policy tool primarily associated with issues of foreign policy, peace, and security, often deployed as a form of coercive diplomacy to induce a change in behavior or policy. In recent years, however, especially as sanctions have been increasingly targeted at those responsible for human rights violations, the potential for greater engagement with transitional justice has expanded. The report considers the role that sanctions may play in advancing or hindering justice goals such as accountability, redress, and prevention in response to massive and serious human rights violations. It suggests that sanctions may provide an alternative or complementary means of justice in contexts of impunity, including in societies where significant political transitions have not yet begun. Sanctions may also offer opportunities for victim participation, while also presenting risks for victims and human rights activists. The report gathers lessons learned to provide guidance and broach a discussion about whether and how international economic sanctions function in support of (1) transitional justice goals, by punishing perpetrators, recognizing victims and repairing the harms they have suffered, advancing the truth, and preventing a recurrence of violations; and (2) transitional justice processes, by documenting human rights violations and identifying those responsible, supporting trials and truth commissions, and funding reparations. The report also examines the challenges that sanctions pose to justice, related to both legitimacy and impact. These include selectivity in the choice of targets, negative humanitarian impact, sanction evasion and the empowerment of authoritarian and corrupt actors, limited tangible impact on targets, undermining justice processes and actors, lack of outreach, legal and practical challenges, and lack of coordination and coherence. It concludes by identifying areas where increased engagement between justice practitioners and sanctions authorities could take advantage of the synergies in their work.
Topic:
Sanctions, Transitional Justice, Criminal Justice, Memory, Accountability, and Atrocity Prevention
Political Geography:
Global Focus

127. Nuclear NATO: How to make it credible and efficient

Author:
Karl-Heinz Kamp
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
NATO’s nuclear deterrence is not suffi ciently prepared for the evolving strategic environment in Europe and beyond. The current Strategic Concept does not defi ne which steps are needed to maintain nuclear deterrence’s eff ectiveness and credibility. To adapt nuclear deterrence to today’s requirements, NATO must fi rst and foremost agree on a new nuclear strategy document.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Nuclear Weapons, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Europe

128. Open-Source AI is a National Security Imperative

Author:
Mike Sexton
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Third Way
Abstract:
America’s footprint in artificial intelligence is prodigious, and it is hard to overstate how consequential this is for the American national interest if it further develops with the right balance between innovation and guardrails. Into this new technology are two divergent directions on the basic structure of the innovation: open-source or company controlled. ChatGPT is the latter model and was developed and licensed by OpenAI. Meta’s LLaMa is an example of open-source AI.1 In this paper, we explore the benefits and drawbacks of open-source AI and conclude that open-source can help balance the safety and security we want from AI with the innovation necessary to set the standard for the world. Both models are right for innovation, safety, and competition. The increasing sophistication of AI raises concerns about risk. One of the chief issues is open-source AI, which a user can run without the developer’s supervision. History shows us that the benefits of open-source software are real but diffuse and nebulous; meanwhile its greatest risks are tangible but mostly hypothetical. Encryption is an example of an open-source success. It is an open-source dual-use technology that vexes the US government. But accepting and adapting to it has been more farsighted than fighting it. Almost every smartphone in the world runs an American-made operating system thanks in large part to Android being open-source. We should not assume the development of open-source AI will necessarily follow the same trajectory. Open-source AI increases the likelihood that no single AI chatbot corners the consumer market and that America remains the innovation leader in AI.
Topic:
National Security, Artificial Intelligence, Science and Technology, ChatGPT, OpenAI, and Innovation
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

129. Status Quo or Bold Adaptation? Reclaiming the Women, Peace and Security Agenda

Author:
Sophie Close and Siad Darwish
Publication Date:
09-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
European Institute of Peace (EIP)
Abstract:
This report by the European Institute of Peace calls for a critical rethinking of the core principles behind the Women, Peace, and Security agenda to ensure its continued relevance and effectiveness in today’s rapidly shifting global context. The study lays out the five persistent barriers preventing women’s meaningful participation in conflict prevention and peace processes, it highlights core principles that could transform the WPS agenda and assesses 12 effective and promising practices that can be used to navigate these barriers. Based on these, the report suggests concrete actions for policymakers and practitioners to enhance women’s meaningful participation in peacebuilding and conflict resolution. This research is part of the Breaking Barriers, Making Peace project led by the European Institute of Peace with support from the German Federal Foreign Office. This 2-year project provides recommendations to policymakers and practitioners on how to address the persistent barriers to women’s meaningful participation in peace and political settlement processes.
Topic:
Conflict Prevention, Women, Peacemaking, Women, Peace, and and Security (WPS)
Political Geography:
Sudan, Ethiopia, Myanmar, and Global Focus

130. Geopolitical Influence & Peace

Author:
Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP)
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Economics & Peace (IEP)
Abstract:
This report, Geopolitical Influence & Peace, explores the shifting dynamics of global power, drawing comparisons to the Cold War while underscoring the unique challenges of today's interconnected and multipolar world. Geopolitical risks today exceed levels seen during the Cold War, driven by heightened military spending, stalled efforts at nuclear disarmament, and a diminished role for multilateral institutions like the United Nations. At the same time, global power is being redistributed, with emerging middle powers reshaping the landscape through strategic investments and influence-building initiatives. These shifts challenge the dominance of traditional Western powers, creating both opportunities and vulnerabilities in global governance. Economic stagnation further complicates the picture, as developing nations grapple with mounting debt burdens that divert critical resources away from health, education, and infrastructure. Unlike the bipolar structure that prevailed in most of the 20th-century Cold War, the current global landscape is shaped by technological dominance, economic interdependence, and influence competition across emerging regions such as Africa, Latin America, and Southeast Asia. While China's rise is clear, emerging regional powers, such as Brazil, Türkiye, United Arab Emirates, South Africa and Indonesia are also seeking to shape regional and global dynamics. The proliferation of advanced technologies like artificial intelligence, semiconductors, and 5G infrastructure has transformed power dynamics, with states vying to secure strategic dominance in these areas. Meanwhile, economic interdependence, once seen as a stabilising force, is increasingly weaponised, as seen in trade wars, sanctions, and the deliberate decoupling of supply chains in critical industries. These dynamics are exacerbated by the intensification of proxy conflicts, hybrid warfare tactics, and disinformation campaigns that further destabilise global alliances and erode trust among nations. In exploring the current dynamics of global power, the report addresses the challenges of a multipolar world and the implications for the developing world. Developing countries can face economic disruptions, diminished development funding, and governance challenges due to shifts in geopolitics of the major powers. During the Cold War, developing countries became arenas for proxy wars, economic exploitation, and political interference, exacerbating instability, poverty, and underdevelopment. Today, as global power struggles intensify, nations in Africa, Latin America, and parts of Asia risk becoming similarly entangled, facing increased economic pressures, disrupted trade partnerships, and reduced access to critical investments. Debt servicing costs now outweigh investments in essential services for many developing countries, undermining their capacity for sustainable growth. Moreover, the plateauing of global trade integration limits economic opportunities, further constraining development pathways for emerging economies. Competition for influence among powerful nations may undermine local governance and development priorities, diverting attention from urgent challenges such as climate change, food insecurity, and peacebuilding. A nuanced understanding of these dynamics is crucial to ensure that developing countries are supported in long-term stability and development.
Topic:
Cold War, Development, Economics, Geopolitics, Peace, Strategic Competition, Multipolarity, and Post-Cold War
Political Geography:
Global Focus

131. China Maritime Report No. 47: The People of China's Navy and Other Maritime Forces: Extended Summary of Conference Findings

Author:
Andrew S. Erickson
Publication Date:
05-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College
Abstract:
Xi Jinping has played a direct and active role in China’s naval buildup. He is China’s first great navalist statesman, the world’s greatest navalist leader today, and among the world’s greatest navalist statesmen in modern history. Notwithstanding major advances in ships, submarines, aircraft, and other hardware, Chinese military leaders believe that the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) continues to lag behind in human factors. Since Xi Jinping came to power in 2012, the PLAN has dismissed (or is rumored to have dismissed) eleven flag officers. Beyond combating outright dysfunction, these removals are intended to prevent potential disloyalty and factionalism, centralize power, and further modernization and warfighting goals. These high-profile dismissals have had no apparent impact on PLAN operational capabilities, which continue to improve at a remarkable rate. From the Taiwan Strait to the “distant oceans” (远洋), the service is present daily and visible internationally, particularly its surface fleet, indicating reliability, trust, and growing responsibilities and capabilities. Since 2008, the PLAN’s surface fleet has almost doubled. Despite being projected to exceed 400 ships by the end of 2025, China’s Navy continues to successfully crew, operate, and train with them. China’s Navy draws on a massive, sufficiently-capable talent pool and education system. Provincial-level compulsory conscription quotas avoid individual compellence thanks to high levels of volunteerism. Given the demands of increasingly frequent and intense training and missions—often with the austere privations of submarines or remote installations—mental health support is increasingly prioritized. Nevertheless, it remains a weakness for China’s Navy, which views U.S. care as the gold standard yet has treated counseling as a “political” issue. China’s Naval Command College in Nanjing—the Naval War College’s closest equivalent—educates its students differently from its counterpart in Newport by focusing on naval operations and warfighting for top-priority scenarios. The PLAN enjoys unique human capital advantages: educational partnerships as early as elementary school; personal data compiled centrally, available and utilizable without privacy restriction; eldercare benefits; and warfighting-focused naval education. PLAN sources perceive weaknesses in lack of talent for new-domain operations and advanced S&T given rising demand in these burgeoning areas; recruitment and training pipeline supply-demand imbalance and talent-skills mismatches; officers’ overly narrow early-career experience and subsequent aging out of cutting-edge relevance; and youths’ declining commitment to the Communist system. Despite being an improvement on its Soviet progenitor, China’s Political Commissar system could represent a critical weakness, causing real-time decision-making bottlenecks or distraction, particularly in crisis or conflict.
Topic:
Armed Forces, Navy, Human Capital, Xi Jinping, and People's Liberation Army (PLA)
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and Nanjing

132. China Maritime Report #48: Great Inspectations: PRC Maritime Law Enforcement Operations in the Taiwan Strait

Author:
Julia Famularo
Publication Date:
07-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College
Abstract:
People’s Republic of China (PRC) law enforcement operations function as forms of cognitive and legal warfare. They represent a clear effort to undermine international maritime law as well as Taiwan’s sovereignty. The PRC asserts that the Taiwan Strait comprises multiple “zones,” to include “internal waters, territorial sea, [the] contiguous zone, and the Exclusive Economic Zone.” While China does not explicitly claim that the waters of the Taiwan Strait wholly constitute PRC sovereign territory, it clearly implies that it has the self-defined right to exercise distinct forms of control over different zones of the Strait. While stressing that China “respects the lawful rights of other countries in relevant waters,” the PRC exploits the absence of the term “international waters” in UNCLOS to assert non-existent sovereignty rights over the Taiwan Strait. China is using its Maritime Traffic Safety Law and Coast Guard Law to illegally enforce expansive maritime jurisdictional claims in the Taiwan Strait, East China Sea, and beyond. The overzealous execution of “law enforcement” operations in the waters surrounding Taiwan’s outlying islands represents an effort to signal that the Taiwan Coast Guard Administration is incapable of conducing effective patrols. It also reinforces the narrative that the PRC possesses legal jurisdiction over waters within the First Island Chain, thereby undermining the lawful rights of Taiwan and neighboring states. The PRC very likely believes that employing China Coast Guard (CCG) and Maritime Safety Administration (MSA) assets to implement a sea-based quarantine would remain below the threshold of conflict, effectively mitigating the risk of escalation and preventing third-party intervention. As joint MSA and CCG operations grow in scope, scale, and complexity, China is gradually exercising the skills necessary to seize one of Taiwan’s outlying islands and potentially seek to force Taiwan leaders to the negotiating table. Under China’s revised maritime law enforcement legal framework, leaders in Beijing could authorize the establishment of exclusion zones to prevent foreign vessels from entering into and operating in PRC-claimed waters, as well as board and inspect ships within the exclusion zone. China could also potentially attempt to divert ships to regional PRC ports for customs inspection and clearance. Beijing furthermore could authorize the use of “all necessary means”—to include the use of force—to implement its quarantine and counter perceived threats to its national security and sovereignty. A PRC decision to implement a quarantine, rather than a full military blockade, would force the United States and its key allies and partners to decide how to react effectively while themselves also mitigating the risk of substantial military escalation. Response options could comprise targeted sanctions or military escorts for commercial vessels carrying critical supplies.
Topic:
Law Enforcement, Navy, Maritime, Jurisdiction, Coast Guard, and People's Liberation Army (PLA)
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, Asia, and Taiwan Strait

133. China Maritime Report #49: The PLAN Corruption Paradox: Insights from the 1st Destroyer Flotilla

Author:
Ryan D. Martinson
Publication Date:
08-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College
Abstract:
Like all organizations led by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the People Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) suffers from endemic corruption, defined as the personal abuse of power for selfish ends. Corruption occurs when PLAN leaders use their power to: 1) influence personnel decisions in exchange for money and/or favor; and 2) extract kickbacks for influencing decisions in the contracting/procurement process for equipment and materiel, construction projects, and other service requirements. Despite widespread corruption in the PLAN, the service has continued to grow and modernize at an astonishing rate. One explanation for this paradox is that the PLAN has strived to keep corruption from infecting the personnel selection process in operational units, which matter most for combat power generation. For at least two decades, the PLAN’s anti-corruption “watchdog”—the Discipline Inspection Commission—has prioritized scrutiny over those units and personnel most directly responsible for the “preparation for military struggle.” This top-down approach has combined with efforts by the units themselves—likely driven by the self-interest of the unit Party Committee, which must answer for poor unit performance—to enact policies to ensure that the best candidates are chosen for leadership positions. The case of the 1st Destroyer Flotilla illustrates policies adopted by operational units to ensure the integrity of the personnel selection process. These include formulating clear regulations stipulating minimum qualifications for leadership positions, adopting strict standards for officer evaluation, and carrying out a transparent selection process. The Flotillas’ personnel selection process entails knowledge and skills competitions judged by senior unit members and incorporates feedback and inputs from other members of the unit. Due to the approaches adopted by units such as the 1st Destroyer Flotilla, individuals in positions of power have less leeway to engage in corrupt behavior, thereby increasing the probability that the most capable officers (commissioned and non-commissioned) will be selected for leadership positions.
Topic:
Corruption, Armed Forces, Leadership, Navy, Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and People's Liberation Army (PLA)
Political Geography:
China and Asia

134. China Maritime Report No. 46: China's Fishermen Spies: Intelligence Specialists in the Maritime Militia

Author:
Ryan D. Martinson
Publication Date:
04-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College
Abstract:
Collecting and reporting maritime intelligence is a core mission of China’s maritime militia. Militia forces help fill in “blind spots” (补盲) for the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and enhance its situational awareness. They are widely dispersed in the waters of greatest strategic and operational importance to Beijing, available in large numbers, extremely familiar with the operating environment, and, the PLA believes, less provocative than other military instruments. Militia forces that specialize in intelligence collection are organized into “maritime reconnaissance” (海上侦察) units. Located in China’s coastal provinces, autonomous regions, and provincial-level cities, these units likely number in the hundreds. Militia vessels dedicated to intelligence collection are often called “information boats” (信息船). China’s maritime militia has developed a cadre of intelligence specialists who serve the function of collecting intelligence and reporting it to the PLA. These militia members, called “information personnel” (信息员), generally deploy with militia vessels tasked with reconnaissance missions, but may also embark on boats from other types of militia units. While at sea, maritime militia intelligence personnel maintain close contact with the PLA units that oversee militia operations, called People’s Armed Forces Departments (PAFDs). PAFDs direct militia reconnaissance operations and receive incoming intelligence reports, which they then share with operational PLA forces. As part-time soldiers, often with comparatively low education levels, maritime militia intelligence personnel cannot meet the same performance standards as intelligence specialists in the PLA. However, the existence of a large cadre of maritime militia intelligence specialists ensures a basic level of competence across the force and guarantees that capable personnel are available for important intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) missions. Given China’s aspirations to become a global naval power, it makes sense that the PLA leverage the latent ISR capacity of China’s distant-water fishing fleet and Chinese owned/operated merchant vessels. PLA experts have argued for embarking intelligence personnel on Chinese vessels operating abroad, and it is likely that this is already happening.
Topic:
Intelligence, Navy, Maritime, Espionage, Militias, Reconnaissance, and People's Liberation Army (PLA)
Political Geography:
China and Asia

135. China Maritime Report #50: Foggy With a Chance of Surprise Attack: PLA Amphibious Deception in a Taiwan Scenario

Author:
Ian Easton
Publication Date:
09-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College
Abstract:
The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) views deception as a force multiplier and war-winning weapon. The PLA leadership reserves a special place of veneration for wartime commanders who can employ deception to obtain surprise, something Xi Jinping refers to as “excelling at stratagem.” In January 1955, the PLA launched a surprise attack on the Yijiangshan islands, then controlled by the Republic of China (ROC) government in Taipei. This campaign remains a case study in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) for how to conduct amphibious operations and catch defenders off guard. Empirical historical research shows that amphibious operations, while complex and difficult to conduct, almost always achieve their objectives. The critical factor is the shock they cause, and that is often enhanced by deception. PLA textbooks and field manuals explicitly link the difficulty of a future Taiwan invasion with the need to embrace unconventional approaches. They exhort officers at all levels of command to use deception. Advanced intelligence and surveillance technologies do not make a surprise attack on Taiwan unachievable. A zero-warning invasion remains virtually impossible, but it is also unnecessary from the PLA’s perspective. Chinese military researchers envision employing robots, containerized missiles, and unmanned amphibious vehicles to confuse and unbalance Taiwan’s defenders in a future war. American and Taiwanese strategists should account for unique ways the PLA may attempt to achieve the element of surprise and plan against those courses of action. War games, simulations, and field exercises that account for a surprise attack on Taiwan could generate insights and help senior leaders rethink the levels of risk associated with current and possible future defense postures. Immediate steps should be taken to cope with deception and minimize reaction times so that any sudden amphibious landings on Taiwan, while dramatic, will not be decisive.
Topic:
Military Strategy, Navy, People's Liberation Army (PLA), and Amphibious Operations
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, and Asia

136. Electoral Management Body Leadership Transitions

Author:
Staffan Darnolf and Rushdi Nackerdien
Publication Date:
06-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES)
Abstract:
Executive leadership transitions within Election Management Bodies (EMBs) can profoundly impact the credibility and effectiveness of electoral processes. Whether planned or unexpected, leadership changes at the highest level can disrupt institutional continuity, unsettle operational readiness, and undermine public trust. In 2024, India offered a striking example of this dual challenge: just weeks before its general elections,1 the resignation of Election Commissioner occurred just after the planned retirement of another commissioner, leaving only the Chief Electoral Commissioner in place to oversee a complex national vote. 2 This combination of both a foreseeable and a sudden departure placed the EMB in a precarious position at a critical moment.3 Similar risks have emerged in other contexts. In 2018, Lesotho's Independent Electoral Commission saw the dismissal of all three commissioners amid allegations of misconduct, requiring swift intervention to restore institutional legitimacy. That same year in Kenya, three commissioners from the Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (IEBC) resigned abruptly due to internal disputes, leaving the body weakened ahead of key electoral processes. In contrast, Australia’s 2024 transition was marked by the orderly retirement of long-serving Electoral Commissioner Tom Rogers, whose departure was announced months in advance, allowing for a planned succession. These varied cases illustrate that without dedicated and well-prepared executive transition strategies, EMBs risk not only internal instability but also the broader integrity of the democratic processes they are mandated to protect. This White Paper is a first effort to outline how EMBs can learn from the experiences of their peers when it comes to improving their executive leadership transition process. To date, much of the EMB leadershiprelated research has focused on the appointment process for commissioners and how the process can impact the EMB’s independence, while very limited attention has been paid to executive leadership transitions. Effective transitions contribute significantly to the success of new executives and the overall integrity of the electoral process. This White Paper makes the case that by ensuring that transitions are well-planned, commissioners are better positioned to swiftly and competently take the reins of the EMB and thereby maintain high levels of trust and confidence among stakeholders. This, in turn, reinforces the credibility of elections and the democratic process. Whether the transition is foreseen well in advance or sudden and unexpected, a structured and proactive approach can help EMBs navigate these changes smoothly, ensuring that they continue to uphold their mandate effectively and without jeopardizing public trust.
Topic:
Politics, Elections, and Leadership
Political Geography:
Global Focus

137. Understanding Young People’s Political and Civic Engagement as a Counter to Democratic Backsliding

Author:
Sarah Timreck and Cassandra Emmons
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES)
Abstract:
Incorporating young people’s voices into political and civic decision-making is fundamentally important in an era marked by democratic declines and rising authoritarianism around the globe1. A large cohort of motivated and engaged young people who participate in efforts to build communal trust, generate social cohesion, and promote political inclusion of diverse populations could help tip the scales in favor of democracy. This report seeks to address the efforts needed to engage young people to support democratic resilience by answering the following questions from the IFES 2023-2026 Learning Agenda: What types of informal civic engagement can lead to greater or more formal political and civic engagement among youth? How can these types of engagement be harnessed to fight against authoritarianism? This research and its findings and recommendations are intended for a broad audience. Answers to the questions will be useful for democracy and governance practitioners, donors, and policymakers, as well as others who engage with young people across the development and education sectors. As explored throughout the report, individuals and groups engage in the political and civic life of their communities in many ways. To start, we need to understand this nuance. In this report, we classify activities based on two dimensions: goal, meaning whether an individual endeavors to influence political or civic outcomes, and procedure, capturing whether an engagement effort is formal or nonformal. Activities fall into four main categories along the two dimensions: formal political engagement (voting, joining a political party); formal civic engagement (taking a civic education course in school, participating in a club or association); nonformal political engagement (attending a protest, following political leaders on social media); and nonformal civic engagement (engaging with peers or community members on social issues of importance).
Topic:
Politics, Youth, Resilience, Civic Engagement, and Democratic Backsliding
Political Geography:
Global Focus

138. The Future of the Chemical Weapons Convention: Recommendations from Civil Society for Addressing Challenges Over the Next Five Years

Author:
Mina Rozei, Paul Walker, and Daryl Kimball
Publication Date:
06-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Arms Control Association
Abstract:
In July 2023, the world reached a landmark achievement in the history of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs): the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) confirmed the verified and irreversible destruction of all known chemical weapons stockpiles. 26 years after the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) entered into force, it had achieved one of its major goals, becoming the first multilateral disarmament treaty to effectively eliminate an entire class of weapons. This was not the first time that the CWC led the way in disarmament. With 193 member states, the CWC is the most universal of multilateral disarmament treaties. In 2013, the OPCW was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for its “extensive efforts to eliminate chemical weapons.” The CWC was opened for signature in January 1993 and officially entered into force on 29 April 1997, after the 65th state party adhered to the convention. The treaty is thorough in its attempt to rid the world of chemical weapons: it outlaws the development, production, acquisition, stockpiling, and retention of chemical weapons. The goal of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) to create a word “free from the threat of chemical weapons” is one step closer now that all declared stockpiles have been destroyed. This latest achievement offered a glimmer of hope in the arms control world amidst rising tensions among nuclear armed powers.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Civil Society, Weapons of Mass Destruction, Disarmament, and Chemical Weapons
Political Geography:
Global Focus

139. EuroMeSCo Consultation Circles – Report

Author:
IEMed/EuroMeSCo
Publication Date:
07-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
IEMed/EuroMeSCo
Abstract:
The European Commission launched from January to June 2025 a broad consultation to design a renewed Euro-Mediterranean partnership — the New Pact for the Mediterranean, led by DG MENA under the leadership of Commissioner Dubravka Šuica. To support its design, the IEMed joined forces with the Commission to facilitate regional reflection and structured dialogue—most notably through the EuroMeSCo network, which brings together 120+ think tanks and research centres from across the Mediterranean. The resulting Consultation Circles report captures the key takeaways from a series of regional dialogues held in Rabat, Cairo, and Brussels, as well as insights from the 15th EuroMed Survey—all aimed at building a more inclusive, grounded and future-ready Pact. The Consultation Circles brought together almost 300 stakeholders, including public officials, civil society leaders, youth representatives, private sector actors, and academics. The cycle officially launched on 8 April 2025 in Brussels, in a high-level event chaired by EU Commissioner for the Mediterranean, Dubravka Šuica, and featured directors from DG MENA and key researchers from the EuroMeSCo network.
Topic:
European Union, Dialogue, European Commission, and Consultation
Political Geography:
Europe and Mediterranean

140. On Limited Nuclear Use in the Western Pacific

Author:
Mike Sweeney
Publication Date:
08-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
Introduction Would China or the United States use nuclear weapons in a conflict over Taiwan? If so, what would that look like in practice? This paper examines that dark prospect. It unfolds as a series of queries designed to highlight the key factors that could influence limited nuclear use in a war in the Western Pacific. Firm answers to these questions are not always forthcoming. The exact decision-making calculations related to nuclear employment—from both the Chinese and U.S. side—are impossible to state definitively in advance of the actual moment when such weapons might be utilized. Rather, the paper’s intent is to provide the reader insight into the issues that come into play when debating nuclear use in a Taiwan contingency. The goal is less hard answers and more a basis for further conversation. Examining nuclear use in the Western Pacific obviously should not be conflated with endorsing it. But avoiding nuclear employment in practice might hinge, in part, on better understanding the circumstances where it could come into play in advance. At a minimum, realistic examinations of nuclear use in the Western Pacific can further raise awareness of the escalation risks in any conflict over Taiwan.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Weapons, Armed Conflict, Escalation, and Firms
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, Asia-Pacific, and United States of America