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101. Regulating after Brexit

Author:
Joël Reland
Publication Date:
05-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
UK in a Changing Europe, King's College London
Abstract:
Deregulation was at the heart of the Conservative vision of Brexit. Boris Johnson negotiated a Brexit deal which gave Great Britain significant freedom to diverge from EU rules and regulations, promising to make the UK ‘the best regulated economy in the world’. This report examines the extent to which the UK has made use of its ‘Brexit freedoms’, finding that there has been very little meaningful divergence from the EU. It identifies the key reasons for this lack of divergence: trade frictions, political complexities, limited state capacity and a lack of strategy. The report then analyses the change in regulatory approach under the current government. It finds that, unlike its predecessors, this government is willing to align with EU rules to remove existing trade barriers and to avoid new ‘passive divergence’ where EU rule changes create divergence by default. Yet, at the same time, the government is keen to use deregulation to boost growth and to build trade ties with the United States. This report identifies a potential conflict between these aims and its EU regulatory agenda, and argues that the UK needs a clear strategy to ensure its multiple regulatory objectives do not undermine one another.
Topic:
European Union, Regulation, Economy, Brexit, and Deregulation
Political Geography:
United Kingdom and Europe

102. Choices and challenges for UK foreign policy

Author:
UK in a Changing Europe
Publication Date:
02-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
UK in a Changing Europe, King's College London
Abstract:
The new British government has come to power at a time of profound geopolitical, economic, ecological, and technological transformation. A major state-on-state war continues to rage in continental Europe. In Africa, the Sudanese civil war has created the largest humanitarian crisis on record. While the recent Israel-Hamas ceasefire brings hope for wider de-escalation in the Middle East, the consequences of the 7 October 2023 attack and subsequent destruction in Gaza will be with us for the foreseeable future. To all of this, the inauguration of President Trump adds a layer of uncertainty. Meanwhile the West struggles to decide how best to deal with the changing nature of competition with China, with rapid technological and ecological change, and with a disparate Global South increasingly hedging its bets in terms of choosing between the West and assertive challengers to the existing order. Confronted with such a complex environment, there is more need than ever for timely, research-based evidence on which to base future policy choices. That is precisely what this report seeks to do. We asked leading experts on contemporary world politics each to analyse the major challenges confronting the UK in a key policy area, to summarise existing UK approaches, and to lay out the key choices facing the government today.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Politics, Geopolitics, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
United Kingdom and Europe

103. The Brexit Files: from referendum to reset

Author:
UK in a Changing Europe
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
UK in a Changing Europe, King's College London
Abstract:
For the past decade, UK in a Changing Europe has provided impartial, research-based analysis on a number of issues, but most particularly on UK-EU relations. Since before the 2015 General Election, we have evaluated those relations, traced and explained the tortuous Brexit process, and attempted to assess the impact that Brexit has had on the country. This report brings together some of the best scholars working on these issues to consider a number of these questions on the 5th anniversary of the UK ceasing to be a member of the European Union.
Topic:
Bilateral Relations, Elections, European Union, and Brexit
Political Geography:
United Kingdom and Europe

104. Equity and Aspiration: Understanding East Londoners’ Views on Social Mobility and Careers in the Professions

Author:
Mile End Institute
Publication Date:
02-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Mile End Institute, Queen Mary University of London
Abstract:
This report sets out the findings of survey research which was conducted with a representative sample of East Londoners, asking a number of questions about careers in the professions – including about the desirability of working in these kinds of roles, and the trustworthiness and diversity of the professional workforce – about social mobility, and about the role of universities and other alternative education providers in all this.
Topic:
Education, Survey, Equity, Social Mobility, and Professions
Political Geography:
United Kingdom, Europe, and East London

105. North of 26 degrees south and the security of Australia: Views from The Strategist, Volume 10

Author:
John Coyne and Henry Campbell
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
The Northern Australia Strategic Policy Centre’s latest report, North of 26 degrees south and the security of Australia: views from The Strategist, Volume 10, contains articles published in ASPI’s The Strategist over the last six months. Expanding on previous volumes, this edition introduces thematic chapters focused on a range of subjects relevant to northern Australia. These include: Northern Australia and Defence, Developing Northern Australia, Northern Australia new policy opportunities, Critical Minerals, Energy, and Commodities, Articles are authored by a range of experts across these varied topics. Volume 10 also features a foreword by The Hon Lia Finocchiaro MLA, Chief Minister of the Northern Territory. Chief Minister Finocchiaro calls readers attention to the Northern Territory’s unique place in Australia’s defence history, its enduring strategic importance, and the Territory’s defence capabilities. The 34 articles in this Compendium provide practical policy options which government could implement in the short term. Facilitating both the security and economic prosperity of northern Australia.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Development, Energy, and Critical Minerals
Political Geography:
Australia and Northern Australia

106. Northern Australia: securing a developing economy to secure a developed nation

Author:
John Coyne and Ian Satchwell
Publication Date:
08-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
Northern Australia is central to the nation’s future. Economically, it serves as the gateway to Indo-Pacific trade, is home to world-class resources and represents a frontier of opportunity. Strategically, it’s the keystone of Australia’s national defence posture. Yet, despite its immense importance, the region continues to face persistent structural challenges, including limited private-sector investment; low local economic capture from major projects; workforce and service deficits; and deteriorating public safety indicators. The Northern Australia Action Plan 2024–2029 describes a refreshed agenda for the north, encompassing economic development and delivering on a broad range of government priorities to support the region’s success. Its policy priorities cover many of the north’s needs. The action plan remains framed largely within nationwide policy approaches, however. This report reframes northern Australia not as a peripheral problem but as a developing economy within a developed nation. It calls for a renewed, coordinated investment agenda, treating spending in the north as a nation-building imperative. Inaction will incur higher costs in the future, but it will also expose Australia to intolerable risks. This investment—needed now—needs to be premised on the strategic advantage offered by the North’s space—literally and figuratively—for ideas, initiatives and infrastructure that strengthen the nation’s security and sovereignty through fields such as energy development, trusted and resilient minerals supply chains and military endeavours including with allies, all of which blends government responsibilities, traditional ownership and commercial development. Drawing on a detailed analysis of the Northern Territory (NT) and extending to northern Queensland and northern Western Australia (WA), this report presents a comprehensive, evidence-based argument for nation-building through targeted investment. It highlights not only the economic, security and strategic benefits but also the moral imperative to close the gap in service access, infrastructure quality, and life outcomes. Much of the analysis focuses on the NT, as the economic data for northern Queensland and northern WA is often distorted by the prosperity of those states’ southern regions. That makes it more difficult to isolate the structural challenges unique to the north in those states. However, the NT shares key demographic, geographic and economic characteristics with northern Queensland and WA—including low population density, high infrastructure costs, limited private-sector depth, and service delivery challenges in remote communities—making it a strong proxy for the broader region. The north shouldn’t be treated as a region apart but as the leading edge of Australia’s future prosperity and security. Ten years on from the Australian Government’s 2015 Our north, our future: White Paper on developing northern Australia, and four years since the 2021 Australian Infrastructure Plan, where progress has been mixed, this report outlines actionable recommendations across the federal, state, territory and private-sector domains. Australia is operating within an unstable international environment, involving an uncertain global outlook that doesn’t just include wars in Europe and the Middle East but growing tensions and security threats in the Indo-Pacific. Australia needs to view investment in the North as not just a local prosperity matter but vital for Australia’s long term security, deterrence of adversaries and preparation and resilience should deterrence ever fail and when inevitable natural disasters occur. In this way, this report provides a practical road map to secure a resilient, sovereign and prosperous future for the north and the nation.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Borders, and Research and Development
Political Geography:
Australia and Northern Australia

107. Australia-Indonesia defence and security partnership: Overcoming asymmetric aspirations to tackle common threats

Author:
Euan Graham and Gatra Priyandita
Publication Date:
08-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
Australian officials accustomed to dealing with Indonesia are cognisant of the limitations to strategic cooperation, but Canberra needs to be more realistic and creative in how it approaches the critical relationship with Jakarta. Australia places greater strategic value on the relationship with Indonesia than vice versa. That dynamic is unlikely to change fundamentally. Optimism and ambition will still be needed to achieve a more balanced partnership, but it’s also crucial that Australian policymakers ground their expectations in this reality. Politicians, in particular, should guard against optimism bias. There are still plenty of opportunities for both countries to engage more deeply across a range of shared security challenges. This report analyses the defence and wider security partnership and identifies several areas where Indonesia and Australia should productively concentrate their efforts in the coming years, particularly to counter the rise of hybrid threats. The 2024 Australia–Indonesia Defence Cooperation Agreement (DCA) is best understood as a continuation of, rather than an acceleration in, the strategic relationship. But it provides Australia with useful avenues to expand its defence relationship with Jakarta, at a time when Indonesia finds itself courted by other countries that don’t share Australia’s security interests. Ultimately, the DCA reflects Canberra’s long-term investment in a defence partnership that can address evolving regional security challenges. From disaster response and maritime patrols to multilateral peacekeeping, the agreement lays the groundwork for a future in which the two countries’ armed forces can operate together effectively. Continued engagement should centre on expanding military training programs, enhancing operational coordination, and exploring new areas of cooperation, especially to counter hybrid threats. The DCA’s future success will depend on the ability of both sides to manage their differing aspirations, motivations and strategic outlooks in a rapidly deteriorating global security environment. Proper management of those differences, rather than avoidance of them, would better position the two countries for practical cooperation on clear common interests but which, too often, is limited to positive prose instead of action. Revitalising the Australia–Indonesia security relationship requires a shift in focus, away from treating defence cooperation as simply an expression of goodwill or strategic alignment and towards framing it as a joint response mechanism to shared vulnerabilities. Australia and Indonesia face a convergence of challenges, such as maritime insecurity, cyberattacks, disinformation, illegal fishing and transnational crime, that affect both nations and undermine the broader stability of the Indo-Pacific. Responses to those shared concerns can still guide the two countries’ defence partnership in the absence of strategic alignment. By investing in functional collaboration—through interoperable training, coordinated hybrid threat responses and trilateral maritime frameworks involving states such as the Philippines—both countries can build a more flexible and purpose-driven security partnership. This approach acknowledges the limitations to cooperation without being paralysed by them, allowing the relationship to evolve around problem-solving rather than the chimera of strategic convergence.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Partnerships, ASEAN, and Strategic Cooperation
Political Geography:
Indonesia, Australia, and Indo-Pacific

108. Match-fit for the global contest?: Innovation, leadership, culture and the future of Australia’s National Intelligence Community

Author:
Chris Taylor
Publication Date:
07-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
The business model of the Australian national intelligence community (NIC), including the ways in which the NIC collects intelligence, analyses that intelligence and then provides it to busy senior customers, is being challenged. At the heart of that challenge lies the NIC’s relationship with innovation and its ability to take advantage of the opportunities that innovation can bring. Innovation matters to Australia because our ability to leverage it will be critical to overcoming Australia’s ‘national capacity’ problem in the coming decades. This problem isn’t new. Australia has always had an inverse relationship between its extensive geography and interests, and its relatively small population. But that’s being exacerbated by the emergent international (and existential) contest in which we’re now engaged and the rapid advances of critical and emerging technologies. The answers to this national capacity problem necessarily involve technology, partnerships— and innovation. Reinvention is hard for all sectors, but it’s particularly hard for intelligence communities, which operate with such high degrees of secrecy. But, to keep pace with larger partners and to keep ahead of adversaries, innovation is absolutely essential. It’s needed so the NIC can develop more sustainable and creative ways to serve its customers, and the NIC also needs to fundamentally, and continuously, rethink the value it provides to them. Despite growing investment, all intelligence communities can struggle to reinvent themselves—and invest in the right capabilities and technologies— as they deal with multiple global conflicts and the unrelenting pace of change. In order to inform the findings and recommendations contained in this report, ASPI conducted a range of semi-structured, qualitative interviews with 28 former and current Australian national-security officials, industry representatives, and those with comparable experience of the UK’s national-security system. The interviews focused on the topics of leadership; technology; risk and experimentation; culture; partnerships; and public engagement and transparency. This report makes five key recommendations, including in relation to actively promoting the concept and practice of ‘intelligent failure’ in the service of innovation; incorporating an appreciation of the impact of secure workspace design and operation on the effectiveness of the work carried out within those spaces; expediting the 2024 Independent Intelligence Review’s own recommendations in relation to national-security technology; an urgent, classified audit of Australia’s sovereign intelligence capability resilience; and preparation of the NIC for the impending (and different) future of intelligence production.
Topic:
Intelligence, National Security, Cybersecurity, Innovation, Artificial Intelligence, and Research and Development
Political Geography:
Australia

109. A critical juncture: Sustaining and strengthening the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security

Author:
Chris Taylor
Publication Date:
07-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
As Australia navigates an increasingly complex security landscape, the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security (PJCIS) stands at a crossroads. With cyber threats, foreign interference, grey-zone competition, and the prospect of Indo-Pacific conflict reshaping our national security, the need for robust, adaptive oversight of intelligence agencies has never been more pressing. This report from ASPI’s Statecraft and Intelligence Policy Centre underscores the need to reform and reinforce the PJCIS to ensure it remains an effective pillar of democratic accountability for Australian intelligence. Key to that reform will be refocusing the future work of the committee back towards intelligence oversight. Strengthening the PJCIS’s structure, clarifying its remit, and enhancing its resources are essential to maintaining public trust and ensuring effective oversight of the national intelligence community. The reforms outlined in this report offer a roadmap for renewal – one that the next chair of the PJCIS can seize with urgency and resolve.
Topic:
Security, Intelligence, National Security, Cybersecurity, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
Australia and Asia-Pacific

110. Shifting the needle: Making Australia’s research security ecosystem work smarter

Author:
Brendan Walker-Munro
Publication Date:
06-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
Since 2018, the Australian Government has made serious strides in countering espionage and foreign interference, including introducing policy and legislative reforms aimed at protecting the research and university sector. That was necessary. Foreign states have actively targeted Australia’s research ecosystem—seeking to influence research agendas, extract sensitive information and exploit institutional vulnerabilities. However, the threat landscape hasn’t remained static. It has evolved—and rapidly. Seven years on, adversaries are no longer simply stealing data or cultivating informal relationships. Today, we’re seeing deliberate efforts to insert malicious insiders, target researchers through transnational repression, exploit data and cyber vulnerabilities, and manipulate legal frameworks through lawfare. Those methods are more sophisticated, more targeted and more integrated than ever before. Responding to them requires more than a continuation of current practice—it demands a fundamental shift in mindset. Security must now be built on persistent adaptation and shared responsibility, not one-off compliance measures. Yet the tools available to respond are lagging. Australia still lacks a clear, consistent national definition of ‘research security’—a gap that has bred confusion, resistance and fatigue across the university and research sectors. For many, security remains synonymous with red tape, rather than resilience. Meanwhile, government controls are fragmented across portfolios and jurisdictions, with no centralised leadership akin to the Counter Foreign Interference Taskforce. Heavy reliance on ministerial discretion and legislative blunt force undermine the goal of shared, sector-wide ownership. At the same time, we must acknowledge that universities aren’t government agencies. They’re complex, competitive, globally connected institutions working under immense financial pressure and regulatory complexity. Building sustainable research security means recognising those realities—not as excuses, but as critical inputs into any effective framework. Encouragingly, there is some movement. The Group of Eight has stepped forward with a national security and defence committee, co-chaired by Major General (Ret’d) Paul Symon and Lieutenant General (Ret’d) Rick Burr, to strengthen trust and coordination with government. But those are early steps. To protect Australia’s sovereign research capability into the future, we need more tailored, practical and scalable approaches to research security. They must be clear in purpose, flexible enough to adapt to changing threats, and sensitive to the day-to-day realities of research collaboration. Above all, they must be nationally coherent and built on partnership—not paternalism. The integrity of our research ecosystem isn’t just a matter of academic ethics. It’s a matter of national security, future capability, and Australia’s ability to compete in a world increasingly shaped by strategic technologies and knowledge dominance. This requires a set of consistent, coherent and high-level principles that informs strong applied policy guidance. This report outlines Australia’s comprehensive and globally leading approach to research security. However, it also makes clear that the threats that are confronting Australia are adapting, and so Australia’s approach will similarly need to adapt. The report argues that Australia’s research security posture must evolve, moving beyond the narrow lens of countering foreign interference and espionage to a broader, more integrated and risk-based framework.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Science and Technology, Cybersecurity, and Research and Development
Political Geography:
Australia and Asia-Pacific

111. North of 26 degrees south and the security of Australia: views from The Strategist, Volume 11

Author:
John Coyne and Susan Thomson
Publication Date:
06-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
The Northern Australia Strategic Policy Centre’s latest report, North of 26 degrees south and the security of Australia: views from The Strategist, Volume 11, contains articles published in ASPI’s The Strategist over the last six months. Expanding on previous volumes, this edition introduces thematic chapters focused on a range of subjects relevant to northern Australia. These include; 1. Defence, 2. Critical minerals, 3. Supply chain resilience, 4.Environmental disaster preparedness, Articles are authored by a range of experts across these varied topics. Volume 11 also features a foreword by Senator the Hon Nita Green, Assistant Minister for Northern Australia. Senator Green calls readers attention to the Federal Government’s commitment to the North, while pointing to the rich opportunities available to northern Australia with the right continued investment. The 34 articles in this Compendium provide practical policy options which government could implement in the short term and the articles work together to create an overarching narrative that centres northern excellence. Thus, facilitating both the security and economic prosperity of northern Australia.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Defense Industry, Supply Chains, and Critical Minerals
Political Geography:
Australia, Asia-Pacific, and Northern Australia

112. The cost of Defence: ASPI Defence Budget Brief 2025-2026

Author:
Marc Ablong
Publication Date:
05-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
Australia faces a perilous strategic environment with multiple threats overlapping and, in some cases, converging. We’re confronted simultaneously by the rise of aggressive authoritarian powers, multiple conflicts around the world, persistent and evolving terrorism, foreign interference and the normalisation of cyberwarfare. Our largest trading partner, China, is increasingly aggressive militarily and has growing control of critical technologies integral to our societies. In Europe, the Middle East and the Indo-Pacific region, rearmament is underway, including increased prospects of nuclear proliferation. Australia is a part of that rearmament, though others are moving much faster. Great powers flout the international rules-based system, either seeking to expand their spheres of influence, as Russia and China are doing, or pursuing a transactional and user-pays form of vassalage in the case of the US under the Trump administration. To be clear: the actions of the US are not comparable to those of Russia and China, but the administration’s tendency to treat all countries the same, without separating friend from foe, is causing unhelpful disruption and adding to global uncertainty. Many countries’ politics are become more partisan and prone to populist movements, fuelled by social-media outrage and demagoguery. Hybrid attacks on critical national infrastructure, internet-connected systems and the political foundations and institutions of states are becoming more common. Trust in public institutions is eroding, and cynicism is rising and often turning into belief in conspiracies. We’re reminded in the ministerial forewords to almost all public national-security documents that there’s no greater responsibility for the government than defending Australia. Part of that most fundamental responsibility is the obligation of government to resource the national-security community appropriately to prepare the nation for the challenges it faces. That’s why, this year, the Australian Strategic Policy Institute has broadened its budget brief, The cost of Defence, beyond its traditional focus on the budget of the Department of Defence. The security challenges that Australia faces cannot, and should not, be borne by Defence and our armed forces alone. For too long, Australian governments have partitioned Australia’s security and failed to deliver a comprehensive approach to national security. ASPI has been vocal in calling for comprehensive national-security planning, and now we reflect that by examining the government’s national-security spending as a whole. Moreover, The cost of Defence: ASPI defence budget brief 2025–26 thoroughly examines the government’s progress with, and spending on, the 2024 National Defence Strategy. The core of the strategy is the concept of national defence, defined as ‘a coordinated, whole-of-government and whole-of-nation approach that harnesses all arms of national power to defend Australia and advance our interests’. This year’s Cost of Defence therefore asks some more fundamental and strategic questions and evaluates whether the government is paying enough attention to the traditional strategy calculation of ends, ways and means. Has it identified and articulated the objectives that meet Australia’s strategic intents, as set out in the 2023 Defence Strategic Review and the 2024 National Defence Strategy? Has it chosen the best plans for meeting those objectives? And has it allocated enough resources for those plans? We also examine whether the government is giving enough attention to the nation’s preparedness and resilience. This is a major theme for ASPI in 2025. The 2025 ASPI Defence Conference: Preparedness and Resilience will focus on those challenges for Australia, including how they bear on our industry, civil society and relationships with international partners. This year’s Cost of Defence provides ASPI’s views as a lead-in to that conversation. Another issue is whether the government is too focused on future equipment acquisitions, rather than the preparedness and readiness of the current force. Given that most of the major acquisitions won’t arrive until well into the 2030s and 2040s, we must ask the unnerving question of whether the ADF is too hollow for military operations this decade. Can the ADF we have now deter adversaries from attempting military domination in our area of primary interest? The issue has been on the country’s mind since a Chinese flotilla this year sailed close to Australia, conducted live-fire drills in the Tasman Sea and rehearsed strikes on Australia’s cities, national infrastructure and joint military facilities. Finally, this year’s Cost of Defence asks the hard questions about whether the government’s rhetoric about a once-in-a-generation investment in defence and about the criticality of Australia’s defence industry base, national economic base and resilience is being matched by resources. This includes money in the latest Budget for 2025–26 and the forward estimates and, perhaps more importantly, human capital in the form of a larger skilled workforce. There are also the strategies, concepts and interagency, intergovernmental and international engagements that government must be delivering. We argue, as we did last year, that resourcing isn’t matching the rhetoric. We suggest that, in part, that’s because the implementation of strategy has been frustrated by bureaucratic, time-consuming and inefficient processes. In a first for the Cost of Defence series, we recommend ways for the government and the Defence Department to shift the dial towards agility, adaptability, effectiveness and efficiency. That includes increased and more effective messaging on why defence investment is needed. Whatever percentage of GDP the government spends on defence, it is a large number, and not enough has been done to foster public support for the defence spending required to deter the types of conflicts we see in Europe and elsewhere. Governments shouldn’t wait for public pressure to make security decisions, but a measure of social licence is needed for defence investment, and that in turn takes candour about the gravity of the threats we face. ASPI’s charter requires us to inform and nurture public debate on defence and security and to provide alternative advice for the government. The cost of Defence does so objectively, sharing the government’s and Defence’s aim of strengthening Australia’s long-term security, prosperity and sovereignty. It’s never been more important for experts inside and outside the Australian Public Service to speak truth to power frankly and fearlessly in order to give decision-makers the strongest possible suite of options. We don’t expect all readers to agree with our positions. Indeed, we welcome debate and disagreement in the hope that Australia will be stronger, more prepared and more resilient for the challenges we confront now and will face in the future.
Topic:
Economics, Armed Forces, Artificial Intelligence, Defense Industry, Research and Development, and AUKUS
Political Geography:
Russia, Australia, and Asia-Pacific

113. Agenda for change 2025: Preparedness and resilience in an uncertain world

Author:
Raelene Lockhorst, Charles Lewis Taylor, Justin Bassi, Danielle Cave, and Marc Ablong
Publication Date:
04-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
For more than a decade, which has included the 2013, 2016, 2019 and 2022 federal elections, ASPI has helped to generate ideas and foster debate about Australian strategic policymaking through Agenda for change, a wide-ranging collection of analyses and recommendations to assist the next Australian Government in its deliberations and planning. Agenda for change 2025: Preparedness and resilience in an uncertain world continues in its tradition by providing focused and anticipatory policy advice for the 48th Parliament of Australia. The agenda strives to highlight, and present solutions to, the most pressing questions that our next government must consider in order to advance and protect Australia’s national interests in a more disordered and challenging world. This edition reflects five interrelated aspects of Australia’s position in 2025, focused on the need to: defend Australia navigate our place in a new world (dis)order reform our security architecture and policies secure our critical infrastructure protect and use our natural resources. In 2025, that means equipping the next government for the reality of the contest in which our country is engaged. Since the previous edition of Agenda for change in 2022 we’ve seen: Russia’s ongoing war on Ukraine and public confirmation of the China–Russia ‘no limits’ partnership change in Australia’s policy towards China, with a focus on ‘stabilisation’, accompanied by reduced economic coercion against Australia but a ratcheting up of military intimidation, including an unprecedented PLA Navy circumnavigation of Australia heightened aggression by China against the Philippines in the South China Sea and against Taiwan a lowering of the national terrorism threat level to ‘possible’ in 2022, before it was raised back to ‘probable’ not quite two years later the 7 October 2023 Hamas terrorist attacks on Israel, the resulting war in Gaza and an increase in politically motivated violence in Australia the rise of artificial intelligence, including the landmark release of ChatGPT in late 2022 and then DeepSeek in 2025 the return of Donald Trump to the White House, bringing tension among allies and question marks over the future of the US-led international order. Each chapter in Agenda for change includes a limited number of prioritised policy recommendations, which are intended to be discrete, do-able and impactful. Although, when dealing with some of the more existential challenges facing Australia, the recommendations are necessarily and similarly expansive. In addressing that extraordinary range of developments, ASPI has drawn on a wide range of expertise for the 2025 edition of Agenda for change. The views expressed are the personal views of the authors and don’t represent a formal position of ASPI on any issue, other than a shared focus on Australia’s national interests.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Climate Change, National Security, United Nations, European Union, Counter-terrorism, Defense Industry, and Defense Economics
Political Geography:
Australia, Asia-Pacific, and United States of America

114. South Korea and Australia in space: Towards a strategic partnership

Author:
Sangsoon Lee
Publication Date:
04-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
Space cooperation between Australian and South Korea remains stuck in its infancy and, to some extent, is treated as an end in itself. This report argues that the time is ripe for both Australia and South Korea to embark on joint projects and initiatives that would deliver tangible and practical outcomes for both countries. For South Korea and Australia, space cooperation and space development serve as key pillars of the bilateral relationship. The two nations elevated their relationship to a comprehensive strategic partnership in December 2021, incorporating space development into core areas of cooperation in the fields of economics, innovation and technology. As a part of that elevation, the leaders of both countries agreed to strengthen joint research and cooperation between space research institutes and industries. Following that, in 2022, South Korea and Australia established a Space Policy Dialogue. A greater bilateral focus on expanding the scope and opportunities for space cooperation could deliver foreign-policy, national-security, defence and economic outcomes for South Korea and Australia. This report argues that there are opportunities in the bilateral relationship to boost both space cooperation (the collaborative efforts between nations to leverage space advancements for mutual benefit and to foster diplomatic ties and intergovernmental collaboration) and space development (the advancement of space-related technologies, infrastructure and industries) and is pivotal in areas such as national security, economic growth and resource management. This report first analyses the space development strategies of South Korea and Australia and examines the environmental factors that can increase the potential for cooperation. It then proposes areas where the two countries can combine their technologies and resources to maximise mutual benefits and offers eight policy recommendations to the governments of both countries. Scott Pace, former Executive Secretary of the US National Space Council, has emphasised that ‘International space cooperation is not an end in itself, but a means of advancing national interests.’ The South Korea – Australia partnership aligns with that principle, and it’s time to realise the opportunity.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Bilateral Relations, Cooperation, and Strategic Partnerships
Political Geography:
South Korea, Australia, Asia-Pacific, and Space

115. Indonesia in 2035: Climate risks to security in the Indo-Pacific

Author:
Michael Copage, Robert Glasser, and Isabelle Bond
Publication Date:
04-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
The Indo-Pacific region is particularly exposed to climate impacts, and Indonesia, like many countries, will be severely affected by climate impacts in the decade to come. The effects of climate-amplified disasters, combined with the political, social and economic consequences of climate impacts originating from within and across the region, will strain Indonesia’s economic and national-security interests. This report presents the findings of a narrative-driven scenario to stress-test Indonesia’s climate risks emerging by 2035. Its objective is to identify opportunities for Indonesia and its economic and strategic partners to prepare for and mitigate the risks. While Australian policymakers have devoted significant attention to the existential risks that Pacific island countries face, Southeast Asian countries are also highly exposed and often face similar risks. Within Southeast Asia, Indonesia’s climate risks have received very limited attention despite its high exposure to climate hazards, its very large population (over 10 times larger than all Pacific island countries combined) which is densely concentrated in vulnerable coastal areas and small islands, and its history of political unrest associated with disruptions to food and energy security. It’s also one of the closest neighbouring countries to Australia. Figure 1 on page 5 provides a visual summary of the interacting hazards, risks and consequences highlighted in this report. The population size of Southeast Asian countries and their often-close proximity to one another means that climate impacts in one country will often have consequences beyond their borders and for their neighbours across the region. Gaining a better understanding of how Indonesia, as the largest country in Southeast Asia, will be affected by climate developments is vital, given both the domestic and regional consequences. Even below the ‘safe’ threshold of a 1.5°C rise in global average temperature—the aspirational target set in 2015 by the signatories to the Paris Agreement—countries around the world are already experiencing serious, record-setting, climate-driven disruptions on a large scale. The era of climate-induced disruption is clearly already upon us—and it will intensify rapidly. Building resilience while preparing for future disruption requires an enhanced appreciation of climate risk that goes beyond adapting to more frequent and severe natural hazards, such as floods and fires. Development-assistance and defence communities have embraced the importance of treating climate change as a threat to human, economic and traditional military security. The challenge is to build the capacity and tools to assess the broad suite of security-related risks of climate change—and to translate that information into measures to mitigate the risks. Understanding the complexity and uncertainty associated with climate trends is a daunting task, greatly complicated by the need to incorporate the many ways climate change affects social, political and economic systems. The scenario developed in this report isn’t a prediction of the future, but rather a description of a possible future. It identifies many climate impacts, but suggests three primary pathways through which Indonesia may face compounding and destabilising climate disruptions: Significant food insecurity from losses to domestic production due to shifting precipitation timing and extremes across the wet and dry seasons, heightened sensitivity to shocks in global food prices, and reduced government ability to absorb economic shocks, such as food-price hikes. Large-scale coastal population displacement driven by Indonesia’s high coastal population density and the significant exposure of that population to sea-level rise and climate-induced coastal flooding. Slowed economic growth from lost agricultural output, declining revenues from stranded fossil-fuel assets, rising disaster costs at home and abroad affecting economic infrastructure and supply chains, and rising challenges in responding to domestic crises driven by food insecurity and population displacements. A major finding of this research is that, in little more than a decade, Indonesia is likely to experience major climate disruptions that also amplify climate and security risks in the region, resulting in a range of additional and cascading risks for Australia. A second overarching finding in the report is that Indonesia may be underestimating the likely scale of the climate risks and should devote greater attention to analysing them. It’s in Australia’s interests to do the same and, as a good neighbour, to coordinate an Australian whole-of-government effort to support Indonesia to mitigate the risks, including cross-border risks.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, and Climate Change
Political Geography:
Indonesia, Australia, and Indo-Pacific

116. National food security preparedness Green Paper

Author:
Andrew Henderson and John Coyne
Publication Date:
04-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
Australia’s agriculture sector and food system produce enough food to feed more than 70 million people worldwide. The system is one of the world’s least subsidised food systems. It has prospered under a global rules-based system influenced by Western liberal values, but it now faces chronic challenges due to rising geopolitical tensions, geo-economic transitions, climate change, deteriorating water security and rapid technological advances. The world is changing so rapidly that the assumptions, policy approaches and economic frameworks that have traditionally supported Australia’s food security are no longer fit for purpose. Potential conflict in the Indo-Pacific is driving enhanced preparedness activity in Australia’s defence force, but that isn’t being replicated across the agriculture sector and food system in a coordinated manner. Food hasn’t featured as a priority in the public versions of the Defence Strategic Review or the National Defence Strategy. This has created a gap in Australia’s preparedness activities: if Australia’s national security and defence organisations are preparing for potential conflict, then Australia’s agriculture sector and food system stakeholders should also be preparing for this period of strategic uncertainty. Food security is a pillar of whole-of-nation preparedness for an uncertain future. While current targeted preparedness efforts and resilience mechanisms are valuable, they aren’t sufficient. Stakeholders are calling for stronger, proactive national coordination from the government to empower and support private-sector action. Meeting that demand is essential to strengthening overall resilience. So, too, is understanding that Australia’s food security relies on a holistic and interconnected ecosystem rather than a fragmented supply chain. Australia is a heavily trade-exposed nation that exports 70% of production, so any disruption to maritime and other transport corridors or to the infrastructure needed to move food risks undermining both national food security and Australia’s standing as a reliable global supplier. This work has been written and constructed as a Green Paper, not an academic publication. Informed by six months of consultations with government, the private sector and civil society, the paper combines applied policy analysis and real-world insights to promote deliberate conversation about protecting Australia’s food security with the same priority as protecting Australia’s national security. The Green Paper is divided into four parts. It also includes three case studies in the Appendix, which use a threat and risk assessment to analyse three critical inputs to the food security ecosystem—phosphate, glyphosate and digital connectivity—to help stakeholders evaluate the vulnerabilities in Australia’s food security ecosystem. The intention of this Green Paper is to deepen understanding of food security as a key public policy issue, stimulate public discussion, inform policymaking and provide both government and key stakeholders with policy options for consideration. This Green Paper’s 14 recommended policy options have been designed to equip governments and the private sector with structured national-security-inspired assessment tools and a framework to continuously identify, prioritise and mitigate vulnerabilities. That includes options to centralise the coordination and decentralise delivery of preparedness activities, establish accountability and embed food security as a national security priority and a key element of Australia’s engagement across the Indo-Pacific.
Topic:
Agriculture, National Security, Food Security, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:
Australia and Indo-Pacific

117. State-sponsored economic cyber-espionage for commercial purposes: Governmental practices in protecting IP-intensive industries

Author:
Gatra Priyandita and Bart Hogeveen
Publication Date:
02-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
Since 2022, an increasing number of governments have introduced new policies, legislation, regulations and standards to deal with the threat to their economies from cyber-enabled IP theft. Most prominently, in October 2023, the heads of the major security and intelligence agencies of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the UK and the US (also known as the ‘Five Eyes’) appeared together in public for the first time, in front of a Silicon Valley audience, and called out China as an ‘unprecedented threat’ to innovation across the world.1 That was followed up in October 2024 with a public campaign called ‘Secure Innovation’. There is, however, variation in how governments frame their responses. Countries such as the UK and Australia take a national-security approach with policy instruments that seek to monitor the flow of knowledge and innovation to and from specific countries (primarily China). Other countries, such as Malaysia and Finland, take a due-diligence risk approach with a focus on awareness building and providing incentives to organisations to do their due-diligence checks before engaging with foreign entities. Countries such as Japan and Singapore, by contrast, take an economic-security approach in which they focus on engaging and empowering at-risk industries proactively. This report is the third in a compendium of three. The first report, State-sponsored economic cyber-espionage for commercial purposes: tackling an invisible but persistent risk to prosperity, published in 2022, looked at the scale, scope and impact of state-sponsored cyber-espionage campaigns aimed at extracting trade secrets and sensitive business information. The second report, State-sponsored economic cyber-espionage for commercial purposes: Assessing the preparedness of emerging economies to respond to cyber-enabled IP theft, looks at the extent to which agreed norms effectively constrain states from conducting economic cyber-espionage and also examines the varying levels of vulnerability experienced by selected major emerging economies. This third report complements those diagnoses by offering policymakers an action perspective based on good practices observed across the world. Various practices and examples have been selected, drawing from a multi-year capacity-building effort that included engagements in Southeast Asia, South Asia and Latin America and consultations with authorities in developed economies such as the US, Australia, Japan, Singapore and the Netherlands. Many of the practices covered in this report were presented at the Track 1 Dialogue on Good Governmental Practices that ASPI hosted during Singapore International Cyber Week 2023.
Topic:
Crime, Intellectual Property/Copyright, Cybersecurity, Business, and Espionage
Political Geography:
Global Focus

118. State-sponsored economic cyber-espionage for commercial purposes: Assessing the preparedness of emerging economies to defend against cyber-enabled IP theft

Author:
Gatra Priyandita and Bart Hogeveen
Publication Date:
02-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
Strategic competition is deepening existing tensions and mistrust between states and prompts nations to develop capabilities that they consider central to sovereign national power. Technological capabilities sit at the centre of this. It’s therefore not surprising that governments around the world are seeking technological advantage over their competitors and potential adversaries. In this context, safeguarding intellectual property (IP) has become necessary not just because it’s an essential asset for any modern economy—developed or emerging—but because it’s also increasingly underwriting national and regional security. Today, middle-income countries1 ‘World Bank country and lending groups’, World Bank, 2024, online. that are seeking to progress in the global value chain are home to vibrant knowledge-intensive sectors. Some of the world’s largest science and technology clusters are located in São Paulo and Bengaluru, for example.2 Other exemplars include the biochemical industry in India, information and communication technology (ICT) firms in Malaysia and petroleum processors in Brazil. In fact, countries such as Brazil, India, Indonesia, Mexico and Vietnam have emerged as increasingly major producers of knowledge and innovation.3 Perhaps reflecting that changing reality, it’s middle-income countries that are confronted by increasing attempts to deprive them of their economic crown jewels. In our report State-sponsored economic cyber-espionage for commercial purposes: tackling an invisible but persistent risk to prosperity, ASPI estimated that the number of state-sponsored cyber incidents affecting private entities in Southeast Asia, South Asia, Latin America and the Middle East increased from 40% in 2014 to nearly 60% in 2020.4 To be clear: economic espionage isn’t new. But it’s the growing scale and intensification of economic cyber-espionage for commercial purposes—and as an integrated tool of statecraft—that is a cause for concern.
Topic:
Intellectual Property/Copyright, Cybersecurity, Espionage, and Emerging Economies
Political Geography:
Global Focus

119. The future of US Indo-Pacific policy

Author:
Greg Brown, Nerida King, and Eric Lies
Publication Date:
02-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
How might US policy in the Indo-Pacific change over the next four years? In anticipation of a new US administration and Congress in 2025, ASPI USA held an “alternative futures analysis” exercise in mid-October 2024 to explore the drivers of US policy and how they might evolve through to November 2028. The workshop involved seven Indo-Pacific experts, who discussed a range of factors that could determine US policy and assessed how key factors could drive different outcomes. The participants determined that the two key drivers affecting the US role in the Indo-Pacific over the next four years that are simultaneously most uncertain and most determinative for US policy are: Washington’s perception of China’s strength in the Indo-Pacific the level of US attention to the region. The former is a key determinant of Washington’s threat perception, and the latter is a key determinant of Washington’s capacity to sustainably engage in the region. The nexus of those drivers produced a skeleton of four potential scenarios: Failing to walk and chew gum: Perceived high China power and a low level of US attention. In this scenario, Beijing continues to advance its interests across the region while Washington fails to prioritise imperatives in the Indo-Pacific amid ongoing conflicts in Europe, the Middle East, and elsewhere. Follow US: Perceived high China power and a high level of US attention. In this scenario, the possibility of Chinese regional hegemony is growing, but the US adopts a focused, harder-edged security strategy and leads like-minded states to confront the challenge. The Peaceful Pivot: Perceived low China power and a high level of US attention. In this “stars align” scenario, the perception of diminishing competition and conflict with China couples with the US implementing the decade-old promise of a pivot to Asia. Leading from behind: Perceived low China power and a low level of US attention. China’s capacity to project power falters in this scenario, but the US—pulled into global events elsewhere and distracted by its own domestic politics—does not provide forceful leadership in the region and leans on allies and partners to carry the load.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Armed Forces, and Threat Perception
Political Geography:
North America, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

120. The Pacific cocaine corridor: A Brazilian cartel’s pipeline to Australia

Author:
Rodrigo Duton
Publication Date:
02-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
Australia faces an emerging national security threat from Brazilian transnational crime groups. Once a domestic concern, Brazilian organised crime has evolved into a powerful narco-insurgency with transnational reach, making Brazil the world’s second-largest player in the cocaine trade after Colombia. While Brazilian organised crime previously posed little threat to Australia, this report, The Pacific cocaine corridor: A Brazilian cartel’s pipeline to Australia, examines how Brazil’s expanding role in global cocaine supply, rising criminal network sophistication, and growing demand in Australia’s lucrative cocaine market are increasing the presence of Brazilian organised crime on Australian shores. The report highlights how Brazil’s Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC) has become a major transnational criminal threat, exploiting weaknesses in political, legal, and economic systems. It explores Brazil’s geography and criminal networks with South American cocaine producers and examines the PCC’s global distribution networks, with a focus on how the Pacific is increasingly used to transport drugs destined for Australia. A recent case study demonstrates the prioritisation of the Australian market in these operations. The report concludes with recommendations for strengthening police cooperation, enhancing financial surveillance, and proactively detecting and disrupting PCC activities. By addressing key enablers of the PCC’s resilience and closing gaps in international information exchange, a coordinated approach will not only mitigate the immediate threat but also bolster Australia’s long-term defences against transnational organised crime.
Topic:
National Security, United Nations, Armed Forces, European Union, Police, and Organized Crime
Political Geography:
Asia-Pacific and United States of America