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41. Advancing locally led evaluations: Practical insights for humanitarian contexts

Author:
Hana Abul Husn and Dorothy Mae Albiento
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
ALNAP: Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance
Abstract:
Evaluation is widely recognised as a way to learn and to hold humanitarian action to account. Over time, the field of evaluation has evolved because of criticisms of traditional or classic models that are seen as top-down, quantitative and highly technical. Many evaluators are urgently calling for a focus on social justice and equity, as they feel the role and power of local voices in evaluation needs to be re-examined. Alongside humanitarian sector-wide discussions on the need to decolonise and localise aid is a call to re-examine and reframe evaluation practice. Locally led humanitarian action and the growing attention to accountability to populations affected by crisis both support the case that local evaluators are better able to lead community-centred evaluations based on their deeper understanding of local contexts, cultures and values. The overarching objective of this scoping paper is to raise the visibility and accessibility of locally led evaluation among relevant stakeholders in humanitarian contexts. We hope that it can be more easily applied and recognised as having greater value. The paper summarises the opinions and experiences of evaluation stakeholders captured during informal discussions, interviews and scoping events, as well as evidence from relevant literature. We explore what is meant by locally led evaluation and the principles underpinning it, as well as why, how, and by and for whom evaluations are carried out. More specifically, we suggest how evaluation stakeholders can meaningfully engage with and participate in locally led evaluations.
Topic:
Development, Humanitarian Aid, Accountability, and Evaluation
Political Geography:
Global Focus

42. Practical steps to advance locally led evaluation

Author:
Hana Abul Husn and Dorothy Mae Albiento
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
ALNAP: Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance
Abstract:
Stakeholders working to advance a locally led evaluation agenda in humanitarian contexts should consider several enablers (what has worked), barriers (major challenges blocking the way) and practical solutions. In this section, we draw together the reflections from our discussions with evaluation stakeholders to outline practical steps. These steps do not form an exhaustive list of what can be done to advance locally led evaluations, they do not need to be followed in a fixed order, and they might not be applicable in every context. However, they can be used as a starting or continuation point to inspire action. The practical steps are divided into long-term strategies for the overall evaluation function (LTS) and more immediate actions for ongoing or upcoming evaluations. LTS are grouped under three topics: Shaping evaluation culture, policies and strategies; Developing know-how; Establishing and maintaining critical relationships.
Topic:
Humanitarian Aid, Stakeholders, Monitoring, and Evaluation
Political Geography:
Global Focus

43. Future research and learning: Shaping agendas to inform more people centred humanitarian action

Author:
Veronique Barbelet
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
ALNAP: Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance
Abstract:
In recent years, several critical reform agendas - localisation, accountability to affected populations (AAP) and inclusion – have built momentum at the heart of a push for quality humanitarian action grounded in equity and the experiences of crisis-affected people. Despite this progress, ALNAP ’s recent review of outcomes and practices highlights the inadequacy of current methodologies and a particularly weak evidence base around these reforms (although better for localisation). It revealed that while it is likely good practices do exist in the field, they often have not been fully evidenced, researched or widely disseminated. The review also underlined the need to reflect on and better inform research and learning.
Topic:
Humanitarian Aid, Reform, Accountability, Localization, and Gender Equality
Political Geography:
Global Focus

44. Connecting not conflating: Opportunities and risks of merging the localisation, AAP and inclusion agendas

Author:
Veronique Barbelet
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
ALNAP: Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance
Abstract:
It is promising that people-centred humanitarian action has become such a key focus of reform for humanitarian actors, including donors and the United Nations. The concept of people-centred approaches, though loosely defined, increasingly appears to serve as a unifying umbrella for various reform agendas—such as localisation, accountability to affected populations (AAP), and inclusion—agendas that have, for the most part, been pursued separately in both policy and practice. While research has called for appropriate consideration of the benefits of bringing these agendas together (Barbelet et al., 2022; Lough et al., 2022), there is a risk that a people-centred focus could conflate the three distinct reform areas, rather than connect them in their synergies.
Topic:
Humanitarian Aid, United Nations, Reform, Inclusion, and Localization
Political Geography:
Global Focus

45. Breaking boundaries: local and national actors’ engagement in the humanitarian–development–peace nexus

Author:
Mae Albiento
Publication Date:
03-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
ALNAP: Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance
Abstract:
There has been increased focus in the international system on the role of local and national actors (LNAs) in the humanitarian–development–peace (HDP) nexus because of their connections to communities and their focus on holistic needs and vulnerabilities (Ministry of Foreign Affairs Denmark et al., 2023). Yet, often, LNAs’ experiences are absent in how the nexus is framed, implemented and evaluated (Morinière and Morrison-Métois, 2023). At the same time, international approaches to the HDP nexus have been criticised as lacking concrete examples of integrated and holistic programming (Morinière and Morrison-Métois, 2023; IASC , 2024). This report brings the voices of LNAs into the HDP nexus discussion. It highlights their perspectives and experiences in designing and implementing programmes that straddle the three systems, drawing on survey data and key informant interviews (KIIs) with LNAs across 22 countries. The report provides key insights to understand those experiences and puts forward recommendations for how the international system can better recognise and support the nexus-style work of LNAs.
Topic:
Development, Humanitarian Aid, and Localization
Political Geography:
Global Focus

46. Explain: Inclusion and inclusive humanitarian action

Author:
ALNAP
Publication Date:
03-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
ALNAP: Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance
Abstract:
This is part of the Explain: Essential briefings for humanitarian decision-makers series. In recent years, the humanitarian sector has increasingly focused on marginalised groups such as women and girls, people with disabilities, and minoritised communities. While this shift is both essential and overdue - given the persistent evidence of people falling through the cracks - translating attention into meaningful action has proven challenging. Implementing inclusive humanitarian action is hindered by the absence of an agreed definition, clear policy commitments and a standardised way to measure progress. Inclusion, at its core, acknowledges that different people are affected by crises in varying and disproportionate ways and that discrimination and marginalisation, based on different identity factors, create barriers to accessing assistance and services. Addressing these challenges requires targeted analysis and actions.
Topic:
Humanitarian Aid, Disability, Accountability, Marginalization, and Inclusion
Political Geography:
Global Focus

47. Public Administration and Corporate Governance

Author:
C. P. Chandrasekhar
Publication Date:
05-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
India International Centre (IIC)
Abstract:
I met Shri B. G. Deshmukh twice, once when he was Cabinet Secretary and the second time when he kindly called on me when I was the Cabinet Secretary. On the first occasion, I was the Chairman of the Spices Board in Ernakulam. A Mumbai-based exporter had complained to him that my policies were keeping the cardamom market very high, thus preventing exports. I met the Cabinet Secretary and explained to him that the exporter was a ‘bear’ in his operations and wanted to use government machinery to bring prices down after he had underquoted to importers abroad. He understood immediately. Meanwhile, the Commerce Ministry was upset that the Cabinet Secretary had gone directly to a field officer instead of to the Ministry. However, I came to understand later that this was Shri Deshmukh's style of work. He felt that it would save time and effort to hear directly from the field. This view was reinforced when Shri Deshmukh called on me after I had taken charge as Cabinet Secretary. This visit was important for me as it gave me a few pointers on how I should conduct my work. Shri Deshmukh told me that it was his practice to visit different state headquarters and meet young officers and hear from them. I followed his lead a little differently. I wrote to all Chief Secretaries, asking them to send a list of important issues pending in each state for want of approval from the Government of India. After I received the lists, I held meetings at which the Secretaries and state representatives were present. In this process, many issues were resolved. Another method I followed was to take plane loads of Secretaries to the weaker states to resolve their problems as fast as possible. The Secretaries would sit with their counterparts and try to solve as many problems as feasible at their level. The residual issues were then discussed at a meeting held by me and we would try to settle them or indicate definite time limits by which they would be resolved. We visited Assam, the northeast, Jammu and Kashmir, Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand for such meetings. A third method which I initiated—and which continues—was to hold annual meetings of Chief Secretaries. All these ideas came to me after my discussion with Shri Deshmukh and his suggestion that work will proceed apace only if there is close coordination between the Centre and the States—cooperative federalism at the administrative level, in short. I will now deal with the dissimilarities between corporate governance and public administration, and how it would be incorrect to think that wholesale application of corporate governance principles, or lateral entry of corporate employees into government, is the solution to transformation of administration. To some extent, my logic has been explained in a chapter in my book (2022: 204–17).
Topic:
Governance, Domestic Politics, and Public Administration
Political Geography:
South Asia and India

48. Digital Data and Advanced AI for Richer Global Intelligence

Author:
Danielle Goldfarb
Publication Date:
02-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI)
Abstract:
From collecting millions of online price data to measure inflation, to assessing the economic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on low-income workers, digital data sets can be used to benefit the public interest. Using these and other examples, this special report explores how digital data sets and advances in artificial intelligence (AI) can provide timely, transparent and detailed insights into global challenges. These experiments illustrate how governments and civil society analysts can reuse digital data to spot emerging problems, analyze specific group impacts, complement traditional metrics or verify data that may be manipulated. AI and data governance should extend beyond addressing harms. International institutions and governments need to actively steward digital data and AI tools to support a step change in our understanding of society’s biggest challenges.
Topic:
Economics, Inflation, Artificial Intelligence, and Data
Political Geography:
Global Focus

49. Lowering the Cost of Capital for Climate and SDG Finance in Emerging Markets and Developing Economies (EMDEs)

Author:
Jeffrey Sachs, Lisa Sachs, Ana Maria Camelo Vega, and Bradford M. Willis
Publication Date:
04-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment
Abstract:
Today, the world’s fastest-growing economies face the steepest borrowing costs — even for clean energy projects with solid fundamentals. This is not a function of global capital scarcity. Trillions are available. The problem lies in systemic barriers that prevent capital from flowing to where it’s most urgently needed. The high cost of capital in EMDEs not only undermines critical financing for the energy transition and sustainable development; it also limits the ability for US- and EU-based financial institutions to invest in and finance projects in EMDEs, despite institutional and stakeholder appetite and interest for transition finance. This paper provides a holistic diagnosis of the structural forces inflating the cost of capital in EMDEs – including sovereign credit ratings, investor risk perceptions, development finance mandates, and regulatory norms – and it outlines ten actionable solutions to unlock long-term, affordable finance for climate and sustainable development – at the speed and scale required by both global goals and national ambitions. Each of the proposed approaches deserves careful discussion, consideration, and exploration; they are presented in this paper as a roadmap for discussion, including in the context of relevant global discussions on financing climate action and sustainable development, including the UN Financing for Development Agenda, the UNFCCC COP process, and the G20 Sustainable Finance Working Group.
Topic:
Development, Emerging Markets, Climate Finance, Sustainable Development Goals, and Capital
Political Geography:
Global Focus

50. Distinguishing Among Climate Change-Related Risks

Author:
Lisa Sachs, Denise Hearn, Matt Goldklang, and Perrine Toledano
Publication Date:
02-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment
Abstract:
Understanding the diverse types of climate change-related risks is crucial for developing effective strategies to address the global climate crisis. A holistic yet disaggregated approach allows for a comprehensive view of the challenges while enabling targeted responses from various stakeholders. This document outlines three main categories of climate-related risks: planetary, economic, and financial, detailing their relevance to various stakeholders, timeframes, and potential response strategies. This short brief aims to disentangle the complex nature of risk discussions for productive discourse and appropriate risk management approaches for different stakeholders. In practice, discussions related to assessing and responding to climate change risk have conflated categories of risk, confusing discussions and undermining the effectiveness of related strategies. We hope this brief can bring clarity and rigor to analyses of risk and support constructive discussion among policymakers, financial institutions, social sector actors, and the public. We plan to follow this short briefing with a longer report including more detailed analysis, integrating feedback to these initial ideas.
Topic:
Climate Change, Finance, Economy, Investment, Risk, and Sustainability
Political Geography:
Global Focus

51. Pakistan Security Report 2024: An Abridged Version

Author:
Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS)
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS)
Abstract:
Marking a 70% increase from the previous year, Pakistan experienced a total of 521 terrorist attacks in 2024. This intensified wave of terrorism claimed 852 lives, reflecting a 23% rise compared to the terrorism-related fatalities recorded the year before. Another 1,092 people were injured in these attacks recorded during the year. Although terrorist attacks were recorded in all four provinces and the federal capital in 2024, over 95% of them were concentrated in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan. In 2024, a significant increase in militant fatalities was observed during operational strikes conducted by security forces in Pakistan. Compared to 373 militants killed in such operations in 2023, the number rose to 621 in 2024, marking a rise of over 66%. Overall, security forces and law enforcement agencies carried out 158 anti-militant operations in 2024, which was a 22% increase from the previous year. These are some of the key findings from Pakistan Security Report 2024, prepared and released by Pak Institute for Peace Studies.
Topic:
Security, Terrorism, Law Enforcement, and Counter-terrorism
Political Geography:
Pakistan and South Asia

52. Rethinking a Political Approach to Nuclear Abolition

Author:
George Perkovich, Fumihiko Yoshida, and Michiru Nishida
Publication Date:
03-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Preventing nuclear war and other existential military threats requires nations today to focus more on politics than on the qualities or quantities of weapons. Yet, many participants in nuclear policy debates do the opposite.
Topic:
Security, Nuclear Weapons, and Military
Political Geography:
Global Focus

53. Biopower: Securing American Leadership in Biotechnology

Author:
Vivek Chilukuri and Hannah Kelley
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
The biorevolution is upon us. Converging breakthroughs in biological sequencing, engineering biology, and machine learning are ushering in an almost science fiction–like world in which humans can manipulate and even design the building blocks of life with increasing sophistication—for good or ill. In this world, cutting-edge biotechnologies will create organs, capture carbon emissions, restore polluted environments, tailor medicines to a person’s genes, and replace vulnerable supply chains for food, fuel, fabrics, and firepower with domestic biobased alternatives. According to one estimate, existing biotechnologies could have a direct economic impact of $4 trillion a year for the next 20 years.1 As innovation continues, the ceiling could be far higher. If next-generation biotechnologies hold great promise, they also come with gathering perils from new bioweapons, intrusive biosurveillance, and the race for biotechnology breakthroughs without adequate safeguards for public health, the environment, and democratic values. For policymakers, the question is not whether the biorevolution has transformative power, but which nation will responsibly harness that power to unlock new tools for defense, health, manufacturing, food security, environmental remediation, and the fight against climate change. No country is better positioned to lead the biorevolution than the United States, but it requires that policymakers act now with swift, ambitious, and far-sighted steps to secure America’s place as the global biopower. The United States enters the biorevolution with formidable tailwinds—an unrivaled innovation ecosystem, world-leading research institutes, unmatched private investment, talent, and a global network of democratic partners and allies. Recent federal investments and an emerging policy framework have fortified U.S. leadership. But in this fast-moving field, settling for gradual progress will guarantee falling behind as competitors like China race to eclipse the United States with ambitions to scale up their biotechnology research, innovation, talent, and infrastructure. To secure America’s place as the global biopower, the Trump administration and Congress should accelerate U.S. tailwinds through greater investment in biotechnology research and infrastructure, especially in sectors beyond health and medicine; expand the pipeline of biotalent; and lead globally to drive biotechnology norms, standards-setting, and responsible adoption. At the same time, policymakers must navigate headwinds that could imperil further progress—specifically, an underdeveloped national biomanufacturing infrastructure; insufficient public and private investment that flows overwhelmingly to biotechnology research and development (R&D) in the health and medical sectors; a lack of uniform federal standards, definitions, and codes; a morass of conflicting policies and regulations; inaccessible and insecure biodata; and low public awareness and trust in emerging and ethically fraught biotechnology applications. This report outlines several recommendations to shore up America’s position as the preeminent biopower, including an investment of $20 billion in new federal funding. Policymakers should view this level of investment as the floor of what it will require to secure U.S. biotechnology leadership. Cutting-edge biotechnologies will create organs, capture carbon emissions, restore polluted environments, tailor medicines to a person’s genes, and replace vulnerable supply chains for food, fuel, fabrics, and firepower with domestic biobased alternatives. Regardless of what U.S. policymakers do, countries around the world are moving swiftly to embrace the biorevolution. The United Kingdom (UK) is driving innovation by concentrating and sharing its biodata through the UK Biobank, which houses the fully sequenced genetic codes of 500,000 people.2 France has invested roughly $9.5 billion through Innovation Santé 2030 to drive biomedical research.3 Japan has committed $3 billion to promote its biotechnology ecosystem.4 South Korea is carving out a niche in digital biotechnology and aims to transition 30 percent of its manufacturing industry to biomanufacturing within a decade.5 If any nation can surpass the United States as the global biopower, it will be China. In its most recent five-year plans, Beijing made explicit its ambition to become a biotechnology “superpower.” It is well on its way. China’s biotechnology leadership has surged on the back of significant public investment, long-term policy prioritization, a massive domestic market, decades of largely unrestricted capital flows, and the amassing of biodata through licit and illicit means.6 China’s concerted biotechnology push has already paid dividends: its scholars rank second in the world for authoring biomedical papers, and the country leads high-impact research in biofuels and biomanufacturing. China’s high-impact research in synthetic biology is more than triple that of the United States, posing a high risk of monopolization.7 Today, China is a global biomanufacturing powerhouse that exports roughly 40 percent of the world’s active pharmaceutical ingredients.8 Now, China aspires to move up the biotechnology value chain with a renewed push to support start-ups, integrate its vast biodata with cutting-edge machine learning tools, and dominate emerging markets for biotechnology with “national champions” such as BGI Group and WuXi Biologics, as it did with Huawei and 5G. China’s ambition to close the gap with the United States should inspire action from policymakers to secure and extend America’s lead. To that end, this report outlines a series of immediate and longer-term recommendations in six key areas for leaders in policymaking and industry.
Topic:
Leadership, Innovation, and Biotechnology
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

54. Averting AI Armageddon: U.S.-China-Russia Rivalry at the Nexus of Nuclear Weapons and Artificial Intelligence

Author:
Jacob Stokes, Colin H. Kahl, Andrea Kendall-Taylor, and Nicholas Lokker
Publication Date:
02-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
In recent years, the previous bipolar nuclear order led by the United States and Russia has given way to a more volatile tripolar one, as China has quantitatively and qualitatively built up its nuclear arsenal. At the same time, there have been significant breakthroughs in the field of artificial intelligence (AI) technologies, including for military applications. As a result of these two trends, understanding the AI-nuclear nexus in the context of U.S.-China-Russia geopolitical competition is increasingly urgent. There are various military use cases for AI, including classification models, analytic and predictive models, generative AI, and autonomy. Given that variety, it is necessary to examine the AI-nuclear nexus across three broad categories: nuclear command, control, and communications; structural elements of the nuclear balance; and entanglement of AI-enabled conventional systems with nuclear risks. While each of these categories has the potential to generate risk, this report argues that the degree of risk posed by a particular case depends on three major factors: the role of humans, the degree to which AI systems become a single point of failure, and the AI offense-defense balance. As Russia and China increasingly aim to modernize their nuclear arsenals and integrate AI into their militaries, it is essential for policymakers to be aware of the risks posed by the AI-nuclear nexus. Dealing with China and Russia on issues at this nexus is likely to be difficult in the current diplomatic and military context, characterized by increasingly strained bilateral relationships between the United States and both China and Russia, along with an uptick in coordination between Beijing and Moscow. Nonetheless, there are still various steps that U.S. policymakers could take to bolster deterrence and stability with respect to these issues. These include: building knowledge and competency around issues at the AI-nuclear nexus; integrating AI into diplomatic initiatives related to nuclear and other strategic risks, and vice versa; establishing and promoting norms for the safe use of AI in relation to nuclear arsenals and other strategic capabilities; developing policy and technical criteria for assessing exactly how and when to keep humans in the loop on all nuclear-related processes; including AI technologies as a factor in oversight and reviews of the U.S. nuclear arsenal; investing in AI-enabled cyber and space capabilities to enhance defense and resilience, reduce incentives to attack those areas, and mitigate entanglement risks; consulting closely with U.S. allies about how AI will shape extended deterrence calculations related to both nuclear and conventional capabilities; and pursuing a comprehensive set of risk reduction and crisis management mechanisms with China and Russia while recognizing the obstacles to progress. Failing to take these steps could leave the country and the world dangerously exposed to risks and ill-prepared to seize any opportunities arising from the increasingly salient AI-nuclear nexus.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Cybersecurity, Artificial Intelligence, and Rivalry
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

55. Assessing China’s Nuclear Decision-Making: Three Analytical Lenses

Author:
Jacob Stokes
Publication Date:
03-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
China’s rapid nuclear buildup is raising questions about how the country makes decisions related to nuclear weapons. This policy brief analyzes that trend by presenting three overarching analytical lenses, or categories of factors, that shape Beijing’s nuclear decision-making: leadership, weapons systems and military organizations, and official policies and doctrine. On leadership, Chinese Communist Party General Secretary Xi Jinping likely sees nuclear weapons granting prestige and growing in relevance, but his views on nuclear weapons’ efficacy are less clear. On weapons systems and military organizations, the expansion of China’s nuclear arsenal provides the country’s leaders with new options, which could shift those leaders’ intentions over time. Implementation of those options, though, runs through often-corrupt People’s Liberation Army military organizations. On official policies and doctrine, Beijing possibly sees its professed stance as a country that does not engage in U.S.- and Russian-style arms buildups as a source of diplomatic influence, particularly in the developing world or Global South. Separately, the circumstances where China’s nuclear no-first-use policy would face a true test—for example, during a major Taiwan contingency—are precisely the moments when Beijing would have massive incentives to selectively interpret or simply abandon that policy. In the near term, China’s official nuclear weapons policies will likely stay the same, so the gap between rhetoric and action will grow. A bigger arsenal and more nuclear rhetoric and signaling will, over time, also shape future Chinese coercion campaigns. In response, U.S. policymakers should commission an intelligence assessment of Xi’s views of specific nuclear crises, pressure China to issue more explanation of its nuclear policies and capabilities, and expand information sharing about missile tests on a reciprocal basis. U.S. policymakers should also make an authoritative policy statement on what would constitute China reaching nuclear parity with the United States and counter China’s nuclear buildup using both conventional and nuclear capabilities.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, and Decision-Making
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and United States of America

56. Countering the Digital Silk Road: Brazil

Author:
Ruby Scanlon and Bill Drexel
Publication Date:
04-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
This year marks the 10th anniversary of the Digital Silk Road (DSR), China’s ambitious initiative to shape critical digital infrastructure around the world to advance its geopolitical interests and technology leadership. A decade after its launch, digital infrastructure and emerging technologies have only grown more vital and contested as demand for connectivity, digital services, and emerging technologies like artificial intelligence (AI) expand. Against this backdrop, the DSR has become increasingly central to China’s broader strategy to challenge and ultimately supplant the U.S.-led digital order, and in doing so, reap potentially vast security, economic, and intelligence advantages. To assess the DSR’s impact 10 years after its inception—and explore how the United States and its allies can offer a more compelling and coherent alternative—the CNAS Technology and National Security team has undertaken a major research project that produces in-depth case studies of four diverse and geostrategically critical nations—Indonesia, Brazil, Kenya, and Saudi Arabia—and culminates in a full-length report. The second case study focuses on Brazil. For the study, researchers from the CNAS Technology and National Security team spent a week in the country interviewing local policymakers, journalists, technology firms, civil society, and academics, along with U.S. diplomats, development experts, and companies. Drawing on these interviews and desk research, this case study seeks to shed light on the current dynamics and stakes of the U.S.-China competition to shape Brazil’s digital ecosystem.
Topic:
National Security, Geopolitics, Artificial Intelligence, and Digital Silk Road (DSR)
Political Geography:
China, Asia, Brazil, and South America

57. Regional and Global Responses to a Taiwan Contingency: Gauging the Prospects for Coalition-Building Under Fire

Author:
Jacob Stokes, Kareen Hart, Ryan Claffey, and Thomas Corel
Publication Date:
05-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
Acontingency across the Taiwan Strait has the potential to reshape the Indo-Pacific and even global security environment. This report explores how states beyond the United States and Taiwan would respond to a major Taiwan contingency. It defines a major Taiwan contingency as a conflict that might start in the so-called gray zone between peace and war but clearly escalates into a larger campaign that has unification as the near-term objective of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Specifically, the report examines how geopolitical interests, values, and material power might determine the approaches of countries across the region and the world. Regional and global responses to a major Taiwan contingency would depend heavily on structural factors present at the time it happens, as well as the specific circumstances of the situation. The report details four key structural factors that would shape states’ responses: the specific nature of the Taiwan contingency, the global trade and technology landscape when the contingency occurs, Taiwanese and U.S. capabilities and responses, and the spectrum of intervention options. Beyond those structural factors, the response from four groups of states would play a major role in determining the outcome of a major Taiwan contingency. The first group is Japan and the Philippines. Both U.S. allies would be on the front lines of a Taiwan conflict and host U.S. forces but are also the most exposed to military retaliation from China. The second group is close U.S. allies and partners South Korea, Australia, and India. Their locations are farther from the main battlespace, but each would have to consider how its response would affect its own security concerns and relations with the United States in the future. Regional and global responses to a major Taiwan contingency would depend heavily on structural factors present at the time it happens, as well as the specific circumstances of the situation. The third group includes the other states in Southeast Asia. Thailand and Singapore would have to consider their defense ties to Washington, while Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar might get requests from Beijing. Other Southeast Asian states would adopt a studiously neutral stance. The fourth group is Europe and the rest of the world. European states now pay more attention to Taiwan, and many see parallels with Ukraine’s plight. But uneven ties with China and a lack of power projection capabilities would mostly limit direct European intervention. Meanwhile, the developing world would likely side with Beijing. And it lacks the political will—much less the proximity or military power—to come to Taipei’s aid. Several findings flow from the analysis: First, it is unlikely that any other states will come to Taiwan’s aid if Taiwan does not fight fiercely and the United States does not intervene on a large scale. Second, geographic proximity increases a country’s stake in the defense of Taiwan, but that same closeness also makes countries more vulnerable to PRC retaliation. Third, any Taiwan contingency would cause massive economic harm, so states would try to balance protecting their economic interests—especially access to high-end semiconductors—with ending the conflict just to stem the disruption caused by the fighting. Fourth, states’ choices will reflect their national interests and values, but those responses will depend to a significant degree on what others do. U.S. policymakers should take the following actions to best position Washington to mount an effective coalition defense of Taiwan during a contingency, should those policymakers choose to do so: Prioritize preventing a Taiwan contingency. Reinforce with Taipei how much would hinge on Taiwan’s contingency response, both in terms of demonstrating will and capabilities. Expect limited contributions but be creative in exploring what in the spectrum of intervention might be possible. Deepen intra-Asian and Euro-Asian security ties that include the United States. Support and, where possible, facilitate the growth of intra-Asian security ties that do not rely on the United States as the hub. Plan for humanitarian evacuation operations as a means to encourage Southeast Asian countries to think through a Taiwan contingency.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Coalition, and Regional Security
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, Asia, and United States of America

58. Gender-Based Violence and Sources of Support in the Middle East and North Africa (2023-2024)

Author:
Arab Barometer
Publication Date:
03-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Arab Barometer
Abstract:
According to reports from the World Bank, 40 percent of women across the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) have experienced violence from their partner at least once in their lifetime. A report from the OECD found that violence against women in MENA increased during the COVID-19 pandemic. These findings are in-line with the findings from the most recent Arab Barometer 2023-2024 survey, in which a plurality of citizens from nearly every country perceive that violence against women has increased in the past year. Governments across the region are taking actions to combat the rise in violence but more remains to be done. Despite the dire circumstances, there are points of hope in Arab Barometer’s findings as well. In particular, nearly all citizens can point to at least one source of support for women that face abuse. While citizens are highly unlikely to say a woman facing abuse cannot find support, the most commonly cited sources of support are familial rather than institutional. Specifically, support from male family members is seen as far more readily available than support from hospitals or clinics. Relying on family rather than institutions for support is complicated. At best, a lack of institutional support may indicate that citizens do not view the government as particularly invested in supporting women facing gender-based violence. Increasing institutionalized support through funding and outreach with local organizations or healthcare facilities could provide more security for abused women.
Topic:
Public Opinion, Gender Based Violence, Survey, COVID-19, and Gender Equality
Political Geography:
Middle East and North Africa

59. North Korea, Russia, and China: Past Cooperation & Future Prospects

Author:
Sydney Seiler
Publication Date:
06-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
Syd Seiler argues that recent developments in the relationship between North Korea, China, and Russia should be examined within the context of past interactions and North Korea’s geopolitical reality over the past several decades. North Korea’s pursuit of a distanced approach toward China and the Soviet Union during the Cold War, its post-Cold War management of the bilateral relationships while developing nuclear weapons, and contemporary developments within the North Korea-China-Russia triangle highlight limited shared interests and few signs of deliberate trilateralism. Despite skepticism regarding the durability of trilateralism, Seiler warns against neglecting the threat of collaboration and cooperation among the three countries. In particular, the evolving relationship between North Korea, China, and Russia holds the potential to harm the existing balance of power on the Korean Peninsula and embolden North Korea to believe that the use of force might be justified within the New Cold War structure. Seiler outlines three scenarios in which the evolution of trilateralism could lead to North Korea employing military force on the Korean Peninsula, highlighting the critical role of China and Russia in either restraining or encouraging North Korean revisionism. To properly respond to the dangerous transformation of the geopolitical environment, Seiler recommends the United States, South Korea, and like-minded states reinforce conventional and extended deterrence by convincing China and Russia that they will incur high costs for enabling North Korea’s coercive and revisionist behavior.
Topic:
Security, International Cooperation, Nuclear Weapons, Geopolitics, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Eurasia, Asia, and North Korea

60. Siloed No More: The U.S.-ROK Alliance and a Taiwan Conflict

Author:
Clint Work
Publication Date:
03-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:
This project was motivated by and builds upon earlier research tracing the evolution and apparent alignment of U.S. and South Korean signaling on Taiwan, wherein the South Korean government adopted a more outspoken position regarding “the importance of peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait” and framed it in increasingly expansive terms—as a regional and global issue yet also directly linked to the peace and stability of the Korean Peninsula. The previous research indicated the U.S.-ROK alliance faced a gap between its topline diplomatic rhetoric on Taiwan and its preparedness to navigate an actual conflict between the United States and China over Taiwan and the attendant risk of a simultaneous conflict on the Korean Peninsula. This project aimed to go beyond diplomatic rhetoric. Forty-two interviews were conducted from June 2024 to February 2025 in both Washington and Seoul. Most were in-person interviews with some conducted virtually or by written response via email. Through these interviews with U.S. and ROK current and former government officials, think tank experts, and academics—as well as open-source research—this project offers insight on the evolution and state of U.S.-ROK alliance discussions on a Taiwan conflict, key challenges obstructing such discussions, and critical variables or dynamics the alliance would have to navigate in the event of a conflict.
Topic:
Security, Alliance, Conflict, and Regional Security
Political Geography:
Taiwan, Asia, South Korea, and United States of America