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1. Kuwait Country Report 2024

Author:
Arab Barometer
Publication Date:
05-2026
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Arab Barometer
Abstract:
Since the last Arab Barometer survey in Kuwait, conducted in 2022, major changes have taken place, significantly affecting political stability in the country. While political life in Kuwait was saturated with crises, and its indicators were clearly visible in the dissolution of the National Assembly (Parliament) repeatedly before completing its term, the shifts, changes, and political instability that dominated the public arena, between late 2022 and the current period of 2024, included even more severe events. Kuwait faced the unconstitutional dissolution of the National Assembly and the suspension of some articles in the constitution, now for the third time in Kuwait’s history. The first two such crises were in 1967 and 1986. To summarize the events that took place from June 2022 until the dissolution of the Parliament and the suspension of the constitution in May 2024, they are as follows: On August 3, 2022, the National Assembly was dissolved constitutionally, in response to the sit-in of a number of MPs inside the Parliament and their overnight stay there. The Crown Prince (the current Emir) gave a speech in which he emphasized adherence to the constitution, and also presented initiatives in electoral reform. He emphasized that the government would not vote for the candidate for the speaker of the National Assembly, and that the elections would be through the national ID card (effectively changing electoral circuits). The protesting MPs considered these reforms a victory. As a result, Ahmed al-Nawaf was appointed Prime Minister
Topic:
Corruption, Education, Environment, Gender Issues, Health, Migration, Governance, Democracy, Economy, Discrimination, Institutions, Labor Market, Freedom, and Political System
Political Geography:
Middle East and Kuwait

2. Protecting the North American Arctic and Beyond

Author:
Mathieu Boulegue, Rebecca Pincus, and Madison Lipson
Publication Date:
11-2026
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:
The United States has quickly adapted to the new security environment in a changing Arctic, as the region must deal with geopolitical tension stemming from Russia, the impact of climate change, and NATO’s increased role and presence. Many unknowns remain, however. Turning current and future US strategic documents and concepts about the Arctic into reality does not have any easy solutions. This will require continued endeavor and patience. The US should ensure prevailing in the Arctic in terms of homeland security and forward defense. Forward defense in the Arctic will require forward-thinking, notably what constitutes Arctic-specific integrated deterrence through tailored and calibrated presence as part of the Joint Force. A large part of this endeavor falls on the leadership of USNORTHCOM. USNORTHCOM must be empowered to become the Department of Defense’s Arctic “capability advocate” under the Unified Command Plan (UCP) and the Total Force concept. USNORTHCOM must be emboldened to take the lead in associated challenges to defend the US homeland, secure the region, cooperate with allies, and bridge potential security gaps. This paper seeks to help USNORTHCOM leverage its influence in shaping the future of Arctic security for the US homeland. It offers plenty of innovative policy recommendations and action points aimed at streamlining the role of NORTHCOM to keep the Arctic safe and secure for the US and its allies. Future policy must address the need to enhance Arctic domain awareness and foster a new approach to Arctic-specific capabilities, technologies, and procurement tailored to the environment. Part of this endeavor is also connected to bridging potential gaps related to logistics, sustainment, maintenance, and transportation adapted to Arctic-specific requirements. This will ensure increased mobility and reach across the region. USNORTHCOM should ensure that regular Arctic drills and exercises under its supervision systematically include logistics and sustainment as essential parts of training. Policy must also clarify the role of the primary Arctic combatant command by identifying structural gaps and bridging them, especially in times of crisis or escalation. Better synchronization of efforts will help the US reach a common operating picture of the Arctic from a whole of government perspective.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, and USNORTHCOM
Political Geography:
North America and Arctic

3. After Ukraine: Prospects for a Russian Resurgence in the Middle East

Author:
Anna Borshchevskaya and Matt Tavares
Publication Date:
01-2026
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
Moscow has cultivated ties with U.S. adversaries and allies alike, and Washington must respond by advancing a holistic policy that empowers Ukrainian commercial interests and addresses deficits in sanctions policy. Russia’s position in the Middle East has faced major setbacks in recent years, including the fall of Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad, the weakening of Iran and its proxies, and the toll from Moscow's unending war of choice in Ukraine. But reports of a Russian retreat from the region are premature. Alongside traditional defense and economic relationships with Algeria, Egypt, and Iraq, Moscow has cultivated ties with a host of other countries—U.S. adversaries and allies alike. With Iran, it has reportedly begun assembling Su-35 fighters as part of a $6.5 billion deal that would boost the regime’s air force. With the United Arab Emirates, an American ally, Russia’s non-oil trade grew to $11.5 billion as of 2024. And in Syria, Russia’s pre-revolution military bases remain in place, while an October meeting between Presidents Putin and Sharaa indicated a cooperative spirit. In this comprehensive Policy Note, experts Anna Borshchevskaya and Matt Tavares argue that Russia is poised for a resurgence in the Middle East, especially once the war in Ukraine ends—a point they also make clear in a hard-hitting op-ed published in the National Interest. Washington, they argue, must recognize the multiple threats this would present to U.S. interests in the region and develop a vigorous counterstrategy in response—one that includes empowering Ukrainian commercial interests, refining sanctions policy, and rebutting Russian propaganda in real-time.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Sanctions, Iran, Regional Politics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Middle East

4. Toward a Fairer EU-Tunisia Agricultural Partnership

Author:
Imen Louati
Publication Date:
01-2026
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Arab Reform Initiative (ARI)
Abstract:
Tunisian policymakers approach agriculture as the main economic tool to improve the country’s trade balance. Optimizing the trade balance as the primary objective has led to a dual strategy for the agricultural sector: to promote exports of products for which Tunisia has a comparative advantage – olive oil, dates, citrus fruits, and fish – while reducing its dependence on imports of staple foods – cereals, milk, and beef – in the interest of safeguarding national food security. This dual strategy has created tension in the agricultural policy. The free trade liberalization facilitated by the country’s membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO) is counterbalanced by protections for domestic producers, using measures such as tariff and non-tariff barriers, particularly for sensitive foodstuffs (agricultural products that a country considers highly important to its national interests and therefore seeks to protect from full trade liberalization).1 The simultaneous goals of prioritizing food security and protecting national farming interests, while also integrating with international markets, prevent trade policies from effectively balancing export promotion and import needs. The inherent contradiction of these objectives has not only compromised Tunisia’s agricultural policy but also directly contributed to supply chain disruptions and the temporary disappearance of essential food items from the national market. The sustained dependence on imported staples has, in turn, exacerbated the wider economic crisis, contributing directly to a significant rise in Tunisia’s external debt and straining the foreign currency reserves needed for servicing that debt. As Tunisia is currently engaged in negotiations to update its trade agreement with the EU, there is an urgent need to reevaluate Tunisia’s trade policy framework to prevent the negotiation process from locking the country into unsustainable and irreversible policy choices. In that spirit, this policy analysis traces the roots of Tunisia’s agricultural trade policies, examining key multilateral obligations and the asymmetric outcomes of its trade agreements with the EU. It outlines how the deep power imbalance between the EU and Tunisia is affecting Tunisia’s agricultural policies and documents the critiques and resistance to deeper trade integration among Tunisian civil society, unions, and farmers. Building on the evidence gathered through analysis and semistructured interviews with stakeholders from civil society organizations, farmer unions, and the EU representative in Tunisia, this report proposes a six-point proactive strategy to redefine the EU-Tunisia trade relationship.
Topic:
European Union, Partnerships, Food Sovereignty, and Agricultural Policy
Political Geography:
Europe, North Africa, and Tunisia

5. Financing Water Justice: International Aid and Development in the MENA Region

Author:
Dana Abi Ghanem
Publication Date:
01-2026
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Arab Reform Initiative (ARI)
Abstract:
The need for water justice in the MENA region represents a pressing policy challenge, as governments confront pressures from climate change that threaten water resources. The region is considered one of the most water-scarce in the world,1 but its geographic diversity means that different countries in MENA face a litany of challenges when securing water and food for their populations in just and sustainable ways. Several of them must address systemic issues in water governance, including unequal allocation, inadequate infrastructure, and uneven access among rural, urban, and displaced populations. Others face increasing droughts, driving vast areas that rely on agriculture for their income into social and economic precarity. Climate change, population growth, and transboundary water tensions further complicate national and regional efforts to ensure fair and sustainable water management. Since the end of the Second World War, international aid and development organizations have launched technical cooperation projects, often focused on rural water supply and irrigation. Led by the WB and United Nations agencies over the last three decades, bilateral aid agencies and the EU, these international financial institutions (IFIs) have played a significant role in water development – promoting approaches like integrated water resource management (IWRM), as well as lending support for transboundary water management and water governance. This support can be traced back through reams of documentation and convenings that showcase technical assistance and financing for various water development efforts, including dam building, irrigation projects, and wastewater treatment plants, with claims often linked to sustainability principles and sound water management. Viewing these actions from a water justice lens, we argue that water development processes and structures pertaining to transparent decision-making, participation, and democracy are as important as equitability and fairness in access to water.2 In this context, the role that IFIs can play in enabling or hindering water justice across various countries in the MENA region warrants scrutiny. This report examines how IFIs might facilitate a just water future for the region, exploring how their practices, investments, and partnerships influence fairness in access, equity, sustainability, and transparency in water governance.
Topic:
Development, Foreign Aid, Water, and Climate Justice
Political Geography:
Middle East and North Africa

6. Land Tenure in Lebanon: The Elephant in the Room of Agricultural Policy Debates

Author:
Christophe Maroun
Publication Date:
01-2026
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Arab Reform Initiative (ARI)
Abstract:
“Land for those who work it.” This popular slogan, heralded by anti-colonialists and anti-imperialists worldwide, as well as by peasant movements such as La Via Campesina and the Landless Workers’ Movement in Brazil, encapsulates a global demand for agrarian reforms that put peasants at the heart of food systems. Yet while global conversations about food production and rural development have had to confront the uncomfortable issue of land tenure, in Lebanon land remains the elephant in the room of national agrarian policy debates. The question of land distribution and access in Lebanon touches on the very foundations of the country’s political economy, which is based on rent extraction, clientelism, and elite capture. A tangle of different land regimes has enabled political and economic elites to continuously convert land into speculative private assets, slowly eroding the social value of land while turning it into a commodity and a source of political power. The persistence of land-based power and elite resistance has historically blocked any meaningful structural reform. In parallel, by preferring donor-driven, technical interventions in agrarian and food policies that avoid the core issue of unequal land access, the Lebanese state functions as a guarantor of existing class structures. This article argues that reforming land access in Lebanon is the essential structural condition for cultivating a fair and sustainable agricultural system rooted in agroecology. It also proposes specific reformist policies and measures toward that goal. In the current political landscape, redistributive land reform – the transfer of tenure rights to new beneficiaries to provide more equitable access – remains distant. Nevertheless, pragmatic alternatives exist to improve land access to vulnerable communities and safeguard precarious agricultural lands. These include strengthening the use of communal amiri lands, protecting agricultural zones from speculation, and activating idle land.
Topic:
Environment, Transitional Justice, Land Tenure, and Agricultural Policy
Political Geography:
Middle East and Lebanon

7. A pivot or a saga? How Turkish foreign policy is torn between domestic pressures and economic needs

Author:
Başak Alpan
Publication Date:
01-2026
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS)
Abstract:
The EU must take proactive steps to address longstanding issues and cultivate a more trust-based and cooperative relationship with Turkey. Bilateral relations could be rejuvenated by addressing key issues such as democratic reforms, visa liberalisation, civil society engagement and the ongoing dispute over Cyprus. This CEPS Explainer explores the recent orientation of the Turkish foreign policy, focusing on its historical Western orientation and recent efforts to achieve ‘strategic autonomy’ by scrutinising the results of the fieldwork undertaken through the CATS Network project. Interviews conducted in Ankara, Istanbul and Brussels show that while Turkish policymakers aim to diversify the country’s foreign policy by forging security and economic partnerships with non-Western actors, such as the BRICS, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), China and Russia, its institutional and ideological foundation remains Western-oriented. Integrating Turkey into European security alignments, such as the SAFE framework, and modernising the Turkey-EU customs union would help to strengthen bilateral ties. Additionally, the EU should substantiate the people-to-people contact approach to rebuild trust and encourage further cooperation.
Topic:
European Union, Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Civil Society, Partnerships, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
Turkey, Middle East, and Europe

8. Economic implications for Europe of a potential reintegration of Iran into the world economy

Author:
Gabriel Felbermayr, Mahdi Ghodsi, Heider Kariem, Robert Stehrer, and Yoto V. Yotov
Publication Date:
02-2026
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies (WIIW)
Abstract:
How would fundamental political change in Iran, leading to a democratic system with a free and rules-based economic order, affect Germany and the EU economically? In the event of change, sanctions could be scaled back, allowing Iran to rejoin the global economy. This study quantifies the economic effects of such a transformation. It neither advocates for nor legitimises the lifting or easing of sanctions under the current regime or without far-reaching and credible reforms that fully address the concerns underlying the sanctions currently in place. Using the newest available data and quantitative methods, the results indicate that lifting EU sanctions alone could raise Iran’s real GDP by more than 80% in the long run while generating moderate but economically meaningful gains for Germany and the EU of around 0.3-0.4% of GDP. These gains are driven by expanded trade, lower energy and input prices, and improved allocative efficiency. When sanctions removal is combined with plausible scenarios of productivity catch-up with Turkey or South Korea, Iran’s GDP would increase by 240-388% and the gains for Europe would increase further, underscoring the strong complementarity between trade integration and productivity growth. Moreover, Iran’s reintegration would reduce energy price volatility, improve the security of maritime trade routes, and lower migration pressures. Overall, the findings suggest that a negotiated transition and rules-based reintegration of Iran would generate substantial mutual economic benefits while contributing to regional and global stability.
Topic:
Markets, Political Economy, Foreign Direct Investment, Sanctions, European Union, Economy, Inflation, Energy, and Trade Integration
Political Geography:
Europe, Iran, and Germany

9. Structural dependencies and choke points in GVCs: An industry-level analysis

Author:
Robert Stehrer
Publication Date:
02-2026
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies (WIIW)
Abstract:
Global value chains (GVCs) are intricate international networks in which the production and distribution of goods and services across multiple economies and industries is coordinated. Their complexity introduces strategic dependencies when economies or industries rely heavily on a limited number of foreign suppliers. Such dependencies can also create additional vulnerabilities, particularly at choke points (i.e. key links or nodes in the chain) whose disruption – whether due to political instability and geopolitical tensions, natural disasters, pandemics or policy shocks and trade restrictions – can halt production. This study builds on previous research by examining two factors: (i) size dependencies arising when an importing economy-industry pair relies largely on the inputs of a partner economies, and (ii) choke dependencies, where imports from one economy pass through another, creating potential choke points. Choke dependency is particularly concerning, as disruptions in the choke economy can impact not only its direct exports but also the flow of goods from other suppliers. Using the multi-country input-output tables (MC IOTs), this study introduces two indicators to assess dependencies: (i) ‘size dependency’, based on the share of an economy-industry’s foreign output sourced from a specific partner, and (2) ‘choke dependency’, based on the pass-through frequency (ptf) indicator, which reveals how often inputs from third economies are routed through a particular partner. An economy-industry pair is considered dependent if it meets thresholds for size dependency, choke dependency or both. This comprehensive approach aims to offer a deeper understanding of systemic vulnerabilities in global trade networks.
Topic:
International Trade and Finance, Global Value Chains, Vulnerability, Dependency, and Choke Points
Political Geography:
Global Focus

10. África ante la crisis de financiación para el desarrollo

Author:
Andrea Chamorro, Jaume Portell, Olga Namasembe, Luis García Blanch, and Romeo Gbaguidi
Publication Date:
03-2026
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Fundación Alternativas
Abstract:
La Fundación Alternativas les invita a debatir en Casa África en torno al Informe África 2026. En esta edición nos centramos en los retos y oportunidades que plantea un nuevo modelo de financiación al desarrollo a resultas de factores como la retirada de EEUU del sistema de la ayuda, con el desmantelamiento de la USAID y de las agencias de Naciones Unidas; la presencia creciente de China a través de su proyecto de la Franja y la Ruta; o nuevas prioridades en Europa como el aumento del gasto en defensa. Nuestro Informe ofrece un estudio en profundidad que reflexiona y elabora propuestas en torno a un nuevo modelo de financiación del desarrollo sostenible. Estamos en un momento crítico donde la UE y España deberían contribuir a la articulación de un nuevo modelo, más horizontal, participativo y eficaz. Abordaremos cuestiones como el estado actual de la deuda y el desarrollo en África: el nexo entre seguridad y desarrollo; las tensiones entre las agendas externas y los intereses africanos en el Sahel y África Occidental; el nuevo escenario de la cooperación española y europea; el papel del sector privado, o las perspectivas para el desarrollo africano tras la IV Cumbre de Financiación de Sevilla.
Topic:
Development, European Union, Geopolitics, Economy, and Financing
Political Geography:
Africa

11. Ciencia, Industria y Competitividad

Author:
Gonzalo León, Francisco Marín, Carlos Marti Sempere, Raquel Jorge, and María Peñate
Publication Date:
02-2026
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Fundación Alternativas
Abstract:
La Fundación Alternativas analiza la evolución del sistema de I+D en España en el contexto internacional y geopolítico, destacando los grandes cambios recientes en ciencia, tecnología e innovación. El informe subraya que España dispone de capacidades competitivas en áreas clave como biotecnología, comunicaciones, software o IA, y puede contribuir al fortalecimiento tecnológico de la UE. Ante el ascenso de China, la inestabilidad global y la creciente importancia de la seguridad y la soberanía tecnológica, el texto defiende la necesidad de reformar el sistema español de I+D, mejorar su gestión y alinearlo con una política industrial europea más ambiciosa. El objetivo final es reforzar la competitividad, la autonomía tecnológica y el papel estratégico de España en Europa.
Topic:
Science and Technology, European Union, Youth, Digital Culture, Industry, and Competition
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and Spain

12. Political Violence in America: Public Perceptions, Polarization, and Accountability

Author:
PRRI Staff
Publication Date:
01-2026
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
PRRI: Public Religion Research Institute
Abstract:
Two-thirds of Americans (67%) believe political leaders’ failure to condemn violent rhetoric contributes a lot to violent actions in society. Majorities of Americans also believe that false or misleading information generated by AI (64%) and public displays of hate symbols (61%) contribute a lot to violent actions in society, while smaller majorities believe easy access to guns and harsh and violent political language are also drivers (both 53%). While 51% of Republicans believe public displays of hate symbols contribute a lot to violence, 76% of Democrats do. Fewer than half of Republicans (46%) believe that harsh and violent political language contributes a lot to violence in society; white evangelical Protestants are the only group of religious Americans in which a minority (45%) share that view. Very few Americans support hostile and violent actions by their political allies to advance important political goals. Very few Americans justify imprisoning a political opponent without a trial if that person poses a clear danger to the country (12%); damaging or destroying property as a form of protest (7%); pushing, shoving, or punching a political opponent (6%); posting the home address or private phone number of a political opponent online so their family will be harassed (5%); or killing a political opponent if that person poses a clear danger to the country (5%). While very strong majorities of Americans over the age of 50 completely disagree that violent and harsh actions may justify political outcomes, such sentiments are less widely shared among younger Americans, especially those who are under 30. More than three in four Americans disagree that violence may be needed to save the country; views are similar across partisan groups, though they have shifted some throughout the year. Most Americans (77%) disagree that “because things have gotten so far off track, true American patriots may have to resort to violence in order to save our country,” compared with 20% of those who agree. Agreement about the potential need for political violence has decreased significantly among Republicans since President Donald Trump’s reelection in November 2024; agreement among Democrats has remained low over time but increased slightly in the past year. Since early 2021, support for political violence has varied across religious groups. Support among white Christians has declined since the 2024 election, though white evangelical Protestants continue to show higher support than white Christians overall. Support for political violence remains highest among Christian nationalism Adherents and lowest among Rejecters. Americans’ views on who is most responsible for political violence are deeply polarized, split largely along partisan and religious lines. Democrats overwhelmingly attribute most responsibility for political violence to right-wing groups (73%), while Republicans attribute most responsibility to left-wing groups (72%). While more Christians of color and non-Christians attribute most responsibility to right-wing groups for most political violence today, white Christian groups attribute most responsibility to left-wing groups. Most Christian nationalism Adherents (73%) and Sympathizers (64%) attribute responsibility to left-wing groups, while most Rejecters (72%) attribute responsibility to right-wing groups. Christian nationalism Skeptics are divided. Americans’ views are strongly divided by party and religion on whether National Guard deployments in American cities cause more violence than they prevent. A slim majority of Americans (52%) agree that deploying the National Guard to patrol American cities may cause more violence than it prevents. Democrats (80%) and independents (60%) are far more likely than Republicans (23%) to agree. Most Christians of color and non-Christians agree that these deployments cause more violence, while white Christian groups are far less likely to do so. Agreement is particularly lower among white evangelical Protestants (29%). Christian nationalism Rejecters (80%) are the most likely to agree, followed by Skeptics (54%), Sympathizers (37%), and Adherents (26%). Opposition to Trump’s Jan. 6 pardons is widespread, with notable exceptions among Republicans, white Christian groups, and Christian nationalism Adherents and Sympathizers. Most Americans (68%) oppose “President Trump’s pardoning of over 1,500 people convicted for their role in the attacks on the U.S. Capitol on January 6, 2021,” compared with 29% who favor it. Republicans (63%) are far more likely to favor these pardons than independents (22%) and Democrats (4%). White Christian groups, particularly white evangelical Protestants (58%), are more likely than non-Christians (24%), Christians of color (19%), and unaffiliated Americans (18%) to favor Trump’s Jan. 6 pardons, as are Christian nationalism Adherents (61%) and Sympathizers (49%), compared with Skeptics (25%) and Rejecters (8%). Opposition to stripping citizenship and deporting U.S. citizens deemed a threat is widespread, with notable exceptions among Republicans, white evangelical Protestants, and Christian nationalism Adherents and Sympathizers. Four in ten Americans (41%) favor “stripping U.S. citizens of their citizenship and deporting them if they are determined to be a threat to the country.” Republicans (60%) are roughly twice as likely as independents (38%) and Democrats (27%) to agree. White evangelical Protestants (56%) are the only religious group with majority support for stripping U.S. citizens of their citizenship and deporting them, compared with fewer Hispanic Protestants (49%), white Catholics (48%), and white mainline Protestants (46%). Support among other religious groups is notably lower. Christian nationalism Adherents (67%) and Sympathizers (57%) are notably more likely than Skeptics (40%) and Rejecters (23%) to favor stripping U.S. citizens of their citizenship.
Topic:
Political Violence, Accountability, Misinformation, and Polarization
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

13. Mapping Christian Nationalism Across the 50 States: Insights from PRRI’s 2025 American Values Atlas

Author:
PRRI Staff
Publication Date:
02-2026
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
PRRI: Public Religion Research Institute
Abstract:
Around three in ten Americans qualify as Christian nationalism Adherents or Sympathizers. One-third of Americans qualify as Christian nationalism Adherents (11%) or Sympathizers (21%), compared with two-thirds who qualify as Skeptics (37%) or Rejecters (27%). These percentages have remained stable since PRRI first asked these questions in late 2022, with a slight decline among Americans who qualify as Christian nationalism Rejecters, who peaked at 32% in June 2023 and declined to 26% by the end of 2025. White evangelical Protestants and Hispanic Protestants are most likely to hold Christian nationalist beliefs; Americans who frequently attend religious services, especially those who are white, are more likely to be Christian nationalists. White Christians (46%) are more likely than Christians of color (39%), non-Christians (13%), and religiously unaffiliated Americans (10%) to qualify as Christian nationalism Adherents and Sympathizers. White evangelical Protestants (67%) and Hispanic Protestants (54%) are the only major religious groups among whom a majority hold Christian nationalist beliefs. The majority of those who attend religious services weekly or more qualify as Christian nationalism Adherents or Sympathizers (54%), compared with 39% of those who attend at least a few times a year and 20% of those who seldom or never attend services. This correlation holds among those who pray outside of religious services and those who read religious texts. White Americans who attend religious services, pray, or read the Bible or other religious texts frequently are more likely than their Black and Hispanic counterparts to qualify as Christian nationalism Adherents and Sympathizers. Christian nationalism support is also strongly linked to party, media habits, age, education, and race. A majority of Republicans qualify as either Christian nationalism Adherents (21%) or Sympathizers (35%), compared with one-quarter of independents (7% Adherents and 18% Sympathizers) and less than one in five Democrats (5% Adherents and 12% Sympathizers). Two-thirds of Americans who most trust far-right news sources qualify as Christian nationalism Adherents (34%) or Sympathizers (31%), as do a majority of those who most trust Fox News (18% Adherents and 37% Sympathizers). Support for Christian nationalism is positively associated with lower education levels and older age; AAPI Americans are far less likely to be Christian nationalists than other Americans. Christian nationalist views predominate in the South and Midwest; support for Christian nationalism is strongly correlated in all 50 states with favorable views of President Donald Trump and the proportion of Republican representation in state legislatures. The states with the highest levels of support for Christian nationalism — which includes about half of their residents — are Arkansas (54%), Mississippi (52%), West Virginia (51%), Oklahoma (49%), and Wyoming (46%). Three states emerge with more than half of their white, non-Hispanic residents supporting Christian nationalism: Arkansas (59%), Mississippi (54%), and West Virginia (53%). The higher state residents scored on the Christian nationalism scale, the more likely they are to hold favorable views of Trump and the larger the proportion of Republican elected officials in their state legislatures. Christian nationalists are more likely than other Americans to support political violence and score high on PRRI’s Right-Wing Authoritarianism Scale. Three in ten Christian nationalism Adherents (30%) and one-quarter of Sympathizers (23%) agree that “because things have gotten so far off track, true American patriots may have to resort to violence to save the country,” compared with only 14% of Skeptics and 11% of Rejecters. Support for political violence among Christian nationalism Adherents was higher under President Joe Biden and declined after Trump’s reelection. Christian nationalism Adherents and Sympathizers score high on PRRI’s Right-Wing Authoritarianism Scale; scores for Skeptics are mixed, while Rejecters score low. Christian nationalism Adherents and Sympathizers overwhelmingly view Trump as a strong leader, while Skeptics and Rejecters overwhelmingly view him as a dangerous dictator. Christian nationalists also hold more extreme views about immigrants and are more likely to say mandatory vaccines for children should be illegal. Majorities of Christian nationalism Adherents (67%) and Sympathizers (53%) believe that “immigrants are invading our country and replacing our cultural and ethnic background.” Majorities of Christian nationalism Adherents (61%) and Sympathizers (54%) agree with “the U.S. government deporting undocumented immigrants to foreign prisons without due process.” While at least half of Christian nationalism Adherents and Sympathizers support birthright citizenship, majorities agree with “stripping U.S. citizens of their citizenship and deporting them if they are determined to be a threat to the country” (66% and 56%). Over four in ten Christian nationalism Adherents (44%) and one-third of Sympathizers (34%) say that mandatory vaccines for children should be illegal in all or most cases, compared with one-quarter of Skeptics and one in ten Rejecters.
Topic:
Politics, Religion, Ideology, and Christian Nationalism
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

14. Mapping Support for LGBTQ Rights Across the 50 States: Insights from PRRI’s 2025 American Values Atlas

Author:
PRRI Staff
Publication Date:
03-2026
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
PRRI: Public Religion Research Institute
Abstract:
LGBTQ Americans trend younger, Democratic, liberal, and more religiously unaffiliated than other Americans. One in ten Americans identify as LGBTQ. Two in ten Americans ages 18-29 (20%) identify as LGBTQ, compared with smaller shares among those ages 30-49 (11%), ages 50-64 (5%), and ages 65 and older (4%). LGBTQ Americans are more likely to identify as Democrats (40%), compared with 28% of all Americans, and are nearly twice as likely to identify as politically liberal (51% vs. 26%, respectively). The majority of LGBTQ Americans identify as religiously unaffiliated (51%), compared with 27% of all Americans. Views on LGBTQ rights differ strongly by state. Massachusetts (85%), Maryland (82%), and Alaska (81%), along with the District of Columbia (82%), hold the highest support for nondiscrimination protections for gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgender people, while Mississippi (60%), Wyoming (57%), and Arkansas (53%) show the lowest support. Massachusetts (72%), Hawaii (71%), Vermont (71%), and Connecticut (70%), along with the District of Columbia (70%), show the strongest opposition to religiously based service refusals, while West Virginia (44%) shows the lowest opposition. The only states without majority support for same-sex marriage are Mississippi (47%) and Arkansas (50%). Massachusetts (85%), Rhode Island (85%), and Vermont (81%) show the highest support. Except for Christian nationalism Adherents, strong majorities of Americans — including most people of faith — support nondiscrimination protections for LGBTQ individuals. Most Americans support nondiscrimination protections for LGBTQ people (72%), with Democrats (90%) being the most supportive, followed by independents (76%) and Republicans (56%). Majorities of most major religious groups support non-discrimination protections, though support is highest among non-Christians and the religiously unaffiliated. Christian nationalism Rejecters (91%) are the most likely to support nondiscrimination protections, followed by 77% of Skeptics, 61% of Sympathizers, and 42% of Adherents. Over the past decade, Americans ages 18-29 have shown a gradual decrease in support for LGBTQ nondiscrimination laws, from 80% in 2015 to 70% in 2025, largely driven by young Republicans, while seniors 65 and over have increased their support from 61% to 74% over the same period. Except for Republicans, Christian nationalism Adherents, and Sympathizers, most Americans continue to oppose religiously based service refusals for LGBTQ people. Most Americans oppose allowing small businesses to refuse service to LGBTQ people on religious grounds (59%), with Democrats (82%) more likely to oppose, compared with independents (60%) and Republicans (35%). Opposition among white Christians grew from 49% in 2015 to 55% in 2020, but has declined since to 46%. Opposition among Christians of color, non-Christians, and religiously unaffiliated Americans remains high. Christian nationalism Rejecters (83%) are the most likely to oppose religiously based refusals for LGBTQ people, followed by 62% of Skeptics, 44% of Sympathizers, and 32% of Adherents. Support for same-sex marriage remains high for most Americans, but partisanship, religious affiliation, and Christian nationalist views are linked to differing opinions. Support for same-sex marriage remains higher today (65%) than in 2015 (53%). Today, Republicans (49%) are notably less likely than Democrats (83%) and independents (69%) to support same-sex marriage. Majorities of most religious groups support same-sex marriage, except for Latter-day Saints (47%), Hispanic Protestants (45%), white evangelical Protestants (37%), Muslims (37%), and Jehovah’s Witnesses (19%). Nearly all Christian nationalism Rejecters (93%) and three-fourths of Skeptics (73%) support same-sex marriage, compared with 46% of Sympathizers and 22% of Adherents. Except for young Americans under 30, support for same-sex marriage has steadily grown across older age groups, gender, race, and education levels. While most Americans agree that transgender people deserve the same rights and protections as other Americans, just 40% oppose laws that require transgender people to use bathroom of their sex assigned at birth. Seven in ten Americans (71%) agree that “transgender people deserve the same rights and protections as other Americans,” including most Democrats (88%), independents (77%), and Republicans (57%). Except for Christian nationalism Adherents (40%), solid majorities across all religious groups, Christian nationalism groups, age, gender, race, and education levels agree that transgender people deserve the same rights as other Americans. The majority of Americans (56%) favor laws that require transgender individuals to use bathrooms that correspond to their sex at birth, with most Republicans (81%) in favor, compared with 55% of independents and 32% of Democrats. Americans who agree transgender people deserve the same rights and protections as other Americans are less likely to favor laws that require transgender individuals to use bathrooms that correspond to their sex assigned at birth than those who disagree that transgender people deserve the same rights (49% vs. 77%).
Topic:
Human Rights, Religion, Discrimination, LGBT+, Transgender, and Christian Nationalism
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

15. Genocide and the Courts: A Brief Review of Jurisprudence on the Crime of Genocide from Nuremberg to Today

Author:
David J. Scheffer
Publication Date:
01-2026
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Simon-Skjodt Center for the Prevention of Genocide, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum
Abstract:
In this January 2026 report, Genocide and the Courts: A Brief Review of Jurisprudence on the Crime of Genocide from Nuremberg to Today, Ambassador David Scheffer narrates how courts around the world, and over decades, have understood the crime of genocide. Published 80 years after the start of the Nuremberg trials, this report takes readers through court judgments that have grappled with questions of intent, protected groups, prohibited acts, and individual and state responsibility. We hope that teachers, students, and others will benefit from this concise summary of how courts have addressed questions about the definition of genocide over time. Over the past eight decades, “genocide” has gone from being an idea in Raphael Lemkin’s mind to being a universally recognized international crime, accompanied by a growing body of jurisprudence. Judicial rulings have been a critical means of addressing ambiguities about the definition of genocide that are found in the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. Courts have gone a long way toward clarifying, for example, what must be established to find that a genocidal “intent to destroy” has been present. Reviewing the history of how courts have ruled on genocide cases, is therefore an important way to promote greater understanding of the meaning of this singular crime. The report begins with the Nuremberg trials—where judgments regarding Nazi war crimes and crimes against humanity during the Holocaust laid a foundation for future understanding of genocide—and the United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, which codified the crime. Mass atrocities in the second half of the 20th century devastated millions, from Cambodia and Guatemala to Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, and the report describes how trials grappling with those crimes refocused our understanding of genocide. As important as understanding past jurisprudence around genocide is, Ambassador Scheffer makes clear that it does not supplant the importance of working to prevent and effectively respond to genocide. We hope that this resource will not only deepen readers’ understanding of genocide but also inspire people to rededicate themselves to ending this horrible scourge.
Topic:
Genocide, International Law, Courts, Holocaust, Jurisprudence, and Nuremberg
Political Geography:
Global Focus

16. Humanities Matter: Symposium Proceedings

Author:
Sukrita Paul Kumar, Swati Pal, and Asani Bhaduri
Publication Date:
02-2026
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
India International Centre (IIC)
Abstract:
In contemporary times, the obsession with technology and commerce has eventually led to a total dismissal of sensitivity to environmental issues, humanistic values and social justice. While each discipline of knowledge may have taken leaps in thought and theory, the sum and total of knowledge and learning have not resulted in an overall development of the human mind. Though ‘inclusivity’, divergent/innovative thought and ‘value education’ have become buzzwords in academic seminars and conferences, it is ‘skill development’ and ‘employability’ that have acquired a formidable importance in education. Some of the key attributes crucial in all professions are indeed compassion, empathy, fair-mindedness, emotional maturity, commitment and perseverance that evolve with a knowledge of psychology and even economics. All of these fall into the domain of Humanities and Social Sciences. Some fundamental questions that arise are: y What does it mean for a student of sciences, commerce or engineering and even medicine, to not have humanities in their curriculum? What does it mean to have this gap in knowledge? How can this issue be addressed? y Should we redefine our notion of ‘progress’? y Why is there so much misery and unhappiness amongst learners as well as teachers? y Do we equip ourselves adequately to deal with conflict resolutions rather than resorting to violence and aggression? y How do we work out a balance between theoretical and practical learning? y How do we make room for pauses for reflection amidst the stress of gathering degrees and certificates? As we navigate an increasingly complex world, it is essential to revisit the value of humanities and social sciences in fostering empathy, critical thinking and wellrounded individuals.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Academia, Curriculum, and Humanities
Political Geography:
South Asia and India

17. Quantum Technologies and the Geostrategic Landscape: Implications for Finance and Central Banks

Author:
Tracey Forrest, Paul Samson, S. Yash Kalash, and Michael P. A. Murphy
Publication Date:
03-2026
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI)
Abstract:
Quantum technologies, and quantum computing in particular, could completely reshape the integrity of today’s financial markets. Both through risk and opportunity channels, quantum computing is changing the game and raising the stakes. Cracking today’s cryptographic standards would undermine global payment systems and digital assets, causing the potential collapse of all current encryption systems, while quantum-enabled advances in optimization and modelling may dramatically enhance economic forecasting, monetary policy and planning. “Quantum readiness” is the next necessary step for any nation wanting to both stay safe from these projected dangers and also to make the most of the potential benefits. This special report aims to provide a situational analysis of quantum technologies useful for senior G7 (and beyond) decision makers in finance and central banking. By examining the current landscape, as well as several scenarios, the authors outline key implications for strategic planning and action for consideration by policy leaders around the world. They structure their suggested priority interventions across three tiers: national, international and public-private collaboration, with actionable recommendations across each level.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Banking, Financial Governance, and Quantum Computing
Political Geography:
Global Focus

18. Intellectual Property Amid Trade Tensions

Author:
Jeremy de Beer
Publication Date:
04-2026
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI)
Abstract:
Intellectual property (IP) is a key asset in the modern economy, and just like any asset, it’s influencing trade flows, investment, and economic value, especially as digital and intangible transactions grow. It’s often said that Canada is facing an IP trade deficit, but that claim is seldom documented statistically. CIGI Senior Fellow Jeremy de Beer changes that in this special report, building a stronger evidence base for IP-related trade policy. Through examining three possible scenarios for the future of IP as a trade asset (rebalancing, renegotiation and restructuring), the report identifies four strategic priorities for Canada to consider: strengthening Canada’s statistical evidence base for IP policy making; using domestic and international legal flexibilities responsibly and in coordination with allies; reclaiming policy space in trade negotiations; and recalibrating innovation and industrial policy at home.
Topic:
Intellectual Property/Copyright, Economy, Trade, and Transactions
Political Geography:
Global Focus

19. Nature-based Solutions for a Sustainable Critical Minerals Value Chain

Author:
Lara Fornabaio, Sara Saloum, Perrine Toledano, and Kirsten Hund
Publication Date:
04-2026
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment
Abstract:
Critical minerals production is essential for a net-zero future yet mining land footprint overlaps with sensitive ecosystems: of the sector’s 101,583 square kilometers of mining concessions, 7% are in biodiversity hotspots, 8% are in protected areas, and 16% are in “wilderness” areas of high ecological integrity. The value chains of mining operations “both depend on and impact nature” (ICMM, 2024), creating a responsibility for mining actors to manage and mitigate the impacts of operations on the landscape. This responsibility includes addressing nature loss, supporting the well-being of communities, and contributing to the resilience of ecosystems. Nature-based solutions (NbS), which are based on the idea that healthy ecosystems deliver valuable services to society, offer one method of working towards these goals
Topic:
Mining, Sustainability, Value Chains, Net Zero, Critical Minerals, and Sustainable Development
Political Geography:
Global Focus

20. Implementing the Biden Administration’s China Strategy

Author:
Christopher S. Chivvis and Senkai Hsia
Publication Date:
03-2026
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
When Joe Biden’s administration took office in January 2021, U.S.-China relations were in free fall. The era of presumed convergence had ended, mutual trust had collapsed, and the risk of escalation was real. The COVID-19 pandemic was raging. The central question was whether the relationship would harden into open and dangerous hostility or settle into a more durable form of rivalry. Biden officials viewed the inheritance of the first Trump administration to be a sharpened awareness of the China challenge but an underdeveloped national strategy and limited institutional capacity for that challenge. They set out to impose greater coherence, discipline, and durability on the U.S. approach to this crucial problem of American statecraft. At the heart of Biden’s approach was the consolidation of a framework for strategic competition with an eye toward coexistence. These officials accepted that China and the Chinese Communist Party are permanent features of the geopolitical landscape and that neither America nor China could meaningfully defeat the other without catastrophic cost. Their objective was therefore not dominance, but competitive coexistence—preserving U.S. advantages while avoiding war. That framing now shapes Washington’s statecraft and has endured even in the second Trump administration, albeit with some adjustments. The Biden team looked to technology as the center of gravity of their strategy. Building on but systematizing earlier efforts, they deployed export controls, industrial policy, and alliance coordination to protect U.S. leadership in semiconductors, artificial intelligence, and advanced manufacturing. For the first time in decades, technological advantage was treated as the decisive arena of great-power rivalry. This shift represents one of their most consequential legacies. The Biden administration also paired competition with sustained diplomacy—especially in the second half of its term. Rather than treating dialogue as a concession, the White House aimed to use it to reduce misperception and manage risk. Strategic communications channels were restored and military-to-military contacts resumed. This produced tangible gains, including improved crisis management and renewed Chinese cooperation on fentanyl enforcement. Biden’s diplomats did not aim to eliminate rivalry, only to stabilize it by convincing Beijing that strategic competition was the appropriate framing for the U.S.-China relationship. Without this diplomatic track, the competitive strategy would have been more dangerous. The administration also emphasized U.S. alliances, particularly in the Indo-Pacific. Security ties with Japan, Australia, India, and the Philippines deepened, and the administration worked to improve military coordination. At the same time, the administration was cautious about market opening, judging the domestic costs to outweigh the alliance building benefits. The alliance network thus grew stronger on defense but less integrated economically than long-term competition may require. On military strategy, the administration took a maximalist approach that bolstered deterrence, but they did so without fully resolving a fundamental question: how much is enough? Investments in regional posture and advanced capabilities were substantial, yet the strategy leaned toward maximizing capability rather than defining sufficiency from a strategic perspective. A competition framework does not require primacy at all costs. Future administrations will need to determine how to balance deterrence with flexibility, fiscal sustainability, and escalation risk—especially as the depth of U.S. support for conflict with China can be questioned. Biden’s China policy was calibrated realism—neither naive nor warlike. It recognized that long-term competition will be decided more by American domestic vitality than by military deployments. The strategy’s enduring insight is that diplomacy is an important complement to sustaining technological leadership, economic resilience, political stability, and capable alliances. These ultimately matter more than rhetorical confrontation and maximizing military advantage. The U.S.-China relationship remains fraught and unsettled, but Biden established a structured rivalry that avoided collapse and created a baseline from which future leaders—of either party—can operate.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Strategic Competition, and Joe Biden
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

21. Iran may be a turning point for US regime change objectives in Latin America

Author:
Tiziano Breda and Sandra Pellegrini
Publication Date:
03-2026
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)
Abstract:
In Venezuela, Operation Absolute Resolve caused no American fatalities, and Nicolás Maduro was captured swiftly and replaced with Delcy Rodríguez, who embarked on normalization of relations with the United States and reforms that benefit US interests. In contrast, Operation Epic Fury in Iran has already seen hundreds of American service members injured and seven killed; Iranian retaliation has inflicted serious political costs on the US and allies; and the replacement for Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, killed in US-Israeli operations, is his son, a fellow hard-liner — signaling Iranian defiance rather than concessions. The risk of increasing entanglement in Iran will likely weaken US capacity and dampen domestic appetite for further intervention, at least ahead of the November mid-term elections. Sustained US military engagement in the Middle East may further divert some of its resources deployed in the Caribbean, already deprived of the USS Gerald Ford aircraft carrier.1 This, in turn, may limit the credibility of any threat of further US operations in Venezuela or Cuba, hindering Trump’s ability to extract concessions from Caracas and Havana, particularly those related to democratization. Cuba remains a US priority: Trump has reiterated warnings of imminent changes in the island.2 However, recent US-Cuba engagement suggests that a negotiated political settlement, rather than a direct and costly military operation as in Venezuela, has gained traction. The US has applied pressure to bring the Cuban regime to the negotiating table. A blockade on oil exports has already triggered several power outages that have affected all sectors of the economy and access to basic necessities, and these are likely to deepen as oil import prices hike. The shortages risk heightening social discontent and increase domestic pressure on the government. Previous spikes in demonstrations in Cuba have been spurred by fuel and energy shortages, and recent protests suggest this dynamic remains potent.3
Topic:
Regime Change, Military Intervention, Armed Conflict, Energy, and Operation Epic Fury
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Cuba, Latin America, Venezuela, North America, and United States of America

22. The migration debate on the streets: Four key things to know from global data on protests

Author:
Kieran Doyle and Ciro Murillo
Publication Date:
02-2026
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)
Abstract:
The Trump administration’s immigration crackdown has sent shockwaves across the United States. Far-reaching detention operations across the country led by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agents have sparked thousands of anti-ICE and pro-migrant protests. In early January 2026, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) massively expanded “Operation Metro Surge” in Minnesota, making it the agency’s largest-ever operation. Within three weeks, federal migration enforcement officers shot and killed two people in incidents that were recorded from multiple angles by bystanders in videos that quickly went viral. These shootings inflamed already heightened tensions between demonstrators and law enforcement agents and triggered hundreds of anti-ICE protests across the country. As the operation continues despite Trump’s promise of “de-escalation,” and amid a fresh ICE operation in Maine, it’s clear that the fight over migration in the US is far from finished.1 The situation in the United States is not unique – these protests represent a fraction of the larger picture of demonstrations over migration worldwide. ACLED records migration-related demonstrations in over 75 countries since the beginning of 2025. From peaceful demonstrations to episodes of violence perpetrated by radical groups, sentiments toward migration manifest differently across regional and political contexts. ACLED’s protest data provide four key insights on surges in pro- and anti-migration mobilization. These findings reflect how migration demonstrations are a global phenomenon – albeit much more concentrated in major destination countries – and point to how migration and migration crackdowns play a role in polarizing societies around the world.
Topic:
Migration, Protests, Political Extremism, and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)
Political Geography:
Global Focus

23. Ukraine war: How six new trends are shaping the conflict

Author:
Olha Polishchuk and Cristian Vlas
Publication Date:
02-2026
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)
Abstract:
Russia made limited yet costly advances in the Donetsk region, and expanded pressure along the northern front and the Zaporizhia region. As Russia scaled up its drone production, it has also spread and intensified its drone-led civilian targeting across Ukraine. Russia ramped up its campaign against Ukraine’s energy infrastructure ahead of the coldest winter since the war began, causing widespread blackouts during freezing temperatures. Ukraine sharpened its long-range attacks deep into Russian territory, targeting oil and military facilities to generate economic and reputational damage. Russia tested and mapped security across Europe by engaging in sabotage, drone overflights, and provocative use of weapons. Ukraine faced an increasing number of Russian-recruited saboteurs and genuine cohesion challenges around anti-corruption efforts.
Topic:
Drones, Armed Conflict, Sabotage, Energy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, and Ukraine

24. Africa: Non-state armed groups are the main drivers of violence targeting local officials

Author:
Christian Jaffe
Publication Date:
04-2026
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)
Abstract:
In 2025, violence affected local officials in 28 African countries but was strongly concentrated in the east and west of the continent (see map below). Although this violence has been decreasing regionwide since 2023, in three of the six worst-affected countries — Nigeria, Ethiopia, and Cameroon — it grew in 2025. In South Sudan, it remained at the same levels recorded in 2024, while it decreased in Kenya and Somalia. All six of these countries were also in the top 10 worst-affected countries in 2024.
Topic:
Political Violence, Non State Actors, Armed Forces, Violence, and Local Government
Political Geography:
Africa, Ethiopia, Nigeria, and Cameroon

25. Blue Nile: From peripheral front to central battleground in the Sudan conflict

Author:
Jalale Getachew Birru
Publication Date:
01-2026
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)
Abstract:
The 25 January clash between the SAF and the RSF and SPLM-N Hilu faction now places Blue Nile state at the center of the Sudan conflict.
Topic:
Civil War, Armed Conflict, Rapid Support Forces (RSF), and Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF)
Political Geography:
Africa, Sudan, and Blue Nile

26. If China Attacks Taiwan: The Consequences for China of “Minor Conflict” and “Major War” Scenarios

Author:
Bonnie S. Glaser
Publication Date:
01-2026
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
Research on the possibility and likely outcome of a conflict in the Taiwan Strait has expanded rapidly in recent years. Studies have focused on a broad range of questions related to deterrence, potential conflict dynamics, and possible conflict outcomes. Tabletop exercises have been used to identify gaps in the capabilities of the United States, the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and Taiwan to assess potential escalation pathways and to better understand war termination strategies.1 Comparatively less attention has been devoted to the potential impact of cross-Strait conflict on the PRC itself and how that impact could shape President Xi Jinping’s risk calculus and decision-making about use of force against Taiwan. Xi’s risk calculus is crucial to understanding if and under what circumstances Beijing might take aggressive actions against Taiwan because any such decision would carry profound political, economic, and strategic consequences for the PRC and for him personally. Xi has tied his legitimacy to putting the PRC on an irreversible path toward the “China Dream” of national rejuvenation by 2049 and unifying Taiwan with the motherland is deemed essential to that goal. Yet a military conflict over Taiwan would risk massive economic disruption, catastrophic military losses, significant social unrest, and devastating sanctions, all of which could turn his dream into a nightmare and undermine his political authority. Xi’s calculus must therefore weigh the perceived benefits of using force to achieve unification against the potential costs. The centrality of Xi’s risk calculus to understanding future PRC decision-making about potential actions against Taiwan demands deeper investigation than has taken place so far. This report seeks to fill this research gap by examining how use of force against Taiwan would impact the PRC in four key areas: its economy, its military capabilities, its social stability, and international costs. Each issue set is evaluated in a separate paper, although all four are interrelated, a factor that the report’s conclusion addresses. Logan Wright and Charlie Vest assess potential implications for the PRC economy. Joel Wuthnow analyzes the possible impact on the Chinese military. Sheena Chestnut Greitens and Jake Rinaldi consider the potential risks for social stability. Zack Cooper examines the likely international responses and costs. There is a broad range of possible scenarios for PRC use of force against Taiwan. Potential actions taken by Beijing may vary in terms of intensity and duration. To make comparisons possible across the four papers, the authors were given two baseline scenarios, a limited conflict and a major war. Both are described in detail below. In outlining these scenarios, specific triggers were not established. They would nevertheless be important in determining international responses and subsequently would have implications for the PRC economy and possibly for social stability. Although the absence of a detailed trigger is a limiting factor, in any crisis multiple actors will draw their own conclusions about what sparked the conflict, so perceptions of who was at fault would differ across countries. The authors were also permitted to assess cases situated between a minor conflict and a major war, given that the economic, military, political, and international costs may vary discontinuously across a range of scenarios. All scenarios were assumed to occur between 2026 and 2030. The first scenario that authors assess is a minor conflict lasting several weeks. In this case, PRC ships and aircraft surround Taiwan after a series of deadly air and maritime confrontations between their forces. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) then attempts to conduct a “quarantine” of major ports in Taiwan. The United States intervenes and its warships escort commercial vessels through the blockade zone without incident. For the purposes of this scenario, dozens of PRC and Taiwan armed forces members are assumed killed in incidents in the air and at sea. There are no losses of foreign personnel. The conflict terminates when both sides agree to de-escalate the situation. This results in a relatively low intensity and short duration conflict. The second scenario that authors were asked to review was a major conflict of several months that ends in a PLA defeat. This conflict starts with an amphibious invasion of Taiwan in which initial PLA missile strikes target Taiwan’s military and US forces in Japan and Guam. PRC forces land on Taiwan but supplies and follow-on forces are hampered by sustained Taiwanese and US strikes on ships and aircraft crossing the Taiwan Strait. After several months of heavy fighting, PRC forces withdraw to the mainland after losing roughly 100,000 personnel. Taiwan suffers approximately 50,000 military casualties and 50,000 civilian casualties. The United States loses 5,000 military members and 1,000 civilians, while Japan loses 1,000 military members and 500 civilians. Beyond this, no substantial foreign losses occur. The conflict terminates when the PLA withdraws from the main island of Taiwan but retains control of the Kinmen and Matsu Islands. The purpose of these scenarios is not to assert that this is how a conflict over Taiwan would play out. The intention is instead to help describe in more detail what the costs would be to the PRC of a failed crossstrait operation. An important caveat is that the authors were asked to make their own assessments of the impact on the PRC in each of the four areas examined. They were not asked to put themselves in Xi’s (or his successor’s) shoes. Xi and his colleagues might underestimate (or overestimate) the costs that the PRC would incur in these scenarios. Even if Beijing anticipates that the costs of taking an action against Taiwan are high, they might proceed despite the perceived risks. National leaders often make choices that overlook high costs if the perceived benefits are high or overridden by political considerations. Xi might conclude that not acting is more costly for him personally than taking a risky action that he believes is necessary to demonstrate resolve. For example, if Xi views a step taken by Taipei as intended to permanently separate it from the PRC, and especially if he judges that Washington supports that goal, he is likely to move against Taiwan even if he expects that the PLA would suffer high casualties in attempting to seize it. Overall, the authors of these essays demonstrate that the costs to the PRC of a failed military operation against Taiwan would be substantial. As noted above, this is not to suggest that Beijing would necessarily be deterred from starting a conflict in the first place. But it would be a mistake to simply assume that the PRC would prevail in a conflict over Taiwan. The history of failed amphibious operations is long, and these essays demonstrate that an unsuccessful PRC-initiated conflict would have severe negative consequences for the country’s economy, military, social stability, and international standing.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, Armed Conflict, and Threat Assessment
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, and Asia

27. A Long Time Coming: Europe and India have discovered a strategic partnership

Author:
Garima Mohan
Publication Date:
01-2026
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
The relationship between Europe and India is on the cusp of change. Later this month, in a historic first, EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen will serve as guest of honor, a position reserved for India’s top partners, at the country’s Republic Day ceremony. At the subsequent EU-India summit, the two sides are likely to sign a long-elusive free trade agreement (FTA) and an expansive security and defense partnership. They are also expected to announce initiatives designed to boost skilled migration, and to foster cooperation between European and Indian industry to enhance economic security. There are several other positive developments. German Chancellor Friedrich Merz just undertook his first official visit to India, also his first to a non-NATO ally. Accompanied by a substantial business delegation, he secured many agreements on defense industrial cooperation, semiconductors, and critical minerals. Recent German governments have made a point of sending top leadership to India before official visits to China, and Merz’s visit continues that convention. French President Emmanuel Macron is due to follow in February to cement his own country’s ties with New Delhi on emerging technologies, thereby broadening an already substantial and critical strategic partnership. India’s foreign minister, in a breakthrough for India’s small-group diplomacy in Europe, just joined a Weimar Format meeting for the first time. Lastly, Prime Minister Narendra Modi is set to visit the continent in spring for the next India-Nordic summit. For some observers this momentum is the result of the rocky relationships that Europe and India have with the United States. In a world of fractured alliances and partnerships, Europe and India need each other like never before. But the groundwork for their current ties was laid over the last decade. Structural factors such as competition with China, and India’s policy of diversification that led it to focus on ties with the West, have brought them closer and raised bilateral ambitions. The relationship is, however, not without divergences, particularly on approaches to Russia. Based on interviews with policymakers in New Delhi, Paris, Berlin, The Hague, and Brussels, this piece will trace the evolution of the “India agenda” in European foreign policy and lay out Europe’s position among New Delhi’s foreign policy priorities.
Topic:
Security, European Union, Geopolitics, Trade, Transatlantic Relations, and Strategic Partnerships
Political Geography:
Europe, South Asia, and India

28. Conflicts and Trends to Watch in 2026

Author:
Jessica Anania, Vicka Heidt, Anna Tuohey, and Jessica M. Smith
Publication Date:
02-2026
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace and Security (GIWPS)
Abstract:
Entering 2026, the global security landscape is defined by record-high levels of armed conflict, democratic backsliding, geopolitical fragmentation, and an accelerating climate crisis—dynamics unfolding alongside unprecedented cuts to foreign aid and development assistance. These converging pressures are reshaping conflict environments in ways that disproportionately endanger women and girls while eroding the systems meant to protect them, even as women remain central actors in humanitarian response, peacebuilding, and civic resistance. Women, Peace and Security: Conflicts and Trends to Watch in 2026 integrates gender-responsive analysis into conflict forecasting by drawing on insights from the Women, Peace and Security Conflict Tracker and expert consultations. This report identifies three cross-cutting trends expected to shape conflict dynamics in the year ahead: the increasing weaponization of hunger as a tactic of conquest and control, with devastating gendered consequences; political transitions that intensify repression, violence, and women’s exclusion at critical decision-making moments; and worsening climate shocks that compound displacement, insecurity, and economic loss for women and girls. The report also profiles 10 settings—Colombia, Ethiopia, Iran, Israel & Palestine, Mali, Pakistan, South Sudan, Sudan, Ukraine, and Venezuela—where these dynamics are likely to be especially acute in 2026. By centering gendered risks as early warning indicators of instability, this report addresses a critical gap in mainstream conflict analysis and offers policymakers, donors, multilateral institutions, and civil society leaders a more inclusive framework for anticipating crises, protecting civilians, and advancing more durable and inclusive peace and security outcomes.
Topic:
Security, Women, Armed Conflict, Inclusion, Democratic Backsliding, Women, Peace, and and Security (WPS)
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Iran, Sudan, Ukraine, Israel, Colombia, Palestine, Venezuela, Ethiopia, Mali, South Sudan, and Global Focus

29. Guidelines for Decarbonizing Industry in Time to Meet Global Climate Goals

Author:
Chris Bataille, Seton Stiebert, and Francis Li
Publication Date:
04-2026
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center on Global Energy Policy (CGEP), Columbia University
Abstract:
Near-term guidance for decarbonizing global industry is needed to ensure it happens on pace to meet Paris Agreement climate goals. Such insights would help industry and financial decision-makers as well as inform government policies meant to support the transition toward lower-carbon energy sources. This report combines a review of country diplomatic commitments, policies, and industrial roadmaps with decarbonization scenarios and new global modeling to suggest timelines, carbon prices, regulations, and lead markets for clean products, to replace unabated fossil fuel–powered industrial facilities and equipment with near-zero carbon emissions alternatives. It also estimates the capital and operating expenditures required, and provides policy options to support these efforts.
Topic:
Climate Change, Industry, Paris Agreement, and Decarbonization
Political Geography:
Global Focus

30. Assessing US Government Efforts to Support Fossil Fuel–Reliant Communities

Author:
Noah Kaufman
Publication Date:
02-2026
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center on Global Energy Policy (CGEP), Columbia University
Abstract:
The decline of domestic fossil fuel production in the United States poses serious economic risks for communities that rely on fossil fuel industries for jobs and public revenues. Many of these communities lack the resources and capacity to manage those risks on their own. The absence of viable economic strategies for affected regions is a barrier to building the broad, durable coalitions needed for an equitable national transition to cleaner energy sources. President Joe Biden touted investments into fossil fuel–reliant communities as part of his administration’s broader place-based economic and climate change strategies. This study assesses those federal efforts, examining the rationale, design, and implementation status of the major programs involved.
Topic:
Climate Change, Economics, Government, Fossil Fuels, and Energy Transition
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

31. New Frameworks for Language Access: Tracking the Expansion & Features of State & Local Laws & Policies

Author:
Jacob Hofstetter
Publication Date:
01-2026
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Migration Policy Institute (MPI)
Abstract:
Over the past 25 years, many state and local governments have sought to develop more organized approaches to helping residents with limited English proficiency access public services and information. There are multiple reasons for this. By addressing language barriers, language access policies and laws help governments communicate with an increasingly multilingual U.S. public, enhance public safety and emergency responses, improve access to public information and services, and boost the overall effectiveness of government programs. Since 2020, nine states and 31 localities have enacted new language access measures. These laws and policies, which now exist in 13 states, the District of Columbia, and more than 60 localities, generally share certain common features related to agency responsibilities (for example, on the provision of interpretation services and the translation of written materials) and policy administration (such as naming an oversight office). This report explores the rise of state and local language access policies and laws, their key features, and their role in a changing national policy context during the second Trump term. With growing cracks in the federal policy framework related to language access, state and local efforts play a vital role, the study finds, in meeting the practical, everyday communication needs of state and local governments and their communities.
Topic:
Immigrants, Integration, Immigration Policy, Local Government, and Language Access
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

32. A Human-Centric Framework: Employment Principles for Lethal Autonomous Weapons

Author:
Brennan Deveraux
Publication Date:
01-2026
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:
This monograph challenges the Department of War to reframe the conversation about humans’ involvement in lethal autonomous weapons systems by codifying a human-centric framework built on the employment pillars of certification, authority, restriction, and accountability. Although an ample body of literature discusses lethal autonomous weapon systems, this monograph takes a novel approach by proposing a theoretical framework and applying it to historical and hypothetical practical scenarios involving weapons with autonomous characteristics. In terms of methodology, the monograph relies heavily on primary sources, including UN documents and Department of War publications, which are augmented by secondary sources from experts in the field and creative speculation about the characteristics of future warfare. The study’s conclusions will help US military and policy practitioners manage and integrate lethal autonomous weapon systems. This study is designed to spark a necessary and likely uncomfortable conversation about when relying on lethal machines is appropriate. The monograph provides tangible recommendations to help shape future policy decisions about developing and employing lethal autonomous weapon systems.
Topic:
Security, Drones, Emerging Technology, and Autonomous Weapons Systems
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

33. AI National Security Scenarios

Author:
Duncan Cass-Beggs and Matthew da Mota
Publication Date:
02-2026
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI)
Abstract:
On March 26, 2025, the Global AI Risks Initiative at the Centre for International Governance Innovation and the Privy Council Office of Canada co-hosted a full-day, in-person scenarios workshop in Ottawa, Ontario, to explore existing and emerging implications for national security posed by next-generation artificial intelligence (AI) systems. This summary report contains policy recommendations that are intended to stimulate and enrich discussion among policy makers and the broader public. It is composed of three parts: an executive summary highlighting key messages drawn from the workshop discussions and background literature; a detailed description of key uncertainties and five possible future AI scenarios and implications considered at the workshop, adapted from the background paper shared with participants in advance of the workshop; and an appendix summarizing key points from the workshop discussion.
Topic:
National Security, Governance, and Artificial Intelligence
Political Geography:
Global Focus

34. Advancing the Science of Outcome Measurement in Child Sexual Violence Prevention: Results of a Rapid Review

Author:
Hannabeth Franchino-Olsen, Lakshmi Neelakantan, and Mpho Silima
Publication Date:
01-2026
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Sexual Violence Research Initiative (SVRI)
Abstract:
This rapid review synthesises the outcomes and measures used to evaluate interventions addressing child sexual violence (CSV) across the prevention–response continuum, drawing on 362 primary studies and using the WHO INSPIRE strategies as an organising framework. It maps the current landscape of CSV outcome measurement, highlighting dominant trends – particularly the reliance on education, life skills, and attitudinal measures – and the relative scarcity of measures capturing experiences of victimisation and perpetration. The review also underscores significant geographical and population imbalances, with most evidence originating from high-income countries and focused on adolescents. By identifying key gaps in definitions, measurement approaches, and alignment between the problem of CSV and how it is evaluated, this review provides a critical foundation for developing a more coherent, globally relevant framework for CSV outcome measurement. Ultimately, it aims to strengthen comparability across studies, improve the assessment of intervention impact, and ensure that outcome measurement better reflects the lived realities of children and communities, particularly in low- and middle-income settings.
Topic:
Children, Sexual Violence, and Public Health
Political Geography:
Global Focus

35. Who are the Israel-backed armed groups fighting Hamas in Gaza?

Author:
Nasser Khdour
Publication Date:
04-2026
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)
Abstract:
When Hamas rejected a proposal by the United States-backed Board of Peace for the group’s full disarmament, it pointed not only to Israel’s continued violations of the ceasefire, but also to its support for anti-Hamas armed groups.1 While fears of continued Israeli attacks reinforce Hamas’ assertion that full disarmament would leave Gaza defenseless, the growing activity of Israel-backed groups has further hardened its position. As long as Israel continues providing these groups with weapons, training, and other support, their activities are likely to intensify. Violence from these groups will make Hamas even less willing to compromise on disarmament. Still, the groups don’t pose a credible threat to Hamas’ existence on their own. Anti-Hamas groups have grown in number and become more active since the October ceasefire. At least five of these groups now operate from Israel-controlled areas east of the Yellow Line across all Gaza governorates (see visual below). ACLED records more than 40 violent events since October involving these groups that resulted in nearly 80 fatalities. Their activity has intensified since February 2026, which coincided with the US’ efforts to advance phase 2 of President Donald Trump’s plan to end the conflict in Gaza.
Topic:
Armed Forces, Hamas, Ceasefire, Armed Conflict, and 2023 Gaza War
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and Gaza

36. Economic shockwaves from the Iran war fuel protests across South Asia

Author:
Pearl Pandya
Publication Date:
06-2026
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)
Abstract:
South Asia was one of the first regions to experience the economic fallout from the Iran conflict. The impacts are only increasing with time, and growing economic hardship, along with governments’ responses, has already translated into unrest. ACLED records more than 1,200 demonstrations across South Asia related to the economic impact of the Iran war, including over a shortage of cooking gas and fuel and the rising cost of living. No country in the region is immune to the economic fallout, and protests over the rising cost of living have been recorded in each one of them (see map below). Across South Asia, these demonstrations have increased from an average of three per day before the war to 15 now. This increase has been most stark in Pakistan and Nepal, countries especially reliant on oil and gas imports and remittances from the Gulf. India, given its size, also unsurprisingly recorded a significant number of demonstrations on the issue. An outlier is Bangladesh, the third-most populous country in the region, with similar economic dependencies but relatively few protests. Its government’s early introduction of mitigating measures has seemingly bought it time.
Topic:
Economics, Protests, Armed Conflict, and 2026 Iran War
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Bangladesh, Iran, South Asia, India, Sri Lanka, Nepal, and Maldives

37. Monitoring Report | Public consultation in Albania: The illusion of inclusion

Author:
Institute for Democracy and Mediation (IDM)
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Democracy and Mediation (IDM)
Abstract:
The Institute for Democracy and Mediation (IDM) has released a new report: Public Consultation in Albania: The Illusion of Inclusion. This report presents the results of an in-depth monitoring of 50 laws, public policies, and strategic documents consulted by the central government during the years 2022-2023. The assessment covers 10 key government institutions, evaluating their public consultation processes in terms of: Transparency and accessibility of consultation documents; Effectiveness of the public consultation process; Public accountability during this process; Citizen participation in consultations; Ensuring inclusivity and non-discrimination. In addition to the qualitative analysis of public consultation previously conducted by IDM, this assessment for the first time provides statistical data related to this important governance process. The evaluation system applied in this report provides the opportunity to compare institutions’ performance in the consultation of different acts, in relation to the aforementioned principles. Ultimately, the findings highlight a ‘’long distance’’ between transparency and participation in government consultations. The goal of this study is to contribute to evidence-based advocacy for legal reforms and the improvement of institutional practices, so that public consultations fulfill their core function – citizens’ participation and impact in decision-making.
Topic:
Transparency, Inclusion, Monitoring, and Civic Space
Political Geography:
Europe, Balkans, and Albania

38. Lift the Sanctions: The Principal Danger in Syria Today is Instability

Author:
Carl Conetta
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Project on Defense Alternatives
Abstract:
The most critical international security goal regarding Syria today is the country’s stabilization – and that requires immediate and substantial aid and sanction relief. The question on which recognition of the new government should most hinge is whether it can achieve sovereign authority in the country and do so without the type of human rights abuses or cross-border militancy that pose a threat to regional peace. Given the urgency of stabilizing the country, the new government provisionally meets this criteria. Should it change course and pose a threat to regional peace, the international community can adjust policy accordingly. Two outstanding challenges to sovereignty and legitimacy are the presence of foreign troops – Israeli, Turkish, and US – and the status of Kurdish areas. Especially acute is the triangular relationship among Damascus, Ankara, and Syria’s Kurdish community, which is among the issues addressed in this viewpoint. As for foreign troops: 15,000-20,000 currently occupy the country. Affirming Syrian sovereignty entails expeditiously withdrawing all those forces not explicitly invited by the new government. A related concern is the remnants of the Islamic State (ISIL) in Syria, including the 40,000+ cadre, family members, and displaced persons interned in camps run by the Kurdish authorities. Going forward, the task of managing and combating IS remnants on Syrian territory should fall to Damascus, acting together with Kurdish and foreign partners as it sees fit. The threat that IS affiliates and aspirants pose to the United States and the broader international community have been and are most effectively addressed through measure of homeland security and law enforcement. Securing the US homeland does not require the ongoing deployment of US troops in Syria, which would inadvertently undermine the legitimacy of the new government.
Topic:
International Security, Sanctions, Syrian War, and Instability
Political Geography:
Middle East and Syria

39. Shipment of a Controlled Vacuum Furnace to North Korea via Multiple States: An HS Code Case Study

Author:
David Albright
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Security and International Studies (ISIS)
Abstract:
In tracking trade data and trade flows, Harmonized System (HS) codes are routinely used to aid searches for dual-use commodities and to help guide the identification of dual-use items that require a license or greater scrutiny. A recurring concern is shipper falsification of HS codes to evade detection or payment of duties. An illustration of such falsifications is a case we learned about via government sources from around 2022 that involved North Korea and a dual-use vacuum furnace suitable for uranium melting that wound its way from Spain to North Korea, via Mexico, South Africa, and China. Such a furnace is typically controlled under the Nuclear Supplier Group (NSG) Part 2 list and is banned for export to North Korea under United Security Council resolutions. This type of furnace is a mainstay of a nuclear weapons program, particularly one that uses weapon-grade uranium as the nuclear explosive material, as North Korea is known to do. With North Korea expanding its uranium enrichment program and producing greater quantities of weapon-grade uranium, this new furnace would be especially important.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Trade, and Dual Use Items
Political Geography:
Asia and North Korea

40. New Information on Shenyang Machine Tool Company’s Illicit Sales to North Korea and Russia

Author:
David Albright and Spencer Faragasso
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Security and International Studies (ISIS)
Abstract:
Several years ago, the Institute reported about the relatively large, multinational Chinese company Shenyang Machine Tools Company supplying sophisticated computer numerically controlled (CNC) machine tools, equipped with Western controlled software, to North Korea in violation of UN Security Council (UNSC) sanctions and a supplier country’s trade control laws that banned re-export of this software. New information details the disingenuous way in which the Chinese government investigated this case, indicating nonetheless inadvertently that North Korea received these machine tools, while also demonstrating China’s utter disregard for enforcing UNSC sanctions or its own or others’ export control laws. This case serves as another of the many cases highlighting China as a long-time irresponsible trading partner that responsible companies should avoid when sensitive dual-use goods are involved, lest they be complicit in outfitting North Korea’s, Iran’s, or Russia’s military programs. Today, responsible suppliers are inadvertently facilitating Russia’s prosecution of an illegal war against Ukraine. Given Shenyang Machine Tools Company’s recent exports of goods to Russia with Harmonized Shipments (HS) codes found on the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) Common High Priority List (CHPL), this company should be considered for sanctions.
Topic:
Sanctions, Trade, Illegal Trade, and Shenyang Machine Tool Company
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Asia, and North Korea

41. Navigating the Challenges of Environmentalism in an Increasingly Authoritarian Iraq

Author:
Taif Alkhudary
Publication Date:
02-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Arab Reform Initiative (ARI)
Abstract:
There has been a marked increase in environmental activism in Iraq in recent years. This shift has taken place in the context of what has often been presented as a new stability, due to the absence of active armed conflict in the country since 2017. However, as “stabilization” efforts give way to “development”, Iraq is also coming to terms with the slow violence of protracted wars,1 an astronomical and rapid rise in oil production, and the impacts of climate change – most visible in the widespread incidences of pollution and public health crises, as well as in the drying up of ancient rivers and lakes and desertification, which is destroying livelihoods and causing mass migration across the country.2 The rise in interest in the environment has also come in the aftermath of the 2019 Tishreen uprising, to which the government and associated militias have responded with a widespread crackdown on freedom of expression and assembly, making any form of activism increasingly dangerous. This study examines how self-identified environmentalists active in Iraq interact with this complex context and the challenges they face. To navigate the increased authoritarianism of the Iraqi state, this research finds that environmentalists tend to adopt small, carefully framed initiatives that are usually presented as supporting the government in solving some of the environmental issues it faces, as opposed to being overtly adversarial. This approach also means that Iraq’s environmental movements lack autonomy, and that certain issues – particularly those that might harm the business interests or standing of the political elite – remain off-limits. As a result, environmental initiatives in Iraq tend to make shallow interventions that do little to address the root causes of environmental degradation or to mitigate the effects of climate change. These dynamics are compounded by the funding structures of donor organizations, who prefer to award grants to small-scale, time-bound projects the outcomes of which can be easily measured. Environmental actors active in Iraq have also begun to form coalitions with the government, the private sector, and other members of civil society, such as political activists. However, this remains in its infancy and is often limited to a small number of individuals acting alone. Coalition building remains a substantial challenge and is often actively blocked by the government, used by corporations for greenwashing, and sees the efforts of environmental activists and organizations coopted by politicians for their own political and financial ends. The findings of the current study corroborate and extend the work of Wiktor-Mach et al. on Kurdistan, especially their characterization of environmental activism in the region as “a specific type of activism that does not question mainstream policies and practices but intends to push for change within existing systems and that has a cooperative character”.3 However, it is also important to note (as will be discussed in greater detail in this paper) that in Federal Iraq, the uptake of such non-confrontational tactics is the result of the increased crackdown on civil society post-Tishreen, which has raised the stakes and dangers of more adversarial work. In addition, while in Kurdistan episodes of mass contention are relatively rare and often focus on issues such as salaries and service provision, in Federal Iraq there has been at least one episode of mass mobilization in response to environmental issues in recent years in the form of the 2018 water protests in Basra.
Topic:
Environment, Politics, Authoritarianism, and Activism
Political Geography:
Iraq and Middle East

42. Online Narratives and Manipulations: Tunisian and Regional Panorama

Author:
Arab Reform Initiative
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Arab Reform Initiative (ARI)
Abstract:
In the wake of the presidential elections of October 2024, the first since the coup d'état in July 2021, Tunisia has seen a resurgence of suspiciously sponsored political content, both pro- and anti-regime, on online social media networks. These included advertisements denouncing the refusal of the president of the electoral body, Farouk Bouasker, to reinstate certain candidates. We also saw “locked” profiles with Egyptian-sounding names reacting with likes or "laugh" emojis to publications on the Facebook page of the Presidency of the Republic of Tunisia. With the proliferation of anti-Saied pages garnering thousands of likes in the space of a few days, pro-regime influencers have multiplied their videos to denounce the spread of these pages and content, calling their audiences to witness the truth of the plot hatched by dark forces, which is the mainstay of the new regime's narrative. It is hard to overlook the importance of Facebook in Tunisia. It remains the most widely used network1 and continues to be a major platform for political life.2 While it has long been the site of disinformation campaigns3 in Tunisia, in recent years the issue has taken on a whole new dimension: the sector has gone from being a local, cottage industry to a veritable industry run by specialized companies operating on an international scale. This industrialization of disinformation goes hand in hand with a phenomenon of opinion manipulation, taking the form of troll profiles dictating the political agenda, or fake profiles creating a false sense of popularity for certain ideas. Both disinformation and manipulation raise questions about the future of democracy, in Tunisia and globally, in a context where for many, these networks continue to represent a faithful reflection of reality. This paper seeks to provide an overview of the dynamics of disinformation from the Tunisian digital space, exploring the different narratives conveyed, forms of manipulation, and the role of social media platforms in their amplification. The paper also shows that certain disinformation narratives circulate between different countries in the region. The aim is to broaden reflection on these forms of manipulation while proposing a regional research and action agenda that can help reduce the impact of these activities, known in the Arab world by the general name of "electronic flies".4
Topic:
Elections, Media, Misinformation, and Narrative
Political Geography:
North Africa and Tunisia

43. The Future of Official Development Assistance: Incremental Improvements or Radical Reform?

Author:
Masood Ahmed, Rachael Calleja, and Pierre Jacquet
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for Global Development (CGD)
Abstract:
Over the last decade, donor country governments have faced new and additional demands for financing international challenges, including providing global public goods (GPGs) and addressing historically high numbers of refugees and humanitarian crises. They have partly done so by re-allocating their official development assistance (ODA) away from its original aim: to support poverty reduction and growth in developing countries. This has led to questions about the integrity and credibility of ODA. These questions are only likely to grow more pertinent in the coming decade because the pressures on ODA—and on public finances more broadly—are here to stay. ODA budgets are being cut in a number of traditional donor countries and what remains is increasingly being deployed to meet emerging needs beyond traditional development and to reflect a more national security perspective on development cooperation. The time is right, therefore, to ask whether the concept and accounting for ODA need to be modified to ensure that the needy and vulnerable it was designed to serve continue to be protected in the face of fiscal constraints and changing geopolitical circumstances. This report, a compendium on the future of ODA, aims to provide fresh thinking and inspire the action needed for ODA to remain relevant and effective. It brings together reflections and proposals from leading experts and practitioners, including the under-secretary-general and executive director of UNOPS to a former DAC chair, to inform policymakers. In this executive summary, we will introduce the key arguments from the compendium contributors. The contributions are organised into four key areas of discussion that reflect the main themes raised in this compendium: the rationale for ODA reform, the political and institutional realities shaping reform, using ODA for climate and leveraging private finance, and forward-looking proposals for reimagining ODA’s role and purpose.
Topic:
Development, Finance, Humanitarian Crisis, Donors, and Foreign Assistance
Political Geography:
Global Focus

44. Ukraine and Beyond: Shaping Europe’s Security Future

Author:
International Crisis Group
Publication Date:
02-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
What happens with the war in Ukraine matters beyond its borders, as events there will shape the larger standoff between Russia and the West. The U.S. and European powers can manage the risks of a changing security order with a mix of diplomacy and deterrence.
Topic:
Security, Diplomacy, Deterrence, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

45. Finding a Way Out of Festering Conflict in India’s Manipur

Author:
International Crisis Group
Publication Date:
02-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
Manipur, a state in north-eastern India, has been beset with intercommunal strife since May 2023. The central government has now taken a bold step to quell the violence. It should keep acting urgently to avert a protracted crisis.
Topic:
Ethnic Conflict, Violence, and Crisis Management
Political Geography:
South Asia, India, and Manipur

46. Locked in Transition: Politics and Violence in Haiti

Author:
International Crisis Group
Publication Date:
02-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
Criminal gangs have tightened their grip on much of Port-au-Prince, with the multinational security mission making little headway and transitional authorities mired in internal disputes. The UN Security Council should quickly decide how to respond to Haiti’s request for further assistance in restoring public safety.
Topic:
Security, UN Security Council, Organized Crime, Gangs, and Public Safety
Political Geography:
Caribbean and Haiti

47. Christian Nationalism Across All 50 States: Insights from PRRI’s 2024 American Values Atlas

Author:
PRRI Staff
Publication Date:
02-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
PRRI: Public Religion Research Institute
Abstract:
In 2024, PRRI released a groundbreaking national survey that provided for the first time the ability to estimate support for Christian nationalism in all 50 states. Building on that work throughout 2024, PRRI interviewed more than 22,000 adults as part of the PRRI American Values Atlas to continue monitoring the spread of support for Christian nationalism and the factors driving such views.
Topic:
Domestic Politics, Survey, Partisanship, and Christian Nationalism
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

48. LGBTQ Rights Across All 50 States: Key Insights from PRRI’s 2024 American Values Atlas

Author:
PRRI Staff
Publication Date:
03-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
PRRI: Public Religion Research Institute
Abstract:
In 2024, PRRI interviewed over 22,000 adults as part of the PRRI American Values Atlas to provide a detailed analysis of the demographic, political, and religious characteristics of LGBTQ Americans. The report also examines public attitudes on LGBTQ rights across all 50 states and the District of Columbia, focusing on support for nondiscrimination protections, opposition to religiously based service refusals, and support for same-sex marriage. Additionally, new survey questions explore views on transgender-related policies, including restrictions on gender-affirming care for minors and ID laws requiring birth-assigned sex.
Topic:
Public Opinion, Domestic Politics, LGBT+, and Survey
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

49. Practical Guidance for Integrating Climate into WPS National Action Plans

Author:
Christina Vetter and Jessica Smith
Publication Date:
03-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace and Security (GIWPS)
Abstract:
In this practical guidance note, the Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace and Security explores the capacity for National Action Plans on Women, Peace and Security (WPS NAPs) to be effective tools for national-level implementation of the WPS Agenda that is responsive to climate-related security risks. WPS NAPs have become the primary tool for national-level efforts to implement the WPS Agenda. To remain relevant and effective, NAPs must be responsive to the ever-changing security landscape and emerging threats to peace and security, like climate change. While the share of NAPs that mention climate change has slowly increased, many include just one cursory reference to climate change in the background section that does not comprehensively address the impacts of climate-related security risks across all four pillars of WPS or include specific actions or commitments related to climate in the NAP’s implementation framework. This report presents actionable policy recommendations for WPS NAPs to more meaningfully address climate change and related security risks throughout their design, drafting, and implementation. The report, authored by Christina Vetter and Dr. Jessica Smith, was made possible with support from the Embassy of Denmark in Washington, D.C.
Topic:
Security, Climate Change, Women, and Peace
Political Geography:
Global Focus

50. How Does Disinformation Target and Affect Interethnic Relations in Kosovo?

Author:
Ramadan Ilazi, Jeta Loshaj, Tamara Pavlović, and Agnesa Bytyçi
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Kosovar Centre for Security Studies (KCSS)
Abstract:
Disinformation and misinformation are pervasive issues in Kosovo, where they exploit existing societal divisions and low trust in institutional narratives. Participants in focus groups and interviews largely defined misinformation as unintentional inaccuracies or partial truths spread due to misunderstanding or lack of verification, while disinformation was seen as deliberately misleading information designed to create division. Though malinformation was not discussed, the distinction between misinformation and disinformation highlights the deliberate nature of the latter in destabilizing interethnic relations. According to a recent NDI Kosovo survey 67% of Kosovo Serbs believe things are moving in the wrong direction, while 41% of Kosovo Albanians believe the opposite. Kosovo Serbs prioritize unemployment (66%) and interethnic tensions (49%) as their primary issues, while Albanians focus more on unemployment (77%) and corruption (56%). There is a significant disparity in perceptions of interethnic relations, while 65% of Kosovo Serbs expect relations to worsen, 53% of Kosovo Albanians are optimistic about improvement. Media consumption is heavily segmented by ethnicity with 79% of the Kosovo Serbs relying on Serbian TV stations daily, with 66% expressing trust in these outlets. Kosovo Albanian respondents primarily use Kosovo TV stations (86%) and social media (50%) as information sources. Trust in information sources remains low across ethnic groups, with reliance on personal networks (friends and family) common for fact-checking.2 Kosovo Serbian community widely believe in disinformation narratives, such as claims of ethnic cleansing plans and mistreatment by Kosovo Police during incidents like the Banjska terrorist attack. Among Kosovo Albanians, skepticism about these narratives is higher, reflecting ethnic polarization. A significant factor enabling both misinformation and disinformation is the skepticism toward institutional narratives—whether from the government, international organizations, or national media. These institutions are widely viewed as biased or agenda-driven, misaligned with the priorities of local communities. Conversely, reliance on familiar sources, such as ethnically divided local news outlets and word-of-mouth communication, exacerbates separation and distrust. These sources, while perceived as relatable and acting in the community’s best interest, are often biased, incomplete, or inaccurate, further reinforcing community echo chambers. Relations between Kosovar Albanians and Kosovar Serbs are frequently manipulated through disinformation to fuel distrust. Actions by the Kosovo Government impacting the Serbian community—such as institutional closures—are framed in Serbian media as ethnic discrimination or even “ethnic cleansing.” Similarly, uncontextualized or sensationalized reports about past events, like the fabricated claim of Albanian children being drowned by Serbs, continue to inflame ethnic hostility. These narratives exploit the unresolved history, reinforcing grievances that hinder reconciliation efforts. Socio-economic hardships, such as high poverty rates and employment gaps, increase susceptibility to disinformation. According to the 2024 Democracy Plus Vulnerability Index, which saw Kosovo’s vulnerability score rise from 41 to 57, economic instability makes individuals more receptive to emotionally charged misinformation.3 Limited access to quality education weakens critical thinking and media literacy, leaving many unable to identify biased information. The National Democratic Institute in their report on Information Integrity in Kosovo Assessment of the Political Economy of Disinformation (July 2022) found that the education system insufficiently prepares citizens for assessing online disinformation, further enhancing vulnerability. The issue of disinformation is not merely a challenge of modern information ecosystems; it is a deliberate strategy employed by internal and external actors to destabilize communities and undermine democratic governance. As digital platforms expand access to information, they also facilitate the rapid spread of false narratives, making it increasingly difficult for communities to discern fact from fiction. This report addresses these challenges with a focus on their implications for interethnic relations between Kosovo Albanians and Serbs. This report is grounded in qualitative research, incorporating insights from two primary sources: Two focus group discussions were conducted with a total of fifteen participants, comprising a mix of Kosovo Albanians and Kosovo Serbs. These discussions provided a grassroots perspective on how disinformation affects interethnic dynamics, exploring lived experiences, perceptions, and community-level challenges. Additionally, nine in-depth interviews were conducted with a diverse range of stakeholders, including local and international experts, representatives from civil society, and government officials. These interviews offered expert insights into the structural, cultural, and political dimensions of disinformation in Kosovo. The combination of these approaches ensures a nuanced understanding of the issue, capturing both macro-level trends and micro-level experiences. The findings are contextualized within existing literature and complemented by statistical data from surveys and prior studies. The report is structured as follows: A detailed analysis of the main themes and insights that emerged from the focus groups and interviews, highlighting the impact of disinformation on interethnic relations, institutional trust, and reconciliation efforts. The next section explores the structural, cultural, and political factors that make Kosovo particularly susceptible to disinformation. A breakdown of the primary methods and stories used in disinformation campaigns, including the roles of media, political actors, and diaspora communities, is also included. An assessment of how disinformation influences community dynamics, perpetuates stereotypes, and undermines peacebuilding initiatives. Kosovo’s ongoing efforts at normalization of relations with Serbia make the issue of disinformation particularly salient. Disinformation not only perpetuates division but also undermines trust in institutions and mediation efforts to normalize relations between Kosovo and Serbia. By addressing the mechanisms and impacts of disinformation, this report seeks to contribute to a deeper understanding of how to better counter disinformation targeting interethnic relations, in order to foster a cohesive and democratic society. The findings and recommendations presented here are intended to serve as a resource for policymakers, civil society organizations, media practitioners, and international actors working to promote peace and reconciliation in Kosovo. At its core, this report emphasizes the importance of fostering resilience against disinformation where interethnic relations are characterized by trust, cooperation, and mutual respect. The research paper “Understanding How Disinformation Targets and Affects Interethnic Relations in Kosovo” is implemented with the support of the National Democratic Institute (NDI) and United States Agency for International Development (USAID), in Kosovo. The content of this research paper belongs to the Kosovar Center for Security Studies and does not necessarily reflect the position and stances of NDI and USAID.
Topic:
Ethnicity, Institutions, Disinformation, Misinformation, Trust, and Civil Peace
Political Geography:
Europe and Kosovo