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1. Kuwait Country Report 2024

Author:
Arab Barometer
Publication Date:
05-2026
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Arab Barometer
Abstract:
Since the last Arab Barometer survey in Kuwait, conducted in 2022, major changes have taken place, significantly affecting political stability in the country. While political life in Kuwait was saturated with crises, and its indicators were clearly visible in the dissolution of the National Assembly (Parliament) repeatedly before completing its term, the shifts, changes, and political instability that dominated the public arena, between late 2022 and the current period of 2024, included even more severe events. Kuwait faced the unconstitutional dissolution of the National Assembly and the suspension of some articles in the constitution, now for the third time in Kuwait’s history. The first two such crises were in 1967 and 1986. To summarize the events that took place from June 2022 until the dissolution of the Parliament and the suspension of the constitution in May 2024, they are as follows: On August 3, 2022, the National Assembly was dissolved constitutionally, in response to the sit-in of a number of MPs inside the Parliament and their overnight stay there. The Crown Prince (the current Emir) gave a speech in which he emphasized adherence to the constitution, and also presented initiatives in electoral reform. He emphasized that the government would not vote for the candidate for the speaker of the National Assembly, and that the elections would be through the national ID card (effectively changing electoral circuits). The protesting MPs considered these reforms a victory. As a result, Ahmed al-Nawaf was appointed Prime Minister
Topic:
Corruption, Education, Environment, Gender Issues, Health, Migration, Governance, Democracy, Economy, Discrimination, Institutions, Labor Market, Freedom, and Political System
Political Geography:
Middle East and Kuwait

2. Protecting the North American Arctic and Beyond

Author:
Mathieu Boulegue, Rebecca Pincus, and Madison Lipson
Publication Date:
11-2026
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:
The United States has quickly adapted to the new security environment in a changing Arctic, as the region must deal with geopolitical tension stemming from Russia, the impact of climate change, and NATO’s increased role and presence. Many unknowns remain, however. Turning current and future US strategic documents and concepts about the Arctic into reality does not have any easy solutions. This will require continued endeavor and patience. The US should ensure prevailing in the Arctic in terms of homeland security and forward defense. Forward defense in the Arctic will require forward-thinking, notably what constitutes Arctic-specific integrated deterrence through tailored and calibrated presence as part of the Joint Force. A large part of this endeavor falls on the leadership of USNORTHCOM. USNORTHCOM must be empowered to become the Department of Defense’s Arctic “capability advocate” under the Unified Command Plan (UCP) and the Total Force concept. USNORTHCOM must be emboldened to take the lead in associated challenges to defend the US homeland, secure the region, cooperate with allies, and bridge potential security gaps. This paper seeks to help USNORTHCOM leverage its influence in shaping the future of Arctic security for the US homeland. It offers plenty of innovative policy recommendations and action points aimed at streamlining the role of NORTHCOM to keep the Arctic safe and secure for the US and its allies. Future policy must address the need to enhance Arctic domain awareness and foster a new approach to Arctic-specific capabilities, technologies, and procurement tailored to the environment. Part of this endeavor is also connected to bridging potential gaps related to logistics, sustainment, maintenance, and transportation adapted to Arctic-specific requirements. This will ensure increased mobility and reach across the region. USNORTHCOM should ensure that regular Arctic drills and exercises under its supervision systematically include logistics and sustainment as essential parts of training. Policy must also clarify the role of the primary Arctic combatant command by identifying structural gaps and bridging them, especially in times of crisis or escalation. Better synchronization of efforts will help the US reach a common operating picture of the Arctic from a whole of government perspective.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, and USNORTHCOM
Political Geography:
North America and Arctic

3. After Ukraine: Prospects for a Russian Resurgence in the Middle East

Author:
Anna Borshchevskaya and Matt Tavares
Publication Date:
01-2026
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
Moscow has cultivated ties with U.S. adversaries and allies alike, and Washington must respond by advancing a holistic policy that empowers Ukrainian commercial interests and addresses deficits in sanctions policy. Russia’s position in the Middle East has faced major setbacks in recent years, including the fall of Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad, the weakening of Iran and its proxies, and the toll from Moscow's unending war of choice in Ukraine. But reports of a Russian retreat from the region are premature. Alongside traditional defense and economic relationships with Algeria, Egypt, and Iraq, Moscow has cultivated ties with a host of other countries—U.S. adversaries and allies alike. With Iran, it has reportedly begun assembling Su-35 fighters as part of a $6.5 billion deal that would boost the regime’s air force. With the United Arab Emirates, an American ally, Russia’s non-oil trade grew to $11.5 billion as of 2024. And in Syria, Russia’s pre-revolution military bases remain in place, while an October meeting between Presidents Putin and Sharaa indicated a cooperative spirit. In this comprehensive Policy Note, experts Anna Borshchevskaya and Matt Tavares argue that Russia is poised for a resurgence in the Middle East, especially once the war in Ukraine ends—a point they also make clear in a hard-hitting op-ed published in the National Interest. Washington, they argue, must recognize the multiple threats this would present to U.S. interests in the region and develop a vigorous counterstrategy in response—one that includes empowering Ukrainian commercial interests, refining sanctions policy, and rebutting Russian propaganda in real-time.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Sanctions, Iran, Regional Politics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Middle East

4. Toward a Fairer EU-Tunisia Agricultural Partnership

Author:
Imen Louati
Publication Date:
01-2026
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Arab Reform Initiative (ARI)
Abstract:
Tunisian policymakers approach agriculture as the main economic tool to improve the country’s trade balance. Optimizing the trade balance as the primary objective has led to a dual strategy for the agricultural sector: to promote exports of products for which Tunisia has a comparative advantage – olive oil, dates, citrus fruits, and fish – while reducing its dependence on imports of staple foods – cereals, milk, and beef – in the interest of safeguarding national food security. This dual strategy has created tension in the agricultural policy. The free trade liberalization facilitated by the country’s membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO) is counterbalanced by protections for domestic producers, using measures such as tariff and non-tariff barriers, particularly for sensitive foodstuffs (agricultural products that a country considers highly important to its national interests and therefore seeks to protect from full trade liberalization).1 The simultaneous goals of prioritizing food security and protecting national farming interests, while also integrating with international markets, prevent trade policies from effectively balancing export promotion and import needs. The inherent contradiction of these objectives has not only compromised Tunisia’s agricultural policy but also directly contributed to supply chain disruptions and the temporary disappearance of essential food items from the national market. The sustained dependence on imported staples has, in turn, exacerbated the wider economic crisis, contributing directly to a significant rise in Tunisia’s external debt and straining the foreign currency reserves needed for servicing that debt. As Tunisia is currently engaged in negotiations to update its trade agreement with the EU, there is an urgent need to reevaluate Tunisia’s trade policy framework to prevent the negotiation process from locking the country into unsustainable and irreversible policy choices. In that spirit, this policy analysis traces the roots of Tunisia’s agricultural trade policies, examining key multilateral obligations and the asymmetric outcomes of its trade agreements with the EU. It outlines how the deep power imbalance between the EU and Tunisia is affecting Tunisia’s agricultural policies and documents the critiques and resistance to deeper trade integration among Tunisian civil society, unions, and farmers. Building on the evidence gathered through analysis and semistructured interviews with stakeholders from civil society organizations, farmer unions, and the EU representative in Tunisia, this report proposes a six-point proactive strategy to redefine the EU-Tunisia trade relationship.
Topic:
European Union, Partnerships, Food Sovereignty, and Agricultural Policy
Political Geography:
Europe, North Africa, and Tunisia

5. Financing Water Justice: International Aid and Development in the MENA Region

Author:
Dana Abi Ghanem
Publication Date:
01-2026
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Arab Reform Initiative (ARI)
Abstract:
The need for water justice in the MENA region represents a pressing policy challenge, as governments confront pressures from climate change that threaten water resources. The region is considered one of the most water-scarce in the world,1 but its geographic diversity means that different countries in MENA face a litany of challenges when securing water and food for their populations in just and sustainable ways. Several of them must address systemic issues in water governance, including unequal allocation, inadequate infrastructure, and uneven access among rural, urban, and displaced populations. Others face increasing droughts, driving vast areas that rely on agriculture for their income into social and economic precarity. Climate change, population growth, and transboundary water tensions further complicate national and regional efforts to ensure fair and sustainable water management. Since the end of the Second World War, international aid and development organizations have launched technical cooperation projects, often focused on rural water supply and irrigation. Led by the WB and United Nations agencies over the last three decades, bilateral aid agencies and the EU, these international financial institutions (IFIs) have played a significant role in water development – promoting approaches like integrated water resource management (IWRM), as well as lending support for transboundary water management and water governance. This support can be traced back through reams of documentation and convenings that showcase technical assistance and financing for various water development efforts, including dam building, irrigation projects, and wastewater treatment plants, with claims often linked to sustainability principles and sound water management. Viewing these actions from a water justice lens, we argue that water development processes and structures pertaining to transparent decision-making, participation, and democracy are as important as equitability and fairness in access to water.2 In this context, the role that IFIs can play in enabling or hindering water justice across various countries in the MENA region warrants scrutiny. This report examines how IFIs might facilitate a just water future for the region, exploring how their practices, investments, and partnerships influence fairness in access, equity, sustainability, and transparency in water governance.
Topic:
Development, Foreign Aid, Water, and Climate Justice
Political Geography:
Middle East and North Africa

6. Land Tenure in Lebanon: The Elephant in the Room of Agricultural Policy Debates

Author:
Christophe Maroun
Publication Date:
01-2026
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Arab Reform Initiative (ARI)
Abstract:
“Land for those who work it.” This popular slogan, heralded by anti-colonialists and anti-imperialists worldwide, as well as by peasant movements such as La Via Campesina and the Landless Workers’ Movement in Brazil, encapsulates a global demand for agrarian reforms that put peasants at the heart of food systems. Yet while global conversations about food production and rural development have had to confront the uncomfortable issue of land tenure, in Lebanon land remains the elephant in the room of national agrarian policy debates. The question of land distribution and access in Lebanon touches on the very foundations of the country’s political economy, which is based on rent extraction, clientelism, and elite capture. A tangle of different land regimes has enabled political and economic elites to continuously convert land into speculative private assets, slowly eroding the social value of land while turning it into a commodity and a source of political power. The persistence of land-based power and elite resistance has historically blocked any meaningful structural reform. In parallel, by preferring donor-driven, technical interventions in agrarian and food policies that avoid the core issue of unequal land access, the Lebanese state functions as a guarantor of existing class structures. This article argues that reforming land access in Lebanon is the essential structural condition for cultivating a fair and sustainable agricultural system rooted in agroecology. It also proposes specific reformist policies and measures toward that goal. In the current political landscape, redistributive land reform – the transfer of tenure rights to new beneficiaries to provide more equitable access – remains distant. Nevertheless, pragmatic alternatives exist to improve land access to vulnerable communities and safeguard precarious agricultural lands. These include strengthening the use of communal amiri lands, protecting agricultural zones from speculation, and activating idle land.
Topic:
Environment, Transitional Justice, Land Tenure, and Agricultural Policy
Political Geography:
Middle East and Lebanon

7. A pivot or a saga? How Turkish foreign policy is torn between domestic pressures and economic needs

Author:
Başak Alpan
Publication Date:
01-2026
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS)
Abstract:
The EU must take proactive steps to address longstanding issues and cultivate a more trust-based and cooperative relationship with Turkey. Bilateral relations could be rejuvenated by addressing key issues such as democratic reforms, visa liberalisation, civil society engagement and the ongoing dispute over Cyprus. This CEPS Explainer explores the recent orientation of the Turkish foreign policy, focusing on its historical Western orientation and recent efforts to achieve ‘strategic autonomy’ by scrutinising the results of the fieldwork undertaken through the CATS Network project. Interviews conducted in Ankara, Istanbul and Brussels show that while Turkish policymakers aim to diversify the country’s foreign policy by forging security and economic partnerships with non-Western actors, such as the BRICS, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), China and Russia, its institutional and ideological foundation remains Western-oriented. Integrating Turkey into European security alignments, such as the SAFE framework, and modernising the Turkey-EU customs union would help to strengthen bilateral ties. Additionally, the EU should substantiate the people-to-people contact approach to rebuild trust and encourage further cooperation.
Topic:
European Union, Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Civil Society, Partnerships, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
Turkey, Middle East, and Europe

8. Economic implications for Europe of a potential reintegration of Iran into the world economy

Author:
Gabriel Felbermayr, Mahdi Ghodsi, Heider Kariem, Robert Stehrer, and Yoto V. Yotov
Publication Date:
02-2026
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies (WIIW)
Abstract:
How would fundamental political change in Iran, leading to a democratic system with a free and rules-based economic order, affect Germany and the EU economically? In the event of change, sanctions could be scaled back, allowing Iran to rejoin the global economy. This study quantifies the economic effects of such a transformation. It neither advocates for nor legitimises the lifting or easing of sanctions under the current regime or without far-reaching and credible reforms that fully address the concerns underlying the sanctions currently in place. Using the newest available data and quantitative methods, the results indicate that lifting EU sanctions alone could raise Iran’s real GDP by more than 80% in the long run while generating moderate but economically meaningful gains for Germany and the EU of around 0.3-0.4% of GDP. These gains are driven by expanded trade, lower energy and input prices, and improved allocative efficiency. When sanctions removal is combined with plausible scenarios of productivity catch-up with Turkey or South Korea, Iran’s GDP would increase by 240-388% and the gains for Europe would increase further, underscoring the strong complementarity between trade integration and productivity growth. Moreover, Iran’s reintegration would reduce energy price volatility, improve the security of maritime trade routes, and lower migration pressures. Overall, the findings suggest that a negotiated transition and rules-based reintegration of Iran would generate substantial mutual economic benefits while contributing to regional and global stability.
Topic:
Markets, Political Economy, Foreign Direct Investment, Sanctions, European Union, Economy, Inflation, Energy, and Trade Integration
Political Geography:
Europe, Iran, and Germany

9. Structural dependencies and choke points in GVCs: An industry-level analysis

Author:
Robert Stehrer
Publication Date:
02-2026
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies (WIIW)
Abstract:
Global value chains (GVCs) are intricate international networks in which the production and distribution of goods and services across multiple economies and industries is coordinated. Their complexity introduces strategic dependencies when economies or industries rely heavily on a limited number of foreign suppliers. Such dependencies can also create additional vulnerabilities, particularly at choke points (i.e. key links or nodes in the chain) whose disruption – whether due to political instability and geopolitical tensions, natural disasters, pandemics or policy shocks and trade restrictions – can halt production. This study builds on previous research by examining two factors: (i) size dependencies arising when an importing economy-industry pair relies largely on the inputs of a partner economies, and (ii) choke dependencies, where imports from one economy pass through another, creating potential choke points. Choke dependency is particularly concerning, as disruptions in the choke economy can impact not only its direct exports but also the flow of goods from other suppliers. Using the multi-country input-output tables (MC IOTs), this study introduces two indicators to assess dependencies: (i) ‘size dependency’, based on the share of an economy-industry’s foreign output sourced from a specific partner, and (2) ‘choke dependency’, based on the pass-through frequency (ptf) indicator, which reveals how often inputs from third economies are routed through a particular partner. An economy-industry pair is considered dependent if it meets thresholds for size dependency, choke dependency or both. This comprehensive approach aims to offer a deeper understanding of systemic vulnerabilities in global trade networks.
Topic:
International Trade and Finance, Global Value Chains, Vulnerability, Dependency, and Choke Points
Political Geography:
Global Focus

10. África ante la crisis de financiación para el desarrollo

Author:
Andrea Chamorro, Jaume Portell, Olga Namasembe, Luis García Blanch, and Romeo Gbaguidi
Publication Date:
03-2026
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Fundación Alternativas
Abstract:
La Fundación Alternativas les invita a debatir en Casa África en torno al Informe África 2026. En esta edición nos centramos en los retos y oportunidades que plantea un nuevo modelo de financiación al desarrollo a resultas de factores como la retirada de EEUU del sistema de la ayuda, con el desmantelamiento de la USAID y de las agencias de Naciones Unidas; la presencia creciente de China a través de su proyecto de la Franja y la Ruta; o nuevas prioridades en Europa como el aumento del gasto en defensa. Nuestro Informe ofrece un estudio en profundidad que reflexiona y elabora propuestas en torno a un nuevo modelo de financiación del desarrollo sostenible. Estamos en un momento crítico donde la UE y España deberían contribuir a la articulación de un nuevo modelo, más horizontal, participativo y eficaz. Abordaremos cuestiones como el estado actual de la deuda y el desarrollo en África: el nexo entre seguridad y desarrollo; las tensiones entre las agendas externas y los intereses africanos en el Sahel y África Occidental; el nuevo escenario de la cooperación española y europea; el papel del sector privado, o las perspectivas para el desarrollo africano tras la IV Cumbre de Financiación de Sevilla.
Topic:
Development, European Union, Geopolitics, Economy, and Financing
Political Geography:
Africa

11. Ciencia, Industria y Competitividad

Author:
Gonzalo León, Francisco Marín, Carlos Marti Sempere, Raquel Jorge, and María Peñate
Publication Date:
02-2026
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Fundación Alternativas
Abstract:
La Fundación Alternativas analiza la evolución del sistema de I+D en España en el contexto internacional y geopolítico, destacando los grandes cambios recientes en ciencia, tecnología e innovación. El informe subraya que España dispone de capacidades competitivas en áreas clave como biotecnología, comunicaciones, software o IA, y puede contribuir al fortalecimiento tecnológico de la UE. Ante el ascenso de China, la inestabilidad global y la creciente importancia de la seguridad y la soberanía tecnológica, el texto defiende la necesidad de reformar el sistema español de I+D, mejorar su gestión y alinearlo con una política industrial europea más ambiciosa. El objetivo final es reforzar la competitividad, la autonomía tecnológica y el papel estratégico de España en Europa.
Topic:
Science and Technology, European Union, Youth, Digital Culture, Industry, and Competition
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and Spain

12. Political Violence in America: Public Perceptions, Polarization, and Accountability

Author:
PRRI Staff
Publication Date:
01-2026
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
PRRI: Public Religion Research Institute
Abstract:
Two-thirds of Americans (67%) believe political leaders’ failure to condemn violent rhetoric contributes a lot to violent actions in society. Majorities of Americans also believe that false or misleading information generated by AI (64%) and public displays of hate symbols (61%) contribute a lot to violent actions in society, while smaller majorities believe easy access to guns and harsh and violent political language are also drivers (both 53%). While 51% of Republicans believe public displays of hate symbols contribute a lot to violence, 76% of Democrats do. Fewer than half of Republicans (46%) believe that harsh and violent political language contributes a lot to violence in society; white evangelical Protestants are the only group of religious Americans in which a minority (45%) share that view. Very few Americans support hostile and violent actions by their political allies to advance important political goals. Very few Americans justify imprisoning a political opponent without a trial if that person poses a clear danger to the country (12%); damaging or destroying property as a form of protest (7%); pushing, shoving, or punching a political opponent (6%); posting the home address or private phone number of a political opponent online so their family will be harassed (5%); or killing a political opponent if that person poses a clear danger to the country (5%). While very strong majorities of Americans over the age of 50 completely disagree that violent and harsh actions may justify political outcomes, such sentiments are less widely shared among younger Americans, especially those who are under 30. More than three in four Americans disagree that violence may be needed to save the country; views are similar across partisan groups, though they have shifted some throughout the year. Most Americans (77%) disagree that “because things have gotten so far off track, true American patriots may have to resort to violence in order to save our country,” compared with 20% of those who agree. Agreement about the potential need for political violence has decreased significantly among Republicans since President Donald Trump’s reelection in November 2024; agreement among Democrats has remained low over time but increased slightly in the past year. Since early 2021, support for political violence has varied across religious groups. Support among white Christians has declined since the 2024 election, though white evangelical Protestants continue to show higher support than white Christians overall. Support for political violence remains highest among Christian nationalism Adherents and lowest among Rejecters. Americans’ views on who is most responsible for political violence are deeply polarized, split largely along partisan and religious lines. Democrats overwhelmingly attribute most responsibility for political violence to right-wing groups (73%), while Republicans attribute most responsibility to left-wing groups (72%). While more Christians of color and non-Christians attribute most responsibility to right-wing groups for most political violence today, white Christian groups attribute most responsibility to left-wing groups. Most Christian nationalism Adherents (73%) and Sympathizers (64%) attribute responsibility to left-wing groups, while most Rejecters (72%) attribute responsibility to right-wing groups. Christian nationalism Skeptics are divided. Americans’ views are strongly divided by party and religion on whether National Guard deployments in American cities cause more violence than they prevent. A slim majority of Americans (52%) agree that deploying the National Guard to patrol American cities may cause more violence than it prevents. Democrats (80%) and independents (60%) are far more likely than Republicans (23%) to agree. Most Christians of color and non-Christians agree that these deployments cause more violence, while white Christian groups are far less likely to do so. Agreement is particularly lower among white evangelical Protestants (29%). Christian nationalism Rejecters (80%) are the most likely to agree, followed by Skeptics (54%), Sympathizers (37%), and Adherents (26%). Opposition to Trump’s Jan. 6 pardons is widespread, with notable exceptions among Republicans, white Christian groups, and Christian nationalism Adherents and Sympathizers. Most Americans (68%) oppose “President Trump’s pardoning of over 1,500 people convicted for their role in the attacks on the U.S. Capitol on January 6, 2021,” compared with 29% who favor it. Republicans (63%) are far more likely to favor these pardons than independents (22%) and Democrats (4%). White Christian groups, particularly white evangelical Protestants (58%), are more likely than non-Christians (24%), Christians of color (19%), and unaffiliated Americans (18%) to favor Trump’s Jan. 6 pardons, as are Christian nationalism Adherents (61%) and Sympathizers (49%), compared with Skeptics (25%) and Rejecters (8%). Opposition to stripping citizenship and deporting U.S. citizens deemed a threat is widespread, with notable exceptions among Republicans, white evangelical Protestants, and Christian nationalism Adherents and Sympathizers. Four in ten Americans (41%) favor “stripping U.S. citizens of their citizenship and deporting them if they are determined to be a threat to the country.” Republicans (60%) are roughly twice as likely as independents (38%) and Democrats (27%) to agree. White evangelical Protestants (56%) are the only religious group with majority support for stripping U.S. citizens of their citizenship and deporting them, compared with fewer Hispanic Protestants (49%), white Catholics (48%), and white mainline Protestants (46%). Support among other religious groups is notably lower. Christian nationalism Adherents (67%) and Sympathizers (57%) are notably more likely than Skeptics (40%) and Rejecters (23%) to favor stripping U.S. citizens of their citizenship.
Topic:
Political Violence, Accountability, Misinformation, and Polarization
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

13. Mapping Christian Nationalism Across the 50 States: Insights from PRRI’s 2025 American Values Atlas

Author:
PRRI Staff
Publication Date:
02-2026
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
PRRI: Public Religion Research Institute
Abstract:
Around three in ten Americans qualify as Christian nationalism Adherents or Sympathizers. One-third of Americans qualify as Christian nationalism Adherents (11%) or Sympathizers (21%), compared with two-thirds who qualify as Skeptics (37%) or Rejecters (27%). These percentages have remained stable since PRRI first asked these questions in late 2022, with a slight decline among Americans who qualify as Christian nationalism Rejecters, who peaked at 32% in June 2023 and declined to 26% by the end of 2025. White evangelical Protestants and Hispanic Protestants are most likely to hold Christian nationalist beliefs; Americans who frequently attend religious services, especially those who are white, are more likely to be Christian nationalists. White Christians (46%) are more likely than Christians of color (39%), non-Christians (13%), and religiously unaffiliated Americans (10%) to qualify as Christian nationalism Adherents and Sympathizers. White evangelical Protestants (67%) and Hispanic Protestants (54%) are the only major religious groups among whom a majority hold Christian nationalist beliefs. The majority of those who attend religious services weekly or more qualify as Christian nationalism Adherents or Sympathizers (54%), compared with 39% of those who attend at least a few times a year and 20% of those who seldom or never attend services. This correlation holds among those who pray outside of religious services and those who read religious texts. White Americans who attend religious services, pray, or read the Bible or other religious texts frequently are more likely than their Black and Hispanic counterparts to qualify as Christian nationalism Adherents and Sympathizers. Christian nationalism support is also strongly linked to party, media habits, age, education, and race. A majority of Republicans qualify as either Christian nationalism Adherents (21%) or Sympathizers (35%), compared with one-quarter of independents (7% Adherents and 18% Sympathizers) and less than one in five Democrats (5% Adherents and 12% Sympathizers). Two-thirds of Americans who most trust far-right news sources qualify as Christian nationalism Adherents (34%) or Sympathizers (31%), as do a majority of those who most trust Fox News (18% Adherents and 37% Sympathizers). Support for Christian nationalism is positively associated with lower education levels and older age; AAPI Americans are far less likely to be Christian nationalists than other Americans. Christian nationalist views predominate in the South and Midwest; support for Christian nationalism is strongly correlated in all 50 states with favorable views of President Donald Trump and the proportion of Republican representation in state legislatures. The states with the highest levels of support for Christian nationalism — which includes about half of their residents — are Arkansas (54%), Mississippi (52%), West Virginia (51%), Oklahoma (49%), and Wyoming (46%). Three states emerge with more than half of their white, non-Hispanic residents supporting Christian nationalism: Arkansas (59%), Mississippi (54%), and West Virginia (53%). The higher state residents scored on the Christian nationalism scale, the more likely they are to hold favorable views of Trump and the larger the proportion of Republican elected officials in their state legislatures. Christian nationalists are more likely than other Americans to support political violence and score high on PRRI’s Right-Wing Authoritarianism Scale. Three in ten Christian nationalism Adherents (30%) and one-quarter of Sympathizers (23%) agree that “because things have gotten so far off track, true American patriots may have to resort to violence to save the country,” compared with only 14% of Skeptics and 11% of Rejecters. Support for political violence among Christian nationalism Adherents was higher under President Joe Biden and declined after Trump’s reelection. Christian nationalism Adherents and Sympathizers score high on PRRI’s Right-Wing Authoritarianism Scale; scores for Skeptics are mixed, while Rejecters score low. Christian nationalism Adherents and Sympathizers overwhelmingly view Trump as a strong leader, while Skeptics and Rejecters overwhelmingly view him as a dangerous dictator. Christian nationalists also hold more extreme views about immigrants and are more likely to say mandatory vaccines for children should be illegal. Majorities of Christian nationalism Adherents (67%) and Sympathizers (53%) believe that “immigrants are invading our country and replacing our cultural and ethnic background.” Majorities of Christian nationalism Adherents (61%) and Sympathizers (54%) agree with “the U.S. government deporting undocumented immigrants to foreign prisons without due process.” While at least half of Christian nationalism Adherents and Sympathizers support birthright citizenship, majorities agree with “stripping U.S. citizens of their citizenship and deporting them if they are determined to be a threat to the country” (66% and 56%). Over four in ten Christian nationalism Adherents (44%) and one-third of Sympathizers (34%) say that mandatory vaccines for children should be illegal in all or most cases, compared with one-quarter of Skeptics and one in ten Rejecters.
Topic:
Politics, Religion, Ideology, and Christian Nationalism
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

14. Mapping Support for LGBTQ Rights Across the 50 States: Insights from PRRI’s 2025 American Values Atlas

Author:
PRRI Staff
Publication Date:
03-2026
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
PRRI: Public Religion Research Institute
Abstract:
LGBTQ Americans trend younger, Democratic, liberal, and more religiously unaffiliated than other Americans. One in ten Americans identify as LGBTQ. Two in ten Americans ages 18-29 (20%) identify as LGBTQ, compared with smaller shares among those ages 30-49 (11%), ages 50-64 (5%), and ages 65 and older (4%). LGBTQ Americans are more likely to identify as Democrats (40%), compared with 28% of all Americans, and are nearly twice as likely to identify as politically liberal (51% vs. 26%, respectively). The majority of LGBTQ Americans identify as religiously unaffiliated (51%), compared with 27% of all Americans. Views on LGBTQ rights differ strongly by state. Massachusetts (85%), Maryland (82%), and Alaska (81%), along with the District of Columbia (82%), hold the highest support for nondiscrimination protections for gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgender people, while Mississippi (60%), Wyoming (57%), and Arkansas (53%) show the lowest support. Massachusetts (72%), Hawaii (71%), Vermont (71%), and Connecticut (70%), along with the District of Columbia (70%), show the strongest opposition to religiously based service refusals, while West Virginia (44%) shows the lowest opposition. The only states without majority support for same-sex marriage are Mississippi (47%) and Arkansas (50%). Massachusetts (85%), Rhode Island (85%), and Vermont (81%) show the highest support. Except for Christian nationalism Adherents, strong majorities of Americans — including most people of faith — support nondiscrimination protections for LGBTQ individuals. Most Americans support nondiscrimination protections for LGBTQ people (72%), with Democrats (90%) being the most supportive, followed by independents (76%) and Republicans (56%). Majorities of most major religious groups support non-discrimination protections, though support is highest among non-Christians and the religiously unaffiliated. Christian nationalism Rejecters (91%) are the most likely to support nondiscrimination protections, followed by 77% of Skeptics, 61% of Sympathizers, and 42% of Adherents. Over the past decade, Americans ages 18-29 have shown a gradual decrease in support for LGBTQ nondiscrimination laws, from 80% in 2015 to 70% in 2025, largely driven by young Republicans, while seniors 65 and over have increased their support from 61% to 74% over the same period. Except for Republicans, Christian nationalism Adherents, and Sympathizers, most Americans continue to oppose religiously based service refusals for LGBTQ people. Most Americans oppose allowing small businesses to refuse service to LGBTQ people on religious grounds (59%), with Democrats (82%) more likely to oppose, compared with independents (60%) and Republicans (35%). Opposition among white Christians grew from 49% in 2015 to 55% in 2020, but has declined since to 46%. Opposition among Christians of color, non-Christians, and religiously unaffiliated Americans remains high. Christian nationalism Rejecters (83%) are the most likely to oppose religiously based refusals for LGBTQ people, followed by 62% of Skeptics, 44% of Sympathizers, and 32% of Adherents. Support for same-sex marriage remains high for most Americans, but partisanship, religious affiliation, and Christian nationalist views are linked to differing opinions. Support for same-sex marriage remains higher today (65%) than in 2015 (53%). Today, Republicans (49%) are notably less likely than Democrats (83%) and independents (69%) to support same-sex marriage. Majorities of most religious groups support same-sex marriage, except for Latter-day Saints (47%), Hispanic Protestants (45%), white evangelical Protestants (37%), Muslims (37%), and Jehovah’s Witnesses (19%). Nearly all Christian nationalism Rejecters (93%) and three-fourths of Skeptics (73%) support same-sex marriage, compared with 46% of Sympathizers and 22% of Adherents. Except for young Americans under 30, support for same-sex marriage has steadily grown across older age groups, gender, race, and education levels. While most Americans agree that transgender people deserve the same rights and protections as other Americans, just 40% oppose laws that require transgender people to use bathroom of their sex assigned at birth. Seven in ten Americans (71%) agree that “transgender people deserve the same rights and protections as other Americans,” including most Democrats (88%), independents (77%), and Republicans (57%). Except for Christian nationalism Adherents (40%), solid majorities across all religious groups, Christian nationalism groups, age, gender, race, and education levels agree that transgender people deserve the same rights as other Americans. The majority of Americans (56%) favor laws that require transgender individuals to use bathrooms that correspond to their sex at birth, with most Republicans (81%) in favor, compared with 55% of independents and 32% of Democrats. Americans who agree transgender people deserve the same rights and protections as other Americans are less likely to favor laws that require transgender individuals to use bathrooms that correspond to their sex assigned at birth than those who disagree that transgender people deserve the same rights (49% vs. 77%).
Topic:
Human Rights, Religion, Discrimination, LGBT+, Transgender, and Christian Nationalism
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

15. Genocide and the Courts: A Brief Review of Jurisprudence on the Crime of Genocide from Nuremberg to Today

Author:
David J. Scheffer
Publication Date:
01-2026
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Simon-Skjodt Center for the Prevention of Genocide, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum
Abstract:
In this January 2026 report, Genocide and the Courts: A Brief Review of Jurisprudence on the Crime of Genocide from Nuremberg to Today, Ambassador David Scheffer narrates how courts around the world, and over decades, have understood the crime of genocide. Published 80 years after the start of the Nuremberg trials, this report takes readers through court judgments that have grappled with questions of intent, protected groups, prohibited acts, and individual and state responsibility. We hope that teachers, students, and others will benefit from this concise summary of how courts have addressed questions about the definition of genocide over time. Over the past eight decades, “genocide” has gone from being an idea in Raphael Lemkin’s mind to being a universally recognized international crime, accompanied by a growing body of jurisprudence. Judicial rulings have been a critical means of addressing ambiguities about the definition of genocide that are found in the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. Courts have gone a long way toward clarifying, for example, what must be established to find that a genocidal “intent to destroy” has been present. Reviewing the history of how courts have ruled on genocide cases, is therefore an important way to promote greater understanding of the meaning of this singular crime. The report begins with the Nuremberg trials—where judgments regarding Nazi war crimes and crimes against humanity during the Holocaust laid a foundation for future understanding of genocide—and the United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, which codified the crime. Mass atrocities in the second half of the 20th century devastated millions, from Cambodia and Guatemala to Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, and the report describes how trials grappling with those crimes refocused our understanding of genocide. As important as understanding past jurisprudence around genocide is, Ambassador Scheffer makes clear that it does not supplant the importance of working to prevent and effectively respond to genocide. We hope that this resource will not only deepen readers’ understanding of genocide but also inspire people to rededicate themselves to ending this horrible scourge.
Topic:
Genocide, International Law, Courts, Holocaust, Jurisprudence, and Nuremberg
Political Geography:
Global Focus

16. Humanities Matter: Symposium Proceedings

Author:
Sukrita Paul Kumar, Swati Pal, and Asani Bhaduri
Publication Date:
02-2026
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
India International Centre (IIC)
Abstract:
In contemporary times, the obsession with technology and commerce has eventually led to a total dismissal of sensitivity to environmental issues, humanistic values and social justice. While each discipline of knowledge may have taken leaps in thought and theory, the sum and total of knowledge and learning have not resulted in an overall development of the human mind. Though ‘inclusivity’, divergent/innovative thought and ‘value education’ have become buzzwords in academic seminars and conferences, it is ‘skill development’ and ‘employability’ that have acquired a formidable importance in education. Some of the key attributes crucial in all professions are indeed compassion, empathy, fair-mindedness, emotional maturity, commitment and perseverance that evolve with a knowledge of psychology and even economics. All of these fall into the domain of Humanities and Social Sciences. Some fundamental questions that arise are: y What does it mean for a student of sciences, commerce or engineering and even medicine, to not have humanities in their curriculum? What does it mean to have this gap in knowledge? How can this issue be addressed? y Should we redefine our notion of ‘progress’? y Why is there so much misery and unhappiness amongst learners as well as teachers? y Do we equip ourselves adequately to deal with conflict resolutions rather than resorting to violence and aggression? y How do we work out a balance between theoretical and practical learning? y How do we make room for pauses for reflection amidst the stress of gathering degrees and certificates? As we navigate an increasingly complex world, it is essential to revisit the value of humanities and social sciences in fostering empathy, critical thinking and wellrounded individuals.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Academia, Curriculum, and Humanities
Political Geography:
South Asia and India

17. Quantum Technologies and the Geostrategic Landscape: Implications for Finance and Central Banks

Author:
Tracey Forrest, Paul Samson, S. Yash Kalash, and Michael P. A. Murphy
Publication Date:
03-2026
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI)
Abstract:
Quantum technologies, and quantum computing in particular, could completely reshape the integrity of today’s financial markets. Both through risk and opportunity channels, quantum computing is changing the game and raising the stakes. Cracking today’s cryptographic standards would undermine global payment systems and digital assets, causing the potential collapse of all current encryption systems, while quantum-enabled advances in optimization and modelling may dramatically enhance economic forecasting, monetary policy and planning. “Quantum readiness” is the next necessary step for any nation wanting to both stay safe from these projected dangers and also to make the most of the potential benefits. This special report aims to provide a situational analysis of quantum technologies useful for senior G7 (and beyond) decision makers in finance and central banking. By examining the current landscape, as well as several scenarios, the authors outline key implications for strategic planning and action for consideration by policy leaders around the world. They structure their suggested priority interventions across three tiers: national, international and public-private collaboration, with actionable recommendations across each level.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Banking, Financial Governance, and Quantum Computing
Political Geography:
Global Focus

18. Intellectual Property Amid Trade Tensions

Author:
Jeremy de Beer
Publication Date:
04-2026
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI)
Abstract:
Intellectual property (IP) is a key asset in the modern economy, and just like any asset, it’s influencing trade flows, investment, and economic value, especially as digital and intangible transactions grow. It’s often said that Canada is facing an IP trade deficit, but that claim is seldom documented statistically. CIGI Senior Fellow Jeremy de Beer changes that in this special report, building a stronger evidence base for IP-related trade policy. Through examining three possible scenarios for the future of IP as a trade asset (rebalancing, renegotiation and restructuring), the report identifies four strategic priorities for Canada to consider: strengthening Canada’s statistical evidence base for IP policy making; using domestic and international legal flexibilities responsibly and in coordination with allies; reclaiming policy space in trade negotiations; and recalibrating innovation and industrial policy at home.
Topic:
Intellectual Property/Copyright, Economy, Trade, and Transactions
Political Geography:
Global Focus

19. Nature-based Solutions for a Sustainable Critical Minerals Value Chain

Author:
Lara Fornabaio, Sara Saloum, Perrine Toledano, and Kirsten Hund
Publication Date:
04-2026
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment
Abstract:
Critical minerals production is essential for a net-zero future yet mining land footprint overlaps with sensitive ecosystems: of the sector’s 101,583 square kilometers of mining concessions, 7% are in biodiversity hotspots, 8% are in protected areas, and 16% are in “wilderness” areas of high ecological integrity. The value chains of mining operations “both depend on and impact nature” (ICMM, 2024), creating a responsibility for mining actors to manage and mitigate the impacts of operations on the landscape. This responsibility includes addressing nature loss, supporting the well-being of communities, and contributing to the resilience of ecosystems. Nature-based solutions (NbS), which are based on the idea that healthy ecosystems deliver valuable services to society, offer one method of working towards these goals
Topic:
Mining, Sustainability, Value Chains, Net Zero, Critical Minerals, and Sustainable Development
Political Geography:
Global Focus

20. Implementing the Biden Administration’s China Strategy

Author:
Christopher S. Chivvis and Senkai Hsia
Publication Date:
03-2026
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
When Joe Biden’s administration took office in January 2021, U.S.-China relations were in free fall. The era of presumed convergence had ended, mutual trust had collapsed, and the risk of escalation was real. The COVID-19 pandemic was raging. The central question was whether the relationship would harden into open and dangerous hostility or settle into a more durable form of rivalry. Biden officials viewed the inheritance of the first Trump administration to be a sharpened awareness of the China challenge but an underdeveloped national strategy and limited institutional capacity for that challenge. They set out to impose greater coherence, discipline, and durability on the U.S. approach to this crucial problem of American statecraft. At the heart of Biden’s approach was the consolidation of a framework for strategic competition with an eye toward coexistence. These officials accepted that China and the Chinese Communist Party are permanent features of the geopolitical landscape and that neither America nor China could meaningfully defeat the other without catastrophic cost. Their objective was therefore not dominance, but competitive coexistence—preserving U.S. advantages while avoiding war. That framing now shapes Washington’s statecraft and has endured even in the second Trump administration, albeit with some adjustments. The Biden team looked to technology as the center of gravity of their strategy. Building on but systematizing earlier efforts, they deployed export controls, industrial policy, and alliance coordination to protect U.S. leadership in semiconductors, artificial intelligence, and advanced manufacturing. For the first time in decades, technological advantage was treated as the decisive arena of great-power rivalry. This shift represents one of their most consequential legacies. The Biden administration also paired competition with sustained diplomacy—especially in the second half of its term. Rather than treating dialogue as a concession, the White House aimed to use it to reduce misperception and manage risk. Strategic communications channels were restored and military-to-military contacts resumed. This produced tangible gains, including improved crisis management and renewed Chinese cooperation on fentanyl enforcement. Biden’s diplomats did not aim to eliminate rivalry, only to stabilize it by convincing Beijing that strategic competition was the appropriate framing for the U.S.-China relationship. Without this diplomatic track, the competitive strategy would have been more dangerous. The administration also emphasized U.S. alliances, particularly in the Indo-Pacific. Security ties with Japan, Australia, India, and the Philippines deepened, and the administration worked to improve military coordination. At the same time, the administration was cautious about market opening, judging the domestic costs to outweigh the alliance building benefits. The alliance network thus grew stronger on defense but less integrated economically than long-term competition may require. On military strategy, the administration took a maximalist approach that bolstered deterrence, but they did so without fully resolving a fundamental question: how much is enough? Investments in regional posture and advanced capabilities were substantial, yet the strategy leaned toward maximizing capability rather than defining sufficiency from a strategic perspective. A competition framework does not require primacy at all costs. Future administrations will need to determine how to balance deterrence with flexibility, fiscal sustainability, and escalation risk—especially as the depth of U.S. support for conflict with China can be questioned. Biden’s China policy was calibrated realism—neither naive nor warlike. It recognized that long-term competition will be decided more by American domestic vitality than by military deployments. The strategy’s enduring insight is that diplomacy is an important complement to sustaining technological leadership, economic resilience, political stability, and capable alliances. These ultimately matter more than rhetorical confrontation and maximizing military advantage. The U.S.-China relationship remains fraught and unsettled, but Biden established a structured rivalry that avoided collapse and created a baseline from which future leaders—of either party—can operate.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Strategic Competition, and Joe Biden
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America