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Begin New Search Topic European Union Content Type Special Report Publication Year within 25 Years

1. UK-EU Relations Tracker Q3

Author:
Cleo Davies and Jannike Wachowiak
Publication Date:
10-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
UK in a Changing Europe, King's College London
Abstract:
Released quarterly, the UK in a Changing Europe UK-EU Relations Tracker assesses relations between the UK and EU as well as relationships between the UK and EU member states. This edition of the tracker covers developments from July to September 2023. On 1 October, the UK government introduced the green-lane/red-lane system to ease the flow of goods between Great Britain and Northern Ireland as part of the Windsor Framework. In the context of thawing relations post Windsor Framework, the UK and EU have reiterated their commitment to making the most of the Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA). The political agreement on the UK’s association to the Horizon and Copernicus programmes was an important milestone. In other areas, the tracker notes that discussions are ongoing. On the future of the relationship, the tracker highlights a growing mismatch between debates on the two sides. Within the UK, the Labour Party have set out plans for building on the TCA in pursuit of a closer trading relationship. The EU, on the other hand, shows little appetite for revisiting the terms of UK-EU trade. Bilaterally, the UK has now signed general statements or declarations with most EU member states. The focus is therefore shifting from formalising relations to maintaining and implementing them. This requires continued engagement, which the tracker indicates can be difficult to sustain at the highest political level.
Topic:
International Relations, International Cooperation, European Union, and Trade
Political Geography:
United Kingdom and Europe

2. The Strategic Repositioning of LNG: Implications for Key Trade Routes and Choke Points

Author:
Leslie Palti-Guzman and Marc-Antoine Eyl-Mazzega
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
2022 saw the climax so far of the weaponization of energy. Following its geopolitical demise, Russia has undertaken its own gas amputation, moving from a super energy power status to a diminished role with uncertain prospects and only hard options left. Russia has cut off almost entirely pipeline gas supplies to the European Union (EU), first inflicting huge financial pain and collecting record high revenues, but then simply losing out its largest and best market with no realistic alternative, and no prospect of any significant return. However, the Kremlin could still further reduce some of the remaining pipeline gas or liquefied natural gas (LNG) supplies and thus cause some tensions in the markets. Russia also retains leverage on oil markets, where the Kremlin managed to cope with the embargo as well as the price cap and maintain the relationship with Saudi Arabia which drives OPEC+ decisions. Meanwhile, in 2022, the European energy system has managed to surprisingly adapt on the supply and demand side to the three shocks: the decoupling from Russian energy supplies, the hydropower generation crisis, and the French nuclear electricity crisis. Liquefied natural gas has made a comeback in Europe and has been a savior of industries, governments, and populations. The LNG corridor between the EU and the United States (U.S.) has become the most dominant LNG trade route in 2022. This came at a huge cost though – EU’s gas import bill soared ten times from 2020 and three times from 2021 levels. For 2023, the European gas balance is much more fragile, as the demand reduction potential has reached its limits, same for the ability to attract additional non-Russian exports to Europe, at a time when missing Russian volumes will probably reach 120 billion cubic meters (bcm), instead of about 77 bcm in 2022. More moderate price levels since November 2022 have clearly overshadowed this fundamental mismatch, especially as the weather has been mild and China was still struggling with the pandemic. With an additional 30-40 bcm of missing Russian gas to offset in 2023 compared to 2022, Europeans can be expected to benefit from an extra gas of around 20-25 bcm left in storages thanks to mild weather and available LNG. They have no choice but to continue saving energy in a hurry, that is both on gas and electricity. Gas demand in power generation had increased in the first nine months of 2022 before falling in Q4 2022, and well over 15 bcm can be saved here in 2023 as more nuclear is available altogether, alongside more renewables, and some coal. It will be critical to reduce peak loads though. The key improvement is in terms of logistics, with the massive new LNG import capacity deployed across Europe. Overall, EU’s import situation will be very tensed and fragile for the next winter. The key challenge is that EU’s gas supply security ultimately depends on the weather in Europe, China’s and Japan’s LNG demand, and weather or technical outages in the Gulf of Mexico or in other producers. Any slight disruptions in supplies can have major impacts. As a last resort, bringing back some Groningen supplies, no matter how politically sensitive this would be, must be considered and prepared. Large financial compensations and effective governmental action would notably be required to offset the hardships.
Topic:
European Union, Gas, Exports, Trade, Energy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, China, and Europe

3. China/United States: Europe off Balance

Author:
Thomas Gomart and Marc Hecker
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
As French President Emmanuel Macron (accompanied by Ursula von der Leyen) is on a state visit to China, some twenty Ifri researchers decipher the stakes of the U.S./China/Europe strategic triangle. This 16-text study follows Olaf Scholz’s visit to Beijing (November 2022) and precedes that of Emmanuel Macron (April 2023). It comes especially one year after the beginning of a geopolitical and geoeconomic shock of a rare magnitude: the invasion of Ukraine by Russia. The War in Ukraine or the Return of Bloc Geopolitics? The war in Ukraine has broken ties between the European Union (EU) and Russia for the foreseeable future, particularly in the field of energy, though not without consequences in the Middle East, Africa, and the Indo-Pacific. Furthermore, this war has become the main show of active indirect confrontation between the United States—which has provided military support to Ukrainians, with help from its European allies—and China, which has supported Russia politically and economically. In February 2022, Moscow and Beijing declared their “no limits friendship”; in March 2023, Xi Jinping offered his personal support to Vladimir Putin after the International Criminal Court issued a warrant for his arrest. In its position on the political settlement of the Ukraine crisis, presented in February 2023, China stated: “All parties should oppose the pursuit of one’s own security at the cost of others’ security, prevent bloc confrontation, and work together for peace and stability on the Eurasian Continent”. China is no more of a mediator than the United States: it would be unrealistic to believe so. We appear to be witnessing a return of bloc geopolitics, albeit in a starkly different context than that of the Cold War (1947-1991). Globalization has produced strong economic and technological interdependencies that make any prospect of decoupling very costly, if not impossible. Economic partners are no longer necessarily military allies, and vice versa. In other words, a gap is opening up between geopolitical perceptions and geoeconomic realities. The term “decoupling” is popular in the United States, though much less so elsewhere. The rejection of bloc geopolitics is particularly acute outside of the West, where a “pragmatic” approach to foreign policy is often promoted. The Saudi foreign minister summed this up during the World Policy Conference in December 2022: “Polarization is the last thing we need right now. […] We need to build bridges, strengthen connections, and find areas of cooperation”. A few months later, China pulled off an extraordinary diplomatic coup by brokering a deal to restore relations between Riyadh and Tehran. For the EU, the situation is particularly delicate: Europe is in the Western camp, but a severing of ties with Beijing would cause a crushing economic blow. In 2022, China accounted for more than 20% of the EU’s imports, while the United States accounted for around 12%. By 2030, the EU’s GDP is expected to rise to $20.5 trillion, compared to $30.5 trillion for the United States and $33.7 trillion for China. In January 2023, the President of the European Commission declared at Davos: “We still need to work and trade with China, especially when it comes to this transition. So, we need to refocus our approach on de-risking, rather than decoupling”. For its part, Beijing has encouraged European aspirations of “strategic autonomy”, understood in China as a form of detachment from the United States. At the same time, the EU is constantly strengthening its military, technological, financial and energy ties with the U.S. This collective study notes a hypothetical search for balance on the part of the Europeans, faced with a war on their territory (the Western peninsula of the heartland), who cannot escape Sino-American mechanisms, and who do not form a monolithic whole. It also analyzes the strategy of several important actors outside our continent, and shows that, from Ukraine to Taiwan, via Africa and the Middle East, Europeans have little room for maneuver. This is why the study proposes recommendations to try, at a crucial moment, to reinforce their positioning.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Climate Change, International Trade and Finance, Science and Technology, European Union, and Industry
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and United States of America

4. Authoritarian kleptocrats are thriving on the West’s failures. Can they be stopped?

Author:
Francis Shin and Ben Judah
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
A hidden web of power revealed itself to Internet users in early 2022. Following a brutal government crackdown in Kazakhstan in January, anyone using open-source flight-tracking websites could watch kleptocratic elites flee the country on private jets. A little more than a month later, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine brought a new spectacle: social media users were able to track various oligarchs’ superyachts as they jumped from port to port to evade Western sanctions. These feeds captured a national security problem in near real time: In Eurasia and beyond, kleptocratic elites with deep ties to the West were able to move themselves and their assets freely despite a host of speeches by senior officials, sanctions, and structures designed to stop them. Kleptocratic regimes—kleptocracy means “rule by thieves”—have exploited the lax and uneven regulatory environments of the global financial system to hide their ill-gotten gains and interfere in politics abroad, especially in the United States, the United Kingdom, and the European Union. They are aided in this task by a large cast of professional enablers within these jurisdictions. The stronger these forces get, the more they erode the principles of democracy and the rule of law. Furthermore, the international sanctions regime imposed on Russia in response to its invasion of Ukraine has little hope of long-term success if the global financial system itself continues to weaken. The West still has a long way to go to rein in the authoritarian kleptocrats who have thrived on the institutional dysfunction, regulatory failure, and bureaucratic weakness of the transatlantic community for far too long. We need to rethink not just how we combat kleptocracy, but also how we define it. Policy makers need to understand that authoritarian regimes that threaten transatlantic security are closely linked to illicit financial systems. As it stands, our thinking about how foreign corruption spreads is too constrained by stereotypes about kleptocratic goals and actions.
Topic:
Corruption, Diplomacy, Intelligence, Politics, Sanctions, Authoritarianism, Reform, European Union, Regulation, Finance, Economy, Rule of Law, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, United Kingdom, Europe, Ukraine, Canada, and United States of America

5. Europe and Russia on the Balkan Front. Geopolitics and Diplomacy in the EU’s Backyard

Author:
Giorgio Fruscione
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI)
Abstract:
The war in Ukraine has taken its toll on the stability of the Balkans by reshuffling regional geopolitics and reviving diplomatic competition between the West and Russia. Since the summer of 2022, growing tensions between Kosovo and Serbia have raised concerns about a possible Russian involvement and pushed the European Union to react promptly. By brokering a new normalisation agreement, the West seeks to prevent new hotbeds in Europe and push Russia one step back from the Balkans. Meanwhile, the Russian invasion of Ukraine has given new momentum to the integration process of candidate states, making EU membership a tangible goal rather than an unattainable dream. Will the EU be able to stabilise the Balkans? Will Russia continue to exert its influence in the region? Are Belgrade and Pristina on the eve of a new phase in the normalisation process?
Topic:
Diplomacy, European Union, Geopolitics, Political stability, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Balkans

6. How to rebuild Europe’s security architecture?

Author:
Loïc Simonet
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP)
Abstract:
Russia’s war on Ukraine is overturning the European security order in place since the end of the Cold War. The Helsinki Final Act (1975), the Charter of Paris for a New Europe (1990), the 1992 Helsinki Summit, as well as the fragile acquis of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), failed to build and maintain a system involving all countries of ‘Greater Europe’, including the Russian Federation. For at least two decades, Russia has expressed discomfort regarding its perceived status in a ‘concert of nations’ dominated, in its perception, by the Atlantic Alliance and the European Union. Still referring to a conception of security based on spheres of influence, it has considered NATO’s eastward expansion as a threat to its national security (Russian National Security Strategy, 2015, 15). “Only during ‘critical junctures’ – relatively rare watershed moments marked by rapid change and upheaval – are security architectures likely to be fundamentally reconfigured” (Hyde-Price, 2014, 105). The war in Ukraine is already listed as such a turning point in history. ln addition to continuing efforts to support Ukraine and stabilize the situation on the battlefield, the time seems ripe for an in-depth assessment of Europe’s security regime. Many might argue that it makes little sense to discuss architecture while the house is burning. I answer that it is our responsibility to stress our preparedness and explore all opportunities. Just increasing military expenditures cannot be the only option. We need a ‘Code of Conduct’ for the 21st Century that would allow no more – real or perceived - ‘security vacuums’. This is in no way intended to accept the Russian narrative. Even during the Cold War, European countries were able to progress in building a common security architecture through dialogue and negotiations. It was less than a month after the brutal military suppression of the Prague Spring by the Warsaw Pact States, in 1968, that the Finnish Government initiated the process that ended up in the Helsinki Final Act.
Topic:
Security, NATO, European Union, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe

7. Western Balkans’ Horizon 2023 – New uncertainties in a changed geopolitical setting

Author:
Vedran Dzihic
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP)
Abstract:
“The age of uncertainty” has recently become the most used description for the time we live in. The aggression of Russia against Ukraine and the war approaching now its second year have changed the globe. Global uncertainties and huge geopolitical changes we witness are mirrored in European semiperipheral regions like the Western Balkans. The Western Balkans has been in a limbo for a while with no major progress towards the EU and democracy in general. Instead of steady democratization in the region we witnessed a gradual autocratization, most prominently in Serbia, and constant rise of crisis and tensions.
Topic:
European Union, Democracy, Geopolitics, Autocracy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Balkans

8. Continuities and Ruptures in the EU’s Border and Migration Control Regime

Author:
Clemens Binder
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP)
Abstract:
After years of decrease in the public salience of the issue, border security and migration control are back on top of the agenda in the European Union. Rows around issues such as the Schengen accession of Romania and Bulgaria, the ongoing debate about refugees from Ukraine and the deteriorating humanitarian situation in the Mediterranean have once again caused intense political debates in Brussels and the member states. While numerous topics (such as cooperation with third countries) arise in this context, this report will deal with three aspects – the further implementation of the EU Pact on Migration, the general technologization of border management and the operationalization of two new databases in the field of mobility control at the borders. These issues bear both political and academic significance and are thus major developments to observe in 2023.
Topic:
Security, Migration, European Union, and Borders
Political Geography:
Europe

9. Little substance, considerable impact Russian influence in Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Montenegro

Author:
Wouter Zweers and Niels Drost
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
This Clingendael report explores the role of the Russian Federation in Serbia, Montenegro, and Bosnia and Herzegovina. It examines Russia’s objectives in its relations with the three countries, as well the various sources of influence the Kremlin holds in each of the three countries. The report places this analysis within the changed geopolitical circumstances resulting from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Russia’s main objectives for the Western Balkans are threefold. First, the Kremlin seeks to project great power status globally. Second, it seeks to obstruct the Euro-Atlantic integration of the region by advocating against NATO and EU integration and by raising instabilities. Third, the Kremlin uses the Balkans, especially the Kosovo issue, as an argument for its foreign policy agenda elsewhere, particularly when it comes to defending its perceived dominance over its near abroad. Instead of building a sustainable, all-encompassing, and meaningful relation with Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), and Montenegro, Russia instead pursues an opportunistic approach depending on fragmented entry points for influence in each country. The Kremlin displays moderate ambitions for building positive relationships with the three countries, which is reflected also in the instruments it uses to influence the region. It nurtures contacts with, and influence through, a wide range of individual politicians, the Orthodox Church, the media and malign proxy groups, making use of energy links as well as local tensions and historical memories. Moscow pursues this approach deliberately, and it has proven relatively successful. At the political level, Russia’s clout stretches especially to (pro-)Serb politicians, who often make use of similar narratives and use Russia as an external supporter to promote their own ideas. In particular, its position on Kosovo, Russian support for Republika Srpska leader Milorad Dodik and its Orthodox Church links remain important entry points for Russia’s political influence in the region at large. Of the three countries, entry points for Russian influence are most widespread In Serbia, followed by Bosnia and Herzegovina. Economically, Russia’s influence is outperformed substantially by that of the EU, especially in terms of trade. Russia’s far-reaching influence in the energy sectors of BiH and Serbia, however, yield substantial political leverage, even if its investments often prove economically inviable. When it comes to military influence, Russia seeks to maintain its military cooperation with its main partner, Serbia, while also supporting the militarisation of Republika Srpska. Belgrade is satisfied with its current degree of cooperation with Moscow but seeks to avoid becoming Russia’s foothold in the Balkans. Factually, Russia is only one of multiple security actors in the Balkans, overshadowed by NATO and challenged by China. While presenting itself as a partner to Serbia and Republika Srpska in particular, Russia also resorts to malign instruments which have often proven to be effective in shaping the political environment of the Western Balkans. Lacking a military presence in the region, Russia supports far-right nationalist figures and organisations, which generally better resemble organised crime groups than paramilitary organisations, to attain its goal of destabilisation by stirring up polarisation and anti-Western sentiment. The Kremlin is perhaps most successful in the field of media and disinformation. Russian propaganda penetrates Serbia, Montenegro, and Bosnia and Herzegovina through Russian-funded portals, local media and social media. Russian disinformation and narratives have penetrated the region to such an extent that considerable sections of society hold a positive image of Russia and its political leadership. In all these fields, the Russian invasion of Ukraine has moderately affected but not fully altered Russia’s approach towards Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Montenegro. While the invasion has led to sharper dividing lines between Russia and the West and decreases in Russian financial and diplomatic capacities, we observe continuity in terms of Russian strategies and objectives. Russia’s sources of influence in the three countries have been moderately strained, among other causes as a result of BiH and Serbia’s first steps to diversify energy sources and Western pressure to diminish their political and security links with the Russian Federation. For the time being, this has not yet affected Moscow’s ability to act as a spoiler to the Euro-Atlantic integration of the three countries. The extent to which the European Union and NATO are effective in countering Russian influence in Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Montenegro will be part of a follow-up Clingendael report to be published in fall 2023. As part of the same research project, analyses of societal and political perceptions towards Russia in the three countries will be published in summer 2023 by Clingendael partners the Atlantic Council of Montenegro, the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia, and the Atlantic Initiative in BiH.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, European Union, Disinformation, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
Russia, Eastern Europe, Serbia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina

10. The EU in the South Caucasus: Navigating a geopolitical labyrinth in turmoil

Author:
Bob Deen and Wouter Zweers
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
The tectonic plates of geopolitics are shifting in such a profound way that has not been seen since the end of the Cold War. The Russian invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022 has not only increased tensions between the world’s major powers, but also severely impacted the regions in which they traditionally strive to project their power. This applies especially to areas in the wider Eurasian region that the Russian Federation unjustifiably considers as part of its sphere of influence, such as the South Caucasus. Russia’s failure to achieve a quick and decisive victory in its full-scale invasion of Ukraine has not only forced the Kremlin to limit its objectives on the battlefield, at least for the time being, to Ukraine’s east. It has also reduced the credibility of the Russian military that much of its power projection has depended upon – and has reduced its attractiveness as a security partner for countries that have traditionally regarded Russia as such. Russia has had to withdraw some of its troops and military equipment from the South Caucasus, its leadership is preoccupied with Ukraine, and it has not lived up to its security commitments to Armenia. This has contributed to a geopolitical vacuum and uncertainty in the South Caucasus that other actors are eager to exploit.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, European Union, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:
Europe and South Caucasus

11. The Multiannual Financial Framework: The search for flexibility and recognised effectiveness

Author:
Adriaan Schout and Saskia Hollander
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
The European Union (EU) is currently confronted with developments that could have deep impacts on our societies and policies. Yet the EU’s Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) – which defines the size and aim of the EU budget over a certain period of time – has difficulties in overcoming its inflexibility and ensuring best value in relation to shifting priorities. One important step that could modernise the MFF would be to improve the use of effectiveness assessments in relation to EU spending. In 2003, André Sapir and colleagues famously referred to the MFF as a ‘historic relic’ with expenditures, revenues and procedures being ‘inconsistent with the present and future state of EU integration’. Although the MFF has improved since then, it continues to suffer from discrepancies between stated priorities and actual spending. EU finances risk becoming increasingly reliant on funds and instruments outside the MFF ceiling because existing programmes are hard to change. Moreover, doubts about the effectiveness of the MFF remain. With European integration having moved far beyond the level of technical harmonisation of the internal market, the EU budget, arguably, needs more flexibility to respond to current geopolitical and societal challenges and investment needs. As political discussions on the next MFF – the current MFF runs from 2021 to 2027 – are starting, this report discusses avenues for realigning expenditures to changing EU priorities and to unforeseen challenges and crises. In order to enhance flexibility suitable procedures are required that would lead to political decisions based on accurate assessments. Furthermore, better methods are needed to communicate potential – and possibly painful – shifts in priorities to the broader public. In order to develop such procedures, thorough analysis and discussion are needed on the effectiveness of EU programmes and the use of effectiveness assessments in redefining political priorities. This report therefore relates the concept of European added value – defined by the Commission as ‘the value resulting from an EU intervention which is additional to the value that would have been otherwise created by Member State action alone’ – to mechanisms to better respond to new situations. One of the questions this raises is whether the current (multilevel) systems for assessing European added value are able to offer the timely information needed for flexibility. Given the workload involved in performance assessments, and given the importance of national ownership of reforms, further analysis is needed of the role of the European Court of Auditors (ECA) and its interactions with its national counterparts.
Topic:
European Union, Finance, and Multinational Corporations
Political Geography:
Europe

12. Open strategic autonomy: The digital dimension

Author:
Maaike Okano-Heijmans
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
In recent years the European Union (EU) and its member states hesitantly embarked on a new and ambitious path towards what came to be called ‘digital and technological autonomy’. This paradigm shift involves a turn away from the market-based, open economy thinking that has dominated in European policy circles in recent decades. The new direction is towards a geostrategic, more closed economy thinking, with a shift from a focus on trade to technology.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Sovereignty, European Union, Leadership, Strategic Autonomy, and Digital Sovereignty
Political Geography:
Global Focus

13. Military capabilities affected by climate change: An analysis of China, Russia and the United States

Author:
Adaja Stoetman, Dick Zandee, Ties Dams, Niels Drost, and Louise Van Schaik
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
Climate change is one of the most pressing challenges of the present and the future. Rising temperatures and sea levels, as well as extreme weather events are manifestations of climate change that also influence military capabilities. Increased attention for the climate change-security nexus is visible both at the national and the international level: nationally through the incorporation of climate change in security strategies and internationally through incorporation in important strategic documents such as the EU’s Strategic Compass and NATO’s Strategic Concept. Given its transnational nature, governments around the world have a shared responsibility to face climate change. A particular role is laid down for the global powers, China, Russia and the United States, given their position in the world. It is, however, questionable whether the global powers’ interests align. They differ in their approaches to address climate change, and even more so in their views on how it affects the armed forces. China and particularly Russia are more reluctant towards depicting climate change as a matter of international security. This is for example visible in international forums, such as the UN Security Council. In contrast, in the US, support for climate action is subject to political preferences, but climate related security risks are widely recognised within the defence establishment. This report reviews various aspects of the relationship between climate and security, with a particular focus on the military. It discusses the role of climate change in a country’s security and defence strategy and, vice versa, the changing tasks and deployment of the armed forces in response to climate change, the effects of climate change on military infrastructure, and measures to realise a greener defence sector.
Topic:
Security, Climate Change, European Union, and Military
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

14. How strategic tech cooperation can reinvigorate relations between the EU and India

Author:
Vera Kranenburg and Maaike Okano-Heijmans
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
In an era of multipolarity, India – expected to become the world’s most populous nation soon – will be a significant geopolitical player. This necessitates European Union (EU) member states to shift their policies to engage one of the world’s largest consumer and industrial markets.
Topic:
Markets, Science and Technology, European Union, Industry, Multipolarity, and Cooperation
Political Geography:
Europe, South Asia, and India

15. The state of economic convergence in the Eurozone: Two decades of monetary union and economic governance

Author:
Adriaan Schout
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
What is the state of economic convergence in the euro area? And will the redefinition of the Stability and Growth Pact result in a more effective policy for achieving convergence? A common currency, together with the four freedoms, was assumed to lead to economic convergence. This Clingendael Report reviews the state of convergence in the euro area by focusing on nominal, real and institutional convergence. Despite a range of policy initiatives and monitoring systems, convergence has not been achieved neither in terms of monetary and economic performance nor of the quality of governance at the national level. Despite some major successes in convergence, welfare has continued to diverge in some countries and differences in debt levels have increased up to the point of threatening the - economic and political - coherence of the euro area. Public spending also varies considerably while higher public spending does not ensure higher growth levels. The paradoxical situation has arisen in which countries that (drastically) reduced debt levels performed better in terms of growth and reduction in unemployment.
Topic:
Economics, Governance, European Union, Economic Growth, and Economic Stability
Political Geography:
Europe

16. Conditionality in Migration Cooperation: Five Ideas for Future Use Beyond Carrots, Sticks, and Delusions

Author:
Victoria Rietig and Marie Walter-Franke
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:
Effective migration partnerships with third countries are a declared goal of the European Union. But views diverge on what good migration cooperation looks like. Using carrots and sticks, also known as conditionality, is a controversial strategy to reach the EU’s migration goals. Politicians and experts either frame it as necessary and legitimate, or as post-colonial and counterproductive. Whether one supports conditionality or not, positive and negative incentives have shaped the different types of migration agreements the EU and its Member States have struck in the last decade. Some are formal agreements binding under international law, but most are soft law or handshake deals. They may cover just one specific issue within migration policy, or tie migration to other policy areas. Some are public, others confidential. All these agreements reflect the interests and the leverage which the EU, Member States, and partner countries bring to the table. The three most discussed levers the EU uses to nudge partner countries toward joint migration management are visas, development aid, and trade – the holy trinity of migration conditionality. But the exclusive focus on these three levers is artificial. Europe also uses other levers, such as police or military cooperation and training, diplomatic attention and high level visits, legal migration opportunities, and others. When these levers are used, they generate three kinds of effects: the conclusion of an agreement, common document, or statement (paper), procedural or technical changes (process), and migratory movements (people). But they also bring unintended side effects, such as backlash from the citizens of third countries, or the phenomenon of reverse conditionality, when a third country reacts to threats by reducing border patrols or by supporting irregular onward migration. Lever use of one EU country can also worsen the migration relationship of its EU neighbors with that third country. Despite these high stakes, Europe uses conditionality remarkably inconsistently. Its strategy to create coordination mechanisms to make Member States’ approaches more coherent is hobbled by entrenched realities: The cost of coordination is often disproportionate to its benefits, and turf demarcation hinders cooperation. Thus, the chase for coherent conditionality usage in the EU is at best an uphill battle and at worst a delusion. This report puts forward five recommendations to improve Europe’s migration conditionality use and debate in the future. It draws on case studies that trace the EU’s use of incentives and threats toward Bangladesh, The Gambia, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Nigeria, and distills lessons from them.
Topic:
Migration, European Union, Cooperation, and Conditionality
Political Geography:
Europe

17. Russia’s War in Ukraine: Rethinking the EU’s Eastern Enlargement and Neighborhood Policy

Author:
Guntram Wolff, Alexandra Gritz, Stefan Meister, and Milan Nič
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:
The stagnating EU accession process needs political will and procedural changes allowing eastern candidates to advance. In the meantime, they should be more supported to use the full potential of existing opportunities for gradual economic and sectoral integration with the EU. An upgraded Eastern Partnership needs a comprehensive security dimension linking resilience, connectivity, and defense policy, as well as cooperation in the area of the Common Security and Defence Policy. The protracted regional conflicts (in Moldova and the South Caucasus) require a more active EU engagement as existing OSCE formats continue to be blocked, and Russia’s role and military presence weaken. New openings for conflict resolution mean higher demand for the EU’s diplomatic, monitoring, and peacekeeping capacities. A new eastern Neighborhood Policy should be designed for the wider region, connecting the Black Sea and the South Caucasus with Central Asia and thus creating viable alternatives to the competing geoeconomic and governance “offers” of China, Russia, and Turkey.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Governance, European Union, International Order, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Central Asia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

18. From Coy to Cold Shoulder - The European Union and North Korea

Author:
Glyn Ford
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
East-West Center
Abstract:
The European Union (EU)—then 15 member states prior to its 2004 enlargement to 25—formally established diplomatic relations with Pyongyang in 2001 after a high-level visit to Pyongyang by Göran Persson, Swedish Prime Minister and then President in office of the European Council of Ministers. There, accompanied by EU security affairs chief Javier Solana and EU foreign affairs commissioner Chris Patten, he met with Kim Jong Il. Less than five years before, Commission officials were under orders not to even speak to officials from North Korea, officially the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK). However, at this meeting, the two parties agreed to establish both Political and Human Rights Dialogues; the latter modeled on the EU’s ongoing Human Rights Dialogue with Beijing. This move by the EU followed pressure from President Kim Dae-Jung in Seoul for allies to normalize relations as part of his ‘Sunshine’ policy. Some of the EU’s peripheral member states had long-standing relations with Pyongyang, in some cases dating back to before they had even joined the EU, with Finland, Sweden, and Denmark establishing relations in 1973, Austria in 1974, and Portugal in 1975. However, only Sweden had chosen to establish an Embassy, with the rest represented from Beijing. At the turn of the century, that pressure from Seoul resulted into most of the remaining dominoes falling in place. Italy and the UK jumped the gun in 2000, with Tony Blair and UK Foreign Minister Robin Cook agreeing to extend diplomatic recognition and establish an embassy en route to the Seoul Asia-Europe Summit.
Topic:
International Relations, Economics, Politics, and European Union
Political Geography:
Europe, Asia, and North Korea

19. The Emissions Reduction Potential for Freight Transport on a High-speed Rail Line Along the ‘European Silk Road’

Author:
Erica Angers, Aleksandr Arsenev, and Mario Holzner
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies (WIIW)
Abstract:
This report estimates the CO2 emissions of freight transport on a hypothetical high-speed rail (HSR) line along the northern route, from Lyon to Warsaw, of a ‘European Silk Road’ (ESR). Using a methodology consisting of predictions regarding the freight-carrying capacity of the future HSR, and the commodity-level switchover, our results indicate that a best-case scenario, at a project lifecycle of 60 years, in which all trains run with 257 tonnes of load, provides for a reduction of 176.2 Mt of net CO2 emissions compared with current levels. These lifespan savings are comparable to a reduction of net emissions by close to 24% of the overall EU transport sector emissions (excluding air transport) of one year (as measured by the net emissions in 2018). The net negative emissions in the optimistic full-capacity scenario will compensate for the construction costs in 13 years. Thus, the potential for emission reduction along the northern route of the ESR is quite substantial, given that this is just one line, with limited capacity. This hints at the importance that bold missions, such as the construction of a pan-European HSR network, could have for the definition of a European Green Industrial Policy that is capable of supporting the fulfilment of the goals of the Paris Agreement on climate change.
Topic:
Climate Change, Infrastructure, European Union, Economic Growth, Transportation, Logistics, Ecology, and Green Economy
Political Geography:
Europe

20. The Euro Area’s Achilles Heel: Reassessing Italy’s Long Decline in the Context of European Integration and Globalisation

Author:
Dario Guarascio, Philipp Heimberger, and Francesco Zezza
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies (WIIW)
Abstract:
This paper analyses how Italy’s decades-long decline turned the country into the euro area’s Achilles heel, the most vulnerable spot in the common currency. We use a structuralist framework to synthesise different (competing) supply-side and demand-side explanations, accounting for long-term processes and sectoral interdependencies. We argue that structural domestic factors that were already present in the decades after World War II (‘original sins’) – low-cost competition and labour fragmentation, many small firms linked to low innovation, and a deep territorial divide – interacted with the policy constraints brought about by globalisation and European integration to exacerbate Italy’s decline vis-à-vis its euro area peers.
Topic:
Globalization, European Union, Regional Integration, and Macroeconomics
Political Geography:
Europe and Italy