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1. China, climate and conflict in the Indo-Pacific

Author:
Anastasia Kapetas
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
This paper surveys the current reporting and analysis on climate and security to explore the implications that climate change may have for China’s ability to prosecute its security goals in the region’s three major hotspots: the SCS, Taiwan and the India–China border conflict. Those three hotspots all involve longstanding border and territorial disputes between China and other nations and may draw in various levels of US involvement should China continue to escalate tensions.
Topic:
Security, Climate Change, and Conflict
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and Indo-Pacific

2. The World After Taiwan’s Fall

Author:
David Santoro, Ralph Cossa, Ian Easton, Malcolm Davis, and Matake Kamiya
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
Let us start with our bottom line: a failure of the United States to come to Taiwan’s aid—politically, economically, and militarily—would devastate the Unites States’ credibility and defense commitments to its allies and partners, not just in Asia, but globally. If the United States tries but fails to prevent a Chinese takeover of Taiwan, the impact could be equally devastating unless there is a concentrated, coordinated U.S. attempt with likeminded allies and partners to halt further Chinese aggression and eventually roll back Beijing’s ill-gotten gains. This is not a hypothetical assessment. Taiwan has been increasingly under the threat of a military takeover by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and, even today, is under attack politically, economically, psychologically, and through so-called “gray zone” military actions short of actual combat. The U.S. government, U.S. allies, and others have begun to pay attention to this problem, yet to this day, they have not sufficiently appreciated the strategic implications that such a takeover would generate. To address this problem, the Pacific Forum has conducted a multi-authored study to raise awareness in Washington, key allied capitals, and beyond about the consequences of a Chinese victory in a war over Taiwan and, more importantly, to drive them to take appropriate action to prevent it. The study, which provides six national perspectives on this question (a U.S., Australian, Japanese, Korean, Indian, and European perspective) and fed its findings and recommendations into the second round of the DTRA SI-STT-sponsored (and Pacific Forum-run) Track 2 “U.S.-Taiwan Deterrence and Defense Dialogue,”[1] outlines these strategic implications in two alternative scenarios. In the first scenario, China attacks Taiwan and it falls with no outside assistance from the United States or others. In the other scenario, Taiwan falls to China despite outside assistance (i.e., “a too little, too late” scenario).
Topic:
Security, Conflict, Crisis Management, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
Japan, China, Europe, India, Taiwan, Asia, Korea, and United States of America

3. Countering hybrid threats: The role of the Joint Expeditionary Force

Author:
Adaja Stoetman and Dick Zandee
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
Russia’s war in Ukraine has fundamentally changed the international order that is based on norms and values of state sovereignty and international law. While the Balkan wars in the nineties were the result of internal turmoil leading to the collapse of Yugoslavia, the Russian-Ukrainian armed conflict marks the return of large-scale interstate warfare in Europe for the first time since the end of the Second World War. A year after the Russian invasion was launched on 24 February 2022, valuable lessons can already be drawn for the characteristics of modern warfare. The conflict has shown – both in the run-up to the invasion as well as after the start of the war – that non-military aspects are part of Russia’s strategy. Well-known examples are the abuse of the European ‘oil and gas dependency’ on Russia, the spread of disinformation, cyberattacks and the channelling of refugees and migration flows. What these means have in common is that they are aimed at undermining the unity of the West and destabilising their societies and democracies. This very complex set of hybrid threats raises new questions on how to respond to them, as the hybrid domain requires the involvement of many different actors at the national and international level: from various ministries and even private companies (such as the energy sector) to the EU and NATO. As hybrid challenges have become an integral part of modern conflict, the question has arisen what kind of role should be laid down for the armed forces. Hybrid challenges are very often of a transboundary and non-military nature. Therefore, they have to be addressed primarily by civil actors. But in addition, the military can also play a role in countering hybrid threats, and this raises the question of the role of multinational (military) formats such as the Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF). The JEF is a multinational military formation of northern European countries with the United Kingdom as the lead nation. Since 2019, the JEF has increasingly focused its activities on the hybrid domain. The war in Ukraine has been a catalyst for increased cooperation in the JEF context at the political, policy and military operational levels. The Russian threat, both physically (conventional forces) and virtually/digitally, has become the main focus of attention. It is in the latter category of threats that the JEF Nations are struggling with the question of what its role should be. This report explores the possible role of the JEF in hybrid conflicts and how cooperation in the JEF can be attained. The first chapter addresses the role of military forces in responding to hybrid threats and what the JEF has realised in this context so far. Particular attention will be given to the challenges of but also the opportunities for connecting military activities with those of non-military actors. The second chapter focusses on the roles of NATO and the EU in the hybrid domain and how the JEF could relate to the efforts of these international organisations. The potential impact of the future NATO membership of Finland and Sweden – both JEF Participating Nations – is also addressed. The third chapter zooms in on the potential of the JEF’s role and functions in the hybrid domain and how this should be implemented. The growing political character of the JEF cooperation is also addressed. The report ends with a list of conclusions and recommendations for the Netherlands. The methodology used for this report consists of a mix of literature research and a series of interviews with government representatives and members of think tanks in a selection of JEF Nations as well as with staff officers at the JEF Headquarters, at the NATO Headquarters and at EU institutions. These interviews were held under the application of the Chatham House rule. The authors are grateful to all interviewees for their valuable contributions.
Topic:
Conflict, Hybrid Threats, International Order, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe

4. Twilight Institutions: Land conflict and hybrid authorities in Benin’s Borgou department

Author:
Kars de Bruijne
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
The Borgou Department is a large administrative area with eight communes and 43 districts spanning over 25,856 square kilometers. The department primarily comprises the Bariba, Dendi, Boo (about 40%) and Fulani ethnic groups (about 33%). The majority of the first three groups are farmers, and the Fulani are primarily nomadic or semi-nomadic cattle and sheepherders. The Borgou Department in Northern Benin has seen communal conflict over the past few years. There are escalating tensions between farmers and herders, even though there has also been more violence between the supporters of the former president Boni Yayi and those of the sitting President Patrice Talon (particularly in 2019 and 2020). Communal conflicts between farmers and herders in Borgou have multiple driving forces. This report explores one of these: changing land management systems. It is argued that recent changes in land management are in any event likely to become a stronger driver of tensions in Borgou in the near future. Exploring land management systems and their impact on the Borgou is relevant for two reasons. First, there is simply very little literature on changing land management systems in Benin. For example, in August 2017 Benin’s authorities modified the 2013 Land Code to limit land conflicts and to modernize the institutional framework governing land acquisition and management. But exactly what the impact of this change has been has not been fully explored. Second, Northern Benin has experienced the problem of increasing violent extremist activity. While this activity is concentrated in the Alibori and Atacora regions, it is conceivable that once it has become established it might further escalate, with Borgou being a possible area of expansion. Being able to focus on vulnerabilities with the aim of addressing them is important for Benin’s stability. Research and media reports point to an increase in both the number and intensity of farmer-herder confrontations in the Borgou Department over the past five years. From the literature, it is apparent that this shift is driven by two factors. On the one hand, it is the effect of the demographic growth of and the increase in the cattle population which results in more competition for land. On the other hand, the introduction of land reforms by successive governments has tended to reinforce the feeling of insecurity among essentially illiterate farmers and herders.
Topic:
Violent Extremism, Conflict, Institutions, and Land Rights
Political Geography:
Africa and Benin

5. What North Korea Has Been Learning From Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine

Author:
Tereza Novotná
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
East-West Center
Abstract:
A year ago, in February 2022, Russia invaded its neighbor, Ukraine. Russian aggression has upended the post-war security mechanisms in Europe and made the international multilateral system, including the UN Security Council, more fragile and ineffective than ever. Even though the war in Ukraine has implications for security in Northeast Asia, many Asian nations consider it a distant issue for Europeans to solve. However, this perspective mirrors what Europe’s Asian counterparts, especially the Koreans, have faced for decades. It serves as an apt analogy for explaining the dangers of North Korea to Europe. North Korea is also watching the war closely to discern what lessons or leverage can be extracted from the unfolding conflict. This short article reflects on two lessons and three opportunities that the War in Ukraine presents to Kim Jong Un and concludes with recommendations on what the Europeans could do in the near future.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Conflict, Russia-Ukraine War, and Invasion
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, Asia, and North Korea

6. Global Peace Index 2023

Author:
Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP)
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Economics & Peace (IEP)
Abstract:
This is the 17th edition of the Global Peace Index (GPI), which ranks 163 independent states and territories according to their level of peacefulness. Produced by the Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP), the GPI is the world’s leading measure of global peacefulness. This report presents the most comprehensive datadriven analysis to-date on trends in peace, its economic value, and how to develop peaceful societies. The GPI covers 163 countries comprising 99.7 per cent of the world’s population, using 23 qualitative and quantitative indicators from highly respected sources, and measures the state of peace across three domains: the level of Societal Safety and Security; the extent of Ongoing Domestic and International Conflict; and the degree of Militarisation. In addition to discussing the findings from the 2023 GPI, the report includes analysis of current conflicts and potential future conflicts, including an analysis of the likely economic impact of a Chinese blockade of Taiwan on the global economy. This year’s results found that the average level of global peacefulness deteriorated by 0.42 per cent. This is the thirteenth deterioration in peacefulness in the last fifteen years, with 84 countries improving and 79 deteriorating in peacefulness in 2022.
Topic:
Economics, Conflict, and Peace
Political Geography:
Global Focus

7. The Challenges of Climate Financing in Conflict Contexts

Author:
Sagal Abshir
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
European Institute of Peace (EIP)
Abstract:
The “Challenges of climate finance in conflict contexts” is a paper by Sagal Abshir, senior advisor to the Environmental Peacemaking Project in Somalia, supported by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Amidst a general global underfunding of climate action, fragile and conflict-affected states struggle to secure climate financing. This is the case even for countries where climate change exacerbates the impact of chronic war and poverty. Although the funding gap is known, climate finance flows are scarce and scattered to fragile and conflict-affected to adapt and mitigate lag behind what has been promised and what is needed. In the cases of Somalia and Yemen, which are highly vulnerable to climate impacts, it averaged only USD 2 per capita. More generally, the total annual global flows of climate-related finance averaged a little over USD 600B in 2019-2020 – only a third of the IPCC’s estimate of funding required to reach our climate targets – from which only 10 per cent is directed to climate adaptation. The challenges in preparing communities and governments in fragile and conflict-affected states for climate impacts call for a new imagination, new mechanisms, and mobilizing political commitment to ensure climate financing flows help people in these countries respond to climate risks. Other solutions are on the horizon: well-designed climate action can serve as an opportunity to consolidate peace. Lessons learned from pilot climate responses in war-torn countries demonstrated that climate adaptation could contribute to conflict prevention and resolution efforts, such as in the case of Sudan and Nepal. In this paper, Sagal Abshir explores the status of climate finance for the extremely fragile and climate-vulnerable countries of Somalia and Yemen. The author reviews the global climate financing landscape and some challenges of deploying climate financing resources in these contexts. Using Somalia and Yemen as case studies, the paper will take a closer look at how these two countries have fared; and conclude with some reflections and recommendations.
Topic:
Climate Change, Environment, Climate Finance, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Africa and Somalia

8. Rolling the Iron Dice: The Increasing Chance of Conflict Protraction

Author:
Andrew Metrick
Publication Date:
11-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
The prospect of a Sino-American war looms on the horizon. No scenario for such a conflict has garnered more interest than the potential invasion of Taiwan by the People’s Republic of China (PRC). In the United States, discussions have focused on the early days of a conflict, in particular sinking the PRC’s amphibious fleet.1 Both the United States and the PRC place great emphasis on offensive military operations that heavily use the fruits of the precision strike revolution (PSR).2 This focus on early offensive action leads immediately to considerations of forces and weapons. U.S. defense planners are unsurprisingly most comfortable with the dynamics of short, sharp wars, having spent the past decade focused on deterring or defeating adversary faits accomplis, short and often opportunistic campaigns of aggression. Speed, political sophistication, and immediate military overmatch seemed to be the key ingredients for victory. Russia’s seizure of Crimea in 2014 was seen as a template for other future aggressors to follow.3 Prolonged wars of attrition, particularly those involving the United States, were thought no longer possible. Russia’s subsequent invasion of Ukraine in 2022 turned this vision on its head, demonstrating the military and political consequences of trying and failing to obtain a similar fait accompli on a larger scale. The ongoing Russian experiences in Ukraine indicate a need to reevaluate such thinking and consider the potential of protraction in the context of a hypothetical U.S.-PRC conflict. Most work on this topic has considered only the initial days and weeks of hostilities, usually over Taiwan or in the South or East China Seas.4 There has been comparably little discussion of what comes after.5 There are three key concepts that inform the following discussions: exhaustion, sanctuary, and protraction. Exhaustion is the point when large-scale offensive operations are no longer possible as offensive military capabilities have been used up. Afterward, some period of reconstitution and recovery is needed. This requires sanctuary, the relative freedom from attack sufficient for the rebuilding of military forces and capacities. Protraction occurs after at least one cycle of exhaustion and recovery. It is closely tied to pre-conflict leadership beliefs about the length of the looming war. A simplified definition of a protracted war is a conflict that lasts longer than leaders expect; it is a mismatch between political-military expectations and reality. Doctrinal developments in both the PRC and the United States, influenced by improvements in technology, place significant emphasis on the early stages of conflict and rapid, offensive operations. The emphasis by both the PRC and the United States on the early stages of the conflict can be seen in the PRC’s system destruction warfare and United States’ denial-centric concepts that aim for rapid decisive results.6 These approaches focus almost exclusively on the operational level of war, ignoring strategic factors animating the conflict and shaping its termination. Should PRC President Xi Jinping commit the PLA to seizing Taiwan by force, enter a war with the United States, and “roll the iron dice,” protraction appears increasingly likely, contrary to most contemporary military thinking and preparation.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Conflict, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, Asia, North America, and United States of America

9. China's messaging on the Ukraine conflict

Author:
Samantha Hoffman and Matthew Knight
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
In the early days of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, social media posts by Chinese diplomats on US platforms almost exclusively blamed the US, NATO and the West for the conflict. Chinese diplomats amplified Russian disinformation about US biological weapon labs in Ukraine, linking this narrative with conspiracy theories about the origins of COVID-19. Chinese state media mirrored these narratives, as well as replicating the Kremlin’s language describing the invasion as a ‘special military operation’. ASPI found that China’s diplomatic messaging was distributed in multiple languages, with its framing tailored to different regions. In the early stage of the conflict, tweets about Ukraine by Chinese diplomats performed better than unrelated content, particularly when the content attacked or blamed the West. ASPI’s research suggests that, in terms of its international facing propaganda, the Russia–Ukraine conflict initially offered the party-state’s international-facing propaganda system an opportunity to reassert enduring preoccupations that the Chinese Communist Party perceives as fundamental to its political security.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Cybersecurity, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Ukraine, and Asia

10. Peace Report 2022: Capable of Peace in Times of War

Author:
Institute for Development and Peace
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Development and Peace
Abstract:
The Russian war of aggression in Ukraine has caused the European security architecture to collapse. The Peace Report 2022 analyzes the escalation, highlights consequences for Ukraine and the region, and focuses on the reorientation of German and European security and defense policy. In addition to the global implications of the war, the report also outlines the conditions for success and limits of sanctions and analyzes the crisis of the global nuclear order. Furthermore, the research on global conflict shows that internationalized conflicts, jihadist violent actors, and violence and discrimination against women and LGBTQI* minorities require new peace policy emphases. And the steadily expanding competencies of security institutions within democracies due to the threat of terrorism, pandemics and extremism also require stronger democratic control.
Topic:
Security, Discrimination, Conflict, and Peace
Political Geography:
Global Focus

11. Foreign fighters in the Russia-Ukraine war

Author:
Aleksandre Kvakhadze
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
Abstract:
Since the beginning of the large-scale phase of the Russia-Ukraine war, hundreds and possibly thousands of volunteers from all over the world have expressed their desire to fight on the side of Ukraine. Although foreign volunteers also helped the armed forces of Ukraine in the 2014 Donbas conflict, the current war has further increased the mobilization of foreign fighters. Foreign fighters were participants in many conflicts of the 20th century. According to Cerwyn Moore and Paul Tumelty, foreign fighters differ from mercenaries in that their main motivation is ideology, religion, and/or ethnicity, rather than material benefit. Along with the development of information technologies and the simplification of movement between countries, the number of foreign fighters and the scale of their mobilization have increased in the world. This article aims to review the major groups of foreign volunteers fighting on the side of the Ukrainian Armed Forces.
Topic:
Security, Armed Forces, Conflict, Foreign Fighters, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

12. The Impact of the Russian-Ukrainian War on the North Caucasus and Occupied Territories of Georgia

Author:
Aleksandre Kvakhadze
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
Abstract:
From the first days of the Russian-Ukrainian war, it became clear that the Caucasus region was widely represented in the conflict. Caucasian fighters are fighting on both the Russian and Ukrainian sides. The war also has a great impact on the socio-political situation in the region. We will try to describe the contribution of the peoples of the North Caucasus, Abkhazia and Tskhinvali to this war and the possible long-term effects of the conflict on these regions.
Topic:
War, Conflict, Foreign Fighters, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Caucasus, Eastern Europe, and Georgia

13. Turkey’s Place and Role in the Russia-Ukraine War

Author:
Zurab Batiashvili
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
Abstract:
In recent decades, Ankara has maintained a kind of balance in foreign policy and this approach naturally applied to Russia and Ukraine as well. NATO member Turkey sought to develop lucrative military-political and trade-economic relations with both Russia and Ukraine. However, after the Kremlin's war with Ukraine, Ankara clearly saw the facing imminent Russian threat, precipitating the change in its position (supply additional weaponry to Ukraine, close the Bosporus and Dardanelles Straits, etc.). At the same time, the longer the Russia-Ukraine war lasts, the more drastic consequences it will have for Turkey. Consequently, Ankara will have to take even more decisive retaliatory steps.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, NATO, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Turkey, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

14. How the United States Should Respond if Russia Invades Ukraine

Author:
Max Bergmann
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for American Progress - CAP
Abstract:
A Russian invasion of Ukraine must come at a high cost to the Kremlin.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, North America, and United States of America

15. Can Emerging Technologies Lead a Revival of Conflict Early Warning/Early Action? Lessons from the Field

Author:
Branka Panic
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center on International Cooperation
Abstract:
The early warning/early action (EWEA) community has been working for decades on analytics to help prevent conflict. The field has evolved significantly since its inception in the 1970s and 80s. The systems have served with variable success to predict conflict trends, alert communities to risk, inform decision makers, provide inputs to action strategies, and initiate a response to violent conflict. Present systems must now address the increasingly complex and protracted nature of conflicts in which factors previously considered peripheral have become core elements in conflict dynamics.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Conflict, Risk, and Early Warning
Political Geography:
Global Focus

16. Ukraine Russia Crisis: Terrorism Briefing

Author:
Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP)
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Economics & Peace (IEP)
Abstract:
On 24 February 2022, Russia launched an attack on Ukraine. Figure 1 highlights that the invasion comes after a decade of deteriorating relations between Russia, Ukraine and the West. This brief covers several aspects relating to the current Ukrainian war, including the frequency of past acts of terrorism in Russia, Ukraine and Georgia and covers likely future scenarios. It also analyses cyberattacks on Ukraine over the last decade and lead up to the current war. The main finding is that terrorism increases with the intensity of conflict. Both the Georgian conflict in 2008 and the Ukrainian conflict of 2014 saw substantial spikes in terrorist activity around the wars, and as the current war intensifies increased terrorist activity should be expected. Secondly, cyberattacks on Ukraine have markedly increased over the last decade, and especially in the months and weeks leading up to the war. Further, cyberattacks have the potential to unintentionally spill over into other countries because of global connectivity, the effects of which have been seen on numerous occasions. As cyberattacks by nefarious actors are a recent phenomenon, and given the difficulty in the attribution of such attacks, the demarcation between what constitutes a cyberattack, cyber warfare or cyber terrorism are unclear. Regardless, this briefing looks at the broad phenomena of cyberattacks in Ukraine to offer background on recent events.
Topic:
Terrorism, Cybersecurity, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, Eastern Europe, and Georgia

17. World Risk Poll: Spotlight on Ukraine and Russia

Author:
Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP)
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Economics & Peace (IEP)
Abstract:
The Lloyd’s Register Foundation World Risk Poll, when combined with associated data from the Gallup World Poll and a number of other sources, reveals a complex and sometimes counterintuitive view of the world for both Ukrainians and Russians prior to the Russian invasion in 2022. Ukrainian citizens’ positive sentiments on a number of questions on social wellbeing were on the rise at a time when global averages were in decline. In the lead-up to the invasion, Ukrainians’ perceptions of safety and security were improving, with the percentage of people reporting feeling safer than five years prior rising from 19 to 26 per cent, bringing it closer to the global average. This represents a major increase, especially as it came at a time when the global average fell markedly, from 36 to 27.4 per cent, and for Russians the rate fell from 19.2 to 17.4 per cent. The conflict has unfolded within the context of Ukraine’s increasing socio-political reorientation toward the West. By November 2021, 58 per cent of Ukrainians said that, if the country were to join just one economic union, it should join the European Union (EU), compared to 21 per cent that said it should join the Russia-led Eurasian Economic Union. This was the highest rating ever recorded. Similarly, 54 per cent said they would vote to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), compared to 28 per cent who would vote against joining. Surprisingly, “war and terrorism” was only the sixth highest-rated concern in Ukraine in 2021. Ukrainians rated health-related risks (not including COVID-19) as their top concern. Transportation-related risks, crime and violence, economic concerns and financial hardship were more frequently cited than “war and terrorism."
Topic:
Security, NATO, European Union, Conflict, Risk, Polls, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

18. Global Peace Index 2022

Author:
Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP)
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Economics & Peace (IEP)
Abstract:
This is the 16th edition of the Global Peace Index (GPI), which ranks 163 independent states and territories according to their level of peacefulness. Produced by the Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP), the GPI is the world’s leading measure of global peacefulness. This report presents the most comprehensive data-driven analysis to-date on trends in peace, its economic value, and how to develop peaceful societies. The GPI covers 163 countries comprising 99.7 per cent of the world’s population, using 23 qualitative and quantitative indicators from highly respected sources, and measures the state of peace across three domains: the level of societal Safety and Security; the extent of Ongoing Domestic and International Conflict; and the degree of Militarisation. In addition to discussing the findings from the 2022 GPI, the report includes an analysis of the military conflict in Ukraine. It covers likely increases in military spending, new and emerging uses of technology in the war, its impact on food prices and global shipping routes. The report also contains a deeper analysis on violent demonstrations around the world.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Political Violence, Economics, Terrorism, Military Spending, Conflict, Peace, and Instability
Political Geography:
Global Focus

19. China Maritime Report No. 22: Logistics Support for a Cross-Strait Invasion: The View from Beijing

Author:
Kevin McCauley
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College
Abstract:
The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) believes that logistics support is one of the key determinants of a successful large-scale invasion of Taiwan. Logistics support includes transport, materiel and oil supply, medical care, search and rescue, logistics infrastructure protection, and maintenance of war materiel reserves. Despite the recognized importance of logistics support, it is likely the PLA does not currently possess the requisite logistics capabilities to successfully support a large-scale amphibious landing on Taiwan and a possible protracted conflict involving the United States and allies. Key deficits include a lack of amphibious ships (both military and civilian), transport aircraft, and war reserves. The PLA also continues to face difficulties with landing the requisite logistics supplies during the critical beach assault phase, constructing maritime transfer platforms or temporary wharves to sustain resupply if intact ports are not rapidly captured, establishing a landing base for logistics operations, maintaining the flow of logistics during on-island combat, and establishing strategic war reserves to support the large-scale operation and possibly prolonged conflict. These problem areas might be resolved with several years of sustained effort and complex training.
Topic:
Territorial Disputes, Armed Forces, Conflict, and People's Liberation Army (PLA)
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, and Asia

20. Afghan Peace and Reconciliation

Author:
Arooj Mumtaz
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS)
Abstract:
The Taliban captured Kabul on 15th August 2021 and announced their government three weeks later. Pakistan viewed the event as cleaning up of the unwanted externalities in its neighborhood i.e., a complete pullback of Indian and Western presence and influence. However, the initial exhilaration has morphed into disappointment over the past months. Not only has the Taliban regime adopted traditional approach to Durand line, they are also believed to be turning a blind eye to the safe havens of anti-Pakistan terrorist groups on their soil. Pakistan in the current situation requires an all-encompassing parliament-led policy that focuses on provision of humanitarian assistance and on winning hearts and minds of the Afghan people. Along with humanitarian assistance, Pakistan’s present Afghan policy must address its bilateral equation with Afghanistan and counter-terrorism mechanisms. Unfortunately, despite their proximity, Afghanistan and Pakistan share no formal agreement regarding refugees, trade or border. So, the government must avail this opportunity and focus on sketching a bilateral strategic agreement because unlike previous governments in Kabul, the current government is keen to make formal agreements with neighbouring Pakistan. Moreover, Pakistan needs to exhibit a balanced approach, neither being apologetic about the amicable equation it shares with the Afghan Taliban, nor become an advocate of the Taliban. This will allow Pakistan to be pragmatic and shape its actions and reactions accordingly. Here it may be noted that a key factor that is limiting Pakistan’s policy choices is the enhanced threats to Pakistan’s internal security as well its western borders since the Taliban takeover of Kabul. Cross border movements of militants have increased, leading to a spike in attacks on Pakistan security personnel. As far as TTP is concerned, between September 2021 and March 2022, it claimed to have carried out 197 attacks. Apparently, the Taliban have reneged on their promises made in Doha as well as earlier that they would prevent Afghan soil from becoming a staging point for attacks inside Pakistan. This inaction is fundamentally due to the Afghan Taliban’s long affiliation with the TTP which fought side by side with them against foreign forces. Against this backdrop, the Afghan Taliban are averse to the idea of cracking down on the TTP in a meaningful way. Currently, the Taliban are limiting their efforts to being a mediator between the Pakistani government and TTP kingpins. On the question of Afghanistan’s humanitarian and economic crisis, there are contrasting opinions. While some advocate that Pakistan must be at the front foot, others maintain that Afghanistan’s humanitarian and economic issues are majorly a concern of the international community and Pakistan must conduct low- key. Through Pakistan’s weakened economy does not allow it to help Afghanistan single-handedly, still it can facilitate international engagement which certainly is the remedy for Afghanistan’s humanitarian and economic crises. Socio-economic stability in Afghanistan is crucial for Pakistan’s internal security because if Afghanistan does not stabilise macroeconomically, no politics or diplomacy will save Pakistan from fallout of the crisis in Afghanistan. Pakistan must focus its efforts towards assuring that international engagement and assistance is not conditioned with the provision of women rights – at least in the immediate term - particularly because Afghanistan has a specific cultural orientation which does not fully align with the Western concepts of human rights. Pakistan has so far exhibited a stern strategy towards refugees. Though it is fundamentally an attempt to keep the international community from denying its responsibility towards war ravaged Afghanistan, it is also motivated by Pakistan’s economic fragility. Not only has Pakistan given a cold response to the idea of more refugees pouring into Pakistan, it has also stopped UNHCR from using the terms “new arrivals” or “new refugees”. However, this approach will have negative impacts because when refugees are abandoned by states and a vacuum is created, other forces and elements start interfering. It is argued that such policies have led to recruitments in ISKP. So, with the situation in hand, the right roadmap will be to sketch inclusive measures in order to deal with the matter of refugees; refugees living in Pakistan for the last many decades should be considered for granting right to Pakistani citizenship.
Topic:
Governance, Taliban, Political stability, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Middle East

21. Perspectives From Pakistan on Afghan Peace and Reconciliation

Author:
Muhammad Amir Rana
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS)
Abstract:
Since the US withdrawal and Taliban takeover in August last year, Afghanistan’s economic situation has been fast deteriorating. As a result, Afghans are suffering from poverty, starvation, and a lack of access to healthcare and other services. Pakistani government and different segments of its society seem aware of the situation. The government has not only been providing humanitarian support to the Afghan people but also facilitating international efforts in that regard. On political front, too, Pakistan continues to help Afghanistan by telling the world not to abandon Afghan people in time of their need. During the quarter under review, Pakistan facilitated a Saudi-led OIC Foreign Ministers’ extraordinary meeting in Islamabad. It has already established Afghanistan Inter-Ministerial Coordination Cell. Both of these initiatives are meant to accelerate relief efforts in Afghanistan. Similarly, while Pakistan has not yet formally recognized the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, it has informally started the diplomatic relationship with the country. This chapter provides a summarized outcome of the PIPS quarterly monitoring of the opinions of different segments of Pakistani society and state institutions on Afghanistan’s political, social and security situations and their perceived impact on Pakistan. PIPS’ desk and field researchers regularly monitored/reviewed press and electronic media reports, social media platforms, academic and research analyses and reports, publications of religious groups and militants, government records and press releases, as well as officials’ statements and happenings on the Afghan situation and related developments. PIPS team also conducted interviews with experts, officials, political leaders, and media persons to seek their comments where responses were missing in public or media discourses
Topic:
Regional Cooperation, Governance, Conflict, and Strategic Stability
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Middle East

22. Before the Invasion: The Russian-Belarusian Allied Resolve Exercises

Author:
Anna Maria Dyner
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
On 10-20 February, Belarus hosted the active phase of the Belarusian-Russian manoeuvres Allied Resolve, after which Russian troops remained in the country. The drills preceded the Russian invasion of Ukraine that started on 24 February. The scenario was an extension of last year’s Zapad exercises and simulated actions against the countries of NATO’s Eastern Flank and Ukraine. The manoeuvres showed Russia’s ability to deploy units over long distances (more than 10,000 km) and the high interoperability of the Russian and Belarusian armed forces. The growing military integration of Belarus and Russia, along with the decision to leave Russian military units in Belarus, is a challenge for NATO in the context of defending its Eastern Flank and its policy towards Ukraine.
Topic:
Armed Forces, Conflict, and Military Exercises
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Eurasia, and Belarus

23. Eritrea as an Informal Representative of the Pro-Russia Forces in Africa

Author:
Jędrzej Czerep
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
Eritrea was the only African country to vote against the UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution on 2 March condemning Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Although this voice was isolated, Eritrea has become the informal representative of a larger group of states on the continent critical of the West. The possible enlargement of this pro-Russia bloc will depend on the financial and military ability of Russia to remain active in Africa.
Topic:
International Relations, Diplomacy, United Nations, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Africa, Russia, and Eritrea

24. Turkey's Role in the Russian-Ukrainian Negotiations

Author:
Aleksandra Maria Spancerska
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
The Russian-Ukrainian negotiations held on 29 March in Istanbul demonstrates that Turkey is assuming the role of an intermediary. Its policy of balancing between Russia and Ukraine is backed by the majority of the Turkish public, which gives President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan more freedom to manoeuvre. Acting as an intermediary in the conflict may allow Turkey an opportunity to start improving the strained relations with the European Union and the United States.
Topic:
International Relations, Diplomacy, European Union, Conflict, and Negotiation
Political Geography:
Russia, Turkey, and Ukraine

25. Appraising the War in Ukraine and Likely Outcomes

Author:
Philip Wasielewski
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
After six weeks of combat, where is the Russo-Ukrainian War going? Modern technology both facilitates and hampers the answer to that question. Every day, this war is evaluated from every angle and perspective, but modern technology provides only a soda-straw view of the war’s entire canvas. This article will try to discern that larger canvas of the war, including a focus on casualties, information operations and morale, and logistics to see how they and the tactical correlation of forces may influence several possible strategic outcomes.
Topic:
Conflict, Military Tactics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Eurasia, and Ukraine

26. Reviving the Prospects for Coercive Diplomacy in Ukraine

Author:
Sean Monaghan
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
The United States and its allies in the West have been unable to use the threat of military force to coerce Russia into stopping its war in Ukraine. In part, this is because the West is more concerned about escalation than Russia. Further analysis using Alexander L. George’s framework of coercive diplomacy, however, suggests the problem is more complex and deep-rooted: Few of the historical conditions or factors that favor coercive diplomacy are present in Ukraine. This analysis reveals three things the United States and its allies should do to revive the prospects of ending the war in Ukraine through coercive diplomacy. First, they should take smaller, more achievable steps which are less likely to inspire Russia to double-down. Second, they should exploit Russia’s deteriorating position through a mixture of carrots and sticks. Finally, the West should seek to minimize the intensity of its wider confrontation with Russia and focus on strategic stability as an end in itself. This will be challenging because of the gravity of Russian atrocities in Ukraine. But it may help end the war through coercive diplomacy, and avoid a serious miscalculation with Russia.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Conflict, Coercion, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

27. The Evolving Political-Military Aims in the War in Ukraine After 100 Days

Author:
Philip Wasielewski
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
Russian war aims have contracted from conquering Ukraine to simply expanding the territory of the statelets it supposedly went to war to protect. By contrast, Ukraine’s war aims have grown from survival to the recovery of all territory lost to Russia since 2014. These uncompromising objectives lock Russia and Ukraine into a war of attrition with little hope of a negotiated settlement. The ongoing battle in Donbas could provide Russia with some tactical successes and a propaganda victory but probably not a strategic one. In fact, further losses could weaken the Russian army to the point that it enables later Ukrainian counterattacks or even causes the Russian army to fracture. Leaders in Moscow may find that a depleted army leaves them few options for victory and that even their superiority in nuclear weapons may not be as useful as supposed.
Topic:
Politics, Armed Forces, Conflict, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Eurasia, and Ukraine

28. Security Challenges in the Eastern Mediterranean

Author:
Leah Pedro and Aaron Stein
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
On May 2–3 2022, the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung Syria/Iraq Office and the Foreign Policy Research Institute convened a panel of foreign policy experts for a dialogue on security challenges present in the Eastern Mediterranean. The first day addressed state fragility in the region and how this phenomenon intersects with systemic security issues, including climate change, maritime issues, and migration. The second day of dialogue addressed military issues, including Russian naval modernization, US-Russian regional retrenchment, and how each country views the other’s long-term regional ambitions. Additionally, the conversations in the second day covered European regional security views and how the broader US-Russia rivalry impacts thinking on the continent amidst the current crisis landscape. In each panel, two guest speakers shared their subject matter expertise on the focus topic and a dialogue followed brief presentations. The entirety of the event was conducted under Chatham House Rule, wherein the participants could share views and opinions freely. As a result, findings from these conversations can be more transparent than traditional formal dialogues in traditional diplomatic channels. In this report, we share the consensus highlights and points of contention which came from the discussions. As the nature of Chatham House Rule protects the identity of our participants, below are a few areas of expertise found among those involved in the dialogue.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Climate Change, Diplomacy, Migration, National Security, Economy, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Mediterranean

29. The Art of the Possible: Minimizing Risks as a New European Order Takes Shape

Author:
Gabriela Iveliz Rosa-Hernandez
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
Russia’s war on Ukraine is poised to bring into being a new European security order. Although the last eight months have been full of surprises, that new order may very well be marked by unstable standoffs, buildups, and dangerous activities and incidents between both Ukraine and Russia and Russia and Ukraine’s Western backers. These will risk ever more dangerous crises, all with the threat of nuclear war looming. The last eight years of military deployments, near-simultaneous exercises, and other proximate activities by Russia and NATO offer some hints as to what this future may look like. These, notably, were undertaken not to prevent an escalation in Ukraine but to deter NATO from attacking Russia and vice versa. During this time, discussions about a return to conventional arms control in Europe to mitigate the dangers of military activities gained little traction with policymakers, and the agreements and arrangements that had been in place continued to deteriorate and dwindle. In late 2021, as Russian forces massed on Ukraine’s borders, the West offered Russia a return to conventional arms control solutions. Russia countered with demands that NATO return to its 1990s-era force posture and eschew any further enlargement, and then proceeded to roll its tanks into Ukraine. During the tense months prior to Russia’s invasion, the conventional arms control mechanisms that remained, such as the Vienna Document, made it possible to call out Russia’s buildup, but not reverse it or prevent attack. Although there is little logic and less appetite for new arms control deals now, an end to fighting in Ukraine will create new imperatives to make Europe safer than it is today. While sanctions can limit Russian capacity to some extent, they may well be inadequate to prevent substantial buildups. For this reason, NATO members and their partners should be thinking in advance about how they could limit Russian capabilities via negotiated arrangements with robust verification measures and repercussions for violations. Once the shooting stops in Ukraine, deals such as these could make a more secure Europe, bolstered by more reliable deterrence, attainable.
Topic:
Security, NATO, Arms Control and Proliferation, Conflict, Deterrence, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

30. American Interests in the Ukraine War

Author:
Joshua Shifrinson
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
Policymakers have poorly defined U.S. strategic interests in the Russia-Ukraine War. Those interests that have been defined—deterring future aggression and protecting the “liberal order”—do not stand up to scrutiny. Actual U.S. interests in Ukraine are essentially negative: preventing further escalation or spillover of the conflict and limiting a wholesale collapse in U.S.-Russian relations. The limited interests that the U.S. does have in Ukraine suggest that Washington should try to convince Ukraine and Russia to accept a negotiated settlement.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Liberal Order, Conflict, Strategic Interests, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, Eastern Europe, and United States of America

31. Prepare Ukraine for Victory in a Long War

Author:
Luke Coffey
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
On February 24, Russia invaded Ukraine for the second time in eight years. While many assumed that the war would be short, a stiff Ukrainian defense halted and then successfully counter-attacked against the Russian advances on Kyiv, Sumy, and Kharkiv. After capturing Kherson, Russia’s main advance from occupied Crimea in the south toward Mykolaiv also stalled. At the time of writing, Ukrainian forces are beginning a counterattack in that region and are located approximately 12 miles outside Kherson city center. Mariupol, on the Sea of Azov coastline, fell to the Russians on May 22 after Ukrainian forces made a heroic last stand in the Azovstal iron and steel works. This capture allowed Russia to create a land bridge from the Russian Federation to occupied Crimea. Mariupol’s capture also turned the Sea of Azov into a Russian lake.”1 In the Donbas, which is arguably Russia’s main effort at this stage of the war, Russian troops have made limited advances at a very high cost in equipment and manpower. In late June, Russian forces captured Sievierodonetsk after weeks of heavy fighting, leaving Russia in control of Ukraine’s Luhansk Oblast. Ukrainians are currently defending a front line that is approximately 1,250 miles long—this is equal to the straight- line distance from Washington, DC, to Houston, Texas. Russian public opinion still supports the war.”2 While Russia’s advancements in the Donbas have been slow and costly, there is no indication that Moscow will stop its offensive anytime soon. President Vladimir Putin knows that his legacy rides on Russia’s victory or defeat in Ukraine.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, National Security, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

32. Dangerous Straits: Wargaming a Future Conflict over Taiwan

Author:
Stacie L. Pettyjohn, Becca Wasser, and Chris Dougherty
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
Until recently, U.S. policymakers and subject matter experts have viewed the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC’s) forcible unification with Taiwan as a distant threat. But the mix of rapid Chinese military modernization, a narrow window for localized near-parity with the U.S. military, and growing pessimism about the prospects for peaceful unification may lead the PRC to perceive that it has the ability to pursue a successful operation against Taiwan. Beijing’s lessons learned from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine could prompt the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to adjust its war plans for Taiwan to become more effective and deadly. Coupled together, these developments may suggest an accelerated timeline for seizing Taiwan. It is therefore urgent that the United States, in conjunction with its regional allies and partners, identify ways to deter the PRC from invading Taiwan and prevent a future conflict. To do so, the Gaming Lab at CNAS, in partnership with NBC’s Meet the Press, conducted a high-level strategic-operational wargame exploring a fictional war over Taiwan, set in 2027. The wargame sought to illuminate the dilemmas that U.S. and Chinese policymakers might face in such a conflict, along with the strategies they might adopt to achieve their overarching objectives. The game was intended to produce insights as to how the United States and its allies and partners could deter the PRC from invading Taiwan and could better position themselves to defend Taiwan and defeat such aggression should deterrence fail.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Conflict, and War Games
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, Asia-Pacific, and United States of America

33. Mediating the political transformation of non-state armed groups Workshop report

Author:
Berghof Foundation
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Berghof Foundation
Abstract:
Together with the United Nations DPO DDR section, our team working to improve international support to transformation processes of non-state armed groups after wars and conflicts, organised a workshop with international experts in Berlin.
Topic:
International Cooperation, United Nations, Governance, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Global Focus

34. Trapped in Conflict: Reforming Military Strategy to Save Lives in Colombia

Author:
International Crisis Group
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
Colombia’s new president, Gustavo Petro, says he will work to bring “total peace” to the countryside, including areas roiled by violent competition among criminal and other armed groups. This task will require significant changes to military approaches devised for fighting the insurgencies of the past.
Topic:
Crime, Governance, Leadership, Conflict, Peace, and Gangs
Political Geography:
Colombia and South America

35. Avoiding a Return to War in Myanmar’s Rakhine State

Author:
International Crisis Group
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
An unofficial ceasefire has kept Rakhine State quiet compared to much of Myanmar following the 2021 coup. But friction is building between the military and ethnic Rakhine fighters. The parties should strike a formal deal to avert a return to war.
Topic:
War, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Peace
Political Geography:
Asia and Myanmar

36. Risky Competition: Strengthening U.S.-China Crisis Management

Author:
International Crisis Group
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
As their strategic rivalry grows, China and the U.S. are increasingly operating in close proximity in the Asia Pacific. An accident or misinterpreted signal could set off a wider confrontation. The danger level is low, but dialogue is needed to dial it down further.
Topic:
Conflict, Crisis Management, Rivalry, and Competition
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

37. Syria: Ruling over Aleppo’s Ruins

Author:
International Crisis Group
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
Aleppo was devastated by bombing and shelling during the Syrian war. It remains unsafe, with residents subject to shakedowns by the regime’s security forces and various militias. Damascus and its outside backers should curb this predation as a crucial first step toward the city’s recovery.
Topic:
Security, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Recovery
Political Geography:
Middle East and Syria

38. Managing Vigilantism in Nigeria: A Near-term Necessity

Author:
International Crisis Group
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
Vigilantes have become so important to protecting the Nigerian public that for now the country has little choice but to rely on them. Yet there are dangers. Authorities should better regulate these groups, while working to restore citizens’ trust in the police.
Topic:
Governance, Conflict, Police, and Vigilantism
Political Geography:
Africa and Nigeria

39. Addressing Islamist Militancy in the Southern Philippines

Author:
International Crisis Group
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
The transition to self-rule in the Bangsamoro, the majority-Muslim region in the southern Philippines, is proceeding apace. Militants outside the associated peace process are losing strength but could recover. Regional and national authorities should do all in their power to keep that from happening.
Topic:
Religion, Governance, Conflict, and Violence
Political Geography:
Philippines and Oceania

40. Rebels, Victims, Peacebuilders: Women in Cameroon’s Anglophone Conflict

Author:
International Crisis Group
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
Years of fighting between separatists and the state in Cameroon have hit women hard, uprooting hundreds of thousands. The government and external partners should step up aid for the displaced. Donors should start planning now for including women activists in future peace talks.
Topic:
Women, Conflict, Peace, Victims, and Peacebuilding
Political Geography:
Africa and Cameroon

41. Brokering a Ceasefire in Yemen’s Economic Conflict

Author:
International Crisis Group
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
Alongside the battles over territory, the parties to Yemen’s war are embroiled in fights for control of key parts of the country’s economy. The latter struggle causes great civilian suffering. The new UN envoy should make it a central task to achieve an economic truce.
Topic:
Diplomacy, International Cooperation, United Nations, Conflict, Peace, and Ceasefire
Political Geography:
Yemen and Persian Gulf

42. Winter is Coming: The Baltics and The Russia-Ukraine War

Author:
Leon Hartwell, Agnė Rakštytė, Julia Ryng, and Ēriks Kristiāns Selga
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
LSE IDEAS
Abstract:
In this LSE IDEAS Special Report, the authors focus on the impact of the Russia-Ukraine war on the Baltics. The report highlights both collective and country-level impacts and responses to the conflict. It is argued that Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania have been among the top supporters of Ukraine, not merely in terms of military aid, but also with regards to providing substantial diplomatic and humanitarian support during Ukraine’s darkest hour since the breakup of the Soviet Union. Moreover, it is argued that this literal and metaphorical winter will be a key challenge, not only for Ukraine, but also for the Baltics. Given how closely the fate of Ukraine is intertwined with Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, the manner in which the Baltics and NATO respond to the winter could significantly influence the Russia-Ukraine war. A key strategic priority for the Baltics and NATO should be to promote resilience of everything from defense to energy security. Accordingly, the Report concludes with a variety of key policy recommendations aimed at the Baltics, EU and NATO.
Topic:
Security, NATO, European Union, Conflict, Resilience, Energy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, and Baltic States

43. And So Now… It’s War?

Author:
Carl Conetta
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Project on Defense Alternatives
Abstract:
The battle within Ukraine and the USA-Russia contest over it has returned Europe to the darkest, most ominous period of the 1947-1989 Cold War. That this should happen with both the United States and Russia barreling grimly forward reflects a singular failure of diplomacy and common sense. There were two recent points in time when positive leadership might have turned us away from the path of disaster. Fortunately, one of these is not yet foreclosed. Movement toward resolution begins with recognizing that all sides, all stakeholders share fault for the current crisis. And no side has told the whole truth of it. Without question, Russian intervention in Ukraine’s civil conflict violates international law. Although Russia has the right to defend itself from attack, this proviso does not apply in the current situation. The annexation of Crimea was illegal, as is Russian intervention in the Donbass. This is indisputable.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, NATO, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America

44. Russia-Ukraine War: Estimating Casualties & Military Equipment Losses

Author:
Carl Conetta
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Project on Defense Alternatives
Abstract:
Within days of the Russian invasion, it became clear that Moscow’s effort to seize Ukraine had stumbled badly. The Russian military had expected a quick win, but found itself facing a hard slog instead. But why? And how to measure the conflict now?
Topic:
NATO, Weapons, Conflict, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

45. China’s Antarctic Ambitions – and Their Implications for Australia

Author:
Yun Jiang
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
In a new special report AIIA China Matters Fellow Yun Jiang argues that popular Australian concerns around the Antarctic ambitions of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), including possible territorial claims, militarisation, and mining, are overstated.
Topic:
Military Strategy, Territorial Disputes, Hegemony, Conflict, Mining, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and Australia

46. Public Perception of Serbian Foreign Policy in the Midst of the War in Ukraine

Author:
Vuk Vuksanovic, Luka Steric, and Maja Bjelos
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Kosovar Centre for Security Studies (KCSS)
Abstract:
The war in Ukraine did not significantly affect the perception of the Serbian public regarding the major issues of Serbian foreign and security policy. In this context, this relates to how Serbian citizens think about the influence of great powers in their country and how the public perceives its relations with Russia and Western security institutions, the EU and NATO. The public opinion surveys also showed that the issue of Kosovo is still being perceived as a major foreign policy priority. There is a powerful cynicism in how the Serbian public views great power influences, as most respondents believe that external great powers bribe Serbian politicians and moguls to further their interests in the country. Russia and China are perceived as close foreign policy partners of Serbia, putting them in clear advantage over those who favour the EU on that front. The respondents also believed that Russia and China are sincere friends of Serbia and not players guided by their self-interest. As opposed to the study conducted by the Belgrade Centre for Security Policy (BCSP) in 2020, which noted that Serbs perceived Chinese influence in the country as more positive than Russian influence, the latest survey shows that those who believe Russian influence in Serbia is positive have a slight edge over those who believe the same about Chinese influence. This is most likely the result of the fact that China has not been in the spotlight in recent months.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Public Opinion, Conflict, Russia-Ukraine War, and Perception
Political Geography:
Europe, Kosovo, Serbia, and Balkans

47. The Coming Storm: Insights from Ukraine about Escalation in Modern War

Author:
Benjamin Jensen and Adrian Bogart
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
Based on three crisis simulations held in late March 2022 with think tank fellows, military planners, and congressional staffers, The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) will likely struggle to address escalation vectors almost certain to push the current war in Ukraine beyond the country’s borders. This paper captures key insights from across these simulations based on two triggering events: (1) a Russian surgical strike on a NATO logistics hub used to provide weapons to Ukraine in southeast Poland, and (2) Russian use of chemical weapons along the Polish border while simultaneously mobilizing to threaten the Baltics. As the conflict crossed a key threshold and risked becoming a regional war, most participants found a natural pull to escalate in each scenario despite limited expectations of achieving a position of competitive advantage. Analyzing how individuals and teams approached decision making provides insights on rethinking escalation models in the twenty-first century and taking advantage of new concepts and capabilities to better support signaling during a crisis.
Topic:
Security, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

48. Of Ships and Cyber: Transposing the Incidents at Sea Agreement

Author:
Alexander Klimburg
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
Amid the geopolitical crises caused by Russia’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine, it may seem wildly optimistic—or even bad diplomacy—to consider future arms-control scenarios for cyber operations. However, good policy needs to prepare for the day after tomorrow, and smart policy will look at what has gone wrong today and what can be learned from yesterday. Arguably, one element that may have contributed to rising geopolitical tensions over the past decade has been a lack of clear cyber signals among the main adversaries. This makes it even more urgent to consider what can be learned from past arms-control exercises such as the vaunted Incidents at Sea (INCSEA) Agreement—especially as this accord was conceived in the wake of several of its own perilous crises. In 1962, a lack of agreed signaling protocols nearly led to World War III. According to a riveting account in the 2020 book Nuclear Folly, 1 on October 27, 1962—at the height of the Cuban Missile Crisis—the U.S. Navy cornered one of the few Soviet submarines unaccounted for off Cuba. In an effort to convince the Foxtrot-class B-59 submarine to surface, the destroyer USS Cony employed practice depth charges—which were not accurately identified as such by B-59’s beleaguered crew. When, in the middle of the night, the submarine did indeed surface, a low-flying anti-submarine aircraft dropped flares and pyrotechnics so it could take better photographs. This seemed like an attack to the submarine, and the exhausted captain of B-59 ordered a crash dive and speculated that perhaps the war had already broken out. He gave orders to prepare to launch a 10-kiloton nuclear torpedo at the U.S. Navy task force. It took a near-mutiny by senior officers to stop him. This close call remained unknown until fairly recently. But several more prominent naval incidents throughout 1960s convinced the Soviet Union and the United States that a basic common agreement was necessary, and the Cold War “thaw” of the early 1970s made this possible.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Cybersecurity, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, North America, and United States of America

49. It's Moving Time: Taiwanese Business Responds to Growing U.S.-China Tensions

Author:
Scott Kennedy
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
A new report by the CSIS Trustee Chair in Chinese Business and Economics interprets a formal survey of over 500 Taiwanese business executives, documenting their views about the evolving environment on the island and beyond. The Washington policy community is quite familiar with the views that U.S. and European companies hold toward China, but less clear are the views of Taiwanese companies that are central to the story of the world’s interaction with China. Their opinions have implications for Taiwan’s economic trajectory, cross-strait relations, global supply chains, and the effectiveness of U.S. policy in the region. The report documents that Taiwanese companies are highly concerned about their potential overdependence on the Chinese economy and the possibility of a military conflict. As a result, there is significant support for expanding trade and investment ties via regional arrangements and bilaterally with the United States, as well as for maintaining Taiwan’s technological edge through more spending on research and development and broadening restrictions for technology transfer to China. But perhaps the most noteworthy finding is that Taiwanese companies appear to be moving their businesses at record levels from Mainland China, but also from Taiwan. This report, by Trustee Chair Scott Kennedy, explains how the survey was carried out, then analyzes the sources of Taiwanese companies’ anxieties and the ways they are responding, and concludes by considering the policy implications for all parties involved. The report’s appendix provides a full summary of the original survey results.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Territorial Disputes, Business, Conflict, and Rivalry
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, Asia, North America, and United States of America

50. What If . . . Alternatives to a Chinese Military Invasion of Taiwan Image

Author:
Benjamin Jensen, Riley McCabe, and Adrian Bogart
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
With the 20th Party Congress approaching and Xi Jinping seeking an unprecedented third term, it is important to explore the full range of actions Beijing could take to coerce Taiwan over the next 10 years. History provides a range of historical cases that suggest alternatives to a full-scale invasion. As part of its On Future War series, the CSIS International Security Program adapted six historical cases of coercion China could use to target Taiwan short of a costly amphibious invasion. The report looks back to look ahead, using the logic of historical cases ranging from the 1948 Berlin Airlift to the 1980s Tanker War in the Arabian Gulf to identify ways and means Beijing could use to compel Taiwan. The resulting range of scenarios point toward an urgent need to develop new escalation management frameworks supporting the new integrated deterrence strategy.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, and Conflict
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, and Asia