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Begin New Search Topic Conflict Content Type Special Report Publication Year within 25 Years

1. China, climate and conflict in the Indo-Pacific

Author:
Anastasia Kapetas
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
This paper surveys the current reporting and analysis on climate and security to explore the implications that climate change may have for China’s ability to prosecute its security goals in the region’s three major hotspots: the SCS, Taiwan and the India–China border conflict. Those three hotspots all involve longstanding border and territorial disputes between China and other nations and may draw in various levels of US involvement should China continue to escalate tensions.
Topic:
Security, Climate Change, and Conflict
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and Indo-Pacific

2. The World After Taiwan’s Fall

Author:
David Santoro, Ralph Cossa, Ian Easton, Malcolm Davis, and Matake Kamiya
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Pacific Forum
Abstract:
Let us start with our bottom line: a failure of the United States to come to Taiwan’s aid—politically, economically, and militarily—would devastate the Unites States’ credibility and defense commitments to its allies and partners, not just in Asia, but globally. If the United States tries but fails to prevent a Chinese takeover of Taiwan, the impact could be equally devastating unless there is a concentrated, coordinated U.S. attempt with likeminded allies and partners to halt further Chinese aggression and eventually roll back Beijing’s ill-gotten gains. This is not a hypothetical assessment. Taiwan has been increasingly under the threat of a military takeover by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and, even today, is under attack politically, economically, psychologically, and through so-called “gray zone” military actions short of actual combat. The U.S. government, U.S. allies, and others have begun to pay attention to this problem, yet to this day, they have not sufficiently appreciated the strategic implications that such a takeover would generate. To address this problem, the Pacific Forum has conducted a multi-authored study to raise awareness in Washington, key allied capitals, and beyond about the consequences of a Chinese victory in a war over Taiwan and, more importantly, to drive them to take appropriate action to prevent it. The study, which provides six national perspectives on this question (a U.S., Australian, Japanese, Korean, Indian, and European perspective) and fed its findings and recommendations into the second round of the DTRA SI-STT-sponsored (and Pacific Forum-run) Track 2 “U.S.-Taiwan Deterrence and Defense Dialogue,”[1] outlines these strategic implications in two alternative scenarios. In the first scenario, China attacks Taiwan and it falls with no outside assistance from the United States or others. In the other scenario, Taiwan falls to China despite outside assistance (i.e., “a too little, too late” scenario).
Topic:
Security, Conflict, Crisis Management, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
Japan, China, Europe, India, Taiwan, Asia, Korea, and United States of America

3. Countering hybrid threats: The role of the Joint Expeditionary Force

Author:
Adaja Stoetman and Dick Zandee
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
Russia’s war in Ukraine has fundamentally changed the international order that is based on norms and values of state sovereignty and international law. While the Balkan wars in the nineties were the result of internal turmoil leading to the collapse of Yugoslavia, the Russian-Ukrainian armed conflict marks the return of large-scale interstate warfare in Europe for the first time since the end of the Second World War. A year after the Russian invasion was launched on 24 February 2022, valuable lessons can already be drawn for the characteristics of modern warfare. The conflict has shown – both in the run-up to the invasion as well as after the start of the war – that non-military aspects are part of Russia’s strategy. Well-known examples are the abuse of the European ‘oil and gas dependency’ on Russia, the spread of disinformation, cyberattacks and the channelling of refugees and migration flows. What these means have in common is that they are aimed at undermining the unity of the West and destabilising their societies and democracies. This very complex set of hybrid threats raises new questions on how to respond to them, as the hybrid domain requires the involvement of many different actors at the national and international level: from various ministries and even private companies (such as the energy sector) to the EU and NATO. As hybrid challenges have become an integral part of modern conflict, the question has arisen what kind of role should be laid down for the armed forces. Hybrid challenges are very often of a transboundary and non-military nature. Therefore, they have to be addressed primarily by civil actors. But in addition, the military can also play a role in countering hybrid threats, and this raises the question of the role of multinational (military) formats such as the Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF). The JEF is a multinational military formation of northern European countries with the United Kingdom as the lead nation. Since 2019, the JEF has increasingly focused its activities on the hybrid domain. The war in Ukraine has been a catalyst for increased cooperation in the JEF context at the political, policy and military operational levels. The Russian threat, both physically (conventional forces) and virtually/digitally, has become the main focus of attention. It is in the latter category of threats that the JEF Nations are struggling with the question of what its role should be. This report explores the possible role of the JEF in hybrid conflicts and how cooperation in the JEF can be attained. The first chapter addresses the role of military forces in responding to hybrid threats and what the JEF has realised in this context so far. Particular attention will be given to the challenges of but also the opportunities for connecting military activities with those of non-military actors. The second chapter focusses on the roles of NATO and the EU in the hybrid domain and how the JEF could relate to the efforts of these international organisations. The potential impact of the future NATO membership of Finland and Sweden – both JEF Participating Nations – is also addressed. The third chapter zooms in on the potential of the JEF’s role and functions in the hybrid domain and how this should be implemented. The growing political character of the JEF cooperation is also addressed. The report ends with a list of conclusions and recommendations for the Netherlands. The methodology used for this report consists of a mix of literature research and a series of interviews with government representatives and members of think tanks in a selection of JEF Nations as well as with staff officers at the JEF Headquarters, at the NATO Headquarters and at EU institutions. These interviews were held under the application of the Chatham House rule. The authors are grateful to all interviewees for their valuable contributions.
Topic:
Conflict, Hybrid Threats, International Order, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe

4. Twilight Institutions: Land conflict and hybrid authorities in Benin’s Borgou department

Author:
Kars de Bruijne
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
The Borgou Department is a large administrative area with eight communes and 43 districts spanning over 25,856 square kilometers. The department primarily comprises the Bariba, Dendi, Boo (about 40%) and Fulani ethnic groups (about 33%). The majority of the first three groups are farmers, and the Fulani are primarily nomadic or semi-nomadic cattle and sheepherders. The Borgou Department in Northern Benin has seen communal conflict over the past few years. There are escalating tensions between farmers and herders, even though there has also been more violence between the supporters of the former president Boni Yayi and those of the sitting President Patrice Talon (particularly in 2019 and 2020). Communal conflicts between farmers and herders in Borgou have multiple driving forces. This report explores one of these: changing land management systems. It is argued that recent changes in land management are in any event likely to become a stronger driver of tensions in Borgou in the near future. Exploring land management systems and their impact on the Borgou is relevant for two reasons. First, there is simply very little literature on changing land management systems in Benin. For example, in August 2017 Benin’s authorities modified the 2013 Land Code to limit land conflicts and to modernize the institutional framework governing land acquisition and management. But exactly what the impact of this change has been has not been fully explored. Second, Northern Benin has experienced the problem of increasing violent extremist activity. While this activity is concentrated in the Alibori and Atacora regions, it is conceivable that once it has become established it might further escalate, with Borgou being a possible area of expansion. Being able to focus on vulnerabilities with the aim of addressing them is important for Benin’s stability. Research and media reports point to an increase in both the number and intensity of farmer-herder confrontations in the Borgou Department over the past five years. From the literature, it is apparent that this shift is driven by two factors. On the one hand, it is the effect of the demographic growth of and the increase in the cattle population which results in more competition for land. On the other hand, the introduction of land reforms by successive governments has tended to reinforce the feeling of insecurity among essentially illiterate farmers and herders.
Topic:
Violent Extremism, Conflict, Institutions, and Land Rights
Political Geography:
Africa and Benin

5. What North Korea Has Been Learning From Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine

Author:
Tereza Novotná
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
East-West Center
Abstract:
A year ago, in February 2022, Russia invaded its neighbor, Ukraine. Russian aggression has upended the post-war security mechanisms in Europe and made the international multilateral system, including the UN Security Council, more fragile and ineffective than ever. Even though the war in Ukraine has implications for security in Northeast Asia, many Asian nations consider it a distant issue for Europeans to solve. However, this perspective mirrors what Europe’s Asian counterparts, especially the Koreans, have faced for decades. It serves as an apt analogy for explaining the dangers of North Korea to Europe. North Korea is also watching the war closely to discern what lessons or leverage can be extracted from the unfolding conflict. This short article reflects on two lessons and three opportunities that the War in Ukraine presents to Kim Jong Un and concludes with recommendations on what the Europeans could do in the near future.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Conflict, Russia-Ukraine War, and Invasion
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, Asia, and North Korea

6. Global Peace Index 2023

Author:
Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP)
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Economics & Peace (IEP)
Abstract:
This is the 17th edition of the Global Peace Index (GPI), which ranks 163 independent states and territories according to their level of peacefulness. Produced by the Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP), the GPI is the world’s leading measure of global peacefulness. This report presents the most comprehensive datadriven analysis to-date on trends in peace, its economic value, and how to develop peaceful societies. The GPI covers 163 countries comprising 99.7 per cent of the world’s population, using 23 qualitative and quantitative indicators from highly respected sources, and measures the state of peace across three domains: the level of Societal Safety and Security; the extent of Ongoing Domestic and International Conflict; and the degree of Militarisation. In addition to discussing the findings from the 2023 GPI, the report includes analysis of current conflicts and potential future conflicts, including an analysis of the likely economic impact of a Chinese blockade of Taiwan on the global economy. This year’s results found that the average level of global peacefulness deteriorated by 0.42 per cent. This is the thirteenth deterioration in peacefulness in the last fifteen years, with 84 countries improving and 79 deteriorating in peacefulness in 2022.
Topic:
Economics, Conflict, and Peace
Political Geography:
Global Focus

7. The Challenges of Climate Financing in Conflict Contexts

Author:
Sagal Abshir
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
European Institute of Peace (EIP)
Abstract:
The “Challenges of climate finance in conflict contexts” is a paper by Sagal Abshir, senior advisor to the Environmental Peacemaking Project in Somalia, supported by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Amidst a general global underfunding of climate action, fragile and conflict-affected states struggle to secure climate financing. This is the case even for countries where climate change exacerbates the impact of chronic war and poverty. Although the funding gap is known, climate finance flows are scarce and scattered to fragile and conflict-affected to adapt and mitigate lag behind what has been promised and what is needed. In the cases of Somalia and Yemen, which are highly vulnerable to climate impacts, it averaged only USD 2 per capita. More generally, the total annual global flows of climate-related finance averaged a little over USD 600B in 2019-2020 – only a third of the IPCC’s estimate of funding required to reach our climate targets – from which only 10 per cent is directed to climate adaptation. The challenges in preparing communities and governments in fragile and conflict-affected states for climate impacts call for a new imagination, new mechanisms, and mobilizing political commitment to ensure climate financing flows help people in these countries respond to climate risks. Other solutions are on the horizon: well-designed climate action can serve as an opportunity to consolidate peace. Lessons learned from pilot climate responses in war-torn countries demonstrated that climate adaptation could contribute to conflict prevention and resolution efforts, such as in the case of Sudan and Nepal. In this paper, Sagal Abshir explores the status of climate finance for the extremely fragile and climate-vulnerable countries of Somalia and Yemen. The author reviews the global climate financing landscape and some challenges of deploying climate financing resources in these contexts. Using Somalia and Yemen as case studies, the paper will take a closer look at how these two countries have fared; and conclude with some reflections and recommendations.
Topic:
Climate Change, Environment, Climate Finance, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Africa and Somalia

8. Rolling the Iron Dice: The Increasing Chance of Conflict Protraction

Author:
Andrew Metrick
Publication Date:
11-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
The prospect of a Sino-American war looms on the horizon. No scenario for such a conflict has garnered more interest than the potential invasion of Taiwan by the People’s Republic of China (PRC). In the United States, discussions have focused on the early days of a conflict, in particular sinking the PRC’s amphibious fleet.1 Both the United States and the PRC place great emphasis on offensive military operations that heavily use the fruits of the precision strike revolution (PSR).2 This focus on early offensive action leads immediately to considerations of forces and weapons. U.S. defense planners are unsurprisingly most comfortable with the dynamics of short, sharp wars, having spent the past decade focused on deterring or defeating adversary faits accomplis, short and often opportunistic campaigns of aggression. Speed, political sophistication, and immediate military overmatch seemed to be the key ingredients for victory. Russia’s seizure of Crimea in 2014 was seen as a template for other future aggressors to follow.3 Prolonged wars of attrition, particularly those involving the United States, were thought no longer possible. Russia’s subsequent invasion of Ukraine in 2022 turned this vision on its head, demonstrating the military and political consequences of trying and failing to obtain a similar fait accompli on a larger scale. The ongoing Russian experiences in Ukraine indicate a need to reevaluate such thinking and consider the potential of protraction in the context of a hypothetical U.S.-PRC conflict. Most work on this topic has considered only the initial days and weeks of hostilities, usually over Taiwan or in the South or East China Seas.4 There has been comparably little discussion of what comes after.5 There are three key concepts that inform the following discussions: exhaustion, sanctuary, and protraction. Exhaustion is the point when large-scale offensive operations are no longer possible as offensive military capabilities have been used up. Afterward, some period of reconstitution and recovery is needed. This requires sanctuary, the relative freedom from attack sufficient for the rebuilding of military forces and capacities. Protraction occurs after at least one cycle of exhaustion and recovery. It is closely tied to pre-conflict leadership beliefs about the length of the looming war. A simplified definition of a protracted war is a conflict that lasts longer than leaders expect; it is a mismatch between political-military expectations and reality. Doctrinal developments in both the PRC and the United States, influenced by improvements in technology, place significant emphasis on the early stages of conflict and rapid, offensive operations. The emphasis by both the PRC and the United States on the early stages of the conflict can be seen in the PRC’s system destruction warfare and United States’ denial-centric concepts that aim for rapid decisive results.6 These approaches focus almost exclusively on the operational level of war, ignoring strategic factors animating the conflict and shaping its termination. Should PRC President Xi Jinping commit the PLA to seizing Taiwan by force, enter a war with the United States, and “roll the iron dice,” protraction appears increasingly likely, contrary to most contemporary military thinking and preparation.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Conflict, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, Asia, North America, and United States of America

9. The Coming Storm: Insights from Ukraine about Escalation in Modern War

Author:
Benjamin Jensen and Adrian Bogart
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
Based on three crisis simulations held in late March 2022 with think tank fellows, military planners, and congressional staffers, The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) will likely struggle to address escalation vectors almost certain to push the current war in Ukraine beyond the country’s borders. This paper captures key insights from across these simulations based on two triggering events: (1) a Russian surgical strike on a NATO logistics hub used to provide weapons to Ukraine in southeast Poland, and (2) Russian use of chemical weapons along the Polish border while simultaneously mobilizing to threaten the Baltics. As the conflict crossed a key threshold and risked becoming a regional war, most participants found a natural pull to escalate in each scenario despite limited expectations of achieving a position of competitive advantage. Analyzing how individuals and teams approached decision making provides insights on rethinking escalation models in the twenty-first century and taking advantage of new concepts and capabilities to better support signaling during a crisis.
Topic:
Security, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

10. Of Ships and Cyber: Transposing the Incidents at Sea Agreement

Author:
Alexander Klimburg
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
Amid the geopolitical crises caused by Russia’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine, it may seem wildly optimistic—or even bad diplomacy—to consider future arms-control scenarios for cyber operations. However, good policy needs to prepare for the day after tomorrow, and smart policy will look at what has gone wrong today and what can be learned from yesterday. Arguably, one element that may have contributed to rising geopolitical tensions over the past decade has been a lack of clear cyber signals among the main adversaries. This makes it even more urgent to consider what can be learned from past arms-control exercises such as the vaunted Incidents at Sea (INCSEA) Agreement—especially as this accord was conceived in the wake of several of its own perilous crises. In 1962, a lack of agreed signaling protocols nearly led to World War III. According to a riveting account in the 2020 book Nuclear Folly, 1 on October 27, 1962—at the height of the Cuban Missile Crisis—the U.S. Navy cornered one of the few Soviet submarines unaccounted for off Cuba. In an effort to convince the Foxtrot-class B-59 submarine to surface, the destroyer USS Cony employed practice depth charges—which were not accurately identified as such by B-59’s beleaguered crew. When, in the middle of the night, the submarine did indeed surface, a low-flying anti-submarine aircraft dropped flares and pyrotechnics so it could take better photographs. This seemed like an attack to the submarine, and the exhausted captain of B-59 ordered a crash dive and speculated that perhaps the war had already broken out. He gave orders to prepare to launch a 10-kiloton nuclear torpedo at the U.S. Navy task force. It took a near-mutiny by senior officers to stop him. This close call remained unknown until fairly recently. But several more prominent naval incidents throughout 1960s convinced the Soviet Union and the United States that a basic common agreement was necessary, and the Cold War “thaw” of the early 1970s made this possible.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Cybersecurity, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, North America, and United States of America

11. It's Moving Time: Taiwanese Business Responds to Growing U.S.-China Tensions

Author:
Scott Kennedy
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
A new report by the CSIS Trustee Chair in Chinese Business and Economics interprets a formal survey of over 500 Taiwanese business executives, documenting their views about the evolving environment on the island and beyond. The Washington policy community is quite familiar with the views that U.S. and European companies hold toward China, but less clear are the views of Taiwanese companies that are central to the story of the world’s interaction with China. Their opinions have implications for Taiwan’s economic trajectory, cross-strait relations, global supply chains, and the effectiveness of U.S. policy in the region. The report documents that Taiwanese companies are highly concerned about their potential overdependence on the Chinese economy and the possibility of a military conflict. As a result, there is significant support for expanding trade and investment ties via regional arrangements and bilaterally with the United States, as well as for maintaining Taiwan’s technological edge through more spending on research and development and broadening restrictions for technology transfer to China. But perhaps the most noteworthy finding is that Taiwanese companies appear to be moving their businesses at record levels from Mainland China, but also from Taiwan. This report, by Trustee Chair Scott Kennedy, explains how the survey was carried out, then analyzes the sources of Taiwanese companies’ anxieties and the ways they are responding, and concludes by considering the policy implications for all parties involved. The report’s appendix provides a full summary of the original survey results.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Territorial Disputes, Business, Conflict, and Rivalry
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, Asia, North America, and United States of America

12. What If . . . Alternatives to a Chinese Military Invasion of Taiwan Image

Author:
Benjamin Jensen, Riley McCabe, and Adrian Bogart
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
With the 20th Party Congress approaching and Xi Jinping seeking an unprecedented third term, it is important to explore the full range of actions Beijing could take to coerce Taiwan over the next 10 years. History provides a range of historical cases that suggest alternatives to a full-scale invasion. As part of its On Future War series, the CSIS International Security Program adapted six historical cases of coercion China could use to target Taiwan short of a costly amphibious invasion. The report looks back to look ahead, using the logic of historical cases ranging from the 1948 Berlin Airlift to the 1980s Tanker War in the Arabian Gulf to identify ways and means Beijing could use to compel Taiwan. The resulting range of scenarios point toward an urgent need to develop new escalation management frameworks supporting the new integrated deterrence strategy.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, and Conflict
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, and Asia

13. Military Stockpiles: A Life-Insurance Policy in a High-Intensity Conflict?

Author:
Léo Péria-Peigné
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
For the first time after thirty years of budgetary restriction, European armies must face a high-intensity conflict involving heavy human and material losses. Having run down their military stockpiles to the bare minimum, supporting Ukraine has taken a heavy toll on their operational inventory; as modern operational inventories are limited, much decommissioned and older equipment has also been donated. Russia too has mobilized its extensive military stockpiles, inherited from the USSR, to maintain its combat capability after the initial failure of its “special military operation”. Russian efforts to retrofit older systems have also intensified as production of modern equipment has stalled. As a result, we are seeing modern and ancient weapons pitted against each other in Ukraine. This situation raises questions about France’s military storage strategy and prompts comparisons with those of other nations. US forces have kept a significant proportion of their Cold War arsenal in working condition, using it as a valuable commercial, diplomatic, and military asset. This arsenal also allows the United States to dominate the second-hand weapons market as it can supply cheap and almost immediately available systems. In Russia, despite an apparent modernization process, military power still relies on Soviet-era stocks of vehicles and weapons. For the Russian navy, modernization of old hulls is a way to compensate for the slow production of modern ships. Chinese armed forces are being modernized and rationalized: substantial quantities of older equipment could therefore become available before 2030, a potential asset for Chinese diplomacy. In Europe, military stockpiling strategies diverge along a rough east–west line. Western powers such as the United Kingdom and France chose quality over quantity, while Eastern ones, closer to the Russian threat, try to maintain large volumes while also modernizing their equipment. While the war in Ukraine may prompt Western nations to begin a reinforcement program, Eastern European countries such as Poland had already begun their own before 2014 and the Crimea crisis. After the 2015 terrorist attacks in Paris, France began to restore its military means and budgets, but the overall size of its armed forces is still inadequate to face a high-intensity conflict. The professionalization of the armed forces, the 2008 financial crisis, and budget cuts progressively led to the practice of stockpiling being replaced with a generalized “just-in-time” approach, to reduce infrastructure needs and costs more broadly. French armed forces had to make tough choices with their limited budgets, keeping what was immediately useful to their current missions and abandoning what was not. Operations in Africa and the Middle East and anti-terrorist operations in French cities absorbed considerable budgets, while specialized military units and infrastructure necessary to maintain stocks required for high-intensity conflicts were disbanded. Several initiatives and processes are at work to restore minimum storage capabilities, but a relevant stockpiling strategy, in line with France’s resources and strategic context, is still far off. The French army is building several military reserve units that could drive greater retention of older equipment and vehicles, although compatibility issues with more recent models may arise. As storing combat aircraft would be far too costly, the French Air and Space Force is trying to optimize the availability of its fleet, especially through a new approach to private industry partners in maintenance and training. The French navy has initiated a reform and rationalization process of its spare-parts-storage policy to optimize the availability of its ships as well as their capabilities. A coherent equipment reserve and stockpiling program is an essential component of a military driven by a clear strategic framework. However, in the French case, this strategy is currently being pulled in two directions: between the probable end of expeditionary operations in Africa and the Middle East, and the likelihood of a high-intensity conflict. The whole French stockpiling approach cannot be based entirely on the experience in Ukraine, and it is therefore necessary to evaluate multiple probable scenarios to develop relevant recommendations. A conflict in Eastern Europe fought by a coalition differs from one led by Europe without US support, or from a major crisis in the French territories of the Pacific or Indian Ocean. Moreover, recommendations must reflect military realities, as French resources are limited and would not allow for the creation of a reserve stock strategy similar to that of the United States. To support an allied nation under attack, the French army would need a much expanded ammunition stockpile. Similarly, the French air force lacks advanced munitions, while the French navy needs to rebuild a support fleet sufficient to enable combat operations far away from the French mainland and infrastructure.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Conflict, Industry, and Armament
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, France, and United States of America

14. Appraising the War in Ukraine and Likely Outcomes

Author:
Philip Wasielewski
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
After six weeks of combat, where is the Russo-Ukrainian War going? Modern technology both facilitates and hampers the answer to that question. Every day, this war is evaluated from every angle and perspective, but modern technology provides only a soda-straw view of the war’s entire canvas. This article will try to discern that larger canvas of the war, including a focus on casualties, information operations and morale, and logistics to see how they and the tactical correlation of forces may influence several possible strategic outcomes.
Topic:
Conflict, Military Tactics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Eurasia, and Ukraine

15. Reviving the Prospects for Coercive Diplomacy in Ukraine

Author:
Sean Monaghan
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
The United States and its allies in the West have been unable to use the threat of military force to coerce Russia into stopping its war in Ukraine. In part, this is because the West is more concerned about escalation than Russia. Further analysis using Alexander L. George’s framework of coercive diplomacy, however, suggests the problem is more complex and deep-rooted: Few of the historical conditions or factors that favor coercive diplomacy are present in Ukraine. This analysis reveals three things the United States and its allies should do to revive the prospects of ending the war in Ukraine through coercive diplomacy. First, they should take smaller, more achievable steps which are less likely to inspire Russia to double-down. Second, they should exploit Russia’s deteriorating position through a mixture of carrots and sticks. Finally, the West should seek to minimize the intensity of its wider confrontation with Russia and focus on strategic stability as an end in itself. This will be challenging because of the gravity of Russian atrocities in Ukraine. But it may help end the war through coercive diplomacy, and avoid a serious miscalculation with Russia.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Conflict, Coercion, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

16. The Evolving Political-Military Aims in the War in Ukraine After 100 Days

Author:
Philip Wasielewski
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
Russian war aims have contracted from conquering Ukraine to simply expanding the territory of the statelets it supposedly went to war to protect. By contrast, Ukraine’s war aims have grown from survival to the recovery of all territory lost to Russia since 2014. These uncompromising objectives lock Russia and Ukraine into a war of attrition with little hope of a negotiated settlement. The ongoing battle in Donbas could provide Russia with some tactical successes and a propaganda victory but probably not a strategic one. In fact, further losses could weaken the Russian army to the point that it enables later Ukrainian counterattacks or even causes the Russian army to fracture. Leaders in Moscow may find that a depleted army leaves them few options for victory and that even their superiority in nuclear weapons may not be as useful as supposed.
Topic:
Politics, Armed Forces, Conflict, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Eurasia, and Ukraine

17. Security Challenges in the Eastern Mediterranean

Author:
Leah Pedro and Aaron Stein
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
On May 2–3 2022, the Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung Syria/Iraq Office and the Foreign Policy Research Institute convened a panel of foreign policy experts for a dialogue on security challenges present in the Eastern Mediterranean. The first day addressed state fragility in the region and how this phenomenon intersects with systemic security issues, including climate change, maritime issues, and migration. The second day of dialogue addressed military issues, including Russian naval modernization, US-Russian regional retrenchment, and how each country views the other’s long-term regional ambitions. Additionally, the conversations in the second day covered European regional security views and how the broader US-Russia rivalry impacts thinking on the continent amidst the current crisis landscape. In each panel, two guest speakers shared their subject matter expertise on the focus topic and a dialogue followed brief presentations. The entirety of the event was conducted under Chatham House Rule, wherein the participants could share views and opinions freely. As a result, findings from these conversations can be more transparent than traditional formal dialogues in traditional diplomatic channels. In this report, we share the consensus highlights and points of contention which came from the discussions. As the nature of Chatham House Rule protects the identity of our participants, below are a few areas of expertise found among those involved in the dialogue.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Climate Change, Diplomacy, Migration, National Security, Economy, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Mediterranean

18. The Art of the Possible: Minimizing Risks as a New European Order Takes Shape

Author:
Gabriela Iveliz Rosa-Hernandez
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
Russia’s war on Ukraine is poised to bring into being a new European security order. Although the last eight months have been full of surprises, that new order may very well be marked by unstable standoffs, buildups, and dangerous activities and incidents between both Ukraine and Russia and Russia and Ukraine’s Western backers. These will risk ever more dangerous crises, all with the threat of nuclear war looming. The last eight years of military deployments, near-simultaneous exercises, and other proximate activities by Russia and NATO offer some hints as to what this future may look like. These, notably, were undertaken not to prevent an escalation in Ukraine but to deter NATO from attacking Russia and vice versa. During this time, discussions about a return to conventional arms control in Europe to mitigate the dangers of military activities gained little traction with policymakers, and the agreements and arrangements that had been in place continued to deteriorate and dwindle. In late 2021, as Russian forces massed on Ukraine’s borders, the West offered Russia a return to conventional arms control solutions. Russia countered with demands that NATO return to its 1990s-era force posture and eschew any further enlargement, and then proceeded to roll its tanks into Ukraine. During the tense months prior to Russia’s invasion, the conventional arms control mechanisms that remained, such as the Vienna Document, made it possible to call out Russia’s buildup, but not reverse it or prevent attack. Although there is little logic and less appetite for new arms control deals now, an end to fighting in Ukraine will create new imperatives to make Europe safer than it is today. While sanctions can limit Russian capacity to some extent, they may well be inadequate to prevent substantial buildups. For this reason, NATO members and their partners should be thinking in advance about how they could limit Russian capabilities via negotiated arrangements with robust verification measures and repercussions for violations. Once the shooting stops in Ukraine, deals such as these could make a more secure Europe, bolstered by more reliable deterrence, attainable.
Topic:
Security, NATO, Arms Control and Proliferation, Conflict, Deterrence, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

19. American Interests in the Ukraine War

Author:
Joshua Shifrinson
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
Policymakers have poorly defined U.S. strategic interests in the Russia-Ukraine War. Those interests that have been defined—deterring future aggression and protecting the “liberal order”—do not stand up to scrutiny. Actual U.S. interests in Ukraine are essentially negative: preventing further escalation or spillover of the conflict and limiting a wholesale collapse in U.S.-Russian relations. The limited interests that the U.S. does have in Ukraine suggest that Washington should try to convince Ukraine and Russia to accept a negotiated settlement.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Liberal Order, Conflict, Strategic Interests, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, Eastern Europe, and United States of America

20. Prepare Ukraine for Victory in a Long War

Author:
Luke Coffey
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
On February 24, Russia invaded Ukraine for the second time in eight years. While many assumed that the war would be short, a stiff Ukrainian defense halted and then successfully counter-attacked against the Russian advances on Kyiv, Sumy, and Kharkiv. After capturing Kherson, Russia’s main advance from occupied Crimea in the south toward Mykolaiv also stalled. At the time of writing, Ukrainian forces are beginning a counterattack in that region and are located approximately 12 miles outside Kherson city center. Mariupol, on the Sea of Azov coastline, fell to the Russians on May 22 after Ukrainian forces made a heroic last stand in the Azovstal iron and steel works. This capture allowed Russia to create a land bridge from the Russian Federation to occupied Crimea. Mariupol’s capture also turned the Sea of Azov into a Russian lake.”1 In the Donbas, which is arguably Russia’s main effort at this stage of the war, Russian troops have made limited advances at a very high cost in equipment and manpower. In late June, Russian forces captured Sievierodonetsk after weeks of heavy fighting, leaving Russia in control of Ukraine’s Luhansk Oblast. Ukrainians are currently defending a front line that is approximately 1,250 miles long—this is equal to the straight- line distance from Washington, DC, to Houston, Texas. Russian public opinion still supports the war.”2 While Russia’s advancements in the Donbas have been slow and costly, there is no indication that Moscow will stop its offensive anytime soon. President Vladimir Putin knows that his legacy rides on Russia’s victory or defeat in Ukraine.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, National Security, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

21. Dangerous Straits: Wargaming a Future Conflict over Taiwan

Author:
Stacie L. Pettyjohn, Becca Wasser, and Chris Dougherty
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
Until recently, U.S. policymakers and subject matter experts have viewed the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC’s) forcible unification with Taiwan as a distant threat. But the mix of rapid Chinese military modernization, a narrow window for localized near-parity with the U.S. military, and growing pessimism about the prospects for peaceful unification may lead the PRC to perceive that it has the ability to pursue a successful operation against Taiwan. Beijing’s lessons learned from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine could prompt the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) to adjust its war plans for Taiwan to become more effective and deadly. Coupled together, these developments may suggest an accelerated timeline for seizing Taiwan. It is therefore urgent that the United States, in conjunction with its regional allies and partners, identify ways to deter the PRC from invading Taiwan and prevent a future conflict. To do so, the Gaming Lab at CNAS, in partnership with NBC’s Meet the Press, conducted a high-level strategic-operational wargame exploring a fictional war over Taiwan, set in 2027. The wargame sought to illuminate the dilemmas that U.S. and Chinese policymakers might face in such a conflict, along with the strategies they might adopt to achieve their overarching objectives. The game was intended to produce insights as to how the United States and its allies and partners could deter the PRC from invading Taiwan and could better position themselves to defend Taiwan and defeat such aggression should deterrence fail.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Conflict, and War Games
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, Asia-Pacific, and United States of America

22. Mediating the political transformation of non-state armed groups Workshop report

Author:
Berghof Foundation
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Berghof Foundation
Abstract:
Together with the United Nations DPO DDR section, our team working to improve international support to transformation processes of non-state armed groups after wars and conflicts, organised a workshop with international experts in Berlin.
Topic:
International Cooperation, United Nations, Governance, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Global Focus

23. Trapped in Conflict: Reforming Military Strategy to Save Lives in Colombia

Author:
International Crisis Group
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
Colombia’s new president, Gustavo Petro, says he will work to bring “total peace” to the countryside, including areas roiled by violent competition among criminal and other armed groups. This task will require significant changes to military approaches devised for fighting the insurgencies of the past.
Topic:
Crime, Governance, Leadership, Conflict, Peace, and Gangs
Political Geography:
Colombia and South America

24. Avoiding a Return to War in Myanmar’s Rakhine State

Author:
International Crisis Group
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
An unofficial ceasefire has kept Rakhine State quiet compared to much of Myanmar following the 2021 coup. But friction is building between the military and ethnic Rakhine fighters. The parties should strike a formal deal to avert a return to war.
Topic:
War, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Peace
Political Geography:
Asia and Myanmar

25. Risky Competition: Strengthening U.S.-China Crisis Management

Author:
International Crisis Group
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
As their strategic rivalry grows, China and the U.S. are increasingly operating in close proximity in the Asia Pacific. An accident or misinterpreted signal could set off a wider confrontation. The danger level is low, but dialogue is needed to dial it down further.
Topic:
Conflict, Crisis Management, Rivalry, and Competition
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

26. Syria: Ruling over Aleppo’s Ruins

Author:
International Crisis Group
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
Aleppo was devastated by bombing and shelling during the Syrian war. It remains unsafe, with residents subject to shakedowns by the regime’s security forces and various militias. Damascus and its outside backers should curb this predation as a crucial first step toward the city’s recovery.
Topic:
Security, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Recovery
Political Geography:
Middle East and Syria

27. Managing Vigilantism in Nigeria: A Near-term Necessity

Author:
International Crisis Group
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
Vigilantes have become so important to protecting the Nigerian public that for now the country has little choice but to rely on them. Yet there are dangers. Authorities should better regulate these groups, while working to restore citizens’ trust in the police.
Topic:
Governance, Conflict, Police, and Vigilantism
Political Geography:
Africa and Nigeria

28. Addressing Islamist Militancy in the Southern Philippines

Author:
International Crisis Group
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
The transition to self-rule in the Bangsamoro, the majority-Muslim region in the southern Philippines, is proceeding apace. Militants outside the associated peace process are losing strength but could recover. Regional and national authorities should do all in their power to keep that from happening.
Topic:
Religion, Governance, Conflict, and Violence
Political Geography:
Philippines and Oceania

29. Rebels, Victims, Peacebuilders: Women in Cameroon’s Anglophone Conflict

Author:
International Crisis Group
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
Years of fighting between separatists and the state in Cameroon have hit women hard, uprooting hundreds of thousands. The government and external partners should step up aid for the displaced. Donors should start planning now for including women activists in future peace talks.
Topic:
Women, Conflict, Peace, Victims, and Peacebuilding
Political Geography:
Africa and Cameroon

30. Brokering a Ceasefire in Yemen’s Economic Conflict

Author:
International Crisis Group
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
Alongside the battles over territory, the parties to Yemen’s war are embroiled in fights for control of key parts of the country’s economy. The latter struggle causes great civilian suffering. The new UN envoy should make it a central task to achieve an economic truce.
Topic:
Diplomacy, International Cooperation, United Nations, Conflict, Peace, and Ceasefire
Political Geography:
Yemen and Persian Gulf

31. Winter is Coming: The Baltics and The Russia-Ukraine War

Author:
Leon Hartwell, Agnė Rakštytė, Julia Ryng, and Ēriks Kristiāns Selga
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
LSE IDEAS
Abstract:
In this LSE IDEAS Special Report, the authors focus on the impact of the Russia-Ukraine war on the Baltics. The report highlights both collective and country-level impacts and responses to the conflict. It is argued that Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania have been among the top supporters of Ukraine, not merely in terms of military aid, but also with regards to providing substantial diplomatic and humanitarian support during Ukraine’s darkest hour since the breakup of the Soviet Union. Moreover, it is argued that this literal and metaphorical winter will be a key challenge, not only for Ukraine, but also for the Baltics. Given how closely the fate of Ukraine is intertwined with Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, the manner in which the Baltics and NATO respond to the winter could significantly influence the Russia-Ukraine war. A key strategic priority for the Baltics and NATO should be to promote resilience of everything from defense to energy security. Accordingly, the Report concludes with a variety of key policy recommendations aimed at the Baltics, EU and NATO.
Topic:
Security, NATO, European Union, Conflict, Resilience, Energy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, and Baltic States

32. Before the Invasion: The Russian-Belarusian Allied Resolve Exercises

Author:
Anna Maria Dyner
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
On 10-20 February, Belarus hosted the active phase of the Belarusian-Russian manoeuvres Allied Resolve, after which Russian troops remained in the country. The drills preceded the Russian invasion of Ukraine that started on 24 February. The scenario was an extension of last year’s Zapad exercises and simulated actions against the countries of NATO’s Eastern Flank and Ukraine. The manoeuvres showed Russia’s ability to deploy units over long distances (more than 10,000 km) and the high interoperability of the Russian and Belarusian armed forces. The growing military integration of Belarus and Russia, along with the decision to leave Russian military units in Belarus, is a challenge for NATO in the context of defending its Eastern Flank and its policy towards Ukraine.
Topic:
Armed Forces, Conflict, and Military Exercises
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Eurasia, and Belarus

33. Eritrea as an Informal Representative of the Pro-Russia Forces in Africa

Author:
Jędrzej Czerep
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
Eritrea was the only African country to vote against the UN General Assembly (UNGA) resolution on 2 March condemning Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Although this voice was isolated, Eritrea has become the informal representative of a larger group of states on the continent critical of the West. The possible enlargement of this pro-Russia bloc will depend on the financial and military ability of Russia to remain active in Africa.
Topic:
International Relations, Diplomacy, United Nations, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Africa, Russia, and Eritrea

34. Turkey's Role in the Russian-Ukrainian Negotiations

Author:
Aleksandra Maria Spancerska
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
The Russian-Ukrainian negotiations held on 29 March in Istanbul demonstrates that Turkey is assuming the role of an intermediary. Its policy of balancing between Russia and Ukraine is backed by the majority of the Turkish public, which gives President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan more freedom to manoeuvre. Acting as an intermediary in the conflict may allow Turkey an opportunity to start improving the strained relations with the European Union and the United States.
Topic:
International Relations, Diplomacy, European Union, Conflict, and Negotiation
Political Geography:
Russia, Turkey, and Ukraine

35. And So Now… It’s War?

Author:
Carl Conetta
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Project on Defense Alternatives
Abstract:
The battle within Ukraine and the USA-Russia contest over it has returned Europe to the darkest, most ominous period of the 1947-1989 Cold War. That this should happen with both the United States and Russia barreling grimly forward reflects a singular failure of diplomacy and common sense. There were two recent points in time when positive leadership might have turned us away from the path of disaster. Fortunately, one of these is not yet foreclosed. Movement toward resolution begins with recognizing that all sides, all stakeholders share fault for the current crisis. And no side has told the whole truth of it. Without question, Russian intervention in Ukraine’s civil conflict violates international law. Although Russia has the right to defend itself from attack, this proviso does not apply in the current situation. The annexation of Crimea was illegal, as is Russian intervention in the Donbass. This is indisputable.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, NATO, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America

36. Russia-Ukraine War: Estimating Casualties & Military Equipment Losses

Author:
Carl Conetta
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Project on Defense Alternatives
Abstract:
Within days of the Russian invasion, it became clear that Moscow’s effort to seize Ukraine had stumbled badly. The Russian military had expected a quick win, but found itself facing a hard slog instead. But why? And how to measure the conflict now?
Topic:
NATO, Weapons, Conflict, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

37. China’s Antarctic Ambitions – and Their Implications for Australia

Author:
Yun Jiang
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
In a new special report AIIA China Matters Fellow Yun Jiang argues that popular Australian concerns around the Antarctic ambitions of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), including possible territorial claims, militarisation, and mining, are overstated.
Topic:
Military Strategy, Territorial Disputes, Hegemony, Conflict, Mining, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and Australia

38. Public Perception of Serbian Foreign Policy in the Midst of the War in Ukraine

Author:
Vuk Vuksanovic, Luka Steric, and Maja Bjelos
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Kosovar Centre for Security Studies (KCSS)
Abstract:
The war in Ukraine did not significantly affect the perception of the Serbian public regarding the major issues of Serbian foreign and security policy. In this context, this relates to how Serbian citizens think about the influence of great powers in their country and how the public perceives its relations with Russia and Western security institutions, the EU and NATO. The public opinion surveys also showed that the issue of Kosovo is still being perceived as a major foreign policy priority. There is a powerful cynicism in how the Serbian public views great power influences, as most respondents believe that external great powers bribe Serbian politicians and moguls to further their interests in the country. Russia and China are perceived as close foreign policy partners of Serbia, putting them in clear advantage over those who favour the EU on that front. The respondents also believed that Russia and China are sincere friends of Serbia and not players guided by their self-interest. As opposed to the study conducted by the Belgrade Centre for Security Policy (BCSP) in 2020, which noted that Serbs perceived Chinese influence in the country as more positive than Russian influence, the latest survey shows that those who believe Russian influence in Serbia is positive have a slight edge over those who believe the same about Chinese influence. This is most likely the result of the fact that China has not been in the spotlight in recent months.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Public Opinion, Conflict, Russia-Ukraine War, and Perception
Political Geography:
Europe, Kosovo, Serbia, and Balkans

39. China's messaging on the Ukraine conflict

Author:
Samantha Hoffman and Matthew Knight
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
In the early days of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, social media posts by Chinese diplomats on US platforms almost exclusively blamed the US, NATO and the West for the conflict. Chinese diplomats amplified Russian disinformation about US biological weapon labs in Ukraine, linking this narrative with conspiracy theories about the origins of COVID-19. Chinese state media mirrored these narratives, as well as replicating the Kremlin’s language describing the invasion as a ‘special military operation’. ASPI found that China’s diplomatic messaging was distributed in multiple languages, with its framing tailored to different regions. In the early stage of the conflict, tweets about Ukraine by Chinese diplomats performed better than unrelated content, particularly when the content attacked or blamed the West. ASPI’s research suggests that, in terms of its international facing propaganda, the Russia–Ukraine conflict initially offered the party-state’s international-facing propaganda system an opportunity to reassert enduring preoccupations that the Chinese Communist Party perceives as fundamental to its political security.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Cybersecurity, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Ukraine, and Asia

40. Peace Report 2022: Capable of Peace in Times of War

Author:
Institute for Development and Peace
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Development and Peace
Abstract:
The Russian war of aggression in Ukraine has caused the European security architecture to collapse. The Peace Report 2022 analyzes the escalation, highlights consequences for Ukraine and the region, and focuses on the reorientation of German and European security and defense policy. In addition to the global implications of the war, the report also outlines the conditions for success and limits of sanctions and analyzes the crisis of the global nuclear order. Furthermore, the research on global conflict shows that internationalized conflicts, jihadist violent actors, and violence and discrimination against women and LGBTQI* minorities require new peace policy emphases. And the steadily expanding competencies of security institutions within democracies due to the threat of terrorism, pandemics and extremism also require stronger democratic control.
Topic:
Security, Discrimination, Conflict, and Peace
Political Geography:
Global Focus

41. Foreign fighters in the Russia-Ukraine war

Author:
Aleksandre Kvakhadze
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
Abstract:
Since the beginning of the large-scale phase of the Russia-Ukraine war, hundreds and possibly thousands of volunteers from all over the world have expressed their desire to fight on the side of Ukraine. Although foreign volunteers also helped the armed forces of Ukraine in the 2014 Donbas conflict, the current war has further increased the mobilization of foreign fighters. Foreign fighters were participants in many conflicts of the 20th century. According to Cerwyn Moore and Paul Tumelty, foreign fighters differ from mercenaries in that their main motivation is ideology, religion, and/or ethnicity, rather than material benefit. Along with the development of information technologies and the simplification of movement between countries, the number of foreign fighters and the scale of their mobilization have increased in the world. This article aims to review the major groups of foreign volunteers fighting on the side of the Ukrainian Armed Forces.
Topic:
Security, Armed Forces, Conflict, Foreign Fighters, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

42. The Impact of the Russian-Ukrainian War on the North Caucasus and Occupied Territories of Georgia

Author:
Aleksandre Kvakhadze
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
Abstract:
From the first days of the Russian-Ukrainian war, it became clear that the Caucasus region was widely represented in the conflict. Caucasian fighters are fighting on both the Russian and Ukrainian sides. The war also has a great impact on the socio-political situation in the region. We will try to describe the contribution of the peoples of the North Caucasus, Abkhazia and Tskhinvali to this war and the possible long-term effects of the conflict on these regions.
Topic:
War, Conflict, Foreign Fighters, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Caucasus, Eastern Europe, and Georgia

43. Turkey’s Place and Role in the Russia-Ukraine War

Author:
Zurab Batiashvili
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
Abstract:
In recent decades, Ankara has maintained a kind of balance in foreign policy and this approach naturally applied to Russia and Ukraine as well. NATO member Turkey sought to develop lucrative military-political and trade-economic relations with both Russia and Ukraine. However, after the Kremlin's war with Ukraine, Ankara clearly saw the facing imminent Russian threat, precipitating the change in its position (supply additional weaponry to Ukraine, close the Bosporus and Dardanelles Straits, etc.). At the same time, the longer the Russia-Ukraine war lasts, the more drastic consequences it will have for Turkey. Consequently, Ankara will have to take even more decisive retaliatory steps.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, NATO, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Turkey, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

44. How the United States Should Respond if Russia Invades Ukraine

Author:
Max Bergmann
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for American Progress - CAP
Abstract:
A Russian invasion of Ukraine must come at a high cost to the Kremlin.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, North America, and United States of America

45. Can Emerging Technologies Lead a Revival of Conflict Early Warning/Early Action? Lessons from the Field

Author:
Branka Panic
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center on International Cooperation
Abstract:
The early warning/early action (EWEA) community has been working for decades on analytics to help prevent conflict. The field has evolved significantly since its inception in the 1970s and 80s. The systems have served with variable success to predict conflict trends, alert communities to risk, inform decision makers, provide inputs to action strategies, and initiate a response to violent conflict. Present systems must now address the increasingly complex and protracted nature of conflicts in which factors previously considered peripheral have become core elements in conflict dynamics.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Conflict, Risk, and Early Warning
Political Geography:
Global Focus

46. Ukraine Russia Crisis: Terrorism Briefing

Author:
Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP)
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Economics & Peace (IEP)
Abstract:
On 24 February 2022, Russia launched an attack on Ukraine. Figure 1 highlights that the invasion comes after a decade of deteriorating relations between Russia, Ukraine and the West. This brief covers several aspects relating to the current Ukrainian war, including the frequency of past acts of terrorism in Russia, Ukraine and Georgia and covers likely future scenarios. It also analyses cyberattacks on Ukraine over the last decade and lead up to the current war. The main finding is that terrorism increases with the intensity of conflict. Both the Georgian conflict in 2008 and the Ukrainian conflict of 2014 saw substantial spikes in terrorist activity around the wars, and as the current war intensifies increased terrorist activity should be expected. Secondly, cyberattacks on Ukraine have markedly increased over the last decade, and especially in the months and weeks leading up to the war. Further, cyberattacks have the potential to unintentionally spill over into other countries because of global connectivity, the effects of which have been seen on numerous occasions. As cyberattacks by nefarious actors are a recent phenomenon, and given the difficulty in the attribution of such attacks, the demarcation between what constitutes a cyberattack, cyber warfare or cyber terrorism are unclear. Regardless, this briefing looks at the broad phenomena of cyberattacks in Ukraine to offer background on recent events.
Topic:
Terrorism, Cybersecurity, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, Eastern Europe, and Georgia

47. World Risk Poll: Spotlight on Ukraine and Russia

Author:
Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP)
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Economics & Peace (IEP)
Abstract:
The Lloyd’s Register Foundation World Risk Poll, when combined with associated data from the Gallup World Poll and a number of other sources, reveals a complex and sometimes counterintuitive view of the world for both Ukrainians and Russians prior to the Russian invasion in 2022. Ukrainian citizens’ positive sentiments on a number of questions on social wellbeing were on the rise at a time when global averages were in decline. In the lead-up to the invasion, Ukrainians’ perceptions of safety and security were improving, with the percentage of people reporting feeling safer than five years prior rising from 19 to 26 per cent, bringing it closer to the global average. This represents a major increase, especially as it came at a time when the global average fell markedly, from 36 to 27.4 per cent, and for Russians the rate fell from 19.2 to 17.4 per cent. The conflict has unfolded within the context of Ukraine’s increasing socio-political reorientation toward the West. By November 2021, 58 per cent of Ukrainians said that, if the country were to join just one economic union, it should join the European Union (EU), compared to 21 per cent that said it should join the Russia-led Eurasian Economic Union. This was the highest rating ever recorded. Similarly, 54 per cent said they would vote to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), compared to 28 per cent who would vote against joining. Surprisingly, “war and terrorism” was only the sixth highest-rated concern in Ukraine in 2021. Ukrainians rated health-related risks (not including COVID-19) as their top concern. Transportation-related risks, crime and violence, economic concerns and financial hardship were more frequently cited than “war and terrorism."
Topic:
Security, NATO, European Union, Conflict, Risk, Polls, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

48. Global Peace Index 2022

Author:
Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP)
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Economics & Peace (IEP)
Abstract:
This is the 16th edition of the Global Peace Index (GPI), which ranks 163 independent states and territories according to their level of peacefulness. Produced by the Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP), the GPI is the world’s leading measure of global peacefulness. This report presents the most comprehensive data-driven analysis to-date on trends in peace, its economic value, and how to develop peaceful societies. The GPI covers 163 countries comprising 99.7 per cent of the world’s population, using 23 qualitative and quantitative indicators from highly respected sources, and measures the state of peace across three domains: the level of societal Safety and Security; the extent of Ongoing Domestic and International Conflict; and the degree of Militarisation. In addition to discussing the findings from the 2022 GPI, the report includes an analysis of the military conflict in Ukraine. It covers likely increases in military spending, new and emerging uses of technology in the war, its impact on food prices and global shipping routes. The report also contains a deeper analysis on violent demonstrations around the world.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Political Violence, Economics, Terrorism, Military Spending, Conflict, Peace, and Instability
Political Geography:
Global Focus

49. China Maritime Report No. 22: Logistics Support for a Cross-Strait Invasion: The View from Beijing

Author:
Kevin McCauley
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College
Abstract:
The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) believes that logistics support is one of the key determinants of a successful large-scale invasion of Taiwan. Logistics support includes transport, materiel and oil supply, medical care, search and rescue, logistics infrastructure protection, and maintenance of war materiel reserves. Despite the recognized importance of logistics support, it is likely the PLA does not currently possess the requisite logistics capabilities to successfully support a large-scale amphibious landing on Taiwan and a possible protracted conflict involving the United States and allies. Key deficits include a lack of amphibious ships (both military and civilian), transport aircraft, and war reserves. The PLA also continues to face difficulties with landing the requisite logistics supplies during the critical beach assault phase, constructing maritime transfer platforms or temporary wharves to sustain resupply if intact ports are not rapidly captured, establishing a landing base for logistics operations, maintaining the flow of logistics during on-island combat, and establishing strategic war reserves to support the large-scale operation and possibly prolonged conflict. These problem areas might be resolved with several years of sustained effort and complex training.
Topic:
Territorial Disputes, Armed Forces, Conflict, and People's Liberation Army (PLA)
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, and Asia

50. Afghan Peace and Reconciliation

Author:
Arooj Mumtaz
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS)
Abstract:
The Taliban captured Kabul on 15th August 2021 and announced their government three weeks later. Pakistan viewed the event as cleaning up of the unwanted externalities in its neighborhood i.e., a complete pullback of Indian and Western presence and influence. However, the initial exhilaration has morphed into disappointment over the past months. Not only has the Taliban regime adopted traditional approach to Durand line, they are also believed to be turning a blind eye to the safe havens of anti-Pakistan terrorist groups on their soil. Pakistan in the current situation requires an all-encompassing parliament-led policy that focuses on provision of humanitarian assistance and on winning hearts and minds of the Afghan people. Along with humanitarian assistance, Pakistan’s present Afghan policy must address its bilateral equation with Afghanistan and counter-terrorism mechanisms. Unfortunately, despite their proximity, Afghanistan and Pakistan share no formal agreement regarding refugees, trade or border. So, the government must avail this opportunity and focus on sketching a bilateral strategic agreement because unlike previous governments in Kabul, the current government is keen to make formal agreements with neighbouring Pakistan. Moreover, Pakistan needs to exhibit a balanced approach, neither being apologetic about the amicable equation it shares with the Afghan Taliban, nor become an advocate of the Taliban. This will allow Pakistan to be pragmatic and shape its actions and reactions accordingly. Here it may be noted that a key factor that is limiting Pakistan’s policy choices is the enhanced threats to Pakistan’s internal security as well its western borders since the Taliban takeover of Kabul. Cross border movements of militants have increased, leading to a spike in attacks on Pakistan security personnel. As far as TTP is concerned, between September 2021 and March 2022, it claimed to have carried out 197 attacks. Apparently, the Taliban have reneged on their promises made in Doha as well as earlier that they would prevent Afghan soil from becoming a staging point for attacks inside Pakistan. This inaction is fundamentally due to the Afghan Taliban’s long affiliation with the TTP which fought side by side with them against foreign forces. Against this backdrop, the Afghan Taliban are averse to the idea of cracking down on the TTP in a meaningful way. Currently, the Taliban are limiting their efforts to being a mediator between the Pakistani government and TTP kingpins. On the question of Afghanistan’s humanitarian and economic crisis, there are contrasting opinions. While some advocate that Pakistan must be at the front foot, others maintain that Afghanistan’s humanitarian and economic issues are majorly a concern of the international community and Pakistan must conduct low- key. Through Pakistan’s weakened economy does not allow it to help Afghanistan single-handedly, still it can facilitate international engagement which certainly is the remedy for Afghanistan’s humanitarian and economic crises. Socio-economic stability in Afghanistan is crucial for Pakistan’s internal security because if Afghanistan does not stabilise macroeconomically, no politics or diplomacy will save Pakistan from fallout of the crisis in Afghanistan. Pakistan must focus its efforts towards assuring that international engagement and assistance is not conditioned with the provision of women rights – at least in the immediate term - particularly because Afghanistan has a specific cultural orientation which does not fully align with the Western concepts of human rights. Pakistan has so far exhibited a stern strategy towards refugees. Though it is fundamentally an attempt to keep the international community from denying its responsibility towards war ravaged Afghanistan, it is also motivated by Pakistan’s economic fragility. Not only has Pakistan given a cold response to the idea of more refugees pouring into Pakistan, it has also stopped UNHCR from using the terms “new arrivals” or “new refugees”. However, this approach will have negative impacts because when refugees are abandoned by states and a vacuum is created, other forces and elements start interfering. It is argued that such policies have led to recruitments in ISKP. So, with the situation in hand, the right roadmap will be to sketch inclusive measures in order to deal with the matter of refugees; refugees living in Pakistan for the last many decades should be considered for granting right to Pakistani citizenship.
Topic:
Governance, Taliban, Political stability, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Middle East

51. Perspectives From Pakistan on Afghan Peace and Reconciliation

Author:
Muhammad Amir Rana
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS)
Abstract:
Since the US withdrawal and Taliban takeover in August last year, Afghanistan’s economic situation has been fast deteriorating. As a result, Afghans are suffering from poverty, starvation, and a lack of access to healthcare and other services. Pakistani government and different segments of its society seem aware of the situation. The government has not only been providing humanitarian support to the Afghan people but also facilitating international efforts in that regard. On political front, too, Pakistan continues to help Afghanistan by telling the world not to abandon Afghan people in time of their need. During the quarter under review, Pakistan facilitated a Saudi-led OIC Foreign Ministers’ extraordinary meeting in Islamabad. It has already established Afghanistan Inter-Ministerial Coordination Cell. Both of these initiatives are meant to accelerate relief efforts in Afghanistan. Similarly, while Pakistan has not yet formally recognized the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, it has informally started the diplomatic relationship with the country. This chapter provides a summarized outcome of the PIPS quarterly monitoring of the opinions of different segments of Pakistani society and state institutions on Afghanistan’s political, social and security situations and their perceived impact on Pakistan. PIPS’ desk and field researchers regularly monitored/reviewed press and electronic media reports, social media platforms, academic and research analyses and reports, publications of religious groups and militants, government records and press releases, as well as officials’ statements and happenings on the Afghan situation and related developments. PIPS team also conducted interviews with experts, officials, political leaders, and media persons to seek their comments where responses were missing in public or media discourses
Topic:
Regional Cooperation, Governance, Conflict, and Strategic Stability
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Middle East

52. Public Views of the U.S.-China Competition in MENA

Author:
Michael Robbins
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Arab Barometer
Abstract:
Over the last decade, the global competition between the U.S. and China has been on the rise. China’s increased global outlook, particularly through its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), has led to a significantly greater economic engagement with countries across the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). At the same time, the U.S. continues its retrenchment from the region focusing on a broader pivot to Asia. How have these developments affected views toward both countries? Arab Barometer’s wave seven, the largest public opinion survey of its kind across MENA since the time of COVID, provides insight into these questions. Across MENA, China remains more popular than the U.S. Among the nine countries surveyed, only in Morocco is the U.S. more popular overall than China. In the remainder, China tends to be significantly more favored than the U.S. Yet, this story may be gradually changing. When asked about closer economic ties between their country and the two global powers, in the majority of countries surveyed, citizens are significantly less likely to say they want stronger ties with China than they were in 2018-19. In no country is there an increased desire for stronger economic ties with China while in multiple cases there has been a 20-point shift against China. By comparison, in most countries the desire for closer economic ties with the U.S. has increased or remained unchanged over the same period. This outcome suggests that BRI may not be having the intended effects, with citizens now moving away from China overall.
Topic:
Infrastructure, Conflict, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Strategic Competition, and Rivalry
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

53. Narrative Warfare: How the Kremlin and Russian news outlets justified a war of aggression against Ukraine

Author:
Nika Aleksejeva and Andy Carvin
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
In the weeks and months leading up to Russia invading Ukraine on February 24, 2022, the Kremlin and pro-Kremlin media employed false and misleading narratives to justify military action against Ukraine, mask the Kremlin’s operational planning, and deny any responsibility for the coming war. Collectively, these narratives served as Vladimir Putin’s casus belli to engage in a war of aggression against Ukraine. To research this report, the Digital Forensic Research Lab (DFRLab) identified recurring pro-Kremlin narratives over two timeframes: the 2014–2021 interwar period and the seventy days leading up to the 2022 invasion. For the interwar period, we reviewed more than 350 fact-checks of pro-Kremlin disinformation. We then collected more than ten thousand examples of false and misleading narratives published by fourteen pro-Kremlin outlets over the seventy-day pre-invasion period. To understand how these narratives evolved, we catalogued them by themes, sub-narratives, and relationships to pre-invasion escalatory events. This allowed us to produce a timeline of false and misleading Kremlin narratives encompassing the year leading to the invasion, showing how Russia weaponized these narratives as its actions on the ground escalated toward war.
Topic:
News Analysis, Conflict, Narrative, Information Warfare, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

54. The geopolitical implications of Russia's invasion of Ukraine

Author:
Paul Dibb
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
The eminent Harvard University professor of Ukrainian history, Serhii Plokhy, observed that Russia’s occupation of Crimea, Donetsk and Luhansk in 2014 raised fundamental questions about Ukraine’s continuing existence as a unified state, its independence as a nation, and the democratic foundations of its political institutions.1 This created a new and dangerous situation not only in Ukraine but also in Europe as a whole. For the first time since the end of World War II, a major European power made war on a weaker neighbour and annexed part of the territory of a sovereign state. This unprovoked Russian aggression against Ukraine threatened the foundations of international order—a threat to which, he said, the EU and most of the world weren’t prepared to respond. Two years later, Plokhy published a book called Lost kingdom: a history of Russian nationalism from Ivan the Great to Vladimir Putin 2 in which he observed—correctly, in my view—that the question of where Russia begins and ends, and who constitutes the Russian people, has preoccupied Russian thinkers for centuries. He might have added that Russia has no obvious or clear-cut geographical borders. Plokhy also stated that the current Russo-Ukrainian conflict is only the latest turn of Russian policy resulting from the Russian elite’s thinking about itself and its East Slavic neighbours as part of their joint historical and cultural space, and ultimately as the same nation. He asserts that the current conflict reprises many of the themes that have been central to political and cultural relations in the region for the previous five centuries. Those include Russia’s great-power status and influence beyond its borders; the continued relevance of religion, especially Orthodox Christianity, as defined in Russian identity and the conduct of Russian policy abroad; and, last but not least, the importance of language and culture as tools of Russian state policy in the region. Moreover, the conflict reminds the world that the formation of the modern Russian nation is still far from complete. Plokhy concludes that this threat is no less serious than the one posed in the 19th and early 20th centuries by the German question—the idea of uniting all the German lands to forge a mighty German Empire.
Topic:
Defense Policy, National Security, Geopolitics, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

55. Conflict in the Penta-Border Area: Benin’s Northern Jihad from the perspective of its neighbours

Author:
Kars de Bruijne
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
Since December 2021, Benin has suffered an increasing number of armed conflicts linked to violent extremist groups. The Beninese government publicly acknowledges that there have been around 20 violent events in the period between December 2021 and May 2022. This report records 43 discrete violent events involving Violent Extremist Organisations (VEOs) from December 2021 to September 2022 (92 when including non-violent activities). This report makes an uncommon point: that violence in Benin presently comes from its neighbours and not from within. Developments in Burkina Faso, Niger, Togo and even Nigeria generate the problems in Alibori and Atactora (the Northern Provinces of Benin), for now. This report explores the activity of four main groups and the rational for expansion. A JNIM group under the command of Mouslimou, the Emir of the East, in Kompienga; a JNIM group in Tapoa (Burkina Faso); a JNIM group in Torodi (Niger) under the command of Emir of Torodi, Abu Anifa; and finally the Islamic State of the Greater Sahel (ISGS)."
Topic:
Violent Extremism, Conflict, Borders, and Armed Conflict
Political Geography:
Africa and Benin

56. The Periphery Cannot Hold: Upper Nile since the Signing of the R-ARCSS

Author:
Joshua Craze
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Small Arms Survey
Abstract:
Upper Nile is in chaos. A once durable alliance between the national government in Juba and the Padang Dinka in Malakal has given way to a much more uncertain situation, in which the regime of South Sudanese President Salva Kiir sets feuding elites against each other. Disorder has proved an effective tool of rule. In Upper Nile, Kiir's regime has successfully peeled off Eastern Nuer commanders once loyal to Riek Machar's Sudan People's Liberation Army in Opposition (SPLA-IO). Following a brutal dry season campaign against the SPLA-IO waged by these commanders, Machar's opposition suffered an almost total collapse of support in Upper Nile. The rump of the SPLA-IO fighting forces had already split from Machar in 2021, and formed the Kitgwang faction, which hoped to acquire materiel and money in Khartoum to fund a renewed war. However, thanks to a regional realignment that means Sudan and South Sudan are allies, the Kitgwang found no succour in Khartoum, and was easily divided by Kiir's regime. The current fighting in Upper Nile is the fallout from the two parts of the Kitgwang being set against each other by the government. Clashes have displaced more than 10,000 people, and taken on a worryingly ethnic dimension that Kiir's regime will struggle to control.
Topic:
Politics, Armed Forces, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Africa, Sudan, South Sudan, and Upper Nile

57. 'And Everything Became War': Warrap State since the Signing of the R-ARCSS

Author:
Joshua Craze
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Small Arms Survey
Abstract:
In Warrap state, home to South Sudanese President Salva Kiir and much of the country's political and military elite, many hoped that the signing of a peace agreement in 2018 would bring an end to the violence that had scarred their country for the previous five years. Instead, in Warrap, violence intensified, and pitted communities against each other in increasingly brutal tit-for-tat attacks that targeted women, children, homes, and the very capacities of communities to sustain life. At the war's end, everything became war. Such clashes are often dismissed as 'inter-communal violence' delinked from the politics of the peace agreement. 'And Everything Became War': Warrap State since the Signing of the R-ARCSS—a report from the Survey’s Human Security Baseline Assessment for Sudan and South Sudan (HSBA) project—demonstrates that the conflict raging in Warrap is instead deeply political, and a consequence of the way that Kiir's regime maintains power by setting feuding elites against each other. In Warrap, the South Sudanese state has suffered an almost total collapse in political legitimacy, and cattle-guards have emerged as the only actors on the ground with genuine community support that can resist the predatory state, even if they are also instrumentalized by it. 'And Everything Became War' is the first in-depth study of conflict dynamics in Warrap state since the beginning of the South Sudanese civil war. Based on extensive fieldwork, the report makes one central conclusion: as South Sudan enters its fourth year of ‘peace’, everything has become war, and the South Sudanese government is the war’s cause rather than the solution.
Topic:
Security, Politics, Treaties and Agreements, Conflict, and Elites
Political Geography:
Africa, Sudan, and South Sudan

58. Political and Media Analysis on the Tigray Conflict in Ethiopia

Author:
Moses Tofa, Alagaw Ababu Kifle, and Hubert Kinkoh
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
European Institute of Peace (EIP)
Abstract:
This study reviews patterns of domestic and international media reporting and the role of disinformation, misinformation, and media bias in the Tigray conflict, which has been raging since November 2020. Since its outbreak, the conflict has evolved through four broad phases. Throughout these phases, the conflict was characterised by egregious violations of international human rights law, international humanitarian law and international refugee law. To analyse the role of the media in the conflict, this study reviewed local and international media, conducted interviews with local and international journalists and analysts, and consulted secondary literature. Patterns of reporting by international and local media exhibited fairly significant levels of divergence in the issues that were selected for reporting and how they were reported during these four phases of the conflict. The study found significant levels of disinformation, misinformation, and biased reporting that clouded accounts of the conflict and encouraged debates over highly contested issues. International media largely disregarded the role that the TPLF played in provoking the federal government to take military action, at times neglecting to mention the TPLF attack on the Ethiopian Northern Command and occasionally even accusing Prime Minister Ahmed Abiy of ordering a wanton attack on Tigray. International journalists either partially or completely ignored the historical context of the conflict. On the other hand, domestic Ethiopian media largely disregarded the violations that were committed by the federal government and were overly focussed on debunking the claims that were made by the TPLF. Overall, the study found a systematic pattern of local media biased towards the narrative of the federal government, whereas the international media were generally biased towards the narrative of the TPLF. As a result, the voice of the people who suffered the brunt of the fighting became the “casualty” of misinformation, disinformation and biased reporting.
Topic:
Human Rights, Politics, Media, Conflict, and Disinformation
Political Geography:
Africa, Ethiopia, and Tigray

59. Fragile States Index 2021 – Annual Report

Author:
Natalie Fiertz, Nate Haken, Patricia Taft, Emily Sample, and Wendy Wilson
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Fund for Peace
Abstract:
The Fragile States Index, produced by The Fund for Peace, is a critical tool in highlighting not only the normal pressures that all states experience, but also in identifying when those pressures are pushing a state towards the brink of failure. By highlighting pertinent issues in weak and failing states, The Fragile States Index—and the social science framework and software application upon which it is built—makes political risk assessment and early warning of conflict accessible to policy-makers and the public at large.
Topic:
Climate Change, Authoritarianism, Employment, Fragile States, Economy, Political stability, Conflict, Crisis Management, Peace, Resilience, COVID-19, Health Crisis, Early Warning, and Risk Assessment
Political Geography:
Africa, Europe, Middle East, Tajikistan, Germany, Armenia, Central America, Spain, Lebanon, Timor-Leste, North America, Ethiopia, Southeast Asia, El Salvador, Global Focus, and United States of America

60. Asking my Sisters Intergenerational Voices of Women from the Moro Islamic Liberation Front in Mindanao

Author:
Berghof Foundation
Publication Date:
12-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Berghof Foundation
Abstract:
In this booklet female ex-combatants from the Moro Islamic Liberation Front - Bangsamoro Women's Auxiliary Brigade (MILF-BIWAB) and their daughters in Mindanao share their stories from the region’s post-conflict reconciliation process.
Topic:
Conflict, Violence, Peace, and Gender
Political Geography:
Asia and Philippines

61. Omani perspectives on the peace process in Yemen

Author:
Abdullah Baabood
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Berghof Foundation
Abstract:
Oman has played an important role in supporting mediation efforts since the conflict in Yemen began. The country’s amicable relations with Saudi Arabia, Ansar Allah, Iran, and other Yemeni and international conflict stakeholders has allowed it to facilitate negotiations in a manner few other countries are able or willing to realise. This comes in the context of Oman’s established history of attempting to bring conflicting parties from its immediate western neighbour to the table at critical junctures. These efforts were again reactivated in early 2021 with the facilitation of talks between belligerents in the current conflict and international representatives in Muscat.
Topic:
Regional Cooperation, Conflict, Peace, and Mediation
Political Geography:
Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Oman, and Persian Gulf

62. A Fight by Other Means: Keeping the Peace with Colombia’s FARC

Author:
International Crisis Group
Publication Date:
11-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
Colombia’s 2016 peace deal was a landmark achievement, convincing the FARC guerrillas to disarm and enter civilian life. Yet much remains to be done to show insurgents that they can redress their grievances through ordinary politics. The country’s leaders should recommit to finishing the job.
Topic:
Security, Terrorism, Conflict, and Peace
Political Geography:
Colombia and South America

63. Relaunching Negotiations over Western Sahara

Author:
International Crisis Group
Publication Date:
10-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
The fighting in Western Sahara, which broke out again in November 2020, remains of low intensity. Yet outside powers would be wrong to assume that it will not escalate. With U.S. support, the new UN envoy should pursue confidence-building measures that could facilitate negotiations.
Topic:
International Cooperation, United Nations, Military Strategy, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Africa and Sahara

64. Beyond Business as Usual in Israel-Palestine

Author:
International Crisis Group
Publication Date:
08-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
The latest escalation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict brought important shifts in the status quo, underscoring the necessity of a political settlement. A peace based on equal respect for both peoples’ rights will take time, however. Steps to lower the temperature are urgent in the interim.
Topic:
Territorial Disputes, Conflict, Peace, and Settlements
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, and Palestine

65. Turkey-Greece: From Maritime Brinkmanship to Dialogue

Author:
International Crisis Group
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
In mid-2020, Turkey and Greece put their Mediterranean fleets on high alert, dramatically raising tensions in their long-running dispute over air, water, rock and now seabed gas deposits as well. Talks have been frustrating but remain the best way to contain the risk of conflict.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, Bilateral Relations, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Europe, Turkey, and Greece

66. The French Military's Perception of the Turkish Military and Turkey's Expansion in the Eastern Mediterranean

Author:
Aris Marghelis
Publication Date:
11-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
In the summer of 2020, the Central and Eastern Mediterranean became the center of unusual tensions between France and Turkey. Given that these tensions were also military, which is uncommon for the two countries, the perception that the French military has of Turkey’s army and its doctrine is particularly relevant to address. From the interviews that were conducted with French officers, it appears that for the French military, 2016 and 2020 are two milestones in the evolution of both Turkish political and military Turkish attitudes. From 2016 onwards, the Syrian and Libyan conflicts uncovered diverging interests between France and Turkey, with military implications for France. In the same year, Turkish military behavior in the Eastern Mediterranean started shifting, but was at first seen as of little consequence. Additionally, the failed coup attempt against President R. T. Erdogan decreased the level and quality of communication and cooperation between both militaries. In 2020, Turkish aggressiveness openly manifested itself in the Eastern Mediterranean, including directly against France with the Courbet incident. This attitude was criticized by the interviewees who specified that such behavior, along with unilateral actions and faits accomplis, would not be tolerated in the future. Yet, it also appears that the French military show respect for the Turkish armed forces. The latter are generally accredited with professionalism, reliability, efficiency, and determination. The interviews revealed no sign of animosity by the French officers towards their Turkish counterparts: sometimes, even the opposite was detected.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Conflict, Army, and Military
Political Geography:
Europe, Turkey, France, and Mediterranean

67. A Year Later: Status and Perspectives on Israeli-Arab Normalisation

Author:
Michał Wojnarowicz
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
Israeli-Arab normalisation launched in August 2020 has proved to be a stable process so far. Relations are deepened by the interest of the parties despite changing conditions (e.g., the new government in Israel and the U.S.) or the escalation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The future of the process remains dependent on U.S. policy towards the region and the scale of support for the new Israeli government.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, Conflict, and Normalization
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and Arab Countries

68. The Fall of Afghanistan: The Biden Administration's First Crisis

Author:
Mateusz Piotrowski
Publication Date:
10-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
The chaotic withdrawal from Afghanistan sparked the first major crisis of confidence in President Joe Biden and his administration, both in the U.S. and internationally. It has affected the administration’s relations with Democrats in Congress, whose confidence in the president has weakened. This narrows the president’s freedom to conduct foreign policy. At the same time, the way the U.S. withdrew from Afghanistan will be used by its rivals to undermine American guarantees to Allies and the U.S. standing in the international arena.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, Conflict, and Joe Biden
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, South Asia, and United States of America

69. Promoting China–European Union Cooperation on Green and Sustainable Finance

Author:
Ian Anthony, Jingdong Yuan, and Sun Xia
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
Abstract:
Energy transition is an essential element of the global effort to meet the objectives set out in the 2016 Paris Agreement on climate change. China and the European Union (EU) have agreed to work together to help deliver the financing needed to achieve energy transition, but more is needed. To promote China–EU co-operation, this SIPRI Policy Brief recommends: (a) exploring a dedicated China–EU green finance initiative; (b) presenting a joint China–EU proposal on clear definitions and standards of sustainable green financing to the International Partnership on Sustainable Finance; (c) generating a joint curriculum to train staff in multilateral development banks, private investment banks, insurance companies and green banks; (d) pursuing joint finance for projects that find private capital difficult to attract; and (e) deploying independent evaluation teams to scrutinize how rating systems are applied in energy transition projects.
Topic:
Security, European Union, Finance, Conflict, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and Peace
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and Asia

70. Finding Firmer Ground: The Role of Civil Society and NGOs in U.S.-China Relations

Author:
The Carter Center
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Carter Center
Abstract:
This report looks back with respect and admiration on the decision of America’s and China’s leaders to restore normal diplomatic relations after a 30-year hiatus that witnessed war, economic isolation, and the bitter evaporation of long-standing contacts between the American and Chinese people. Its recommendations seek to contribute to an updated vision of U.S. engagement across the next century.
Topic:
Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Bilateral Relations, Hegemony, Conflict, Peace, and Rivalry
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

71. Relaunching the Kosovo-Serbia Dialogue

Author:
International Crisis Group
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
Thirteen years after Kosovo broke away from Serbia, the two countries remain mired in mutual non-recognition, with deleterious effects on both. The parties need to move past technicalities to tackle the main issues at stake: Pristina’s independence and Belgrade’s influence over Kosovo’s Serbian minority.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Minorities, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Europe, Kosovo, and Serbia

72. The Exile Effect: Venezuela’s Overseas Opposition and Social Media

Author:
International Crisis Group
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
A study of social media content shows that Venezuelan opposition figures often take harder anti-government lines if they flee abroad. Exiles’ voices are important, but those trying to end Venezuela’s crisis should listen to others as well, recalling that compromise offers the only peaceful exit.
Topic:
Mass Media, Leadership, Social Media, Conflict, Peace, and Opposition
Political Geography:
South America and Venezuela

73. Southern Philippines: Keeping Normalisation on Track in the Bangsamoro

Author:
International Crisis Group
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
Peace in the Philippines’ majority-Muslim region requires disarming 40,000 ex-rebels and encouraging economic development where they live. But progress toward these goals, together called “normalisation”, is sputtering. Both Manila and the former insurgents need to hit the accelerator lest the process lose momentum entirely.
Topic:
Religion, Minorities, Ethnicity, Conflict, Peace, Economic Development, and Identity
Political Geography:
Asia, Philippines, and Oceania

74. Ending Nigeria’s Herder-Farmer Crisis: The Livestock Reform Plan

Author:
International Crisis Group
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
Nigeria’s latest plan for curbing herder-farmer conflict is facing obstacles, including staff and funding shortages as well as political opposition. If this initiative fails, there could be more rural violence. Abuja should work with donors to raise both money and awareness of the scheme’s benefits.
Topic:
Conflict, Violence, Rural, and Farming
Political Geography:
Africa and Nigeria

75. Turkey-Greece: From Maritime Brinkmanship to Dialogue

Author:
International Crisis Group
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
In mid-2020, Turkey and Greece put their Mediterranean fleets on high alert, dramatically raising tensions in their long-running dispute over air, water, rock and now seabed gas deposits as well. Talks have been frustrating but remain the best way to contain the risk of conflict.
Topic:
Maritime Commerce, Territorial Disputes, Water, Maritime, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Europe, Turkey, Greece, and Mediterranean

76. Post-war Prospects for Nagorno-Karabakh

Author:
International Crisis Group
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
The 2020 war over Nagorno-Karabakh left many issues unresolved and the front lines volatile. The parties should establish a formal communication channel to address urgent post-war problems, Russian peacekeepers need a clearer mandate and aid agencies must be granted access to the conflict zone.
Topic:
Territorial Disputes, Peacekeeping, Conflict, and Violence
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Caucasus

77. Stemming the Insurrection in Mozambique’s Cabo Delgado

Author:
International Crisis Group
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
Deadly conflict in Mozambique’s ruby- and natural gas-rich northernmost coastal province feeds on a mix of colonial-era tensions, inequality and Islamist militancy. To tame the insurrection, Maputo needs to use force, with bespoke assistance from outside partners, and to carefully address underlying grievances.
Topic:
Natural Resources, Inequality, Conflict, Humanitarian Crisis, and Insurrection
Political Geography:
Africa and Mozambique

78. Iraq’s Tishreen Uprising: From Barricades to Ballot Box

Author:
International Crisis Group
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
The huge demonstrations that rocked Iraqi cities two years ago reverberate still, with the main grievances unaddressed. Protests could arise anew at any time, risking another lethal crackdown. The government should hold those who harmed protesters accountable and work to ensure clean elections in October.
Topic:
Social Movement, Conflict, Protests, and Oppression
Political Geography:
Iraq and Middle East

79. Iran: The Riddle of Raisi

Author:
International Crisis Group
Publication Date:
08-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
Iran has a new president, consolidating the hardliners’ control over the centres of power. What will he do about the country’s numerous crises? One answer is clear: the 2015 nuclear deal’s fate remains the most pressing issue for Tehran and its foreign interlocutors.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, Governance, Leadership, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East

80. Beyond Business as Usual in Israel-Palestine

Author:
International Crisis Group
Publication Date:
08-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
The latest escalation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict brought important shifts in the status quo, underscoring the necessity of a political settlement. A peace based on equal respect for both peoples’ rights will take time, however. Steps to lower the temperature are urgent in the interim.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Territorial Disputes, Conflict, Peace, and Settlements
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, and Palestine

81. A Time for Talks: Toward Dialogue between the Gulf Arab States and Iran

Author:
International Crisis Group
Publication Date:
08-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
The Gulf Arab states have perceived threats from Iran since the 1979 revolution. Frictions have lessened of late, offering an important opportunity. Riyadh and Abu Dhabi should keep engaging Tehran with an eye to initiating the broadest possible talks on regional peace and security.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Peace
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, and Gulf Nations

82. Relaunching Negotiations over Western Sahara

Author:
International Crisis Group
Publication Date:
10-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
The fighting in Western Sahara, which broke out again in November 2020, remains of low intensity. Yet outside powers would be wrong to assume that it will not escalate. With U.S. support, the new UN envoy should pursue confidence-building measures that could facilitate negotiations.
Topic:
Diplomacy, International Cooperation, United Nations, Humanitarian Intervention, Conflict, and Peace
Political Geography:
Africa

83. A Broken Canopy: Deforestation and Conflict in Colombia

Author:
International Crisis Group
Publication Date:
11-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
Colombia’s vast forest is fast receding, partly because guerrillas and criminals are clearing land for farming, ranching and other pursuits. These unregulated activities are causing both dire environmental harm and deadly conflict. Bogotá should take urgent steps to halt the damage.
Topic:
Environment, Conflict, Farming, and Deforestation
Political Geography:
Colombia and South America

84. Competing Visions of International Order in the South China Sea

Author:
International Crisis Group
Publication Date:
11-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
The disputes in the South China Sea are fundamentally about claims of sovereignty, the broadest of which are staked by Beijing. The Chinese-U.S. rivalry, meanwhile, loads the dissension with geopolitical significance. Both major powers stand to gain by accepting the constraints of international law.
Topic:
Territorial Disputes, Hegemony, Maritime, Conflict, and Rivalry
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

85. A Fight by Other Means: Keeping the Peace with Colombia’s FARC

Author:
International Crisis Group
Publication Date:
11-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
Colombia’s 2016 peace deal was a landmark achievement, convincing the FARC guerrillas to disarm and enter civilian life. Yet much remains to be done to show insurgents that they can redress their grievances through ordinary politics. The country’s leaders should recommit to finishing the job.
Topic:
Security, Treaties and Agreements, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Peace
Political Geography:
Colombia and South America

86. The Philippines’ Dilemma: How to Manage Tensions in the South China Sea

Author:
International Crisis Group
Publication Date:
12-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
The maritime dispute between China and the Philippines is simmering against the backdrop of strategic competition between Beijing and Washington. To keep tensions below boiling point, Manila should push for a Code of Conduct in the South China Sea as well as greater regional cooperation.
Topic:
Regional Cooperation, Territorial Disputes, Conflict, and Rivalry
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and Philippines

87. Vietnam Tacks Between Cooperation and Struggle in the South China Sea

Author:
International Crisis Group
Publication Date:
12-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
Together with the Philippines, Vietnam is on the front line of maritime disputes with China. The risk of armed confrontation is low but growing. Hanoi should redouble efforts to build confidence, starting with less sensitive issues, and to establish an effective Code of Conduct.
Topic:
Economics, Regional Cooperation, Maritime, Conflict, and Peace
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and Vietnam

88. Mali: Enabling Dialogue with the Jihadist Coalition JNIM

Author:
International Crisis Group
Publication Date:
12-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
Authorities in Mali seem to be considering negotiations with Jamaat Nusratul Islam wal-Muslimin, the country’s largest Islamist insurgency. Pursuing talks will be a tall order, given the stakes and the group’s al-Qaeda connection. Both the government and the militants should begin with incremental steps.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Terrorism, Conflict, Violence, and Dialogue
Political Geography:
Africa and Mali

89. Lessons of the Syrian Conflict: Toward a Better Intervention Debate

Author:
Nick Danforth
Publication Date:
12-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
In October 2019, The New York Times published a feature story describing how “Russia, Turkey and Bashar al-Assad carved up northern Syria as the Americans retreated.”1 It is hard to think of a more telling, and damning, one-sentence encapsulation of both the failure of American policy in Syria and the skewed political discourse compounding it. Somehow the United States was retreating from a place it never wanted to occupy—and the Syrian regime’s success in partially clawing back control of a country it once ruled with an iron fist was prime evidence of American decline. This paper begins from the premise that Washington will increasingly be confronted with conflicts where it can neither determine the outcome nor stay out entirely, and the country needs better strategies for charting a middle course. Given the scale of the tragedy that has befallen Syria, and the damaging repercussions it continues to have for U.S. interests in the region, few would argue that Washington’s handling of the Syrian civil war represents a success. Yet there remains no consensus on the nature of Washington’s failure. In a highly charged debate, many critics are adamant that faster and more forceful military intervention could have secured a more favorable outcome. Others, by contrast, are equally insistent that Washington should have done even less. It is possible that the ideal form of intervention advocated by interventionists or the ideal form of nonintervention advocated by noninterventionists would have created a better outcome in Syria. Instead, Washington pursued a sometimes-inconsistent intermediate approach that achieved the worst of both worlds. The United States engaged in the conflict in a way that put its credibility at stake without positively affecting the outcome. By examining how this happened, this paper seeks to ensure that Washington can avoid similar failures in the future.
Topic:
Military Intervention, Conflict, and Syrian War
Political Geography:
Middle East and Syria

90. Principles for the Combat Employment of Weapon Systems with Autonomous Functionalities

Author:
Robert O. Work
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
An international debate over lethal autonomous weapon systems (LAWS) has been under way for nearly a decade.1 In 2012, the Department of Defense (DoD) issued formal policy guidance on weapon systems with autonomous functionalities,2 and nations have come together since 2014 to discuss LAWS through the United Nations Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW). The discussions at the CCW have been hampered by the lack of an agreed-upon definition for LAWS.3 However, states party to the CCW agreed in 2019 that “human responsibility” for the decisions over the use of weapon systems and the use of force “must be retained.”4 Accordingly, discussions now tend to focus on the type and degree of human involvement required to ensure compliance with international humanitarian law and satisfy ethical concerns.5 Several scholars argue these discussions should focus on “developing objective, commonly held, and function-based understandings of autonomy in the military context” (emphasis added).6 The premise of this paper is that the best way to achieve such an understanding is to develop, debate, and agree upon some commonly accepted principles for the employment of weapon systems with autonomous functionalities in armed conflict.7 This is where the legal, ethical, and moral questions about autonomy in warfare are most acute and deserve the most attention. This paper offers a starting point for these discussions. The seven principles proposed in this paper are intended to complement and build on existing DoD guidance, including DoD Directive (DoDD) 3000.09, Autonomy in Weapon Systems, and DoD’s Artificial Intelligence (AI) Principles.8 They are also consistent with the 11 guiding principles adopted in 2019 by the CCW in its “Meeting of the High Contracting Parties to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects.”9 These seven new principles concentrate on the responsible use of autonomous functionalities in armed conflict in ways that preserve human judgment and responsibility over the use of force and help minimize the probability of loss of control of the system or unintended engagements, especially against noncombatants. This paper is organized into four sections. The first details the history of U.S. weapon systems with autonomous functionalities. It is intended to give the reader a notion of how these weapons have historically been used, why autonomous functionalities are so useful, and why the DoD retains the right to use them. The second section explains why weapons with autonomous functionalities are now being improved through the addition of AI, an important development that aims to make the weapons more discriminate in the application of force. The third section explains why the DoD should consider publishing a new set of principles for the combat employment of weapon systems with autonomous functionalities. The final section outlines seven proposed principles for consideration.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Military Affairs, Weapons, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Global Focus and United States of America

91. Afghanistan: The Fog at the End of the Tunnel

Author:
Carl Conetta
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Project on Defense Alternatives
Abstract:
What is causing the uncertainty about when US ground forces will exit Afghanistan. The Biden administration insists that logistical factors explain its breach of the 2020 US-Taliban agreement, which reset the exit date from May to September. Logistical factors are also supposed to explain why the date may now be walked back to July. Actually, logistical issues explain neither. Using current data and historical precedent, this short analysis shows why. An alternative explanation for the delay is that it gave Washington more time to pursue some of its unfinished goals regarding Afghanistan. In this, the lingering troop presence serves as leverage. What goals? Improve Kabul’s military posture, polish plans and preparations for US forces to “fight from afar,” and pursue dramatic new international initiatives aiming to lock the Taliban into a cease-fire, peace settlement, and government reform plan substantially defined by the USA. This high risk-gambit won’t succeed, but it might prolong the conflict and America’s involvement in it.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Treaties and Agreements, War, Military Strategy, Armed Forces, Taliban, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, South Asia, North America, and United States of America

92. Seeing in the Dark: Real-Time Monitoring in Humanitarian Crises

Author:
Daniel Maxwell, Erin Lentz, Kamau Wanjohi, Daniel Molla, Matthew Day, Peter Hailey, Christopher Newton, and Anna Colom
Publication Date:
03-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Feinstein International Center, Tufts University
Abstract:
Humanitarian information systems typically provide analysis to predict crisis, assess needs, direct program resources, and assess short- to medium-term effects of programs. But much of this information is “chunky”—a single estimate of “needs,” for example, can be expected to direct resources and programming for up to a full year (IASC 2020). A single early warning scenario might be expected to provide information about potential hazards and the exposure of population to the ill-effects of that hazard for three to four months. And almost by definition, early warning analyses are grounded in known and likely hazards, “population in need” (PIN) figures are based on the impacts of known shocks, and program resources are (or should be) allocated on the basis of known and projected PIN figures. There have long been questions about the timeliness of humanitarian information and especially about the extent to which information initiates appropriate and timely actions (Buchanan-Smith and Davies 1995; Bailey 2012; Lentz et al. 2020). And there have always been concerns that circumstances can change in shorter time periods than standard humanitarian analysis procedures can pick up, so interest in real-time monitoring (RTM) as a component of humanitarian information systems has increased for at least the past decade or so (FSNAU 2015).
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Humanitarian Aid, Famine, Food Security, Humanitarian Intervention, Conflict, and Nutrition
Political Geography:
Middle East, Yemen, Somalia, Malawi, South Sudan, and Africa

93. Engaging Russia over Syria: Managing Peripheral Conflict and Narrowing Interests

Author:
Aaron Stein
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
The United States is examining how to narrow core objectives in the Middle East to focus on improving military readiness and increasing the number of low-density, high-demand assets available for deployment in Asia and Europe. To free up more forces and to help improve readiness, Washington should explore selective engagement with Moscow about securing a formal ceasefire in Syria’s northwest and reaching agreement on a “no-foreign forces zone” in Syria’s south. This policy would not alter the status quo in Syria, but seek to use diplomatic tools to allow for the reallocation of certain resources now tasked with protecting U.S. ground forces. This engagement with the Russian Federation would elevate a key U.S. interest and use counter-terrorism capabilities based in Jordan to disrupt plots against the homeland. It would also seek to use diplomatic tools to create conditions to remove forces that do not directly support this counter-terrorism effort. This approach would retain U.S. forces in the Middle East, but in a way that allows for certain assets to be repositioned in either the United States, Indo-Pacific, or Europe.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Conflict, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, Middle East, Syria, and United States of America

94. Women in Multilateral Peace Operations in 2021: What is the State of Play?

Author:
Claudia Pfeifer, Timo Smit, and Jaïr van der Lijn
Publication Date:
11-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
Abstract:
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000) on Women, Peace and Security stresses the importance of women’s full and equal participation in all efforts towards maintaining and promoting peace and security, including peace operations. More than 20 years after the resolution was adopted, some progress has been achieved in improving women’s representation in multilateral peace operations, but there are still gaps to fill. Specific achievements include the UN and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) launching gender parity strategies and establishing specific targets for women’s participation in their respective personnel. At the same time, the European Union (EU) affirmed its political commitment by increasing women’s representation in Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions. This booklet provides a data-driven analysis of UN peace operations, OSCE field operations and EU CSDP missions and operations. It uses data visualizations to provide annual snapshots and averages of women’s representation in leadership roles, overall personnel numbers and member state contributions. The booklet supports the efforts of multilateral organizations and their member states to increase the representation of women in peace operations. Having a richer, data-oriented picture of women’s participation in peace operations will help multilateral organizations to identify gender-parity strategies. Finally, it enhances transparency and provides insights into recent trends and developments in peace operations.
Topic:
Security, Peacekeeping, Women, Conflict, Multilateralism, and Peace
Political Geography:
Global Focus

95. Food Systems in Conflict and Peacebuilding Settings: Pathways and Interconnections

Author:
Caroline Delgado, Vongai Murugani, and Kristina Tschunkert
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
Abstract:
Failing food systems and the resultant increasing world hunger are among the most pressing issues of our time. With 155 million people acutely food insecure and nearly 30 million people on the verge of starvation in 2020, the world is far off track to achieve the United Nations’ Sustainable Development Goal 2 (Zero Hunger) by 2030. Violent conflict remained the main driver of global hunger in 2020. Conflict has a direct negative impact on food systems and resultant levels of food security. Moreover, heightened food insecurity may create grievances that can escalate into instability and violent conflict. The increases in both acute food insecurity and violent conflict demand urgent and decisive action. The objectives of this three-part policy paper series are to emphasize the urgency of addressing the relationship between conflict and food insecurity and to point out existing opportunities to do so. This paper, the first in the series, aims, firstly, to inform policymakers of the intricate relationships between food security and violent conflict, secondly, to alert policymakers to the potential ability of food systems to contribute to peace, and then to highlight the action required to enhance this potential. The paper concludes with four recommendations intended to help guide more effective preventative and mitigating action to limit (and ultimately avoid) the long-term adverse consequences of violent conflict for food security and exploit food security’s potential to foster peace.
Topic:
Security, Development, Food, Conflict, Peace, and Resilience
Political Geography:
Global Focus

96. Afghanistan: What Just Happened? What Comes Next?

Author:
Carl Conetta
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Project on Defense Alternatives
Abstract:
in short order, a 20-year $1.2 trillion US effort at nation-building evaporated, disintegrated, went up in smoke. And while unreconstructed interventionists pummel President Biden for surrendering Afghanistan, the truth is that we never had it. What we held instead was a hollow construct of our own imagination and creation – a client pseudo-state. And when it was finally and fully tested, it (for the most part) threw down its arms and ran away. In a sense, the sudden collapse of Kabul’s government and security services provides the surest litmus test of America’s 20-year enterprise in Afghanistan. It tells us that coercive nation-building by a foreign power – indeed, an alien power – is an impossible mission. Outsiders lack the knowledge, indigenous roots, legitimacy, and degree of interest to succeed against local resistance. Their very presence is provocative, especially given differences of language, religion, and culture. It’s as likely to spur resistance as it is to quell it. At the same time, such interventions risk becoming intractable given domestic political dynamics and Washington’s fixation on preserving its superpower reputation, its claim to being the “indispensable power”.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Taliban, Conflict, and Military
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, South Asia, and United States of America

97. Peace Through Food: Ending the Hunger-Instability Nexus

Author:
Kelly M. McFarland
Publication Date:
08-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University
Abstract:
In the twentieth century, humankind made phenomenal steps to increase food production. But today, complex and interrelated issues drive an increase in food insecurity globally, and propel conflict, migration, and human insecurity. Nearly a billion people, at a minimum, are malnourished or suffer the pains of hunger—while the world wastes a third of food produced. This pain, or the fear of it, drives political instability and conflict as people seek reliable access to food. Adverse climate events, poor resource management, disease outbreaks, breakdowns in distribution, and profit-driven research and development, among other factors, have led to structural imbalances and inequities in the food system, which limit consistent access to nutrition for an increasing number of people. In spring 2021, the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy convened a series of working group meetings with participants representing academia, think tanks, government, international organizations, NGOs, and the private sector. The group mapped out the current state of global food systems, discussed the relationship between hunger and conflict, and sought ways to establish food security as a means to promote stability and end conflict. Ultimately, an end to food insecurity requires three strands of policymaking: re-envision food security as a basic human right; re-think universal food security as a core component of stability and peace; and reform the global food system and distribution networks to address these shifts. Governments, NGOs, international organizations, and the private sector have already provided a foundation, but it is not yet sufficient to address the issue moving forward.
Topic:
Food, Food Security, Conflict, Peace, and Instability
Political Geography:
Global Focus

98. The Platform of the 3+3 Format: A Review

Author:
Badri Belkania
Publication Date:
11-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
Abstract:
The aftermath of the Nagorno-Karabakh war, which in Ankara and Baku was hailed as a triumphant victory for the Turkish-Azerbaijani alliance, significantly changed the political situation and the balance of power in the Caucasus region. The turn of the decades-long status quo in favor of Azerbaijan showed that a new phase has begun in the region, often pointed out so by the victorious side as well. 1 Against the backdrop of a significantly changed regional agenda and the growing Turkish-Azerbaijani influence in the Caucasus, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan introduced the idea of establishing a six-member regional cooperation platform. If the idea were to materialize, the members would include Turkey, Azerbaijan, Iran, Russia, Georgia, and Armenia.2 Erdogan's idea received a wide response in the region. The new platform for regional cooperation (Russia, Iran, Turkey + Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan) has become an important topic of discussion in all six countries, primarily due to its controversial format. The idea of geographically adjacent but politically different countries joining one platform is in direct conflict with the opposing interests of these countries. Despite this significant obstacle, the apologists for the idea, that seeks to replace the conflicts and tensions in the Caucasus with a "long-term peace," remain hopeful that the platform will have a future.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, Conflict, and Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict
Political Geography:
Turkey and Azerbaijan

99. Iran-Azerbaijan Confrontation: Threats and Challenges

Author:
Zurab Batiashvili
Publication Date:
11-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
Abstract:
Iran-Azerbaijan relations have never been easy but they became particularly tense in September-October 2021, attracting attention within the region and beyond. This confrontation between the parties escalated into large-scale military exercises and a war of statements but, fortunately, the tension did not reach a level of military confrontation. In the second half of October, the confrontation slowly subsided. However, the problem has not disappeared. Its causes still exist and have a great potential of reigniting the conflict. Such a situation creates a fertile ground for a number of threats and challenges for the entire region, including Georgia.
Topic:
Bilateral Relations, Military Affairs, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Iran, Azerbaijan, and Georgia

100. From indices to insight: A proposal to enhance the risk assessment of the Dutch Early Warning/Early Action process

Author:
Bob Deen, Adaja Stoetman, and Kars de Bruijne
Publication Date:
11-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
Over the course of the last three decades, countless scholars, diplomats and experts have sought to develop reliable ways to predict and prevent violent conflict and instability. These efforts have yielded a vast array of analytical instruments, ranging from indices that measure various proximate and structural causes of instability to forecasting models that estimate the probability of an outbreak of violent conflict. Predicting and preventing violent conflict and instability Presently, there is a great deal of data available ranging from better measures of political violence and better predictors of violence. Moreover, as data sciences advance, social scientists have been able to develop new models and refine their predictions. However, as such tools proliferate, so do the challenges for policymakers. First, more data does not always mean ‘better’ data. Key indicators such as on political inclusivity, local grievances and competition are often still not readily available. Second, more data and better methodologies have not always meant a better insight into conflict risks. While we have generally become better in predicting the continuation and intensity of ongoing conflict, it remains a major challenge to predict which countries will become unstable and when. Third, perhaps the biggest problem is that even when having a clear insight into conflict risks, converting these insights into actionable policies remains difficult. In these instances, it is often not a lack of information or insufficient early warning signals per se that pose the key obstacles, but rather the ability to convert these data points into policy-relevant analysis and to identify relevant entry points for preventive efforts.
Topic:
Political Violence, Conflict, Risk, and Instability
Political Geography:
Europe and Netherlands