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Begin New Search Topic Military Affairs Content Type Special Report Publication Year within 25 Years Publication Year within 3 Years

1. China Maritime Report No. 25: More Chinese Ferry Tales: China's Use of Civilian Shipping in Military Activities, 2021-2022

Author:
J. Michael Dahm
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College
Abstract:
This report provides a comprehensive assessment of Chinese civilian shipping support to the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), examining civil maritime-military activities from October 2021 through September 2022. As of 2022, the PLA and its reserve civilian merchant fleet are still probably unable to provide significant amphibious landing capabilities or the maritime logistics in austere or challenging environments necessary to support a major cross-strait invasion of Taiwan. However, large volume lift exercises conducted in 2022 suggest that the PLA has made significant progress in the use of civilian vessels for the large-scale lift of PLA troops and equipment into undefended ports, a capability that may be leveraged in a military assault on Taiwan. This report also discusses other civil maritime-military activities not previously observed, including the use of civilian vessels and infrastructure to conceal PLA troop movements, operations from austere ports, use of ocean-going vessels to transport PLA forces along inland waterways, and logistics support for China’s South China Sea outposts.
Topic:
Infrastructure, Military Affairs, Shipping, Logistics, and People's Liberation Army (PLA)
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, and Asia

2. China Maritime Report No. 26: Beyond the First Battle: Overcoming a Protracted Blockade of Taiwan

Author:
Lonnie D. Henley
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College
Abstract:
If there is a war over Taiwan, an extended Chinese blockade is likely to determine the outcome. While a blockade might include intercepting ships at sea, the primary focus would be on sealing airfields and ports, particularly on the west coast of Taiwan. China could sustain that type of blockade indefinitely. Penetrating a prolonged blockade and keeping Taiwan alive would require a serious U.S. investment in systems and operational concepts that we currently do not have. Unless we make that investment, we may win the first battle, defeating an attempted landing. But we cannot win the war.
Topic:
Infrastructure, Military Affairs, Maritime, Port, People's Liberation Army (PLA), and Blockade
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, and Asia

3. How Russia Went to War: The Kremlin’s Preparations for Its Aggression Against Ukraine

Author:
Kalev Stoicescu, Mykola Nazarov, Keir Giles, and Matthew Johnson
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
This report examines Russia’s preparations for its full-scale invasion of Ukraine: domestically, in Ukraine itself, in the global information domain, and in building its relationship with China. For Russia, crushing Ukraine’s quest for democracy was central to meeting its objectives of reshaping the post-Cold War order in Europe and globally, restoring its own status, and reconstituting the Russian empire and Russian world. Its preparations in the political and informational, military, and economic domains for a full-scale war in Ukraine were too extensive and overt to go unnoticed, but they were not acted upon. It is hard to avoid the conclusion that the evidence went against the dominant narrative in the West and was simply brushed aside. In the political and informational domains, Russia’s domestic preparations including cementing the regime’s authority, and taking advantage of the population’s Soviet nostalgia and aspirations for the restoration of the Russian world and the empire. Limited economic preparations were intended to safeguard Russia’s economy against current and future Western sanctions, while Russia’s extensive military preparations involved large-scale defence spending and extensive military modernisation efforts. Russia’s preparations beyond its own territory included: a campaign within Ukraine to divide society and discredit the democratically elected leadership; a campaign directed at the rest of the world about Ukraine, discrediting the country and its people as an object of sympathy and support in their resistance against Russia; and a campaign of intimidation designed to instil in western leaders and populations a fear of obstructing, impeding, or offending Russia. Russia also worked to build a relationship with China. China’s support is essential to Putin’s ambitions. But equally, China’s strategy for confronting the United States – which China cannot do alone – depends on Russia remaining at least a quasi-great power.
Topic:
Security, NATO, Development, Sanctions, Military Affairs, European Union, Resilience, and Information Warfare
Political Geography:
Russia, China, United Kingdom, Europe, Asia, and United States of America

4. Russia’s Military Industry Forecast 2023-2025

Author:
Pavel Luzin
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
After the start of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine on February 24, 2022, the arms expenditures and military budget of Russia skyrocketed and continue to grow for the foreseeable future. However, the military industry is under threat Despite the additional massive financial inflow. The military industry could not—with few exceptions—increase the production capacity significantly nor solve its other major problems of workforce deficit and annual net losses. Moreover, the Western embargo on the supply of components, industrial equipment, and technologies makes the further development of the Russian military industry doubtful. Even reverse engineering has become an impossible task. However, the Kremlin’s choice in this situation would be in favor of more arms expenditures and extending the practices of the command economy.
Topic:
Military Affairs, Budget, Industry, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, and Ukraine

5. Russia’s War in Ukraine: Critical Vulnerabilities to Russia’s Military Operations and Systems

Author:
Rob Lee and Philip Wasielewski
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
Some of the critical vulnerabilities to Russia’s military operations and systems—revealed during the war in Ukraine—are due to its military culture and poor strategic choices at the beginning of the war including overly ambitious strategic aims. Deficiencies in Russian military culture include a highly centralized decision-making process, a disregard for the welfare of its soldiers, and flagrant dishonesty. Certain aspects of Russia’s military culture, especially the disconnect between front-line soldiers and senior officers, complicate the Russian military’s ability to adapt, develop solutions to obvious deficiencies, and institutionalize lessons learned from the battlefield. Other critical Russian military vulnerabilities are not inherent to its military culture but to Russia’s national demographic and industrial capabilities. Limits in these areas make it difficult for Russia to regenerate military power by either increasing the size of its military or increasing the quality of its weapons systems. Even if Russia’s military culture experiences a post-war military renaissance, its ability to regenerate military power lost in Ukraine will be limited by its declining population and industrial bases as well as Western sanctions on high technology.
Topic:
Sanctions, Armed Forces, Military Affairs, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, and Ukraine

6. EU lessons from the evacuation of Kabul: Part 1 – What went wrong? The decision-making moments

Author:
Mihai Sebastian Chihaia and Georg Riekeles
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
European Policy Centre (EPC)
Abstract:
What went wrong in Kabul and what were the critical junctures in the West’s decision-making? This Paper explores these two questions in detail. Two moments stand out in the chaotic evacuation from Kabul: the establishment of the military withdrawal schedule in mid-April and when all the countries involved scrambled to get their civilians out too. What is clear is that EU institutions were not prepared and were equally blindsided by the speed of events and decisions. This Paper shows that the dereliction of prudence, planning and duty also extends to the EU. This is the first paper of a three-part Report examining the evacuation of Kabul, and the combined failures of NATO and the EU, amid the war in Ukraine. The Report is structured in three parts: A description of the central decision moments leading up to and during the evacuation from Afghanistan. An assessment of the main factors contributing to failure in anticipation, planning and execution. Recommendations regarding the EU’s crisis management architecture and capacity in the context of the implementation of the Strategic Compass.
Topic:
NATO, Military Affairs, European Union, and Crisis Management
Political Geography:
Afghanistan and South Asia

7. EU lessons from the evacuation of Kabul: Part 2 – Critical factors in the failure to prepare for evacuation

Author:
Mihai Sebastian Chihaia and Georg Riekeles
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
European Policy Centre (EPC)
Abstract:
The EU has yet to engage in a comprehensive ex-post evaluation of the factors of failure ahead of and during the critical summer months in 2021. By failing to deal with the past, one also does not learn about the future. Building on the preceding chapter’s analysis of the events leading up to and during the evacuation of Kabul, this paper identifies three main factors in the West’s Kabul fiasco: a collective failure of anticipation, NATO groupthink and dependence on the US, and the absence of European will and capabilities. This is the second Paper of a three-part Report examining the evacuation of Kabul, and the combined failures of NATO and the EU, amid the war in Ukraine. The Report is structured in three parts: A description of the central decision moments leading up to and during the evacuation from Afghanistan. An assessment of the main factors contributing to failure in anticipation, planning and execution. Recommendations regarding the EU’s crisis management architecture and capacity in the context of the implementation of the Strategic Compass.
Topic:
NATO, Military Affairs, European Union, Crisis Management, and Strategic Planning
Political Geography:
Afghanistan and Europe

8. Russia-China Defense Cooperation

Author:
Andrea Kendall-Taylor and Nicholas Lokker
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
Russia’s war in Ukraine has been a critical test of the depth of Sino-Russian relations. Since Russia’s invasion, China has remained an essential partner for Moscow. Although there have been limits to what Beijing has been willing to do for Russia, China has served as a vital lifeline for the Kremlin including by parroting Russian talking points about the war, increasing purchases of Russian oil and gas, and continuing to export microchips and other component parts to Moscow cut off by the West. Warnings by senior U.S. officials that China is contemplating providing Russia with lethal military aid in support of its war against Ukraine underscore the depth of their partnership.1 Emerging reports that Chinese companies have provided rifles and dual-use equipment such as drone parts and body armor only add credibility to these warnings.2 Although it remains unclear at the time of writing whether China will ultimately decide to send lethal aid to Russia, the last year has provided further evidence that Russia and China are deeply aligned and that the persistence and evolution of their partnership will continue to pose challenges that the United States and its allies must navigate. This working paper will focus on the challenges that Russia-China military cooperation poses to the United States and its allies and partners. This aspect of their relationship has been one of the most consequential dimensions of their deepening partnership. Already, China has obtained key capabilities from Moscow such as Su-27 and Su-35 fighter aircrafts, S-300 and S-400 air defense systems, and anti-ship missiles, which bolster China’s military posture in the Indo-Pacific.3 Russia too has benefited from a large market for its arms sales and access to technological components it can no longer access following the imposition of Western sanctions in 2014—a need that has grown exponentially since Russia’s reinvasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Meanwhile, more frequent and elaborate joint exercises have signaled to onlooking countries the two partners’ mutual support for each other’s security priorities and willingness to push back against the United States. In the context of Russia’s ongoing war against Ukraine and increasing U.S.-China tensions in the Indo-Pacific, it has become even more urgent to understand how future military cooperation between Russia and China could evolve and what it would mean for the United States and its partners. This memo examines this aspect of the partnership, including what is driving it, how it has evolved following the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, and the implications for the United States and its allies and partners.
Topic:
Bilateral Relations, Military Affairs, Russia-Ukraine War, and Defense Cooperation
Political Geography:
Russia, China, and Asia

9. U.S.-China Competition and Military AI: How Washington Can Manage Strategic Risks amid Rivalry with Beijing

Author:
Jacob Stokes, Alexander Sullivan, and Noah Greene
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
Two tectonic trends in the international security environment appear to be on a collision course. The first trend is the intensifying geopolitical rivalry between the United States and the People’s Republic of China (PRC or China). The second trend is the rapid development of artificial intelligence (AI) technologies, including for military applications. This report explores how the United States can manage strategic risks—defined as increased risks of armed conflict or the threat of nuclear war—that could be created or exacerbated by military AI in its relationship with China. It begins by providing an overview of China’s views on and policies toward AI. Beijing sees AI playing roles in both its civilian economy and the modernization of its military, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). At home, Chinese leaders want to leverage AI to boost growth and innovation, address economic and social challenges, and secure the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) domestic rule. AI also plays a key role in China’s military ambitions, especially its goal to become a “world-class military” by midcentury, in part through the “intelligentization” of its forces. Intelligentization relies on integrating AI and other emerging technologies into the joint force with the goal of gaining an edge on the United States. China argues that its governance model, including its military-civil fusion policy, gives Beijing a competitive advantage over Washington. Realization of that vision, however, remains uncertain and will require China to overcome external and internal obstacles.
Topic:
Security, Military Affairs, Artificial Intelligence, Rivalry, and Competition
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

10. Campaign of Denial: Strengthening Simultaneous Deterrence in the Indo-Pacific and Europe

Author:
Becca Wasser
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
The United States faces an unprecedented challenge: simultaneously deterring large-scale conventional aggression by two nuclear-armed powers. The nation will need to deter these major adversaries from overt aggression in the near term in two primary, yet distinct, regions: China in the Indo-Pacific and Russia in Europe. However, the U.S. military is unprepared to concurrently meet the challenges posed by China and Russia. These challenges have become more pronounced as Beijing continues its ambitious military modernization and Moscow continues to threaten European security despite its currently diminished military strength. Effective simultaneous deterrence requires the United States to reembrace the basic principles of deterrence to reverse unfavorable trends in military power that are eroding long-standing U.S. warfighting advantages. It necessitates U.S. forces to project power into far-flung regions that are contested by China and Russia to uphold America’s extended deterrence commitments to its allies and partners. To do so, the Pentagon must shift from previous approaches designed to deter opportunistic aggressors and respond to crises. While the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) has realigned its strategy to focus on great-power deterrence, it has faced hurdles in strategy implementation that have stymied changes needed to organize more effectively for simultaneous deterrence. This is due in part to a sizable mismatch between strategy and resources. The U.S. military does not have the kinds and numbers of forces required to simultaneously deter China in the Indo-Pacific and Russia in Europe from conventional conflict. This deficit is especially telling in two priority scenarios: an invasion of Taiwan by China, and a Russian invasion of the Baltics. American forces lack the modernized capabilities, necessary posture, right levels of readiness, and familiarity with executing the types of warfighting missions needed to meet the current challenge.1 The balance between meeting global demands and responding to persistent threats while shifting to emphasize deterrence in the Indo-Pacific and Europe is precarious. Concentrating on strategic priorities requires accepting risk in other regions, as the United States, with fewer forces and resources stretched around the globe, moves capabilities and forces to priority theaters. A new approach to simultaneous deterrence is needed. The Biden administration has outlined the concept of campaigning as a key component of peacetime deterrence. This concept seeks to sequence and link military activities so they intentionally counter coercion by priority adversaries. The intent is to enable the Pentagon to respond to challenges posed by China and Russia, while still meeting global demands. But the concept is currently ill-defined and expansive, and its broad interpretation does not help the DoD meet its deterrence requirements or align strategy and resources. Instead, campaigning runs the risk of engaging U.S. forces in activities that do not contribute to or are counterproductive to deterrence. A failure to curb these activities will result in either the need to expand force size, or the hindrance of modernization efforts.
Topic:
Security, Military Affairs, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Europe, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

11. Resisting China’s Gray Zone Military Pressure on Taiwan

Author:
Jacob Stokes
Publication Date:
12-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
The People’s Republic of China (PRC or China) has sharply escalated its pressure campaign targeting the Republic of China (ROC or Taiwan) in recent years. Beijing appears likely to use Taiwan’s upcoming presidential election in January 2024 as a pretext to apply more pressure on the self-governing island, particularly in the “gray zone” using China’s military, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), along with other tools of state power. There is no precise and commonly agreed upon definition of what gray zone activities are and are not. In general, though, the concept refers to actions that fall into the space between, on one side, peace and, on the other, full-scale kinetic war.1 Gray zone activities are coercive and aggressive but designed to stay below the threshold of triggering major conflict. China uses gray zone operations as part of a comprehensive strategy to pressure Taiwan that spans the areas of diplomacy, information, economics, and security. This policy brief examines one major component of that campaign: gray zone military and security operations. It starts by detailing the capabilities and tactics China uses to put security pressure on Taiwan. Then, it explains what Beijing seeks to achieve with those actions. The paper concludes with recommendations for how U.S. and Taiwan policymakers can resist and counter China’s gray zone operations.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Diplomacy, Economics, Military Affairs, and Information
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, and Asia

12. The Future of the Joint Warfighting Headquarters: An Alternative Approach to the Joint Task Force

Author:
Eric Bissonette, Thomas Bruscino, Kelvin Mote, Matthew Powell, and Marc Sanborn
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:
The US military must create standing, numbered, and regionally aligned Joint warfighting headquarters— American Expeditionary Forces (AEFs)—around a command council and a staff organized into Joint centers and cells. Calls for standing Joint force headquarters are not new, but the demonstrated military effectiveness of the Joint Task Force (JTF) model coupled with increasing service-specific resource requirements and tightening fiscal constraints have resulted in little evolution in joint force headquarters construction since the end of World War II. Analysis of the historical record has shown that joint warfighting is best conducted with a Joint warfighting command subordinate to the geographic combatant commands. However, the Joint Task Force model is problematic because the ad-hoc, post-crisis activation of JTFs, along with their antiquated command and control structure, inherently puts the United States at a strategic and operational disadvantage. In the future, the US military will primarily maintain its competitive advantage, especially in great-power competition, by being a superior and sustainable joint force sooner than its adversaries. The proposed AEFs draw on generations of hard-earned experience to maintain and grow American supremacy in Joint warfighting in an increasingly dangerous world.
Topic:
Armed Forces, Military Affairs, Army, and Joint Operations
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

13. The Lessons of the Afghan War That No One Will Want to Learn

Author:
Anthony H. Cordesman
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
At the best of times, the U.S. tends to rush out heavily politicized studies of the lessons of war that are more political ammunition than serious analyses, and while these are followed by long formal studies that are often quite good, they then are often ignored as the flow of events moves on. These are scarcely the best of times. The collapse of the Afghan government and forces has occurred during one of the most partisan periods in American politics, followed by a totally different kind of conflict in Ukraine, all while the U.S. focus on terrorism and regional conflicts that began with 9/11 has been replaced by a focus on competition with nuclear superpowers like Russia and China. The very fact that the war stretched out over two decades has meant that much of the focus on lessons has ignored the first half or more of the war, and the almost inevitable chaos following the U.S. decision to withdraw has led to the focus on the collapse of the Afghan forces and the central government rather than on the actual conduct of the war – and few within the U.S. government now want to rake over the list of past mistakes that turned an initial tactical victory into a massive grand strategic defeat.
Topic:
Security, Military Strategy, Military Affairs, and Strategic Stability
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

14. How Will China Respond to the Russia-Ukraine Crisis?

Author:
Chris Miller
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
How will China respond to a potential Russian military escalation against Ukraine? Relations between Russia and China have intensified in recent years, with Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping holding regular summits and the two countries’ militaries participating in joint exercises and cooperating in some defense industrial efforts. Ties between Moscow and Beijing are now closer than any time since the days of Stalin and Mao, driven by a shared perception that the United States is each country’s primary foreign policy challenge. One top Russian official told media in December 2021 that the relationship now “exceeds an alliance.”[1] Chinese state media, meanwhile, have vocally backed Russia in arguing that the current crisis stems from the US “using NATO as a tool to cannibalize and squeeze Russia’s strategic space.”[2] The 2014 war in Ukraine and annexation of Crimea was an important factor driving Russia and China closer to each other, as Russia sought to reduce post-Crimea international isolation and as Beijing realized it could drive a hard bargain in its bilateral relationship with Russia on issues like energy. China’s response to the 2014 war, however, was generally to avoid taking sides. China accepted a narrative that placed blame on the West for causing the crisis, with top diplomats citing Western “foreign interference for causing the crisis,” but didn’t approve of Russia’s seizure of Crimea or its military actions in the Donbas.[3] China abstained from voting on the key United Nations resolutions regarding Crimea, for example, and it still declines to recognize Crimea as Russian territory. Similarly, it verbally rejected US and European sanctions on Russia though it let Chinese firms, including the country’s big state-owned banks, abide by these sanctions to avoid being cut off from US financial markets and the international banking system. Compared to 2014, however, China may find it more difficult to avoid involvement in an escalating crisis. Leaders in Beijing and around the world will see the US response to any military escalation against Ukraine as sending signals about whether the US could effectively respond to future crises in the Taiwan Strait or East or South China Seas. The success or failure of US efforts to impose meaningful costs on Russia if it escalates will be seen as a test of whether the US could do something similar in Asia. Moreover, after repeated summits between Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin, including Xi’s description of Putin as his “best friend,” China’s approach to Russia amid a crisis will also be interpreted as sending signals about China’s own capabilities and influence. Because of this, China will not see a new phase of war between Russia and Ukraine as a peripheral issue in its foreign policy, even though China has no core issues at stake in Ukraine itself. China is most likely to be implicated in the crisis by potential Western sanctions on Russia, which in contrast to 2014 will impose substantially more pressure on Beijing to take sides. China’s decision either to adhere to new Western sanctions or to help Russia avoid them will shape escalation pathways and determine the magnitude of economic and political isolation that sanctions impose.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Politics, Sanctions, Military Affairs, Economy, Crisis Management, and Escalation
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Eurasia, Ukraine, and Asia

15. Regaining the High Ground Against China: A Plan to Achieve US Naval Aviation Superiority This Decade

Author:
Bryan Clark and Timothy A. Walton
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
The U.S. Navy and Marine Corps face growing challenges ranging from China and Russia to regional threats such as Iran and North Korea, all of whom seek to undermine their neighbors’ stability and revise geopolitical relationships in their favor. Despite the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic and resulting economic downturn, each of these potential adversaries continued to improve its military capabilities, especially the number and reach of precision missiles able to strike U.S. allies and slow or prevent intervention by U.S. naval forces. Supported by commercial and military surveillance networks in every domain, weapons located on adversary territory are capable of threatening U.S. and allied ships, troop formations, and aircraft hundreds of miles away. U.S. naval aviation risks sliding into irrelevance unless Navy and Marine Corps leaders embrace organizational and investment changes that would enable more effective operational concepts against peer adversaries. To support the approaches, naval air forces will need greater reach, adaptability, and capacity, which this study proposes to address by changing the composition of carrier air wings and repurposing aircraft based ashore or on surface combatants and amphibious ships. Rebalancing naval aviation primarily involves force management, supported by additional procurement or modification of existing aircraft and payloads. This contrasts with prevailing Navy and Marine Corps plans, which sustain the existing force with minimal improvements while prioritizing development of next-generation capabilities. Not only does this approach fail to address the urgent nature of Russian and Chinese threats, but it also perpetuates the Navy’s expectation that revolutionary new capabilities will fix problems that demand tactical, organizational, or adaptive technical solutions. That strategy failed to deliver in the cases of the Littoral Combat Ship, Zumwalt-class destroyer, and Ford-class carrier. The F/A-XX program for a sixth-generation air superiority fighter-even if successful-is unlikely to transform naval aviation but could consume resources needed to address peer adversaries during the next decade. The shortfalls facing naval airpower against the People’s Republic of China are significant, but not insurmountable. Analysts have pronounced the death of the aircraft carrier several times since the end of World War II, but by exploiting its adaptability and mobility U.S. naval forces could remain relevant against peer opponents despite the emergence of long-range sensor and precision weapon networks. However, achieving the reach and capacity necessary to counter Chinese aggression in the Indo-Pacific will depend on carriers focusing on the mission only they can do sustainably and at scalelong-range counter-air and strike warfare. Navy and Marine Corps leaders have an opportunity to substantially improve the ability of maritime airpower to influence events in the Indo-Pacific. However, rebalancing naval aviation will require overcoming cultural, organizational, and programmatic hurdles. As described in this report, the necessary changes are possible and affordable, but only if naval leaders embrace the urgency of their challenges and do not continue to hope they can continue to push their problems-and solutions-out into the future.
Topic:
Defense Policy, National Security, Armed Forces, Military Affairs, Navy, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

16. Regaining Decision Advantage: Revising JADC2 to Buttress Deterrence in Our Window of Greatest Need

Author:
Herbert "Hawk" Carlisle, Scott Swift, and Eric Wesley
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
We believe that Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2) is a critical priority for the Department of Defense (DoD) as it represents the best path towards deterring potential People’s Republic of China (PRC) aggression and addressing the other military challenges of our time. To the DoD, JADC2 represents the capability to sense and make sense of information at all levels, in all phases of war, across all domains, and with all partners, thereby ensuring information advantage at the speed of relevance.1 JADC2 is therefore the US military’s essential technical enabler to leverage joint and coalition capabilities in complex military operations. Practically speaking, this means choosing important operational problems and wiring together the right sensors and decision aids to deliver the right effects to solve them. The result will create operational dilemmas for our adversaries, and new options for US commanders.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Armed Forces, and Military Affairs
Political Geography:
China, North America, and United States of America

17. Building a Team for Next Generation Air Dominance

Author:
Bryan Clark and Dan Patt
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
US air and naval forces face contested environments over wider areas than ever before. Opponents fighting near their home territory can use long-range surface-to-surface missiles and air defense systems—enabled by a combination of commercial or military satellites and airborne sensors—to threaten US or allied airfields, ships, and aircraft thousands of miles away, as depicted in Figure 1.1 By showing they can slow or prevent US intervention in their regions, aggressors like the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Russia, and Iran hope they can convince neighbors to accept their demands for access, influence, or territory. And if coercion proves unsuccessful, these revisionist powers could employ long-range precision weapons as part of a military offensive to achieve their objectives. Although formidable, long-range weapon and sensor complexes like that of the PRC would not be impenetrable. For example, countermeasures and stealth capabilities could degrade the ability of enemy sensors to target and communicate the location of US ships or aircraft, and self-defense systems could prevent small attacks from being successful. As Figure 1 suggests, against the larger strikes likely to be mounted during war, US ships, aircraft, and bases could also be positioned farther from enemy missile batteries to shrink weapon salvos to within US units’ defensive capacities.3 However, reducing their detectability and attacking from longer ranges would reduce the number and intensity of effects US ships or aircraft could generate. Consequently, adversary leaders may have greater confidence in their ability to win a war on acceptable terms.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Armed Forces, Military Affairs, and Air Force
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

18. Entangling alliances? Europe, the United States, Asia, and the risk of a new 1914

Author:
Bruno Tertrais
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
How has alliance formation and maintenance changed since the Cold War? As Russia invades Ukraine, China threatens Taiwan, Iran harasses Gulf States, and Turkey’s neighbors worry about Ankara’s designs, it is a good time to reassess the validity of alliances for global security. Some believe that traditional military alliances are getting weaker or outmoded, and will increasingly be replaced by looser ad hoc groupings such as the Quad, the defense-alliance trio known as AUKUS, or coalitions for given operations such as those in Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq, or Libya. However, standing alliances are proliferating (increasing in numbers), widening (welcoming new members), and deepening (reinforcing solidarity and cooperation). The result is a network of interlocking defense relationships, to which an ever-thicker layer of new security groupings and quasi alliances is being added. The emerging system is complex, and policymakers would do well to think through possible future crises to imagine how the various moving parts would end up interacting. They should avoid drawing on the Cold War as a guiding epoch, as it was a comparatively stable and predictable bipolar order. Alliances will also be consistently tested as well, because, as alliances are created or reinforced, adversaries react and probe their limits. Will this expanding network of alliances create more stability or more instability? Does alliance proliferation reduce or increase the risk of war? And if war erupted somewhere, what would be the risks of escalation? The dawning multipolar world, featuring an increasingly dense network of security arrangements, uncomfortably remind us of the years 1912-1914, shortly before the outbreak of World War I. A definitive answer may be impossible to arrive at, but evidence suggests that the current proliferation of alliances is, on balance, more stabilizing to world order than not. The broad set of alliances, suballiances, and security arrangements act as a “safety belt” for world order, rather than as a “conveyor belt” to catastrophe.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Military Affairs, Alliance, and Instability
Political Geography:
Europe, Asia, and United States of America

19. Belarus's Reaction to the Russian Invasion of Ukraine

Author:
Anna Maria Dyner
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
From the very beginning of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the Belarusian authorities have sided with Russia, supporting it politically and militarily, including making its territory available to the Russian troops. In this way, Belarus is also an aggressor and, as a consequence, the EU and the U.S. have imposed further sanctions on it. Regardless of the attempts to engage in Ukrainian-Russian negotiations, Belarus will be negatively affected by the consequences of its government’s policy and the country, although formally sovereign, has ceased to be perceived as an independent entity in international relations.
Topic:
International Relations, Sovereignty, War, and Military Affairs
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus

20. The U.S.-Egypt Military Relationship: Complexities, Contradictions, and Challenges

Author:
David Witty
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
Shared security interests, such as maintaining and expanding Arab-Israel peace efforts, can serve as the foundation of future ties. Since the Egypt-Israel peace treaty was signed in 1979, Washington has given Cairo more than $50 billion in military grant aid. But a strong military relationship has raised as many questions as it has answered: about the ethics of working with an increasingly harsh authoritarian government; about the partnership’s success in achieving American interests in the region; about the Egyptian military’s willingness to reform; and about whether conditioned aid can spur political change. Correspondingly, the post–Arab Spring years have seen rough patches, caused by U.S. limitations on military aid following the 2013 overthrow of Mohamed Morsi, America’s chafing at Egyptian human rights abuses, and Cairo’s eventual turn toward less restrictive partners such as Moscow and Paris for military supplies. In this comprehensive Policy Focus, David M. Witty—a retired U.S. Army Special Forces colonel and foreign area officer—probes the complexities of the U.S.-Egypt military rapport before proposing that Washington base its future ties on shared security interests, including Arab-Israel peace efforts, negotiation of ceasefires between Israel and the Palestinians, and permission for U.S. military transit of Egyptian waterways and airspace.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, and Military Affairs
Political Geography:
North Africa, Egypt, and United States of America

21. Fighting Jihadists By, With, and Through U.S. Partners: Lessons Learned and Future Prospects

Author:
Ido Levy
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
Special forces have succeeded especially in such missions, but any BWT effort requires some U.S. ground presence to achieve its goals. As part of its bid to end Middle East “forever wars,” the United States has employed a “by, with, and through” (BWT) doctrine for fighting jihadist adversaries. Such operations rely on local partner forces to assume the bulk of the hard ground combat, sometimes with U.S. accompaniment, while American advisors provide support through training, intelligence, heavy air and artillery assets, equipment, funding, and logistics. BWT missions have seen success over the past two decades in theaters such as Iraq (with the Counter Terrorism Service), Syria (with the Syrian Democratic Forces), and Somalia (with the Danab Brigade). But they do not succeed on their own and must be guided by several principles, including a serious U.S. commitment, alignment of American and partner interests, and strong interpersonal relations between advisors and local actors. In this tightly argued Policy Note, military analyst Ido Levy emphasizes the particular success of U.S.-created special forces in missions against jihadist forces. But he cautions that BWT efforts cannot thrive without some U.S. ground presence and, as occurred in Afghanistan, would likely fail amid an outright American withdrawal.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Terrorism, Military Affairs, and Jihad
Political Geography:
Middle East and United States of America

22. Iran's Nuclear Hedging Strategy: Shaping the Islamic Republic's Proliferation Calculus

Author:
Michael Eisenstadt
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
Tehran’s willingness to pause aspects of its nuclear program may offer opportunities to stoke regime concerns about the potential costs of moving forward. Since halting its crash nuclear weapons program in 2003, the Islamic Republic has pursued a cautious hedging strategy that has enabled it to become an advanced nuclear threshold state, while also avoiding a military confrontation with the United States and Israel. Yet Iran’s willingness to pause aspects of its nuclear program in order to ease pressure—and in turn to pursue more urgent objectives—may help Washington constrain Tehran’s nuclear ambitions by amplifying its concerns about the potential risks and costs of proliferating. In this Policy Focus, military analyst Michael Eisenstadt surveys the evolution of Iran’s nuclear hedging strategy and suggests ways for the United States, along with its allies and partners, to shape the regime’s proliferation calculus with the goal of preventing an Iranian breakout and a nuclearized Middle East.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Military Affairs, and Nonproliferation
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, and United States of America

23. China, Europe, and the Pandemic Recession: Beijing’s Investments and Transatlantic Security

Author:
John R. Deni, Chris Alden, Erik Brattberg, Roger Cliff, Mark Duckenfield, R. Evan Ellis, Nicholas Nelson, and Laura Speranza
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:
Given the depth and breadth of the pandemic-induced recession in Europe, private companies in need of capital and governments looking to shed state-owned enterprises may be tempted to sell shares, assets, or outright ownership to investors with liquidity to spare. Of greatest concern is the role that China might play in Europe, building Beijing’s soft power, weakening allied geopolitical solidarity, and potentially reprising the role it played in the 2010s, when its investments in Europe expanded dramatically. More specifically, there is concern over China’s investments in infrastructure and sensitive technologies relevant to American and allied military operations and capabilities. Whether Europe is prepared and able to parry Beijing’s economic statecraft is somewhat unclear, given varied attitudes toward China and the patchwork of investment screening mechanisms across the continent. Regardless, the outcomes will have significant implications for US security and for the Defense Department specifically. In support of US European Command (EUCOM) and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the U.S. Army War College’s Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) assembled an interdisciplinary team to examine these issues and offer actionable policy recommendations for military leaders and decisionmakers on both sides of the Atlantic.
Topic:
Security, Military Affairs, Economy, Investment, Transatlantic Relations, COVID-19, State-Owned Enterprises, and Recession
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Asia, and United States of America

24. Contested Deployment

Author:
Bert B. Tussing, John Eric Powell, and Benjamin C. Leitzel
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:
As indicated in the 2018 National Defense Strategy and evolving Multi-Domain Operations doctrine, the assumption the homeland will provide a secure space for mobilization and deployment is no longer valid. This integrated research project goes beyond affirming this assumption and contributes to efforts to mitigate the concerns a contested deployment entails. Following the introductory chapter, Chapter 2, “Army Deployments in a Contested Homeland: A Framework for Protection,” explores how current coordination and cooperation mechanisms between the DoD and state and local government may need realignment, with civil authorities preparing themselves to support military mobilization. Chapter 3, “Strategic Seaports and National Defense in a Contested Environment,” examines the 22 strategic seaports across the United States, identifying issues with throughput, structural integrity, security, readiness, funding, and authorities. Chapter 4, “Single Point of Failure,” identifies how strict adherence to a business efficiency model for munition production and distribution may jeopardize the successful employment of military forces. Chapter 5, “The Interstate Highway System: Reinvestment Needed before a Contested Deployment,” provides the status of the deteriorating road network and explains how associated vulnerabilities could be exploited by an adversary. The two appendices provide points for consideration on cyberattacks and defense and the impacts a full mobilization of reserve forces would have on the homeland.
Topic:
Defense Policy, National Security, Military Affairs, Crisis Management, Public Policy, Army, and Troop Deployment
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

25. Framing the Future of the US Military Profession

Author:
Richard A. Lacquement Jr. and Thomas P. Galvin
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:
The military profession needs to be redefined by examination of its expertise and jurisdictions of practice, whereas previously the focus was on securing its professional identity. Twenty years ago, the original Future of the Army Profession research project responded to growing concerns among officers that the Army was no longer a profession in light of the post–Cold War drawdown and the onset of global operations including Iraq and Afghanistan. Today, the profession faces recurrent challenges raised by the changing character of war, the renewal of great-power competition, crises surrounding issues of sexual harassment and assault, the effects of a major global pandemic and associated social and political unrest, and the growing societal distrust toward professions in general. Richard Lacquement and Thomas Galvin propose that the questions of professional identity, while still important, are now less salient than those about the professions’ jurisdictions of practice and domains of expert knowledge. Clarifying them will help better prepare US military professionals to exercise discretionary judgment effectively. They also propose a new Future of the US Military Profession research effort that addresses these jurisdictions across service, joint, and defense enterprises to clarify the divisions of professional work and responsibilities. This is a must-read for any steward of the military profession.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Armed Forces, Military Affairs, Sexual Violence, Army, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

26. US Arms Sales Reveal Discord in Taiwan's Defense Strategy

Author:
Ethan Kessler
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Chicago Council on Global Affairs
Abstract:
Washington has started selling arms that serve a "porcupine" defense strategy to Taiwan. Whether Taipei fully embraces this new approach remains to be seen. Taiwan, claimed by China as a rogue province and armed by the United States, is at a crossroads. Should it continue buying big-ticket US arms, such as advanced fighter jets and tanks, to counter Chinese forces in case of a blockade or invasion? Taipei’s longstanding conventional strategy, which calls for these kinds of arms, views the ambiguous US defense commitment as concerning. Since Washington may not intervene against a Chinese attack, conventionalists want to hold on to Taiwan’s traditional, long-range weapons. Conventionalists also claim that buying big-ticket arms strengthens Washington’s political commitment to Taiwan. However, officials and experts increasingly see another strategy as prudent. Recent Chinese economic growth and military modernization have greatly enhanced Beijing’s capabilities, to the point that many believe Taiwan could not hold out alone against a Chinese invasion. Reformers thus argue that Taiwan needs to start building its forces around small, easily distributed weapons such as mobile anti-ship missiles and patrol boats and make greater investments in reserve forces and territorial defense. This “porcupine” defense strategy can theoretically buy more time for US forces to arrive in a war. The fate of Taiwan’s military strategy, which also depends greatly on political relations between Beijing, Taipei, and Washington, will help determine the strength of deterrence in the Taiwan Strait. A breakdown in this deterrence could lead to US-China war. The United States not only influences Taiwan’s strategy, but has a great stake in its future.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Military Affairs, Budget, Defense Spending, and Arms Sales
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, Asia, North America, and United States of America

27. China Maritime Report No. 24: Incubators of Sea Power: Vessel Training Centers and the Modernization of the PLAN Surface Fleet

Author:
Ryan D. Martinson
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College
Abstract:
The People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is building modern surface combatants faster than any other navy in the world. Before these new ships can be deployed, however, their crews must learn how to effectively operate them across the range of missions for which they were designed. In the PLAN, this “basic training” largely occurs at specialized organizations called Vessel Training Centers (VTCs). Since their creation in 1980, VTCs have played a key role in generating combat power for the fleet. But as China’s naval ambitions have grown, the VTCs have been forced to adapt. Since the early 2000s, and especially since 2012, they have faced tremendous pressure to keep pace with the rapid expansion and modernization of the PLAN surface fleet and its growing mission set, improve the standards and quality of vessel training, and uphold the integrity of training evaluations. This report argues that the PLAN’s VTCs have generally risen to the challenge, ensuring that new and recently-repaired ships can quickly reach operational units in a fairly high state of readiness.
Topic:
Armed Forces, Military Affairs, Maritime, Seapower, and People's Liberation Army (PLA)
Political Geography:
China and Asia

28. Competing in Time: Ensuring Capability Advantage and Mission Success through Adaptable Resource Allocation

Author:
Dan Patt and William C. Greenwalt
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
The keystone of the Department of Defense’s institutional architecture is not acquisition, but rather the budgeting process. This governs its ability to allocate funding to achieve national security objectives, links together requirements and purchasing, sets the calendar of the department, controls changes to investment priority, and serves as the mechanism for Congress to exercise its constitutionally granted appropriations powers. While there have been dozens of acquisition reform efforts, the budgeting process has been nearly untouched since 1961. Bureaucratic resource allocation processes—especially planning, budgeting, and appropriations—are a critical engine for maintaining an edge in a long-term military competition. In the 1950s, this realization was mechanized by the US, when fast-paced military developments with shifting directions were used to drive cost into ponderous Soviet planning processes. Ultimately, Soviet strategists also recognized that agility in resource allocation would ultimately determine the outcome of competition given a sufficiently long horizon. The Department of Defense (DoD) allocates resources through the Planning, Programming, Budget, and Execution (PPBE) system. PPBE is the scheme by which DoD sets its own plans and priorities and also how it asks Congress to approve its spending and provide oversight (often by verifying actual execution against predicted schedule and performance). The history of the PPBE dates to 1961 and is based on period industrial planning concepts. The PPBE’s inflexibility increases the difficulty of rapidly shifting funding to emergent innovations that appear promising, as new programs must typically wait more than two years to be included in the budget. Additionally, the PPBE encodes divisions between research, production, and operations activities that stymy iterative or feedback-based development. A common theme across core DoD processes including the PPBE is an emphasis on long-term prediction of future needs and an attempt to optimize high-performance weapons against projected requirements. When these conditions are not met (whether from shifting technology or shifting adversaries), these processes may not yield optimal, relevant, or militarily effective results. Historical analysis of innovation time cycles—the time measured from the origin of a new concept for military capability until its initial fielding—indicates the cycles were shorter prior to the implementation of the triad of McNamara-era processes, commonly with an average time around five years for both ships and aircraft, and have grown steadily since. Emerging technologies, especially information technologies, are central to future conflict and are largely commercial and globalized. The defense acquisition process and legacy defense industrial base approach struggle to accommodate timely adoption of these technologies, as evidenced by lengthy modern time cycles (more than ten years) for development and fielding of new-start weapon systems. China may have an edge in its resource allocation process, although this topic merits further investigation. Evidence includes their ability to develop and field twenty-five new unmanned aircraft systems from 2010 to 2020, including stealthy carrier-based unmanned systems. Efforts to improve adaptability that focus on acquisition milestones have been only partially successful. Analysis of the chained and linear components of the modern military capability development and fielding process suggests that it is difficult to create a competitive, adaptable resource allocation scheme without revisiting the PPBE and key decision processes that govern the ability to make rapid, early investments in new operational capability or concepts. Incoming administration leadership, military leaders, and Congressional leaders need to revisit institutional structure and the budgeting process recognizing the central role of time in driving innovation, adaptability, and resilience. It is not yet too late to favorably shape the trajectory of long-term military competition with China, but the only hope of an upper hand rests on agility and initiative.
Topic:
Defense Policy, National Security, Military Affairs, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
China and United States of America

29. Implementing Decision-Centric Warfare: Elevating Command and Control to Gain an Optionality Advantage

Author:
Bryan Clark, Dan Patt, and Timothy A. Walton
Publication Date:
03-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Since the Cold War ended, the US Department of Defense (DoD) has developed doctrine and capabilities predominantly for the most stressing campaigns it could face against opponents such as the People’s Republic of China (PRC), Russia, and North Korea. These worst-case scenarios are intended to ensure US forces can address “lesser-included” cases as well. This approach, however, favors concepts and systems designed for large-scale, high-intensity military conflict, and intelligent US adversaries are unlikely to present US forces with confrontations where DoD could leverage its strengths in missions such as power projection or precision strike. America’s rivals have evolved approaches during the past decade to circumvent US military strengths, such as PRC and Russian gray-zone or hybrid operations, that obtain objectives at lower cost and escalation—albeit over longer timeframes—than traditional military combat. DoD should therefore revise its planning to raise the priority of new scenarios that stress the US military in different ways than theater-wide high-intensity combat such as through protraction, varying levels of escalation and scale, and the use of proxy and paramilitary forces. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) concept of System Destruction Warfare and the Russian military’s New Generation Warfare are representative of the new approaches being employed against the United States and its allies. Although they are very different in their theory of victory and methodology, both concepts share a focus on information and decision-making as the main battlegrounds for future conflict. They direct attacks on an opponent’s battle network electronically and physically to degrade its ability to obtain accurate information while introducing false information that erodes the opponent’s ability to orient. Simultaneously, military and paramilitary forces would present dilemmas to the opponent by isolating or attacking targets in a manner that neutralized their combat potential and controlled the escalation of a conflict.
Topic:
Defense Policy, National Security, Science and Technology, and Military Affairs
Political Geography:
Global Focus and United States of America

30. The Invisible Battlefield: A Technology Strategy for US Electromagnetic Spectrum Superiority

Author:
Bryan Clark, Timothy A. Walton, Melinda Tourangeau, and Steve Tourangeau
Publication Date:
03-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
The electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) is a uniquely challenging environment for military operations. Unlike objects physically moving through the air or along the ground or sea, electromagnetic energy travels at the speed of light and cannot be easily contained by walls, boundaries, or exclusion zones. As a result, military EMS activities such as sensing, communications, and electromagnetic warfare (EW) are difficult to separate from one another or from civilian users. The constraints on military EMS access will only grow with the need to allocate spectrum to 5G mobile communications, expanded Wi-Fi coverage, and ubiquitous sensing and communications on vehicles and consumer products. Adversaries, most prominently the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the Russian Federation, are also countering US military operations in the EMS. They are using passive sensors and jammers to exploit the dependence of expeditionary US forces on active radars for air defense and long-range radio frequency (RF) communications for command and control (C2). As the “home team” in most likely military conflicts, US adversaries can rely to a greater degree on wired communications, multistatic and passive sensing, and their understanding of local conditions to gain an advantage in a highly contested electromagnetic environment. Addressing challenges to US EMS operations will become more difficult as defense budgets come under pressure from costs to combat the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, respond to economic recession, and service the growing national debt. Given the growing variety of adversary countermeasures and diverse demands for commercial spectrum, attempting to modify or replace Department of Defense (DoD) EMS systems so they avoid specific threats and civilian encroachments is likely to be unaffordable and continually late to need. DoD’s forecast-centric planning approach, embodied in the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS), is ill-suited to identify capabilities that solve DoD’s EMS challenges in a fiscally constrained and technologically dynamic environment. Forecast-centric planning bases new requirements on the anticipated gaps between capabilities needed to execute desired concepts in future operations and a military force’s current or projected capabilities. This analytic approach depends on assumptions regarding the scenarios in which conflict is likely to occur, the capabilities and tactics to be used by opponents, and the probable actions of US allies and partners. The need to make multiple, interdependent assumptions reduces the accuracy of forecast-centric planning, and when assumptions prove incorrect, budget constraints could reduce the force’s ability to adapt. To regain enduring EMS superiority under today’s conditions of technological and fiscal uncertainty, DoD will need to adopt a decision-centric planning approach in which adaptability is a more important metric than predicted performance against a particular threat in a specific scenario. In contrast with forecast-centric planning’s mobilization of resources to efficiently develop a single solution, decision-centric planning would seek to preserve options for as long as possible within a mission or over a competition. Within operational timeframes, the optionality afforded by a more adaptable force could allow commanders to make faster and more effective decisions, while the complexity imposed on the enemy would degrade its decision-making process. Over strategic and industrial timescales, increasing the adaptability of military systems speeds responses to adversary innovations or enables capability developers to leap ahead of an opponent’s advancements. Adaptability, however, is not sufficient to gain an advantage if the option space is not centered on advantageous capabilities. For example, high-power broadcast radios or scanning search radars can be made highly adaptable using artificial intelligence (AI)-enabled controls, but their risk of counter-detection makes them a poor choice for operations against revisionist powers like the PRC that can deploy numerous distributed passive radiofrequency (RF) sensors in areas where they intend to initiate conflict. This study will use the technique of net assessment to center the option space for new EMS technologies on areas that exploit fundamental asymmetries between the US military and its main competitors.
Topic:
Defense Policy, National Security, Science and Technology, Military Affairs, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
United States of America

31. Risky Business: Future Strategy and Force Options for the Defense Department

Author:
Stacie L. Pettyjohn, Becca Wasser, and Jennie Matuschak
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
Despite the overarching strategic priorities laid out by the Biden administration and initial indicators provided by the Department of Defense (DoD), it is unclear how the next National Defense Strategy (NDS) will prioritize threats and the primary role of the U.S. military. Will the DoD clearly preference China (and to a lesser extent Russia)? Or will it hedge and try to more equally meet the expanded list of threats detailed in the Interim National Security Strategic Guidance? Is the Pentagon’s priority to compete below the threshold of armed conflict, or is it to prepare to defeat a great-power adversary in a large-scale war to strengthen deterrence? Answering these questions is critical to developing a clear strategy that emphasizes the right priorities, activities, and resources. To consider the next defense strategy and the tradeoffs associated with different options, we developed three possible strategies—high-end deterrence, day-to-day competition, and full-spectrum competition—that alter the factors highlighted above and reflect the Biden administration’s stated priorities. Our analysis of the Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 budget indicates that the DoD is trying to do more than constrained budgets can support over the next few years and is moving toward what we term as a strategy of “full-spectrum competition.” It appears as if the Biden administration is pursuing a strategy that seeks to strike a balance between competing in the near term while still enhancing preparedness for great-power conflict, as well as hedging against a range of threats and mitigating risk over time. The forces and posture that are necessary for this competition are quite different from those that are needed to defend against a conventional fait accompli attack by China on Taiwan or Russia on the Baltics. It is unlikely that the United States can build a force that can achieve both of these objectives with the current topline. Our testing of the budget-constrained force associated with the full-spectrum competition strategy finds that it could not successfully fulfill its two primary aims: defeating sub-conventional aggression and Russian and Chinese gray zone tactics, and building a force capable of defeating a great-power adversary attack on its neighbor. Moreover, this strategy risks significant overstretch, the potential for long-term technological overmatch, and inadvertent escalation. The other two strategies focus on China, but day-to-day competition emphasizes the daily military contest with Beijing and the threat of sub-conventional conflict, while high-end deterrence focuses on defeating conventional aggression and achieving a long-term military technological advantage. The day-to-day competition strategy would lose a high-end conflict in East Asia and Europe; it also would fail to halt or overturn sub-conventional land grabs. The competition strategy bets that a large and visible force that actively contests daily military provocations will deter both sub-conventional and conventional aggression, even if the force is not capable of stopping either type of attack. The risk that this assumption fails grows over time because this strategy forgoes investments in advanced technologies, while China and Russia are rapidly seeking to wrest the military technological advantage from the United States. There are also significant escalatory risks associated with an approach that regularly and assertively contests Chinese and Russian forces. We conclude that it is unlikely that competition can be won by the military, even one optimized to face this challenge. More optimistically, our analysis suggests that it is possible to build a force capable of winning one big conflict and overturning sub-conventional aggression with this topline—but only if the department is willing to accept some near-term risk in competition, against other threats, and in other regions. The high-end deterrence strategy mitigates the temporal risk by making near-term improvements in combat capabilities, including expanding stockpiles of preferred long-range munitions, investments to improve the resiliency of U.S. posture in the Indo-Pacific and Europe, and additional investments in cyber and electronic warfare capabilities. It also relies on frontline allies and partners to be responsible for the daily competition. We assert that the high-end deterrence strategy is the best path forward, but it requires a better delineation and ranking of threats and responsibilities for the joint force and strategic discipline over the long run. Congress must also support this strategy and allow the Defense Department to make the hard choices, such as cutting capacity and retiring weapons systems, that are required to rebalance the force for this mission and to sustain its military technological advantage over the long run. Senior Pentagon leaders will need to partner with Congress to help them understand how specific changes are connected to higher order objectives. It is important to note that the FY22 budget is largely an inherited one and the Biden administration is making some significant investments that align with a high-end deterrence strategy. Nevertheless, the 2022 NDS and the FY23 budget will need to accept more risk and further prioritize to prepare the force for the most challenging and consequential threats. If the Biden administration does not make these hard choices or Congress refuses to support this strategy, the chasm between U.S. strategic and military objectives and the costs of achieving them will only grow significantly. Trying to do too much is a risky business that could result in the United States losing its military technological edge and, ultimately, a war against a great power.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Military Affairs, Risk, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
China, North America, and United States of America

32. The Role of County Veteran Service Officers

Author:
Katherine L. Kuzminski, Nathalie Grogan, and Elena LoRusso
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
This assessment examines the role of county veteran service officers (CVSOs) throughout the United States. The report highlights the services and support available to veterans via CVSOs around the country, and compares their effectiveness against the help offered by staff through other types of veteran service organizations (VSOs). CVSOs provide resources to veterans at the local level, and their roles and experiences vary according to the state- and federal-level VSOs available in that area. Using quantitative analysis, the effectiveness of CVSOs is measured through grant rates of disability compensation claims submitted, as compared to those submitted by state and nonprofit VSOs. This report examines the effectiveness, challenges, barriers, and resources that CVSOs face when serving veterans in their jurisdictions.
Topic:
Military Affairs, Veterans, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

33. Improving Joint Operational Concept Development within the U.S. Department of Defense

Author:
Paul Benfield and Greg Grant
Publication Date:
10-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
For the first time in nearly four decades, the DoD is developing joint warfighting concepts designed to counter advanced military rivals—specifically China and Russia. The last such effort took place at the height of the Cold War in the late 1970s and early 1980s to address the strategic and operational challenges posed by the Soviet Union’s conventional advantage on Europe’s Central Front. Now, as the 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS) emphasizes, the joint force must “prioritize preparedness for war” which includes developing “innovative operational concepts” for military advantage.1 As operational concepts are fundamentally visions of future war that guide future force design and development, the joint force first must answer the question of how it intends to fight future wars before it tries to answer questions of what it needs to fight with. Yet, if the DoD is going to move to “joint concept driven, threat informed capability development,” it faces a considerable challenge in that its joint concept development and experimentation process is fundamentally broken.2 While the post–Cold War era has witnessed repeated efforts to develop joint operational concepts, the process fails to yield innovative warfighting approaches to guide future force and capability development. Instead, the process produces concepts that seem almost intentionally designed not to drive significant change. These concepts are not truly “joint,” but rather lowest-common-denominator assemblages of existing service concepts that privilege service priorities. Any innovative joint ideas that make it through the development process are so watered-down and vague that they fail to provoke change (and thus threaten the interests of key stakeholders). In this environment, individual service concepts win out over joint concepts and drive investment priorities. However, warfighting concepts and critical investments must be joint because the services have become increasingly interdependent at the operational level.3 Moreover, current wargaming and analysis suggest that this operational interdependence will be a critical aspect of future conflict with a highly-capable peer adversary such as China or Russia—whether as a strength or a weakness remains to be seen. One can expect an advanced, adaptive adversary to seek out any gaps and seams presented by the U.S. military and exploit those to its advantage. In this regard, the current joint force is not “joint” enough for a high-end war against a peer adversary that has developed counters to critical, long-standing U.S. operational advantages such as air, maritime, and information dominance. As this paper discusses, successfully waging war at the scale and intensity that a conflict with a peer rival would entail will demand entirely new ways of warfighting that in turn will require a forcing function that integrates individual service capabilities into an actual “joint” fighting force. Recent efforts to develop threat-focused joint warfighting concepts—if successful—represents the best chance for that result actually to occur. This paper briefly discusses three past attempts by the DoD to develop joint concepts, including AirLand Battle, Air-Sea Battle, and a more recent effort, the Advanced Capabilities and Deterrence Panel (ACDP). It uses these examples to showcase the challenges of overcoming stovepiped and parochial service-led efforts and to illustrate the drawbacks of building service-centric concepts and covering them with a patina of jointness. These cases highlight how the persistent pathologies of the joint concept development process have rendered post–Cold War joint concepts useless for encouraging operational innovation or driving change in service investment priorities. Ongoing work to develop new joint warfighting concepts provides the DoD with a long-overdue opportunity to focus its concept development on tangible threats and consequent operational objectives. The current effort is the first time in decades that the DoD is organizing concept development around countering a specific threat instead of supporting idealized notions of how the joint force preferred to operate against vague or undefined groups of adversaries. However, without major changes to what is widely viewed as a consensus process that does not foster a competition of ideas, the DoD risks repeating the same concept development mistakes it has made in the past. Additionally, new joint concepts must be rigorously tested and refined through a campaign of experimentation to validate their viability for future force design. That experimentation piece is currently missing.4 The Joint Staff is trying to rebuild its joint concept development capability after years of neither prioritizing nor adequately resourcing that work. Generating truly new ways of warfighting with the potential to transform future force design will require the sustained attention of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS and VCJCS) to push new joint concepts through the system. The DoD’s senior leadership must overcome the tendency of each service to drive toward consensus products that are aimed more at protecting existing priorities and longstanding prerogatives than generating creative ideas.
Topic:
Defense Policy, War, Military Strategy, and Military Affairs
Political Geography:
Russia, China, North America, and United States of America

34. Transitioning to Tech: Transitioning Service Members and Veteran Perceptions Regarding a Career in the Technology Sector

Author:
Jason Dempsey, Katherine L. Kuzminski, Nathalie Grogan, and Cody Kennedy
Publication Date:
11-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
Military experience provides service members with a range of technical and soft skills that can prepare them for meaningful employment in the private sector. Unfortunately, perceptions about the differences between military service and civilian employment can hinder the transition process, leading some veterans to believe they are unqualified for certain roles, or unaware of the steps they can take to gain meaningful employment in positions that seem vastly different from the work they did in uniform. This can be particularly true in the technology sector, where stereotypes and misperceptions—on both sides—can make the gap between military service and employment in a place like Silicon Valley seem insurmountable. However, as many have demonstrated, veterans can successfully make the leap to meaningful employment in the technology sector, and the firms that hire them can benefit from the skills and experience transitioning service members bring to the field. Understanding veteran perceptions about opportunities in technology is therefore an important first step in identifying the hurdles, both real and perceived, to expanding this pathway and getting more military veterans into meaningful employment in this sector. This white paper uses a mixed-methods approach to examine veteran opportunities and perceptions of opportunities in the technology sector. It begins with an overview of current support efforts specific to employment and education in the technology sector provided by the government’s Transition Assistance Program (TAP), technology companies, and veteran-serving nonprofit organizations. The paper then examines the attitudes of veterans in transition with a focus on perceptions of employment opportunities in the technology sector and perceived gaps between the skills transitioning service members have and the skills they believe are necessary to pursue a career in technology. The white paper concludes with recommendations for relevant departments, agencies, programs, employers, veteran-serving organizations, transitioning service members, and veterans. For the purposes of this paper, employment in “technology” is broadly defined to include both jobs that require specific technological skills and general employment in companies that produce technology products. Technology companies range from small startups to large software and e-commerce corporations with a myriad of job titles and a variety of roles requiring different skill sets. The span of technological expertise can cross industries, including technological support and information management for large brick-and-mortar businesses and the medical and financial industries. The analysis provided in this white paper is informed by a survey that CNAS and VetsinTech, a veteran-serving nonprofit, performed from August 31, 2021, through September 18, 2021. The survey yielded over 1,000 responses from veterans, transitioning service members, and active-duty service members. The analysis also incorporates feedback from interviews with action officers at the Department of Defense (DoD), the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), and the Department of Labor (DoL), as well as veterans currently employed in the technology sector and those who seek to hire veterans in the technology sector.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Military Affairs, Veterans, and Career
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

35. Navigating Relations with Russia in the Arctic: A Roadmap for Stability

Author:
Andrea Kendall-Taylor, Jim Townsend, Lawson W. Brigham, and Nicholas Lokker
Publication Date:
11-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
Until recently, the Arctic was largely immune to the geopolitical tensions that play out between Russia and the transatlantic partners in other regions and on other issues. Indeed, the Arctic is one area where the United States and Russia, together with the other Arctic states, have engaged in quiet cooperation on issues including search and rescue, scientific research, and the environment. Such pragmatic cooperation has been possible in part because bilateral irritants are diffused by shared and cross-cutting interests among all eight Arctic states, as well as the region’s multilayered governance regime.1 However, climate change and the Arctic’s melting sea ice have opened access and allowed for increased human activity, which, in turn, has amplified competition in the region. At stake are core national interests for the Arctic states, ranging from economic opportunities to security and stability. The region’s growing importance and level of activity, alongside the lack of trust and limited dialogue on military issues between Russia and the United States, raise the risk of conflict and instability in the region. For Russia, its part of the Arctic, including an increasingly accessible Northern Sea Route, is central to core national security concerns and an important pillar of the economy and future development. To secure its interests, the Kremlin has taken numerous actions, many of them military, in the Arctic that are of shared concern to the other Arctic nations and NATO.
Topic:
Security, Bilateral Relations, Infrastructure, Military Affairs, Economy, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
Russia, North America, Arctic, and United States of America

36. AI and International Stability: Risks and Confidence-Building Measures

Author:
Michael Horowitz and Paul Scharre
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
Militaries around the world believe that the integration of machine learning methods throughout their forces could improve their effectiveness. From algorithms to aid in recruiting and promotion, to those designed for surveillance and early warning, to those used directly on the battlefield, applications of artificial intelligence (AI) could shape the future character of warfare. These uses could also generate significant risks for international stability. These risks relate to broad facets of AI that could shape warfare, limits to machine learning methods that could increase the risks of inadvertent conflict, and specific mission areas, such as nuclear operations, where the use of AI could be dangerous. To reduce these risks and promote international stability, we explore the potential use of confidence-building measures (CBMs), constructed around the shared interests that all countries have in preventing inadvertent war. Though not a panacea, CBMs could create standards for information-sharing and notifications about AI-enabled systems that make inadvertent conflict less likely.
Topic:
Science and Technology, International Affairs, Military Affairs, Political stability, and Artificial Intelligence
Political Geography:
Global Focus

37. Principles for the Combat Employment of Weapon Systems with Autonomous Functionalities

Author:
Robert O. Work
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
An international debate over lethal autonomous weapon systems (LAWS) has been under way for nearly a decade.1 In 2012, the Department of Defense (DoD) issued formal policy guidance on weapon systems with autonomous functionalities,2 and nations have come together since 2014 to discuss LAWS through the United Nations Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW). The discussions at the CCW have been hampered by the lack of an agreed-upon definition for LAWS.3 However, states party to the CCW agreed in 2019 that “human responsibility” for the decisions over the use of weapon systems and the use of force “must be retained.”4 Accordingly, discussions now tend to focus on the type and degree of human involvement required to ensure compliance with international humanitarian law and satisfy ethical concerns.5 Several scholars argue these discussions should focus on “developing objective, commonly held, and function-based understandings of autonomy in the military context” (emphasis added).6 The premise of this paper is that the best way to achieve such an understanding is to develop, debate, and agree upon some commonly accepted principles for the employment of weapon systems with autonomous functionalities in armed conflict.7 This is where the legal, ethical, and moral questions about autonomy in warfare are most acute and deserve the most attention. This paper offers a starting point for these discussions. The seven principles proposed in this paper are intended to complement and build on existing DoD guidance, including DoD Directive (DoDD) 3000.09, Autonomy in Weapon Systems, and DoD’s Artificial Intelligence (AI) Principles.8 They are also consistent with the 11 guiding principles adopted in 2019 by the CCW in its “Meeting of the High Contracting Parties to the Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects.”9 These seven new principles concentrate on the responsible use of autonomous functionalities in armed conflict in ways that preserve human judgment and responsibility over the use of force and help minimize the probability of loss of control of the system or unintended engagements, especially against noncombatants. This paper is organized into four sections. The first details the history of U.S. weapon systems with autonomous functionalities. It is intended to give the reader a notion of how these weapons have historically been used, why autonomous functionalities are so useful, and why the DoD retains the right to use them. The second section explains why weapons with autonomous functionalities are now being improved through the addition of AI, an important development that aims to make the weapons more discriminate in the application of force. The third section explains why the DoD should consider publishing a new set of principles for the combat employment of weapon systems with autonomous functionalities. The final section outlines seven proposed principles for consideration.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Military Affairs, Weapons, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Global Focus and United States of America

38. “This is War”: Examining Military Experience Among the Capitol Hill Siege Participants

Author:
Daniel Milton and Andrew Mines
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
This report uses federal court documents to examine the prevalence, demographics, and characteristics of individuals with military experience who were charged for their involvement in the January 6, 2021, siege on the U.S. Capitol. Several key findings emerge from this analysis. First, this report reveals that most of the arrestees with military experience were veterans. Among the 357 individuals charged as of March 31, 2021, this analysis identified 43 (12%) as having some form of military experience. Of the 43 arrestees with military experience, 40 (93%) had left the military and were veterans at the time of their arrest. Second, there appears to be a greater prevalence of affiliation with domestic violent extremist organizations among arrestees with military experience than those without. 37% of individuals with military experience had affiliations to domestic violent extremist (DVE) organizations like the Oath Keepers and the Proud Boys, around four times more likely to be a part of such groups than those without military experience. Third, there is a large amount of nuance when it comes to arrestees with military experience, among whom were young and old, almost every branch of service, longtime soldiers and those who left early on in their careers. This nuance suggests both a need for more research and continued care in dealing with this difficult issue. NOTE: All of the individuals charged in these documents and examined in this report are innocent until proven guilty.
Topic:
Military Affairs, Far Right, Veterans, Proud Boys, and January 6
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

39. Principles for Building Confidence and Stability into National Defenses and International Security – toward sufficient, affordable, robust, and reliable defense postures

Author:
Charles Knight
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Project on Defense Alternatives
Abstract:
By bringing military structures into line with defensive political goals, the non-provocation standard facilitates the emergence of trusting, cooperative, peaceful political relations among nations. In contrast, any doctrine and force posture oriented to project power into other countries is provocative — unless reliably restrained by political and organizational structures.
Topic:
Defense Policy, International Security, Armed Forces, and Military Affairs
Political Geography:
Global Focus

40. The EU’s military engagement in Central Mediterranean – Migrant crisis and arms embargo intertwined

Author:
Vojtěch Freitag
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Europeum Institute for European Policy
Abstract:
In the new EU Monitor Vojtěch Freitag writes about the ongoing EU’s military mission in the Central Mediterranean Sea called EUNAVFOR MED Irini. The article attempts to overview, critically reflect and present recommendations for the issues connected to it. Notwithstanding EU’s efforts, Sophia had not achieved the prevention ofillicit arms flows. In fact, it could not possibly be successful as the sea is not the only entry point into the vast country. Failure of the embargo has been recently confirmed also by the UN expert panel on Libya, which claimed “total ineffectiveness”. However, the termination of the operation was caused by concerns deemed of greater importance to the member-states than the arms embargo –the question of rescuing and disembarking migrants, an aspect fitting into general EU’s immigration policy debate.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Migration, Military Affairs, and Refugee Crisis
Political Geography:
Europe and Mediterranean

41. Cyber Conscription: Experience and Best Practice from Selected Countries

Author:
Martin Hurt and Tiia Sõmer
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
Cyber conscription is quite a new phenomenon and there is no common definition of the term. Cyber conscripts may carry out a range of functions including technical cybersecurity and cyber defence, as well as IT support, programming and development. They may also serve in more traditional branches such as communications/signals, intelligence, and even social media. This report aims to identify best practices in the use of conscripts and reservists with information and communications technology (ICT)-related education and/or experience, bearing in mind the limited time that they serve. It examines the selection, training and employment of cyber conscripts and reservists in six countries: Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland. In the countries analysed, the number of volunteers applying for cyber conscription exceeds the military’s needs—there is no immediate need to increase the attractiveness of this type of service. This may change, however, since several nations plan to increase the annual requirement for cyber conscripts. Interviews conducted for this report found that cyber conscripts receive basic military training that mostly follows a uniform pattern common to all conscripts. Only after completing basic military training are cyber conscripts given more specific training, including on cyberspace operations. Several of the armed forces of the countries studied cooperate with universities and have either developed or are planning to launch partnerships with the private sector. Some also provide cyber conscripts with training that gives them a specialist certificate or university credit points. Our report makes recommendations for military authorities that should benefit the armed forces and the individual conscripts, as well as academia and the private sector.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Military Affairs, Cybersecurity, Cyberspace, and Conscription
Political Geography:
Finland, Norway, Estonia, Denmark, Switzerland, and Sweden

42. How to Recalibrate U.S. Policy in the Middle East

Author:
Douglas A. Ollivant
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
Changes in the Middle East have not been sufficiently accounted for in U.S. policy towards the region. Instead, policy has lagged, grounded in anachronism. This report provides five policy recommendations to fix this problem: focus Middle East policy on Chinese influence, empower the State Department, re-evaluate the purpose and location of military basing and forces, prioritize business interests, and acknowledge the reality of interacting with authoritarian states. In doing so, the United States can shift resources away from the region and still protect key interests and partners.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Military Affairs, Authoritarianism, Geopolitics, and Strategic Encirclement
Political Geography:
Middle East and United States of America

43. Russia’s Coercive Diplomacy: Why Did the Kremlin Mass Its Forces Near Ukraine This Spring?

Author:
Rob Lee
Publication Date:
08-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
During March and April 2021, the Russian military conducted a large-scale buildup in its regions bordering Ukraine, including Crimea, which Russia annexed in 2014. Scores of videos appeared on TikTok, Telegram, Twitter, and other social media sites showing Russian military equipment, including tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, artillery, and air defense systems, moving toward or appearing in the vicinity of Ukraine’s borders. The United States Department of Defense’s spokesperson John Kirby told reporters that the Russian buildup was even larger than during the peak of the fighting in 2014. Ukrainian officials estimated that the Russian military buildup would reach a total of 120,000 Russian troops with more than fifty-six battalion tactical groups (BTG). United States defense officials gave a lower estimate that 48 BTGs had moved into the border area and 80,000 Russian troops were in Crimea or elsewhere near Ukraine’s borders. To put this in perspective, the Russian military has approximately 850,000-900,000 servicemembers in total, and 168 constant readiness BTGs, according to Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu. If these estimates were accurate, the Russian military massed roughly 10-15% of its total manpower and approximately one third of its BTGs near Ukraine’s borders. In response to the buildup, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Mark Milley, National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan, and President Joe Biden all called their Russian counterparts to discuss the situation. U.S. European Command (EUCOM) raised its alert status to its highest level. The buildup also coincided with an increase in fighting along the line of contact, with at least 36 Ukrainian servicemen killed thus far in 2021. The movement of Russian forces led to intense speculation about Russia’s intentions, including fears of a large-scale ground invasion. However, U.S. intelligence indicated that a large-scale ground invasion was unlikely because of a lack of prepositioned spare parts, field hospitals, ammunition, and other logistics necessary for such an operation. Likewise, EUCOM commander General Tod Wolters said on April 15 that there was a “low to medium” risk of a Russian ground invasion of Ukraine in the coming weeks. On April 22, after the end of a large-scale exercise at the Opuk training area in Crimea, which included an amphibious landing, a helicopter air assault operation with two companies, and a multi-battalion airborne operation with more than two thousand paratroopers and sixty vehicles parachuted from forty Il-76MD transport aircraft, Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu announced that the winter verification tests for the Western and Southern Military Districts had been a success and the troops would return to their permanent bases. However, he indicated that equipment from Central Military District’s 41st Combined Arms Army, which included BM-27 Uragan multiple launch rocket systems and Iskander-M short-range ballistic missile systems and other heavy equipment, would remain at the Pogonovo training area in Voronezh near Ukraine’s border until the Zapad 2021 strategic exercise in September. Furthermore, Shoigu did not state clearly whether all of the equipment and units deployed near Ukraine’s borders outside of Crimea would also return to their bases, nor how those units were employed during the snap inspection. Two weeks after Shoigu’s announcement, U.S. defense officials said that Russia had removed only “a few thousand” troops and that there were approximately 80,000 servicemen near Ukraine’s borders, despite Shoigu’s order for most of those units to return to their permanent bases by May 1. Thus Russia can still escalate rapidly in Ukraine in the future, though the immediate threat of a serious escalation of fighting in the Donbas appears to have passed with Shoigu’s announcement.
Topic:
Conflict Prevention, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, and Military Affairs
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, Ukraine, and United States of America

44. Where are the Carriers? U.S. National Strategy and the Choices Ahead

Author:
John F. Lehman
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
As the United States seeks to prepare for a potential conflict with a peer-level adversary, the debate around the utility of the aircraft carrier—and its role in such a contingency—once again has resurfaced. Since the carrier’s adoption over 100 years ago, policymakers and servicemembers have argued over the ship’s mission, size, vulnerability, and—of course—cost. These arguments have become increasingly more pointed as the armed services compete over diminishing financial resources. Former Secretary of the Navy John Lehman, with the assistance of Center for Naval Analyses Analyst Steve Wills, evaluates aircraft carrier options as he has done numerous times in the past. These choices include: Gerald R. Ford-class nuclear-powered, large carrier; Light carriers based on amphibious warfare ships of the Wasp and America class; French nuclear-powered carrier Charles de Gaulle or conventionally powered British Queen Elizabeth-class carrier; A new medium carrier the size of the Cold War Midway-class ships. Lehman and Wills analyze these choices with fact-based criteria by considering a number of questions. What are the missions for air power at sea as the United States again confronts great power rivals in the form of the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation? How “survivable” is the carrier in conditions of “modern” combat? How many carriers are needed for a global conflict? How big or small should that flattop be? How many and what type of carrier-based aircraft should it support? Can carrier aviation survive as an effective component of U.S. power projection and sea control capabilities without the kind of longer-range strike aircraft that it possessed during the Cold War? Where are the Carriers examines a wide range of sources, including those from Congress and the Defense Department, as well as carrier studies from both federally and privately funded research institutions, to develop a surprising conclusion on what the next U.S. carrier choice should be.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Military Strategy, Military Affairs, and Navy
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

45. Zapad 2021 and Russia’s Potential for Warfighting

Author:
Johan Norberg and Natalie Simpson
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
According to press information, on 10 September 2021, the Russian Armed Forces plan to start the one-week-long active phase of this year’s annual strategic-level exercise (STRATEX), Zapad (West) 2021, a bilateral large-scale Russo-Belorussian strategic-level exercise, primarily in Belarus and Russia’s Western Military District (MD, see map 1). Large-scale Russian exercises understandably attract much attention and speculation both in Russia and abroad. Most Western comments about Zapad 2017 addressed Russian and international political aspects and detailed several capabilities employed in the exercise and its scenarios or steps and phases. Few, if any, addressed what it meant for the potential of Russian forces to fight wars, which these exercises are all about actually. Russia’s warfighting potential is important for the West writ large for several reasons. Tensions between Russia and NATO are increasing. Russia perceives a growing military threat in its west. Russian strategic documents re-emphasise the importance of military power. Russia actually uses military force to achieve its geopolitical goals, such as in Eastern Ukraine and in Syria.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Armed Forces, Military Affairs, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, and Belarus

46. Autonomous Weapon Systems and International Humanitarian Law: Identifying Limits and the Required Type and Degree of Human–Machine Interaction

Author:
Dr Vincent Boulanin, Netta Goussac, and Laura Bruun
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
Abstract:
Compliance with international humanitarian law (IHL) is recognized as a critical benchmark for assessing the acceptability of autonomous weapon systems (AWS). However, in certain key respects, how and to what extent existing IHL rules provide limits on the development and use of AWS remains either subject to debate or underexplored. This report aims to help states form and express their views on the legal provisions that already do, or should, govern the development and use of AWS, particularly with respect to the required type and degree of human–machine interaction. It maps (a) what limits IHL already places on the development and use of AWS; (b) what IHL demands from users of AWS to perform and satisfy IHL obligations, whether the obligations are of a state, an individual or both; and (c) threshold questions concerning the type and degree of human–machine interaction required for IHL compliance. In its findings and recommendations, the report does not pre-judge the policy response that should regulate AWS. Instead, it aims to provide an analytical framework for states and experts to assess how the normative and operational framework regulating the development and use of AWS may need to be clarified and developed further.
Topic:
Security, Science and Technology, Military Affairs, Weapons, Disarmament, Autonomy, and International Humanitarian Law (IHL)
Political Geography:
Global Focus

47. Iran-Azerbaijan Confrontation: Threats and Challenges

Author:
Zurab Batiashvili
Publication Date:
11-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
Abstract:
Iran-Azerbaijan relations have never been easy but they became particularly tense in September-October 2021, attracting attention within the region and beyond. This confrontation between the parties escalated into large-scale military exercises and a war of statements but, fortunately, the tension did not reach a level of military confrontation. In the second half of October, the confrontation slowly subsided. However, the problem has not disappeared. Its causes still exist and have a great potential of reigniting the conflict. Such a situation creates a fertile ground for a number of threats and challenges for the entire region, including Georgia.
Topic:
Bilateral Relations, Military Affairs, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Iran, Azerbaijan, and Georgia

48. Old Ally, New Direction: Cobra Gold and Beyond

Author:
Kitti Prasirtsuk
Publication Date:
11-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
East-West Center
Abstract:
Kitti Prasirtsuk, Ph.D., a Professor of International Relations at Thammasat University, explains that despite strained U.S.-Thai relations over the past decade, the Cobra Gold (CG) military exercise “equates to a win for both sides” and “is the cornerstone of the US-Thailand alliance, representing a major bond between the two nations in their post-Vietnam War relations.” As President Biden is strengthening alliance cooperation, the administration will likely revisit the U.S.-Thailand alliance. However, it is important to consider how the context for the alliance has changed.
Topic:
International Relations, Bilateral Relations, Military Affairs, and Alliance
Political Geography:
North America, Thailand, Southeast Asia, and United States of America

49. Prospects For Russia’s Policy Towards Afghanistan

Author:
Anna Maria Dyner and Arkadiusz Legieć
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
Taking advantage of the withdrawal of the U.S. and NATO forces from Afghanistan, Russia intends to strengthen its influence in that country by increasing contacts with the Afghan government and the Taliban. The aim is to become a key mediator in the peace process, which will enable it to influence the participants, increase control over the situation in Afghanistan, and use it in relations with the countries of the region. Russia’s policy may make the stabilisation of Afghanistan more difficult and undermine the effects of the efforts made by NATO countries during the stabilisation mission.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, NATO, and Military Affairs
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, Russia, South Asia, and Eurasia

50. France’s Indo-Pacific Strategy and its overseas territories in the Indian and Pacific oceans: Characteristics, capabilities, constraints and avenues for deepening the Franco-Australian strategic partnership

Author:
Nicolas Regaud
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
The report analyses France’s military capabilities and cooperation activities in the Indian and Pacific Oceans, underlining its strengths and limitations. In terms of its economic presence and official development assistance commitments, it is clear that the French strategy suffers significant limitations. However, these may be offset by a growing commitment from the EU and through strategic partnerships allowing France to pool efforts at all levels to meet regional and global challenges.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Bilateral Relations, and Military Affairs
Political Geography:
France, Australia, Asia-Pacific, and Indo-Pacific

51. Somebody might hear us: Emerging communications security technologies

Author:
Andrew Davies
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
Militaries have been trying to keep their communications safe from prying eyes for centuries. But they have also sought to be able to communicate as quickly as possible and as widely as possible with their own forces. Those requirements are in tension with one another. Today, militaries can communicate globally over increasingly capacious data pipes. But the same technological evolution that allows them to do that has also given would-be eavesdroppers new and powerful tools to collect and exploit signals. In this report, author Dr Andrew Davies explains the principles of secure communication and uses some examples of emerging technologies to illustrate what the next generation of secure communications might look like.
Topic:
Security, Science and Technology, Communications, and Military Affairs
Political Geography:
Australia

52. Stronger Together: US force posture in Australia’s north—a US perspective on Australia’s strategic geography

Author:
Todd C. Hanks
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
Stronger together: US force posture in Australia’s north—a US perspective on Australia’s strategic geography This report argues why, and analyses how, Australia’s defence force capabilities and strategic geography can enable US force posture initiatives in the Indo-Pacific to promote greater regional cooperation in ways that advance US and Australian national interests. Lieutenant Colonel Hanks writes that there are ‘practical and tangible areas for US-Australia cooperation and growth which include: 1) expanding the Australian defence industrial base while securing and hardening supply chains; 2) increasing US Army force posture in northern Australia; 3) increasing multinational training opportunities; and 4) in conjunction with Australia, expanding the defence partnership with Indonesia.’ ‘The US now relies on increased cooperation from partners and allies to regain the initiative from the PRC in the Indo-Pacific. Australia’s defence strategy and policies are better aligned with US defence strategy and policies today, than ever before.’ The report argues that military modernization alone will not effectively expand the competitive space and disrupt PRC grey-zone decision cycles. Thinking asymmetrically, Australia can use its strategic geography and defence capabilities to enable US force posture initiatives in the Indo-Pacific to promote greater regional cooperation and, through greater deterrent posture and capability, reduce the risk of conflict.
Topic:
National Security, Military Affairs, Geography, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Australia and United States of America

53. The Russian Northern Fleet – Extended Status and Geopolitical Ambitions

Author:
Giorgi Surmava
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
Abstract:
On December 21, 2020, by Decree #803 of the President of the Russian Federation, the Northern Fleet became the only one throughout the history of Russia to have the authority of a military district. In particular, the decree states that in order to ensure the integrity and inviolability of the territory of the Russian Federation, the Northern Fleet should be considered a strategic-territorial interdisciplinary union of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation which has the tasks of a military district. The Northern Fleet is responsible for the largest territorial zone of Russia. This territory is mostly an ice desert which has strategic importance for Russia. It runs along the North Sea Route which is 7,300 nautical miles from Yokohama to Rotterdam (11,200 nautical miles through the Indian Ocean). In addition, this territory contains a large supply of hydrocarbons and other mineral or marine resources. The shorter lines between the US and Russian strategic missiles and their intended targets also pass through this area.
Topic:
Natural Resources, Military Affairs, Geopolitics, and Navy
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, and Georgia

54. Security Review: Black Sea Security

Author:
Giorgi Surmava, Zurab Batiashvili, David Batashvili, and Nika Petriashvili
Publication Date:
03-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
Abstract:
The following anthology is dedicated to the Black Sea security situation, an issue that drew particularly focused attention following the illegal annexation of Crimea by Russia, when the Kremlin began rapid militarization of the peninsula, while also strengthening its military capabilities in the entire Black Sea basin. The Russian-Ukrainian War was soon followed by the active intervention of Russia in the Syrian conflict, further emphasizing the importance of the Black Sea, as it was precisely through the Black Sea that Russia aided hostilities in Syria and established communication lines with a Russian naval base there. Russia's active engagement in the Black Sea precipitated increased NATO interest towards the region. In recent years, NATO experts have been actively discussing the so-called "Black Sea dimension", that is, the need to develop a new strategy for the region which reflects the improved capabilities of NATO and its individual member states in the Black Sea, forging closer ties with local partners, increasing visits of naval vessels to the Sea, and resisting Russian military domination in general. The exacerbation of the situation in the Black Sea is a significant challenge for Turkey, in particular. The Montreux Convention grants Turkey a special role, which it is trying to maintain, and yet the Russian aggressive policy in the region cannot but trouble it. What role can Georgia play in this situation? What challenges or opportunities does the return of the Black Sea to the strategic map of the world bring for Georgia? This anthology presents the views of four experts from the Rondeli Foundation: General Giorgi Surmava reviews the military capabilities of the Black Sea countries; the Turkish perspective is introduced by Zurab Batiashvili; David Batashvili discusses the Russian point of view; while Alex Petriashvili deliberates the Western approach and the role of Georgia.
Topic:
Security, Military Affairs, Conflict, and Annexation
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, Ukraine, Crimea, and Black Sea

55. Security Review: Russia-Ukraine Confrontation

Author:
Giorgio Bilanishvili, Zurab Batiashvili, Nika Petriashvili, and Giorgi Surmava
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
Abstract:
After the occupation and annexation of Crimea in 2014, the epicenter of hostilities shifted to eastern Ukraine, specifically to the Donetsk and Luhansk regions. The Russian-speaking population was not loyal to Kyiv even before that but the events in Crimea and the Russian assistance invigorated the local separatists who, along with adventurers backed by the regular Russian troops, managed to gain control over parts of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions. The fighting turned out to be quite bloody and long lasting. There were large casualties on both sides, including civilians. Coupled with a high-profile incident of the downing of a passenger plane, it caused a wide international reverberation and world interest in resolving the conflict. The efforts of the leading OSCE countries had led to a certain agreement and the cessation of intense hostilities by September 2014. A quadripartite agreement (Germany, France, Russia, Ukraine) was achieved on the separation of the parties and a ceasefire. The line of contact was divided into sectors and precincts where a group of OSCE military observers began to monitor the “silence” regime. Since then, the intensity and scale of the hostilities have been significantly reduced. However, every now and then the situation would worsen which was followed by a new agreement on a ceasefire and the establishment of a “silence” regime. It should be noted that since March 2021, the number of incidents has increased dramatically. At the same time, regular Russian troops began to gather along Ukraine's eastern borders and Crimea.
Topic:
International Relations, National Security, Military Affairs, Conflict, Separatism, and Annexation
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, Ukraine, Eastern Europe, and Crimea

56. An Ever Closer Union? Ramifications of further integration between Belarus and Russia

Author:
Bob Deen, Sam Roggeveen, and Wouter Zweers
Publication Date:
08-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
The Union State of Russia and Belarus was forged in the 1990s through a series of bilateral treaties but has largely remained a paper tiger – at least until now. For well over two decades Belarusian President Lukashenko has had a complicated love-hate relationship with the Kremlin, milking the Russian Federation for energy subsidies and other economic benefits while simultaneously zealously guarding his country’s sovereignty and shielding its state-owned enterprises from Russian takeovers. Although co-operation in the military domain has advanced considerably, the more far-reaching provisions of the Union State, such as a joint constitution, monetary union and a single energy market, have never materialized. While Belarus has generally aligned its foreign policy outlook with the Russian Federation and acceded to the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union, at various moments Lukashenko tried to keep his geopolitical options open as his relations with the Kremlin deteriorated. Among other things, he sought closer relations with the European Union following the 2008 Georgia conflict and the 2014 Ukraine crisis. The EU, in turn, has alternated between defending its democratic values by imposing sanctions on Lukashenko and his regime for human rights abuses, and then lifting those again a few years later, hoping to lure Belarus away from Russia’s sphere of influence. These hopes proved to be in vain. The Presidential elections of August 2020 and their repressive aftermath have again led to a turning point in Belarus’ relations with the West and with the Russian Federation. Relying on Russian support to remain in power and facing a series of European sanctions, Lukashenko is now again under pressure by the Kremlin to make far-reaching concessions and to advance the integration of Belarus and Russia within the Union State framework. As both the stability of the Lukashenko regime and the outcome of the integration process remain uncertain, this report identifies six scenarios for the future of Belarus and further elaborates the consequences of four of them.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Sanctions, Military Affairs, European Union, and Integration
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, and Belarus

57. Russia’s Strategic Interests and Actions in the Baltic Region

Author:
Heinrich Brauß and András Rácz
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:
This report deals with Russia’s geopolitical objectives, policy and strategy, and their effects across the wider Baltic Region. The second part sums up NATO’s response to this evolving strategic challenge, including the potential military threat posed by Russia.
Topic:
NATO, Military Affairs, Geopolitics, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, and Baltic States

58. Increasing Support for U.S.‐Japan Alliance in Okinawa is Not a Pipedream

Author:
Hillary C. Dauer
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
East-West Center
Abstract:
The ongoing political impasse between Japan’s central government in Tokyo and the Okinawa prefectural government over U.S. military basing threatens the long-term stability of the U.S.-Japan Alliance. In spite of the friction between the central government and the prefecture, and the much decried “burden” of U.S. bases on Okinawa there is relatively little deep-seeded resentment among the Okinawan people toward the U.S. military presence or the U.S.-Japan Alliance as a whole, especially among those born after the reversion of Okinawa to Japanese sovereignty in 1972. Surveys also show that Okinawans desire more dialogue with U.S. service members based in Okinawa. But a fraught Okinawan history with mainland Japan and economic marginalization have so far undermined the strong potential for good-faith dialogue that could break the impasse. The relocation of U.S. military bases is essential to the U.S. and Japanese governments’ security policy vis-à-vis emerging threats in the region. Both governments realized in the 1990s that Okinawa could not remain a key power projection node in the Western Pacific if the bases remained a flashpoint of political controversy due to their proximity to densely populated communities. This potentially volatile situation was brought under intense scrutiny with the 1995 rape committed by three U.S. service members against an Okinawan junior high school student and the resulting agreement to close the Marine Corps Air Station at Futenma. Moreover, the construction of the Futenma Replacement Facility also factors into subsequent U.S. Pacific maritime realignment strategy. Further delays could leave Japan less secure and impair U.S. attempts to counter growing Chinese assertiveness in the East and South China Seas.
Topic:
Politics, Bilateral Relations, Military Affairs, and Alliance
Political Geography:
Japan, Asia, North America, and United States of America