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301. Going Nuclear on Rosatom: Ending Global Dependence on Putin’s Nuclear Energy Sector

Author:
David Albright
Publication Date:
03-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Security and International Studies (ISIS)
Abstract:
Rosatom, its entities, and its senior personnel should be subjected to far greater sanctions by the United States and its allies. Sanction carveouts or waivers can be granted for nuclear reactor safety considerations, operating nuclear reactors, and for other Rosatom customers as they wind down existing contracts. However, the status quo is not sustainable. It leaves the United States and its allies vulnerable to political and economic pressure by Rosatom and its owner Russia, with the constant threat that this Putin-controlled entity could cut off energy supplies. This already happened to Germany in September 2022 when Gazprom, another Putin-controlled entity, cut off natural gas supplies to Germany as a result of a clash over Putin’s invasion of Ukraine. Only a mild winter staved off serious and needless suffering by the German people. Rosatom deserves sanctions today. It is not just a benign commercial nuclear energy supplier. Rosatom has actively participated in the illegal seizure of the Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant (ZNPP), a seizure causing an increased risk of a major nuclear accident. Rosatom officials are not authorized to operate these reactors. IAEA Director General Raphael Grossi has called this situation “not sustainable” and “risks nuclear safety and security.” Rosatom is also complicit in the human rights violations of Ukrainian plant personnel, violations that include torture. Rosatom also actively contributes importantly to the production of Russian weapon systems used against Ukraine. A case in point is the participation of one of its subsidiaries in the production of the Shahed 136 kamikaze drone that Russia has used to destroy much of Ukraine’s civilian energy infrastructure and terrorize its civilian population.
Topic:
Sanctions, Nuclear Energy, Energy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia and Eurasia

302. Alabuga’s Greatly Expanded Production Rate of Shahed 136 Drones

Author:
David Albright, Igor Anokhin, Sarah Burkhard, Victoria Cheng, and Spencer Faragasso
Publication Date:
05-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Security and International Studies (ISIS)
Abstract:
Over the last two years, Russia has launched thousands of Shahed 136 drones against Ukraine. Although most of these relatively noisy, slow-moving drones have been shot down, about 15 percent on average have gotten through, causing immense damage to Ukraine’s military and civilian infrastructure. The Russian manufacturer of these drones, JSC Alabuga, contracted with Iran in early 2023 in a $1.75 billion dollar franchise deal to supply 6000 of the drones to the Russian Army by September 2025 in a three-stage arrangement, shown in Figure 1. While there were initial delays and skepticism about Alabuga being able to supply 6000 drones, data on Russian launches of Shahed drones collected by the Ukrainian military indicate that Alabuga is ahead in its production schedule and has already supplied approximately 4500 of the promised 6000 drones as of late April 2024. Based on these data, Alabuga has almost tripled its average production rate recently. It has, for the last several months produced Shahed drones at an average rate of about 20 drones per workday, equivalent to two shifts per day at the production facility, compared to a contract amount for 2023 of about 7 drones per workday followed by 10 drones per day. At this new rate, about 5200 drones per year, Alabuga could fulfill its commitment of supplying 6000 drones a year early, by mid-August 2024, and it could supply an additional 5400 drones by September 2025.
Topic:
Weapons, Drones, Production, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Iran, and Ukraine

303. Russian Decoy Drones that Depend on Western Parts Pose a Great Challenge to Ukrainian Defenses

Author:
Igor Anokhin and Spencer Faragasso
Publication Date:
12-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Security and International Studies (ISIS)
Abstract:
Russia has developed and deployed several types of decoy drones to assist missile and drone strikes on Ukraine. This report discusses two of those decoy drones, the Gerbera (also known as Gerber) and the Parody (also known as Parodiya) UAVs that mimic the Shahed 136 and other drone systems. Both of these drones can be mass produced quickly and are built from simple materials like plywood, foam, and a few electronics, making them inexpensive compared to their more costly counterparts. Ukraine has become increasingly proficient at identifying, tracking, and intercepting Russian airborne platforms, like missiles and drones. To increase the effectiveness of Russian barrages, these decoy drones are launched in large numbers alongside missiles and attack drones, like the Shahed 136 and Lancet-3, to overwhelm and confuse Ukrainian defenses to draw anti-aircraft fire on the decoys, allowing other weapons to reach their targets. Ukrainian defenders can never be entirely certain that an incoming drone does not carry an explosive warhead, forcing them to expend valuable munitions intercepting these drones. Because Ukraine has limited stockpiles of interceptor missiles, anti-aircraft artillery ammunition, and hunter-killer-drones, deploying decoy drones is a viable strategy to wear down Ukrainian defenders. Using decoy drones can also help Russian forces identify where Ukraine has positioned anti-aircraft defenses, radar, and electronic warfare systems, and target those in subsequent attacks.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Weapons, Drones, Trade, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

304. Action from Semiconductor Companies is Long Overdue

Author:
David Albright and Spencer Faragasso
Publication Date:
09-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Security and International Studies (ISIS)
Abstract:
The United States and its allies have struggled to stop the supply of controlled microelectronics to Russia, which then uses them in a variety of drones, missiles, and other weapon systems in its brutal war against Ukraine. While the United States and its allies can do more, it is time to turn far greater attention to the Western companies making these goods and demand far more from them. A recent companion study of trade data charting exports from China to Russia in a twenty-month period up to the end of 2023, conducted by one of us, showed that exports of the most critical microelectronics, electronic integrated circuits, amounted to $1.5 billion, steadily increasing throughout 2023, despite Western restrictions and pressure on China, which remains uncooperative, even hostile. 1 Electronic integrated circuits take on special significance, because Russia cannot make them, and there are limited manufacturers in the world, almost all in the United States and Europe. In a four-tier U.S. priority listing of banned electronic and other components and the means to make them, Tier 1 is exclusively composed of electronic integrated circuits. Aided importantly by China, Russia is countering the sanctions imposed by the United States and its allies. Without more countermeasures and enforcement, it would be unsurprising to find Russia continuing to acquire large quantities of restricted Western microelectronics needed for its war production.
Topic:
Sanctions, Weapons, Trade, Semiconductors, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, and United States of America

305. Chinese Export of Restricted High Priority Battlefield Items to Russia

Author:
Spencer Faragasso
Publication Date:
09-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Security and International Studies (ISIS)
Abstract:
The Institute for Science and International Security has reviewed more than 295,000 commercial import-export trade manifest records from May 2022 through the end of December 2023, detailing exports of restricted Tier One Harmonized System Codes (HS Codes) items on the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) Common High Priority List (CHPL) being exported by Chinese companies to Russian importers. The BIS CHLP applies trade restrictions to Russia on the most sensitive and sought-after Western electronics and other commodities that Russia requires to build its war machine. Tier One covers key items that Russia cannot domestically produce and that have limited manufacturers and constitutes four HS Code chapter 84 codes (8542.31, 8542.32, 8542.33, and 8542.39) detailing the most important electronics which Russia needs to build drones, missiles, and other weapon systems. Russia depends on illicit import practices and networks to acquire these goods from overseas, mainly Western goods via China. Without these critical commodities, Russia would be crippled in its ability to produce the advanced missiles, drones, and other combat systems it needs to wage its war of aggression in Ukraine. More than $1.5 billion worth of restricted Tier One commodities were found being exported from China to Russia during the assessed period. The shipments contained electronics designed and produced by Western firms, but shipped by often obscure and little-known Chinese companies to Russian firms. Shipments containing Western brands found in the trade data include Texas Instruments, XILINX, Analog Devices, Intel, NVIDIA, ST Microelectronics, and other major sought-after designers and producers of electronics. Many of these companies’ products have been frequently found in Russian weapons used in Ukraine, especially in drone systems such as the Shahed 136 and the Lancet kamikaze drones, and Kometa anti-jamming equipment. For example, XILINX field programmable gate arrays (FPGA) and microcontrollers, all of which were found in the assessed trade data, are essential components in the Shahed 136, hundreds of which are being launched at Ukraine each month. 1 NVIDIA Jetson AI modules play a key role in how the Lancet—another drone launched by Russia at Ukraine in the thousands—autonomously identifies, tracks, and engages targets. 2 These amounts of drones, as well as other weapon systems like missiles and other drones, demand a huge quantity of Western Tier 1 goods to keep up production rates and meet the Russian military’s operational needs.
Topic:
Weapons, Exports, Trade, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, and Asia

306. Unsealed Indictment Shows Iranian Agents Acquired Controlled Camera with Nuclear Weapons Application from United States

Author:
Sarah Burkhard, Chloe DeVere, and Kendall Roach
Publication Date:
08-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Security and International Studies (ISIS)
Abstract:
In the spring of 2023, the U.S. Justice Department unsealed an indictment from 2012, which shows that in addition to the previously known high-speed cameras Iran purchased from Russia, brokered by Mohsen Vanaki, 2 Iran also acquired another camera with applications in nuclear and ballistic missile testing at the same time from the United States. 3 From 2006 to 2009, five agents residing in Iran, Azerbaijan, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Canada worked together to purchase the camera, which required an export license, from a U.S. company. They then shipped the camera via Canada and the UAE to an Iranian customer with known ties to Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile program. While a first attempt to purchase the camera failed, a second attempt succeeded, requiring an elaborate scheme with multiple transshipment points, front companies, and falsified end-user information. Ironically, the Iranian end user experienced multiple technical issues with the camera post-shipment, requiring prolonged back-and-forth communication among the network and with the manufacturer. Despite efforts taken by the multiple agents to ship the camera and conceal its end use, this case reveals red flags and missed opportunities to stop the initial shipment or the repair and technical consultations post-shipment. While it is difficult to determine in what way the camera could have contributed to Iran’s nuclear weapons efforts, there are several indications that Iran was continuing nuclear weapons related activities previously conducted under the Amad plan during that time frame, and multiple governments agreed at the time that Iran’s nuclear weapons program was likely ongoing. The case highlights that Iran seeks controlled high-speed cameras for nuclear and military applications. It also serves as an important reminder that Iran does have the type of sophisticated equipment needed to conduct various aspects of nuclear weapons development, then and today. Additionally, this case again shows the value of dual-national and other Iranian procurement agents located outside of Iran, especially in Western countries. Moreover, if they are arrested and prosecuted, Iran has effectively developed a strategy of trading them for innocent Western hostages it has arbitrarily seized inside Iran.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Sanctions, Weapons, and Trade
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

307. Russian Company Drake LLC’s Procurements for JSC Alabuga’s Military Drone Projects - JSC Alabuga’s Weaponization of Commercial Drones for Military Use in Ukraine

Author:
David Albright and Spencer Faragasso
Publication Date:
07-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Security and International Studies (ISIS)
Abstract:
With the onset of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, JSC Alabuga shifted from centering on hosting domestic and international civilian manufacturing facilities at its Special Economic Zone (SEZ) to direct military production of military drones, in particular the Shahed 136 kamikaze drone under a supply and franchise contract with Iran. This shift has necessitated the large-scale procurement of a variety of different types of goods abroad. One of JSC Alabuga’s important procurement arms has been Drake LLC, aka Dreik LLC, which contracts with Alabuga Development Company, JSC Alabuga’s main construction and production arm. Drake’s role in outfitting military industries was recognized on February 23, 2024, when it was sanctioned by the United States. However, its precise dealings which warranted this designation have received little public scrutiny. The case of Drake exposes a part of Alabuga’s drone production supply chain and its broader interest in military drones in addition to the Shahed 136 drone. This case study reveals how Alabuga Development Company purchased in early 2023 via Drake and a third party in Kazakhstan, DRONE.kz, up to 30 Dragonfish drones from Autel Robotics, a major Chinese drone manufacturer with a strong U.S. presence, for modification at Alabuga for military use in Ukraine. The planned changes included extending the drone’s range, strengthening its ability to defeat jamming from enemy electronic warfare systems, and/or attaching a universal delivery system for a variety of ordnance, such as grenades and video-guided rocket propelled grenades.
Topic:
Weapons, Drones, Manufacturing, Procurement, Russia-Ukraine War, and Dual Use Items
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

308. Russian Company Elmak Procures “High Priority” Items for Russia’s War Efforts via China

Author:
David Albright and Spencer Faragasso
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Security and International Studies (ISIS)
Abstract:
Russian weapons, including bombs, missiles, and drones, depend on crucial electronic components, such as field programmable gate arrays (FPGA) and microcontrollers, many of which cannot be made by Russia. In many cases, produced only by Western companies, these essential components are being sourced by Russian electronics importers and trading companies in large quantities from, foremost, China. The Russian trading company Elmak LLC, aka Kometa LLC, has imported over $5 million of Western electronic goods, almost entirely via China. Over 90 percent of the items fall under Tier 1 of the Bureau of Industry and Security and European Union List of Common High Priority Items banned for export to Russia and at heightened risk of being diverted to Russia illegally due to “their importance to Russia’s war efforts.” China’s lack of action to prevent these sales justifies NATO’s recent labeling China as a “decisive enabler of Russia’s war against Ukraine,” 1 adding weight to calls for the application of more sanctions against Chinese suppliers and enabling banks. But U.S. and other Western companies need to do more. They should not ship to China any electronics known to be used in weapons against Ukraine. U.S. companies should show greater due diligence on the final use and end users of their products and simplify supply chains to prevent unauthorized transfers of electronics with restricted Harmonized System (HS) codes. At the very least, companies should agree not to export the most important electronic items to China, which have been identified in Russian weapons downed in Ukraine. Otherwise, as the war continues, with more U.S and other Western manufacturers’ electronics found in Russian weapons in Ukraine after causing casualties and destruction, these manufacturers look increasingly insensitive and powerless against their own complicity in supporting Russia’s illegal war.
Topic:
Sanctions, Weapons, Trade, Imports, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, and Ukraine

309. Iran/Russia Military Technology Axis: Russia Showcases to Iran New and Advanced Military Technology

Author:
David Albright and Spencer Faragasso
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Security and International Studies (ISIS)
Abstract:
A dangerous new weapons technology partnership between Iran and Russia is emerging with deadly consequences for the United States, Israel, and their allies. This axis, helped importantly by China, exchanges finished military hardware and the technology to replicate and produce it. With the advent of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the transfer of weapons technology from Iran to Russia has developed on a large scale. The Ukraine war has led Russia to seek goods from Iran, including prominently a $1.75 billion purchase of Shahed 136 kamikaze drones and their production know-how. As it produces the Shahed drones, known in Russia as the Geran 2 drone, Russia has improved it. Based on the extensive interactions in Iran and in Russia between Iranian experts and the drone manufacturer, JSC Alabuga, there are grounds to believe that Russian improvements in the drone’s design and production have filtered back to Iran. Additionally, Iran is interested more generally in Russian military technologies.
Topic:
Weapons, Drones, Trade, Russia-Ukraine War, and Military Technology
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Iran, and Middle East

310. A Security Symphony: Harmonizing Cybersecurity Regulation

Author:
Aspen Digital
Publication Date:
05-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Aspen Institute
Abstract:
Global cybersecurity regulation is fragmented, inefficient, and often ineffective. More than 60 countries are implementing an array of legal frameworks, making it difficult to regulate cyber practices across borders. Costly on many levels, inconsistent regulations and varying compliance standards allow bad actors to seek out gaps in the system and facilitate attacks that span geographies. With the current amplification and intensity of cyber threats, government and industry need to share tactics, techniques, and procedures with each other as well as with partner nations. If the field doesn’t achieve a higher degree of harmony in the global regulatory landscape, multiple dimensions will remain inefficient and costly: operations, risk management, research and development, and more. In A Security Symphony, Aspen Digital’s Global Cybersecurity Group calls for establishing regulatory harmonization principles, with a focus on collaboration and standardization. The principles span the core categories of interoperability and transparency, market competition, and mutual recognition frameworks. The paper also demonstrates the real-life harms of lacking coordination as well as the benefits of harmonized models through case studies on the 2016 dismantling of the “Avalanche” network and the Factor Analysis of Information Risk (FAIR). A collective of cybersecurity experts committed to democracy and freedom online, the Global Cybersecurity Group is uniquely positioned to offer cross-border guidance to their peers and like-minded nations.
Topic:
National Security, Cybersecurity, Regulation, and Risk
Political Geography:
Global Focus

311. The Roots of Mistrust in Coalition Building among Syrian Nonprofits: Lessons from the Truth and Justice Charter

Author:
Marianna Al-Tabba
Publication Date:
12-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Arab Reform Initiative (ARI)
Abstract:
For the past 13 years, the establishment and management of alliances in Syria have not been one of the pillars of public affairs work, whether in political, relief, or human rights work, and the field of transitional justice is no exception. Despite the harmony of the parties in vision, goal, or even ideology – and their shared struggles whether political, revolutionary, or any other form – a lack of trust between groups often surfaced, hindering the formation of strong and strategic relationships and delaying the unification of their ranks at a time of great need. This paper attempts to investigate and explore the extent to which lack of trust affects the formation of alliances as perceived by actors in the Syrian public sphere. It examines the nature of the existing relationships between Syrian institutions and organizations and their ability to build alliances around a specific demand or cause that unites them. Due to the overlapping factors and different schools of thought in explaining the emergence and success of different forms of institutional cooperation and their gradations, the paper focuses on one crucial determinant in building strategic cooperation and alliances: trust. It raises a general question about the causes of weak trust between organizations working in the public sphere; its impact on collective action; and the lessons learned to overcome the obstacle of weak trust, focusing on nonprofit organizations working in the field of transitional justice and the movements by victims’ families and survivors. The importance of the topic emerges not only in understanding the causes and deconstructing the lack of trust, or mistrust, among Syrian public affairs workers, and the impact of this on building strong relationships and alliances based on deep trust among its members – something that is desperately needed at the political, human rights, and civil work levels in general. Its importance also emerges from the lessons learned from a previous experience in contemporary Syrian history – a coalition of Syrian associations and institutions that built high levels of trust among themselves. This paper emphasizes the ability of Syrian men and women to create a demanding grassroots movement around the issue of detention and enforced disappearance, a movement that is geographically widespread, driven by the people themselves and prominent women leaders.
Topic:
Civil Society, Coalition, and Trust-building
Political Geography:
Middle East and Syria

312. Red Lines, Where to Find Them, and How to Work with Them: Civil Society, the State, and Political Change in Morocco

Author:
Francesco Colin
Publication Date:
11-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Arab Reform Initiative (ARI)
Abstract:
Who is included in “civil society” and which function it is supposed to perform – particularly in the realm of political action – remain largely debated (Edwards 2014).1 On one hand, achieving political change, and democratization in particular, has become an essential element of civil society in non-democratic regimes after the so-called “third wave of democratization” (Ibrahim 2015: 46–47). On the other, the state’s increasing control of civil society’s space for action has raised attention to the fact that states rely on these spaces to stabilize a given political order (Poppe and Wolff 2017). Even in established democracies, the increasing “politicization” of civil society action has been a key driver of the restrictions on its space for action (as Hummel 2022 showed in the case of Germany, for instance). In Morocco, the monarchy’s posture towards civil society has been ambiguous, to say the least.2 Beyond the analytical insights that stress the regime’s efforts to tame this sector, this paper acknowledges that civil society’s growing ability to intervene in the public sphere prompted a redefinition of the monarchy’s strategy towards this sector (Sater 2007). In this context, palace-led civil society development initiatives such as the “National Initiative for Human Development” (launched in 2005) not only testify to the importance that the state attributes to this sector of society, but also allow the state to reinforce its control over civil society at the local level (Bergh 2012). With more than 240,000 associations officially registered in Morocco, the government’s plan to develop a new official “strategy” for civil society further corroborates the state’s strong and continued interest in the structuring and control of civil society’s space for action (Wail El Karmouni 2023).3
Topic:
Civil Society, Politics, and Activism
Political Geography:
North Africa and Morocco

313. Can Poverty Graduation Programs Truly Free the Poor from Poverty? Reflections on International and Regional Experiences

Author:
Howaida Adly Roman
Publication Date:
10-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Arab Reform Initiative (ARI)
Abstract:
Poverty is an intractable structural issue, which raises a question that has been perplexing for many years: Why have multiple efforts to combat poverty not liberated the poor from its bond and captivity, allowing them the freedom of sufficiency and human dignity? Does the reason lie in the inadequacy of these efforts, or because the efforts did not address the issue of poverty from its structural causes, instead only dealing with its symptoms? The reasons for questioning this issue are varied. This uncertainty has led to the emergence of a new type of intervention that has been tested initially on limited populations, known as the “graduation out of poverty” approach. This approach was motivated by the recognition in the late 1990s that traditional poverty reduction and microfinance programs could not reach the poorest because, in addition to the barrier of income marginalization, the poor face multidimensional social, economic, and political poverty, as well as psychological and cultural barriers.1 Poverty graduation programs offer an integrated package of interventions aimed at lifting the poor out of their situation and ensuring the sustainability of their emancipation over a specific time, ranging from 24 to 36 months. In 2002, the Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC) developed a program to target the poorest of the poor to free them from their situation and ensure sustainable livelihoods.2 BRAC is a non-governmental organization founded in 1972; its work continued until 2001 when it expanded to include many other countries in the global south, applying its experience in poverty alleviation and establishing branches in many other countries.3 The interventions of these programs seek to combine addressing the immediate needs of those targeted with long-term investment in technical skills, life skills, asset transfer, entrepreneurial development, promoting savings opportunities, and planning for the future to ensure a sustainable exit from poverty and a stable life for these social groups.4 This paper aims to examine poverty exit programs that have been implemented in diverse social, economic, and cultural contexts around the world to draw key conclusions about the ability of these programs to deal with the root causes of poverty and vulnerability. The paper also seeks to investigate the extent to which these programs are scalable, meaning that they can be applied to larger populations; their sustainability; and the guarantee that the poor will not fall back into poverty. The paper focuses on analyzing three experiences from the Arab region, two from Egypt and one from Yemen. Yemen’s program, which is the earliest in the region, dates back to 2006 when the Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP) and the Ford Foundation decided to expand the approaches to graduation out of poverty through various contexts. In Egypt, the Bab Amal program was implemented by a group of NGOs, while the Forsa program was a government program for graduating beneficiaries of conditional cash transfers (CCT) – the Takaful program – that was implemented in partnership between the Ministry of Social Solidarity and NGOs. Bab Amal was started earlier and has undergone preliminary evaluations, while Forsa is still in its infancy. Research into global poverty graduation programs may help these two experiments avoid making similar mistakes, especially in the context of scaling up. Based on the above, this paper will shed light on what poverty graduation programs are, how they emerged and for what reasons, what role NGOs played, how governments began to adopt these programs and apply them and later expand them, and what the challenges and issues of expansion are. The paper concludes by analyzing a number of challenges facing these programs – chief among them of course the challenge of sustainability – and finally, the lessons learned.
Topic:
Development, Poverty, Economic Inequality, and Social Programs
Political Geography:
Middle East, Yemen, North Africa, and Egypt

314. Lebanon's Social Protection System Suffers Amidst the Current War: Urgent Action Needed!

Author:
Cynthia Saghir, Farah Al Shami, and Diana Tonea
Publication Date:
10-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Arab Reform Initiative (ARI)
Abstract:
This policy paper assesses Lebanon’s social protection response to the ongoing war and provides recommendations for policymakers to further develop this response and later improve the shock-responsiveness and -resilience of the country’s social protection system. The war in Lebanon has exacerbated the existing economic crisis, leading to mass displacement and increased poverty. The social protection system, already fragmented and underfunded, is struggling to meet the humanitarian needs of the affected population. The emergency response has been inadequate and limited to cash transfers and in-kind donations reaching only a small portion of those in need. Lebanon’s social protection system primarily relies on poverty-targeted social safety nets, which offer limited coverage and are heavily dependent on international funding. These safety nets have been expanded in response to the war but their reach remains relatively narrow. This implies an urgent need for a more comprehensive and coordinated approach to address the crisis – an approach that involves immediate humanitarian assistance as well as longer-term social protection measures that strengthen the system’s shock-responsiveness and -resilience. Linkages between the humanitarian and social assistance systems are also crucial for an integrated and sustainable approach. The paper concludes that for Lebanon's social protection system to become more fit for purpose, universal social security schemes should be prioritized, followed by a plan that tackles the issue of being composed of a complex web of different programs and registries. The government must therefore take decisive action to secure additional funding through domestic resources, improve coordination among stakeholders, and expand the reach of social assistance programs so that vulnerable populations receive the support they need to cope with the current crisis, and have their wellbeing and livelihood constantly protected.
Topic:
Humanitarian Aid, Conflict, and Social Protection
Political Geography:
Middle East and Lebanon

315. A Critical Study of the Role of Zakat in Social Protection in Sudan from 1980 to 2021

Author:
Medani Abbas Medani
Publication Date:
09-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Arab Reform Initiative (ARI)
Abstract:
Sudan suffers from a high percentage of its total population, more than 65%, living in poverty. This percentage is affected by poor economic growth, the spread of civil conflicts and the resulting migration and destruction, and loss of livelihoods.1 With such a high incidence of poverty, social protection networks do not cover large segments of the Sudanese population. Since the early 1990s, Sudan has embarked on economic reform programs that include the removal of subsidies on basic, government-subsidized commodities such as bread and fuel. As is well known, the implementation of these policies requires effective social protection networks to minimize the effects of these policies on the poor, which is not an easy task in a low-income country where there are already serious questions about the government’s ability to develop an effective social protection system. In light of limited government resources and a large security and military budget, especially during the period of al-Bashir’s rule from 1989 to 2019, the government’s ability to allocate resources to support social protection programs has been weak. This means that the Zakat Chamber is considered the main provider of social protection interventions in Sudan. It targets poor and vulnerable segments, as Zakat resources represent about 87% of the total interventions of government social protection networks (excluding government support).2 This study starts from the premise that Zakat can be an effective tool in financing and implementing social protection programs, as well as social protection institutions in Sudan, if properly managed. As such, the paper traces the historical development of the Zakat system in Sudan and the impact of the ruling regimes on Zakat’s roles in the social protection system. The study also examines the impact of the Bashir regime (1989-2019) on the Zakat system from the perspective of economic and political empowerment, and the extent of the regime’s impact on Zakat’s ability to strengthen social protection networks in Sudan. The nature of the political system plays a role in determining the frameworks of the Zakat system: the Zakat Chamber law authorizes it to disburse Zakat under the discretionary authority of the ruler as the original authority. In other words, the ruler’s discretion affects the distribution of Zakat resources to projects.3 The study examines the period of Omar al-Bashir’s regime, which lasted from 1989 to 2019. The study then deals with the period following the fall of the Muslim Brotherhood rule in the transitional period from 2019-2021, and proceeds to shed light on the role of the Zakat Chamber after the outbreak of the Sudanese war on 15 April 2023. The study concludes with the positives and challenges facing the role of Zakat in social protection in Sudan. It also provides recommendations aimed at reviewing the program, which, despite its expansion, is accompanied by issues in terms of its use in collecting and providing resources that are not subject to appropriate exchange and institutional controls and as a tool affected by the nature of the ruling political regime and its priorities, which may contradict the goals of Zakat and social protection. The importance of addressing the relationship between Zakat and social protection in Sudan lies in the fact that Zakat is categorized as one of the most important social protection resources. Zakat, for much of the period under study, was a compulsory religious tax, a fact that goes against the principles of Islamic countries in dealing with the Zakat obligation. The link between Zakat and social protection needs a careful approach that separates the roles that Zakat can play in social protection. Zakat is not just a charitable act and can have macroeconomic effects, falling into the trap of being used as an easy tax resource by which governments evade their roles in developing and institutionalizing social protection. This paper attempts, through the experience in Sudan, to contribute to the development of the debate and experience on the roles of Zakat in social protection.
Topic:
Poverty, Social Protection, and Zakat
Political Geography:
Africa and Sudan

316. Universal Health Coverage for Better Social Protection: The Case of Iraq

Author:
Sami Nader
Publication Date:
08-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Arab Reform Initiative (ARI)
Abstract:
Decades of violence, conflict, and humanitarian crises, combined with international sanctions and continuous neglect of the health sector, have seriously harmed Iraq’s healthcare system. As a result, many skilled physicians and other medical practitioners have left the country, causing a shortage of medical staff. Furthermore, Iraqis harbor a great degree of mistrust for the government and the public healthcare system, particularly following the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, which exposed and aggravated the multitude of vulnerabilities in public healthcare infrastructure and delivery. Once a prosperous and advanced healthcare system, Iraq has been steadily bleeding out talent, with medical staff and other healthcare practitioners emigrating to find better working conditions abroad; in the same vein, a large number of Iraqis travel to regional neighbors for medical care, including to Lebanon, Iran, Jordan, and Türkiye. Ideally, the state would provide social safety and healthcare as fundamental rights for everyone to guarantee fair access and complete coverage. Yet, Iraq’s healthcare system remains in a state of acute crisis and is characterized by disorganization and poor planning, shortages of staff and resources, fragmentation and insufficient coverage, and pervasive corruption, which instead erode the quality, affordability, and accessibility of basic as well as specialist healthcare services for a majority of Iraqis. The lack of long-term, sustainable health policies is widening inequality between Iraqis; large-scale private healthcare systems, acting as substitutes for the public health system, are spreading at a steady rate throughout the country, creating a “two-tier” healthcare system—in other words, one for those who can afford private healthcare services, and the other for those who cannot. Hence, the current landscape is enabling and widening the gap in health disparities for Iraqis. This paper relies on documentation, reports, and studies, in addition to previous recent experience on the ground in terms of public finance management programs as well as regional finance and public policy. It will map the history of Iraq’s healthcare crisis and the impact of the sanctions on health coverage, as well as the strain imposed by the COVID-19 pandemic on service delivery. The paper will then build a case for a collaborative health insurance scheme as an intermediary response to leverage the strengths of Iraq’s public and private sectors, and most pertinently, to alleviate the immediate healthcare needs of the country’s population. Finally, the paper will articulate policy recommendations towards that end, and for the overall Iraqi healthcare system.
Topic:
Health, Public Policy, Health Insurance, and Social Protection
Political Geography:
Iraq and Middle East

317. Urban Communities as Alternative to Slums: A Case Study of Egypt's Asmarat

Author:
Ibrahim Ezzeddine
Publication Date:
07-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Arab Reform Initiative (ARI)
Abstract:
Egypt is one of the most prominent countries that are facing serious housing and informal settlements issues. The state has, at different times, developed many policies and development programs to deal with these issues. During the last decade, Egypt has witnessed a new development in addressing the issue of informal settlements: the establishment of new urban communities as alternative areas for rehousing those living in slums. This paper analyzes the Asmarat area as the most prominent governmental project in this regard, asking the following questions: To what extent do resettlement areas meet the basic needs of the population? Does the Asmarat project achieve economic, social, and cultural sustainability as a suitable housing project? The paper reviewed the Asmarat general plan in terms of the density of residential units, the road network, the distribution of commercial activities, green areas, and open spaces. The paper presents the geographical location of the study area, which is the Mokattam neighborhood in Cairo Governorate, and it reviews the general plan and the footprint for the area to be built; the three phases of the project; and the financial cost, which exceeded 3.35 billion Egyptian pounds (about US$69.8 million), according to what was announced on official websites. The paper uses the framework of economic, social and cultural rights as an indicator to assess the area. The first indicator assesses the methods of legal security of tenure. All legal safeguards that protect residents from forced eviction should be in place. The second indicator measures access to natural resources, safe drinking water, energy for cooking, heating and lighting, sanitation, waste disposal, drainage, and access to emergency services. The third indicator assesses the adequacy and affordability of housing costs in relation to personal income and the cost of daily living for individuals and families. The fourth indicator assesses the suitability of housing for family size in terms of space and protection from cold, humidity, heat, and the spread of infections. The fifth indicator assesses access to adequate housing for all those affected by the removal of their homes, and the need for alternative housing. The sixth indicator assesses the suitability of the housing location in terms of the availability of employment opportunities, access to basic and health services, access to health care and education services, and access to social services. The seventh indicator assesses the expression of the housing’s cultural and social identity, and the adaptation of the exterior and interior design and landscaping to this end.
Topic:
Urban, Informal Settlement, and Housing
Political Geography:
Middle East, North Africa, and Egypt

318. Lebanon’s Solar Rollout: In What Ways Has It Been an Unjust Energy Transition?

Author:
Yusra Bitar
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Arab Reform Initiative (ARI)
Abstract:
Lebanon’s national electricity supply has nearly collapsed, with the country’s residents experiencing constant power cuts over the past three decades and total blackouts since 2020.1 This has led residents across the country to find their “coping strategies” - which have become somewhat normalized - to deal with the national shortages, including purchasing or subscribing to diesel generators.2 More recently, these coping strategies have started to include solar energy installations, which have been deemed revolutionary for Lebanon,3 although in reality, the story is much more complex. As the climate crisis worsens and global institutions start to advocate and fund just transitions,4 it is imperative to reflect on what this means to prevent the repetition of collective injustices. This paper briefly outlines the solar energy landscape in Lebanon and asks some questions about the country’s solar rollout, including who benefits from it and how, as well as how this process repeats past energy injustices. It then presents some case studies of initiatives that have addressed some community energy needs while offering lessons for future energy planning. The paper concludes with recommendations to policymakers, civil society organizations, and the private sector as they transition to solar energy.
Topic:
Environment, Solar Power, and Energy Transition
Political Geography:
Middle East and Lebanon

319. The Muhammasheen Mobilization Among Yemen’s Most Marginalized Community

Author:
Aisha Al-Warraq
Publication Date:
04-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Arab Reform Initiative (ARI)
Abstract:
The historical disenfranchisement Yemen’s Muhammasheen face would still be invisible today, to the rest of the country and wider the world, if not for the community’s own mobilization efforts in the past four decades. Muhammasheen, meaning “the marginalized”, is a contemporary term for a people whom the rest of Yemeni society had for generations untold referred to with names such as Al-Akhdam, “the servants” or Al-Abeed, “the slaves”. Despite centuries of recorded history in Yemen, this ethnic minority’s dark skin has traditionally been denigrated by the rest of society as not belonging to the country, causing them to face caste-like ostracization, stigmatization, and denial of basic human dignity. Muhammasheen communities are often found in shanty towns at the periphery of Yemen’s urban centers and in isolated rural areas. This exclusion from mainstream society, dispersion around the country, and the blurry definitions that define the group have made assessing their numbers difficult, with estimates ranging anywhere between 500,000 and 3.5 million.1 In the 1990s, Muhammasheen who sought to better their community’s situation began to be increasingly vocal and active in drawing attention to their plight and asserting their right to be regarded as full members of society. The powers that be have, by turns, attempted to oppress and coopt these initiatives, as well as exploit the Muhammasheen’s vulnerable status, which has only been exacerbated by Yemen’s ongoing civil war. The belligerent parties on all sides, for instance, have sought out Muhammasheen youth in their impoverished communities and lured them to fight on the frontlines with the promise of a paycheque. At the national level, Muhammasheen advocacy is today as fragmented as the country itself. However, the drive within the group to better the community at large continues to gain momentum, as evidenced by the ever-growing number of local initiatives around the country, even as the goal of full citizenhood remains a distant prospect. The following paper examines the history and development of Muhammasheen-led activism in Yemen, and this marginalized community’s struggle for self-empowerment.
Topic:
Marginalization, Racism, Activism, and Muhammasheen
Political Geography:
Middle East and Yemen

320. The Road Ahead of Algeria’s Elections: A Changing Status Quo?

Author:
Zine Labidine Ghebouli
Publication Date:
03-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Arab Reform Initiative (ARI)
Abstract:
In December 2019, Abdelmadjid Tebboune was elected as President of Algeria to replace Abdelaziz Bouteflika, who was forced by the February 2019 Hirak popular protest to resign in April of that year.1 Tebboune was, therefore, inaugurated amidst a deep and turbulent political crisis characterized by an unprecedented protest movement known as the Hirak, a large-scale operation of “clean hands” that targeted hundreds of corrupt senior officials and a fractured ruling establishment. Since then, the Tebboune administration engaged in multiple reforms to rehabilitate the state’s institutions, stabilize the country’s political and social fronts, revive the ailing economy, and reclaim Algiers’ place on the international stage. Four years after his election, the country is preparing for a consequential presidential race which will not be an easy task for any candidate, including the current leadership. Throughout his presidency, Tebboune had to endure several setbacks that often placed his agenda at risk and imposed urgent domestic and foreign policies. In early 2020, the world faced the COVID-19 pandemic2 which paralyzed international and local governance including in Algeria. President Tebboune himself was hospitalized in Germany3 following his infection and had to undergo a relatively long recovery. In addition, Algeria found itself at the heart of complex geopolitical equations when Russia launched a full-scale invasion against Ukraine in February 2022.4 As a historic military partner of Moscow, Algiers had to walk on thin lines between its principled non-alignment doctrine and Western pressures to condemn Russia. At the same time, Algiers had also to deal with regional crises including its escalatory cold war with Rabat,5 security turmoil in the Sahel’s Mali6 and Niger,7 and risks of instability in neighboring Tunisia and Libya. Furthermore, the 2019 protest movement left its mark on Algerian society as a new generation of Algerians emerged with unique demands and aspirations. While the 2019 elections were essentially focused on sociopolitical stability, candidates for the December 2024 presidential race are expected to provide concrete reforms on domestic affairs and foreign policy. In that sense, a set of priorities is already pressuring the ruling establishment as well as the opposition regarding political reforms, economic revival, and regional dossiers; and how these priorities are addressed is likely to weigh during the vote Hence, an assessment of Algeria’s challenges and the maneuvering of the Tebboune administration is critical ahead of December’s elections to both identify the potential dossiers that will shape public debate and candidates’ programs and draw realistic expectations about the opposition’s options and chances.
Topic:
Governance, Elections, Domestic Politics, and Status Quo
Political Geography:
Algeria and North Africa

321. Emergence, Resilience, and Tensions: A Decade of LGBTQ Activism in Morocco

Author:
Sanae A.
Publication Date:
02-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Arab Reform Initiative (ARI)
Abstract:
Although Article 4891 of Morocco’s Penal Code criminalizes homosexual acts, LGBTQ organizing in Morocco has taken a new turn since 2011, with the emergence of multiple collectives that organize and employ a variety of strategies to claim their rights as a community. The emergence of LGBTQ collectives can be traced to a post-2011 wave of new forms of organizing.2 During the 2011 social uprisings that swept the MENA region, Morocco’s 20 February social movement mobilized large numbers of citizens around socio-economic and political demands. The movement marked a new era in Moroccan politics and political resistance in the public space. As a youth-led movement, it challenged previous modes of organizing and existing alliances and divisions within the political scene and expanded the public sphere by offering alternative spaces to express grievances and to organize around them. The movement symbolized “hope for Moroccan youth”3 and challenged classical ways of taking political action while bringing into the public debate taboo topics such as feminist body politics, reproductive rights, religious freedoms, and the rights of sexual and gender minorities. At the same time, activists who identified as LGBTQ brought forward discussions around sexual orientation and the rights of LGBTQ. These issues were not explicitly part of the political agenda of the 20 February movement, however, many activists within it who identified as LGBTQ brought queer slogans during official protests with signs reading “Oppression is here, I am here” or “Love is not a crime.” New forms of organizing that emphasized occupying the public space in addition to artistic expressions (such as the production of magazines and zines, graffiti, and music) and underground cultural expressions (such as teach-ins and social theater) came to the surface. This essay explores the evolution of LGBTQ organizing in Morocco since 2011, highlighting the impact of the 20 February social movement as a catalyst for activism. It discusses the emergence of LGBTQ collectives, their strategies for claiming rights, and the challenges they face, including surveillance, violence, and cooptation. The essay also examines new generations of LGBTQ activism, the role of social media, and the response to outing campaigns. It delves into the tensions within local LGBTQ politics, including the debate between culturalist and systemic approaches, and the effects of NGOization on the movement's goals and strategies. It underlines how the increasing visibility of the LGBTQ movement, and the queer critiques of the Moroccan women’s rights movement compels feminist groups to reflect on their politics and the very definition of what feminism is and who it is for.
Topic:
LGBT+, Resilience, and Activism
Political Geography:
North Africa and Morocco

322. Operation Al-Aqsa Flood in Lebanon’s Palestinian Camps: Emotion and Reason, Solidarity and Militancy

Author:
Marie Kortam
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Arab Reform Initiative (ARI)
Abstract:
In September and early October of 2023, I was in Lebanon on a working visit to the Ain al-Hilweh Palestinian refugee camp after the outbreak of bloody battles between the Fatah movement and the “Muslim Youth.”1 The clashes in Ain al-Hilweh began on 30 July 2023, following the assassination of Abu Ashraf al-Armushi, Fatah’s security chief for southern Lebanon. The Palestinian National Security Forces, affiliated with the Palestinian Authority, are responsible for protecting and managing the security of Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon, and communicating with the Lebanese army to solve any incidents that occur. The clashes continued intermittently until late September, and stopped completely as Operation Al-Aqsa Flood began, with rogue elements on both sides promising to resume their conflict after the Gaza War. This was not the first time that Ain al-Hilweh camp has witnessed an armed conflict between Fatah and the "Muslim youth." This battle was one round in a series of escalations between Fatah and various Islamist militant groups which began with the establishment of Osbat al-Ansar in 1990, then with more extremist groups that splintered from al-Ansar after it concluded a peace agreement with Fatah in 2002. In reality, this battle was a conflict between Fatah and Hamas over control of the camp, as part of their fundamental struggle over Palestinian legitimacy. One hypothesis suggests that the recent clashes in Ain al-Hilweh resulted from an attempt by a party with no stakes in reconciliation between Fatah and Hamas to scuttle the dialogue conference in Egypt held on 30 July 2023. Fatah members, residents, and activists in the camp claim that Hamas is fighting “with another’s sword” against Fatah, that is, using unrecognized Islamic groups in the camp such as the Maqdisi group led by Fadi Al-Saleh, a close affiliate of Hamas who works with Turkish non-governmental organizations and supports the "Muslim Youth" groupings. Historically, the camps in Lebanon were under the control of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), and still are. However, since Mahmoud Abbas took over the administration of the Palestinian Authority, the Fatah movement, the PLO, and all Palestinian national institutions have marginalized refugees and failed to prioritize their cause. As a consequence, Palestinian refugees became increasingly discontent with Abbas’ positions, even those within the ranks of the Fatah movement, albeit this discord was not always made public. As for Hamas, it lost its base in the Yarmouk camp in Syria after the rift between it and the Syrian regime with the outbreak of the Syrian revolution, which made it search for another base among the refugees. Ain al-Hilweh camp was one of its areas of interest, as the largest Palestinian refugee camp in Lebanon where Islamist movements such as the Osbat al-Ansar and the Mujahid Movement were present, making the camp fertile ground for Islamist activity. Hence, it became logical for Hamas to compete with Fatah over governance of the Lebanese camps, the most important of which is Ain al-Hilweh as the capital of the Palestinian diaspora. This article presents a preliminary analysis of the perception of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon towards Operation Al-Aqsa Flood and the forms of solidarity with Gaza, both as socio-political solidarity and as militant engagement at a moment of intense competition between Fatah and Hamas. The article also raises the issue of the mobilization of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon and Hamas's attempts to establish influence in the camps in the aftermath of Operation Al-Aqsa Flood. The article is based on official and informal meetings, observations during field visits to the camps in early October and November 2023, and a review of news coverage.
Topic:
Refugees, Solidarity, Hamas, Armed Conflict, and Al-Aqsa Flood
Political Geography:
Middle East, Palestine, Gaza, and Lebanon

323. “Under One Tree”? Exploring Pastoral, National, and International Approaches to Humanitarian Action

Author:
Elizabeth Stites, Merry Fitzpatrick, and Paul Howe
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Feinstein International Center, Tufts University
Abstract:
Although resilience is an inherent component of pastoral systems, it must be adequately supported through effective national and international policies, programs, and approaches. However, to date the evidence provided by pastoralists and organizations working with pastoral populations suggests that international and national humanitarian assistance is rarely provided in ways that are truly helpful for pastoral communities to protect their livelihoods. This synthesis report brings together the findings from the first phase of a three-year research project exploring how humanitarian action — comprising early warning, anticipatory action, and emergency response — can be more attuned to the needs, perspectives, and approaches of pastoral communities in the dryland areas of the Greater Horn and Sudano-Sahel. The main outputs from Phase 1 are three desk studies examining humanitarian action from three perspectives: the views of the pastoralists, national governments, and the international community. This synthesis report reflects upon the cross-cutting learning and key themes and considers the implications for humanitarian action in dryland areas.
Topic:
Climate Change, Natural Disasters, Natural Resources, Pastoralism, Resilience, Livelihoods, Safety Net, Gender, Early Warning, and Social Protection
Political Geography:
Africa, Sahel, and Horn of Africa

324. Anticipatory Insurance with African Risk Capacity: A Holistic Benefit-Cost Analysis

Author:
Leah B. Poole, Vaibhav Anand, Alexa Gozdiff Spognardi, Anne Radday, Komal Rathod, and Erin Coughlan de Perez
Publication Date:
08-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Feinstein International Center, Tufts University
Abstract:
African Risk Capacity, with the support of the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, has designed an anticipatory insurance product to support farmers in the drought-prone regions of Malawi and Zambia. The anticipatory approach is innovative because the insurance pays out when forecasts predict a drought, rather than after drought-related losses and damages have occurred. This report explores the potential costs and benefits of the insurance product and proposes a framework for monitoring and evaluating these factors once the product is implemented. Costs and benefits are assessed with an economic model, supported by qualitative data collected from key stakeholders. The results of this research are intended to assist government decision-makers by providing insights into potential challenges and successes associated with the product’s implementation. Additionally, the research may offer a useful framework of considerations for the expansion of this initiative to other countries.
Topic:
Agriculture, Climate Change, Natural Disasters, Resilience, Livelihoods, Safety Net, Early Warning, and Livestock
Political Geography:
Africa

325. Laying a Strong Foundation for Disaster Resilience: How Can Data Make Us Resilient to Disasters?

Author:
Samet Keskin
Publication Date:
10-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV)
Abstract:
This report aims to demonstrate the importance of data-driven approaches for laying strong foundations in disaster management. The report firstly provides information on which data may be needed for disaster risk reduction and how they can be used in disaster management, as well as examples of good practices, services and products. This review is followed by recommendations to use data more effectively in disaster risk reduction and to better integrate it into policymaking and strategy development processes.
Topic:
Natural Disasters, Crisis Management, Resilience, and Data
Political Geography:
Global Focus

326. Data-Driven Strategic Planning for Disaster Risk Reduction

Author:
Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV)
Publication Date:
07-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV)
Abstract:
For disaster risk reduction (DRR) policies, there is a need to examine the existing political framework, data collection, budgeting approaches based on this data, and cross-sectoral collaborations. This publication is based on the participants’ recommendations from the Training and Workshop: Data-Driven Strategic Planning for Disaster Risk Reduction event that took place on May 14, 2024 within the scope of Improving Disaster Resilience for Sustainable Cities project, implemented by TESEV with the support of the Friedrich Naumann Foundation for Freedom.
Topic:
Sustainability, Data, Disaster Management, Strategic Planning, and Budgeting
Political Geography:
Global Focus

327. R2P Monitor, Issue 68, 1 March 2024

Author:
Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect
Publication Date:
03-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect
Abstract:
R2P Monitor is a quarterly publication applying the atrocity prevention lens to populations at risk of mass atrocities around the world. Issue 68 looks at developments in Afghanistan, Central Sahel (Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger), China, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Haiti, Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Myanmar (Burma), Nicaragua, Nigeria, Sudan, Syria, Ukraine, Venezuela, Cameroon, Central African Republic, South Sudan and Yemen.
Topic:
Human Rights, International Law, Responsibility to Protect (R2P), and Atrocity Prevention
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, China, Sudan, Ukraine, Israel, North Korea, Yemen, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Palestine, Nicaragua, Haiti, Syria, Venezuela, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Myanmar, South Sudan, Cameroon, Sahel, Central African Republic, and Global Focus

328. R2P Monitor, Issue 69, 1 June 2024

Author:
Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect
Publication Date:
05-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect
Abstract:
R2P Monitor is a quarterly publication applying the atrocity prevention lens to populations at risk of mass atrocities around the world. Issue 69 looks at developments in Afghanistan, Central Sahel (Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger), Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Haiti, Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Myanmar (Burma), Nicaragua, Nigeria, Sudan, Syria, Ukraine, Venezuela, Central African Republic and South Sudan. Updates for Cameroon, China and Yemen are available on our Populations at Risk page.
Topic:
Human Rights, International Law, Responsibility to Protect (R2P), and Atrocity Prevention
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, Sudan, Ukraine, Israel, North Korea, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Palestine, Nicaragua, Haiti, Syria, Venezuela, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Myanmar, Sahel, and Central African Republic

329. R2P Monitor, Issue 70, 1 September 2024

Author:
Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect
Publication Date:
09-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect
Abstract:
R2P Monitor is a quarterly publication applying the atrocity prevention lens to populations at risk of mass atrocities around the world. Issue 70 looks at developments in Afghanistan, Central Sahel (Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger), Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Haiti, Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Myanmar (Burma), Nicaragua, Nigeria, Sudan, Syria, Ukraine, Venezuela, Central African Republic and South Sudan. Updates for Cameroon, China and Yemen are available on our Populations at Risk page.
Topic:
Human Rights, International Law, Responsibility to Protect (R2P), and Atrocity Prevention
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, Sudan, Ukraine, Israel, North Korea, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Palestine, Nicaragua, Haiti, Syria, Venezuela, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Myanmar, South Sudan, Sahel, and Central African Republic

330. R2P Monitor, Issue 71, 1 December 2024

Author:
Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect
Publication Date:
12-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect
Abstract:
R2P Monitor is a quarterly publication applying the atrocity prevention lens to populations at risk of mass atrocities around the world. Issue 71 looks at developments in Afghanistan, the Central Sahel (Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger), Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Haiti, Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Myanmar (Burma), Nicaragua, Nigeria, Sudan, Syria, Ukraine, Venezuela, Central African Republic and South Sudan. Updates for Cameroon, China and Yemen are also available on our Populations at Risk page.
Topic:
Human Rights, International Law, Responsibility to Protect (R2P), and Atrocity Prevention
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, Sudan, Ukraine, Israel, North Korea, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Palestine, Nicaragua, Haiti, Syria, Venezuela, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Myanmar, South Sudan, Sahel, and Central African Republic

331. How the EU can – and should – enhance its security and global competitiveness

Author:
Stefania Benaglia, Steven Blockmans, Michael Emerson, Tinatin Akhvlediani, Ceren Ergenc, and Fanny Sauvignon
Publication Date:
09-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS)
Abstract:
To achieve the objectives of security and competitiveness the EU will absolutely need to prioritise its enlargement policy, defence strategy and global partnerships over the coming years to 2030 and beyond. To make the EU fit for 30+ members, it will have to start by reforming its enlargement methodology towards a ‘staged accession’ procedure and move towards more qualified majority voting, alongside adapting its budget to accommodate new members. Accession negotiations will need to have ironclad security commitments and the EU should assist candidates in shoring up their own defences, as well as beefing up its own Member States’ military capacities. The EU also has no choice but to become a security provider for the entire continent. To strengthen its overall global competitiveness, the EU should boost Europe’s defence industry, ramp up the production of much-needed capabilities, tackle procurement issues and harmonise technical and operational standards. Collaboration with regional partners through the Global Gateway is also important but the EU shouldn’t position itself as an exclusive alternative to China’s Belt and Road Initiative. It must also actively engage all parties in the Middle East peace process to counterbalance China’s influence and (re)assert itself as a key regional player. The India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) will test the EU’s ability to maintain its global relevance and uphold its values.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, European Union, Competition, and Enlargement
Political Geography:
Europe

332. Explaining Ukraine’s recovery and reconstruction: what, how and when?

Author:
Tinatin Akhvlediani
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS)
Abstract:
Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has resulted in colossal human loss. According to the World Bank, this has already in 2023 amounted to 26 000 civilian casualties, the displacement of around 3.7 million people internally within Ukraine and around 5.9 million externally in Europe and beyond. The war has pushed 7.1 million people into poverty and reversed 15 years of economic development. This is reflected in the drastic increase in inequality, particularly among women, children, people with disabilities and elderly. This CEPS Explainer aims to review what is at stake, how Ukraine’s reconstruction has been addressed thus far, and what conditions and timelines are necessary for scaling up efforts. It looks at the immediate and long-term needs for Ukraine’s recovery and reconstruction, examines the existing framework for coordinating and implementing rebuilding efforts, describes potential funding sources and analyses the financial support already committed for Ukraine’s reconstruction. Finally, it reviews Ukraine’s ability to effectively absorb reconstruction funds and outlines the basic conditions required for scaling up reconstruction.
Topic:
Reconstruction, Recovery, Economic Development, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

333. The Impact of Ukraine’s Accession on the EU’s Economy

Author:
Tinatin Akhvlediani and Veronika Movchan
Publication Date:
03-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS)
Abstract:
The groundwork for Ukraine’s integration into the EU’s single market was laid by the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement (AA). A key component of the AA, the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA), paved the way for Ukraine’s gradual integration into the EU’s single market. Building on the DCFTA, Ukraine’s integration into the EU’s economy has significantly advanced since February 2022. In response to the invasion, the EU swiftly and temporarily but completely liberalised its market for Ukrainian goods through Autonomous Trade Measures (ATMs) and triggered the Temporary Protection Directive that has enabled over 4 million Ukrainian refugees to reside and work in the EU. With a continued swift trajectory, Ukraine’s integration is set to be much more comprehensive by the (yet unknown) time of accession. As this study outlines, the prospect of Ukraine’s accession to the EU brings some challenges but holds immense potential for mutual economic benefit. Free movement of goods. Full access under the ATM has not caused drastic changes in the EU’s imports or in the functioning of the single market in general. Yet, to avoid disruptions in the future, the accession treaty could include transition periods for full market access for Ukrainian goods in those EU Member States that may be vulnerable to a sharp increase in imports. Full trade liberalisation in services is expected to have more trade-easing effects, particularly for the EU, as it holds most of the reservations. Ukraine’s main EU partners in services trade are Germany and Poland, but services trade with Ukraine’s other major partners, including Estonia, has been steadily increasing since the implementation of the EU-Ukraine DCFTA. Thus, trade absorption capacity should be sustainable. Free movement of capital. Given the underdevelopment of Ukraine’s financial sector and capital markets, legislative and policy alignment should serve as a solid foundation for financial deepening in the country. Eased movement of capital will make it significantly easier to conduct business and trade and commercial and non-commercial payments between Ukraine and the EU. Free movement of workers. As long as Ukrainian workers fit the labour demands of the receiving EU countries, they could fill the gap in the labour supply and complement rather than replace local workers. An enlarged EU as a global supplier. Ukraine could strengthen the EU’s position in critical materials and key agricultural products, as well as contribute to the EU technologically with its emerging ICT sector and increasing skills and know-how in IT and computer services. Ukraine’s reconstruction and sustainable recovery is a significant challenge that requires substantial financial support. Yet, by addressing these considerations with foresight and diligence, Ukraine’s accession to the EU could not only elevate Ukraine’s standing but could also strengthen the EU’s position on the global stage.
Topic:
Reconstruction, European Union, Economy, Regional Integration, Trade, Recovery, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe and Ukraine

334. The Berlin Pulse 2024/2025 (full issue)

Author:
Hanno Pevkur, Stephanie Zonszein, Majed Al-Ansari, Halyna Yanchenko, and Boris Pistorius
Publication Date:
11-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Körber-Stiftung
Abstract:
Welcome to the eight’s edition of The Berlin Pulse! As every year, we compare international expectations of Germany with public opinion in Germany. But this year’s edition is special, as it comes off the press with one part of our representative survey conducted right after the polls have closed in the United States and the German coalition collapsed. Thanks to our editors Julia Ganter and Jonathan Lehrer, this issue underlines that Germany must decide what image it wants to project and what international expectations it wants to meet. Bangladeshi analyst Shafqat Munir and Russian opposition politician Andrei Pivovarov want Germany to live up to its moral aspirations and support the revival of democratic values in their countries. Israeli journalist Mairav Zonszein argues that precisely Germany’s reputation as a defender of democratic norms complicates its arms support to Israel, calling on Berlin to ensure its weapons are not used in human rights violations. Meanwhile, Ukrainian politican Halyna Yanchenko urges Germany to supply more arms to help end Russia’s illegal war of aggression. These expectations illustrate that Germany’s international standing as a partner in upholding international law, human rights and democracy is currently at stake. Berlin faces a complex balancing act, striving to avoid perceptions of selectively applying international law. Estonia’s Defence Minister Hanno Pevkur argues that half-hearted actions will not suffice – or as he puts it, ʻDo we want Ukraine to survive, or do we want it to win?ʼ The German population has a strong opinion on many of these issues. While 57 per cent of German respondents still want Berlin to support Ukraine militarily only 25 per cent want military support for Israel. Despite these dilemmas, it is encouraging that 46 per cent of German respondents want their country to be more engaged on international crises. It is the highest level since we started surveying this in 2017 and it shows that, after three years of war in Ukraine and a year of war in the Middle East, Germans want change and want to see Germany driving change. Thanks to our partner, the Pew Research Center, we know that Germans and Americans have trusted each other to make a change in international politics over the past four years. But our new figures, conducted after the US election, show that this partnership may be threatened: 79 per cent of Germans think President Donald Trump will damage transatlantic relations. But only 35 per cent of Germans think that Germany should step in to lead the West. It is time to decide, Germany. What kind of international player do we want to be, in which areas do we want to go all in? The following pages can help us make difficult decisions in difficult times.
Topic:
International Relations, Security, Foreign Policy, Human Rights, Taliban, Polls, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, Russia, Europe, Ukraine, India, Germany, and United States of America

335. Cold War Case Studies and Chinese Perspectives

Author:
Raven Witherspoon, Jenna Wichterman, and Shivam Shankar Singh
Publication Date:
03-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Carter Center
Abstract:
Rising Sino-American tensions have prompted widespread discussion of a “New Cold War,” and analysts increasingly worry that flashpoints in the bilateral relationship could trigger conventional war that could escalate to the nuclear domain. This research utilizes the Cold War analogy as a starting point for analyzing how nuclear war between the U.S. and China can be averted.
Topic:
Conflict Prevention, Cold War, Nuclear Weapons, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

336. Uncovering the Depths of UXO Contamination: A Town-Level Analysis of Three Areas in Syria

Author:
The Carter Center
Publication Date:
02-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Carter Center
Abstract:
Alongside armed combat and a dire socioeconomic downturn in Syria, civilians must continue to navigate the hidden threat of unexploded ordnance (UXO). The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs estimates that half of people in Syria are living in areas contaminated with explosive ordnance.
Topic:
Syrian War, Armed Conflict, Protection, War Remnants, and Unexploded Ordnance
Political Geography:
Middle East and Syria

337. Pathways to Prosperity for Adolescent Girls in Africa

Author:
Kehinde Ajayi and Estelle Koussoubé
Publication Date:
11-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for Global Development (CGD)
Abstract:
Africa stands at a crossroads, with its future prosperity hinging on the policy and investment decisions it makes today. The continent has an opportunity to shape the trajectories of generations to come by investing in the success of a pivotal population: its adolescent girls. With over 145 million adolescent girls calling Africa home, the potential for transformative change is immense. Yet challenges persist: from high rates of child marriage to limited educational opportunities. Over half of African girls ages 15 to 19 are out of school or married or have children. How can African countries overcome these challenges to ensure that adolescent girls enter adulthood empowered to thrive? Pathways to Prosperity for Adolescent Girls in Africa offers a groundbreaking roadmap for change. This landmark report outlines concrete, actionable policy recommendations; provides a comprehensive review of evidence-based interventions; presents a data-driven categorization of African countries to guide investments in adolescent girls; and introduces an innovative framework for understanding and measuring adolescent girls’ empowerment. Drawing on extensive research and consultations with adolescent girls, policymakers, and practitioners, the report reveals that investing in adolescent girls can yield a tenfold return in economic impact. It outlines six key areas for targeted action: building human capital, enhancing economic success, focusing on the most vulnerable girls, adopting a holistic approach, addressing data and evidence gaps, and mobilizing diverse stakeholders.
Topic:
Education, Women, Inclusion, Girls, Empowerment, and Gender Equality
Political Geography:
Africa

338. Beyond the Election: Overcoming Bangladesh’s Political Deadlock

Author:
International Crisis Group
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
Bangladesh is heading into general elections with the opposition sitting out the vote after staging major protests. With dissatisfaction growing among the public, the ruling party and its rivals should hold negotiations to curb the risk of further turmoil.
Topic:
Elections, Domestic Politics, Protests, and Civil Unrest
Political Geography:
Bangladesh and South Asia

339. The Taliban’s Neighbourhood: Regional Diplomacy with Afghanistan

Author:
International Crisis Group
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
Even as many diplomats shun the Taliban regime, protesting its treatment of women and girls, emissaries of countries near Afghanistan have sought dealings with Kabul in areas like security and commerce. It is a worthwhile endeavour, and the West should not stand in the way.
Topic:
Security, Diplomacy, Human Rights, Women, and Commerce
Political Geography:
Afghanistan and South Asia

340. Unrest on Repeat: Plotting a Route to Stability in Peru

Author:
International Crisis Group
Publication Date:
02-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
No country in Latin America suffers higher rates of dissatisfaction with democracy and government institutions than Peru. Absent remedies for political polarisation and state dysfunction, the mass protests that rocked the country in late 2022 could easily recur, bringing comparably violent crackdowns.
Topic:
Democracy, Political stability, Institutions, Polarization, and Civil Unrest
Political Geography:
South America and Peru

341. The Unsolved Crime in “Total Peace”: Dealing with Colombia’s Gaitanistas

Author:
International Crisis Group
Publication Date:
03-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
The Gaitanistas, Colombia’s largest and richest armed and criminal group, remain outside the government’s initiative for dialogue with all the country’s armed organisations. To avoid jeopardising other peace processes and to protect civilians, Bogotá should seek gradual talks with the Gaitanistas, while maintaining security pressure.
Topic:
Security, Non State Actors, Law Enforcement, Protection, and Gaitanistas
Political Geography:
Colombia and South America

342. Northern Kosovo: Asserting Sovereignty amid Divided Loyalties

Author:
International Crisis Group
Publication Date:
04-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
Tensions are rising in Kosovo’s restive Serb-majority north, as Pristina enforces its writ against the backdrop of continuing disputes with Belgrade. The parties and outside supporters should first work on defusing the short-term risk of violence and then look for ways to foster lasting stability.
Topic:
Sovereignty, Political stability, Domestic Politics, and Violence
Political Geography:
Europe, Eastern Europe, and Kosovo

343. Stopping Famine in Gaza

Author:
International Crisis Group
Publication Date:
04-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
The Israeli military campaign in the Gaza Strip has pushed many of its residents to the edge of death from starvation and disease. Only a prolonged ceasefire accompanied by a massive aid operation can improve the situation enough to avoid a horrific toll.
Topic:
Humanitarian Aid, Famine, Ceasefire, Disease, Starvation, and 2023 Gaza War
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and Gaza

344. Calming the Long War in the Philippine Countryside

Author:
International Crisis Group
Publication Date:
04-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
Manila’s counter-insurgency campaign has whittled the Philippine communist rebellion down to a fraction of its former strength. But it has fallen short of ending the conflict. A negotiated peace preceded by confidence-building measures is the best way forward.
Topic:
Communism, Insurgency, Counterinsurgency, Negotiation, Peacebuilding, and Confidence Building Measures
Political Geography:
Philippines and Asia-Pacific

345. The Generals’ Labyrinth: Crime and the Military in Mexico

Author:
International Crisis Group
Publication Date:
05-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
Mexico’s outgoing president has deployed more soldiers than ever to fight crime. But levels of violence remain high. His successor should set limits to the military’s role in public safety while working to sever state officials’ ties to criminals and allow better civilian law enforcement.
Topic:
Corruption, Law Enforcement, Organized Crime, Public Safety, and Military
Political Geography:
Latin America, North America, and Mexico

346. Ukraine: How to Hold the Line

Author:
International Crisis Group
Publication Date:
05-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
The gruelling war in Ukraine continues, with Russian forces creeping forward amid fierce fighting. To stop Russia’s immediate momentum and withstand its assault, Kyiv and its backers will need to move quickly to fix problems that have hindered the Ukrainian effort to date.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Armed Conflict, Military Aid, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

347. A Fraught Path Forward for Ukraine’s Liberated Territories

Author:
International Crisis Group
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
Even as Ukraine continues to resist Russia’s onslaught, it faces the challenge of reintegrating lands its army freed from Russian occupation in 2022. With aid from donors, there is much Kyiv can do to help make these areas peaceful and productive once more.
Topic:
Humanitarian Aid, Occupation, Donors, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

348. Bending the Guardrails: U.S. War Powers after 7 October

Author:
International Crisis Group
Publication Date:
07-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
Amid the Gaza war, the Biden administration has resorted to military force without asking Congress, further corroding the U.S. constitution’s checks and balances in this domain. Job one is a ceasefire but war powers reform is a vital task for the future.
Topic:
Reform, Constitution, Military, 2023 Gaza War, and War Powers
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, Palestine, Gaza, and United States of America

349. Man on a Wire: A Way Forward for Iran’s New President

Author:
International Crisis Group
Publication Date:
07-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
The Islamic Republic’s ninth president assumes office with an unenviable inheritance of domestic discontent, regional turmoil and poor relations with the West. He should work to bridge the state-society gap, while outside powers should test his administration’s willingness to shift from an escalatory posture.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Leadership, Domestic Politics, Presidency, and Masoud Pezeshkian
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East

350. Breaking Away: The Battle for Myanmar’s Rakhine State

Author:
International Crisis Group
Publication Date:
08-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
The Arakan Army, an ethnic Rakhine group, is carving out a proto-state on the Myanmar-Bangladesh border. Fighting with regime forces has taken a heavy toll on civilians, including Rohingya. The Arakan Army, communal leaders and outside powers all have roles to play in fostering stability.
Topic:
Ethnicity, Separatism, Armed Conflict, Arakan Army, and Proto-State
Political Geography:
Southeast Asia, Myanmar, and Rakhine