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151. Senegal’s Gas-to-Power Ambitions: Securing Scale and Sustainability

Author:
Papa Daouda Diene, Thomas Scurfield, Aaron Sayne, and Jessica Obeid
Publication Date:
07-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Natural Resource Governance Institute
Abstract:
Senegal will benefit from generating electricity from some of its gas, but authorities should carefully consider the scale of the country’s “gas-to-power” ambitions and how they relate to its renewable energy plans. This is a pivotal moment for achieving the government’s energy and sustainable development objectives. Recent plans to develop over 3 gigawatts (GW) of gas-to-power capacity by 2050 may face obstacles. Senegal may not be able to extract enough gas to feed the power plants; it may also struggle to raise sufficient funds (at least USD 2.2 billion) to build the necessary infrastructure. A more balanced energy mix, with a stronger emphasis on renewables alongside gas, offers Senegal a more secure pathway, but necessitates a cohesive long-term strategy and international support. Senegal’s participation in a Just Energy Transition Partnership (JETP) has led to increased medium-term renewable power generation goals—possibly to around 1 GW by 2030. To reach them, Senegal’s development partners must deliver the promised financial and technical support. If Senegal realizes only those plans that are published, gas will comprise 75 percent of installed capacity in the long term. The absence of a long-term plan for renewables could lock the country into this large role for gas, inhibiting the intended catalytic effect of the JETP and preventing the government from fully leveraging the country’s solar and wind potential. A more transparent and inclusive approach will help Senegal’s government to refine and implement its energy plans, helping to manage public expectations, foster public trust and increase credibility with investors.
Topic:
Gas, Fossil Fuels, Sustainability, and Energy Transition
Political Geography:
Africa and Senegal

152. Tax Avoidance, Tax Evasion and Trade Misinvoicing: Risks to Senegal’s Mining Sector

Author:
William Davis
Publication Date:
09-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Natural Resource Governance Institute
Abstract:
Tax evasion, trade misinvoicing and multinational companies’ efforts to avoid tax are important risks in the extractive sector, especially in developing countries, including Senegal. Senegal’s extractive governance arrangements are strong in many areas, including in preventing multinational tax avoidance. However, there is cause for concern in two areas: misinvoicing of international trade (imports and exports), and cost inflation by subcontractors in the extractive industries. Quantitative estimates of trade misinvoicing suggest the former is a significant problem for Senegal (including for its mining sector), which could lead to the loss of 1–3 percent of the country’s tax revenues. Authorities in Senegal should address such risks, especially before the country begins large-scale oil and gas production. Unless they do so, revenues from the country’s hydrocarbon resources will be at risk. Measures that Senegal can take include strengthening the tax authorities—especially customs and auditing accounts of extractive industry suppliers.
Topic:
Corruption, Government, Gas, Mining, Minerals, Tax Evasion, and Public Finance
Political Geography:
Africa and Senegal

153. Behind the Schemes: Anticorruption Gaps in Mining Sector Certifications

Author:
Susannah Fitzgerald, Robert Pitman, Matthieu Salomon, and Phesheya Nxumalo
Publication Date:
11-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Natural Resource Governance Institute
Abstract:
Decisionmakers are increasingly looking to certification schemes to provide information on the sustainability of mining operations, yet these schemes have significant room for improvement regarding how they address corruption in their standards. The report assesses the content of the performance standards used by the Aluminium Stewardship Initiative (ASI), the International Council on Mining and Metals (ICMM), the Initiative for Responsible Mining Assurance (IRMA), The Copper Mark, and Towards Sustainable Mining (TSM). Schemes address some topics, such as revenue and payments and anticorruption procedures, relatively well; this may reflect the extent to which legislation and regulations address these topics. Schemes’ standards less frequently covered other issues, such as beneficial ownership and allegations of corruption. Many schemes, and the mining companies that use them, are missing an opportunity to assess the implementation of corporate-level anticorruption policies in mine-site assessments. The quality of certification schemes’ governance and assurance processes is essential to their effectiveness, yet many fall short of best practice. This undermines their credibility. Key governance challenges include the unbalanced representation of different interests within schemes and the risk of conflicts of interest in the auditing process. Decisionmakers risk becoming overreliant on certification schemes as indicators of responsible business conduct, which may be facilitated in part by industry influence over policymaking processes. Certification schemes are not a replacement for ongoing, robust due diligence into the environmental, social, and governance impacts of mining operations, including corruption, and the design and enforcement of robust regulatory frameworks. In a shifting standards landscape where there are efforts to both consolidate and review existing certification schemes, and a moment where the risk of corruption is heightened by growing demand for transition minerals, governments, mining companies, and certification schemes themselves must do more to address the topic of corruption. To do so effectively, they should focus their attention on solutions that will have the most impact in addressing this issue.
Topic:
Corruption, Environment, Governance, Accountability, Mining, Transparency, and Minerals
Political Geography:
Global Focus

154. The Newest Allies: Finland and Sweden in NATO

Author:
Tony Lawrence, Tomas Jermalavicius, and Jan Hyllander
Publication Date:
03-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
Sweden’s flag was raised at NATO headquarters at midday on 11 March 2024, ceremonially marking one of the most surprising outcomes of Russia’s war in Ukraine. In the face of Russia’s aggression and the risks it presented to their own security, Finland, which joined NATO in April 2023, and Sweden had abandoned decades-long policies of neutrality and non-alignment to become the Alliance’s 31st and 32nd member states. Our report examines the consequences of these changes, largely from the perspective of the defence of the Baltic states. Although Finland had developed armed forces to cope independently with any military aggression, the brutality of Russia’s full-scale attack on Ukraine led to a rapid and substantial shift in public opinion in favour of NATO membership, which was quickly embraced by the leadership. Public opinion shifted rapidly in Sweden too, but the debate there was also heavily influenced by Finland’s inescapable move towards the Alliance, which essentially undercut the logic of Sweden’s continued non-alignment. The two countries submitted their applications to join NATO on the same day in May 2022. As Allies, Finland and Sweden will bring great benefits to the security of the Nordic-Baltic region. Politically, their accession will strengthen NATO, including by creating a large bloc of states in northern Europe whose memberships of security organisations are (mostly) aligned and who demonstrate broadly similar security thinking. At the operational level, their accession will plug a large hole in NATO territory, reducing the isolation and vulnerability of the Baltic states and allowing military commanders many more options for preparing for and dealing with a possible conflict with Russia. At the tactical level, they add modern, capable armed forces to NATO’s inventory. Nonetheless, their accession is not without challenges and risks. The most difficult practical challenge for both countries will likely be developing deployable ground forces to meet the requirements of NATO membership. However, perhaps the more difficult challenges related to accession will be mental and cultural. For Finland, these relate to adjusting an independent, highly self-reliant defence model, held in great regard by both the leadership and population, to meet the needs of collective defence; and to the requirement to bolster Allied cohesion by speaking more openly about threats to the Allies’ common security interests, in particular, Russia. For Sweden, neutrality has been fostered not only as a defining element of its self-identity as a distinctive international actor, but also as a necessary vehicle for the development of a unique democracy and welfare state. These ideas are deep-seated and Sweden’s mental transition to Allied status may be difficult and lengthy. Among the risks is that the addition of two strong Allies will encourage other Allies or their publics to believe that deterrence and defence in the Nordic-Baltic region is complete, needing no further attention. A second is that the low-key approach Finland and Sweden expect to take to their membership, at least in the years immediately following accession, may mean that the benefits of their joining will be only partly realised. It would be a missed opportunity, for example, if Sweden declined to take a leadership role in the Nordic-Baltic region. There is also a risk that Finland and Sweden’s commitment to a strong Nordic regional identity, while useful for promoting practical security and defence cooperation, may be disadvantageous to Baltic security if its pull were to result in the diminished engagement of the two countries in the Baltic region. The tension between the two countries northern and Baltic identities has already been apparent in a discussion concerning their place in NATO’s operational-level command structure. Finally, there is a risk that imprecise talk about ‘strategic depth’ that has sometimes been part of the discussion about the benefits that Finland and Sweden bring to NATO may suggest that other parts of Allied territory are somehow less important. This would be unhelpful to coherent deterrence by denial on the north-east flank. While Finland and Sweden’s accession to NATO greatly benefits the security and defence of the Baltic states, it is important that such risks and challenges are recognised, in order that they can be mitigated. We make several recommendations to Finland and Sweden as they continue their integration into the Alliance.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Alliance, and Enlargement
Political Geography:
Russia, Finland, Sweden, Nordic Nations, and Baltic States

155. An Edifying Tale of Keeping the Lights On: Societal Resilience in an Energy Crisis – the Case of Estonia

Author:
Tomas Jermalavicius, Dmitri Teperik, and Karolin Martinson
Publication Date:
05-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
In 2021–23, Europe experienced a major energy shock due to a number of significant factors in the energy market. As a result of Russia’s strategy to take advantage of Europe’s dependency on its energy supply and coerce the EU into acquiescence to Russia’s geopolitical demands, the most important course-changing trigger has been the Russian war against Ukraine. A raft of urgent policy measures passed at the EU and national levels, quick adaptation of the consumers to the price signals, the availability of LNG from the US, suppressed demand in China, and a mild winter meant that a full-scale disaster was averted. However, the previous crisis being less severe than anticipated does not mean the next one will be less challenging. Estonian society’s resilience to future energy crises may determine not only the country’s internal political dynamics but also its relations with key partners, its reputation in the EU, and even the country’s long-term geopolitical prospects. In order to understand how well-prepared Estonian society is for such future crises, this study identifies and analyses the key public narratives that emerged during the 2021–23 energy crisis and investigates how they reflected on Estonian society’s perceptions and actions. The narrative analysis is complemented by survey data, which indicates how the Estonian public viewed various aspects of the crisis and its resolution, as well as the extent to which public sentiment echoes or runs counter to the identified narratives. The study highlights several key shortcomings in Estonian society’s resilience capabilities. Firstly, the lack of constructive responsiveness to warnings about plausible severe risks (i.e., power cuts) and low scores on preparedness for future energy crises show that the Estonian society does not have a mindset of crisis preparedness. Secondly, society’s lack of confidence in the government’s ability to successfully navigate such crises has the potential to undermine the relationship of trust and cooperation in similar episodes in the future. Another breakdown in resilience in the response to the energy crisis was related to the failure to maintain a just and equal distribution of risk, vulnerability, and cost. As the narrative related to the profits of the energy companies—especially state-owned ones—shows, the sense of unfair distribution of costs and benefits was pervasive and highly antagonising. As the survey showed, a responsible and competent media, effective government, and an impartial expert community were the most trusted sources of information with respect to coping with the energy crisis. These actors will have to play an important role in rebuilding the confidence lost during the energy crisis, shaping the narratives that inspire steadfast action for forging a better future for energy and climate security, and improving Estonia’s resilience.
Topic:
Crisis Management, Resilience, and Energy Security
Political Geography:
Europe and Estonia

156. The Practice, Promise and Peril of EU Lawfare

Author:
Steven Blockmans
Publication Date:
05-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
Power generates law and its interpretation, irrespective of whether it serves the cause of international justice. Despite its many shortcomings, the rules-based international order (RBIO) tries to advance that cause. But as a concept, the RBIO is now being rejected by China, Russia and parts of the so-called “Global South” for what they claim is the Western hegemonism and liberal values that underpin it. The fact that these countries have voluntarily signed up to the international covenants that enshrine the legal doctrines to strengthen the sovereign rights of weaker countries, especially in the context of economic relations, makes it hard to sympathise with the argument that the RBIO should be replaced by another concept, especially one that is advanced by autocracies. The RBIO has been partially shaped by the European Union (EU), a community of law that encodes the aspiration of “good global governance” in its constitutional DNA. With the waning “Brussels effect”—the soft power of EU law in shaping international rules and standards, the EU should consider how to instrumentalise the law to protect and promote its foreign policy interests, first and foremost the protection and promotion of the RBIO. This report unpacks the notion of “lawfare” and conducts a comparative analysis of such practices by the US, China, Russia, Ukraine, Turkey and others to assess the promise and peril of the EU using the power of the law to its strategic advantage.
Topic:
International Law, Sanctions, European Union, International Order, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Turkey, Ukraine, and United States of America

157. China’s and Russia’s Aggressive Foreign Policies: Historical Legacy or Geopolitical Ambitions?

Author:
Ivan Ulises Klyszcz, Che-chuan Lee, and James Sherr
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
Beijing and Moscow are among the states across the world pursuing aggressive foreign policies, including towards their neighbours. Beyond mere threats, Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine demonstrated that deterrence could fail, with catastrophic consequences. How is Russia’s war against Ukraine perceived in Taiwan and in the wider Indo-Pacific region? What are the long-standing strategic goals of the Kremlin and the CCP, and what role do Ukraine and Taiwan play in them? International security must guard against new challenges such as hybrid warfare but also prevent the foremost international crime: wars of aggression. Aggressive foreign policies are not the same as wars of aggression, but they are closely linked, as they share a hostile outlook to the status quo. Deciphering the drivers of aggressive state behaviour—between historical legacies and geopolitical ambitions—will help us better prepare against new threats from rival states. China’s aggressive foreign policy seeks to alter the cross-Strait status quo and achieve “national reunification”. While these ambitions are persistent, they also reflect an evolving understanding of Taiwan’s circumstances. Indeed, Beijing has demonstrated both continuity and change in its approach to cross-strait relations, simultaneously upholding the ‘One China Principle’ and pursuing a hybrid warfare strategy to undermine Taipei’s authority. The recent juncture was the 2016 election of President Tsai Ing-wen from the Democratic and Progressive Party (DPP). From early on, Beijing accused the DPP of pursuing Taiwan’s formal independence from China, followed by a cold peace to a more aggressive policy from Beijing. Many of these techniques draw from Beijing’s decades of confrontation with Taipei, and cover a range of political positions, public relations efforts, and ‘grey zone’ tactics. Given the centrality of cross-strait relations for international security, understanding these shifts is critical for adapting to broader shifts in the Indo-Pacific region. Russia’s aggressive foreign policy draws from entrenched adversarial perspectives about the West, as well as recent political developments inside the Kremlin. Despite the Soviet collapse and the transition to Capitalism, Moscow’s security elites still conceive international security through the idea of the ‘correlation of forces’, a Soviet-era concept to describe international relations as a sum-total of society. This wide understanding goes beyond the idea of the ‘balance of power’ by incorporating other dimensions of international power, such as the economy, the state of societies and even psychological factors. Moreover, Moscow never abandoned a sense of entitlement towards the countries that fall within what the Kremlin calls its “near abroad” and has only evolved in how it pursues and articulates this entitlement. Russia’s enduring interests also point to Europe, Ukraine, and China, as well as the broader international order. Putting the aggressive foreign policy of China and Russia side-by-side will enrich the analytical outlook of those engaged in studying these two countries’ foreign policies and the broader regions they are in. These are large topics, and the two chapters of this report offer a concise though comprehensive look that will be of interest to policymakers, analysts, and anybody concerned with the security challenges of today.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, International Order, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Ukraine, Taiwan, and Indo-Pacific

158. Japan, NATO, and the Diversification of Security Partnerships

Author:
Elena Atanassova-Cornelis, Takuya Matsuda, Bart Gaens, and Nele Loorents
Publication Date:
09-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
The US-led military alliances remain an integral part of the defence and deterrence strategies of countries in the Indo-Pacific and Euro-Atlantic regions. Whereas the European security architecture is centred on a multilateral alliance, that is, NATO, the Asian security order is rooted in the hub-and-spokes system – the network of US-led bilateral alliances with key partners in Asia, such as Japan. Bringing in experts from Europe and Japan, this report examines the key shifts in the allies’ threat perceptions and strategic thinking on policy responses. It also explores the rise of informal security alignments designed to address both traditional and hybrid challenges and exemplified by the minilateral-type security cooperation pursued by Japan. Finally, the report zooms in on the growing interlinkages between security in the Indo-Pacific and Euro-Atlantic regions, as evidenced by the deepened security ties between like-minded partners. The report argues that the Russian invasion of Ukraine should be seen as a critical juncture for alliance politics. Military alliances are now increasingly being operationalised to enhance military readiness and effectively generate combat power in case of a contingency. The US-Japan alliance, the report finds, should be perceived as a manifestation of some of the broad and enduring changes in the role of alliance politics in international security, which are observable both in the Western Pacific and Europe. While the US-led alliance remains a key pillar of the security and defence policies of the ‘junior’ allies, notably Japan, the report highlights the allies’ uncertainties about the sustainability of the American security commitments, both in the Indo-Pacific and Euro-Atlantic region. Assessing Japan’s updated conceptualisation of security in the context of the Ukraine war and the rise of hybrid threats, the report detects a sense of urgency in Tokyo to develop a diverse set of capabilities and expand security partnerships. Australia, India, and the Republic of Korea remain a priority in terms of alignment cooperation. At the same time, the changing nature of security challenges is steadily raising the importance of cooperation with geographically distant partners, as seen in Tokyo’s evolving security partnership with the EU and NATO. Japan’s strategic partnership diplomacy exemplifies a broader trend of strategic diversification. Tokyo has been successful in utilising alignment policy to promote an interconnected network and accomplish issue-based, functional cooperation in various areas. From NATO’s perspective, addressing hybrid challenges requires collaboration with various actors, including geographically distant players. Minilateral and multilateral formats involving a small group of like-minded countries can provide NATO with the opportunity to work closely with Japan and other Indo-Pacific partners on specific issues, such as cyberattacks and disinformation campaigns.
Topic:
Security, NATO, European Union, Resilience, and Hybrid Threats
Political Geography:
Japan, China, Europe, South Korea, and United States of America

159. New Russian Immigration to the EU: The Case of the Baltic States, Finland, Germany & Poland

Author:
Igor Gretskiy
Publication Date:
10-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
The political atmosphere in Russia, as well as the September 2022 mobilisation call for military service, made thousands of Russians leave their home country. Although a vast majority of them have settled in post-Soviet countries, a noticeable portion has also taken up residence in EU countries. A recent couple of years have seen significant expert interest in new Russian immigration, so there is no shortage of publications on the phenomenon. However, many of these analyses suffer from substantial flaws. This report aims to provide a better understanding of new Russian immigration to the EU, as well as this group’s prevailing views on the most sensitive political issues. It concludes that the scale of emigration from Russia following the invasion of Ukraine is often overstated. It seems appropriate to distinguish between two waves of new Russian immigration to the EU. The spring wave was apparently more substantial in number and included a higher proportion of political and civil activists, academics, and IT professionals. In contrast, the autumn wave was less “politicised” as many of those leaving Russia were not necessarily opposed to Putin or his war but were primarily motivated by the fear of conscription and the prospect of being sent to the front line. After moving abroad, interest in Russia-related political activities among new Russian immigrants, even seasoned activists, tends to fade. Few remain engaged in political endeavours, instead focusing more on adapting to new realities. Their interactions with associations of Russian migrants from the previous “post-Crimean wave” are sporadic. When it comes to issues related to the politics of EU countries, new Russian immigrants often have a Russia-centric perspective on most of them. This is especially true regarding visa and travel sanctions against Russia. Immigrants remain almost impervious to the argument that for the governments of countries bordering Russia, the absolute priority is their national security and domestic public order, not the transformation of the Russian political regime at any cost. There were several quite sensitive topics that often provoked mixed feelings and even negative emotions among the respondents. The most challenging and almost taboo subject in Russian immigrant communities was donations to support the Ukrainian army. Along with Russian influencers and opposition politicians, most new Russian immigrants are reluctant to get involved in the Russia-Ukraine war, viewing it as not their concern. They largely attribute Russia’s invasion of Ukraine to the Russian government and state-owned media, seeing the Russian population merely as “victims of propaganda” and absolving “average Russians” of responsibility for the war. New Russian émigrés preserve regular contacts with relatives and friends in their homeland but tend to avoid discussing politically charged topics, particularly those related to Ukraine. It appears that they have virtually no impact on the perception of the Russia-Ukraine war and the political attitudes of those who stayed in Russia, and this divide between the two groups is likely to endure. Many admitted that by staying abroad, they are losing touch with developments in Russia. Moreover, most new Russian immigrants see no future for themselves or their children in Russia and are unlikely to return there. A few might consider a temporary return if a trusted leader came to power, but generally, they prefer to live in a free, democratic Russia without taking risks or acting as change agents. Hence, when developing a strategy regarding new Russian immigrants, it is essential to primarily consider the EU’s own security considerations rather than the imagined capabilities of these immigrants. It is crucial to avoid letting the wish for significant socio-political change in Russia cloud objective analysis. In the foreseeable future, Russia will continue to pose serious security threats to Europe, while, as of now, there is no serious indication that new Russian immigration could emerge as a politically influential force back home anytime soon.
Topic:
Security, Diaspora, Immigration, Sanctions, European Union, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, Finland, Poland, Lithuania, Germany, Estonia, Latvia, and Baltic States

160. Russia and China in Central Asia: Potential For Direct Competition

Author:
Maximilian Hess
Publication Date:
04-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:
China is now undisputedly the leading economic partner for the Central Asia region, with trade and investment continuing to increase despite Beijing’s economic slowdown. Russia is still the dominant political partner for the region, but its influence and ability to strong-arm Central Asian states has been significantly dented by the impact of Vladimir Putin’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Central Asian states are now able in tacitly criticize Putin’s actions without significant cost and some have taken advantage of the negative impacts of Russia’s international isolation and sanctions to strike beneficial deals, in particular Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. Moscow remains content in its position, knowing that the lack of democracy in the region and dominance of elite networks in business and politics mean that regional states are still willing to turn to Moscow for political support, as witnessed in the Kyrgyz Republic in particular since President Japarov came to power in 2020. Tensions between Beijing and Russia have failed to emerge, at least publicly, although if the current trends continue the potential for direct competition may increase.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Economics, Strategic Competition, and Regional Power
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Central Asia, and Asia

161. China, Russia, and Power Transition in Central Asia

Author:
Robert E. Hamilton
Publication Date:
05-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:
Since the days of Thucydides, scholars have written about—and policymakers have wrestled with—the dangers of power transition, which occurs when a rising power challenges the previously dominant power in a system. In the 5th Century BCE, this dynamic led to decades of war between alliance systems led by Sparta and Athens. Though Sparta eventually defeated Athens in the Peloponnesian War, the real winner was the Persian Empire, which snatched up territory from the exhausted states of the Hellenic system after the war ended. Much scholarship on the so-called Thucydides Trap focuses on the United States and China, asking if the powers two can negotiate the latter’s rise without conflict. But there is another, more acute power transition underway: that between Russia and China in Central Asia. In the last decade, and especially since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine began in February 2022, Russia’s power and legitimacy in Central Asia has declined in absolute terms. The erosion of Russian power relative to that of China, however, is more important than the decline in Moscow’s absolute power. Power transitions are notoriously hard to navigate and can strain even amicable relationships, turning erstwhile partners into competitors, or worse. The China-Russia partnership is a relatively recent phenomenon after centuries of mostly competitive relations. This means that Beijing and Moscow do not have a reservoir of goodwill built over decades to draw on as they navigate the erosion of Russian power in a region critically important to both. While this power transition is unlikely to lead to outright war between China and Russia over Central Asia, it is already leading to competition between the two, especially in the economic realm. Competition between Beijing and Moscow is made both more likely and more consequential by several unique features of the region. First, it is geographically contiguous to both. Next, both have high-order political, economic, and security interests at stake there. Finally, the US footprint in the region is light, removing a strong incentive for Chinese-Russian cooperation there. The United States is in many ways the binding agent between China and Russia: Where it is present, their shared resistance to Washington’s influence gives them a focal point for cooperation. Where the United States is absent—as it is in Central Asia, at least with respect to China and Russia—that focal point is removed. This report first analyzes Chinese and Russian influence and interests in Central Asia. It then examines how each pursues its political, military, and economic goals in the region. It concludes with an analysis of how and where their interests are most convergent and divergent and the implications for their overall relationship. If Beijing and Moscow can negotiate their power transition in Central Asia and maintain their overall partnership, this implies that the partnership is deep and durable. But it is Central Asia, more than anywhere else in the world, that will test Chinese-Russian ties.
Topic:
Bilateral Relations, Geopolitics, Strategic Competition, Strategic Interests, and Regional Power
Political Geography:
Russia, China, and Central Asia

162. Turning Point or Dead End? Challenging the Kremlin’s Narrative of Stability in Wartime

Author:
András Tóth-Czifra
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:
The Russian government expects 2024 to be a turning point in the country’s war against Ukraine. For this expectation to become reality, the Kremlin is using means of reflexive control: It projects an image of a country that has weathered Western sanctions, ramped up its economic performance, and united a society behind its leader and his goals. This strategy was confirmed by personnel changes executed after Vladimir Putin’s inauguration for a fifth presidential term. The Kremlin’s message masks the costly trade-offs that the Kremlin has created by choosing to pursue a long and costly war with an economic and political system that operates in increasingly tight corners. The past months have seen several destabilizing domestic events in Russia, highlighting the risks of the widespread securitization of public politics, diversion of resources from domestic policy targets to the war, and passiveness of Russian society’s support for the Kremlin’s current policies. The ongoing restructuring of Russia’s domestic economy and economic elite, structural weaknesses created by a military-production based economic growth model, threat of the eventual need for social or military mobilization, and the authorities’ relentless tightening of the limits of public politics and acceptable public behavior represent growing risks for a governance whose sole organizing principle is the ongoing war.
Topic:
Sanctions, Economy, Elites, Russia-Ukraine War, and Regime Durability
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Eurasia, and Ukraine

163. Russian Strategic Culture and the War in Ukraine

Author:
Denys Yurchenko
Publication Date:
07-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:
The Russian invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, shocked the world. Currently, the Russian-Ukrainian war is the biggest European war since the end of World War II.[1] The full-scale invasion was a continuation of unlawful actions in 2014 when Russia seized and temporarily occupied Crimea. Russia’s actions sparked heated debates between realists and liberals while every school of international relations tried to explain why Russia used force to change the internationally recognized borders of its neighbor—Ukraine. In September 2014, Professor John Mearsheimer published the article Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West’s Fault.[2] His work tried to explain the causes of conflict from an offensive realism point of view. Mearsheimer defined the core idea of offensive realism in The Tragedy of Great Power Politics.[3] It is as follows: States—especially great powers—are always thinking about how to survive because there is no supranational institution to protect them. In other words, there is nothing to prevent predatory behavior at the international level. This anarchic system creates conditions for states to seek more power.[4] The best way for a state to survive is to become a hegemon. Although global hegemony is the goal, there are powerful forces mitigating any state from achieving it, so most great powers strive for regional hegemony. Through this lens, Russia’s seizure of Crimea and support for separatists in Eastern Ukraine was part of its attempt at regional hegemony.
Topic:
Armed Conflict, Strategic Culture, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Eurasia, and Ukraine

164. How Sudan's Wars of Succession Shape the Current Conflict

Author:
Alden Young
Publication Date:
07-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:
Since fighting broke out between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the government-sponsored paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in April of 2023, according to the International Rescue Committee at least 25 million people out of a total population of roughly 48.7 million are in need of basic humanitarian aid. The crisis is escalating with fighting spreading to new parts of the country. Perhaps 37 percent of the country is confronting acute food insecurity.[1] Other statistics are also dire. Nine million people have been displaced within Sudan, while 1.7 million have been forced to flee to other countries. Most of the receiving countries such as Chad, Egypt, Ethiopia, and South Sudan are already vulnerable. Initially the conflict was most intense in the capital of Khartoum and in the western provinces of Darfur and Kordofan, but in the last few months it has also spread to regions like Gezira state, the traditional breadbasket of the country.[2] The International Rescue Committee reports that, “Sudan is now the country with the largest number of displaced people and the largest child displacement crisis in the world.”[3] Many migrants who are able to head to the eastern regions of Sudan hope to eventually transit to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates and from there potentially to other destinations.[4] Ever since the outbreak of the conflict the international community has rallied to negotiate an end to the fighting. The United States and Saudi Arabia have teamed up to negotiate at least sixteen failed ceasefires, while the African Union, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, and Egypt have all tried to develop alternative ceasefire and negotiating forums. In January, Mariel Ferragamo and Diana Roy assessed that “negotiation efforts were at a standstill.” [5] Despite the magnitude of the crisis in Sudan a year after fighting broke out, the response from the international community has been paltry. The United Nations has asked for $2.7 billion dollars in order to address the dire humanitarian situation in the country. However, the conflict in Sudan, which is already a regional crisis involving neighbors such as Chad, the Central African Republic, South Sudan, Egypt, Libya, and Ethiopia, has largely been overshadowed by the conflicts in Ukraine and Gaza. To date, the United Nations says that it has received only $424.9 million dollars to address the situation in Sudan.[6] Some of the worst violence during the conflict has taken place in the state of West Darfur. In what many Darfurians experience as reminders of the violence that broke out nearly two decades ago. There have been many credible reports of sexual violence, mass expulsions, and ethnic cleansing. Notably, members of the Masalit ethnic group have been repeatedly targeted as supporters of the SAF by the RSF and their allied militias.[7] The war in Darfur is in many ways a microcosm of the wider conflict, but it also points to the conflict’s direct origins in the long insurgency and counterinsurgency in Darfur.
Topic:
History, Armed Conflict, and Rapid Support Forces (RSF)
Political Geography:
Africa and Sudan

165. Russia’s Space Program After 2024

Author:
Pavel Luzin
Publication Date:
07-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:
Since 2022, Russia’s space program has been in a state of turbulence and uncertainty. However, the deterioration started in 2014 when Russia annexed Crimea and began the first round of the war against Ukraine. Multiple factors have made the sustainable development of the Russian space program impossible: sanctions, an embargo on advanced industrial equipment, workforce shortages, limited financial resources spread among too many projects, cancellation of space cooperation with Western partners except operations on the International Space Station (ISS), and the economic inefficiency of the Russian space industry. The Russian government and Roscosmos are struggling to increase space expenditures, but monetary inflation, cost-plus inflation within the space industry, and devaluation of the ruble do not allow them to reverse the negative trends. Despite these factors, Russia will keep manned spaceflights and the military space program at any cost. Consequently, Russia has two main priorities by the 2030s. First, it must maintain the presence of Russian astronauts in outer space even after the ISS era and without any significant scientific outcomes. Second, it must switch satellite manufacturing from space-grade electronics to relatively simple and cheap consumer-grade electronics. This preference for quantity over quality of satellites would allow Russia to boost its manufacturing of short-lived satellites, which will be replaced quickly and provide the armed forces with communication and intelligence capabilities. In the area of satellite navigation, Russia will struggle to maintain the current architecture of GRusslobal’naya Navigatsionnaya Sputnikovaya Sistema, or Global Navigation Satellite System (GLONASS), and the development of new architecture with less satellites is also questionable. The optimistic scenario is that Russia’s satellite navigation system with new architecture will cover only the Russian and neighboring territories. However, the Russian armed forces use the consumer-grade GPS and BeiDou trackers, so the deteriorating GLONASS is not a crucial problem for them.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Space, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia and Eurasia

166. Advise, Assist, Enable: A Critical Analysis of the US Army's Security Force Assistance Mission During the War on Terror

Author:
John A. Nagl and Marshall Cooperman
Publication Date:
11-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:
The U.S. Army struggled to build capable host-nation security forces in Iraq and Afghanistan because it did not give those security force assistance (SFA) missions the priority and support they deserved. Both the selection and training of U.S. advisors were highly flawed. The Army also struggled to ensure the selection of high-quality personnel into the host-nation forces. Much of the SFA effort was conducted in an ad hoc manner, without sufficient funding or strategic prioritization. Today, the Army has corrected many of the issues that plagued its SFA formations during the War on Terror by creating a permanent Security Force Assistance Command and six Security Force Assistance Brigades. It is essential for the Army to maintain and support these formations to ensure that the bitter lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan are not forgotten.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Armed Forces, and Counter-terrorism
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, Iraq, North America, and United States of America

167. Countering a "Great Jihad" in Central Asia

Author:
Bruce Pannier
Publication Date:
11-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:
Concerns about Islamic extremism are rising in Central Asia. None of the governments in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, or Uzbekistan are commenting publicly about any specific threats. Still, there is a lot of activity aimed at controlling how Islam is practiced and what people say about the religion on social networks in these majority-Muslim countries. Law enforcement agencies are carrying out security operations aimed at rooting out suspected Islamic extremists in their countries, almost certainly spurred by citizens of the Central Asian states’ involvement in terrorist plots and acts outside the region. All this has happened before in Central Asia, but previous extremism or terrorism problems affected only an individual Central Asian country. Now, all five Central Asian governments are taking actions, showing that these fresh concerns are spread across the region. Though these worries are not directly connected to the Taliban, the recent commotion in Central Asia started after the Taliban returned to power in Afghanistan in mid-August 2021.
Topic:
Islam, Counter-terrorism, and Countering Violent Extremism
Political Geography:
Central Asia

168. A "Frozen Conflict" Boils Over: Nagorno-Karabakh in 2023 and Future Implications

Author:
Walter Landgraf and Nareg Seferian
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:
This report has two objectives: first, to present an account of the conflict with an emphasis on analytically useful categories and context up to the present, and second, to discuss local, regional, and global consequences of the latest developments of the dispute, including policy implications and recommendations.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Sovereignty, Territorial Disputes, and Armed Conflict
Political Geography:
Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Nagorno-Karabakh

169. Russia’s Black Sea Fleet in the “Special Military Operation” in Ukraine

Author:
Igor Delanoë
Publication Date:
02-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:
Russia’s Black Sea Fleet’s supremacy on the Black Sea naval theater was contested in the early stage of the conflict. Ukraine’s anti-surface and drone capacities have challenged the Black Sea Fleet’s supremacy at sea, creating a form of sea denial. The Black Sea Fleet adapted its posture to a conflict of attrition. The scope of the missions fulfilled by the Black Sea Fleet has increased over time to include more protection and detection tasks, while active defense remains the general posture at sea. The post-conflict Black Sea Fleet should be more littoralized than before the “special operation.” Lessons already learned from conflict, constraints created by the sanctions, and financial priorities should accelerate the littoralization and the kalibrization of the Black Sea Fleet.
Topic:
Armed Forces, Navy, Russia-Ukraine War, and Black Sea Fleet
Political Geography:
Russia and Black Sea

170. The Realignment of the Middle East

Author:
Lior Sternfeld
Publication Date:
03-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:
In the Middle East, reality can change in the blink of an eye. Misconceptions and misrepresentations that dominate the public discourse have it that the region has been embroiled in war since time immemorial. Still, even its most recognizable conflict—the Israel-Palestine dispute—has been going on for only a century. This report will not focus on the history of that conflict but instead will try to analyze the realignment of the key players in the region and beyond and point out several pathways to build on in securing peace. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has been the sole global superpower. The change in world politics and the demise of the Soviet Union did not end the perception of alliances as zero-sum games. The War on Terror, the debacle of Iraq and Afghanistan, the rise of movements such as al-Qaeda and the Islamic State, the Arab Spring, and the collapse of old state structures, somehow fortified this approach over a more nuanced and pragmatic approach. Since the early 1990s, China entered as a secondary force and slowly gained a different status. This report examines the changes the Chinese doctrine might bring to the geopolitics in the region. Furthermore, it will examine the role China has played in the reshaping of the Middle East as a multipolar region, the transformation in the American role, and identify areas where the United States can take advantage of the new multipolarity in the region in light of Chinese activity.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, History, and Realignment
Political Geography:
China, Middle East, and United States of America

171. Russian Women in the Face of War Against Ukraine

Author:
Egle Murauskaite
Publication Date:
03-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:
Consider the following pieces of a puzzle. Russia’s war against Ukraine has revealed stories about the heroic resistance efforts of Ukrainian women[1]: from a grandmother launching a pickle jar against a drone[2] to volunteers with territorial defense units.[3] However, comparable stories have been entirely lacking on Russia’s side: How come? Here is another piece: the stories of rape and abuse in Russian-occupied Ukrainian territories have shaken the world, with male Russian soldiers featured as systematic perpetrators of war crimes.[4] Were there any female soldiers or pro-Russian civilians involved? The historical background of multiple conflicts across continents does suggest an active women’s role as perpetrators of war crimes (including rape) and terrorism, not only victims.[5] Perhaps it is only a matter of time until stories of Russian women involved in these crimes start to emerge. How do these pieces fit together? I delve into these narratives in an information environment that is still extremely limited (particularly in terms of Russian-language sources)
Topic:
Women, Armed Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

172. Paralysis versus Obedience: China’s Local Policymakers’ Strategic Adaptation To Political centralization

Author:
Jessica C. Teets
Publication Date:
03-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:
Under the concept of “top-level design,” President Xi Jinping has repurposed institutions to eliminate problems caused by local discretion such as corruption and policy implementation gaps. Increasing centralization of policy and strict penalties for lack of compliance is resulting in local officials no longer experimenting with policy to solve local governance problems and instead focusing more on documenting procedures. These strategic adaptations lead to erratic policy swings between paralysis and overcompliance at the local level, and an increasingly rigid and unresponsive policy process. Although these institutional changes are resulting in less corruption and more standardized governance (rule by law), they also reduce the local feedback and policy autonomy that constructed a more durable system than normally seen in authoritarian regimes (so-called “resilient authoritarianism”).
Topic:
Corruption, Xi Jinping, Centralization, and Strategic Adaptation
Political Geography:
China and Asia

173. Russia and China in Central Asia

Author:
Bruce Pannier
Publication Date:
04-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:
The two countries that have the greatest influence in Central Asia are Russia and China. Moscow and Beijing have common interests in Central Asia, foremost are security interests connected to sharing long borders with a mainly Muslim region that itself borders Afghanistan. However, both these giant neighbors view Central Asia differently. Russia and China each have their own purposes in Central Asia, some of which do not affect the other, but some that at the least make the other country uncomfortable. Since Russia launched its full-scale war in Ukraine, these Sino-Russian rifts are becoming more pronounced. Russia and China want the current status quo in Central Asia, and that is the reason both countries have been concerned by the three revolutions in Kyrgyzstan since 2005. Moscow and Beijing know the top people in the Central Asian governments and have established security and business ties in all five countries. Neither China nor Russia want their relationships with individual Central Asian states to change, and neither wants to see the arrival of strong outside competitors for influence in Central Asia as was the case when the United States and its allies suddenly increased their presence in Central Asia for the campaign in Afghanistan in the years after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Strategic Interests, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Central Asia, Eurasia, and Asia

174. Kyrgyzstan: Central Asia's Island of Democracy Sinks into Authoritarianism

Author:
Bruce Pannier
Publication Date:
04-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:
In the early 1990s, Kyrgyzstan was often referred to as an “island of democracy” in Central Asia. The “island’s” shores have receded over the years, but relative to its neighbors, Kyrgyzstan remained the most democratic country. Three distinguishing features of Kyrgyzstan include an active political opposition, a vibrant civil society, and independent media outlets. The current government is eliminating all three of those distinctions. Political opposition leaders have been jailed, civil society has been intimidated and prevented from holding public meetings, and independent media have been taken to court and their websites blocked. Worse might be coming soon. Domestic and international criticisms and appeals that swayed previous Kyrgyz governments are having no effect in persuading those currently in power to turn away from their present course. Kyrgyzstan is set to join the club of authoritarian governments in the region. The country is almost there already.
Topic:
Authoritarianism, Domestic Politics, and Democratic Backsliding
Political Geography:
Central Asia and Kyrgyzstan

175. Critical Minerals and Great Power Competition: An Overview

Author:
Jiayi Zhou and André Månberger
Publication Date:
10-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)
Abstract:
With global politics increasingly fractured, states are rushing to secure critical and strategic mineral supply chains. Each state conceptualizes mineral security differently, driven by a mix of imperatives that range from national development and industrial policy to technological and military dominance. Great power competition pervades all of these issue areas, and that competition may also pose risks at the global level: risks for the pace of green transition, risks of geoeconomic escalation and risks of conflict. This report provides an insightful overview of the mineral security policies of four key powers: China, the European Union, Russia and the United States. It describes the distinct ways in which they conceptualize mineral security, comparing their priority lists of critical and strategic minerals. It considers the wider imperatives that motivate their policies and assesses the implications for developing countries. The report concludes by reflecting on the need to mitigate the worst of the resultant risks through expanded dialogue with a wider set of stakeholders. The goal is a form of mineral security that can serve more broad-based, global developmental interests.
Topic:
European Union, Strategic Competition, Green Transition, Critical Minerals, and Great Powers
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, and United States of America

176. Cyber Risk Reduction in China, Russia, the United States and the European Union

Author:
Lora Saalman, Fei Su, and Larisa Saveleva Dovgal
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)
Abstract:
This report provides an overview of cyber risk reduction terminology and regulatory measures within China, Russia, the United States and the European Union. It finds, among other things, that China and Russia excel at clear visuals and steps, yet they also tend to lack linguistic clarity. China, the USA and the EU possess interagency and public–private sector coordination, while facing jurisdictional overlap. All four actors are securing their supply chains, yet China and Russia face challenges with burdensome penalties for non-compliance, and the USA and the EU confront obstacles to enforcement at the state and member-state levels. This report is intended to provide a baseline for engagement among China, Russia, the USA and the EU on their respective approaches to cyber risk reduction.
Topic:
European Union, Cybersecurity, Public-Private Partnership, and Risk Assessment
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, and United States of America

177. Navigating Security Dilemmas in Indo-Pacific Waters: Undersea Capabilities and Armament Dynamics

Author:
Tytti Erästö, Fei Su, and Wilfred Wan
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)
Abstract:
This paper examines the drivers and implications of naval build-ups in the Indo-Pacific, considering key actors’ security objectives and threat perceptions, as well as the interplay of regional dynamics and strategic relations between nuclear-armed states. The focus is on undersea armament involving submarines and anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capabilities, which constitute a significant focus of military investments. The paper considers the related horizontal and vertical escalation risks, meaning a potential increase in the scope and scale of conflict. Particular attention is paid to nuclear-conventional entanglement related to the counterforce potential of ASW capabilities. In addition to seeking to raise awareness of these dynamics, the paper provides recommendations aimed at mitigating the risks related to the increased undersea activities in the Indo-Pacific.
Topic:
National Security, Strategic Stability, Submarines, and Threat Perception
Political Geography:
Indo-Pacific

178. Getting Ukraine to a Position of Strength: A Strategy for the Trump Administration

Author:
Luke Coffey
Publication Date:
11-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Below are five reasons why Ukraine is important to US interests. 1. Protecting the US economy. North America and Europe account for nearly half of the world’s GDP. Two-thirds of foreign investment into the US comes from Europe, and 48 states export more to Europe than to China. This supports millions of American jobs. European stability, which Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine undermines, benefits the US economy and, by extension, the American worker. Aiding Ukraine helps preserve that stability. 2. Detering Chinese aggression. Russia is China’s junior partner. A weakened or defeated Russia means a weaker China. Beijing is watching how the West supports Ukraine. A strong and victorious Ukraine makes Taiwan appear stronger and deters Chinese aggression. 3. Succeeding in great power competition. Russia’s war against Ukraine is central to America’s great power competition against the Russia–China–Iran–North Korea axis. North Korea has provided 10,000 soldiers, millions of artillery shells, and hundreds of missiles to Russia in exchange for military technology. Meanwhile, Iran provides Russia with drones and ballistic missiles in exchange for fighter jets and other advanced capabilities. China’s technical, economic, and diplomatic support for Russia enables all this as part of Beijing’s strategy to undermine the US. 4. Preparing the US military enterprise for twenty-first-century warfare. Support for Ukraine has exposed major shortcomings in the US defense industrial base that can now be fixed. The war has also tested American-made military hardware in a way not possible in peacetime—with no American casualties. The US is learning what works, what does not work, and how systems evolve in combat. And as Ukraine receives US weapons, America replaces its own weapons stocks with newer, more effective systems. 5. Demonstrating strength. A successful Ukraine demonstrates American strength. However, acquiescing to Putin and abandoning partners shows the world American weakness. Even forcing Ukraine into a deal that lopsidedly benefits Russia would embolden US adversaries and cause America’s allies to hedge toward other security arrangements.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Economy, Deterrence, Donald Trump, Strategic Competition, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America

179. Key Takeaways: The Future of US and Allied Hypersonic Missile Programs

Author:
Rebeccah L. Heinrichs
Publication Date:
10-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Hudson Institute and Space Foundation cohosted a workshop with Congressmen Doug Lamborn (R-CO), Vince Fong (R-CA), and Donald Norcross (D-NJ), Admiral James A. Winnefeld Jr., and former Office of the Secretary of Defense officials Mike White and John Plumb to discuss the future of the United States military’s hypersonic missile and missile defeat programs.
Topic:
Defense Policy, National Security, Missile Defense, and Hypersonic Weapons
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

180. US-India Economic Ties: To the Next Level and Beyond

Author:
Aparna Pande
Publication Date:
10-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
This executive summary outlines the key recommendations for policymakers that emerged from deliberations at the Takshashila Institution–Hudson Institute roundtable series “US-India Economic Ties: To the Next Level and Beyond.” Its recommendations are divided into four proposed areas for collaboration between India and the United States: trade and investment, ideas and human capital, technology, and methods and mechanisms.
Topic:
Economics, Science and Technology, Bilateral Relations, Investment, and Trade
Political Geography:
South Asia, India, North America, and United States of America

181. Understanding and Countering China’s Global South Strategy in the Indo-Pacific

Author:
John Lee
Publication Date:
09-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
While the United States and advanced economies and democracies in Europe and Asia are hardening their views of and position against China, the latter is gaining much ground with respect to the developing economies of the Global South. Indeed, China increasingly demands that developing nations base their discourse and policies on approaches that Beijing supports, and many Global South nations are increasingly complying. In other words, a growing number of these nations have started to alter and adopt discourse and policies that better align with Chinese demands and preferences. In the Indo-Pacific, a region that will largely determine the future shape of the global strategic landscape, evidence shows that developing nations are absorbing Chinese norms and preferences and gradually adjusting their thinking and behaviors accordingly. China’s progress vis-à-vis the Global South—especially in the Indo-Pacific—relies on what material inducements and opportunities Beijing can offer. These are most successful when they prioritize rapid development and regime security over liberal economic rules and individual rights. Meanwhile, regardless of where the fault lies, many developing nations do not believe they have benefited as much materially or institutionally from the US-led order as they would like or expect. Members of the Global South often believe the Chinese narrative about the alleged failure of US-led globalization in the post-colonial and post–Cold War periods. For this reason, many in developing economies believe that the interests and values of these nations (or at least those of the regimes in power) better align with what China is promising than with what Washington is delivering. The US and allies such as Japan and Australia have to accept and respond to this reality. This report analyzes and assesses why and how China is making worrying progress when it comes to shaping and influencing the policies and actions of developing economies in the Indo-Pacific. It explains why this is a significant problem for the US and its allies. It then offers some recommendations to counter the Chinese Global South strategy in the region. In offering six recommendations, this report argues that the US can complicate China’s bid for leadership within the Global South, increase the cost and risk for Beijing, challenge and change narratives and discourse favoring China in the Global South, and compete more effectively in the normative and institutional context.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Economics, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
China, Global South, and Indo-Pacific

182. The US Should Support the National Resistance Front of Afghanistan

Author:
Luke Coffey
Publication Date:
08-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
More than three years ago, the Taliban swept back into power in Afghanistan after a two-decade insurgency against the internationally backed Afghan government. Since then, the situation in Afghanistan has deteriorated considerably. The country faces an acute humanitarian crisis affecting millions and has once again become a haven for transnational terrorism. This tragic outcome was not inevitable, and it is worth reviewing recent history. Starting in 2014, United States troops in Afghanistan were no longer leading daily combat operations but were instead primarily training the Afghan military. When President Donald Trump entered office in January 2017, there were only 11,000 US troops in Afghanistan conducting the counterterrorism and training mission. This was down from a peak of 100,000 troops in 2010–11. In February 2020, Trump agreed to a deal with the Taliban that would have seen the phased withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan by May 2021. This agreement was the starting point of the Afghan government’s collapse and the Taliban’s return to power in August 2021. In January 2021, when President Joe Biden entered office, there were only 2,500 US troops in Afghanistan. Crucially, the US still provided close air support for Afghan forces. While this was not enough troops to ensure that the Afghan government could control the whole country, it was enough for the US to meet its counterterrorism objectives and prevent the Taliban from taking power. Instead of canceling the flawed withdrawal agreement with the Taliban—something that was in Biden’s power to do—the president merely delayed the date from May to September. On July 2 the US departed the strategically located and geopolitically important Bagram Airfield in the middle of the night without warning its Afghan partners. Around the same time, the US stopped providing Afghan troops with close air support. By the end of July, almost all US and international forces had left the country. On August 6, 2021, the Taliban captured Zaranj, the capital of Nimroz Province. This was the first time in almost 20 years that the terror group had successfully captured and held one of Afghanistan’s 34 provincial capitals. Soon after, government-controlled capitals started falling like dominos. The Taliban finally captured Kabul on August 15. By September 11—the twentieth anniversary of the 9/11 attacks—the Taliban controlled more of Afghanistan than it did on that day in 2001. Since the Taliban’s return to power, only one credible and non-extremist group has been willing to take up arms in opposition: the National Resistance Front (NRF) of Afghanistan, led by Ahmad Massoud. Based in the Panjshir Province and operating in more than a dozen other provinces, the NRF has continued to fight against the Taliban against all odds and without any international support. Though there is no longer an American presence in Afghanistan, the country remains geopolitically important. Afghanistan’s location in the heart of the Eurasian landmass has made it strategically significant in great power competition throughout the nineteenth, twentieth, and twenty-first centuries. There is no reason to assume this will change anytime soon. The Biden administration’s actions have left the US without many good policy options in Afghanistan. Furthermore, many Afghans remain distrustful of the White House. But a new US administration will have an opportunity to reset American policy toward the country.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Human Rights, Terrorism, Taliban, Democracy, and National Resistance Front
Political Geography:
Afghanistan and South Asia

183. The Rise of the Free and Open Indo-Pacific and the Challenge of Deterrence

Author:
Kenneth R. Weinstein and William Chou
Publication Date:
08-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
The late Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe first introduced the concept of a free and open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) in July 2016. Over the past eight years, FOIP has redefined the geopolitics of Asia, becoming central to the strategic visions of Japan, the United States, Australia, India, South Korea, key European nations, and the European Union. Every nation that has adopted FOIP has developed its own version of the concept. But FOIP still repositions the strategic geography of Asia, broadening the region from the Asia-Pacific, which placed a dominant China at the center, to the Pacific and Indian Oceans. This shift highlights the critical role of the four large democracies that comprise the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad)—Japan, India, the US, and Australia—a partnership the states revived with the ascent of FOIP. FOIP, moreover, offers a conceptual counter to the strategy of China’s One Belt, One Road (also known as the Belt and Road Initiative, or BRI) by engaging Australia and Europe on the importance of economic development assistance for, and investment in, Southeast Asia. The Trump administration’s rapid adoption of FOIP—the first time an ally’s strategic concept became central to US grand strategy—deepened America and Japan’s strategic alignment, which encouraged Tokyo to become more engaged in security and encouraged the US to become more engaged in economic development. The concept has made immense contributions to Indo-Pacific connectivity, prosperity, peace, and security. It has also been central to the Biden administration’s efforts to move away from the traditional hub-and-spoke alliance in which US partners worked directly with Washington as the hub but not with not each other, toward a lattice architecture in which like-minded allies (such as Australia, Japan, South Korea and the Philippines) are linked to each other in a mutually reinforcing effort to meet the region’s security challenges. However, a Hudson Institute tabletop exercise conducted for this study showed the limitations of FOIP as a strategic doctrine. Specifically, it cannot induce either friendly or less-friendly ASEAN countries to openly aid Taiwan if the People’s Republic of China seeks either to invade or impose a blockade. FOIP, nonetheless, remains central to promoting prosperity and connectivity in the Indo-Pacific. In the aftermath of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Prime Minister Fumio Kishida of Japan refashioned FOIP and focused on promoting agreement around minimal international norms that Russia violated. To enhance regional trust, Kishida highlighted an “Indo-Pacific way,” which would enhance regional resilience by mitigating natural disasters through cooperation under Japanese leadership and enhancing maritime security. Herein lies the security paradox behind FOIP: The concept can extend the network of partners and allies dedicated to Indo-Pacific security. This, in turn, may reduce the burden America bears by shifting it to other nations. But for the time being, FOIP rests upon the foundation of US deterrence.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Alliance, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Japan, India, Australia, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

184. How the US Can Beat the Kremlin in Moldova

Author:
Peter Rough and Luke Coffey
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Russia’s large-scale invasion of Ukraine was a seismic event for the Republic of Moldova. The war upended Chișinău’s long-held belief that constitutional neutrality would protect the country. Additionally, the invasion focused Brussels’s attention on Moldova, which the European Union has often regarded as an afterthought. Moscow’s war catalyzed Moldova’s politics and forced Chișinău and Brussels to make fundamental choices about their future relationship on an accelerated timetable. If Russia hadn’t launched its full-scale invasion, the EU would have probably not invited Moldova to open accession talks so quickly. Important elections in Moldova and a perilous situation in Ukraine ensure that 2024 will be a pivotal year on Chișinău’s path toward Western integration. United States and European policymakers should proactively shape an outcome that benefits both Moldovans and the Euro-Atlantic community.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, International Organization, Democracy, and Alliance
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Eurasia, Ukraine, and Moldova

185. Deterring China: Imposing Nonmilitary Costs to Preserve Peace in the Taiwan Strait

Author:
John Lee and Lavina Lee
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
The United States, Australia, and other allies have spent decades downplaying the prospect of conflict with the People’s Republic of China (PRC), offering Beijing incentives and concessions to assuage its ambitions, and managing their differences with China by seeking to deescalate tensions when they arose. In more recent times, when there is an emerging consensus that the decades-long approach to China has failed, policymakers have elevated deterrence as the urgent priority. This report makes the following key points. First, the case for urgency in the context of deterring Chinese force against Taiwan is clear.
Topic:
Conflict Prevention, Foreign Policy, Sanctions, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, Australia, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

186. Effective US Energy Policy Could Strengthen International Security

Author:
Brigham McCown
Publication Date:
03-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
America faces significant geopolitical risk across multiple theaters of operation. With the post–Cold War peace dividend depleted, today’s multipolar political alignment reflects an instability not seen in nearly 100 years. Russia, Iran, and China are directly challenging the American-led world order. Their goal is clear, and the United States cannot allow them to prevail. While Russia’s disregard for the rule of law and internationally established boundaries preoccupies the near term, an emerging great power competition between the West and China looms over Washington’s mid- to long-term foreign policy priorities. Additionally, Iran’s malign influence has led to a resurgence of violence and instability in the Middle East. Closer to home, socialist and anti-democratic governments in the Western Hemisphere are again wooing voters with the failed and discredited policies of yesteryear. As a new geopolitical status quo emerges, the United States will need a secure source of energy. Energy security can be defined as a country’s ability to ensure the uninterrupted availability of reliable and affordable energy sources. It encompasses the stable supply of energy resources, the resilience of energy infrastructure, and a country’s ability to meet its current and future energy demands while also dealing with emergencies, natural disasters, and geopolitical tensions that could disrupt supply. A responsible energy mix promotes national and economic security while providing a realistic pathway to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. This will include hydrocarbons, renewables, nuclear, and lower-emitting energy sources such as geothermal, hydroelectric, and biofuels. However, the glue that binds any stable energy transition is a key bridge fuel: natural gas. Liquified natural gas (LNG) is critical to meet global energy demand and reduce emissions while promoting American energy security and economic stability worldwide. Yet, the Biden administration recently announced plans to restrict US natural gas exports, directly affecting America’s key allies. In this environment, lawmakers should reflect upon their previous missteps before implementing energy policies that will make the regulatory environment more unstable and unpredictable. Lessons from the Past and Present During World War II, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s drive to build an arsenal of democracy required American energy resources. The US supplied 85 percent of the oil and gas the Allies used,1 including 90 percent of aviation fuel by 1944.2 Ever since then, energy security has been necessary for creating and maintaining peace. Recent events have brought the relationship between energy, economics, and national security back into acute focus. Last year marked the fiftieth anniversary of the Arab Oil Embargo, a reminder of the shortsighted energy policies that gave away America’s energy independence and made the US reliant on Middle Eastern oil for decades. The anniversary coincided with Europe’s struggle to sustain itself following the removal of Russian oil and gas from the market.3 That struggle is not over,4 and the collapse of certain European industrial sectors is ongoing as the continent’s energy prices remain elevated (see figure 1). Drawing on these lessons from history and recent events, below are four principles to guide the future of American energy policy.
Topic:
Energy Policy, National Security, International Security, and Natural Gas
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

187. Moldova votes 2024: A choice between Russia and the EU

Author:
Hugo Blewett-Mundy
Publication Date:
10-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Europeum Institute for European Policy
Abstract:
Moldova stands at a critical juncture that will determine its position within Europe. In the elections on Sunday, the incumbent president Maia Sandu is seeking a second term and a positive result in the EU accession referendum to reaffirm her country’s path towards Europe. But the hybrid threat facing Moldova from Russia will not dissipate, particularly as next year’s pivotal parliamentary elections approach in the tiny former Soviet republic. Hugo Blewett-Mundy, a non-resident associate research fellow from EUROPEUM, analyses the current situation in Moldova and provides an outlook for the country in 2025.
Topic:
Elections, European Union, and Domestic Politics
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Moldova

188. Regional Cooperation in Central Europe in the Aftermath of Russia’s War: Changes and Prospects

Author:
EUROPEUM
Publication Date:
04-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Europeum Institute for European Policy
Abstract:
On April 18th, EUROPEUM’s Brussels Office in partnership with PISM Brussels Office under the Think Visegrad platform hosted a discussion titled “Regional Cooperation in Central Europe in the Aftermath of Russia’s War: Changes and Prospects”. This event was attended by 15 experts from think tanks and representatives of EU institutions.
Topic:
Regional Cooperation, European Union, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, and Central Europe

189. Women in Digital Space (and AI): Looking into Central Europe: cases from Austria, Czechia, Poland and Slovakia

Author:
Silke Maes
Publication Date:
04-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Europeum Institute for European Policy
Abstract:
Our researcher Silke Maes in her latest report addresses issues of cyberviolence on women and examines whether women in the CEE benefit from digitalisation (and AI). The report looks into how women use and contribute to the digital space, examines opportunities and challenges and proposes recommendations for a more inclusive digital space.
Topic:
Women, Artificial Intelligence, Digitalization, Inclusion, and Digital Space
Political Geography:
Poland, Austria, Central Europe, Slovakia, and Czechia

190. EU-Pacific Talks: Fostering Work-Life Balance in Diverse Societies

Author:
Simona Růžičková
Publication Date:
04-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Europeum Institute for European Policy
Abstract:
Another in the series of EU-Pacific talks dealt with fostering work-life balance in diverse societies. The debate focused on examining current demographic trends and their social consequences in high-income countries in Europe and Southeast Asia. The discussion also touched on social systems, flexible job opportunities, and the pressures women face when balancing work and private life.
Topic:
Demographics, European Union, Women, and Work-Life Balance
Political Geography:
Europe and Southeast Asia

191. A Circular Solution for Czechia: Round table discussion on end-of-life management of EV batteries

Author:
Sofia Pahor-Chochoy
Publication Date:
04-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Europeum Institute for European Policy
Abstract:
On April 11, 2024, EUROPEUM Institute for European Policy along with its partner INCIEN Institute for Circular Economy, held a roundtable titled A Circular Solution for Czechia. This round table was part of a project called The End-of-Life Management of the Automotive Industry and the Opportunities for Czechia.
Topic:
Automotive Industry, Electric Vehicles, and Green Transition
Political Geography:
Central Europe and Czechia

192. EU-Pacific Talks | Unveiling Global South Dynamics: EU and Indo-Pacific Perspectives

Author:
Adéla Jehličková
Publication Date:
02-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Europeum Institute for European Policy
Abstract:
During the fifth debate of the third edition of the EU-Pacific Talks, organised by EUROPEUM Institute for European Policy, participants focused on the importance of the Global South and the events taking place there that require attention. In the debate, participants stressed the importance of recognising regional differences, showing respect for the countries in the region and actively engaging in listening to their views. Read what our guests discussed in the report written by Adéla Jehličková.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, European Union, Geopolitics, and Global South
Political Geography:
Europe and Indo-Pacific

193. EU-Pacific Talks | Global Race in Emerging Technologies: Lessons for EU-Pacific Cooperation

Author:
Simona Růžičková
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Europeum Institute for European Policy
Abstract:
In the next debate of the EU-Pacific Talks series, hosted by EUROPEUM Institute for European Policy, the guests explored the relationship between cooperation and competition in overcoming technological frontiers in the context of pressing climate and industrial demands. Guests explored insights on fostering technological innovation, tackling climate change and promoting sustainable development. Read what our guests discussed in the report written by Simona Růžičková.
Topic:
Climate Change, Science and Technology, European Union, Innovation, Emerging Technology, and Sustainable Development
Political Geography:
Europe and Indo-Pacific

194. EU-Pacific Talks | Charting the course for Ukraine: Reassessment of the Indo-Pacific

Author:
Zuzana Augustova
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Europeum Institute for European Policy
Abstract:
During the next debate in the EU-Pacific Talks series organised by EUROPEUM Institute for European Policy, participants engaged in a lively debate covering various aspects of the Russian attack on Ukraine. They also discussed the potential impact on the dynamics of the Indo-Pacific region and the ability of allies and partners to navigate their Indo-Pacific commitments. Read what our guests discussed in this report by Zuzana Augustova.
Topic:
Security, European Union, Trade, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe and Indo-Pacific

195. Amérique latine. L'année politique 2023

Author:
David Recondo
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches Internationales (CERI)
Abstract:
Amérique latine. L’Année politique 2023 est une publication de l’Observatoire politique de l’Amérique latine et des Caraïbes (Opalc) du CERI-Sciences Po. Il prolonge la démarche du site www.sciencespo.fr/opalc en offrant des clés de compréhension d’un continent en proie à des transformations profondes.
Topic:
Civil Society, Crime, Democratization, Politics, Governance, Urbanization, European Union, Multilateralism, Regional Integration, Memory, and Social Policy
Political Geography:
Latin America

196. Regards sur l’Eurasie. L’année politique 2023

Author:
Anne De Tinguy
Publication Date:
02-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Centre d'Etudes et de Recherches Internationales (CERI)
Abstract:
Looking into Eurasia : the year in politics provides some keys to understand the events and phenomena that have left their imprint on a region that has undergone major mutation since the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991: the post-soviet space. With a cross-cutting approach that is no way claims to be exhaustive, this study seeks to identify the key drivers, the regional dynamics and the underlying issues at stak. This volume is devoted to the war in Ukraine
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, International Organization, Migration, Politics, History, Diaspora, European Union, Economy, Post-Soviet Space, Energy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Eurasia

197. The 2024 Assessment of Violent Extremism in Albania

Author:
Institute for Democracy and Mediation (IDM)
Publication Date:
04-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Democracy and Mediation (IDM)
Abstract:
The 2024 national assessment of violent extremism drivers, forms and threats presents a crucial update in Albania’s fight against violent extremism, enriched by an in-depth exploration of perceptions of political extremism and other emerging threats. Building on this expanded scope, the report offers actionable insights and recommendations to enhance Albania’s preventing and countering violent extremism (P/CVE) measures. The assessment seeks to inform and complement the efforts of the Albanian government and P/CVE stakeholders, to enhance resilience against the broad spectrum of violent extremism and ensure a proactive and adaptable response to protect Albanian society and its democratic values. As Albania nears a decade of implementing P/CVE strategies, it is evident that considerable progress has been made in tackling religious extremism, yet the evolving nature of violent extremism presents continuous challenges. Delving into the main forms and drivers of violent extremism, this report has been structured into three main chapters which analyze citizens’ perceptions through the lens of the socio-economic, political and cultural drivers used in previous national assessments, as well as a series of new questions aimed at exploring emerging threats.
Topic:
Security, Religion, Violent Extremism, and Resilience
Political Geography:
Europe, Balkans, and Albania

198. National Integrity System Assessment | Albania 2023

Author:
Institute for Democracy and Mediation (IDM)
Publication Date:
04-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Democracy and Mediation (IDM)
Abstract:
The National Integrity System Assessment, a tool developed by Transparency International, merges in-depth research with active stakeholder participation to evaluate the effectiveness of national anti-corruption mechanisms. This assessment aims to evaluate the institutional framework, assessing levels of good governance, transparency, and accountability. It examines the roles and governance structures of independent institutions, the executive, legislature, judiciary, media, political parties, civil society organizations, businesses, and state enterprises, organized into 15 distinct pillars. Authored by IDM’s research team, this report marks Albania’s first assessment of this kind since 2016.
Topic:
Governance, Transparency, and Integrity
Political Geography:
Europe, Balkans, and Albania

199. Strengthening Institutional Integrity: A Path to Combat Corruption in Public Administration

Author:
Institute for Democracy and Mediation (IDM)
Publication Date:
10-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Democracy and Mediation (IDM)
Abstract:
Strengthening institutional integrity is crucial for our efforts to combat corruption and enhance trust in public institutions. With this in mind, the Institute for Democracy and Mediation (IDM) conducted, for the first time, three social experiments with public administration employees aimed at measuring the culture of silence, tolerance, and reporting of corruption within the public administration. The social experiments involved approximately 70 employees from various public institutions, including the High Prosecutorial Council, the Commissioner for the Right to Information and the Protection of Personal Data, the Department of Public Administration, the General Directorate of Taxes, the Ministry of Health and Social Protection, the Ministry of Justice, and the Institute for Public Health. The social experiments generated data for researching the culture of integrity in public administration. The findings will help inform the development of effective strategies for promoting ethical behavior and strengthening integrity within public institutions. Some of the findings from the experiments are: Public administration employees with in-depth knowledge of integrity rules tend to be better informed about suspected irregularities; Loyalty to the group within public administration influences the tolerance of corruption by its members; Public administration employees lack trust in the functioning of internal institutional mechanisms for reporting corrupt actions and unethical behavior; The main factors contributing to the lack of reporting of corrupt actions include employees’ fear of the impact of reporting on their work relationships and the possibility of retaliation. By focusing on the experiences of these three social experiments, we aim to contribute through innovative scientific research to the development of a new work culture oriented toward ethics, transparency, and accountability, thereby contributing to a more trustworthy and sustainable public administration.
Topic:
Corruption, Governance, Institutions, Identity, and Public Administration
Political Geography:
Europe, Balkans, and Albania

200. AI Policy in EU Illiberal Democracies: The Experience in Hungary and Poland

Author:
Filip Konopczyński
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
This paper examines the emergence of AI policies in Hungary and Poland under illiberal governments, and highlights their potential social and political consequences, particularly for democratic values and civil and fundamental rights. It focuses on the adoption of AI in the public sector, encompassing research and development, public administration, law enforcement, migration, and economic policy. In their AI policies, both countries’ governments have prioritized industry demands and subordination to the expectations of large foreign corporations (which is inconsistent with their digital sovereignty rhetoric). Meanwhile, they have neglected societal consultations and the needs of the scientific community. The AI policies implemented in Hungary and Poland by the Fidesz and Law and Justice (PiS) parties) have been characterized, respectively, by centralization and fragmentation, with varying outcomes. The AI systems deployed do not safeguard citizens’ rights as the political takeover of the justice system and partisan control of law enforcement have undermined redress mechanisms and limited legal protection from AI-related violations. The increasing use of AI in election campaigns, coupled with the lack of democratic oversight, increases the risk of mass disinformation campaigns and electoral manipulation in both countries. The cases of Hungary and Poland highlight some key implications for democracy and human rights in the EU where illiberal actors control AI policies and governance and disregard these values. The new EU AI Act may offer some protection for the rule of law and individual rights, but its potential loopholes could allow the unlawful deployment of AI systems in vital areas. AI policies in both countries have reflected their governments’ illiberal tendencies, expanding their control over citizens and curtailing democratic processes. The centralized governance raises concerns about the potential for mass surveillance and censorship, while the lack of transparency and inclusivity in AI policymaking could further marginalize minority groups and vulnerable populations. However, there are key steps that the EU can take to address these issues.
Topic:
Science and Technology, European Union, Domestic Politics, Artificial Intelligence, and Illiberal Democracy
Political Geography:
Europe, Poland, and Hungary