Content Type: Special Report / Publication Year: within 10 Years

1. Protecting Colombia’s Most Vulnerable on the Road to “Total Peace”

Author:: International Crisis Group
Publication Date:: 02-2026
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: International Crisis Group
Abstract:: The new Colombian government has resolved to curb violence throughout rural areas where guerrillas and criminals hold sway. Its approach – dialogue and security reform – is admirable but risky. Any deal it strikes should seek to halt all the types of coercion the illicit groups employ.
Topic:: Conflict, Violence, Humanitarian Crisis, Vulnerability, and Gender
Political Geography:: Colombia and South America

2. Mexico’s Forgotten Mayors: The Role of Local Government in Fighting Crime

Author:: International Crisis Group
Publication Date:: 06-2026
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: International Crisis Group
Abstract:: Organised crime in Mexico has gone local, as cartels break up into sub-groups battling over smaller patches of turf. At the same time, the federal government has wrested policing away from town halls. A reset is needed to re-empower municipal officials to protect the public.
Topic:: Organized Crime, Municipalities, Local Government, and Mayors
Political Geography:: Latin America, North America, and Mexico

3. Tunisia’s Challenge: Avoiding Default and Preserving Peace

Author:: International Crisis Group
Publication Date:: 12-2026
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: International Crisis Group
Abstract:: Along with democratic backsliding, Tunisia is facing an economic crunch, magnified by foreign debt it is struggling to repay. Outside actors should keep pressing the government on human rights, while looking for ways – chiefly, a revised IMF loan – to stave off the worst-case scenarios.
Topic:: Debt, Human Rights, Economy, IMF, and Democratic Backsliding
Political Geography:: North Africa and Tunisia

4. Kuwait Country Report 2024

Author:: Arab Barometer
Publication Date:: 05-2026
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Arab Barometer
Abstract:: Since the last Arab Barometer survey in Kuwait, conducted in 2022, major changes have taken place, significantly affecting political stability in the country. While political life in Kuwait was saturated with crises, and its indicators were clearly visible in the dissolution of the National Assembly (Parliament) repeatedly before completing its term, the shifts, changes, and political instability that dominated the public arena, between late 2022 and the current period of 2024, included even more severe events. Kuwait faced the unconstitutional dissolution of the National Assembly and the suspension of some articles in the constitution, now for the third time in Kuwait’s history. The first two such crises were in 1967 and 1986. To summarize the events that took place from June 2022 until the dissolution of the Parliament and the suspension of the constitution in May 2024, they are as follows: On August 3, 2022, the National Assembly was dissolved constitutionally, in response to the sit-in of a number of MPs inside the Parliament and their overnight stay there. The Crown Prince (the current Emir) gave a speech in which he emphasized adherence to the constitution, and also presented initiatives in electoral reform. He emphasized that the government would not vote for the candidate for the speaker of the National Assembly, and that the elections would be through the national ID card (effectively changing electoral circuits). The protesting MPs considered these reforms a victory. As a result, Ahmed al-Nawaf was appointed Prime Minister
Topic:: Corruption, Education, Environment, Gender Issues, Health, Migration, Governance, Democracy, Economy, Discrimination, Institutions, Labor Market, Freedom, and Political System
Political Geography:: Middle East and Kuwait

5. Monitoring Report | Public consultation in Albania: The illusion of inclusion

Author:: Institute for Democracy and Mediation (IDM)
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Institute for Democracy and Mediation (IDM)
Abstract:: The Institute for Democracy and Mediation (IDM) has released a new report: Public Consultation in Albania: The Illusion of Inclusion. This report presents the results of an in-depth monitoring of 50 laws, public policies, and strategic documents consulted by the central government during the years 2022-2023. The assessment covers 10 key government institutions, evaluating their public consultation processes in terms of: Transparency and accessibility of consultation documents; Effectiveness of the public consultation process; Public accountability during this process; Citizen participation in consultations; Ensuring inclusivity and non-discrimination. In addition to the qualitative analysis of public consultation previously conducted by IDM, this assessment for the first time provides statistical data related to this important governance process. The evaluation system applied in this report provides the opportunity to compare institutions’ performance in the consultation of different acts, in relation to the aforementioned principles. Ultimately, the findings highlight a ‘’long distance’’ between transparency and participation in government consultations. The goal of this study is to contribute to evidence-based advocacy for legal reforms and the improvement of institutional practices, so that public consultations fulfill their core function – citizens’ participation and impact in decision-making.
Topic:: Transparency, Inclusion, Monitoring, and Civic Space
Political Geography:: Europe, Balkans, and Albania

6. Lift the Sanctions: The Principal Danger in Syria Today is Instability

Author:: Carl Conetta
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Project on Defense Alternatives
Abstract:: The most critical international security goal regarding Syria today is the country’s stabilization – and that requires immediate and substantial aid and sanction relief. The question on which recognition of the new government should most hinge is whether it can achieve sovereign authority in the country and do so without the type of human rights abuses or cross-border militancy that pose a threat to regional peace. Given the urgency of stabilizing the country, the new government provisionally meets this criteria. Should it change course and pose a threat to regional peace, the international community can adjust policy accordingly. Two outstanding challenges to sovereignty and legitimacy are the presence of foreign troops – Israeli, Turkish, and US – and the status of Kurdish areas. Especially acute is the triangular relationship among Damascus, Ankara, and Syria’s Kurdish community, which is among the issues addressed in this viewpoint. As for foreign troops: 15,000-20,000 currently occupy the country. Affirming Syrian sovereignty entails expeditiously withdrawing all those forces not explicitly invited by the new government. A related concern is the remnants of the Islamic State (ISIL) in Syria, including the 40,000+ cadre, family members, and displaced persons interned in camps run by the Kurdish authorities. Going forward, the task of managing and combating IS remnants on Syrian territory should fall to Damascus, acting together with Kurdish and foreign partners as it sees fit. The threat that IS affiliates and aspirants pose to the United States and the broader international community have been and are most effectively addressed through measure of homeland security and law enforcement. Securing the US homeland does not require the ongoing deployment of US troops in Syria, which would inadvertently undermine the legitimacy of the new government.
Topic:: International Security, Sanctions, Syrian War, and Instability
Political Geography:: Middle East and Syria

7. Shipment of a Controlled Vacuum Furnace to North Korea via Multiple States: An HS Code Case Study

Author:: David Albright
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Institute for Security and International Studies (ISIS)
Abstract:: In tracking trade data and trade flows, Harmonized System (HS) codes are routinely used to aid searches for dual-use commodities and to help guide the identification of dual-use items that require a license or greater scrutiny. A recurring concern is shipper falsification of HS codes to evade detection or payment of duties. An illustration of such falsifications is a case we learned about via government sources from around 2022 that involved North Korea and a dual-use vacuum furnace suitable for uranium melting that wound its way from Spain to North Korea, via Mexico, South Africa, and China. Such a furnace is typically controlled under the Nuclear Supplier Group (NSG) Part 2 list and is banned for export to North Korea under United Security Council resolutions. This type of furnace is a mainstay of a nuclear weapons program, particularly one that uses weapon-grade uranium as the nuclear explosive material, as North Korea is known to do. With North Korea expanding its uranium enrichment program and producing greater quantities of weapon-grade uranium, this new furnace would be especially important.
Topic:: Nuclear Weapons, Trade, and Dual Use Items
Political Geography:: Asia and North Korea

8. New Information on Shenyang Machine Tool Company’s Illicit Sales to North Korea and Russia

Author:: David Albright and Spencer Faragasso
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Institute for Security and International Studies (ISIS)
Abstract:: Several years ago, the Institute reported about the relatively large, multinational Chinese company Shenyang Machine Tools Company supplying sophisticated computer numerically controlled (CNC) machine tools, equipped with Western controlled software, to North Korea in violation of UN Security Council (UNSC) sanctions and a supplier country’s trade control laws that banned re-export of this software. New information details the disingenuous way in which the Chinese government investigated this case, indicating nonetheless inadvertently that North Korea received these machine tools, while also demonstrating China’s utter disregard for enforcing UNSC sanctions or its own or others’ export control laws. This case serves as another of the many cases highlighting China as a long-time irresponsible trading partner that responsible companies should avoid when sensitive dual-use goods are involved, lest they be complicit in outfitting North Korea’s, Iran’s, or Russia’s military programs. Today, responsible suppliers are inadvertently facilitating Russia’s prosecution of an illegal war against Ukraine. Given Shenyang Machine Tools Company’s recent exports of goods to Russia with Harmonized Shipments (HS) codes found on the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) Common High Priority List (CHPL), this company should be considered for sanctions.
Topic:: Sanctions, Trade, Illegal Trade, and Shenyang Machine Tool Company
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, Asia, and North Korea

9. Navigating the Challenges of Environmentalism in an Increasingly Authoritarian Iraq

Author:: Taif Alkhudary
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Arab Reform Initiative (ARI)
Abstract:: There has been a marked increase in environmental activism in Iraq in recent years. This shift has taken place in the context of what has often been presented as a new stability, due to the absence of active armed conflict in the country since 2017. However, as “stabilization” efforts give way to “development”, Iraq is also coming to terms with the slow violence of protracted wars,1 an astronomical and rapid rise in oil production, and the impacts of climate change – most visible in the widespread incidences of pollution and public health crises, as well as in the drying up of ancient rivers and lakes and desertification, which is destroying livelihoods and causing mass migration across the country.2 The rise in interest in the environment has also come in the aftermath of the 2019 Tishreen uprising, to which the government and associated militias have responded with a widespread crackdown on freedom of expression and assembly, making any form of activism increasingly dangerous. This study examines how self-identified environmentalists active in Iraq interact with this complex context and the challenges they face. To navigate the increased authoritarianism of the Iraqi state, this research finds that environmentalists tend to adopt small, carefully framed initiatives that are usually presented as supporting the government in solving some of the environmental issues it faces, as opposed to being overtly adversarial. This approach also means that Iraq’s environmental movements lack autonomy, and that certain issues – particularly those that might harm the business interests or standing of the political elite – remain off-limits. As a result, environmental initiatives in Iraq tend to make shallow interventions that do little to address the root causes of environmental degradation or to mitigate the effects of climate change. These dynamics are compounded by the funding structures of donor organizations, who prefer to award grants to small-scale, time-bound projects the outcomes of which can be easily measured. Environmental actors active in Iraq have also begun to form coalitions with the government, the private sector, and other members of civil society, such as political activists. However, this remains in its infancy and is often limited to a small number of individuals acting alone. Coalition building remains a substantial challenge and is often actively blocked by the government, used by corporations for greenwashing, and sees the efforts of environmental activists and organizations coopted by politicians for their own political and financial ends. The findings of the current study corroborate and extend the work of Wiktor-Mach et al. on Kurdistan, especially their characterization of environmental activism in the region as “a specific type of activism that does not question mainstream policies and practices but intends to push for change within existing systems and that has a cooperative character”.3 However, it is also important to note (as will be discussed in greater detail in this paper) that in Federal Iraq, the uptake of such non-confrontational tactics is the result of the increased crackdown on civil society post-Tishreen, which has raised the stakes and dangers of more adversarial work. In addition, while in Kurdistan episodes of mass contention are relatively rare and often focus on issues such as salaries and service provision, in Federal Iraq there has been at least one episode of mass mobilization in response to environmental issues in recent years in the form of the 2018 water protests in Basra.
Topic:: Environment, Politics, Authoritarianism, and Activism
Political Geography:: Iraq and Middle East

10. Online Narratives and Manipulations: Tunisian and Regional Panorama

Author:: Arab Reform Initiative
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Arab Reform Initiative (ARI)
Abstract:: In the wake of the presidential elections of October 2024, the first since the coup d'état in July 2021, Tunisia has seen a resurgence of suspiciously sponsored political content, both pro- and anti-regime, on online social media networks. These included advertisements denouncing the refusal of the president of the electoral body, Farouk Bouasker, to reinstate certain candidates. We also saw “locked” profiles with Egyptian-sounding names reacting with likes or "laugh" emojis to publications on the Facebook page of the Presidency of the Republic of Tunisia. With the proliferation of anti-Saied pages garnering thousands of likes in the space of a few days, pro-regime influencers have multiplied their videos to denounce the spread of these pages and content, calling their audiences to witness the truth of the plot hatched by dark forces, which is the mainstay of the new regime's narrative. It is hard to overlook the importance of Facebook in Tunisia. It remains the most widely used network1 and continues to be a major platform for political life.2 While it has long been the site of disinformation campaigns3 in Tunisia, in recent years the issue has taken on a whole new dimension: the sector has gone from being a local, cottage industry to a veritable industry run by specialized companies operating on an international scale. This industrialization of disinformation goes hand in hand with a phenomenon of opinion manipulation, taking the form of troll profiles dictating the political agenda, or fake profiles creating a false sense of popularity for certain ideas. Both disinformation and manipulation raise questions about the future of democracy, in Tunisia and globally, in a context where for many, these networks continue to represent a faithful reflection of reality. This paper seeks to provide an overview of the dynamics of disinformation from the Tunisian digital space, exploring the different narratives conveyed, forms of manipulation, and the role of social media platforms in their amplification. The paper also shows that certain disinformation narratives circulate between different countries in the region. The aim is to broaden reflection on these forms of manipulation while proposing a regional research and action agenda that can help reduce the impact of these activities, known in the Arab world by the general name of "electronic flies".4
Topic:: Elections, Media, Misinformation, and Narrative
Political Geography:: North Africa and Tunisia

11. The Future of Official Development Assistance: Incremental Improvements or Radical Reform?

Author:: Masood Ahmed, Rachael Calleja, and Pierre Jacquet
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center for Global Development (CGD)
Abstract:: Over the last decade, donor country governments have faced new and additional demands for financing international challenges, including providing global public goods (GPGs) and addressing historically high numbers of refugees and humanitarian crises. They have partly done so by re-allocating their official development assistance (ODA) away from its original aim: to support poverty reduction and growth in developing countries. This has led to questions about the integrity and credibility of ODA. These questions are only likely to grow more pertinent in the coming decade because the pressures on ODA—and on public finances more broadly—are here to stay. ODA budgets are being cut in a number of traditional donor countries and what remains is increasingly being deployed to meet emerging needs beyond traditional development and to reflect a more national security perspective on development cooperation. The time is right, therefore, to ask whether the concept and accounting for ODA need to be modified to ensure that the needy and vulnerable it was designed to serve continue to be protected in the face of fiscal constraints and changing geopolitical circumstances. This report, a compendium on the future of ODA, aims to provide fresh thinking and inspire the action needed for ODA to remain relevant and effective. It brings together reflections and proposals from leading experts and practitioners, including the under-secretary-general and executive director of UNOPS to a former DAC chair, to inform policymakers. In this executive summary, we will introduce the key arguments from the compendium contributors. The contributions are organised into four key areas of discussion that reflect the main themes raised in this compendium: the rationale for ODA reform, the political and institutional realities shaping reform, using ODA for climate and leveraging private finance, and forward-looking proposals for reimagining ODA’s role and purpose.
Topic:: Development, Finance, Humanitarian Crisis, Donors, and Foreign Assistance
Political Geography:: Global Focus

12. Ukraine and Beyond: Shaping Europe’s Security Future

Author:: International Crisis Group
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: International Crisis Group
Abstract:: What happens with the war in Ukraine matters beyond its borders, as events there will shape the larger standoff between Russia and the West. The U.S. and European powers can manage the risks of a changing security order with a mix of diplomacy and deterrence.
Topic:: Security, Diplomacy, Deterrence, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

13. Finding a Way Out of Festering Conflict in India’s Manipur

Author:: International Crisis Group
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: International Crisis Group
Abstract:: Manipur, a state in north-eastern India, has been beset with intercommunal strife since May 2023. The central government has now taken a bold step to quell the violence. It should keep acting urgently to avert a protracted crisis.
Topic:: Ethnic Conflict, Violence, and Crisis Management
Political Geography:: South Asia, India, and Manipur

14. Locked in Transition: Politics and Violence in Haiti

Author:: International Crisis Group
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: International Crisis Group
Abstract:: Criminal gangs have tightened their grip on much of Port-au-Prince, with the multinational security mission making little headway and transitional authorities mired in internal disputes. The UN Security Council should quickly decide how to respond to Haiti’s request for further assistance in restoring public safety.
Topic:: Security, UN Security Council, Organized Crime, Gangs, and Public Safety
Political Geography:: Caribbean and Haiti

15. Christian Nationalism Across All 50 States: Insights from PRRI’s 2024 American Values Atlas

Author:: PRRI Staff
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: PRRI: Public Religion Research Institute
Abstract:: In 2024, PRRI released a groundbreaking national survey that provided for the first time the ability to estimate support for Christian nationalism in all 50 states. Building on that work throughout 2024, PRRI interviewed more than 22,000 adults as part of the PRRI American Values Atlas to continue monitoring the spread of support for Christian nationalism and the factors driving such views.
Topic:: Domestic Politics, Survey, Partisanship, and Christian Nationalism
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

16. LGBTQ Rights Across All 50 States: Key Insights from PRRI’s 2024 American Values Atlas

Author:: PRRI Staff
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: PRRI: Public Religion Research Institute
Abstract:: In 2024, PRRI interviewed over 22,000 adults as part of the PRRI American Values Atlas to provide a detailed analysis of the demographic, political, and religious characteristics of LGBTQ Americans. The report also examines public attitudes on LGBTQ rights across all 50 states and the District of Columbia, focusing on support for nondiscrimination protections, opposition to religiously based service refusals, and support for same-sex marriage. Additionally, new survey questions explore views on transgender-related policies, including restrictions on gender-affirming care for minors and ID laws requiring birth-assigned sex.
Topic:: Public Opinion, Domestic Politics, LGBT+, and Survey
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

17. Practical Guidance for Integrating Climate into WPS National Action Plans

Author:: Christina Vetter and Jessica Smith
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace and Security (GIWPS)
Abstract:: In this practical guidance note, the Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace and Security explores the capacity for National Action Plans on Women, Peace and Security (WPS NAPs) to be effective tools for national-level implementation of the WPS Agenda that is responsive to climate-related security risks. WPS NAPs have become the primary tool for national-level efforts to implement the WPS Agenda. To remain relevant and effective, NAPs must be responsive to the ever-changing security landscape and emerging threats to peace and security, like climate change. While the share of NAPs that mention climate change has slowly increased, many include just one cursory reference to climate change in the background section that does not comprehensively address the impacts of climate-related security risks across all four pillars of WPS or include specific actions or commitments related to climate in the NAP’s implementation framework. This report presents actionable policy recommendations for WPS NAPs to more meaningfully address climate change and related security risks throughout their design, drafting, and implementation. The report, authored by Christina Vetter and Dr. Jessica Smith, was made possible with support from the Embassy of Denmark in Washington, D.C.
Topic:: Security, Climate Change, Women, and Peace
Political Geography:: Global Focus

18. How Does Disinformation Target and Affect Interethnic Relations in Kosovo?

Author:: Ramadan Ilazi, Jeta Loshaj, Tamara Pavlović, and Agnesa Bytyçi
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Kosovar Centre for Security Studies (KCSS)
Abstract:: Disinformation and misinformation are pervasive issues in Kosovo, where they exploit existing societal divisions and low trust in institutional narratives. Participants in focus groups and interviews largely defined misinformation as unintentional inaccuracies or partial truths spread due to misunderstanding or lack of verification, while disinformation was seen as deliberately misleading information designed to create division. Though malinformation was not discussed, the distinction between misinformation and disinformation highlights the deliberate nature of the latter in destabilizing interethnic relations. According to a recent NDI Kosovo survey 67% of Kosovo Serbs believe things are moving in the wrong direction, while 41% of Kosovo Albanians believe the opposite. Kosovo Serbs prioritize unemployment (66%) and interethnic tensions (49%) as their primary issues, while Albanians focus more on unemployment (77%) and corruption (56%). There is a significant disparity in perceptions of interethnic relations, while 65% of Kosovo Serbs expect relations to worsen, 53% of Kosovo Albanians are optimistic about improvement. Media consumption is heavily segmented by ethnicity with 79% of the Kosovo Serbs relying on Serbian TV stations daily, with 66% expressing trust in these outlets. Kosovo Albanian respondents primarily use Kosovo TV stations (86%) and social media (50%) as information sources. Trust in information sources remains low across ethnic groups, with reliance on personal networks (friends and family) common for fact-checking.2 Kosovo Serbian community widely believe in disinformation narratives, such as claims of ethnic cleansing plans and mistreatment by Kosovo Police during incidents like the Banjska terrorist attack. Among Kosovo Albanians, skepticism about these narratives is higher, reflecting ethnic polarization. A significant factor enabling both misinformation and disinformation is the skepticism toward institutional narratives—whether from the government, international organizations, or national media. These institutions are widely viewed as biased or agenda-driven, misaligned with the priorities of local communities. Conversely, reliance on familiar sources, such as ethnically divided local news outlets and word-of-mouth communication, exacerbates separation and distrust. These sources, while perceived as relatable and acting in the community’s best interest, are often biased, incomplete, or inaccurate, further reinforcing community echo chambers. Relations between Kosovar Albanians and Kosovar Serbs are frequently manipulated through disinformation to fuel distrust. Actions by the Kosovo Government impacting the Serbian community—such as institutional closures—are framed in Serbian media as ethnic discrimination or even “ethnic cleansing.” Similarly, uncontextualized or sensationalized reports about past events, like the fabricated claim of Albanian children being drowned by Serbs, continue to inflame ethnic hostility. These narratives exploit the unresolved history, reinforcing grievances that hinder reconciliation efforts. Socio-economic hardships, such as high poverty rates and employment gaps, increase susceptibility to disinformation. According to the 2024 Democracy Plus Vulnerability Index, which saw Kosovo’s vulnerability score rise from 41 to 57, economic instability makes individuals more receptive to emotionally charged misinformation.3 Limited access to quality education weakens critical thinking and media literacy, leaving many unable to identify biased information. The National Democratic Institute in their report on Information Integrity in Kosovo Assessment of the Political Economy of Disinformation (July 2022) found that the education system insufficiently prepares citizens for assessing online disinformation, further enhancing vulnerability. The issue of disinformation is not merely a challenge of modern information ecosystems; it is a deliberate strategy employed by internal and external actors to destabilize communities and undermine democratic governance. As digital platforms expand access to information, they also facilitate the rapid spread of false narratives, making it increasingly difficult for communities to discern fact from fiction. This report addresses these challenges with a focus on their implications for interethnic relations between Kosovo Albanians and Serbs. This report is grounded in qualitative research, incorporating insights from two primary sources: Two focus group discussions were conducted with a total of fifteen participants, comprising a mix of Kosovo Albanians and Kosovo Serbs. These discussions provided a grassroots perspective on how disinformation affects interethnic dynamics, exploring lived experiences, perceptions, and community-level challenges. Additionally, nine in-depth interviews were conducted with a diverse range of stakeholders, including local and international experts, representatives from civil society, and government officials. These interviews offered expert insights into the structural, cultural, and political dimensions of disinformation in Kosovo. The combination of these approaches ensures a nuanced understanding of the issue, capturing both macro-level trends and micro-level experiences. The findings are contextualized within existing literature and complemented by statistical data from surveys and prior studies. The report is structured as follows: A detailed analysis of the main themes and insights that emerged from the focus groups and interviews, highlighting the impact of disinformation on interethnic relations, institutional trust, and reconciliation efforts. The next section explores the structural, cultural, and political factors that make Kosovo particularly susceptible to disinformation. A breakdown of the primary methods and stories used in disinformation campaigns, including the roles of media, political actors, and diaspora communities, is also included. An assessment of how disinformation influences community dynamics, perpetuates stereotypes, and undermines peacebuilding initiatives. Kosovo’s ongoing efforts at normalization of relations with Serbia make the issue of disinformation particularly salient. Disinformation not only perpetuates division but also undermines trust in institutions and mediation efforts to normalize relations between Kosovo and Serbia. By addressing the mechanisms and impacts of disinformation, this report seeks to contribute to a deeper understanding of how to better counter disinformation targeting interethnic relations, in order to foster a cohesive and democratic society. The findings and recommendations presented here are intended to serve as a resource for policymakers, civil society organizations, media practitioners, and international actors working to promote peace and reconciliation in Kosovo. At its core, this report emphasizes the importance of fostering resilience against disinformation where interethnic relations are characterized by trust, cooperation, and mutual respect. The research paper “Understanding How Disinformation Targets and Affects Interethnic Relations in Kosovo” is implemented with the support of the National Democratic Institute (NDI) and United States Agency for International Development (USAID), in Kosovo. The content of this research paper belongs to the Kosovar Center for Security Studies and does not necessarily reflect the position and stances of NDI and USAID.
Topic:: Ethnicity, Institutions, Disinformation, Misinformation, Trust, and Civil Peace
Political Geography:: Europe and Kosovo

19. Enhancing Local Governance: How the private sector can support data capacity in South Africa’s municipalities

Author:: Stuart Morrison and Nnaemeka Ohamadike
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Good Governance Africa (GGA)
Abstract:: According to the World Bank’s Statistical Capacity Index1 , South Africa ranks among the highest on the African continent. This strong foundation positions the country at the forefront of Fourth Industrial Revolution (4IR) technologies, particularly in leveraging government and open-access data to address national and subnational challenges. Cities like Cape Town and eThekwini have established Open Data Portals (ODPs) – online open-access data repositories that enhance transparency, improve service delivery tracking, and help identify pressing socioeconomic and infrastructure challenges. These portals not only benefit municipal decision-making but also provide businesses with valuable datasets to identify investment opportunities, market trends, and areas for social innovation.2 Despite these benefits, South Africa faces challenges in expanding and sustaining ODPs, particularly at the local government level. This presents a unique opportunity for the private sector to support local governments in the development and maintenance of ODPs. Using Cape Town and eThekwini as case studies, this report examines why private sector involvement in OPDs is crucial and how such partnerships can strengthen local governance, drive economic innovation, and foster inclusive urban development.
Topic:: Governance, Private Sector, Data, and Fourth Industrial Revolution
Political Geography:: Africa and South Africa

20. National Dialogues x Transitional Justice

Author:: Sylvia Servaes and David Bloomfield
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Berghof Foundation
Abstract:: In the aftermath of conflict, National Dialogue and Transitional Justice can both contribute to reconciliation and prevent the recurrence of violence. But what is the nexus between the two? What are key shared characteristics, goals, and complementarities? In this paper, Sylvia Servaes and David Bloomfield explore the interlinkages between National Dialogues and Transitional Justice. They also discuss open questions on how both processes can be further integrated in practice to enhance their relevance and effectiveness. Over the last two decades, National Dialogues have been increasingly recognised as a comprehensive tool for preventing violent conflicts and reaching inclusive political settlements. However, questions remain on how to best integrate certain topics in the design of National Dialogues and how to meaningfully include specific societal groups. The series “National Dialogues at crossroads” aims at addressing this gap. It compiles lessons learned and recommendations on four cross-cutting issues: climate change, digitalisation, protest movements, and Transitional Justice.
Topic:: Transitional Justice, Reconciliation, Post-Conflict, and National Dialogue
Political Geography:: Global Focus

21. Improving the Efficiency of NRC Power Reactor Licensing: Environmental Reviews

Author:: Matt Bowen and Rama T. Ponangi
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center on Global Energy Policy (CGEP), Columbia University
Abstract:: Achieving net-zero emissions in the United States by mid-century requires the rapid buildout of low-carbon energy infrastructure. One challenge to this rapid buildout is the environmental reviews required by the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), which are part of federal approval processes for new energy projects. This process has increasingly caused significant delays and added costs, and the Fiscal Responsibility Act (FRA) of 2023 was passed by Congress in part to address these issues through amendments to NEPA that impose timelines on environmental reviews. For nuclear power, a low-carbon energy source that has a role in many US net-zero scenarios, environmental reviews are conducted by the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) as part of its reactor licensing process. Because this process has at times been lengthy and costly, Congress passed the 2024 ADVANCE Act in part to require the NRC to implement its responsibilities under NEPA more efficiently. During the 2000s and 2010s, most of the environmental impact statements (EISs) these reviews produced would not have complied with NEPA’s new FRA timeline (two years or fewer) and page limit (150, or in extraordinary cases 300). More recent NRC environmental reviews for test reactor deployments have been somewhat quicker and had shorter review documents, perhaps a recognition by the agency that the efficiency of this process needed improvement. This report, part of a series of publications on nuclear licensing reform at the Center on Global Energy Policy at Columbia University SIPA, focuses on how the NRC can fulfill the new legal mandates on time and page limits for environmental reviews and in general improve the efficiency of these reviews. The report demonstrates that earlier (1970s–80s) environmental reviews for nuclear power reactors licensed under the 10 CFR 50 licensing pathway took less time and generated shorter review documents than those conducted under 10 CFR 52 during the 2000s and 2010s. The latter reviews—all of which were for large light water reactor projects—also utilized substantial NRC resources, thereby incurring significant costs to the applicants. None of these reviews found that the reactor projects were expected to create what the NRC calls “large adverse” environmental impacts, which could destabilize environmental resources. Although some “moderate adverse” impacts were identified, they typically came from unavoidable elements such as new transmission lines and traffic that would result from any large construction project. And beneficial impacts always came in the form of jobs and taxes. At the very least, these findings raise questions about the allocation of time and resources to various aspects of the NRC’s environmental review.
Topic:: Environment, Regulation, Carbon Emissions, Nuclear Energy, and Permitting
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

22. Report: Eight Years On, China’s Repression of the Uyghurs Remains Dire

Author:: Rian Thum
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Simon-Skjodt Center for the Prevention of Genocide, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum
Abstract:: The Simon-Skjodt Center for the Prevention of Genocide released a report in January 2025, “Eight Years On, China’s Repression of the Uyghurs Remains Dire: How China’s Policies in the Uyghur Region Have and Have Not Changed.” The report is authored by Rian Thum, Senior Lecturer in East Asian History, at the University of Manchester. The report seeks to improve our collective understanding of China’s ongoing repressive policies in the predominantly Uyghur province of Xinjiang in western China. The Simon-Skjodt Center released a report in 2021 detailing multiple crimes against humanity that the Chinese government had committed against the Uyghur population, a Turkic Muslim minority group, and expressing grave concern that the Chinese government may be committing genocide. Since then, detailed reporting on state policies has decreased as Chinese authorities increasingly restricted access to information. Using recent evidence from Chinese state documents, satellite imagery, and survivor testimony, as well as a synthesis of recent academic publications, the report aims to fill a knowledge gap about the current state of mass atrocities targeting the Uyghur community and other Turkic minorities in the Uyghur region. The report finds that, given the available information, all of the policies that led to accusations of mass atrocities in the Uyghur region continue, and some are expanding. These findings should prompt deeper research into the nature of mass atrocities facing the Uyghur population and spark urgent, effective responses. In particular, the report recommends further research into emerging repressive strategies, including the intense network of electronic and human surveillance, curbs on religious practice, and the destruction of cultural heritage.
Topic:: Human Rights, Minorities, Repression, and Uyghurs
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and Xinjiang

23. Advancing locally led evaluations: Practical insights for humanitarian contexts

Author:: Hana Abul Husn and Dorothy Mae Albiento
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: ALNAP: Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance
Abstract:: Evaluation is widely recognised as a way to learn and to hold humanitarian action to account. Over time, the field of evaluation has evolved because of criticisms of traditional or classic models that are seen as top-down, quantitative and highly technical. Many evaluators are urgently calling for a focus on social justice and equity, as they feel the role and power of local voices in evaluation needs to be re-examined. Alongside humanitarian sector-wide discussions on the need to decolonise and localise aid is a call to re-examine and reframe evaluation practice. Locally led humanitarian action and the growing attention to accountability to populations affected by crisis both support the case that local evaluators are better able to lead community-centred evaluations based on their deeper understanding of local contexts, cultures and values. The overarching objective of this scoping paper is to raise the visibility and accessibility of locally led evaluation among relevant stakeholders in humanitarian contexts. We hope that it can be more easily applied and recognised as having greater value. The paper summarises the opinions and experiences of evaluation stakeholders captured during informal discussions, interviews and scoping events, as well as evidence from relevant literature. We explore what is meant by locally led evaluation and the principles underpinning it, as well as why, how, and by and for whom evaluations are carried out. More specifically, we suggest how evaluation stakeholders can meaningfully engage with and participate in locally led evaluations.
Topic:: Development, Humanitarian Aid, Accountability, and Evaluation
Political Geography:: Global Focus

24. Practical steps to advance locally led evaluation

Author:: Hana Abul Husn and Dorothy Mae Albiento
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: ALNAP: Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance
Abstract:: Stakeholders working to advance a locally led evaluation agenda in humanitarian contexts should consider several enablers (what has worked), barriers (major challenges blocking the way) and practical solutions. In this section, we draw together the reflections from our discussions with evaluation stakeholders to outline practical steps. These steps do not form an exhaustive list of what can be done to advance locally led evaluations, they do not need to be followed in a fixed order, and they might not be applicable in every context. However, they can be used as a starting or continuation point to inspire action. The practical steps are divided into long-term strategies for the overall evaluation function (LTS) and more immediate actions for ongoing or upcoming evaluations. LTS are grouped under three topics: Shaping evaluation culture, policies and strategies; Developing know-how; Establishing and maintaining critical relationships.
Topic:: Humanitarian Aid, Stakeholders, Monitoring, and Evaluation
Political Geography:: Global Focus

25. Future research and learning: Shaping agendas to inform more people centred humanitarian action

Author:: Veronique Barbelet
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: ALNAP: Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance
Abstract:: In recent years, several critical reform agendas - localisation, accountability to affected populations (AAP) and inclusion – have built momentum at the heart of a push for quality humanitarian action grounded in equity and the experiences of crisis-affected people. Despite this progress, ALNAP ’s recent review of outcomes and practices highlights the inadequacy of current methodologies and a particularly weak evidence base around these reforms (although better for localisation). It revealed that while it is likely good practices do exist in the field, they often have not been fully evidenced, researched or widely disseminated. The review also underlined the need to reflect on and better inform research and learning.
Topic:: Humanitarian Aid, Reform, Accountability, Localization, and Gender Equality
Political Geography:: Global Focus

26. Connecting not conflating: Opportunities and risks of merging the localisation, AAP and inclusion agendas

Author:: Veronique Barbelet
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: ALNAP: Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance
Abstract:: It is promising that people-centred humanitarian action has become such a key focus of reform for humanitarian actors, including donors and the United Nations. The concept of people-centred approaches, though loosely defined, increasingly appears to serve as a unifying umbrella for various reform agendas—such as localisation, accountability to affected populations (AAP), and inclusion—agendas that have, for the most part, been pursued separately in both policy and practice. While research has called for appropriate consideration of the benefits of bringing these agendas together (Barbelet et al., 2022; Lough et al., 2022), there is a risk that a people-centred focus could conflate the three distinct reform areas, rather than connect them in their synergies.
Topic:: Humanitarian Aid, United Nations, Reform, Inclusion, and Localization
Political Geography:: Global Focus

27. Breaking boundaries: local and national actors’ engagement in the humanitarian–development–peace nexus

Author:: Mae Albiento
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: ALNAP: Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance
Abstract:: There has been increased focus in the international system on the role of local and national actors (LNAs) in the humanitarian–development–peace (HDP) nexus because of their connections to communities and their focus on holistic needs and vulnerabilities (Ministry of Foreign Affairs Denmark et al., 2023). Yet, often, LNAs’ experiences are absent in how the nexus is framed, implemented and evaluated (Morinière and Morrison-Métois, 2023). At the same time, international approaches to the HDP nexus have been criticised as lacking concrete examples of integrated and holistic programming (Morinière and Morrison-Métois, 2023; IASC , 2024). This report brings the voices of LNAs into the HDP nexus discussion. It highlights their perspectives and experiences in designing and implementing programmes that straddle the three systems, drawing on survey data and key informant interviews (KIIs) with LNAs across 22 countries. The report provides key insights to understand those experiences and puts forward recommendations for how the international system can better recognise and support the nexus-style work of LNAs.
Topic:: Development, Humanitarian Aid, and Localization
Political Geography:: Global Focus

28. Explain: Inclusion and inclusive humanitarian action

Author:: ALNAP
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: ALNAP: Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance
Abstract:: This is part of the Explain: Essential briefings for humanitarian decision-makers series. In recent years, the humanitarian sector has increasingly focused on marginalised groups such as women and girls, people with disabilities, and minoritised communities. While this shift is both essential and overdue - given the persistent evidence of people falling through the cracks - translating attention into meaningful action has proven challenging. Implementing inclusive humanitarian action is hindered by the absence of an agreed definition, clear policy commitments and a standardised way to measure progress. Inclusion, at its core, acknowledges that different people are affected by crises in varying and disproportionate ways and that discrimination and marginalisation, based on different identity factors, create barriers to accessing assistance and services. Addressing these challenges requires targeted analysis and actions.
Topic:: Humanitarian Aid, Disability, Accountability, Marginalization, and Inclusion
Political Geography:: Global Focus

29. Public Administration and Corporate Governance

Author:: C. P. Chandrasekhar
Publication Date:: 05-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: India International Centre (IIC)
Abstract:: I met Shri B. G. Deshmukh twice, once when he was Cabinet Secretary and the second time when he kindly called on me when I was the Cabinet Secretary. On the first occasion, I was the Chairman of the Spices Board in Ernakulam. A Mumbai-based exporter had complained to him that my policies were keeping the cardamom market very high, thus preventing exports. I met the Cabinet Secretary and explained to him that the exporter was a ‘bear’ in his operations and wanted to use government machinery to bring prices down after he had underquoted to importers abroad. He understood immediately. Meanwhile, the Commerce Ministry was upset that the Cabinet Secretary had gone directly to a field officer instead of to the Ministry. However, I came to understand later that this was Shri Deshmukh's style of work. He felt that it would save time and effort to hear directly from the field. This view was reinforced when Shri Deshmukh called on me after I had taken charge as Cabinet Secretary. This visit was important for me as it gave me a few pointers on how I should conduct my work. Shri Deshmukh told me that it was his practice to visit different state headquarters and meet young officers and hear from them. I followed his lead a little differently. I wrote to all Chief Secretaries, asking them to send a list of important issues pending in each state for want of approval from the Government of India. After I received the lists, I held meetings at which the Secretaries and state representatives were present. In this process, many issues were resolved. Another method I followed was to take plane loads of Secretaries to the weaker states to resolve their problems as fast as possible. The Secretaries would sit with their counterparts and try to solve as many problems as feasible at their level. The residual issues were then discussed at a meeting held by me and we would try to settle them or indicate definite time limits by which they would be resolved. We visited Assam, the northeast, Jammu and Kashmir, Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand for such meetings. A third method which I initiated—and which continues—was to hold annual meetings of Chief Secretaries. All these ideas came to me after my discussion with Shri Deshmukh and his suggestion that work will proceed apace only if there is close coordination between the Centre and the States—cooperative federalism at the administrative level, in short. I will now deal with the dissimilarities between corporate governance and public administration, and how it would be incorrect to think that wholesale application of corporate governance principles, or lateral entry of corporate employees into government, is the solution to transformation of administration. To some extent, my logic has been explained in a chapter in my book (2022: 204–17).
Topic:: Governance, Domestic Politics, and Public Administration
Political Geography:: South Asia and India

30. Digital Data and Advanced AI for Richer Global Intelligence

Author:: Danielle Goldfarb
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI)
Abstract:: From collecting millions of online price data to measure inflation, to assessing the economic impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on low-income workers, digital data sets can be used to benefit the public interest. Using these and other examples, this special report explores how digital data sets and advances in artificial intelligence (AI) can provide timely, transparent and detailed insights into global challenges. These experiments illustrate how governments and civil society analysts can reuse digital data to spot emerging problems, analyze specific group impacts, complement traditional metrics or verify data that may be manipulated. AI and data governance should extend beyond addressing harms. International institutions and governments need to actively steward digital data and AI tools to support a step change in our understanding of society’s biggest challenges.
Topic:: Economics, Inflation, Artificial Intelligence, and Data
Political Geography:: Global Focus

31. Lowering the Cost of Capital for Climate and SDG Finance in Emerging Markets and Developing Economies (EMDEs)

Author:: Jeffrey Sachs, Lisa Sachs, Ana Maria Camelo Vega, and Bradford M. Willis
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment
Abstract:: Today, the world’s fastest-growing economies face the steepest borrowing costs — even for clean energy projects with solid fundamentals. This is not a function of global capital scarcity. Trillions are available. The problem lies in systemic barriers that prevent capital from flowing to where it’s most urgently needed. The high cost of capital in EMDEs not only undermines critical financing for the energy transition and sustainable development; it also limits the ability for US- and EU-based financial institutions to invest in and finance projects in EMDEs, despite institutional and stakeholder appetite and interest for transition finance. This paper provides a holistic diagnosis of the structural forces inflating the cost of capital in EMDEs – including sovereign credit ratings, investor risk perceptions, development finance mandates, and regulatory norms – and it outlines ten actionable solutions to unlock long-term, affordable finance for climate and sustainable development – at the speed and scale required by both global goals and national ambitions. Each of the proposed approaches deserves careful discussion, consideration, and exploration; they are presented in this paper as a roadmap for discussion, including in the context of relevant global discussions on financing climate action and sustainable development, including the UN Financing for Development Agenda, the UNFCCC COP process, and the G20 Sustainable Finance Working Group.
Topic:: Development, Emerging Markets, Climate Finance, Sustainable Development Goals, and Capital
Political Geography:: Global Focus

32. Distinguishing Among Climate Change-Related Risks

Author:: Lisa Sachs, Denise Hearn, Matt Goldklang, and Perrine Toledano
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment
Abstract:: Understanding the diverse types of climate change-related risks is crucial for developing effective strategies to address the global climate crisis. A holistic yet disaggregated approach allows for a comprehensive view of the challenges while enabling targeted responses from various stakeholders. This document outlines three main categories of climate-related risks: planetary, economic, and financial, detailing their relevance to various stakeholders, timeframes, and potential response strategies. This short brief aims to disentangle the complex nature of risk discussions for productive discourse and appropriate risk management approaches for different stakeholders. In practice, discussions related to assessing and responding to climate change risk have conflated categories of risk, confusing discussions and undermining the effectiveness of related strategies. We hope this brief can bring clarity and rigor to analyses of risk and support constructive discussion among policymakers, financial institutions, social sector actors, and the public. We plan to follow this short briefing with a longer report including more detailed analysis, integrating feedback to these initial ideas.
Topic:: Climate Change, Finance, Economy, Investment, Risk, and Sustainability
Political Geography:: Global Focus

33. Pakistan Security Report 2024: An Abridged Version

Author:: Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS)
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS)
Abstract:: Marking a 70% increase from the previous year, Pakistan experienced a total of 521 terrorist attacks in 2024. This intensified wave of terrorism claimed 852 lives, reflecting a 23% rise compared to the terrorism-related fatalities recorded the year before. Another 1,092 people were injured in these attacks recorded during the year. Although terrorist attacks were recorded in all four provinces and the federal capital in 2024, over 95% of them were concentrated in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan. In 2024, a significant increase in militant fatalities was observed during operational strikes conducted by security forces in Pakistan. Compared to 373 militants killed in such operations in 2023, the number rose to 621 in 2024, marking a rise of over 66%. Overall, security forces and law enforcement agencies carried out 158 anti-militant operations in 2024, which was a 22% increase from the previous year. These are some of the key findings from Pakistan Security Report 2024, prepared and released by Pak Institute for Peace Studies.
Topic:: Security, Terrorism, Law Enforcement, and Counter-terrorism
Political Geography:: Pakistan and South Asia

34. Rethinking a Political Approach to Nuclear Abolition

Author:: George Perkovich, Fumihiko Yoshida, and Michiru Nishida
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:: Preventing nuclear war and other existential military threats requires nations today to focus more on politics than on the qualities or quantities of weapons. Yet, many participants in nuclear policy debates do the opposite.
Topic:: Security, Nuclear Weapons, and Military
Political Geography:: Global Focus

35. Biopower: Securing American Leadership in Biotechnology

Author:: Vivek Chilukuri and Hannah Kelley
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:: The biorevolution is upon us. Converging breakthroughs in biological sequencing, engineering biology, and machine learning are ushering in an almost science fiction–like world in which humans can manipulate and even design the building blocks of life with increasing sophistication—for good or ill. In this world, cutting-edge biotechnologies will create organs, capture carbon emissions, restore polluted environments, tailor medicines to a person’s genes, and replace vulnerable supply chains for food, fuel, fabrics, and firepower with domestic biobased alternatives. According to one estimate, existing biotechnologies could have a direct economic impact of $4 trillion a year for the next 20 years.1 As innovation continues, the ceiling could be far higher. If next-generation biotechnologies hold great promise, they also come with gathering perils from new bioweapons, intrusive biosurveillance, and the race for biotechnology breakthroughs without adequate safeguards for public health, the environment, and democratic values. For policymakers, the question is not whether the biorevolution has transformative power, but which nation will responsibly harness that power to unlock new tools for defense, health, manufacturing, food security, environmental remediation, and the fight against climate change. No country is better positioned to lead the biorevolution than the United States, but it requires that policymakers act now with swift, ambitious, and far-sighted steps to secure America’s place as the global biopower. The United States enters the biorevolution with formidable tailwinds—an unrivaled innovation ecosystem, world-leading research institutes, unmatched private investment, talent, and a global network of democratic partners and allies. Recent federal investments and an emerging policy framework have fortified U.S. leadership. But in this fast-moving field, settling for gradual progress will guarantee falling behind as competitors like China race to eclipse the United States with ambitions to scale up their biotechnology research, innovation, talent, and infrastructure. To secure America’s place as the global biopower, the Trump administration and Congress should accelerate U.S. tailwinds through greater investment in biotechnology research and infrastructure, especially in sectors beyond health and medicine; expand the pipeline of biotalent; and lead globally to drive biotechnology norms, standards-setting, and responsible adoption. At the same time, policymakers must navigate headwinds that could imperil further progress—specifically, an underdeveloped national biomanufacturing infrastructure; insufficient public and private investment that flows overwhelmingly to biotechnology research and development (R&D) in the health and medical sectors; a lack of uniform federal standards, definitions, and codes; a morass of conflicting policies and regulations; inaccessible and insecure biodata; and low public awareness and trust in emerging and ethically fraught biotechnology applications. This report outlines several recommendations to shore up America’s position as the preeminent biopower, including an investment of $20 billion in new federal funding. Policymakers should view this level of investment as the floor of what it will require to secure U.S. biotechnology leadership. Cutting-edge biotechnologies will create organs, capture carbon emissions, restore polluted environments, tailor medicines to a person’s genes, and replace vulnerable supply chains for food, fuel, fabrics, and firepower with domestic biobased alternatives. Regardless of what U.S. policymakers do, countries around the world are moving swiftly to embrace the biorevolution. The United Kingdom (UK) is driving innovation by concentrating and sharing its biodata through the UK Biobank, which houses the fully sequenced genetic codes of 500,000 people.2 France has invested roughly $9.5 billion through Innovation Santé 2030 to drive biomedical research.3 Japan has committed $3 billion to promote its biotechnology ecosystem.4 South Korea is carving out a niche in digital biotechnology and aims to transition 30 percent of its manufacturing industry to biomanufacturing within a decade.5 If any nation can surpass the United States as the global biopower, it will be China. In its most recent five-year plans, Beijing made explicit its ambition to become a biotechnology “superpower.” It is well on its way. China’s biotechnology leadership has surged on the back of significant public investment, long-term policy prioritization, a massive domestic market, decades of largely unrestricted capital flows, and the amassing of biodata through licit and illicit means.6 China’s concerted biotechnology push has already paid dividends: its scholars rank second in the world for authoring biomedical papers, and the country leads high-impact research in biofuels and biomanufacturing. China’s high-impact research in synthetic biology is more than triple that of the United States, posing a high risk of monopolization.7 Today, China is a global biomanufacturing powerhouse that exports roughly 40 percent of the world’s active pharmaceutical ingredients.8 Now, China aspires to move up the biotechnology value chain with a renewed push to support start-ups, integrate its vast biodata with cutting-edge machine learning tools, and dominate emerging markets for biotechnology with “national champions” such as BGI Group and WuXi Biologics, as it did with Huawei and 5G. China’s ambition to close the gap with the United States should inspire action from policymakers to secure and extend America’s lead. To that end, this report outlines a series of immediate and longer-term recommendations in six key areas for leaders in policymaking and industry.
Topic:: Leadership, Innovation, and Biotechnology
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

36. Averting AI Armageddon: U.S.-China-Russia Rivalry at the Nexus of Nuclear Weapons and Artificial Intelligence

Author:: Jacob Stokes, Colin H. Kahl, Andrea Kendall-Taylor, and Nicholas Lokker
Publication Date:: 02-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:: In recent years, the previous bipolar nuclear order led by the United States and Russia has given way to a more volatile tripolar one, as China has quantitatively and qualitatively built up its nuclear arsenal. At the same time, there have been significant breakthroughs in the field of artificial intelligence (AI) technologies, including for military applications. As a result of these two trends, understanding the AI-nuclear nexus in the context of U.S.-China-Russia geopolitical competition is increasingly urgent. There are various military use cases for AI, including classification models, analytic and predictive models, generative AI, and autonomy. Given that variety, it is necessary to examine the AI-nuclear nexus across three broad categories: nuclear command, control, and communications; structural elements of the nuclear balance; and entanglement of AI-enabled conventional systems with nuclear risks. While each of these categories has the potential to generate risk, this report argues that the degree of risk posed by a particular case depends on three major factors: the role of humans, the degree to which AI systems become a single point of failure, and the AI offense-defense balance. As Russia and China increasingly aim to modernize their nuclear arsenals and integrate AI into their militaries, it is essential for policymakers to be aware of the risks posed by the AI-nuclear nexus. Dealing with China and Russia on issues at this nexus is likely to be difficult in the current diplomatic and military context, characterized by increasingly strained bilateral relationships between the United States and both China and Russia, along with an uptick in coordination between Beijing and Moscow. Nonetheless, there are still various steps that U.S. policymakers could take to bolster deterrence and stability with respect to these issues. These include: building knowledge and competency around issues at the AI-nuclear nexus; integrating AI into diplomatic initiatives related to nuclear and other strategic risks, and vice versa; establishing and promoting norms for the safe use of AI in relation to nuclear arsenals and other strategic capabilities; developing policy and technical criteria for assessing exactly how and when to keep humans in the loop on all nuclear-related processes; including AI technologies as a factor in oversight and reviews of the U.S. nuclear arsenal; investing in AI-enabled cyber and space capabilities to enhance defense and resilience, reduce incentives to attack those areas, and mitigate entanglement risks; consulting closely with U.S. allies about how AI will shape extended deterrence calculations related to both nuclear and conventional capabilities; and pursuing a comprehensive set of risk reduction and crisis management mechanisms with China and Russia while recognizing the obstacles to progress. Failing to take these steps could leave the country and the world dangerously exposed to risks and ill-prepared to seize any opportunities arising from the increasingly salient AI-nuclear nexus.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Cybersecurity, Artificial Intelligence, and Rivalry
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

37. Assessing China’s Nuclear Decision-Making: Three Analytical Lenses

Author:: Jacob Stokes
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:: China’s rapid nuclear buildup is raising questions about how the country makes decisions related to nuclear weapons. This policy brief analyzes that trend by presenting three overarching analytical lenses, or categories of factors, that shape Beijing’s nuclear decision-making: leadership, weapons systems and military organizations, and official policies and doctrine. On leadership, Chinese Communist Party General Secretary Xi Jinping likely sees nuclear weapons granting prestige and growing in relevance, but his views on nuclear weapons’ efficacy are less clear. On weapons systems and military organizations, the expansion of China’s nuclear arsenal provides the country’s leaders with new options, which could shift those leaders’ intentions over time. Implementation of those options, though, runs through often-corrupt People’s Liberation Army military organizations. On official policies and doctrine, Beijing possibly sees its professed stance as a country that does not engage in U.S.- and Russian-style arms buildups as a source of diplomatic influence, particularly in the developing world or Global South. Separately, the circumstances where China’s nuclear no-first-use policy would face a true test—for example, during a major Taiwan contingency—are precisely the moments when Beijing would have massive incentives to selectively interpret or simply abandon that policy. In the near term, China’s official nuclear weapons policies will likely stay the same, so the gap between rhetoric and action will grow. A bigger arsenal and more nuclear rhetoric and signaling will, over time, also shape future Chinese coercion campaigns. In response, U.S. policymakers should commission an intelligence assessment of Xi’s views of specific nuclear crises, pressure China to issue more explanation of its nuclear policies and capabilities, and expand information sharing about missile tests on a reciprocal basis. U.S. policymakers should also make an authoritative policy statement on what would constitute China reaching nuclear parity with the United States and counter China’s nuclear buildup using both conventional and nuclear capabilities.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, and Decision-Making
Political Geography:: China, Asia, and United States of America

38. Countering the Digital Silk Road: Brazil

Author:: Ruby Scanlon and Bill Drexel
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:: This year marks the 10th anniversary of the Digital Silk Road (DSR), China’s ambitious initiative to shape critical digital infrastructure around the world to advance its geopolitical interests and technology leadership. A decade after its launch, digital infrastructure and emerging technologies have only grown more vital and contested as demand for connectivity, digital services, and emerging technologies like artificial intelligence (AI) expand. Against this backdrop, the DSR has become increasingly central to China’s broader strategy to challenge and ultimately supplant the U.S.-led digital order, and in doing so, reap potentially vast security, economic, and intelligence advantages. To assess the DSR’s impact 10 years after its inception—and explore how the United States and its allies can offer a more compelling and coherent alternative—the CNAS Technology and National Security team has undertaken a major research project that produces in-depth case studies of four diverse and geostrategically critical nations—Indonesia, Brazil, Kenya, and Saudi Arabia—and culminates in a full-length report. The second case study focuses on Brazil. For the study, researchers from the CNAS Technology and National Security team spent a week in the country interviewing local policymakers, journalists, technology firms, civil society, and academics, along with U.S. diplomats, development experts, and companies. Drawing on these interviews and desk research, this case study seeks to shed light on the current dynamics and stakes of the U.S.-China competition to shape Brazil’s digital ecosystem.
Topic:: National Security, Geopolitics, Artificial Intelligence, and Digital Silk Road (DSR)
Political Geography:: China, Asia, Brazil, and South America

39. Regional and Global Responses to a Taiwan Contingency: Gauging the Prospects for Coalition-Building Under Fire

Author:: Jacob Stokes, Kareen Hart, Ryan Claffey, and Thomas Corel
Publication Date:: 05-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:: Acontingency across the Taiwan Strait has the potential to reshape the Indo-Pacific and even global security environment. This report explores how states beyond the United States and Taiwan would respond to a major Taiwan contingency. It defines a major Taiwan contingency as a conflict that might start in the so-called gray zone between peace and war but clearly escalates into a larger campaign that has unification as the near-term objective of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Specifically, the report examines how geopolitical interests, values, and material power might determine the approaches of countries across the region and the world. Regional and global responses to a major Taiwan contingency would depend heavily on structural factors present at the time it happens, as well as the specific circumstances of the situation. The report details four key structural factors that would shape states’ responses: the specific nature of the Taiwan contingency, the global trade and technology landscape when the contingency occurs, Taiwanese and U.S. capabilities and responses, and the spectrum of intervention options. Beyond those structural factors, the response from four groups of states would play a major role in determining the outcome of a major Taiwan contingency. The first group is Japan and the Philippines. Both U.S. allies would be on the front lines of a Taiwan conflict and host U.S. forces but are also the most exposed to military retaliation from China. The second group is close U.S. allies and partners South Korea, Australia, and India. Their locations are farther from the main battlespace, but each would have to consider how its response would affect its own security concerns and relations with the United States in the future. Regional and global responses to a major Taiwan contingency would depend heavily on structural factors present at the time it happens, as well as the specific circumstances of the situation. The third group includes the other states in Southeast Asia. Thailand and Singapore would have to consider their defense ties to Washington, while Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar might get requests from Beijing. Other Southeast Asian states would adopt a studiously neutral stance. The fourth group is Europe and the rest of the world. European states now pay more attention to Taiwan, and many see parallels with Ukraine’s plight. But uneven ties with China and a lack of power projection capabilities would mostly limit direct European intervention. Meanwhile, the developing world would likely side with Beijing. And it lacks the political will—much less the proximity or military power—to come to Taipei’s aid. Several findings flow from the analysis: First, it is unlikely that any other states will come to Taiwan’s aid if Taiwan does not fight fiercely and the United States does not intervene on a large scale. Second, geographic proximity increases a country’s stake in the defense of Taiwan, but that same closeness also makes countries more vulnerable to PRC retaliation. Third, any Taiwan contingency would cause massive economic harm, so states would try to balance protecting their economic interests—especially access to high-end semiconductors—with ending the conflict just to stem the disruption caused by the fighting. Fourth, states’ choices will reflect their national interests and values, but those responses will depend to a significant degree on what others do. U.S. policymakers should take the following actions to best position Washington to mount an effective coalition defense of Taiwan during a contingency, should those policymakers choose to do so: Prioritize preventing a Taiwan contingency. Reinforce with Taipei how much would hinge on Taiwan’s contingency response, both in terms of demonstrating will and capabilities. Expect limited contributions but be creative in exploring what in the spectrum of intervention might be possible. Deepen intra-Asian and Euro-Asian security ties that include the United States. Support and, where possible, facilitate the growth of intra-Asian security ties that do not rely on the United States as the hub. Plan for humanitarian evacuation operations as a means to encourage Southeast Asian countries to think through a Taiwan contingency.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Coalition, and Regional Security
Political Geography:: China, Taiwan, Asia, and United States of America

40. Gender-Based Violence and Sources of Support in the Middle East and North Africa (2023-2024)

Author:: Arab Barometer
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Arab Barometer
Abstract:: According to reports from the World Bank, 40 percent of women across the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) have experienced violence from their partner at least once in their lifetime. A report from the OECD found that violence against women in MENA increased during the COVID-19 pandemic. These findings are in-line with the findings from the most recent Arab Barometer 2023-2024 survey, in which a plurality of citizens from nearly every country perceive that violence against women has increased in the past year. Governments across the region are taking actions to combat the rise in violence but more remains to be done. Despite the dire circumstances, there are points of hope in Arab Barometer’s findings as well. In particular, nearly all citizens can point to at least one source of support for women that face abuse. While citizens are highly unlikely to say a woman facing abuse cannot find support, the most commonly cited sources of support are familial rather than institutional. Specifically, support from male family members is seen as far more readily available than support from hospitals or clinics. Relying on family rather than institutions for support is complicated. At best, a lack of institutional support may indicate that citizens do not view the government as particularly invested in supporting women facing gender-based violence. Increasing institutionalized support through funding and outreach with local organizations or healthcare facilities could provide more security for abused women.
Topic:: Public Opinion, Gender Based Violence, Survey, COVID-19, and Gender Equality
Political Geography:: Middle East and North Africa

41. North Korea, Russia, and China: Past Cooperation & Future Prospects

Author:: Sydney Seiler
Publication Date:: 06-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:: Syd Seiler argues that recent developments in the relationship between North Korea, China, and Russia should be examined within the context of past interactions and North Korea’s geopolitical reality over the past several decades. North Korea’s pursuit of a distanced approach toward China and the Soviet Union during the Cold War, its post-Cold War management of the bilateral relationships while developing nuclear weapons, and contemporary developments within the North Korea-China-Russia triangle highlight limited shared interests and few signs of deliberate trilateralism. Despite skepticism regarding the durability of trilateralism, Seiler warns against neglecting the threat of collaboration and cooperation among the three countries. In particular, the evolving relationship between North Korea, China, and Russia holds the potential to harm the existing balance of power on the Korean Peninsula and embolden North Korea to believe that the use of force might be justified within the New Cold War structure. Seiler outlines three scenarios in which the evolution of trilateralism could lead to North Korea employing military force on the Korean Peninsula, highlighting the critical role of China and Russia in either restraining or encouraging North Korean revisionism. To properly respond to the dangerous transformation of the geopolitical environment, Seiler recommends the United States, South Korea, and like-minded states reinforce conventional and extended deterrence by convincing China and Russia that they will incur high costs for enabling North Korea’s coercive and revisionist behavior.
Topic:: Security, International Cooperation, Nuclear Weapons, Geopolitics, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Eurasia, Asia, and North Korea

42. Siloed No More: The U.S.-ROK Alliance and a Taiwan Conflict

Author:: Clint Work
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:: This project was motivated by and builds upon earlier research tracing the evolution and apparent alignment of U.S. and South Korean signaling on Taiwan, wherein the South Korean government adopted a more outspoken position regarding “the importance of peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait” and framed it in increasingly expansive terms—as a regional and global issue yet also directly linked to the peace and stability of the Korean Peninsula. The previous research indicated the U.S.-ROK alliance faced a gap between its topline diplomatic rhetoric on Taiwan and its preparedness to navigate an actual conflict between the United States and China over Taiwan and the attendant risk of a simultaneous conflict on the Korean Peninsula. This project aimed to go beyond diplomatic rhetoric. Forty-two interviews were conducted from June 2024 to February 2025 in both Washington and Seoul. Most were in-person interviews with some conducted virtually or by written response via email. Through these interviews with U.S. and ROK current and former government officials, think tank experts, and academics—as well as open-source research—this project offers insight on the evolution and state of U.S.-ROK alliance discussions on a Taiwan conflict, key challenges obstructing such discussions, and critical variables or dynamics the alliance would have to navigate in the event of a conflict.
Topic:: Security, Alliance, Conflict, and Regional Security
Political Geography:: Taiwan, Asia, South Korea, and United States of America

43. Untethered Sentiments: How Politics, Visibility, Perception, and Demographic Differences Shape American Views on Foreign Investment and Trade

Author:: Je Heon (James) Kim and Nils Wollesen Osterberg
Publication Date:: 05-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:: The key takeaways from this study are as follows: 1. Impact of Perception on Foreign Investment Attitudes: The study finds that individual perceptions of FDI at the state level play a crucial role in shaping attitudes toward investment. Individuals who perceive high Korean FDI or states where Korean FDI has more visibility tend to have more favorable views toward foreign investment compared to those in states with low FDI or visibility of such investments. This finding highlights the importance of strategic communication and visibility in shaping public perceptions of foreign investment. Simply increasing investment is not enough; companies and governments must actively promote their contributions to local economic growth and job creation to gain broader public support. 2. Variation in Support Based on Country of Origin: While most Americans view foreign investments as beneficial, attitudes differ based on the investing country’s origin. Investments from South Korea, Japan, and Germany, for instance, are viewed more favorably than investments from China and Russia. 3. Political and Ideological Divides in Trade and Tariff Attitudes: The data reveals partisan differences regarding trade and tariffs. According to our data, a substantial majority of Republicans—at the time of this survey—favor tariffs, mirroring their party leader’s policies. Meanwhile, a minority of Democrats expressed similar support for the use of tariffs. 4. Dissonance on Trade and Tariffs: Despite broad support for U.S. participation in international trade, a significant portion of respondents also favor maintaining or increasing tariffs, suggesting support for the theoretical benefits of trade and protectionism. Evidence suggests that partisan or ideological drivers may be at work. 5. Demographic Influences on Trade and Investment Opinions: Factors such as gender, age, income, and education significantly impact trade attitudes. Younger individuals, higher-income earners, and those with higher education levels are more supportive of open trade, while lower-income and older individuals are more skeptical. 6. Reciprocity as a Key Factor in Investment Policy Preferences: Many Americans favor restrictions on inbound foreign investment unless similar restrictions are removed for U.S. investments abroad, highlighting the importance of the reciprocal approach to trade and investment policies. 7. Limited Influence of Job Creation on Investment Preferences: While respondents recognize that foreign investments create jobs, this factor alone does not significantly sway opinions on investment restrictions, as other economic and political considerations often take precedence. 8. Defense Industrial Cooperation and Export Control Concerns: A majority of respondents support maintaining or increasing restrictions on defense-related industrial cooperation, emphasizing national security concerns over economic benefits from defense-related investments and trade.
Topic:: Politics, Science and Technology, Foreign Direct Investment, Trade, and Economic Security
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

44. The fall of Assad has opened a door. But can Syria seize the moment?

Author:: Qutaiba Idlibi, Charles Lister, and Marie Forestier
Publication Date:: 06-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Atlantic Council
Abstract:: For more than a decade, Syria’s crisis has caused unimaginable suffering inside the country and a constant stream of strategically significant spillover effects across the Middle East and globally. However, this dynamic changed in late 2024, when armed opposition groups in Syria’s northwest launched a sudden and unprecedentedly sophisticated and disciplined offensive, capturing the city of Aleppo and triggering an implosion of Bashar al-Assad’s regime. In the space of ten days, Assad’s rule collapsed like a house of cards, dealing a crippling blow to Iran’s role in Syria and significantly weakening Russia’s influence. Now, for the first time in many years, Syria has a chance to recover and reintegrate into the international system. If the United States, Europe, Middle Eastern nations, and other stakeholders embrace the right approach, support the right policies, and encourage Syria’s transition to move in the appropriate direction, the world will benefit—and Syrians will find peace. The work of the Syria Strategy Project (SSP) and the policy recommendations in the report “Reimagining Syria: A roadmap for peace and prosperity beyond Assad” present a realistic and holistic vision for realizing that goal. This report is the result of intensive joint efforts by the Atlantic Council, the Middle East Institute (MEI), and the European Institute of Peace (EIP), which have been collaborating since March 2024 on the SSP. At its core, the project has involved a sustained process of engagement with subject-matter experts and policymakers in the United States, Europe, and across the Middle East to develop a realistic and holistic strategic vision for sustainably resolving Syria’s crisis. This process, held almost entirely behind closed doors, incorporated Syrian experts, civil society organizations, and other stakeholders at every step.
Topic:: Civil Society, Human Rights, Politics, Economy, Crisis Management, Bashar al-Assad, Freedom, and Democratic Transitions
Political Geography:: Middle East and Syria

45. The European Union Growth Plan for the Western Balkans: A reality test for EU enlargement

Author:: Valbona Zeneli, Richard Grieveson, Isabelle Ioannides, and Dimitar Bechev
Publication Date:: 05-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Atlantic Council
Abstract:: The European Union (EU) Growth Plan for the Western Balkans aims to integrate the region into the EU single market, enhance regional cooperation, implement significant governance and rule of law reforms, and boost EU financial support. In doing so, the EU seeks to foster economic development, political stability, and security in the region amid rising geopolitical tensions, while accelerating the Western Balkans’ EU accession process. The Growth Plan holds substantial potential to reinvigorate the enlargement process and counter the stagnation felt by both the EU and the region. Strong points include: Tangible benefits before full accession: Providing stronger incentives for reform. Active involvement of regional governments: Increasing buy-in from local leaders, who must submit their own reform agendas. Enhanced economic integration, greater access to the EU market, increased EU funding, and reforms to governance and the rule of law: Stimulating investment, promoting economic growth, and raising living standards. These improvements would bring the Western Balkans closer to the economic success seen in the Central and Eastern European countries in the EU over the past two decades. Moreover, fostering deeper regional cooperation will not only deliver an economic boost but also contribute to political normalization. If successful, the plan will bolster the EU’s political influence in the region, countering the impact of external actors and encouraging much-needed nearshoring investment from EU firms. However, the plan faces several challenges: Enforceability: Although conditionality is rigorous, with disbursement of funds tied to strict conditions to prevent misuse, there are concerns regarding its enforceability. The European Court of Auditors has already raised reservations. Quantity: Additionally, the financial support offered is significantly lower than what EU member states in Southeast Europe receive. The reforms required for fund access and single market integration are substantial and will demand significant political will and institutional capacity—both of which have been lacking in the region at times over the past two decades. The success of the growth plan will largely depend on its implementation. The EU must ensure rigorous enforcement of conditionality, reward positive reform steps, and increase funding for countries making progress. Civil society in the Western Balkans should be engaged as much as possible to foster broader support and transparency. The EU should also leverage the plan to align with its broader geopolitical and geoeconomic interests, particularly in strengthening its strategic autonomy. Additionally, the Growth Plan should be fully integrated with the EU’s competitiveness, green, and digital transition agendas. For their part, Western Balkans leaders should seize the increased agency provided by the plan. They must take ownership of the reforms they propose, participate actively in EU meetings, and design their reform agendas to deliver better living standards and deeper EU integration for their populations.
Topic:: Markets, Reform, European Union, and Enlargement
Political Geography:: Europe and Western Balkans

46. The imperative of augmenting US theater nuclear forces

Author:: Greg Weaver
Publication Date:: 04-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Atlantic Council
Abstract:: The United States and its allies and partners face an impending change in the threats posed by nuclear-armed adversaries: a strategic environment marked by two nuclear peer major powers. Russia, long a nuclear peer of the United States, will likely emerge from the war in Ukraine—regardless of how it ends—even more reliant on its nuclear forces, which are already the largest in the world. Meanwhile, China is undertaking the largest nuclear force buildup since the Cold War. That buildup will increase the size of Beijing’s nuclear forces by roughly seven and a half times since 2018, positioning China as a nuclear peer of the United States by 2035.1 Meanwhile, North Korea continues to expand and diversify its nuclear arsenal. Although the North Korean threat has been somewhat constrained by the quality of its ballistic missile systems—particularly its intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs)—technical assistance from Russia, in exchange for Kim Jong Un’s material support for the war in Ukraine, could rapidly enhance North Korean capabilities. Finally, the ongoing conflict in the Middle East could prompt Iran to choose to acquire its own nuclear arsenal, presenting a wholly new challenge. A pair of recent analyses of the strategic impact of this two-nuclear-peer environment have sounded an alarm, making clear that this environment poses a qualitatively and quantitatively new threat of adversary aggression and the potential for nuclear war.2 Conducted by bipartisan teams of former senior US officials and other nuclear experts, both analyses concluded—in the words of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States (hereafter referred to as the Strategic Posture Commission)—that the planned US nuclear force “is absolutely essential, although not sufficient [emphasis added] to meet the new threats posed by Russia and China.”3 Both reports emphasized the urgent need to enhance US theater nuclear forces to address the most likely path to large-scale nuclear war: the failure to deter or counter limited adversary nuclear use in an ongoing conventional conflict. Finally, both reports laid out a set of attributes that US theater nuclear force enhancements must possess to effectively address the threat of limited nuclear escalation. However, these reports did not examine in depth the deterrence and warfighting implications of alternative new US theater nuclear systems. This paper examines why the two-nuclear-peer threat makes the enhancement of US theater nuclear forces an urgent imperative. It explains why the planned US strategic and theater nuclear forces are insufficient to address this threat. The paper then presents a more detailed set of political-military and operational attributes that enhanced US theater nuclear forces must possess to effectively counter the threat. Using these attributes, it evaluates the relative deterrence and warfighting value of various potential alternative theater-range nuclear weapon systems. The paper concludes with a recommended future US theater nuclear force structure and posture, specifically, that the United States should field a theater nuclear force that combines an effectively dispersible dual-capable fighter aircraft (DCA) force in Europe with nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM-Ns) deployed day-to-day on attack submarines (SSNs) in Europe and Asia and ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCM-Ns) and/or ground-launched ballistic missiles (GLBM-Ns) continuously deployed in Europe and/or Asia.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, and Deterrence
Political Geography:: Europe, North America, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

47. Why Latin America and the Caribbean matter for OECD countries

Author:: Jason Marczak and Martin Cassinelli
Publication Date:: 05-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Atlantic Council
Abstract:: As global dynamics evolve, Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) are becoming increasingly important partners for the member countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). The region offers valuable assets, policy alignment in key areas, and opportunities for enhanced collaboration on shared challenges. This report outlines how deeper OECD–LAC engagement can contribute to mutual prosperity, resilience, and global stability.
Topic:: Diplomacy, Politics, Economy, and OECD
Political Geography:: Latin America and Caribbean

48. The next decade of strategic competition: How the Pentagon can use special operations forces to better compete

Author:: Clementine G. Starling-Daniels and Theresa Luetkefend
Publication Date:: 01-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Atlantic Council
Abstract:: Strategic competition is likely to intensify over the next decade, increasing the demands on the United States to deter and defend against wide-ranging and simultaneous security challenges across multiple domains and regions worldwide. In that time frame, the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Joint Force should more effectively leverage the competencies of US Special Operations Forces (USSOF) to compete with US strategic adversaries. Three realities facing the DOD over the next decade lend themselves toward leveraging USSOF more in strategic competition. First, the growing need to counter globally active and increasingly cooperative aggressors, while the broader Joint Force remains focused on the Indo-Pacific and Europe, underscores the value of leveraging USSOF to manage competition in other regions. Second, the desire to avoid war and manage competition below the threshold of conflict aligns with USSOF’s expertise in the irregular aspects of competition. Third, unless defense spending and recruitment dramatically increase over the next decade, the Joint Force will likely have to manage more security challenges without a commensurate increase in force size and capabilities, which underscores the need for the DOD to maximize every tool at its disposal, including the use of USSOF to help manage strategic competition. The US government must harness all instruments of national power, alongside its network of allies and partners, to uphold international security, deter attacks, and counter efforts to undermine US security interests. Achieving this requires effectively integrating and leveraging the distinct roles of the DOD, interagency partners, the intelligence community (IC), and the Joint Force, including components like USSOF that have not been traditionally prioritized in strategic competition. For the past two decades, USSOF achieved critical operational successes during the Global War on Terror, primarily through counterterrorism and direct-action missions. However, peer and near-peer competition now demands a broader application of USSOF’s twelve core activities, with emphasis on seven: special reconnaissance, foreign internal defense, security force assistance, civil affairs operations, military information support operations, unconventional warfare, and direct action. Over the next decade, the DOD should emphasize USSOF’s return to its roots—the core competencies USSOF conducted and refined during the Cold War. USSOF’s unconventional warfare support of resistance groups in Europe; its support of covert intelligence operations in Eastern Europe, Asia, and Latin America; its evacuation missions of civilians in Africa; and its guerrilla and counterguerrilla operations helped combat Soviet influence operations worldwide. During that era, special operations became one of the US military’s key enablers to counter coercion below the threshold of armed conflict, and that is how USSOF should be applied in the next decade to help manage strategic competition. This report outlines five ways the Department of Defense should use Special Operations Forces over the next decade to support US efforts in strategic competition. USSOF should be leveraged to: Enhance the US government’s situational awareness of strategic competition dynamics globally. Entangle adversaries in competition to prevent escalation. Strengthen allied and partner resilience to support the US strategy of deterrence by denial. Support integration across domains for greater effect at the tactical edge Contribute to US information and decision advantage by leveraging USSOF’s role as a technological pathfinder. This report seeks to clarify USSOF’s role in strategic competition over the next decade, address gaps in understanding within the DOD and the broader national security community about USSOF’s competencies, and guide future resource and force development decisions. By prioritizing the above five functions, USSOF can bolster the US competitive edge and support the DOD’s management of challenges across diverse theaters and domains.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, National Security, Terrorism, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:: Africa, China, Middle East, Latin America, and United States of America

49. Why democracies stick together: The theory and empirics behind alliance formation

Author:: Markus Jaeger
Publication Date:: 03-2025
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Atlantic Council
Abstract:: Domestic regime type affects both inter-state conflict and alliance formation. Democratic peace theory posits that democracies do not go to war with one another, while democratic alliance theory suggests that they rarely, if ever, join nondemocratic alliances (or alliances led by nondemocratic powers). Empirical evidence strongly supports both theories. The Atlantic Council’s Freedom and Prosperity Indexes further reinforces the hypothesis that economically prosperous democracies tend to align with one another, whereas authoritarian states gravitate toward similarly nondemocratic and less prosperous partners. If these theories hold, they carry significant implications for Western and especially US foreign policy. First, global democratization would reduce the number of potential conflicts, at least among an increasing number of democracies. Second, it would expand the pool of democratic alliance partners, while at the same limiting the alliance options available to nondemocratic powers. This strategic logic underscores the importance of upholding democratic norms abroad and promoting democratization in nondemocratic states. However, advocating for democratization of nondemocratic great powers will be perceived as both a geopolitical and domestic political challenge aimed at weakening their international position and threatening their governments’ domestic grip on power. Efforts to democratize nondemocratic great-power like Russia and China therefore provoke intense countermeasures. If such a strategy is deemed to be too high risk or too difficult to pursue successfully, a less provocative, “peripheral” strategy may focus on fostering democracy and economic development in authoritarian regimes’ weaker, less prosperous partners, thereby depriving them of potential allies.
Topic:: NATO, Diplomacy, Politics, Democracy, and Alliance
Political Geography:: Russia, China, and Asia

50. UK-EU Relations Tracker Q3

Author:: Cleo Davies and Jannike Wachowiak
Publication Date:: 10-2024
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: UK in a Changing Europe, King's College London
Abstract:: Released quarterly, the UK in a Changing Europe UK-EU Relations Tracker assesses relations between the UK and EU as well as relationships between the UK and EU member states. This edition of the tracker covers developments from July to September 2023. On 1 October, the UK government introduced the green-lane/red-lane system to ease the flow of goods between Great Britain and Northern Ireland as part of the Windsor Framework. In the context of thawing relations post Windsor Framework, the UK and EU have reiterated their commitment to making the most of the Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA). The political agreement on the UK’s association to the Horizon and Copernicus programmes was an important milestone. In other areas, the tracker notes that discussions are ongoing. On the future of the relationship, the tracker highlights a growing mismatch between debates on the two sides. Within the UK, the Labour Party have set out plans for building on the TCA in pursuit of a closer trading relationship. The EU, on the other hand, shows little appetite for revisiting the terms of UK-EU trade. Bilaterally, the UK has now signed general statements or declarations with most EU member states. The focus is therefore shifting from formalising relations to maintaining and implementing them. This requires continued engagement, which the tracker indicates can be difficult to sustain at the highest political level.
Topic:: International Relations, International Cooperation, European Union, and Trade
Political Geography:: United Kingdom and Europe

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