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351. Realities, Challenges, and Opportunities: The Arms Trade Treaty in the Indo-Pacific region

Author:
Andrea Edoardo Varisco, Manon Blancafort, Yulia Yarina, and David Atwood
Publication Date:
08-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Small Arms Survey
Abstract:
The Indo-Pacific region, in all its vastness and diversity, presents many international security challenges. It is also a region with, thus far, limited engagement with the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT). Only 11 Indo-Pacific countries are currently states parties to the ATT, and nine states from the region have signed the Treaty but not yet ratified it. Realities, Challenges, and Opportunities: The Arms Trade Treaty in the Indo-Pacific Region—a new Report from the Small Arms Survey's project on the ATT in the Indo-Pacific region—provides in-depth analysis of the differing attitudes to the ATT as well as obstacles that hinder universalization and compliance in the region. Additionally, the Report outlines opportunities for stakeholders to change the dynamic of engagement with the ATT in this critical geostrategic region for major global politics.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Illegal Trade, and Arms Trade Treaty (ATT)
Political Geography:
Indo-Pacific

352. Global Terrorism Index 2024

Author:
Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP)
Publication Date:
02-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Economics & Peace (IEP)
Abstract:
This is the eleventh edition of the Global Terrorism Index (GTI), which provides a comprehensive summary of the key global trends and patterns in terrorism since 2012. The GTI report is produced by the Institute for Economics & Peace (IEP), using data from Dragonfly’s TerrorismTracker database and other sources. In 2023, deaths from terrorism increased by 22 per cent to 8,352 deaths and are now at their highest level since 2017, although they remain 23 per cent lower than at their peak in 2015. Excluding the October 7th Hamas attack, deaths would have still been up by five per cent. Whilst the number of deaths increased, the number of incidents fell, with total attacks dropping by 22 per cent to 3,350 in 2023. Pakistan recorded the most incidents of any country, with 490 attacks recorded. The rise in deaths but fall in number of incidents shows how terrorism is becoming more concentrated and more lethal. The number of countries recording a death from terrorism fell to 41, considerably lower than the peak of 57 countries recorded in 2015 and the 44 recorded in 2022.
Topic:
Security, Terrorism, Peace, Organized Crime, Countering Violent Extremism, and October 7
Political Geography:
Sahel and Global Focus

353. Business & Peace Report 2024

Author:
Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP)
Publication Date:
02-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Economics & Peace (IEP)
Abstract:
This report examines the relationship between a country's economic performance and its level of peacefulness. The key finding is that peace serves as a reliable predictor of a country's future macro-economic trajectory, creating a business environment that provides superior returns to global averages. This represents a valuable insight for informing strategic investment decisions and offering a multitude of applications for businesses and fund managers, including in the design of financial investment products. For corporations it can help to guide investment decisions into markets with lower risk and stronger growth potential.
Topic:
Economics, Business, Macroeconomics, and Peace
Political Geography:
Global Focus

354. Halo, Positive Peace and Systems Thinking 2024: Advancing a Systems-Based Approach to Understanding and Building Peace

Author:
Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP)
Publication Date:
03-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Economics & Peace (IEP)
Abstract:
The Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP) is dedicated to advancing the understanding of the operations of societal systems. To this end, this report brings together research conducted by IEP over the last decade and includes two conceptual approaches that are distinct but highly compatible: Positive Peace and Halo. These two concepts guide the organisation’s research, mission, and theory of social change. In addition, the report covers other related work including attempts to measure national intent, predict future substantial declines in peace, and to measure societal shocks and resilience in relation to the ecology.
Topic:
Economics, Peace, Resilience, and Systems Thinking
Political Geography:
Global Focus

355. Positive Peace Report 2024

Author:
Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP)
Publication Date:
03-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Economics & Peace (IEP)
Abstract:
Peace is more than the absence of violence. Positive Peace describes the attitudes, institutions and structures that create and sustain peaceful societies. It is conceptually related to many aspects of social development and can be used in multiple contexts. In addition to being a transformative concept, it is also a social good. When combined with systems thinking Positive Peace is a transformational concept as it envisages new ways of understanding how societies operate and how to develop thriving communities. Toward this end, the Institute for Economics & Peace (IEP) developed the Positive Peace Index (PPI), a statistically derived measure of the factors that create flourishing societies, which is based on eight Pillars of Positive Peace. The concept of Positive Peace as well as general PPI results, including rankings and changes over time, are the focus of this report.
Topic:
Economics, Sustainability, Resilience, and Positive Peace
Political Geography:
Global Focus

356. Mexico Peace Index 2024

Author:
Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP)
Publication Date:
05-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Economics & Peace (IEP)
Abstract:
This is the 11th edition of the Mexico Peace Index (MPI), produced by the Institute for Economics & Peace (IEP). It provides a comprehensive measure of peacefulness in Mexico, including trends, analysis, and estimates of the economic impact of violence. The MPI is based on the Global Peace Index, the world’s leading measure of global peacefulness, produced by IEP every year since 2007. The MPI consists of 12 sub-indicators aggregated into five major indicators. Mexico’s peacefulness improved by 1.4 percent in 2023. This was the fourth straight year of improvement, following four consecutive years of deteriorations. However, more states deteriorated than improved, with 15 states improving and 17 deteriorating.
Topic:
Economics, Violence, Peace, and Organized Crime
Political Geography:
Latin America, North America, and Mexico

357. Global Peace Index 2024

Author:
Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP)
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Economics & Peace (IEP)
Abstract:
This is the 18th edition of the Global Peace Index (GPI), which ranks 163 independent states and territories according to their level of peacefulness, covering 99.7 per cent of the world’s population. Produced by the Institute for Economics & Peace (IEP), the GPI is the world’s leading measure of global peacefulness. This report presents the most comprehensive data-driven analysis to-date on trends in peace, its economic value, and how to develop peaceful societies. The GPI uses 23 qualitative and quantitative indicators from highly respected sources and measures the state of peace across three domains: the level of Societal Safety and Security; the extent of Ongoing Domestic and International Conflict; and the degree of Militarisation. This year it introduces a new measure of global military capability that incorporates military sophistication, technology, and battle readiness into a single measure. The report finds that many of the conditions that precede major conflicts are higher than they have been since the end of the Second World War. There are currently 56 active conflicts, the most since the end of Second World War, and with fewer conflicts being resolved, either militarily or through peace agreements. The number of conflicts that ended in a decisive victory fell from 49 per cent in the 1970s to nine per cent in the 2010s, while conflicts that ended through peace agreements fell from 23 per cent to four per cent over the same period.
Topic:
Security, Economics, Peace, and Armed Conflict
Political Geography:
Global Focus

358. Multilateralism Index 2024

Author:
Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP)
Publication Date:
10-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Economics & Peace (IEP)
Abstract:
There are growing calls to transform the multilateral system, which is widely seen as being in crisis. Yet solving the crisis of multilateralism requires understanding what that crisis entails. What parts of the multilateral system are in crisis, and what parts are still functioning? Where is commitment to multilateralism flagging, and where does it remain strong? Where is multilateral action failing to translate into concrete results, and where is it delivering? Who is being left out of multilateral engagement, and who is being included? And what are the trends over time? To help answer these questions, the International Peace Institute (IPI) and the Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP) developed the Multilateralism Index. This 2024 edition of the Index assesses changes in international cooperation between 2013 and 2023 across five domains: Peace and Security, Human Rights, Climate Action, Public Health, and Trade. Each domain is evaluated across three dimensions: Participation, Performance, and Inclusivity
Topic:
Security, Climate Change, Human Rights, Multilateralism, Peace, Trade, Public Health, and International Order
Political Geography:
Global Focus

359. China Maritime Report No. 42: Invasion Plans: Operation Causeway and Taiwan's Defense in World War II

Author:
Ian Easton
Publication Date:
10-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College
Abstract:
During World War II, the United States and the Empire of Japan each developed plans and marshaled forces for a climactic battle over Taiwan. Both sides regarded the island as an area of strategic consequence. Code-named Operation CAUSEWAY, the American invasion of Taiwan would have been the largest amphibious campaign in the Pacific Theater and the largest sea-air-land engagement in world history. Strategists in Japan believed the attack was coming and designed a blueprint for the defense of Taiwan and the Ryukyu Islands called SHO-GO(捷 2 号作戦, or “Operation Victory No. 2”), which envisioned a bloody campaign of annihilation. Japanese camouflage, concealment, and deception efforts in Taiwan were effective at hiding many capabilities from American intelligence. In recent years, Taiwanese military officers have drawn lessons from Taiwan’s wartime history to improve their defense plans. They highlight the need to stockpile, update beach defenses, mobilize whole-of-society support, expand underground bunker complexes, and prepare for a long fight and layered defense campaign. One important lesson of this history for the U.S. Navy and Joint Force is that deterrence worked before. It can work again. Under certain circumstances, the United States and Taiwan may be capable of preventing a PRC invasion of the island. But a tremendous amount of hard work will be needed to realize that goal. By revisiting the history of Taiwan-focused war plans, we may better assess current challenges and develop insights that could inform future strategic, operational, and tactical decisions.
Topic:
History, Military Affairs, Maritime, World War II, People's Liberation Army (PLA), Invasion, and Operation Causeway
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, Asia, and United States of America

360. China Maritime Report No. 41: One Force, Two Force, Red Force, Blue Force: PLA Navy Blue Force Development for Realistic Combat Training

Author:
J. Michael Dahm
Publication Date:
09-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College
Abstract:
Since the mid-2010s, there has been a concerted effort to professionalize a PLAN “blue force” as an opposition force, or OPFOR, in maritime exercises and training. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) routinely refers to its blue forces as metaphorical “whetstones” used to sharpen the PLA for a future fight against enemies of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Efforts to develop a PLAN blue force appear to have accelerated over the past several years in response to Chairman Xi Jinping’s decade-long demand for more realistic combat training. This report examines recent developments in the PLAN’s blue force. It comprises four sections. Part one provides background on PLAN efforts to professionalize its maritime blue force. Part two describes the PLAN’s blue force training units. Part three examines companies producing equipment and virtual environments for China’s blue force units, while part four discusses current blue force capabilities. The report concludes with a summary of findings and implications for the United States, its allies, and partners.
Topic:
Armed Forces, Maritime, People's Liberation Army (PLA), and Military Training
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and United States of America

361. China Maritime Report No. 40: Onboard Political Control - The Ship Political Commissar in Chinese Merchant Shipping

Author:
Conor M. Kennedy
Publication Date:
08-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College
Abstract:
Since the creation of the People’s Republic of China’s merchant fleet, the Chinese Communist Party has implemented a system of political control aboard oceangoing vessels through ship Party branches and ship political commissars. This report focuses on the ship political commissar, a Party representative assigned to oceangoing merchant ships, particularly within state-owned shipping enterprises, to carry out political and administrative work in the management of ship crews. Having peaked in authority and power during the Cultural Revolution, the ship political commissar position has evolved over the decades following economic reforms in the 1980s. Despite years of problematic implementation, the ship political commissar system is currently undergoing a revitalization in staterun shipping companies. The position has supporting roles to play in carrying out national tasking such as evacuations of overseas Chinese citizens. Most ship political commissars are former PLA officers. Chinese roll-on/roll-off ferry operators constitute a special case where the ship political commissar may have greater authority in the ship hierarchy and potentially a role in supporting PLA use of those vessels. This report focuses on the ship political commissar system over the last 20 years, providing a needed update on this understudied topic in the English-language literature.
Topic:
History, Political Parties, Shipping, and People's Liberation Army (PLA)
Political Geography:
China and Asia

362. China Maritime Report No. 39: A Hundred Men Wielding One Gun - Life, Duty, and Cultural Practices Aboard PLAN Submarines

Author:
Conor M. Kennedy
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College
Abstract:
Submarine performance is not just measured in technical terms, but also in how crews operate over time. As the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) increasingly deploys its submarine force beyond the near seas on long-distance combat readiness and training missions, studying the force’s human components benefits a broader understanding its overall effectiveness. This report explores work and living conditions, crew endurance, service culture, political requirements, and approaches to resolving human issues in the submarine force. An inherently dangerous and challenging profession, the submarine force has gradually developed numerous solutions to address various challenges to prevent non-combat attrition among crews. Life and duty in the “Dragon Palace,” both an internal joke and the overarching embodiment of PLAN submarine culture, reveals a professional community focused on secrecy, safety, and expertise that is working to enhance its human performance.
Topic:
Armed Forces, Navy, Submarines, and People's Liberation Army (PLA)
Political Geography:
China and Asia

363. China Maritime Report No. 38: PLAN Anti-Submarine Warfare Aircraft - Sensors, Weapons, and Operational Concepts

Author:
Eli Tirk and Daniel Salisbury
Publication Date:
05-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College
Abstract:
The PLA Navy recognizes the importance of a robust anti-submarine warfare (ASW) system to counter adversaries seeking undersea asymmetric advantages, and its aviation component is a key part of that system. This report discusses the PLAN's efforts to improve its airborne ASW platforms and equipment and describes how PLAN-affiliated sources discuss the employment of those assets. The PLAN's significant buildup and growing employment of fixed-wing maritime patrol aircraft in recent years are key indicators of the importance it attaches to the airborne ASW mission set, as is its push to acquire improved sensors on both fixed and rotary wing ASW platforms. PLAN-affiliated authors show that its academic and operational components are coordinating to explore best practices and maximize the effectiveness of these assets across a wide array of ASW scenarios.
Topic:
Armed Forces, Navy, Submarines, People's Liberation Army (PLA), Warfare, and Aircraft
Political Geography:
China and Asia

364. China Maritime Report No. 37: Re-Engaging With the World: China's Military Diplomacy in 2023

Author:
Jie Gao and Kenneth W. Allen
Publication Date:
04-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College
Abstract:
China’s military diplomacy plays a crucial role in advancing the nation's foreign policy objectives and safeguarding its strategic interests. This report highlights a diverse array of activities within military diplomacy, including senior-level meetings, joint military exercises, naval port calls, UN peacekeeping operations, and academic exchanges. Our findings reveal a significant—but incomplete—recovery in China's military diplomacy activities in 2023, following a period of reduced contacts with foreign militaries during the COVID-19 pandemic. Southeast Asia and Russia remain primary partners for China, with emerging strategic importance also seen in Africa, Oceania, and the Middle East. Overall, China's military diplomacy underscores its efforts to diversify partnerships and assert its global influence, emphasizing regional stability and international cooperation in pursuit of its diplomatic goals.
Topic:
International Cooperation, United Nations, Peacekeeping, COVID-19, People's Liberation Army (PLA), and Military Diplomacy
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Asia, and Southeast Asia

365. China Maritime Report No. 36: China's T-AGOS: The Dongjian Class Ocean Surveillance Ship

Author:
Devin Thorne
Publication Date:
03-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College
Abstract:
Since 2017, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has commissioned a new class of ocean surveillance vessel into its order of battle: the Type 927. Similar in design and function to the U.S. Navy’s Victorious and Impeccable class T-AGOS ships, the Type 927 was introduced to help remedy the PLAN’s longstanding weakness in anti-submarine warfare. The PLAN has likely built six Type 927 ships to date, most based for easy access to the South China Sea. In peacetime, these ships use their towed array sonar to collect acoustic data on foreign submarines and track their movements within and beyond the first island chain. In wartime, Type 927 vessels could contribute to PLAN anti-submarine warfare operations in support of a range of different maritime campaigns. However, their lack of self-defense capabilities would make them extremely vulnerable to attack.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Navy, Maritime, Surveillance, Submarines, and People's Liberation Army (PLA)
Political Geography:
China and Asia

366. China Maritime Report No. 35: Beyond Chinese Ferry Tales: The Rise of Deck Cargo Ships in China's Military Activities, 2023

Author:
J. Michael Dahm
Publication Date:
02-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College
Abstract:
This report provides a comprehensive assessment of Chinese civilian shipping support to the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), examining civil maritime-military activities in 2023. As of 2023 and probably through at least 2030, the PLA’s reserve fleet of civilian ships is probably unable to provide the amphibious landing capabilities or the over-the-shore logistics in austere or challenging environments necessary to support a major cross-strait invasion of Taiwan. However, 2023 activity has demonstrated significant progress toward that end. In addition to the extensive use of civilian ferries, this report identifies the first use of large deck cargo ships to support PLA exercises. While not as capable as large, ocean-going ferries, China’s civil fleet boasts dozens of large deck cargo ships and may provide the PLA with the lift capacity necessary to eventually support a large crossstrait operation. This report also discusses other civil maritime-military activities including “surge lift events,” coordination and synchronization of multi-theater events, floating causeway developments, and the dedicated use of civilian ships for intra-theater military logistics.
Topic:
Maritime, Shipping, Logistics, and People's Liberation Army (PLA)
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, and Asia

367. China Maritime Report No. 34: PLAN Submarine Training in the "New Era"

Author:
Christopher Sharman and Terry Hess
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
China Maritime Studies Institute, U.S. Naval War College
Abstract:
Since 2018, there have been significant changes to People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) submarine force training, and these changes have been driven by important revisions to strategic guidance and subsequent directives that focused PLA efforts to enhance its capabilities to operate in the maritime domain. While this guidance is applicable to all services, improving PLAN submarine force capabilities appears to have been of particular interest to senior Chinese leadership. This guidance expanded the PLA’s maritime domain requirements, which demanded that China’s submarine force improve its capabilities to operate independently or along with other PLAN assets at greater distances from coast and in the far seas. This has resulted in submarine training that is more realistic, rigorous, and standardized across the fleet. Though stressful on submarine equipment and crews, these changes to training may ultimately yield a more combat-capable submarine fleet operating throughout the western Pacific.
Topic:
Armed Forces, Navy, Maritime, Submarines, People's Liberation Army (PLA), and Military Training
Political Geography:
China and Asia

368. Senegal’s Gas-to-Power Ambitions: Securing Scale and Sustainability

Author:
Papa Daouda Diene, Thomas Scurfield, Aaron Sayne, and Jessica Obeid
Publication Date:
07-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Natural Resource Governance Institute
Abstract:
Senegal will benefit from generating electricity from some of its gas, but authorities should carefully consider the scale of the country’s “gas-to-power” ambitions and how they relate to its renewable energy plans. This is a pivotal moment for achieving the government’s energy and sustainable development objectives. Recent plans to develop over 3 gigawatts (GW) of gas-to-power capacity by 2050 may face obstacles. Senegal may not be able to extract enough gas to feed the power plants; it may also struggle to raise sufficient funds (at least USD 2.2 billion) to build the necessary infrastructure. A more balanced energy mix, with a stronger emphasis on renewables alongside gas, offers Senegal a more secure pathway, but necessitates a cohesive long-term strategy and international support. Senegal’s participation in a Just Energy Transition Partnership (JETP) has led to increased medium-term renewable power generation goals—possibly to around 1 GW by 2030. To reach them, Senegal’s development partners must deliver the promised financial and technical support. If Senegal realizes only those plans that are published, gas will comprise 75 percent of installed capacity in the long term. The absence of a long-term plan for renewables could lock the country into this large role for gas, inhibiting the intended catalytic effect of the JETP and preventing the government from fully leveraging the country’s solar and wind potential. A more transparent and inclusive approach will help Senegal’s government to refine and implement its energy plans, helping to manage public expectations, foster public trust and increase credibility with investors.
Topic:
Gas, Fossil Fuels, Sustainability, and Energy Transition
Political Geography:
Africa and Senegal

369. Tax Avoidance, Tax Evasion and Trade Misinvoicing: Risks to Senegal’s Mining Sector

Author:
William Davis
Publication Date:
09-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Natural Resource Governance Institute
Abstract:
Tax evasion, trade misinvoicing and multinational companies’ efforts to avoid tax are important risks in the extractive sector, especially in developing countries, including Senegal. Senegal’s extractive governance arrangements are strong in many areas, including in preventing multinational tax avoidance. However, there is cause for concern in two areas: misinvoicing of international trade (imports and exports), and cost inflation by subcontractors in the extractive industries. Quantitative estimates of trade misinvoicing suggest the former is a significant problem for Senegal (including for its mining sector), which could lead to the loss of 1–3 percent of the country’s tax revenues. Authorities in Senegal should address such risks, especially before the country begins large-scale oil and gas production. Unless they do so, revenues from the country’s hydrocarbon resources will be at risk. Measures that Senegal can take include strengthening the tax authorities—especially customs and auditing accounts of extractive industry suppliers.
Topic:
Corruption, Government, Gas, Mining, Minerals, Tax Evasion, and Public Finance
Political Geography:
Africa and Senegal

370. Behind the Schemes: Anticorruption Gaps in Mining Sector Certifications

Author:
Susannah Fitzgerald, Robert Pitman, Matthieu Salomon, and Phesheya Nxumalo
Publication Date:
11-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Natural Resource Governance Institute
Abstract:
Decisionmakers are increasingly looking to certification schemes to provide information on the sustainability of mining operations, yet these schemes have significant room for improvement regarding how they address corruption in their standards. The report assesses the content of the performance standards used by the Aluminium Stewardship Initiative (ASI), the International Council on Mining and Metals (ICMM), the Initiative for Responsible Mining Assurance (IRMA), The Copper Mark, and Towards Sustainable Mining (TSM). Schemes address some topics, such as revenue and payments and anticorruption procedures, relatively well; this may reflect the extent to which legislation and regulations address these topics. Schemes’ standards less frequently covered other issues, such as beneficial ownership and allegations of corruption. Many schemes, and the mining companies that use them, are missing an opportunity to assess the implementation of corporate-level anticorruption policies in mine-site assessments. The quality of certification schemes’ governance and assurance processes is essential to their effectiveness, yet many fall short of best practice. This undermines their credibility. Key governance challenges include the unbalanced representation of different interests within schemes and the risk of conflicts of interest in the auditing process. Decisionmakers risk becoming overreliant on certification schemes as indicators of responsible business conduct, which may be facilitated in part by industry influence over policymaking processes. Certification schemes are not a replacement for ongoing, robust due diligence into the environmental, social, and governance impacts of mining operations, including corruption, and the design and enforcement of robust regulatory frameworks. In a shifting standards landscape where there are efforts to both consolidate and review existing certification schemes, and a moment where the risk of corruption is heightened by growing demand for transition minerals, governments, mining companies, and certification schemes themselves must do more to address the topic of corruption. To do so effectively, they should focus their attention on solutions that will have the most impact in addressing this issue.
Topic:
Corruption, Environment, Governance, Accountability, Mining, Transparency, and Minerals
Political Geography:
Global Focus

371. The Newest Allies: Finland and Sweden in NATO

Author:
Tony Lawrence, Tomas Jermalavicius, and Jan Hyllander
Publication Date:
03-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
Sweden’s flag was raised at NATO headquarters at midday on 11 March 2024, ceremonially marking one of the most surprising outcomes of Russia’s war in Ukraine. In the face of Russia’s aggression and the risks it presented to their own security, Finland, which joined NATO in April 2023, and Sweden had abandoned decades-long policies of neutrality and non-alignment to become the Alliance’s 31st and 32nd member states. Our report examines the consequences of these changes, largely from the perspective of the defence of the Baltic states. Although Finland had developed armed forces to cope independently with any military aggression, the brutality of Russia’s full-scale attack on Ukraine led to a rapid and substantial shift in public opinion in favour of NATO membership, which was quickly embraced by the leadership. Public opinion shifted rapidly in Sweden too, but the debate there was also heavily influenced by Finland’s inescapable move towards the Alliance, which essentially undercut the logic of Sweden’s continued non-alignment. The two countries submitted their applications to join NATO on the same day in May 2022. As Allies, Finland and Sweden will bring great benefits to the security of the Nordic-Baltic region. Politically, their accession will strengthen NATO, including by creating a large bloc of states in northern Europe whose memberships of security organisations are (mostly) aligned and who demonstrate broadly similar security thinking. At the operational level, their accession will plug a large hole in NATO territory, reducing the isolation and vulnerability of the Baltic states and allowing military commanders many more options for preparing for and dealing with a possible conflict with Russia. At the tactical level, they add modern, capable armed forces to NATO’s inventory. Nonetheless, their accession is not without challenges and risks. The most difficult practical challenge for both countries will likely be developing deployable ground forces to meet the requirements of NATO membership. However, perhaps the more difficult challenges related to accession will be mental and cultural. For Finland, these relate to adjusting an independent, highly self-reliant defence model, held in great regard by both the leadership and population, to meet the needs of collective defence; and to the requirement to bolster Allied cohesion by speaking more openly about threats to the Allies’ common security interests, in particular, Russia. For Sweden, neutrality has been fostered not only as a defining element of its self-identity as a distinctive international actor, but also as a necessary vehicle for the development of a unique democracy and welfare state. These ideas are deep-seated and Sweden’s mental transition to Allied status may be difficult and lengthy. Among the risks is that the addition of two strong Allies will encourage other Allies or their publics to believe that deterrence and defence in the Nordic-Baltic region is complete, needing no further attention. A second is that the low-key approach Finland and Sweden expect to take to their membership, at least in the years immediately following accession, may mean that the benefits of their joining will be only partly realised. It would be a missed opportunity, for example, if Sweden declined to take a leadership role in the Nordic-Baltic region. There is also a risk that Finland and Sweden’s commitment to a strong Nordic regional identity, while useful for promoting practical security and defence cooperation, may be disadvantageous to Baltic security if its pull were to result in the diminished engagement of the two countries in the Baltic region. The tension between the two countries northern and Baltic identities has already been apparent in a discussion concerning their place in NATO’s operational-level command structure. Finally, there is a risk that imprecise talk about ‘strategic depth’ that has sometimes been part of the discussion about the benefits that Finland and Sweden bring to NATO may suggest that other parts of Allied territory are somehow less important. This would be unhelpful to coherent deterrence by denial on the north-east flank. While Finland and Sweden’s accession to NATO greatly benefits the security and defence of the Baltic states, it is important that such risks and challenges are recognised, in order that they can be mitigated. We make several recommendations to Finland and Sweden as they continue their integration into the Alliance.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Alliance, and Enlargement
Political Geography:
Russia, Finland, Sweden, Nordic Nations, and Baltic States

372. An Edifying Tale of Keeping the Lights On: Societal Resilience in an Energy Crisis – the Case of Estonia

Author:
Tomas Jermalavicius, Dmitri Teperik, and Karolin Martinson
Publication Date:
05-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
In 2021–23, Europe experienced a major energy shock due to a number of significant factors in the energy market. As a result of Russia’s strategy to take advantage of Europe’s dependency on its energy supply and coerce the EU into acquiescence to Russia’s geopolitical demands, the most important course-changing trigger has been the Russian war against Ukraine. A raft of urgent policy measures passed at the EU and national levels, quick adaptation of the consumers to the price signals, the availability of LNG from the US, suppressed demand in China, and a mild winter meant that a full-scale disaster was averted. However, the previous crisis being less severe than anticipated does not mean the next one will be less challenging. Estonian society’s resilience to future energy crises may determine not only the country’s internal political dynamics but also its relations with key partners, its reputation in the EU, and even the country’s long-term geopolitical prospects. In order to understand how well-prepared Estonian society is for such future crises, this study identifies and analyses the key public narratives that emerged during the 2021–23 energy crisis and investigates how they reflected on Estonian society’s perceptions and actions. The narrative analysis is complemented by survey data, which indicates how the Estonian public viewed various aspects of the crisis and its resolution, as well as the extent to which public sentiment echoes or runs counter to the identified narratives. The study highlights several key shortcomings in Estonian society’s resilience capabilities. Firstly, the lack of constructive responsiveness to warnings about plausible severe risks (i.e., power cuts) and low scores on preparedness for future energy crises show that the Estonian society does not have a mindset of crisis preparedness. Secondly, society’s lack of confidence in the government’s ability to successfully navigate such crises has the potential to undermine the relationship of trust and cooperation in similar episodes in the future. Another breakdown in resilience in the response to the energy crisis was related to the failure to maintain a just and equal distribution of risk, vulnerability, and cost. As the narrative related to the profits of the energy companies—especially state-owned ones—shows, the sense of unfair distribution of costs and benefits was pervasive and highly antagonising. As the survey showed, a responsible and competent media, effective government, and an impartial expert community were the most trusted sources of information with respect to coping with the energy crisis. These actors will have to play an important role in rebuilding the confidence lost during the energy crisis, shaping the narratives that inspire steadfast action for forging a better future for energy and climate security, and improving Estonia’s resilience.
Topic:
Crisis Management, Resilience, and Energy Security
Political Geography:
Europe and Estonia

373. The Practice, Promise and Peril of EU Lawfare

Author:
Steven Blockmans
Publication Date:
05-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
Power generates law and its interpretation, irrespective of whether it serves the cause of international justice. Despite its many shortcomings, the rules-based international order (RBIO) tries to advance that cause. But as a concept, the RBIO is now being rejected by China, Russia and parts of the so-called “Global South” for what they claim is the Western hegemonism and liberal values that underpin it. The fact that these countries have voluntarily signed up to the international covenants that enshrine the legal doctrines to strengthen the sovereign rights of weaker countries, especially in the context of economic relations, makes it hard to sympathise with the argument that the RBIO should be replaced by another concept, especially one that is advanced by autocracies. The RBIO has been partially shaped by the European Union (EU), a community of law that encodes the aspiration of “good global governance” in its constitutional DNA. With the waning “Brussels effect”—the soft power of EU law in shaping international rules and standards, the EU should consider how to instrumentalise the law to protect and promote its foreign policy interests, first and foremost the protection and promotion of the RBIO. This report unpacks the notion of “lawfare” and conducts a comparative analysis of such practices by the US, China, Russia, Ukraine, Turkey and others to assess the promise and peril of the EU using the power of the law to its strategic advantage.
Topic:
International Law, Sanctions, European Union, International Order, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Turkey, Ukraine, and United States of America

374. China’s and Russia’s Aggressive Foreign Policies: Historical Legacy or Geopolitical Ambitions?

Author:
Ivan Ulises Klyszcz, Che-chuan Lee, and James Sherr
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
Beijing and Moscow are among the states across the world pursuing aggressive foreign policies, including towards their neighbours. Beyond mere threats, Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine demonstrated that deterrence could fail, with catastrophic consequences. How is Russia’s war against Ukraine perceived in Taiwan and in the wider Indo-Pacific region? What are the long-standing strategic goals of the Kremlin and the CCP, and what role do Ukraine and Taiwan play in them? International security must guard against new challenges such as hybrid warfare but also prevent the foremost international crime: wars of aggression. Aggressive foreign policies are not the same as wars of aggression, but they are closely linked, as they share a hostile outlook to the status quo. Deciphering the drivers of aggressive state behaviour—between historical legacies and geopolitical ambitions—will help us better prepare against new threats from rival states. China’s aggressive foreign policy seeks to alter the cross-Strait status quo and achieve “national reunification”. While these ambitions are persistent, they also reflect an evolving understanding of Taiwan’s circumstances. Indeed, Beijing has demonstrated both continuity and change in its approach to cross-strait relations, simultaneously upholding the ‘One China Principle’ and pursuing a hybrid warfare strategy to undermine Taipei’s authority. The recent juncture was the 2016 election of President Tsai Ing-wen from the Democratic and Progressive Party (DPP). From early on, Beijing accused the DPP of pursuing Taiwan’s formal independence from China, followed by a cold peace to a more aggressive policy from Beijing. Many of these techniques draw from Beijing’s decades of confrontation with Taipei, and cover a range of political positions, public relations efforts, and ‘grey zone’ tactics. Given the centrality of cross-strait relations for international security, understanding these shifts is critical for adapting to broader shifts in the Indo-Pacific region. Russia’s aggressive foreign policy draws from entrenched adversarial perspectives about the West, as well as recent political developments inside the Kremlin. Despite the Soviet collapse and the transition to Capitalism, Moscow’s security elites still conceive international security through the idea of the ‘correlation of forces’, a Soviet-era concept to describe international relations as a sum-total of society. This wide understanding goes beyond the idea of the ‘balance of power’ by incorporating other dimensions of international power, such as the economy, the state of societies and even psychological factors. Moreover, Moscow never abandoned a sense of entitlement towards the countries that fall within what the Kremlin calls its “near abroad” and has only evolved in how it pursues and articulates this entitlement. Russia’s enduring interests also point to Europe, Ukraine, and China, as well as the broader international order. Putting the aggressive foreign policy of China and Russia side-by-side will enrich the analytical outlook of those engaged in studying these two countries’ foreign policies and the broader regions they are in. These are large topics, and the two chapters of this report offer a concise though comprehensive look that will be of interest to policymakers, analysts, and anybody concerned with the security challenges of today.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, International Order, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Ukraine, Taiwan, and Indo-Pacific

375. Japan, NATO, and the Diversification of Security Partnerships

Author:
Elena Atanassova-Cornelis, Takuya Matsuda, Bart Gaens, and Nele Loorents
Publication Date:
09-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
The US-led military alliances remain an integral part of the defence and deterrence strategies of countries in the Indo-Pacific and Euro-Atlantic regions. Whereas the European security architecture is centred on a multilateral alliance, that is, NATO, the Asian security order is rooted in the hub-and-spokes system – the network of US-led bilateral alliances with key partners in Asia, such as Japan. Bringing in experts from Europe and Japan, this report examines the key shifts in the allies’ threat perceptions and strategic thinking on policy responses. It also explores the rise of informal security alignments designed to address both traditional and hybrid challenges and exemplified by the minilateral-type security cooperation pursued by Japan. Finally, the report zooms in on the growing interlinkages between security in the Indo-Pacific and Euro-Atlantic regions, as evidenced by the deepened security ties between like-minded partners. The report argues that the Russian invasion of Ukraine should be seen as a critical juncture for alliance politics. Military alliances are now increasingly being operationalised to enhance military readiness and effectively generate combat power in case of a contingency. The US-Japan alliance, the report finds, should be perceived as a manifestation of some of the broad and enduring changes in the role of alliance politics in international security, which are observable both in the Western Pacific and Europe. While the US-led alliance remains a key pillar of the security and defence policies of the ‘junior’ allies, notably Japan, the report highlights the allies’ uncertainties about the sustainability of the American security commitments, both in the Indo-Pacific and Euro-Atlantic region. Assessing Japan’s updated conceptualisation of security in the context of the Ukraine war and the rise of hybrid threats, the report detects a sense of urgency in Tokyo to develop a diverse set of capabilities and expand security partnerships. Australia, India, and the Republic of Korea remain a priority in terms of alignment cooperation. At the same time, the changing nature of security challenges is steadily raising the importance of cooperation with geographically distant partners, as seen in Tokyo’s evolving security partnership with the EU and NATO. Japan’s strategic partnership diplomacy exemplifies a broader trend of strategic diversification. Tokyo has been successful in utilising alignment policy to promote an interconnected network and accomplish issue-based, functional cooperation in various areas. From NATO’s perspective, addressing hybrid challenges requires collaboration with various actors, including geographically distant players. Minilateral and multilateral formats involving a small group of like-minded countries can provide NATO with the opportunity to work closely with Japan and other Indo-Pacific partners on specific issues, such as cyberattacks and disinformation campaigns.
Topic:
Security, NATO, European Union, Resilience, and Hybrid Threats
Political Geography:
Japan, China, Europe, South Korea, and United States of America

376. New Russian Immigration to the EU: The Case of the Baltic States, Finland, Germany & Poland

Author:
Igor Gretskiy
Publication Date:
10-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
The political atmosphere in Russia, as well as the September 2022 mobilisation call for military service, made thousands of Russians leave their home country. Although a vast majority of them have settled in post-Soviet countries, a noticeable portion has also taken up residence in EU countries. A recent couple of years have seen significant expert interest in new Russian immigration, so there is no shortage of publications on the phenomenon. However, many of these analyses suffer from substantial flaws. This report aims to provide a better understanding of new Russian immigration to the EU, as well as this group’s prevailing views on the most sensitive political issues. It concludes that the scale of emigration from Russia following the invasion of Ukraine is often overstated. It seems appropriate to distinguish between two waves of new Russian immigration to the EU. The spring wave was apparently more substantial in number and included a higher proportion of political and civil activists, academics, and IT professionals. In contrast, the autumn wave was less “politicised” as many of those leaving Russia were not necessarily opposed to Putin or his war but were primarily motivated by the fear of conscription and the prospect of being sent to the front line. After moving abroad, interest in Russia-related political activities among new Russian immigrants, even seasoned activists, tends to fade. Few remain engaged in political endeavours, instead focusing more on adapting to new realities. Their interactions with associations of Russian migrants from the previous “post-Crimean wave” are sporadic. When it comes to issues related to the politics of EU countries, new Russian immigrants often have a Russia-centric perspective on most of them. This is especially true regarding visa and travel sanctions against Russia. Immigrants remain almost impervious to the argument that for the governments of countries bordering Russia, the absolute priority is their national security and domestic public order, not the transformation of the Russian political regime at any cost. There were several quite sensitive topics that often provoked mixed feelings and even negative emotions among the respondents. The most challenging and almost taboo subject in Russian immigrant communities was donations to support the Ukrainian army. Along with Russian influencers and opposition politicians, most new Russian immigrants are reluctant to get involved in the Russia-Ukraine war, viewing it as not their concern. They largely attribute Russia’s invasion of Ukraine to the Russian government and state-owned media, seeing the Russian population merely as “victims of propaganda” and absolving “average Russians” of responsibility for the war. New Russian émigrés preserve regular contacts with relatives and friends in their homeland but tend to avoid discussing politically charged topics, particularly those related to Ukraine. It appears that they have virtually no impact on the perception of the Russia-Ukraine war and the political attitudes of those who stayed in Russia, and this divide between the two groups is likely to endure. Many admitted that by staying abroad, they are losing touch with developments in Russia. Moreover, most new Russian immigrants see no future for themselves or their children in Russia and are unlikely to return there. A few might consider a temporary return if a trusted leader came to power, but generally, they prefer to live in a free, democratic Russia without taking risks or acting as change agents. Hence, when developing a strategy regarding new Russian immigrants, it is essential to primarily consider the EU’s own security considerations rather than the imagined capabilities of these immigrants. It is crucial to avoid letting the wish for significant socio-political change in Russia cloud objective analysis. In the foreseeable future, Russia will continue to pose serious security threats to Europe, while, as of now, there is no serious indication that new Russian immigration could emerge as a politically influential force back home anytime soon.
Topic:
Security, Diaspora, Immigration, Sanctions, European Union, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, Finland, Poland, Lithuania, Germany, Estonia, Latvia, and Baltic States

377. Russia and China in Central Asia: Potential For Direct Competition

Author:
Maximilian Hess
Publication Date:
04-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:
China is now undisputedly the leading economic partner for the Central Asia region, with trade and investment continuing to increase despite Beijing’s economic slowdown. Russia is still the dominant political partner for the region, but its influence and ability to strong-arm Central Asian states has been significantly dented by the impact of Vladimir Putin’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Central Asian states are now able in tacitly criticize Putin’s actions without significant cost and some have taken advantage of the negative impacts of Russia’s international isolation and sanctions to strike beneficial deals, in particular Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. Moscow remains content in its position, knowing that the lack of democracy in the region and dominance of elite networks in business and politics mean that regional states are still willing to turn to Moscow for political support, as witnessed in the Kyrgyz Republic in particular since President Japarov came to power in 2020. Tensions between Beijing and Russia have failed to emerge, at least publicly, although if the current trends continue the potential for direct competition may increase.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Economics, Strategic Competition, and Regional Power
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Central Asia, and Asia

378. China, Russia, and Power Transition in Central Asia

Author:
Robert E. Hamilton
Publication Date:
05-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:
Since the days of Thucydides, scholars have written about—and policymakers have wrestled with—the dangers of power transition, which occurs when a rising power challenges the previously dominant power in a system. In the 5th Century BCE, this dynamic led to decades of war between alliance systems led by Sparta and Athens. Though Sparta eventually defeated Athens in the Peloponnesian War, the real winner was the Persian Empire, which snatched up territory from the exhausted states of the Hellenic system after the war ended. Much scholarship on the so-called Thucydides Trap focuses on the United States and China, asking if the powers two can negotiate the latter’s rise without conflict. But there is another, more acute power transition underway: that between Russia and China in Central Asia. In the last decade, and especially since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine began in February 2022, Russia’s power and legitimacy in Central Asia has declined in absolute terms. The erosion of Russian power relative to that of China, however, is more important than the decline in Moscow’s absolute power. Power transitions are notoriously hard to navigate and can strain even amicable relationships, turning erstwhile partners into competitors, or worse. The China-Russia partnership is a relatively recent phenomenon after centuries of mostly competitive relations. This means that Beijing and Moscow do not have a reservoir of goodwill built over decades to draw on as they navigate the erosion of Russian power in a region critically important to both. While this power transition is unlikely to lead to outright war between China and Russia over Central Asia, it is already leading to competition between the two, especially in the economic realm. Competition between Beijing and Moscow is made both more likely and more consequential by several unique features of the region. First, it is geographically contiguous to both. Next, both have high-order political, economic, and security interests at stake there. Finally, the US footprint in the region is light, removing a strong incentive for Chinese-Russian cooperation there. The United States is in many ways the binding agent between China and Russia: Where it is present, their shared resistance to Washington’s influence gives them a focal point for cooperation. Where the United States is absent—as it is in Central Asia, at least with respect to China and Russia—that focal point is removed. This report first analyzes Chinese and Russian influence and interests in Central Asia. It then examines how each pursues its political, military, and economic goals in the region. It concludes with an analysis of how and where their interests are most convergent and divergent and the implications for their overall relationship. If Beijing and Moscow can negotiate their power transition in Central Asia and maintain their overall partnership, this implies that the partnership is deep and durable. But it is Central Asia, more than anywhere else in the world, that will test Chinese-Russian ties.
Topic:
Bilateral Relations, Geopolitics, Strategic Competition, Strategic Interests, and Regional Power
Political Geography:
Russia, China, and Central Asia

379. Turning Point or Dead End? Challenging the Kremlin’s Narrative of Stability in Wartime

Author:
András Tóth-Czifra
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:
The Russian government expects 2024 to be a turning point in the country’s war against Ukraine. For this expectation to become reality, the Kremlin is using means of reflexive control: It projects an image of a country that has weathered Western sanctions, ramped up its economic performance, and united a society behind its leader and his goals. This strategy was confirmed by personnel changes executed after Vladimir Putin’s inauguration for a fifth presidential term. The Kremlin’s message masks the costly trade-offs that the Kremlin has created by choosing to pursue a long and costly war with an economic and political system that operates in increasingly tight corners. The past months have seen several destabilizing domestic events in Russia, highlighting the risks of the widespread securitization of public politics, diversion of resources from domestic policy targets to the war, and passiveness of Russian society’s support for the Kremlin’s current policies. The ongoing restructuring of Russia’s domestic economy and economic elite, structural weaknesses created by a military-production based economic growth model, threat of the eventual need for social or military mobilization, and the authorities’ relentless tightening of the limits of public politics and acceptable public behavior represent growing risks for a governance whose sole organizing principle is the ongoing war.
Topic:
Sanctions, Economy, Elites, Russia-Ukraine War, and Regime Durability
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Eurasia, and Ukraine

380. Russian Strategic Culture and the War in Ukraine

Author:
Denys Yurchenko
Publication Date:
07-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:
The Russian invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, shocked the world. Currently, the Russian-Ukrainian war is the biggest European war since the end of World War II.[1] The full-scale invasion was a continuation of unlawful actions in 2014 when Russia seized and temporarily occupied Crimea. Russia’s actions sparked heated debates between realists and liberals while every school of international relations tried to explain why Russia used force to change the internationally recognized borders of its neighbor—Ukraine. In September 2014, Professor John Mearsheimer published the article Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West’s Fault.[2] His work tried to explain the causes of conflict from an offensive realism point of view. Mearsheimer defined the core idea of offensive realism in The Tragedy of Great Power Politics.[3] It is as follows: States—especially great powers—are always thinking about how to survive because there is no supranational institution to protect them. In other words, there is nothing to prevent predatory behavior at the international level. This anarchic system creates conditions for states to seek more power.[4] The best way for a state to survive is to become a hegemon. Although global hegemony is the goal, there are powerful forces mitigating any state from achieving it, so most great powers strive for regional hegemony. Through this lens, Russia’s seizure of Crimea and support for separatists in Eastern Ukraine was part of its attempt at regional hegemony.
Topic:
Armed Conflict, Strategic Culture, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Eurasia, and Ukraine

381. How Sudan's Wars of Succession Shape the Current Conflict

Author:
Alden Young
Publication Date:
07-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:
Since fighting broke out between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the government-sponsored paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in April of 2023, according to the International Rescue Committee at least 25 million people out of a total population of roughly 48.7 million are in need of basic humanitarian aid. The crisis is escalating with fighting spreading to new parts of the country. Perhaps 37 percent of the country is confronting acute food insecurity.[1] Other statistics are also dire. Nine million people have been displaced within Sudan, while 1.7 million have been forced to flee to other countries. Most of the receiving countries such as Chad, Egypt, Ethiopia, and South Sudan are already vulnerable. Initially the conflict was most intense in the capital of Khartoum and in the western provinces of Darfur and Kordofan, but in the last few months it has also spread to regions like Gezira state, the traditional breadbasket of the country.[2] The International Rescue Committee reports that, “Sudan is now the country with the largest number of displaced people and the largest child displacement crisis in the world.”[3] Many migrants who are able to head to the eastern regions of Sudan hope to eventually transit to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates and from there potentially to other destinations.[4] Ever since the outbreak of the conflict the international community has rallied to negotiate an end to the fighting. The United States and Saudi Arabia have teamed up to negotiate at least sixteen failed ceasefires, while the African Union, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, and Egypt have all tried to develop alternative ceasefire and negotiating forums. In January, Mariel Ferragamo and Diana Roy assessed that “negotiation efforts were at a standstill.” [5] Despite the magnitude of the crisis in Sudan a year after fighting broke out, the response from the international community has been paltry. The United Nations has asked for $2.7 billion dollars in order to address the dire humanitarian situation in the country. However, the conflict in Sudan, which is already a regional crisis involving neighbors such as Chad, the Central African Republic, South Sudan, Egypt, Libya, and Ethiopia, has largely been overshadowed by the conflicts in Ukraine and Gaza. To date, the United Nations says that it has received only $424.9 million dollars to address the situation in Sudan.[6] Some of the worst violence during the conflict has taken place in the state of West Darfur. In what many Darfurians experience as reminders of the violence that broke out nearly two decades ago. There have been many credible reports of sexual violence, mass expulsions, and ethnic cleansing. Notably, members of the Masalit ethnic group have been repeatedly targeted as supporters of the SAF by the RSF and their allied militias.[7] The war in Darfur is in many ways a microcosm of the wider conflict, but it also points to the conflict’s direct origins in the long insurgency and counterinsurgency in Darfur.
Topic:
History, Armed Conflict, and Rapid Support Forces (RSF)
Political Geography:
Africa and Sudan

382. Russia’s Space Program After 2024

Author:
Pavel Luzin
Publication Date:
07-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:
Since 2022, Russia’s space program has been in a state of turbulence and uncertainty. However, the deterioration started in 2014 when Russia annexed Crimea and began the first round of the war against Ukraine. Multiple factors have made the sustainable development of the Russian space program impossible: sanctions, an embargo on advanced industrial equipment, workforce shortages, limited financial resources spread among too many projects, cancellation of space cooperation with Western partners except operations on the International Space Station (ISS), and the economic inefficiency of the Russian space industry. The Russian government and Roscosmos are struggling to increase space expenditures, but monetary inflation, cost-plus inflation within the space industry, and devaluation of the ruble do not allow them to reverse the negative trends. Despite these factors, Russia will keep manned spaceflights and the military space program at any cost. Consequently, Russia has two main priorities by the 2030s. First, it must maintain the presence of Russian astronauts in outer space even after the ISS era and without any significant scientific outcomes. Second, it must switch satellite manufacturing from space-grade electronics to relatively simple and cheap consumer-grade electronics. This preference for quantity over quality of satellites would allow Russia to boost its manufacturing of short-lived satellites, which will be replaced quickly and provide the armed forces with communication and intelligence capabilities. In the area of satellite navigation, Russia will struggle to maintain the current architecture of GRusslobal’naya Navigatsionnaya Sputnikovaya Sistema, or Global Navigation Satellite System (GLONASS), and the development of new architecture with less satellites is also questionable. The optimistic scenario is that Russia’s satellite navigation system with new architecture will cover only the Russian and neighboring territories. However, the Russian armed forces use the consumer-grade GPS and BeiDou trackers, so the deteriorating GLONASS is not a crucial problem for them.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Space, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia and Eurasia

383. Advise, Assist, Enable: A Critical Analysis of the US Army's Security Force Assistance Mission During the War on Terror

Author:
John A. Nagl and Marshall Cooperman
Publication Date:
11-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:
The U.S. Army struggled to build capable host-nation security forces in Iraq and Afghanistan because it did not give those security force assistance (SFA) missions the priority and support they deserved. Both the selection and training of U.S. advisors were highly flawed. The Army also struggled to ensure the selection of high-quality personnel into the host-nation forces. Much of the SFA effort was conducted in an ad hoc manner, without sufficient funding or strategic prioritization. Today, the Army has corrected many of the issues that plagued its SFA formations during the War on Terror by creating a permanent Security Force Assistance Command and six Security Force Assistance Brigades. It is essential for the Army to maintain and support these formations to ensure that the bitter lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan are not forgotten.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Armed Forces, and Counter-terrorism
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, Iraq, North America, and United States of America

384. Countering a "Great Jihad" in Central Asia

Author:
Bruce Pannier
Publication Date:
11-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:
Concerns about Islamic extremism are rising in Central Asia. None of the governments in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, or Uzbekistan are commenting publicly about any specific threats. Still, there is a lot of activity aimed at controlling how Islam is practiced and what people say about the religion on social networks in these majority-Muslim countries. Law enforcement agencies are carrying out security operations aimed at rooting out suspected Islamic extremists in their countries, almost certainly spurred by citizens of the Central Asian states’ involvement in terrorist plots and acts outside the region. All this has happened before in Central Asia, but previous extremism or terrorism problems affected only an individual Central Asian country. Now, all five Central Asian governments are taking actions, showing that these fresh concerns are spread across the region. Though these worries are not directly connected to the Taliban, the recent commotion in Central Asia started after the Taliban returned to power in Afghanistan in mid-August 2021.
Topic:
Islam, Counter-terrorism, and Countering Violent Extremism
Political Geography:
Central Asia

385. A "Frozen Conflict" Boils Over: Nagorno-Karabakh in 2023 and Future Implications

Author:
Walter Landgraf and Nareg Seferian
Publication Date:
01-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:
This report has two objectives: first, to present an account of the conflict with an emphasis on analytically useful categories and context up to the present, and second, to discuss local, regional, and global consequences of the latest developments of the dispute, including policy implications and recommendations.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Sovereignty, Territorial Disputes, and Armed Conflict
Political Geography:
Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Nagorno-Karabakh

386. Russia’s Black Sea Fleet in the “Special Military Operation” in Ukraine

Author:
Igor Delanoë
Publication Date:
02-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:
Russia’s Black Sea Fleet’s supremacy on the Black Sea naval theater was contested in the early stage of the conflict. Ukraine’s anti-surface and drone capacities have challenged the Black Sea Fleet’s supremacy at sea, creating a form of sea denial. The Black Sea Fleet adapted its posture to a conflict of attrition. The scope of the missions fulfilled by the Black Sea Fleet has increased over time to include more protection and detection tasks, while active defense remains the general posture at sea. The post-conflict Black Sea Fleet should be more littoralized than before the “special operation.” Lessons already learned from conflict, constraints created by the sanctions, and financial priorities should accelerate the littoralization and the kalibrization of the Black Sea Fleet.
Topic:
Armed Forces, Navy, Russia-Ukraine War, and Black Sea Fleet
Political Geography:
Russia and Black Sea

387. The Realignment of the Middle East

Author:
Lior Sternfeld
Publication Date:
03-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:
In the Middle East, reality can change in the blink of an eye. Misconceptions and misrepresentations that dominate the public discourse have it that the region has been embroiled in war since time immemorial. Still, even its most recognizable conflict—the Israel-Palestine dispute—has been going on for only a century. This report will not focus on the history of that conflict but instead will try to analyze the realignment of the key players in the region and beyond and point out several pathways to build on in securing peace. Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has been the sole global superpower. The change in world politics and the demise of the Soviet Union did not end the perception of alliances as zero-sum games. The War on Terror, the debacle of Iraq and Afghanistan, the rise of movements such as al-Qaeda and the Islamic State, the Arab Spring, and the collapse of old state structures, somehow fortified this approach over a more nuanced and pragmatic approach. Since the early 1990s, China entered as a secondary force and slowly gained a different status. This report examines the changes the Chinese doctrine might bring to the geopolitics in the region. Furthermore, it will examine the role China has played in the reshaping of the Middle East as a multipolar region, the transformation in the American role, and identify areas where the United States can take advantage of the new multipolarity in the region in light of Chinese activity.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, History, and Realignment
Political Geography:
China, Middle East, and United States of America

388. Russian Women in the Face of War Against Ukraine

Author:
Egle Murauskaite
Publication Date:
03-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:
Consider the following pieces of a puzzle. Russia’s war against Ukraine has revealed stories about the heroic resistance efforts of Ukrainian women[1]: from a grandmother launching a pickle jar against a drone[2] to volunteers with territorial defense units.[3] However, comparable stories have been entirely lacking on Russia’s side: How come? Here is another piece: the stories of rape and abuse in Russian-occupied Ukrainian territories have shaken the world, with male Russian soldiers featured as systematic perpetrators of war crimes.[4] Were there any female soldiers or pro-Russian civilians involved? The historical background of multiple conflicts across continents does suggest an active women’s role as perpetrators of war crimes (including rape) and terrorism, not only victims.[5] Perhaps it is only a matter of time until stories of Russian women involved in these crimes start to emerge. How do these pieces fit together? I delve into these narratives in an information environment that is still extremely limited (particularly in terms of Russian-language sources)
Topic:
Women, Armed Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

389. Paralysis versus Obedience: China’s Local Policymakers’ Strategic Adaptation To Political centralization

Author:
Jessica C. Teets
Publication Date:
03-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:
Under the concept of “top-level design,” President Xi Jinping has repurposed institutions to eliminate problems caused by local discretion such as corruption and policy implementation gaps. Increasing centralization of policy and strict penalties for lack of compliance is resulting in local officials no longer experimenting with policy to solve local governance problems and instead focusing more on documenting procedures. These strategic adaptations lead to erratic policy swings between paralysis and overcompliance at the local level, and an increasingly rigid and unresponsive policy process. Although these institutional changes are resulting in less corruption and more standardized governance (rule by law), they also reduce the local feedback and policy autonomy that constructed a more durable system than normally seen in authoritarian regimes (so-called “resilient authoritarianism”).
Topic:
Corruption, Xi Jinping, Centralization, and Strategic Adaptation
Political Geography:
China and Asia

390. Russia and China in Central Asia

Author:
Bruce Pannier
Publication Date:
04-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:
The two countries that have the greatest influence in Central Asia are Russia and China. Moscow and Beijing have common interests in Central Asia, foremost are security interests connected to sharing long borders with a mainly Muslim region that itself borders Afghanistan. However, both these giant neighbors view Central Asia differently. Russia and China each have their own purposes in Central Asia, some of which do not affect the other, but some that at the least make the other country uncomfortable. Since Russia launched its full-scale war in Ukraine, these Sino-Russian rifts are becoming more pronounced. Russia and China want the current status quo in Central Asia, and that is the reason both countries have been concerned by the three revolutions in Kyrgyzstan since 2005. Moscow and Beijing know the top people in the Central Asian governments and have established security and business ties in all five countries. Neither China nor Russia want their relationships with individual Central Asian states to change, and neither wants to see the arrival of strong outside competitors for influence in Central Asia as was the case when the United States and its allies suddenly increased their presence in Central Asia for the campaign in Afghanistan in the years after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in the United States.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Strategic Interests, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Central Asia, Eurasia, and Asia

391. Kyrgyzstan: Central Asia's Island of Democracy Sinks into Authoritarianism

Author:
Bruce Pannier
Publication Date:
04-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:
In the early 1990s, Kyrgyzstan was often referred to as an “island of democracy” in Central Asia. The “island’s” shores have receded over the years, but relative to its neighbors, Kyrgyzstan remained the most democratic country. Three distinguishing features of Kyrgyzstan include an active political opposition, a vibrant civil society, and independent media outlets. The current government is eliminating all three of those distinctions. Political opposition leaders have been jailed, civil society has been intimidated and prevented from holding public meetings, and independent media have been taken to court and their websites blocked. Worse might be coming soon. Domestic and international criticisms and appeals that swayed previous Kyrgyz governments are having no effect in persuading those currently in power to turn away from their present course. Kyrgyzstan is set to join the club of authoritarian governments in the region. The country is almost there already.
Topic:
Authoritarianism, Domestic Politics, and Democratic Backsliding
Political Geography:
Central Asia and Kyrgyzstan

392. Critical Minerals and Great Power Competition: An Overview

Author:
Jiayi Zhou and André Månberger
Publication Date:
10-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)
Abstract:
With global politics increasingly fractured, states are rushing to secure critical and strategic mineral supply chains. Each state conceptualizes mineral security differently, driven by a mix of imperatives that range from national development and industrial policy to technological and military dominance. Great power competition pervades all of these issue areas, and that competition may also pose risks at the global level: risks for the pace of green transition, risks of geoeconomic escalation and risks of conflict. This report provides an insightful overview of the mineral security policies of four key powers: China, the European Union, Russia and the United States. It describes the distinct ways in which they conceptualize mineral security, comparing their priority lists of critical and strategic minerals. It considers the wider imperatives that motivate their policies and assesses the implications for developing countries. The report concludes by reflecting on the need to mitigate the worst of the resultant risks through expanded dialogue with a wider set of stakeholders. The goal is a form of mineral security that can serve more broad-based, global developmental interests.
Topic:
European Union, Strategic Competition, Green Transition, Critical Minerals, and Great Powers
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, and United States of America

393. Cyber Risk Reduction in China, Russia, the United States and the European Union

Author:
Lora Saalman, Fei Su, and Larisa Saveleva Dovgal
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)
Abstract:
This report provides an overview of cyber risk reduction terminology and regulatory measures within China, Russia, the United States and the European Union. It finds, among other things, that China and Russia excel at clear visuals and steps, yet they also tend to lack linguistic clarity. China, the USA and the EU possess interagency and public–private sector coordination, while facing jurisdictional overlap. All four actors are securing their supply chains, yet China and Russia face challenges with burdensome penalties for non-compliance, and the USA and the EU confront obstacles to enforcement at the state and member-state levels. This report is intended to provide a baseline for engagement among China, Russia, the USA and the EU on their respective approaches to cyber risk reduction.
Topic:
European Union, Cybersecurity, Public-Private Partnership, and Risk Assessment
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, and United States of America

394. Navigating Security Dilemmas in Indo-Pacific Waters: Undersea Capabilities and Armament Dynamics

Author:
Tytti Erästö, Fei Su, and Wilfred Wan
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)
Abstract:
This paper examines the drivers and implications of naval build-ups in the Indo-Pacific, considering key actors’ security objectives and threat perceptions, as well as the interplay of regional dynamics and strategic relations between nuclear-armed states. The focus is on undersea armament involving submarines and anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capabilities, which constitute a significant focus of military investments. The paper considers the related horizontal and vertical escalation risks, meaning a potential increase in the scope and scale of conflict. Particular attention is paid to nuclear-conventional entanglement related to the counterforce potential of ASW capabilities. In addition to seeking to raise awareness of these dynamics, the paper provides recommendations aimed at mitigating the risks related to the increased undersea activities in the Indo-Pacific.
Topic:
National Security, Strategic Stability, Submarines, and Threat Perception
Political Geography:
Indo-Pacific

395. Getting Ukraine to a Position of Strength: A Strategy for the Trump Administration

Author:
Luke Coffey
Publication Date:
11-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Below are five reasons why Ukraine is important to US interests. 1. Protecting the US economy. North America and Europe account for nearly half of the world’s GDP. Two-thirds of foreign investment into the US comes from Europe, and 48 states export more to Europe than to China. This supports millions of American jobs. European stability, which Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine undermines, benefits the US economy and, by extension, the American worker. Aiding Ukraine helps preserve that stability. 2. Detering Chinese aggression. Russia is China’s junior partner. A weakened or defeated Russia means a weaker China. Beijing is watching how the West supports Ukraine. A strong and victorious Ukraine makes Taiwan appear stronger and deters Chinese aggression. 3. Succeeding in great power competition. Russia’s war against Ukraine is central to America’s great power competition against the Russia–China–Iran–North Korea axis. North Korea has provided 10,000 soldiers, millions of artillery shells, and hundreds of missiles to Russia in exchange for military technology. Meanwhile, Iran provides Russia with drones and ballistic missiles in exchange for fighter jets and other advanced capabilities. China’s technical, economic, and diplomatic support for Russia enables all this as part of Beijing’s strategy to undermine the US. 4. Preparing the US military enterprise for twenty-first-century warfare. Support for Ukraine has exposed major shortcomings in the US defense industrial base that can now be fixed. The war has also tested American-made military hardware in a way not possible in peacetime—with no American casualties. The US is learning what works, what does not work, and how systems evolve in combat. And as Ukraine receives US weapons, America replaces its own weapons stocks with newer, more effective systems. 5. Demonstrating strength. A successful Ukraine demonstrates American strength. However, acquiescing to Putin and abandoning partners shows the world American weakness. Even forcing Ukraine into a deal that lopsidedly benefits Russia would embolden US adversaries and cause America’s allies to hedge toward other security arrangements.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Economy, Deterrence, Donald Trump, Strategic Competition, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America

396. Key Takeaways: The Future of US and Allied Hypersonic Missile Programs

Author:
Rebeccah L. Heinrichs
Publication Date:
10-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Hudson Institute and Space Foundation cohosted a workshop with Congressmen Doug Lamborn (R-CO), Vince Fong (R-CA), and Donald Norcross (D-NJ), Admiral James A. Winnefeld Jr., and former Office of the Secretary of Defense officials Mike White and John Plumb to discuss the future of the United States military’s hypersonic missile and missile defeat programs.
Topic:
Defense Policy, National Security, Missile Defense, and Hypersonic Weapons
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

397. US-India Economic Ties: To the Next Level and Beyond

Author:
Aparna Pande
Publication Date:
10-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
This executive summary outlines the key recommendations for policymakers that emerged from deliberations at the Takshashila Institution–Hudson Institute roundtable series “US-India Economic Ties: To the Next Level and Beyond.” Its recommendations are divided into four proposed areas for collaboration between India and the United States: trade and investment, ideas and human capital, technology, and methods and mechanisms.
Topic:
Economics, Science and Technology, Bilateral Relations, Investment, and Trade
Political Geography:
South Asia, India, North America, and United States of America

398. Understanding and Countering China’s Global South Strategy in the Indo-Pacific

Author:
John Lee
Publication Date:
09-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
While the United States and advanced economies and democracies in Europe and Asia are hardening their views of and position against China, the latter is gaining much ground with respect to the developing economies of the Global South. Indeed, China increasingly demands that developing nations base their discourse and policies on approaches that Beijing supports, and many Global South nations are increasingly complying. In other words, a growing number of these nations have started to alter and adopt discourse and policies that better align with Chinese demands and preferences. In the Indo-Pacific, a region that will largely determine the future shape of the global strategic landscape, evidence shows that developing nations are absorbing Chinese norms and preferences and gradually adjusting their thinking and behaviors accordingly. China’s progress vis-à-vis the Global South—especially in the Indo-Pacific—relies on what material inducements and opportunities Beijing can offer. These are most successful when they prioritize rapid development and regime security over liberal economic rules and individual rights. Meanwhile, regardless of where the fault lies, many developing nations do not believe they have benefited as much materially or institutionally from the US-led order as they would like or expect. Members of the Global South often believe the Chinese narrative about the alleged failure of US-led globalization in the post-colonial and post–Cold War periods. For this reason, many in developing economies believe that the interests and values of these nations (or at least those of the regimes in power) better align with what China is promising than with what Washington is delivering. The US and allies such as Japan and Australia have to accept and respond to this reality. This report analyzes and assesses why and how China is making worrying progress when it comes to shaping and influencing the policies and actions of developing economies in the Indo-Pacific. It explains why this is a significant problem for the US and its allies. It then offers some recommendations to counter the Chinese Global South strategy in the region. In offering six recommendations, this report argues that the US can complicate China’s bid for leadership within the Global South, increase the cost and risk for Beijing, challenge and change narratives and discourse favoring China in the Global South, and compete more effectively in the normative and institutional context.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Economics, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
China, Global South, and Indo-Pacific

399. The US Should Support the National Resistance Front of Afghanistan

Author:
Luke Coffey
Publication Date:
08-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
More than three years ago, the Taliban swept back into power in Afghanistan after a two-decade insurgency against the internationally backed Afghan government. Since then, the situation in Afghanistan has deteriorated considerably. The country faces an acute humanitarian crisis affecting millions and has once again become a haven for transnational terrorism. This tragic outcome was not inevitable, and it is worth reviewing recent history. Starting in 2014, United States troops in Afghanistan were no longer leading daily combat operations but were instead primarily training the Afghan military. When President Donald Trump entered office in January 2017, there were only 11,000 US troops in Afghanistan conducting the counterterrorism and training mission. This was down from a peak of 100,000 troops in 2010–11. In February 2020, Trump agreed to a deal with the Taliban that would have seen the phased withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan by May 2021. This agreement was the starting point of the Afghan government’s collapse and the Taliban’s return to power in August 2021. In January 2021, when President Joe Biden entered office, there were only 2,500 US troops in Afghanistan. Crucially, the US still provided close air support for Afghan forces. While this was not enough troops to ensure that the Afghan government could control the whole country, it was enough for the US to meet its counterterrorism objectives and prevent the Taliban from taking power. Instead of canceling the flawed withdrawal agreement with the Taliban—something that was in Biden’s power to do—the president merely delayed the date from May to September. On July 2 the US departed the strategically located and geopolitically important Bagram Airfield in the middle of the night without warning its Afghan partners. Around the same time, the US stopped providing Afghan troops with close air support. By the end of July, almost all US and international forces had left the country. On August 6, 2021, the Taliban captured Zaranj, the capital of Nimroz Province. This was the first time in almost 20 years that the terror group had successfully captured and held one of Afghanistan’s 34 provincial capitals. Soon after, government-controlled capitals started falling like dominos. The Taliban finally captured Kabul on August 15. By September 11—the twentieth anniversary of the 9/11 attacks—the Taliban controlled more of Afghanistan than it did on that day in 2001. Since the Taliban’s return to power, only one credible and non-extremist group has been willing to take up arms in opposition: the National Resistance Front (NRF) of Afghanistan, led by Ahmad Massoud. Based in the Panjshir Province and operating in more than a dozen other provinces, the NRF has continued to fight against the Taliban against all odds and without any international support. Though there is no longer an American presence in Afghanistan, the country remains geopolitically important. Afghanistan’s location in the heart of the Eurasian landmass has made it strategically significant in great power competition throughout the nineteenth, twentieth, and twenty-first centuries. There is no reason to assume this will change anytime soon. The Biden administration’s actions have left the US without many good policy options in Afghanistan. Furthermore, many Afghans remain distrustful of the White House. But a new US administration will have an opportunity to reset American policy toward the country.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Human Rights, Terrorism, Taliban, Democracy, and National Resistance Front
Political Geography:
Afghanistan and South Asia

400. The Rise of the Free and Open Indo-Pacific and the Challenge of Deterrence

Author:
Kenneth R. Weinstein and William Chou
Publication Date:
08-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
The late Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe first introduced the concept of a free and open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) in July 2016. Over the past eight years, FOIP has redefined the geopolitics of Asia, becoming central to the strategic visions of Japan, the United States, Australia, India, South Korea, key European nations, and the European Union. Every nation that has adopted FOIP has developed its own version of the concept. But FOIP still repositions the strategic geography of Asia, broadening the region from the Asia-Pacific, which placed a dominant China at the center, to the Pacific and Indian Oceans. This shift highlights the critical role of the four large democracies that comprise the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad)—Japan, India, the US, and Australia—a partnership the states revived with the ascent of FOIP. FOIP, moreover, offers a conceptual counter to the strategy of China’s One Belt, One Road (also known as the Belt and Road Initiative, or BRI) by engaging Australia and Europe on the importance of economic development assistance for, and investment in, Southeast Asia. The Trump administration’s rapid adoption of FOIP—the first time an ally’s strategic concept became central to US grand strategy—deepened America and Japan’s strategic alignment, which encouraged Tokyo to become more engaged in security and encouraged the US to become more engaged in economic development. The concept has made immense contributions to Indo-Pacific connectivity, prosperity, peace, and security. It has also been central to the Biden administration’s efforts to move away from the traditional hub-and-spoke alliance in which US partners worked directly with Washington as the hub but not with not each other, toward a lattice architecture in which like-minded allies (such as Australia, Japan, South Korea and the Philippines) are linked to each other in a mutually reinforcing effort to meet the region’s security challenges. However, a Hudson Institute tabletop exercise conducted for this study showed the limitations of FOIP as a strategic doctrine. Specifically, it cannot induce either friendly or less-friendly ASEAN countries to openly aid Taiwan if the People’s Republic of China seeks either to invade or impose a blockade. FOIP, nonetheless, remains central to promoting prosperity and connectivity in the Indo-Pacific. In the aftermath of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Prime Minister Fumio Kishida of Japan refashioned FOIP and focused on promoting agreement around minimal international norms that Russia violated. To enhance regional trust, Kishida highlighted an “Indo-Pacific way,” which would enhance regional resilience by mitigating natural disasters through cooperation under Japanese leadership and enhancing maritime security. Herein lies the security paradox behind FOIP: The concept can extend the network of partners and allies dedicated to Indo-Pacific security. This, in turn, may reduce the burden America bears by shifting it to other nations. But for the time being, FOIP rests upon the foundation of US deterrence.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Alliance, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Japan, India, Australia, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific