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402. How China Regards its Future in the World
- Author:
- Marcos Caramuru and Philip Yang
- Publication Date:
- 04-2021
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Brazilian Center for International Relations (CEBRI)
- Abstract:
- China’s post-Covid plans regarding national investment and foreign policy are ambitious and its success depends on the ability to build trustworthy relations with its Asian neighbors and the great powers. The XXII China Analysis Group meeting gathered experts to discuss China’s positioning and the ways in which it could overcome challenges and aim for a positive bilateral agenda with the USA during the Biden administration.
- Topic:
- International Relations, Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Investment, and COVID-19
- Political Geography:
- China, Asia, and United States of America
403. Reforms and Opening of China's Financial System
- Author:
- Marcos Caramuru, Kamila Aben Athar, Karin Vazquez, and Yan Lan
- Publication Date:
- 05-2021
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Brazilian Center for International Relations (CEBRI)
- Abstract:
- China has been the country to better recover from the economic crisis of the pandemic. Its FDI increase, many trade agreements being signed and the Chinese Central Bank deciding to launch a new digital currency are some of the highlights. However, there are still challenges on the horizon and the main one is the relationship with the United States, which has hit a historic low point. Future Beijing-Washington talks, and the results of the many internal and external economic reforms will define China’s role for the next few years. The report summarizes the main finding, analysis and conclusion of the XXIII China Analysis Group Meeting, with the participation of Yan Lan, CEO of Lazard, Anna Jaguaribe, Ambassador Marcos Caramuru and Karin Vazquez.
- Topic:
- Reform, Finance, and Economic Crisis
- Political Geography:
- China, Asia, and United States of America
404. Directions of Innovation Policy: Contrasting Views of China and the US
- Author:
- Anna Jaguaribe and Kamila Aben Athar
- Publication Date:
- 08-2021
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Brazilian Center for International Relations (CEBRI)
- Abstract:
- At the 24th China Analysis Group Meeting, experts analyzed the contrasting views of innovation policies in China and in the United States. The 14th five-year plan continues most of the economic efforts that characterized the last decade while also challenging some certain well-established elements. Internet development is still the dominant focus, but we can also observe the shift towards a service-based economy and high investment in infrastructure. According to the participants, one of the most relevant differences between the US and China is the way non-state actors are connected to the national government. American innovation efforts heavily feature research groups and private corporations having an active role, while in China the government puts up barriers that distort the market and influence it more directly. The tension between the two countries is stronger than ever and the new Biden administration brings a new set of uncertainties to the table, but at the same time, both China and the US are heavily dependent on each other economically. China’s efforts to expand its influence worldwide by negotiating with multiple countries will most likely exacerbate the conflict and talks regarding a decoupling, which currently seems unlikable.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, Economics, Markets, Infrastructure, and Innovation
- Political Geography:
- China, Asia, and United States of America
405. Risky Business: Future Strategy and Force Options for the Defense Department
- Author:
- Stacie L. Pettyjohn, Becca Wasser, and Jennie Matuschak
- Publication Date:
- 07-2021
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
- Abstract:
- Despite the overarching strategic priorities laid out by the Biden administration and initial indicators provided by the Department of Defense (DoD), it is unclear how the next National Defense Strategy (NDS) will prioritize threats and the primary role of the U.S. military. Will the DoD clearly preference China (and to a lesser extent Russia)? Or will it hedge and try to more equally meet the expanded list of threats detailed in the Interim National Security Strategic Guidance? Is the Pentagon’s priority to compete below the threshold of armed conflict, or is it to prepare to defeat a great-power adversary in a large-scale war to strengthen deterrence? Answering these questions is critical to developing a clear strategy that emphasizes the right priorities, activities, and resources. To consider the next defense strategy and the tradeoffs associated with different options, we developed three possible strategies—high-end deterrence, day-to-day competition, and full-spectrum competition—that alter the factors highlighted above and reflect the Biden administration’s stated priorities. Our analysis of the Fiscal Year (FY) 2022 budget indicates that the DoD is trying to do more than constrained budgets can support over the next few years and is moving toward what we term as a strategy of “full-spectrum competition.” It appears as if the Biden administration is pursuing a strategy that seeks to strike a balance between competing in the near term while still enhancing preparedness for great-power conflict, as well as hedging against a range of threats and mitigating risk over time. The forces and posture that are necessary for this competition are quite different from those that are needed to defend against a conventional fait accompli attack by China on Taiwan or Russia on the Baltics. It is unlikely that the United States can build a force that can achieve both of these objectives with the current topline. Our testing of the budget-constrained force associated with the full-spectrum competition strategy finds that it could not successfully fulfill its two primary aims: defeating sub-conventional aggression and Russian and Chinese gray zone tactics, and building a force capable of defeating a great-power adversary attack on its neighbor. Moreover, this strategy risks significant overstretch, the potential for long-term technological overmatch, and inadvertent escalation. The other two strategies focus on China, but day-to-day competition emphasizes the daily military contest with Beijing and the threat of sub-conventional conflict, while high-end deterrence focuses on defeating conventional aggression and achieving a long-term military technological advantage. The day-to-day competition strategy would lose a high-end conflict in East Asia and Europe; it also would fail to halt or overturn sub-conventional land grabs. The competition strategy bets that a large and visible force that actively contests daily military provocations will deter both sub-conventional and conventional aggression, even if the force is not capable of stopping either type of attack. The risk that this assumption fails grows over time because this strategy forgoes investments in advanced technologies, while China and Russia are rapidly seeking to wrest the military technological advantage from the United States. There are also significant escalatory risks associated with an approach that regularly and assertively contests Chinese and Russian forces. We conclude that it is unlikely that competition can be won by the military, even one optimized to face this challenge. More optimistically, our analysis suggests that it is possible to build a force capable of winning one big conflict and overturning sub-conventional aggression with this topline—but only if the department is willing to accept some near-term risk in competition, against other threats, and in other regions. The high-end deterrence strategy mitigates the temporal risk by making near-term improvements in combat capabilities, including expanding stockpiles of preferred long-range munitions, investments to improve the resiliency of U.S. posture in the Indo-Pacific and Europe, and additional investments in cyber and electronic warfare capabilities. It also relies on frontline allies and partners to be responsible for the daily competition. We assert that the high-end deterrence strategy is the best path forward, but it requires a better delineation and ranking of threats and responsibilities for the joint force and strategic discipline over the long run. Congress must also support this strategy and allow the Defense Department to make the hard choices, such as cutting capacity and retiring weapons systems, that are required to rebalance the force for this mission and to sustain its military technological advantage over the long run. Senior Pentagon leaders will need to partner with Congress to help them understand how specific changes are connected to higher order objectives. It is important to note that the FY22 budget is largely an inherited one and the Biden administration is making some significant investments that align with a high-end deterrence strategy. Nevertheless, the 2022 NDS and the FY23 budget will need to accept more risk and further prioritize to prepare the force for the most challenging and consequential threats. If the Biden administration does not make these hard choices or Congress refuses to support this strategy, the chasm between U.S. strategic and military objectives and the costs of achieving them will only grow significantly. Trying to do too much is a risky business that could result in the United States losing its military technological edge and, ultimately, a war against a great power.
- Topic:
- Defense Policy, Military Affairs, Risk, and Deterrence
- Political Geography:
- China, North America, and United States of America
406. From Plan to Action: Operationalizing a U.S. National Technology Strategy
- Author:
- John Costello, Martijn Rasser, and Megan Lamberth
- Publication Date:
- 07-2021
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
- Abstract:
- Ideas abound for actions the United States should take to better position itself for the unfolding global technology competition. Concerning topics as diverse as raw materials to semiconductors to STEM education, a nonstop cavalcade of presidential directives, congressional bills, industry proposals, think tank reports, and pronouncements by big-name luminaries have been issued as measures to address American economic competitiveness and national security challenges. Almost all make their case in the context of dealing with a rising China. Some of these recommendations are excellent and quite a few are good; too many get lost in the noise. It’s not just the sheer volume that presents a challenge to identifying and executing the most promising recommendations. The U.S. government lacks a strategic construct to merge these ideas—for research and development spending, public-private partnerships, tax policy and subsidies, immigration reform, and education—into a coherent whole. The goal of CNAS’ National Technology Strategy project is to create the framework for a comprehensive, whole-of-nation approach for the United States to navigate the global technology competition. The first report in this initiative, “Taking the Helm,” makes the case for a national technology strategy and lays out what such a modern-day strategy should be.1 Its chief argument is that the United States is in a long-term, multifaceted geostrategic competition with China, one that has technology at its core. Technological leadership is more important than ever, yet current U.S. government policies fall well short of what is needed to maintain it. Crafting an affirmative technology policy agenda is not just about competing with China; it comprises the guiding principles for the nation’s technology policy goals and priorities to pursue economic prosperity, protect national security interests and democratic values, and advance society. How the U.S. government should structure itself organizationally and bureaucratically to execute such a strategy is the focus of the second report, “Trust the Process.”2 Today, key institutions such as the National Security Council, National Economic Council, and Office of Science and Technology Policy are not optimized to craft, run, and maintain this effort. “Trust the Process” explains what talent, resources, infrastructure, and processes are needed for strategy development, implementation, and monitoring and evaluation. This third report in the series focuses on concrete and pragmatic measures that U.S. policymakers should take to operationalize a national technology strategy. There are four premises to the security and technology competition that guide these findings: the utility of industrial policies, the convergence of national and economic security, gaps in knowledge, and the need for international partnerships. The report offers recommendations for specific changes to U.S. government departmental and agency authorities, regulatory updates, policy initiatives, and diplomatic efforts that will bolster the U.S. government's ability to craft, execute, and maintain this strategy.
- Topic:
- Diplomacy, National Security, Science and Technology, and Strategic Competition
- Political Geography:
- North America and United States of America
407. The Role of County Veteran Service Officers
- Author:
- Katherine L. Kuzminski, Nathalie Grogan, and Elena LoRusso
- Publication Date:
- 09-2021
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
- Abstract:
- This assessment examines the role of county veteran service officers (CVSOs) throughout the United States. The report highlights the services and support available to veterans via CVSOs around the country, and compares their effectiveness against the help offered by staff through other types of veteran service organizations (VSOs). CVSOs provide resources to veterans at the local level, and their roles and experiences vary according to the state- and federal-level VSOs available in that area. Using quantitative analysis, the effectiveness of CVSOs is measured through grant rates of disability compensation claims submitted, as compared to those submitted by state and nonprofit VSOs. This report examines the effectiveness, challenges, barriers, and resources that CVSOs face when serving veterans in their jurisdictions.
- Topic:
- Military Affairs, Veterans, and COVID-19
- Political Geography:
- North America and United States of America
408. Tangled Threats: Integrating U.S. Strategies toward China and North Korea
- Author:
- Jacob Stokes
- Publication Date:
- 10-2021
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
- Abstract:
- China and North Korea pose intertwined challenges for U.S. and allied policy. The Korean Peninsula constitutes just one area among many in U.S.-China relations. Meanwhile, issues on the peninsula remain central to the future stability and security of Northeast Asia and implicate many broader questions about regional and global order. Dealing with China and North Korea as an interlocking pair requires integrated policies that balance the risks and rewards of various possible approaches. This policy brief explains how to develop such policies and why they are the best option for the current regional landscape. North Korea plays several roles in China’s foreign policy. These include diverting geopolitical attention away from China, providing Beijing with an opportunity to cooperate with other states, creating a point of leverage for China to extract concessions on separate issues, and acting as a flashpoint with the potential for a regional war that directly affects China’s security. At any given time, some roles will be more pronounced than others, but each of them is always present to some degree. Any integrated U.S. strategy toward the pair will have to account for a volatile geopolitical landscape in Northeast Asia. Major trends include closer ties between Beijing and Pyongyang, deteriorating U.S.-China relations, and South Korea’s desire, especially under the government of President Moon Jae-in, to engage North Korea while balancing ties with China and the United States. The United States should employ a strategy toward China and North Korea that blends calibrated pressure and results-oriented engagement. The goal of this strategy should be problem-management rather than problem-solving. Washington should implement this approach across four areas: shaping U.S.-China relations regarding the Korean Peninsula; engaging North Korea on political and security issues; promoting stable deterrence in the region; and coordinating a shared inter-Korean and foreign policy with South Korea. Key recommendations for the United States include acknowledging that major breakthroughs are unlikely with either China or North Korea; proposing four-party nuclear and peace talks with South Korea, North Korea, China, and the United States; and standing up a Nuclear Planning Group that includes Washington, Seoul, and Tokyo to bolster deterrence and stem nuclear proliferation pressures.
- Topic:
- Conflict Prevention, International Relations, Foreign Policy, and Geopolitics
- Political Geography:
- China, Asia, North Korea, and United States of America
409. Improving Joint Operational Concept Development within the U.S. Department of Defense
- Author:
- Paul Benfield and Greg Grant
- Publication Date:
- 10-2021
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
- Abstract:
- For the first time in nearly four decades, the DoD is developing joint warfighting concepts designed to counter advanced military rivals—specifically China and Russia. The last such effort took place at the height of the Cold War in the late 1970s and early 1980s to address the strategic and operational challenges posed by the Soviet Union’s conventional advantage on Europe’s Central Front. Now, as the 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS) emphasizes, the joint force must “prioritize preparedness for war” which includes developing “innovative operational concepts” for military advantage.1 As operational concepts are fundamentally visions of future war that guide future force design and development, the joint force first must answer the question of how it intends to fight future wars before it tries to answer questions of what it needs to fight with. Yet, if the DoD is going to move to “joint concept driven, threat informed capability development,” it faces a considerable challenge in that its joint concept development and experimentation process is fundamentally broken.2 While the post–Cold War era has witnessed repeated efforts to develop joint operational concepts, the process fails to yield innovative warfighting approaches to guide future force and capability development. Instead, the process produces concepts that seem almost intentionally designed not to drive significant change. These concepts are not truly “joint,” but rather lowest-common-denominator assemblages of existing service concepts that privilege service priorities. Any innovative joint ideas that make it through the development process are so watered-down and vague that they fail to provoke change (and thus threaten the interests of key stakeholders). In this environment, individual service concepts win out over joint concepts and drive investment priorities. However, warfighting concepts and critical investments must be joint because the services have become increasingly interdependent at the operational level.3 Moreover, current wargaming and analysis suggest that this operational interdependence will be a critical aspect of future conflict with a highly-capable peer adversary such as China or Russia—whether as a strength or a weakness remains to be seen. One can expect an advanced, adaptive adversary to seek out any gaps and seams presented by the U.S. military and exploit those to its advantage. In this regard, the current joint force is not “joint” enough for a high-end war against a peer adversary that has developed counters to critical, long-standing U.S. operational advantages such as air, maritime, and information dominance. As this paper discusses, successfully waging war at the scale and intensity that a conflict with a peer rival would entail will demand entirely new ways of warfighting that in turn will require a forcing function that integrates individual service capabilities into an actual “joint” fighting force. Recent efforts to develop threat-focused joint warfighting concepts—if successful—represents the best chance for that result actually to occur. This paper briefly discusses three past attempts by the DoD to develop joint concepts, including AirLand Battle, Air-Sea Battle, and a more recent effort, the Advanced Capabilities and Deterrence Panel (ACDP). It uses these examples to showcase the challenges of overcoming stovepiped and parochial service-led efforts and to illustrate the drawbacks of building service-centric concepts and covering them with a patina of jointness. These cases highlight how the persistent pathologies of the joint concept development process have rendered post–Cold War joint concepts useless for encouraging operational innovation or driving change in service investment priorities. Ongoing work to develop new joint warfighting concepts provides the DoD with a long-overdue opportunity to focus its concept development on tangible threats and consequent operational objectives. The current effort is the first time in decades that the DoD is organizing concept development around countering a specific threat instead of supporting idealized notions of how the joint force preferred to operate against vague or undefined groups of adversaries. However, without major changes to what is widely viewed as a consensus process that does not foster a competition of ideas, the DoD risks repeating the same concept development mistakes it has made in the past. Additionally, new joint concepts must be rigorously tested and refined through a campaign of experimentation to validate their viability for future force design. That experimentation piece is currently missing.4 The Joint Staff is trying to rebuild its joint concept development capability after years of neither prioritizing nor adequately resourcing that work. Generating truly new ways of warfighting with the potential to transform future force design will require the sustained attention of the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS and VCJCS) to push new joint concepts through the system. The DoD’s senior leadership must overcome the tendency of each service to drive toward consensus products that are aimed more at protecting existing priorities and longstanding prerogatives than generating creative ideas.
- Topic:
- Defense Policy, War, Military Strategy, and Military Affairs
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, North America, and United States of America
410. Overkill: Reforming the Legal Basis for the U.S. War on Terror
- Author:
- International Crisis Group
- Publication Date:
- 09-2021
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- International Crisis Group
- Abstract:
- After the 9/11 attacks, the U.S. Congress passed a use of force authorisation that successive presidents have used to expand military action ever further. As part of our series The Legacy of 9/11 and the “War on Terror”, we argue that Washington should enact a new statute that promotes transparency and narrows the war’s scope.
- Topic:
- Terrorism, Military Strategy, War on Terror, and Civil-Military Relations
- Political Geography:
- North America and United States of America
411. The Poison Frog Strategy: Preventing a Chinese Fait Accompli Against Taiwanese Islands
- Author:
- Chris Dougherty, Jennie Matuschak, and Ripley Hunter
- Publication Date:
- 10-2021
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
- Abstract:
- How could Taiwan and the United States respond if China seized one of Taiwan’s outlying islands, such as Pratas/Dongsha (hereafter Dongsha) in the South China Sea? Whereas the U.S. national security community has focused on defending Taiwan against Chinese invasion, China’s recent military activities suggest that this kind of coercion and limited aggression might be an equally urgent question. More worryingly, such a scenario could be a prelude or pathway to war involving China, Taiwan, and the United States. To explore potential policy and strategy options to prevent such a calamity, the Gaming Lab at CNAS wargamed this scenario with Taiwanese, American, and regional experts. Worryingly, the game found few credible options for pushing China to abandon Dongsha and return to the status quo. However, the game found numerous areas where preparation and multilateral coordination—particularly in concert with Japan—could deter limited Chinese aggression against Taiwan. During the game, the teams representing the United States and Taiwan struggled to compel a Chinese withdrawal from Dongsha without escalating the crisis. The team representing China avoided further escalation given its first-mover advantage, constrained territorial gains, and geographic proximity. In contrast, the U.S. team had to push its forces far forward in ways that were risky and would be difficult to sustain.1 Punitive non-military options, such as economic sanctions or information campaigns, took too long to produce effects and appeared too weak to compel China to abandon its gains.2 More aggressive military responses risked escalation to war, which both the U.S. and Taiwan teams wished to avoid. With few viable coercive options and the onus of escalation falling on the U.S. and Taiwan teams, the game reaffirmed the difficulty of rolling back territorial aggression of this kind. Indeed, discouraging China from seizing Taiwanese territory before it happens is the most salient lesson of the game. The United States and Taiwan must begin coordinating today to build a credible deterrent against limited Chinese aggression or coercion toward Taiwan.3 Doing so will help identify ways to make a territorial fait accompli by China—such as the seizure of Dongsha—too unpalatable to consider, while also communicating the U.S. commitment to defending Taiwan. This strategy will require advance planning and communication of joint responses and defenses against coercion and territorial aggression. Rather than scrambling to respond to a fait accompli, as occurred in this game, the United States and Taiwan should prepare to implement coordinated, whole-of-government deterrent measures quickly and ensure immediate consequences for Chinese coercion or aggression short of war. Japan’s cooperation is essential in this type of scenario because it could change China’s calculations of the military and diplomatic risks of coercion or aggression. A joint statement from Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga and U.S. President Joseph R. Biden in April 2021 referenced “peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait” and encouraged “the peaceful resolution of cross-Strait issues.”4 The United States would rely heavily on Japan for basing infrastructure to conduct military operations to support Taiwan.5 And, although the statement did not elaborate further, unambiguous Japanese support will be necessary to create a regional, as opposed to bilateral U.S.-Taiwan, response to Chinese coercion or aggression. Specifically, Japan’s involvement could enable coordination with India and Australia via the Quad relationships.6 It could also create opportunities to work with other states facing Chinese coercion and territorial aggression, such as Vietnam and the Philippines. Wargames are not predictive, but they are useful tools for exploring decision-making and identifying vulnerabilities. As China’s assertiveness rises, failure to prepare for the threat of an incursion against Taiwanese territory presents grave risks to Indo-Pacific security. The United States, Taiwan, and regional allies and partners can better understand how to build an effective deterrence strategy to discourage Chinese aggression or coercion through multilateral gaming, to include crisis simulations and exercises.
- Topic:
- Defense Policy, National Security, Military Strategy, and War Games
- Political Geography:
- China, Taiwan, and United States of America
412. When Less Is More: Rethinking U.S. Military Strategy and Posture in the Middle East
- Author:
- Ilan Goldenberg, Becca Wasser, Elisa Catalano Ewers, and Lilly Blumenthal
- Publication Date:
- 11-2021
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
- Abstract:
- For the past 20 years, the U.S. military has invested heavily in the Middle East. Presidents Barack Obama and Donald Trump both attempted to shift assets out of the region and put a greater focus on the Indo-Pacific, but both were drawn back into the Middle East. Now, President Joe Biden again has put an emphasis on the Indo-Pacific, and Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin has emphasized the importance of China as the Department of Defense’s “pacing challenge.” Effectively realizing the new administration’s shift in priority—and avoiding the cycle of drawing forces out of the Middle East only to have new crises pull them back in—requires an assessment of how the United States can continue to protect its core interests in the Middle East with a smaller and smarter footprint. This paper is the beginning of an effort to answer this question. It methodically outlines what key U.S. interests and objectives should be in the Middle East to develop the appropriate U.S. force posture to meet the security challenges of today and tomorrow. It then describes the key military activities necessary to protect those interests and achieve those objectives, in some cases breaking old assumptions and identifying areas where the United States can afford to accept more risk. Finally, it begins to outline the associated military assets necessary to pursue those activities and ends by identifying areas where the United States can look to alter its presence and activities in the region. The conclusion of this analysis is that the United States still has vital interests in the Middle East that require a level of military investment in the region. However, those interests are more limited, and the United States must be willing to accept more risk in the Middle East while also prioritizing non-military tools. Given challenges and strategic interests elsewhere in the world and at home, it is time to consider how the United States might approach force posture in the region differently than in the past.
- Topic:
- Foreign Policy, National Security, Military Strategy, and Strategic Interests
- Political Geography:
- Middle East and United States of America
413. Competing Visions of International Order in the South China Sea
- Author:
- International Crisis Group
- Publication Date:
- 11-2021
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- International Crisis Group
- Abstract:
- The disputes in the South China Sea are fundamentally about claims of sovereignty, the broadest of which are staked by Beijing. The Chinese-U.S. rivalry, meanwhile, loads the dissension with geopolitical significance. Both major powers stand to gain by accepting the constraints of international law.
- Topic:
- Territorial Disputes, Hegemony, Maritime, Conflict, and Rivalry
- Political Geography:
- China, Asia, North America, and United States of America
414. Transitioning to Tech: Transitioning Service Members and Veteran Perceptions Regarding a Career in the Technology Sector
- Author:
- Jason Dempsey, Katherine L. Kuzminski, Nathalie Grogan, and Cody Kennedy
- Publication Date:
- 11-2021
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
- Abstract:
- Military experience provides service members with a range of technical and soft skills that can prepare them for meaningful employment in the private sector. Unfortunately, perceptions about the differences between military service and civilian employment can hinder the transition process, leading some veterans to believe they are unqualified for certain roles, or unaware of the steps they can take to gain meaningful employment in positions that seem vastly different from the work they did in uniform. This can be particularly true in the technology sector, where stereotypes and misperceptions—on both sides—can make the gap between military service and employment in a place like Silicon Valley seem insurmountable. However, as many have demonstrated, veterans can successfully make the leap to meaningful employment in the technology sector, and the firms that hire them can benefit from the skills and experience transitioning service members bring to the field. Understanding veteran perceptions about opportunities in technology is therefore an important first step in identifying the hurdles, both real and perceived, to expanding this pathway and getting more military veterans into meaningful employment in this sector. This white paper uses a mixed-methods approach to examine veteran opportunities and perceptions of opportunities in the technology sector. It begins with an overview of current support efforts specific to employment and education in the technology sector provided by the government’s Transition Assistance Program (TAP), technology companies, and veteran-serving nonprofit organizations. The paper then examines the attitudes of veterans in transition with a focus on perceptions of employment opportunities in the technology sector and perceived gaps between the skills transitioning service members have and the skills they believe are necessary to pursue a career in technology. The white paper concludes with recommendations for relevant departments, agencies, programs, employers, veteran-serving organizations, transitioning service members, and veterans. For the purposes of this paper, employment in “technology” is broadly defined to include both jobs that require specific technological skills and general employment in companies that produce technology products. Technology companies range from small startups to large software and e-commerce corporations with a myriad of job titles and a variety of roles requiring different skill sets. The span of technological expertise can cross industries, including technological support and information management for large brick-and-mortar businesses and the medical and financial industries. The analysis provided in this white paper is informed by a survey that CNAS and VetsinTech, a veteran-serving nonprofit, performed from August 31, 2021, through September 18, 2021. The survey yielded over 1,000 responses from veterans, transitioning service members, and active-duty service members. The analysis also incorporates feedback from interviews with action officers at the Department of Defense (DoD), the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA), and the Department of Labor (DoL), as well as veterans currently employed in the technology sector and those who seek to hire veterans in the technology sector.
- Topic:
- Science and Technology, Military Affairs, Veterans, and Career
- Political Geography:
- North America and United States of America
415. The Future of the Digital Order
- Author:
- Jeff Cirillo, Sarah Curtis, Joshua Fitt, Kara Frederick, Coby Goldberg, Ilan Goldenberg, Andrea Kendall-Taylor, Megan Lamberth, Martijn Rasser, and Dania Torres
- Publication Date:
- 11-2021
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
- Abstract:
- Nations that successfully harness the vast economic, political, and societal power of emerging information and communications technologies will shape the future of the global digital order. This future is not set in stone. A digital order defined by liberal democratic values requires U.S. leadership and the cooperation of trusted like-minded partners. In the absence of democratic leadership, autocratic rivals of the United States can fill that void—exploiting the control of information, surveillance technologies, and standards for technology governance to promote a digital ecosystem that entrenches and expands their authoritarian practices. In exploring how a closed, illiberal order is taking root in strategic regions around the world, this report offers recommendations for how to craft, promote, and preserve a more open and democratic alternative. An assessment of crosscutting trends between China, Russia, and the Middle East across three pillars—information control, surveillance, and technology governance—leads us to the following conclusions: China is the prime mover in shaping the evolving digital order in its favor. Beijing’s use of technologies such as facial recognition software and telecommunications networks allows the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to expand control over its citizens. The CCP’s ability to promote and export this model of digital repression, in turn, gives like-minded, nondemocratic governments a roadmap for how to deploy digital technologies for control and abuse in their own countries. Russia’s model of digital authoritarianism, while technologically less sophisticated than China’s, could prove to be more readily adaptable and enduring for current and aspiring autocrats. Regional powers such as Belarus, Azerbaijan, and some Central Asian states have already incorporated elements of this model. In the Middle East, authoritarian leaders use digital tools to control internal populations by sabotaging and spying on citizens, and this contributes to the construction of an illiberal digital order that is beneficial to America’s peer competitors—China and Russia. These conclusions reveal four key trends with implications for the future of the digital order: Growing China-Russia alignment will generate dangerous digital synergies, such as (1) making digital autocracy accessible for a broader swath of states; (2) accelerating China’s and Russia’s digital innovation; (3) eroding liberal norms in international institutions; and (4) raising the prospects of a “splinternet,” a fragmenting of the internet along nationalistic, political, technological, religious, or ethnic lines. Countries around the world, particularly autocratic regimes and those flirting with illiberalism, will seek to regulate online communications platforms through (1) social media; (2) data localization laws; and (3) instigating company self-censorship, which restricts free speech and increases online control. Illiberal regimes will seek out Chinese technology to help them control social movements and civil protests. U.S. nondemocratic partners, adversaries, and even some democratic partners justify their pursuit of Chinese technology by underscoring ways the adopted technologies will contribute to economic growth, social stability, and efforts to fight crime and terrorism. The practices of illiberal regimes will reduce the efficacy of U.S. mitigation practices. Russia and China’s efforts to promote an illiberal digital order complement one another and could accelerate innovation between the two nations. The United States must craft a policy response that considers these emerging patterns and incorporates more than its usual partners in Europe and the Indo-Pacific. Shoring up the existing coalition of democratic actors to counter these illiberal trends will likely not be sufficient. This report offers recommendations that the United States can implement on three fronts: at home, while engaging with traditional U.S. democratic as well as nondemocratic partners, and when countering U.S. adversaries such as China, Russia, and Iran. The United States must take a leadership role, recognizing that the future digital order is at stake.
- Topic:
- Science and Technology, Governance, Authoritarianism, Leadership, Surveillance, and Digitalization
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, Middle East, North America, and United States of America
416. Navigating Relations with Russia in the Arctic: A Roadmap for Stability
- Author:
- Andrea Kendall-Taylor, Jim Townsend, Lawson W. Brigham, and Nicholas Lokker
- Publication Date:
- 11-2021
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
- Abstract:
- Until recently, the Arctic was largely immune to the geopolitical tensions that play out between Russia and the transatlantic partners in other regions and on other issues. Indeed, the Arctic is one area where the United States and Russia, together with the other Arctic states, have engaged in quiet cooperation on issues including search and rescue, scientific research, and the environment. Such pragmatic cooperation has been possible in part because bilateral irritants are diffused by shared and cross-cutting interests among all eight Arctic states, as well as the region’s multilayered governance regime.1 However, climate change and the Arctic’s melting sea ice have opened access and allowed for increased human activity, which, in turn, has amplified competition in the region. At stake are core national interests for the Arctic states, ranging from economic opportunities to security and stability. The region’s growing importance and level of activity, alongside the lack of trust and limited dialogue on military issues between Russia and the United States, raise the risk of conflict and instability in the region. For Russia, its part of the Arctic, including an increasingly accessible Northern Sea Route, is central to core national security concerns and an important pillar of the economy and future development. To secure its interests, the Kremlin has taken numerous actions, many of them military, in the Arctic that are of shared concern to the other Arctic nations and NATO.
- Topic:
- Security, Bilateral Relations, Infrastructure, Military Affairs, Economy, and Strategic Competition
- Political Geography:
- Russia, North America, Arctic, and United States of America
417. Edge Networks, Core Policy: Securing America's 6G Future
- Author:
- Martijn Rasser, Ainikki Riikonen, and Henry Wu
- Publication Date:
- 12-2021
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
- Abstract:
- Technological leadership by the United States requires forethought and organization. The plan necessary to maintain that leadership—a national technology strategy—should be broad in scope. Its range includes investments in research, nurturing human talent, revamping government offices and agencies, and ensuring that laws, regulations, and incentives provide private industry with the ability and opportunity to compete fairly and effectively on the merits of their products, capabilities, and know-how. Given that key inputs are diffused globally, this plan must also carefully consider how the United States can effectively partner with other tech-leading democracies for mutual economic and security benefit. This includes taking measures to promote norms for technology use that align with shared values. In the context of strategic competition with China, the need to craft new approaches to technology development and deployment is increasingly apparent to government leaders. Many lawmakers grasped the stark reality that U.S. technological preeminence was eroding when they realized that China had become a global juggernaut in telecommunications, a situation exacerbated by Beijing’s push to dominate global fifth generation (5G) wireless networks. The state of play poses national and economic security risks to the United States, which, along with its allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific and Europe, has made notable headway in addressing and mitigating these risks. However, much work remains. Chinese firms continue to push for greater digital entanglement around the world, from Southeast Asia to Africa to Latin America. Given the fundamental importance to the digital economy of communications networks and the standards that govern them, the more successful Beijing’s policies are, the greater the challenge for tech-leading democracies to maintain their economic competitiveness. There is also the specter of norms. If these are dominated by illiberal actors, their power to shape how networks are used and to manipulate data flows poses threats to liberal democratic values the world over.
- Topic:
- Science and Technology, Norms, Strategic Competition, and Digitalization
- Political Geography:
- China, North America, and United States of America
418. Containing Crisis: Strategic Concepts for Coercive Economic Statecraft
- Author:
- Emily Kilcrease, Emily Jin, and Rachel Ziemba
- Publication Date:
- 12-2021
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
- Abstract:
- As the United States and China seek to manage an increasingly tense relationship, both sides have turned to coercive economic statecraft as a core part of their broader foreign policy, with disruptive impacts on the global economic order. A growing body of research examines the use of coercive economic tools, including prior work by the CNAS Energy, Economics, and Security program. This report adds to that literature by specifically examining the use of coercive economic tools during periods of geopolitical crisis to assess their value in de-escalating tensions or deterring further economic coercion. The researchers developed scenario exercises to examine these dynamics, supported by a literature review and extensive engagement with subject matter experts. The insights from the research informed the development of two overarching strategic concepts intended to guide U.S. policymakers when deploying economic tools as part of a crisis management situation.
- Topic:
- Security, Foreign Policy, Economics, Bilateral Relations, and Crisis Management
- Political Geography:
- China, Asia, North America, and United States of America
419. Taking the Helm: A National Technology Strategy to Meet the China Challenge
- Author:
- Martijn Rasser and Megan Lamberth
- Publication Date:
- 01-2021
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
- Abstract:
- The United States faces a challenge like no other in its history: a strategic competition with a highly capable and increasingly resourceful opponent whose worldview and economic and political models are at odds with the interests and values of the world’s democratic states. A rising China poses a fundamental challenge to the economic vitality and national security of the United States and its allies and the currency of liberal democratic values around the world. Technology—a key enabler for economic, political, and military power—is front and center in this competition. Technological leadership—how a country invents, innovates, and deploys technologies to compete economically and to secure its interests—will shape the coming years to a remarkable degree. The United States has maintained such leadership for decades. Today, that leadership is at risk. The United States is failing to rise to the occasion—its policies inadequate and disconnected and its response reactive and disjointed. The country needs a new approach to regain the initiative. The stakes are high and the window for action is closing. The U.S. government must craft a national technology strategy for an era of sustained competition with a highly capable contender: a comprehensive framework to plan, execute, and update its technology policies. The strategy is a whole-of-nation approach—including human capital, infrastructure, investments, tax and regulatory policies, and institutional and bureaucratic processes—to preserve its current advantages and to create new ones. To be effective, creating and executing the strategy must involve stakeholders from federal and state governments, private industry, academia, and civil society. The overarching goal is to maintain the United States’ standing as the world’s premier technology power so that it can empower its citizens, compete economically, and secure its national interests without having to compromise its values or sovereignty. The purpose of this report is to provide the intellectual framing for what a national technology strategy is and why the United States needs one. It does not offer a list of prioritized technology areas. Rather, it provides guidelines for how to think about such prioritization and what qualities should inform the resulting policy decisions.
- Topic:
- Politics, Science and Technology, and Economy
- Political Geography:
- China, Asia, and United States of America
420. Navigating the Deepening Russia-China Partnership
- Author:
- Andrea Kendall-Taylor and David Shullman
- Publication Date:
- 01-2021
- Content Type:
- Special Report
- Institution:
- Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
- Abstract:
- Ties between China and Russia have grown. In virtually every dimension of their relationship—from the diplomatic to defense and economic to informational realms—cooperation between Beijing and Moscow has increased. Political observers in Washington and beyond have noted their alignment, yet they remain divided over what these growing ties portend. Perhaps the most concerning—and least understood—aspect of the Russia-China partnership is the synergy their actions will generate. Analysts understand well the challenges that Russia and China each pose to the United States. But little thought has been given to how their actions will combine, amplifying the impact of both actors. As this report highlights, the impact of Russia-China alignment is likely to be far greater than the sum of its parts, putting U.S. interests at risk globally. The synergy between Russia and China will be most problematic in the way that it increases the challenge that China poses to the United States. Already, Beijing is working with Moscow to fill gaps in its military capabilities, accelerate its technological innovation, and complement its efforts to undermine U.S. global leadership. Simply put, Russia is amplifying America’s China challenge.
- Topic:
- Diplomacy, Partnerships, Economy, and Strategic Interests
- Political Geography:
- Russia, China, Eurasia, Asia, and United States of America