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Begin New Search Topic Arms Control and Proliferation Political Geography United States of America Content Type Special Report Publication Year within 5 Years

1. How to Strengthen US Deterrence and Weaken the Attempts of Rival Nuclear Coercion

Author:
Rebeccah L. Heinrichs
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
On February 24, 2022, Russia started the largest European war since 1945 as it intensified its invasion of Ukraine to a new level and threatened escalation to nuclear war. Though Vladimir Putin has not detonated a nuclear weapon, he used, and continues to use,1 his nuclear arsenal to threaten the United States and other NATO nations against continuing to support Ukraine’s defense. Through pre-invasion nuclear saber-rattling, verbally threatening to employ nuclear weapons on the battlefield,3 and putting such weapons on alert,4 Russia caused President Joe Biden and his administration to declare repeatedly their fears of “World War III”5 and to adopt a gradual, highly cautious approach to helping Ukraine. The White House has chosen to provide only weapons suitable for operations to allow Ukraine to achieve some tactical victories and prevent Russia from a quick and final victory,6 but this aid does not allow Ukraine to achieve and sustain the military victories necessary to win the war.7 Thus, Russia appears to have successfully used nuclear threats to deter the United States from certain actions that are on lower levels on the spectrum of escalation, enabling itself to control escalation8 to serve its aims. Russia’s explicit and implicit nuclear threats deterred US officials from providing Ukraine with real-time targeting data and heavy artillery early in the war9 and electronic warfare capabilities later in the war.10 The nuclear threats also caused US officials to press Ukraine not to hit Russian targets deep behind Russian lines.11Russian officials have ample grounds to conclude that their nuclear coercion has affected the course of the war in their favor.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, National Security, Deterrence, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, North America, and United States of America

2. Eleven Myths and Realities about Biden’s Missile Defense Review

Author:
Rebeccah L. Heinrichs
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
On October 27, 2022, the Biden administration released the public version of the Missile Defense Review (MDR). The document is commendable in some respects and is concerning in others. Below are some myths and realities about the Biden MDR.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Weapons, Missile Defense, and Joe Biden
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

3. Long Shadows: Deterrence in a Multipolar Nuclear Age

Author:
Stacie L. Pettyjohn and Jennie Matuschak
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
This report examines the nuclear policies and postures of the United States and its three primary nuclear adversaries: China, Russia, and North Korea. It concludes that the world is entering a multipolar nuclear era, which is unprecedented, and far more complex and challenging than the Cold War. The current nuclear order has been gradually shifting over the past decade. Russia remains the United States’ only nuclear peer, but the arms control regime that constrained the superpowers’ nuclear arsenals is disintegrating. Relations between Washington and Moscow have worsened since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and Russian President Vladimir Putin’s nuclear saber-rattling. China’s nuclear arsenal is growing in size and sophistication, potentially enabling Beijing to launch conventional attacks behind its nuclear shield. This development will shape both competition among Beijing, Washington, and Moscow and potential future military confrontations. Similarly, North Korea has a small but expanding number of deployed nuclear weapons and is improving its missile technology. In this new nuclear environment, the United States must deter two nuclear-armed great powers as well as a regional nuclear power from launching conventional and nuclear attacks on itself and its allies. As the number of nuclear-armed states grow, interactions become more complex and the risks of miscalculation and misperception increase. The ramifications of this new reality are not well understood, aside from the implication that there is a growing risk that nuclear weapons might be used. The study’s findings have five primary implications for American policy and nuclear posture. To improve strategic stability and enhance deterrence, the United States should take several courses of action.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Deterrence, and Strategic Stability
Political Geography:
Russia, China, North Korea, and United States of America

4. Strategic Annual Report 2020

Author:
Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA)
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Japan Institute Of International Affairs (JIIA)
Abstract:
The year 2020 was characterized by the intensification of US-China confrontation and strategic competition, which had been pointed out in the Strategic Annual Report 2019, in all areas from military and security affairs as well as dominance in advanced technologies and supply chains to narratives on coronavirus responses. Amid this confrontation, the rules-based international order faced even more severe challenges; the multilateral framework established after World War II with the United Nations at its core lost its US leadership and fell into serious dysfunction. While the international community is struggling to cope with the rapidly expanding outbreak of the novel coronavirus, China has been moving to expand its influence through increasingly authoritarian and assertive domestic and international policies on the rule of law and territorial issues, as well as through economic initiatives such as the existing “Belt and Road Initiative” (BRI) and its responses to the pandemic. The confrontation with the United States is becoming more and more pronounced, and the Indo-Pacific region is turning itself into divided and contested oceans. In this transforming strategic environment, expressions of support for the vision of a rulesbased “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” (FOIP) that Japan has been promoting for the past several years, or announcements of similar visions have followed one after the other. The year 2020 also saw significant strengthening of the cooperative framework among four countries – Japan, the United States, Australia, and India (QUAD) – together with the enhancement of bilateral cooperation between countries in this group. At the same time, progress was also made in a regional cooperation framework that includes China with the signing of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) Agreement in East Asia. The Strategic Annual Report 2020 looks back at major international developments since last year’s Report through the end of 2020, focusing on the transformation of the strategic environment in the Indo-Pacific region and the response of the international community.
Topic:
International Relations, Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Science and Technology, Bilateral Relations, Multilateralism, COVID-19, and Destabilization
Political Geography:
Russia, Japan, China, Middle East, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

5. Congressional Perspectives on U.S. Policy Toward North Korea and Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula

Author:
Kelsey Davenport and Julia Masterson
Publication Date:
08-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Arms Control Association
Abstract:
Addressing the threat posed by North Korea’s nuclear weapons is one of the most significant and complex challenges facing the United States. Developing, implementing, and sustaining a verifiable diplomatic process that reduces risk and rolls back Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons program requires a whole of government approach, including constructive contributions from members of the U.S. Congress. While crafting and implementing such an approach will be the prerogative of the Executive Branch, the role that Congress can play in supporting or hindering such a process should not be overlooked. Congress has used an array of tools to put in place conditions for negotiations, express its support or opposition to administration policy, and implement coercive measures toward North Korea designed to punish Pyongyang for its violations of international law and stymie its weapons development efforts. Using survey data and in-depth interviews from the late months of 2020, this report provides insight into how Congress views the North Korean nuclear threat and U.S. approaches to engaging with Pyongyang. More clarity into Congressional views and attitudes may lead to more effective policymaking.
Topic:
Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Military Strategy, and Denuclearization
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, North Korea, North America, and United States of America

6. South Asia’s Nuclear Challenges: Interlocking Views from India, Pakistan, China, Russia and the United States

Author:
Petr Topychkanov and Lora Saalman
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
Abstract:
This report provides an overview of views on nuclear postures and escalation affecting South Asia, based on 119 research interviews conducted in 2020 with military, nuclear, political and regional experts from India, Pakistan, China, Russia and the United States. The publication also builds on the findings from a virtual workshop that SIPRI hosted on 8 and 9 December 2020 on ‘Nuclear challenges in South Asia: Views from India, Pakistan, China, Russia, Australia, New Zealand and the USA’. These discussions revealed a variety of interlocking insights on such issues as no first use, lowered nuclear thresholds, conventional and nuclear entanglement and emerging technologies that are shaping strategic stability. The publication consists of five country-focused sections that explore nuclear postures, strategic technologies and escalatory risks, as well as conclusions that offer building blocks for the next steps on engagement. This report was prepared in the framework of the SIPRI project Assessing Nuclear Deterrence Risks and Challenges in South Asia, generously supported by the German Federal Foreign Office.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Power, and Disarmament
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Russia, China, South Asia, India, and United States of America

7. New Technologies and Nuclear Disarmament: Outlining a Way Forward

Author:
Tytti Erästö
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
Abstract:
This report sheds light on the impact of recent military-technological advancements on nuclear deterrence and disarmament. Noting that progress towards multilateral disarmament is hardly possible without prior and significant reductions in the largest nuclear weapon arsenals, the report views the resumption of bilateral arms control between Russia and the United States as the most important step towards disarmament at the present moment. It argues that these two countries should move away from their cold war era nuclear doctrines, which seek an ability to win nuclear wars, towards a policy of ‘minimal nuclear deterrence’, that is focused on deterring a nuclear attack. In line with doctrinal changes, further cuts in Russian and US nuclear stockpiles could be achieved by removing nuclear weapons from regional conflict dynamics, meaning that they would no longer serve as a deterrent against conventional aggression. Such a change would help to reduce nuclear risks without undermining regional deterrence, as each side already has robust conventional forces comprised of precision-strike weapons and other advanced military systems. At the same time, the report notes that progress towards nuclear disarmament would be complicated by long-range precision-strike weapons and strategic missile defences, which have raised the bar for credible nuclear deterrence by creating uncertainty about US adversaries’ second-strike capabilities. Lowering that bar and eventually reducing the perceived need for nuclear deterrence will require creative arms control diplomacy, including limits on strategic missile defences; stronger norms against both nuclear and conventional aggression; as well as a clear stigma against nuclear weapons.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Science and Technology, and Disarmament
Political Geography:
Russia and United States of America

8. The Iran Nuclear Deal at Five: A Revival?

Author:
International Crisis Group
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
The 2015 nuclear deal enters 2021 clinging to life, having survived the Trump administration’s withdrawal and Iran’s breaches of its commitments. When the Biden administration takes office, Washington and Tehran should move quickly and in parallel to revive the agreement on its original terms.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, and Denuclearization
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

9. Reimagining Nuclear Arms Control: A Comprehensive Approach

Author:
James M. Acton, Thomas Macdonald, and Pranay Vaddi
Publication Date:
12-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
The governments of China, Russia, and the United States all express support for arms control. They disagree profoundly, however, about its purposes and preconditions. To try to find common ground, this report presents nine detailed practical measures that—implemented individually or as part of a package—would help address each state’s specific security concerns and the shared dangers of arms racing and inadvertent escalation.
Topic:
Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, and Treaties and Agreements
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Asia, and United States of America

10. Strategic Risk Reduction between Nuclear-Weapons Possessors

Author:
Corentin Brustlein
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
The topic of nuclear risk reduction has gained momentum in the international security debate among policymakers, nongovernmental organizations, and experts. The current and expected demise of the traditional arms-control architecture, the renewed strategic competition, and the polarization of the multilateral debate on nuclear weapons have contributed to this renewed salience. Building upon the 2019 G7 Statement on Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, this report defines strategic risk reduction as the set of unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral measures that aim at lowering the likelihood of nuclear weapons use through improved communication, predictability, and restraint, and underlines the need to adopt a strategic approach to nuclear risk reduction. Risks emanating from conflict dynamics between nuclear powers are different in nature and severity from those arising from technical incidents. This report argues that in a context of growing geopolitical rivalries, diplomats should prioritize mitigating the former type of risk. Risk reduction efforts should aim at hindering the most dangerous behaviors in crisis time, through measures focusing both on nuclear forces and on nonnuclear capabilities, whose impact on strategic balances keeps growing. Strategic risk reduction can strengthen international security and strategic stability by complementing arms control measures and deterrence policies. It is therefore crucial to ensure that diplomatic initiatives aimed at limiting nuclear risks do not ultimately, and paradoxically, increase the risk of war. Historical experience shows not only the feasibility of such an approach, but also the concrete security benefits that can be derived from it, by channeling the behavior of nuclear powers in times of tensions, reducing the ambiguity inherent in certain strategies and behaviors, or laying the foundations for international regimes based on operational and strategic restraint as well as on transparency.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Disarmament, Deterrence, Strategic Stability, and Confidence Building Measures
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Russia, China, United Kingdom, India, North Korea, France, and United States of America

11. Understanding Hypersonic Weapons: Managing the Allure and the Risks

Author:
Shannon Bugos and Kingston Reif
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Arms Control Association
Abstract:
RESEARCH & REPORTS The debate concerning hypersonic weapons has gained increased attention in recent years as the United States has poured billions of dollars—and plans to pour billions more—into accelerating the development of hypersonic weapons and as China and Russia make headway in developing and deploying their own such weapons. The Pentagon is funding no less than eight prototype hypersonic weapons programs with the aim of fielding an initial capability of at least some of those by 2022. The U.S. rush to field hypersonic weapons merits a more critical examination by the Biden administration and Congress given the many unanswered questions about their rationale, technical viability, cost-effectiveness, and escalatory risks. It is past time for Congress to demand these answers before the military begins fielding the weapons in great numbers. This new report outlines the scope of the unanswered questions about the case for hypersonic weapons, details the underappreciated risks to stability posed by the weapons, assesses the viability of arms control as a tool to reduce these risks, and suggests recommended action items for Congress to better its understanding about the Pentagon’s plans for the weapons, eliminate potential redundancies in weapons capabilities, and mitigate stability risks.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, and Hypersonic Weapons
Political Geography:
Russia, China, and United States of America

12. Arms Control and Strategic Stability with Russia: The View from Europe

Author:
Jon B. Wolfsthal and Andrea Kendall-Taylor
Publication Date:
12-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
The United States and its NATO partners have successfully managed the challenge of deterrence and reassurance for generations. The risk of conflict, even nuclear conflict, with Russia remains all too real, especially as political and military competition continues to escalate, and as new technologies and capabilities come online that could further raise the risk of direct military confrontation between the United States and Russia. Ensuring clear, consistent, and constructive communication among officials and experts within the transatlantic security community about the potential dangers posed by Russian behavior, and how to effectively pursue greater stability together, will be essential if the alliance is to remain successful in the decades to come. The following assessment is informed by conversations among such experts committed to that goal. The memo identifies European allies and partners’ views, interests, and concerns about America’s emerging dialogue with Russia on arms control and strategic stability. It is intended to inform U.S. approaches to alliance management and consultation with European allies as well as potential talks and negotiations with the Russian Federation. Although the expert discussions occurred before Russia’s military buildup on Ukraine’s border resumed in October 2021, the insights the working group produced remain relevant so long as the U.S.-Russia arms control and strategic stability dialogue persists.
Topic:
NATO, Arms Control and Proliferation, Strategic Stability, and Dialogue
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, North America, and United States of America

13. Toward a More Proliferated World? The Geopolitical Forces that Will Shape the Spread of Nuclear Weapons

Author:
Eric M. Brewer, Ilan Goldenberg, Joseph Rodgers, Maxwell Simon, and Kaleigh Thomas
Publication Date:
09-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
The United States and the international community have been relatively successful at preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, but there are new reasons to question whether this track record will last into the future. Working with partners, the United States has steadily built a framework of disincentives and barriers to prevent proliferation. These include: 1) international treaties and agreements that have erected legal, political, and normative barriers to the bomb; 2) U.S. security commitments to allies that dampen their own perceived need for nuclear weapons; and, 3) a set of tough penalties (e.g., sanctions) for those who get caught trying to build the bomb. In other words, the barriers to entry to the nuclear club are high, and those countries that want the ultimate weapon need to be willing to accept significant risks. This helps explain why, although many countries have explored or pursued nuclear weapons, only nine states have them today. But several trends are eroding the foundation on which this formidable set of barriers rests. These trends are rooted in, and being shaped by, changes to the nature and structure of the international system: namely, the decline of U.S. influence and its gradual withdrawal from the international order that it helped create and lead for more than 70 years, and the concurrent rise of a more competitive security environment, particularly among great powers. These trends (detailed below) will have three broad implications for proliferation and U.S. policy. First, they stand to increase pressures on countries to seek nuclear weapons or related capabilities as a hedge. Second, they will almost certainly challenge the U.S. ability to effectively wield the traditional “carrots and sticks” of nonproliferation and counterproliferation policy and dilute the effectiveness of those tools. Finally, they could increasingly pit U.S. nonproliferation goals against other policy objectives, forcing harder tradeoffs.
Topic:
Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Geopolitics, Nonproliferation, and Post Cold War
Political Geography:
Global Focus and United States of America

14. Is It a Nuke?: Pre-Launch Ambiguity and Inadvertent Escalation

Author:
James M. Acton
Publication Date:
04-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:
Ambiguity about whether a weapon is nuclear-armed prior to its launch is an underappreciated, serious, and growing danger. Rising geopolitical tensions and the decay of arms control are exacerbating the risk that such pre-launch warhead ambiguity could lead to nuclear use in a crisis or conflict. Recent developments in technology—as well as potential future advances, such as the development of ambiguous intercontinental missiles—further add to the danger. A first step toward reducing these risks is to enhance awareness among decisionmakers of the causes and potential consequences of ambiguity. Unilateral and cooperative risk-mitigation measures could further reduce the danger of escalation, including in conflicts between the United States and Russia or the United States and China.
Topic:
Conflict Prevention, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:
Russia, China, and United States of America

15. The Future of U.S.-Russia Strategic Arms Control

Author:
Artur Kacprzyk
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
The Trump administration is sceptical about extending the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START, NST), which is to expire in 2021. It wants to sign a new deal with Russia and China covering all kinds of nuclear weapons. It will not be possible, however, to negotiate such a complex agreement before NST expires. In effect, there is a growing risk of a collapse of U.S.-Russia strategic arms control, which would negatively affect NATO as well: it would deepen both the divisions over the future of deterrence policy within the Alliance and the differences in the U.S. Congress on the modernisation of America’s nuclear forces.
Topic:
NATO, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Eurasia, United States of America, and North America

16. Libya’s Civil War: US Abdication Providing a Playground for Foreign Intervention

Author:
Jonathan Winer
Publication Date:
04-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Georgetown Journal of International Affairs
Abstract:
Since Libyan warlord Khalifa Haftar initiated his effort to take Libya’s capital, Tripoli, by force on April 4, 2019, Libya has remained in a state of full-on civil war. The conflict involves not only competing forces within the country, but also foreign powers using Libyan clients as proxies for their regional interests. These external actors—primarily the United Arab Emirates, Russia, and Turkey, plus a host of supporting players—continue to exacerbate the chaos as they maneuver for long-term power. Meanwhile, the United States is absent.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Civil War, Military Intervention, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Libya, North Africa, North America, and United States of America

17. Conventional arms control on the Korean Peninsula: The current state and prospects

Author:
Yong-Sup Han
Publication Date:
05-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Norwegian Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
At the end of 2017, the Korean Peninsula reached the brink of a nuclear war, as the US president Donald Trump and the North Korean leader Kim Jong-un exchanged words of nuclear threats each other. A tug of war as to whose nuclear button is bigger and stronger exacerbated the nuclear crisis. However, the South Korean President Moon Jae-in intervened to resolve the crisis by taking advantage of the Pyeongchang Winter Olympics. In doing so, President Moon intended to pursue denuclearisation and peace-building on the Korean Peninsula at the same time. North Korean Chairman Kim Jong-un responded positively to the South Korean call to hold the inter-Korean summit and the Trump-Kim summit. In order to end the Korean war and promote peace-building on the Korean Peninsula including termination of hostile acts on inter-Korean relations, the two Koreas adopted the April 27 Panmunjom Declaration, the September 19th Pyongyang Joint Declaration and the Inter-Korean Military Agreement at their summit in 2018. The Military Agreement is aimed at reducing tension and building trust between the two Koreas through conventional arms control, while the North Korean nuclear issue is being resolved through the US-DPRK summit. The September 19th Military Agreement is a modest but remarkable success in arms control history when compared with a long-term stalemate or even retreat in the contemporary international arms control arena. Indeed, arms control is at its lowest point in history, so dim are its prospects. Nevertheless, heated debates are taking place, both at home inside South Korea and abroad, over the legitimacy and rationality of the Sept. 19th Military Agreement. With little progress on the denuclearisation issue at the Kim-Trump summit and no sign of easing economic sanctions on Pyongyang, North Korea has test-fired short-range missiles ten times to exert pressure on the United States, undermining peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula. Against this backdrop, this policy brief intends to analyse the true meaning of the September 19 Military Agreement between the two Koreas, to identify its problems and policy implications in order to draw up supplementary measures to implement it successfully. Furthermore, the paper will draw some implications for the relationship between progress on North Korea’s denuclearisation issue and further conventional arms control on the Korean Peninsula.
Topic:
Conflict Prevention, Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, and Treaties and Agreements
Political Geography:
South Korea, North Korea, North America, and United States of America

18. Japan and Post-INF Nuclear Arms Control /Non-Proliferation

Author:
Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA)
Publication Date:
12-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Japan Institute Of International Affairs (JIIA)
Abstract:
Ten years have passed since US President Barack Obama called for a "world without nuclear weapons" in April 2009. However, after short-term progress and a surge in momentum, nuclear arms control and non-proliferation gradually turned sour. Among the negative trends for nuclear arms control in 2019 was the US withdrawal from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, which had a significant impact on the international community. The INF Treaty has been regarded as one of the symbols of nuclear arms control; it was signed in 1987 by US President Ronald Reagan and Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev, who shared the ideal of eliminating nuclear weapons and the recognition that there is no winner in a nuclear war and such a war must thus never be fought, and it obliged the US and the USSR to reduce their nuclear arsenals under strict verification measures, including on-site inspections, for the first time in history.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Treaties and Agreements, and International Affairs
Political Geography:
Japan and United States of America