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81. It's Moving Time: Taiwanese Business Responds to Growing U.S.-China Tensions

Author:
Scott Kennedy
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
A new report by the CSIS Trustee Chair in Chinese Business and Economics interprets a formal survey of over 500 Taiwanese business executives, documenting their views about the evolving environment on the island and beyond. The Washington policy community is quite familiar with the views that U.S. and European companies hold toward China, but less clear are the views of Taiwanese companies that are central to the story of the world’s interaction with China. Their opinions have implications for Taiwan’s economic trajectory, cross-strait relations, global supply chains, and the effectiveness of U.S. policy in the region. The report documents that Taiwanese companies are highly concerned about their potential overdependence on the Chinese economy and the possibility of a military conflict. As a result, there is significant support for expanding trade and investment ties via regional arrangements and bilaterally with the United States, as well as for maintaining Taiwan’s technological edge through more spending on research and development and broadening restrictions for technology transfer to China. But perhaps the most noteworthy finding is that Taiwanese companies appear to be moving their businesses at record levels from Mainland China, but also from Taiwan. This report, by Trustee Chair Scott Kennedy, explains how the survey was carried out, then analyzes the sources of Taiwanese companies’ anxieties and the ways they are responding, and concludes by considering the policy implications for all parties involved. The report’s appendix provides a full summary of the original survey results.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Territorial Disputes, Business, Conflict, and Rivalry
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, Asia, North America, and United States of America

82. Reshoring Semiconductor Manufacturing: Addressing the Workforce Challenge

Author:
Sujai Shivakumar, Charles Wessner, and Thomas Howell
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
On August 9, 2022, President Biden signed the CHIPS and Science Act, sweeping legislation that seeks to strengthen the U.S. semiconductor supply chain, encourage investments in semiconductor manufacturing facilities in the United States, stimulate semiconductor research and development (R&D), and disincentivize U.S. investments in chip-making plants in China. Among other things, the legislation will provide $52.7 billion in federal outlays over five years for loans, loan guarantees, grants, and other financial support for domestic chip-making investments, as well as a 25 percent tax credit for semiconductor investments in the United States. Bolstered by this unprecedented level of federal support, six major chip makers are investing in new wafer fabrication facilities (“fabs”) in the United States: Intel, Samsung, TSMC, GlobalFoundries, Texas Instruments, and Micron Technology.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Manufacturing, Industrialization, and Semiconductors
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

83. Choking off China’s Access to the Future of AI

Author:
Gregory Allen
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
On October 7, 2022, the Biden administration announced a new export controls policy on artificial intelligence (AI) and semiconductor technologies to China. These new controls—a genuine landmark in U.S.-China relations—provide the complete picture after a partial disclosure in early September generated confusion. For weeks the Biden administration has been receiving criticism in many quarters for a new round of semiconductor export control restrictions, first disclosed on September 1. The restrictions block leading U.S. AI computer chip designers, such as Nvidia and AMD, from selling their high-end chips for AI and supercomputing to China. The criticism typically goes like this: China’s domestic AI chip design companies could not win customers in China because their chip designs could not compete with Nvidia and AMD on performance. Chinese firms could not catch up to Nvidia and AMD on performance because they did not have enough customers to benefit from economies of scale and network effects. Because of the new export controls, revenues that formerly flowed to U.S. chip companies will now go to Chinese chip companies, offering a viable path to economies of scale and competitive performance. In the short term, this policy will significantly harm Chinese AI data center companies. However, blocking U.S. AI chip designers from selling their world-leading chips is actually good for China in the longer term because it will strengthen China’s domestic chip design ecosystem. While the reasoning in this criticism is sound, it does not imply that the Biden administration’s actions are self-defeating. Rather, it shows how the policy as disclosed in September was incomplete. A policy like this would not make sense if that is the only step the administration planned to take. Clearly something was missing, and industry experts have been waiting for the other shoe to drop ever since. On October 7, the other shoe dropped. The Biden administration announced a massive policy shift on semiconductor exports to China as well as revised rules for how the lists of restricted parties are managed. In recent decades, U.S. semiconductor policy has been primarily market driven and laissez faire. With the new policy, which comes on the heels of the CHIPS Act’s passage, the United States is firmly focused on retaining control over so-called “chokepoint” (or as it is sometimes translated from Chinese “stranglehold”) technologies in the global semiconductor technology supply chain. The most important chokepoints in the context of this discussion are AI chip designs, electronic design automation software, semiconductor manufacturing equipment, and equipment components. The Biden administration’s latest actions simultaneously exploit U.S. dominance across all four of these chokepoints. In doing so, these actions demonstrate an unprecedented degree of U.S. government intervention to not only preserve chokepoint control but also begin a new U.S. policy of actively strangling large segments of the Chinese technology industry—strangling with an intent to kill.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Hegemony, Artificial Intelligence, Rivalry, and Emerging Technology
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

84. The Ending the HIV Epidemic in the U.S. Initiative: An Interim Assessment and Policy Recommendations

Author:
Jeffrey L. Sturchio, Mackenzie Burke, and Maclane Speer
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
The Ending the HIV Epidemic in the U.S. (EHE) initiative is a promising federal program launched by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) in February 2019 with the aim of reducing new HIV infections by 75 percent by 2025 and 90 percent by 2030 (from a baseline of more than 38,000 new diagnoses in 2017). While the EHE initiative set ambitious targets for ending the HIV epidemic in the United States in the context of a sound and sensible plan, it is at present off track. Now, three years in—at the midpoint of the first EHE phase, which has a target of reducing new HIV infections to 9,250 people or fewer by 2025—is an opportune moment to assess its status and the challenges it faces. After a review of progress to date, this report examines the collision between the logical plan behind the EHE initiative and the complicated patchwork of programs that provide HIV prevention, care, and treatment to the diverse communities affected across all EHE jurisdictions. The analysis is informed by several roundtable discussions convened by CSIS with the participation of a representative group of people living with HIV/AIDS (PLWHA), community advocates, physicians, service providers, researchers, and policymakers who are implementing the EHE initiative around the country. The report concludes with policy recommendations in four areas: (1) meet people where they are by building programs that are centered on the needs of populations directly affected by the HIV epidemic; (2) address flexibility in design and implementation; (3) improve data, metrics, and accountability; and (4) heighten political advocacy to ensure future funding of the EHE initiative. A strong theme that runs throughout the report is that lessons from the global HIV response—the importance of building interventions from the ground up, of engaging with affected communities, and of taking an integrated approach across a spectrum of biomedical, clinical, social, behavioral, economic, and political dimensions—can inform and strengthen the U.S. domestic response to HIV/AIDS.
Topic:
HIV/AIDS, Health, Medicine, and Epidemic
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

85. A Seismic Shift: The New U.S. Semiconductor Export Controls and the Implications for U.S. Firms, Allies, and the Innovation Ecosystem

Author:
Sujai Shivakumar, Charles Wessner, and Thomas Howell
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
On October 7, 2022, the Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) announced sweeping revisions to its export controls, which are aimed at restricting China’s ability to obtain certain high-end semiconductor devices with potential military applications, develop and maintain supercomputers, and manufacture advanced semiconductor devices. This announcement, the most expansive export control action in decades, represents a fundamental shift in the traditional strategy underlying the U.S. and allied export control regime. As National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan put it , until now, “we previously maintained a ‘sliding scale’ approach that said we need to stay only a couple of generations ahead. That is not the strategic environment we are in today. Given the foundational nature of certain technologies, such as advanced logic and memory chips, we must maintain as large of a lead as possible.” In effect, the new measures are intended to dramatically slow, if not freeze Chinese developmental capability.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Innovation, Rivalry, and Semiconductors
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

86. A World in Crisis: The “Winter Wars” of 2022–2023

Author:
Anthony H. Cordesman and Paul Cormarie
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
t is obvious that the world now faces a wide range of potential wars and crises. What is far less obvious is the level of confrontation between the U.S. and its strategic partners with both Russia and China, the rising levels of other types of violence that are emerging on a global level, how serious these wars and crises can become, and what kind of future could eventually emerge out of so many different crises, confrontations and conflicts, and trends. These issues are addressed in depth in a new analysis by the Emeritus Chair in Strategy at the CSIS entitled A World in Crisis: The “Winter Wars” of 2022–2023. This analysis explores the risk on the basis that war does not have to mean actual military conflict. Here, it is important to note that avoiding or minimizing combat is scarcely peace. As Sun Tzu pointed out in the Art of War well over 2,000 years ago, “war” does not have to involve the use of military force or any form of actual combat. His statement that “the supreme art of war is to subdue the enemy without fighting” applies to every form of major military confrontation and gray area warfare between opposing powers. It recognizes that it is all too easy to predict dire outcomes from the War in Ukraine, the current arms races with Russia and China, and growing levels of violence and confrontation between other states. There is still a case, however, for examining the broader impact of the war, the growing intensity of the arms races with Russia and China, and the current overall patterns of global conflict as the world enters the winter of 2022-2023. It is already clear that this will be a deeply troubled winter in many areas of the globe, that the level of confrontation between major powers has risen sharply, that they do seek to subdue the enemy without fighting, and their rivalry has become the equivalent of political and economic warfare. It is equally clear that the wide range of lower-level conflicts between other powers, their civil wars, and the abuses many governments commit against their own citizens are also intensifying, although many of these conflicts have been going on in some form for years or even decades. In far too many cases, the world is not moving toward peace. It is moving towards repression and war. Accordingly, this analysis argues that the world already faces a series of possible and ongoing “Winter Wars” in 2022-2023 that may not escalate to open military conflict but that are wars at the political and economic level and in competition to build-up more lethal military forces both for deterrence and to exert political leverage. It also shows that these “Wars” already pose serious risks and could escalate sharply and in unpredictable ways for at least the next five to ten years.
Topic:
Security, Military Strategy, Rivalry, and Competition
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Asia, North America, and United States of America

87. Implications of the European Union’s Digital Regulations on U.S. and EU Economic and Strategic Interests

Author:
Kati Suominen
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
In recent months, the European Union has adopted several sweeping digital regulations, such as the Digital Services Act (DSA) and Digital Markets Act (DMA), while proposing a number of new measures—including the Data Act, the Artificial Intelligence Act, and the Media Freedom Act. These regulations will shape, likely quite dramatically, the environment for doing digital business in Europe and beyond. They will have profound implications on the leading U.S. digital service providers designated by the European Union as “gatekeepers”—large digital services providers that are expected to adhere to regulatory requirements—as well as these companies’ hundreds of millions of transatlantic European business and individual customers. By impacting primarily U.S. companies instead of Asian or European ones, Europe’s digital policies will also shape U.S. and European global strategic and national security interests. This study will assess the potential implications of new and proposed EU digital acts on U.S. digital service providers, on their customers in Europe and the United States, and on the EU and U.S. economies and exports.
Topic:
European Union, Regulation, Regionalism, Strategic Interests, and Digitalization
Political Geography:
Europe, North America, and United States of America

88. Growing Challenges, Rising Ambitions: AUSMIN 2022 and Expanding U.S.-Australia Cooperation

Author:
Charles Edel and Lam Tran
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
On December 6, 2022, the U.S. secretaries of state and defense, Antony Blinken and Lloyd Austin, will host their Australian counterparts, Penny Wong and Richard Marles, at the 32nd iteration of AUSMIN—the annual Australian-U.S. Ministerial Consultations. Taking place against a backdrop of increasing geopolitical and geoeconomic challenges, AUSMIN 2022 not only is a platform to facilitate dialogue among top leaders from the United States but also can serve as an enabling mechanism—harnessing shared values to propel a vision for the region forward. This CSIS report, Growing Challenges, Rising Ambitions: AUSMIN 2022 and Expanding U.S.-Australia Cooperation, examines a range of pathways for U.S.-Australia cooperation to evolve and deepen. Covering economic, technological, diplomatic, development, and defense topics, the 18 essays in this report outline the state of play on each topic, frame the most salient questions and challenges, and offer concrete recommendations for advancing the alliance.
Topic:
Security, International Cooperation, Leadership, and Alliance
Political Geography:
Australia, North America, and United States of America

89. Software Power The Economic and Geopolitical Implications of Open Source Software

Author:
Alice Pannier
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
Open source plays a central role in software development, both in parallel with proprietary software and increasingly intertwined with it. It has become a major factor for companies’ innovation processes and for the success and popularity of their products. For users, using open source software can alleviate risks stemming from proprietary solutions, including data privacy concerns or trade restrictions. Beyond that, open source is the foundation of critical software bricks and Internet languages and protocols. However, open source is a victim of its own success. It suffers of a lack of resources dedicated to the maintenance of open source components, even though vulnerabilities in open source code can have serious consequences, as illustrated by the Log4Shell vulnerability in December 2021. For these reasons, private companies are investing ever more money and human resources in the development and maintenance of open source software, and acquiring structuring roles in the governance of the ecosystem. This support, however, is not without risk for the open source ecosystem, which is increasingly shaped by the private interests of Big Tech companies. Meanwhile, governments are getting increasingly concerned with the cybersecurity implications of open source software, and with risks not only of accidental vulnerabilities, but also manipulation of codes by criminals and foreign agents. The interest of governments in open source is not new, but it is evolving: governments are no longer only seeking to adopt open source or to develop software solutions, but also to contribute to the financing or even the governance of open source ecosystems, at the national and/or global level. An analysis of the United States, Chinese and European cases show that government involvement in open source is not only pragmatic; it is increasingly politicized, and serves to uphold governments’ ambitions for national security, international influence, or digital sovereignty. The study highlights the dilemmas that emerge, for public authorities, from the tensions between the desire to secure universally used, critical open source components, the desire to develop “sovereign” technologies, and the risk of encroaching on the horizontal and decentralized functioning of open source.
Topic:
European Union, Cybersecurity, Geopolitics, Economy, Software, and Open Source
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and United States of America

90. Military Stockpiles: A Life-Insurance Policy in a High-Intensity Conflict?

Author:
Léo Péria-Peigné
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
For the first time after thirty years of budgetary restriction, European armies must face a high-intensity conflict involving heavy human and material losses. Having run down their military stockpiles to the bare minimum, supporting Ukraine has taken a heavy toll on their operational inventory; as modern operational inventories are limited, much decommissioned and older equipment has also been donated. Russia too has mobilized its extensive military stockpiles, inherited from the USSR, to maintain its combat capability after the initial failure of its “special military operation”. Russian efforts to retrofit older systems have also intensified as production of modern equipment has stalled. As a result, we are seeing modern and ancient weapons pitted against each other in Ukraine. This situation raises questions about France’s military storage strategy and prompts comparisons with those of other nations. US forces have kept a significant proportion of their Cold War arsenal in working condition, using it as a valuable commercial, diplomatic, and military asset. This arsenal also allows the United States to dominate the second-hand weapons market as it can supply cheap and almost immediately available systems. In Russia, despite an apparent modernization process, military power still relies on Soviet-era stocks of vehicles and weapons. For the Russian navy, modernization of old hulls is a way to compensate for the slow production of modern ships. Chinese armed forces are being modernized and rationalized: substantial quantities of older equipment could therefore become available before 2030, a potential asset for Chinese diplomacy. In Europe, military stockpiling strategies diverge along a rough east–west line. Western powers such as the United Kingdom and France chose quality over quantity, while Eastern ones, closer to the Russian threat, try to maintain large volumes while also modernizing their equipment. While the war in Ukraine may prompt Western nations to begin a reinforcement program, Eastern European countries such as Poland had already begun their own before 2014 and the Crimea crisis. After the 2015 terrorist attacks in Paris, France began to restore its military means and budgets, but the overall size of its armed forces is still inadequate to face a high-intensity conflict. The professionalization of the armed forces, the 2008 financial crisis, and budget cuts progressively led to the practice of stockpiling being replaced with a generalized “just-in-time” approach, to reduce infrastructure needs and costs more broadly. French armed forces had to make tough choices with their limited budgets, keeping what was immediately useful to their current missions and abandoning what was not. Operations in Africa and the Middle East and anti-terrorist operations in French cities absorbed considerable budgets, while specialized military units and infrastructure necessary to maintain stocks required for high-intensity conflicts were disbanded. Several initiatives and processes are at work to restore minimum storage capabilities, but a relevant stockpiling strategy, in line with France’s resources and strategic context, is still far off. The French army is building several military reserve units that could drive greater retention of older equipment and vehicles, although compatibility issues with more recent models may arise. As storing combat aircraft would be far too costly, the French Air and Space Force is trying to optimize the availability of its fleet, especially through a new approach to private industry partners in maintenance and training. The French navy has initiated a reform and rationalization process of its spare-parts-storage policy to optimize the availability of its ships as well as their capabilities. A coherent equipment reserve and stockpiling program is an essential component of a military driven by a clear strategic framework. However, in the French case, this strategy is currently being pulled in two directions: between the probable end of expeditionary operations in Africa and the Middle East, and the likelihood of a high-intensity conflict. The whole French stockpiling approach cannot be based entirely on the experience in Ukraine, and it is therefore necessary to evaluate multiple probable scenarios to develop relevant recommendations. A conflict in Eastern Europe fought by a coalition differs from one led by Europe without US support, or from a major crisis in the French territories of the Pacific or Indian Ocean. Moreover, recommendations must reflect military realities, as French resources are limited and would not allow for the creation of a reserve stock strategy similar to that of the United States. To support an allied nation under attack, the French army would need a much expanded ammunition stockpile. Similarly, the French air force lacks advanced munitions, while the French navy needs to rebuild a support fleet sufficient to enable combat operations far away from the French mainland and infrastructure.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Conflict, Industry, and Armament
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, France, and United States of America

91. Neither Surveillance Nor Algorithm-driven Consumerism: Toward an Alternative European Model for Smart Cities

Author:
Jacques Priol and Joé Vincent-Galtié
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
Smart city projects take many forms, ranging from the installation of connected street lights to total initiatives such as The Line – the gargantuan and futuristic project carried out by Saudi Arabia. In one form or another, these initiatives are multiplying, guided by the objectives of efficiency and the improvement of public policies. What they have in common is that they mobilize various digital tools and use data to develop and manage public services. As they are exported, these projects also become levers for international influence. Where does Europe stand on this spectrum? While many smart territory projects have already been implemented on the continent, Europe is still looking for its own model. Two models are unanimously rejected: the one promoted by China, and the one implemented by certain North American cities. The first subordinates the smart city to security and social control imperatives and contributes to the constant surveillance of the population. In contrast to this model, which is primarily concerned with control and surveillance on behalf of the State, the Californian-inspired North American model is criticized for its massive use of personal data, which is collected and used by private actors. Users are alarmed by the potential use of this data for commercial purposes and denounce the replacement of democratic decision-making by automated tools. From there, developing a European model requires taking these pitfalls into account and respecting both the issues related to privacy protection and the maintenance of open and democratic procedures. Europe can rely on an ambitious regulatory framework, capable of encouraging the development of smart cities in its territory. This framework can also be a real asset for exporting its model to other continents. European initiatives in the field of smart cities are also part of efforts to promote digital sovereignty. In this respect, matters of standardization, interoperability and infrastructure are at the heart of the debate and must be fully integrated into the projects implemented. They are also subject to intense international competition.
Topic:
Infrastructure, Governance, Geopolitics, Urban, Smart Cities, and Data
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and United States of America

92. The Pacific caught in the World Wide Web? Geopolitics of submarine cables in Oceania

Author:
Camille Morel
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
This article provides a review of the digital connectivity of the Pacific Islands nations (Polynesia, Melanesia, and Micronesia) and the main challenges and prospects arising from it, at a time when the submarine cable market is undergoing profound change and a growing politicization of this technology on the international scene. In 2022, the 450 fiber-optic cables stretching across the world’s seabed carry more than 98 percent of international data and have become essential to the proper functioning of our societies. Submarine cable connection is all the more important to the geographically isolated Pacific islands because it enables them to digitize various sectors of the economy and society (industry, education, health, etc.) and to maintain a virtual link to the rest of the world. When a submarine cable is disabled, satellite links cannot completely offset this loss. The topic of submarine cables in Oceania is inextricably tied up with the geopolitics of the Indo-Pacific and rivalries between powers. Because of the long distances separating them from the rest of the world and the high cost of cables, the island territories of the Pacific are more liable to be dependent on other countries and subject to outside influence. Cables are also involved in the escalation of maritime competition between states, in a context of military, economic, demographic, and environmental issues, including seabed warfare. Against the backdrop of growing connectivity in the Pacific region since 2011 and the rise of China, the Pacific Ocean has become one of the three main routes for data in the twenty-first century. Within the region, the insular Pacific has several distinguishing features: Because of its particular geography, it appears under-meshed compared with the northern trans-Pacific route and the inter-Asia links. It looks more like a transit zone than a genuine space for investment. Its ecosystem and the methods used by public and private actors to commission, manage, and operate submarine links in the region have been adapted to local constraints and challenges. The main winners in this scenario are Australia and the United States, while the main loser is China, whose growing ambitions in the region are continuously thwarted. As a stage for Sino-American rivalry, the insular Pacific has to adapt to circumvent political difficulties and respond to its population’s urgent need for digital resilience. This challenge seems likely to result in a number of alternative cable projects emerging, offering new opportunities in the digital domain.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Geopolitics, and Connectivity
Political Geography:
Japan, China, Australia, United States of America, and Pacific Ocean

93. Developing Nuclear Energy in Estonia: An Amplifier of Strategic Partnership with the United States?

Author:
Tomas Jermalavicius, Max Bergmann, Peter Crall, Thomas O'Donnell, Tomas Janeliūnas, and Tõnis Idarand
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
Estonia’s climate neutrality commitments and its simultaneous pursuit of national security mean that it will need to develop and cultivate new zero- or low-carbon, affordable, secure and safe domestic sources of energy. Nuclear energy is increasingly regarded as one of the critical ingredients of successful transition to climate-neutral energy system and as a viable part of the future decarbonised mix of energy supply. Therefore, Estonia is officially considering the possibility to adopt nuclear energy generated by new-design Small Modular Reactors (SMR). This choice, however, is not purely environmental, economic or technical, but also has geopolitical implications. It would create new long-term inter-dependencies with foreign partners which could represent fresh opportunities for closer cooperation in security and foreign policy domain, but also could create some new political, reputational, and national security risks. This geopolitical dimension is of particular importance to countries such as Estonia that seek greater involvement of key allies such as the United States, United Kingdom, France, and Germany in the Nordic-Baltic area to counter the geopolitical pressure from Russia and, increasingly, China. The report assumes that Estonia might eventually opt for nuclear energy and would then choose the US as its SMR technology supplier. It explores how Estonia’s foreign and security policy interests would benefit from a potential adoption of nuclear energy and development of technological and commercial relations in this field with the US. The report also maps various potential risks in relations with several key fellow member states of the European Union that may arise from Estonia turning to nuclear power as a major source of energy and to the US for a technological solution. It considers how certain structural issues in national energy policies and divergent geopolitical perspectives of Germany, France, and Poland – as well as some persistent characteristics of intra-European relations manifest through the EU’s common policies – may impair or facilitate Estonian nuclear aspirations. The study also highlights that Estonia’s affirmative decision concerning nuclear energy is likely to draw the attention and actions of malignant actors such as Russia aiming to discredit nuclear energy in general, as a viable pathway to energy security and climate neutrality, and US SMR technology in particular; undermine trust – domestically and internationally – in the ability of the Estonian government and enterprises to ensure competent and responsible stewardship of nuclear energy, and pit Estonia against some key regional and European allies. The report articulates some recommendations on how to better exploit the opportunities related to the US involvement in the development of Estonia’s nuclear energy programme and mitigate the identified risks.
Topic:
Climate Change, National Security, Partnerships, and Nuclear Energy
Political Geography:
Eastern Europe, Estonia, North America, and United States of America

94. Northern Afghanistan and the New Threat to Central Asia

Author:
Bruce Pannier
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
The contest for control of northern Afghanistan between the Taliban, the Islamic State, and other terrorist groups is a major security concern for the states of Central Asia. Since the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan in August 2021, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan have relied on the Taliban to prevent non-state actors from operating in northern Afghanistan and launching cross-border attacks. In recent months, however, the Islamic State has bombed mosques near the border with Central Asia, and claimed to have launched a rocket attack into Uzbekistan. The deteriorating situation in the region demonstrates the limits of Central Asian states’ security strategies, and highlights that they have few options in dealing with a new threat on their border.
Topic:
Security, Non State Actors, Taliban, Borders, and Threat Perception
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, South Asia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and United States of America

95. Afghanistan After Zawahiri: America's Counterterrorism Options in the New South Asia

Author:
Philip Wasielewski
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
Despite the attention in Washington currently paid to developments in Ukraine and the Taiwan Strait, terrorism remains a threat to US national security. The recent counterterrorism strike against Ayman al-Zawahiri in Kabul highlights that the fight against al-Qaeda, among other groups, is not over, and that Afghanistan remains a safe harbor for many of the world’s terrorist organizations or their affiliates. Going forward, the United States will need to continue to dedicate resources to detect and disrupt terrorist threats emanating from Afghanistan. To do so, Washington needs to rebuild a coalition of allies opposed to violent Islamist extremism—both around Afghanistan and inside the country—who can provide intelligence and logistics support as needed, to help in that task.
Topic:
National Security, Violent Extremism, Counter-terrorism, Alliance, and Coalition
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, South Asia, and United States of America

96. American Interests in the Ukraine War

Author:
Joshua Shifrinson
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
Policymakers have poorly defined U.S. strategic interests in the Russia-Ukraine War. Those interests that have been defined—deterring future aggression and protecting the “liberal order”—do not stand up to scrutiny. Actual U.S. interests in Ukraine are essentially negative: preventing further escalation or spillover of the conflict and limiting a wholesale collapse in U.S.-Russian relations. The limited interests that the U.S. does have in Ukraine suggest that Washington should try to convince Ukraine and Russia to accept a negotiated settlement.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Liberal Order, Conflict, Strategic Interests, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, Eastern Europe, and United States of America

97. Immaterial Competition: Rethinking the Roles of Economics and Technology in the US-China Rivalry

Author:
Arthur Tellis
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
The US-China rivalry is likely to be the fulcrum around which international affairs are structured in the twenty-first century, akin to the Cold War from 1947 to 1991. This rivalry, like its predecessor, emerges from divergent geopolitical interests and imperatives. While the Chinese Communist Party’s aims are many, various, and subject to change, they include its continued control of the Chinese State; economic and technological modernization and leadership; internal order; complete union with Taiwan on Beijing’s terms; certain territorial concessions from its neighbors; and the disestablishment of security arrangements across the Indo-Pacific that it views as threatening and trammeling. The latter three are in direct conflict with US interests and imperatives in the Indo-Pacific: prohibiting China’s unilateral modification of the status quo vis-à-vis Taiwan; preserving the sovereignty and territorial integrity of its allies and partners; and maintaining its military partnerships and presence in the region. These antithetical interests animate a larger struggle for hegemony in the Indo-Pacific and serve as the terms on which this contest will be decided. Explanations of the rivalry as an ideological contest or a competition born from competing economic interests are less compelling by comparison. The United States and China are motivated to an extent by ideological imperatives, but these do not appear to propel or serve as the central stakes for the rivalry as much as they affect each’s disposition toward the other. Long-standing trade, investment, and commercial disputes and competition, meanwhile, are not so substantial that they motivate the rivalry. While these issues are impactful to niche communities and conspicuous to national policymakers, they are not particularly consequential for national prosperity. The logic of competition, trade, and globalization, in fact, suggests that the US-China commercial relationship is mutually beneficial, notwithstanding each’s concerns with the other’s economic statecraft and market-leading firms. In their geopolitical rivalry, there are a few key forces or contests of interest: path dependence, regime continuity, prudent strategy, third-party alignments, and the balance of military forces in the Indo-Pacific. Each affects the United States’ and China’s ability to achieve their ends and shapes their rivalry. Economic and technological statecraft, by contrast, is largely peripheral to these ends as it does not effectively advance political objectives relevant to territory, borders, security architectures, and national defense. That is not to suggest that economic and technological factors are irrelevant, however; they shape, constrain, and advantage the United States and China across their rivalry’s key forces and contests of interests. Particularly noteworthy are economic and technological factors’ impact on the military balance. Tradition and intuition hold that nations with bigger and more advanced economies are better postured to resource, procure, and manufacture military equipment and can therefore generate greater military power. In the case of the US-China military competition, however, total military power is less relevant than the specific military balance in the Indo-Pacific, in which the distribution and strength of forces in the theater, the capability and reliability of key materiel inputs of outsized importance, and the operational concepts and tactics with which each’s military fights are more important. Total military power—and in particular greater military equipment—matters on the margin, of course, if only because the party with the greater mass and quality of materiel will be able to retain more forces in the Indo-Pacific, maintain more of these key materiel inputs, and develop novel operational concepts and tactics tailored to their superior materiel. Neither the United States’ nor China’s total economic production, public balance sheet, high-technology commercial firms, and scientific production are likely to provide a decisive or lasting advantage on this count. Each country’s economy can support substantially greater military spending, limiting the extent to which one can derive an advantage from the other’s more binding constraints. The capacity and maturity of each country’s defense industrial base is of greater relevance, but these are flexible quotients that investment can improve. This elasticity of defense production suggests that microeconomic endowments may be binding in the short run but variable in the longer run, meaning that policy choices—rather than existing economic endowments—constrain military production. Technological endowments, informing each country’s capacity for broad innovation, are of similarly bounded importance because military technology is somewhat narrow and other factors, such as military procurement processes and inflexibility in concepts of operation, limit the extent to which superior technology translates into military advantage. The fundamental result of this argument is that the concerns that propel the emerging US-China economic and technological competition are ultimately not all that relevant to the matters at the core to their rivalry and to the instruments of national power most relevant to these issues. The US should therefore be wary of policies ostensibly demanded by economic and technological competition and may find its interests better served by limiting its rivalry with China to military competition driven by its core geopolitical interests.
Topic:
Economics, Science and Technology, Strategic Competition, and Rivalry
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

98. 'Win Without Fighting': The Chinese Communist Party's Political and Institutional Warfare Against the West

Author:
John Lee and Lavina Lee
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
When compared to Western forms of diplomatic conversation and strategic discussion, phrases emanating from Beijing and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) can appear peculiar, platitudinous, and so ambiguous as to be devoid of practical content. China’s paramount leader Xi Jinping speaks frequently about a ‘community of shared future,’ a ‘common destiny for mankind’ as part of his ‘China dream,’ or of his country’s ‘rejuvenation.’ He promises to pursue and achieve a ‘new type of great-power relations’ with the United States that will ‘expand the converging interests of all and build a big global family of harmony and cooperation.’ Yielding to the temptation to dismiss these phrases as glib and meaningless or as empty promises to the world would be a serious mistake. Emerging as the victorious side after the world was reshaped in the aftermath of the Second World War, and, more recently, the formal end of the Cold War, the United States and its allies have generally enjoyed dominance in all forms of power. The challenge and threat of China is largely understood in the context of its increase in material power, which is relatively easy to understand and quantify. In contrast, far less attention is being paid to non-material power, which is, admittedly, more nebulous and difficult to assess. However, China’s focus has been on relentlessly building its ‘comprehensive national power’ (CNP), that is, the sum-total of its powers and strengths—economic, military affair, science and technology, education, and resource—and influence. Thus, CNP encompasses both material and non-material power, and China’s buildup of both of these forms of power best explains its strategic and diplomatic successes. Chinese ‘rejuvenation’ is also not just about building GDP or having the world’s largest naval fleet. Rather, the CCP’s vision of a ‘community of shared future for mankind’ is very much about displacing the dominance enjoyed by the US and other advanced democracies in shaping global discourse and conversations, norms and standards, and influence within and through institutions. The advanced democracies have taken these less obvious forms of power for granted, a complacency that Beijing has exploited. As the CCP recognizes, “In the final analysis, the rise of a great power is a cultural phenomenon. It (that power) must be accepted by the international community. Be accommodated by the international system, rely on the international system, and be recognised by international norms.” To be sure, there is a rich and growing literature on the CCP’s various information, influence, and institutional resources and activities, and this report does not seek to reproduce the excellent work already in the public domain. Rather, it begins from the uncomfortable but growing realization that the CCP believes it has long been at war with the US and its allies, even though kinetic force has been used in only a few instances. It looks at why this war is being waged, what the hallmarks of success for Beijing look like, and how the use of non-material strategies in the form of political and institutional warfare complements and augments China’s better known material approaches in the CCP’s determined attempts to win this ongoing war or struggle. The report seeks to emphasize that, in understanding the challenge and threat of China, political and institutional warfare should not be treated as optional or interesting adjuncts to traditional notions of warfare or that their effects are peripheral to core strategic and even military objectives. On the contrary, non-material approaches are essential to the Chinese strategy and have real-world outcomes that are often the same ones that the use of force or economic coercion is intended to achieve. Just as the CCP views comprehensive power as encompassing material and non-material elements, its notion of waging and winning a war may or may not include a military element. We need to do the same when countering, deterring, and, if necessary, defeating Chinese strategies and actions. Moreover, the CCP’s approach is not just about putting its views forward in overt or veiled ways in the hope that it will change our minds about various issues. Instead, Beijing’s strategy is much more proactive and profound than that. The CCP’s political and institutional approaches are about fundamentally changing and shaping even the way we begin to think about or analyze an issue or what we perceive to be its ‘first principles.’ It is designed to shape the way we talk (or do not talk) about an issue, the presumptive and analytical frameworks we employ to do so, and the discourse regarding it that is accepted and deemed acceptable. At first glance, such a deeply cognitive approach might seem fanciful and impossible to implement. However, this report offers two recent case studies of instances where the CCP enjoyed considerable success in melding the material and the cognitive—with tangible and real-world results. This report then offers a summary of the real-world strategic effects and their impacts on the tactical decision-making of countries and their elites that should concern those in charge of our political, economic, military, and diplomatic policies and activities. In conclusion, it suggests some general responses to the CCP’s strategy, approach, and actions in these contexts.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Politics, Economy, Institutions, Strategic Competition, and Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

99. Regaining the High Ground Against China: A Plan to Achieve US Naval Aviation Superiority This Decade

Author:
Bryan Clark and Timothy A. Walton
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
The U.S. Navy and Marine Corps face growing challenges ranging from China and Russia to regional threats such as Iran and North Korea, all of whom seek to undermine their neighbors’ stability and revise geopolitical relationships in their favor. Despite the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic and resulting economic downturn, each of these potential adversaries continued to improve its military capabilities, especially the number and reach of precision missiles able to strike U.S. allies and slow or prevent intervention by U.S. naval forces. Supported by commercial and military surveillance networks in every domain, weapons located on adversary territory are capable of threatening U.S. and allied ships, troop formations, and aircraft hundreds of miles away. U.S. naval aviation risks sliding into irrelevance unless Navy and Marine Corps leaders embrace organizational and investment changes that would enable more effective operational concepts against peer adversaries. To support the approaches, naval air forces will need greater reach, adaptability, and capacity, which this study proposes to address by changing the composition of carrier air wings and repurposing aircraft based ashore or on surface combatants and amphibious ships. Rebalancing naval aviation primarily involves force management, supported by additional procurement or modification of existing aircraft and payloads. This contrasts with prevailing Navy and Marine Corps plans, which sustain the existing force with minimal improvements while prioritizing development of next-generation capabilities. Not only does this approach fail to address the urgent nature of Russian and Chinese threats, but it also perpetuates the Navy’s expectation that revolutionary new capabilities will fix problems that demand tactical, organizational, or adaptive technical solutions. That strategy failed to deliver in the cases of the Littoral Combat Ship, Zumwalt-class destroyer, and Ford-class carrier. The F/A-XX program for a sixth-generation air superiority fighter-even if successful-is unlikely to transform naval aviation but could consume resources needed to address peer adversaries during the next decade. The shortfalls facing naval airpower against the People’s Republic of China are significant, but not insurmountable. Analysts have pronounced the death of the aircraft carrier several times since the end of World War II, but by exploiting its adaptability and mobility U.S. naval forces could remain relevant against peer opponents despite the emergence of long-range sensor and precision weapon networks. However, achieving the reach and capacity necessary to counter Chinese aggression in the Indo-Pacific will depend on carriers focusing on the mission only they can do sustainably and at scalelong-range counter-air and strike warfare. Navy and Marine Corps leaders have an opportunity to substantially improve the ability of maritime airpower to influence events in the Indo-Pacific. However, rebalancing naval aviation will require overcoming cultural, organizational, and programmatic hurdles. As described in this report, the necessary changes are possible and affordable, but only if naval leaders embrace the urgency of their challenges and do not continue to hope they can continue to push their problems-and solutions-out into the future.
Topic:
Defense Policy, National Security, Armed Forces, Military Affairs, Navy, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

100. One-Size-Fits-None: Overhauling JADC2 to Prioritize the Warfighter and Exploit Adversaries’ Weaknesses

Author:
Bryan Clark and Dan Patt
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Amazon founder Jeff Bezos famously attributes his company’s success to its customer obsession, which drove initiatives ranging from the creation of a cloud infrastructure and processing orders at unprecedented scale to establishing an entirely new logistics network that rapidly moves purchases to destinations. Amazon’s focus on shoppers is understandable, as it only makes about 1 percent of the merchandise it sells. Unlike a product-aligned business model like Apple’s, which seeks to anticipate or shape customer demand, Amazon’s bottom line depends on it being able to understand and respond to consumers better and faster than competitors. Given the urgent challenges China and Russia pose to US allies, the US Department of Defense (DoD) should adopt a fulfillment model like that of Amazon. Although analysts often treat the DoD as a single customer in a monopsonistic relationship with its thousands of suppliers across the defense industrial base, the DoD more closely resembles a market where military services, combat support agencies, and defense contractors collaborate to deliver capabilities to their ultimate customers—combatant commands such as US Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM), US Strategic Command (STRATCOM), and US European Command (EUCOM). Viewing the DoD as a market rather than a customer suggests that services and agencies should focus their efforts on understanding and meeting combatant commanders’ needs. This would reverse the Pentagon’s longstanding practice, codified in the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS), in which services and agencies predict future operational requirements and task government labs or contractors with developing solutions that will fill anticipated capability gaps. JCIDS harkens back to the 20th century’s industrial model of product development exemplified by Henry Ford, who famously said that purchasers of his Model-T could have it in any color they wanted, as long as it was black. The DoD’s customers are similarly disenfranchised. The US Joint Staff, which administers JCIDS and acts as the combatant commanders’ representative in Pentagon decision fora, lacks acquisition authorities and funding and thus can impact defense programs only by defining requirements for future systems. Because requirements are predictive, they attempt to capture the full range of use cases for a new product, leading JCIDS to produce comprehensive, generalized solutions rather than customized capabilities designed to meet combatant commanders’ operational challenges. The argument for military services “pushing” new systems to customers instead of letting end-users “pull” what they need centers on the perception that combatant commanders are focused on near-term capacity rather than next-generation capability. This assessment may have been valid in 2003 when JCIDS was first implemented. Emerging systems like the F-35 strike-fighter and DDG-1000 each took nearly two decades to reach fruition, and combatant commanders lacked the analytic processes and far-term perspective to determine what would be useful or feasible 10 to 20 years in the future. Moreover, the US military in 2003 was by far the world’s most capable force, and threats requiring substantially different US capabilities would take a decade or more to materialize. However, the assumptions underlying the DoD’s industrial model of capability development are no longer valid. INDOPACOM assesses that China could mount a successful invasion of Taiwan during the 2020s, and Russia continues to threaten imminent action against Ukraine and NATO’s eastern members. Combatant commanders’ perspectives on capability requirements should therefore be a top priority for services, agencies, and the defense industry. At the same time, in the commercial sector, computing, manufacturing, and materials technologies are delivering new products within months or several years rather than decades. New defense industrial base entrants that leverage commercial advancements and software-centric innovation could quickly provide relevant capabilities by responding directly to combatant commander’s current and emerging operational challenges. Unfortunately, the DoD’s pursuit of efficiency and centralized decision-making hinder the direct connections between combatant commander customers and commercial or government suppliers that foster innovation. The results will therefore continue to be one-size-fits-all solutions that take longer and are more expensive than concepts and capabilities tailored to meet specific needs. In addition to furthering the Pentagon’s well-documented problems delivering new systems and concepts on cost and schedule, universal solutions will be less likely to target the specific threats posed by such peer adversaries as China or Russia. Without restoring combatant commander customers to the center of the DoD’s capability development efforts, US forces will not be able to keep up with the challenges posed by peer adversaries like China or Russia and may even find themselves behind regional powers with geographic advantages and little to lose. The US military cannot afford another failed and ponderous attempt to “boil the ocean” with universal solutions and should take a page from Amazon by focusing on customer needs first.
Topic:
Defense Policy, National Security, Armed Forces, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
Russia, China, and United States of America