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1. Western Balkans’ Horizon 2023 – New uncertainties in a changed geopolitical setting

Author:
Vedran Dzihic
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP)
Abstract:
“The age of uncertainty” has recently become the most used description for the time we live in. The aggression of Russia against Ukraine and the war approaching now its second year have changed the globe. Global uncertainties and huge geopolitical changes we witness are mirrored in European semiperipheral regions like the Western Balkans. The Western Balkans has been in a limbo for a while with no major progress towards the EU and democracy in general. Instead of steady democratization in the region we witnessed a gradual autocratization, most prominently in Serbia, and constant rise of crisis and tensions.
Topic:
European Union, Democracy, Geopolitics, Autocracy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Balkans

2. Little substance, considerable impact Russian influence in Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Montenegro

Author:
Wouter Zweers and Niels Drost
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
This Clingendael report explores the role of the Russian Federation in Serbia, Montenegro, and Bosnia and Herzegovina. It examines Russia’s objectives in its relations with the three countries, as well the various sources of influence the Kremlin holds in each of the three countries. The report places this analysis within the changed geopolitical circumstances resulting from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Russia’s main objectives for the Western Balkans are threefold. First, the Kremlin seeks to project great power status globally. Second, it seeks to obstruct the Euro-Atlantic integration of the region by advocating against NATO and EU integration and by raising instabilities. Third, the Kremlin uses the Balkans, especially the Kosovo issue, as an argument for its foreign policy agenda elsewhere, particularly when it comes to defending its perceived dominance over its near abroad. Instead of building a sustainable, all-encompassing, and meaningful relation with Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), and Montenegro, Russia instead pursues an opportunistic approach depending on fragmented entry points for influence in each country. The Kremlin displays moderate ambitions for building positive relationships with the three countries, which is reflected also in the instruments it uses to influence the region. It nurtures contacts with, and influence through, a wide range of individual politicians, the Orthodox Church, the media and malign proxy groups, making use of energy links as well as local tensions and historical memories. Moscow pursues this approach deliberately, and it has proven relatively successful. At the political level, Russia’s clout stretches especially to (pro-)Serb politicians, who often make use of similar narratives and use Russia as an external supporter to promote their own ideas. In particular, its position on Kosovo, Russian support for Republika Srpska leader Milorad Dodik and its Orthodox Church links remain important entry points for Russia’s political influence in the region at large. Of the three countries, entry points for Russian influence are most widespread In Serbia, followed by Bosnia and Herzegovina. Economically, Russia’s influence is outperformed substantially by that of the EU, especially in terms of trade. Russia’s far-reaching influence in the energy sectors of BiH and Serbia, however, yield substantial political leverage, even if its investments often prove economically inviable. When it comes to military influence, Russia seeks to maintain its military cooperation with its main partner, Serbia, while also supporting the militarisation of Republika Srpska. Belgrade is satisfied with its current degree of cooperation with Moscow but seeks to avoid becoming Russia’s foothold in the Balkans. Factually, Russia is only one of multiple security actors in the Balkans, overshadowed by NATO and challenged by China. While presenting itself as a partner to Serbia and Republika Srpska in particular, Russia also resorts to malign instruments which have often proven to be effective in shaping the political environment of the Western Balkans. Lacking a military presence in the region, Russia supports far-right nationalist figures and organisations, which generally better resemble organised crime groups than paramilitary organisations, to attain its goal of destabilisation by stirring up polarisation and anti-Western sentiment. The Kremlin is perhaps most successful in the field of media and disinformation. Russian propaganda penetrates Serbia, Montenegro, and Bosnia and Herzegovina through Russian-funded portals, local media and social media. Russian disinformation and narratives have penetrated the region to such an extent that considerable sections of society hold a positive image of Russia and its political leadership. In all these fields, the Russian invasion of Ukraine has moderately affected but not fully altered Russia’s approach towards Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Montenegro. While the invasion has led to sharper dividing lines between Russia and the West and decreases in Russian financial and diplomatic capacities, we observe continuity in terms of Russian strategies and objectives. Russia’s sources of influence in the three countries have been moderately strained, among other causes as a result of BiH and Serbia’s first steps to diversify energy sources and Western pressure to diminish their political and security links with the Russian Federation. For the time being, this has not yet affected Moscow’s ability to act as a spoiler to the Euro-Atlantic integration of the three countries. The extent to which the European Union and NATO are effective in countering Russian influence in Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Montenegro will be part of a follow-up Clingendael report to be published in fall 2023. As part of the same research project, analyses of societal and political perceptions towards Russia in the three countries will be published in summer 2023 by Clingendael partners the Atlantic Council of Montenegro, the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia, and the Atlantic Initiative in BiH.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, European Union, Disinformation, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
Russia, Eastern Europe, Serbia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina

3. Military capabilities affected by climate change: An analysis of China, Russia and the United States

Author:
Adaja Stoetman, Dick Zandee, Ties Dams, Niels Drost, and Louise Van Schaik
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
Climate change is one of the most pressing challenges of the present and the future. Rising temperatures and sea levels, as well as extreme weather events are manifestations of climate change that also influence military capabilities. Increased attention for the climate change-security nexus is visible both at the national and the international level: nationally through the incorporation of climate change in security strategies and internationally through incorporation in important strategic documents such as the EU’s Strategic Compass and NATO’s Strategic Concept. Given its transnational nature, governments around the world have a shared responsibility to face climate change. A particular role is laid down for the global powers, China, Russia and the United States, given their position in the world. It is, however, questionable whether the global powers’ interests align. They differ in their approaches to address climate change, and even more so in their views on how it affects the armed forces. China and particularly Russia are more reluctant towards depicting climate change as a matter of international security. This is for example visible in international forums, such as the UN Security Council. In contrast, in the US, support for climate action is subject to political preferences, but climate related security risks are widely recognised within the defence establishment. This report reviews various aspects of the relationship between climate and security, with a particular focus on the military. It discusses the role of climate change in a country’s security and defence strategy and, vice versa, the changing tasks and deployment of the armed forces in response to climate change, the effects of climate change on military infrastructure, and measures to realise a greener defence sector.
Topic:
Security, Climate Change, European Union, and Military
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

4. Russia’s War in Ukraine: Rethinking the EU’s Eastern Enlargement and Neighborhood Policy

Author:
Guntram Wolff, Alexandra Gritz, Stefan Meister, and Milan Nič
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:
The stagnating EU accession process needs political will and procedural changes allowing eastern candidates to advance. In the meantime, they should be more supported to use the full potential of existing opportunities for gradual economic and sectoral integration with the EU. An upgraded Eastern Partnership needs a comprehensive security dimension linking resilience, connectivity, and defense policy, as well as cooperation in the area of the Common Security and Defence Policy. The protracted regional conflicts (in Moldova and the South Caucasus) require a more active EU engagement as existing OSCE formats continue to be blocked, and Russia’s role and military presence weaken. New openings for conflict resolution mean higher demand for the EU’s diplomatic, monitoring, and peacekeeping capacities. A new eastern Neighborhood Policy should be designed for the wider region, connecting the Black Sea and the South Caucasus with Central Asia and thus creating viable alternatives to the competing geoeconomic and governance “offers” of China, Russia, and Turkey.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Governance, European Union, International Order, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Central Asia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

5. The Disruption of Arctic Exceptionalism: Managing Environmental Change in Light of Russian Aggression

Author:
Kai Kornhuber, Kira Vinke, Evan T. Bloom, Loyle Campbell, Volker Rachold, Sara Olsvig, and Dana Schirwon
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:
The Arctic is directly affected by the interaction of two ongoing global crises: climate change and Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine. With its temperatures rising four times faster than the global average, the Arctic is facing dramatic environmental consequences. Meanwhile, retreating sea ice has led to increased economic interest in the Arctic and its growing geopolitical importance. Thus, understanding and managing the global and local implications of environmental change in this region requires urgent scientific and diplomatic collaboration.
Topic:
Climate Change, Environment, International Cooperation, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Central Asia, Arctic, and Americas

6. Authoritarian kleptocrats are thriving on the West’s failures. Can they be stopped?

Author:
Francis Shin and Ben Judah
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
A hidden web of power revealed itself to Internet users in early 2022. Following a brutal government crackdown in Kazakhstan in January, anyone using open-source flight-tracking websites could watch kleptocratic elites flee the country on private jets. A little more than a month later, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine brought a new spectacle: social media users were able to track various oligarchs’ superyachts as they jumped from port to port to evade Western sanctions. These feeds captured a national security problem in near real time: In Eurasia and beyond, kleptocratic elites with deep ties to the West were able to move themselves and their assets freely despite a host of speeches by senior officials, sanctions, and structures designed to stop them. Kleptocratic regimes—kleptocracy means “rule by thieves”—have exploited the lax and uneven regulatory environments of the global financial system to hide their ill-gotten gains and interfere in politics abroad, especially in the United States, the United Kingdom, and the European Union. They are aided in this task by a large cast of professional enablers within these jurisdictions. The stronger these forces get, the more they erode the principles of democracy and the rule of law. Furthermore, the international sanctions regime imposed on Russia in response to its invasion of Ukraine has little hope of long-term success if the global financial system itself continues to weaken. The West still has a long way to go to rein in the authoritarian kleptocrats who have thrived on the institutional dysfunction, regulatory failure, and bureaucratic weakness of the transatlantic community for far too long. We need to rethink not just how we combat kleptocracy, but also how we define it. Policy makers need to understand that authoritarian regimes that threaten transatlantic security are closely linked to illicit financial systems. As it stands, our thinking about how foreign corruption spreads is too constrained by stereotypes about kleptocratic goals and actions.
Topic:
Corruption, Diplomacy, Intelligence, Politics, Sanctions, Authoritarianism, Reform, European Union, Regulation, Finance, Economy, Rule of Law, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, United Kingdom, Europe, Ukraine, Canada, and United States of America

7. Multipolarity After Ukraine: Old Wine in New Bottles?

Author:
Aldo Ferrari and Eleonora Tafuro Ambrosetti
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI)
Abstract:
One year after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the war has exacerbated the rift between Russia and the “collective West”. While Western governments have been steadfast in punishing Russia for the invasion, other countries around the world have been more ambiguous, at times even choosing to side with Moscow politically or economically. These dynamics have revived the idea of a shift towards multipolarity along an anti-Western trajectory. Are we really heading in that direction? Are we facing increasing fragmentation due to the war or a re-consolidation of longstanding alliances? What principles underlie the formation of these blocs? What are the consequences of these dynamics for global security and the global economy? This Report aims to shed light on these questions, while also outlining the war’s possible future implications for the Russian Federation, the “West”, and the international order.
Topic:
Security, Governance, Economy, Multipolarity, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

8. Europe and Russia on the Balkan Front. Geopolitics and Diplomacy in the EU’s Backyard

Author:
Giorgio Fruscione
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI)
Abstract:
The war in Ukraine has taken its toll on the stability of the Balkans by reshuffling regional geopolitics and reviving diplomatic competition between the West and Russia. Since the summer of 2022, growing tensions between Kosovo and Serbia have raised concerns about a possible Russian involvement and pushed the European Union to react promptly. By brokering a new normalisation agreement, the West seeks to prevent new hotbeds in Europe and push Russia one step back from the Balkans. Meanwhile, the Russian invasion of Ukraine has given new momentum to the integration process of candidate states, making EU membership a tangible goal rather than an unattainable dream. Will the EU be able to stabilise the Balkans? Will Russia continue to exert its influence in the region? Are Belgrade and Pristina on the eve of a new phase in the normalisation process?
Topic:
Diplomacy, European Union, Geopolitics, Political stability, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Balkans

9. What North Korea Has Been Learning From Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine

Author:
Tereza Novotná
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
East-West Center
Abstract:
A year ago, in February 2022, Russia invaded its neighbor, Ukraine. Russian aggression has upended the post-war security mechanisms in Europe and made the international multilateral system, including the UN Security Council, more fragile and ineffective than ever. Even though the war in Ukraine has implications for security in Northeast Asia, many Asian nations consider it a distant issue for Europeans to solve. However, this perspective mirrors what Europe’s Asian counterparts, especially the Koreans, have faced for decades. It serves as an apt analogy for explaining the dangers of North Korea to Europe. North Korea is also watching the war closely to discern what lessons or leverage can be extracted from the unfolding conflict. This short article reflects on two lessons and three opportunities that the War in Ukraine presents to Kim Jong Un and concludes with recommendations on what the Europeans could do in the near future.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Conflict, Russia-Ukraine War, and Invasion
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, Asia, and North Korea

10. Two Peripheries: The Ukraine War's Effect on North Korea-Russia Relations

Author:
Anthony V. Rinna
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
East-West Center
Abstract:
Spanning the Eurasian landmass, Russia’s actions in adjacent Ukraine invariably affect the geopolitical state of play on the similarly adjacent Korean Peninsula. Although ties between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) and Russia have been of largely secondary importance for both countries since their veritable rupture in the early- and mid-1990s, Moscow-Pyongyang relations became more mutually beneficial in 2022. Whereas most countries have outright condemned Russia’s invasion of Ukraine or taken up an ambiguous position, the DPRK has been vocal in its support for Russia. From the DPRK perspective, the Kremlin’s post-2022 diplomatic and economic estrangement from much of the world has provided Pyongyang with an opening to leverage ties with Russia to push for an easing of its own diplomatic and economic isolation. Meanwhile, strengthening its DPRK ties allows Russia to undermine US influence on its Asian periphery. In supporting Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, North Korea appears to be aiming toward obtaining economic benefits from closer ties with Russia, a country whose economy has managed to stay afloat despite heavy Western sanctions. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has provided the impetus for Pyongyang’s outreach to Moscow. However, the roots of the current upswing in Moscow-Pyongyang relations go back to the April 2019 summit between Kim Jong Un and Vladimir Putin. Kim received an invitation to meet with Putin in May 2018 yet waited eleven months to meet with the Russian leader, even as Kim regularly met with the leaders of other major players on the Korean Peninsula. Kim may have decided after the February 2019 Hanoi summit yielded few results that strengthening ties with Russia, which was more reluctant than China to support UN sanctions against Pyongyang in 2017, was a more viable option for sanctions relief. Aside from the fact that Russia has demonstrated a clear unwillingness to impose new sanctions against the DPRK, North Korean citizens are reported to still be working in Russia in contravention of UN Resolution 2397. North Korean workers’ earnings are said to have suffered because of Russia’s reduced access to hard currency. Yet, the ruble’s continued resilience may mean that earning currency in Russia is still worthwhile for laborers dispatched at Pyongyang’s behest.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, Economics, and Politics
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, Asia, and North Korea

11. Balancing Natural Resources and Human and Social Capital: Pathways to Economic Diversification in Mongolia

Author:
Thorvaldur Gylfason and Jean-Pascal N. Nganou
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies (WIIW)
Abstract:
Economic diversification has gained significant attention as a crucial factor for sustainable development worldwide. This paper addresses the risks associated with extreme specialisation and explores the potential benefits of economic diversification for Mongolia. By comparing Mongolia with its designated aspirational and structural peers, the paper aims to shed light on strategies that can foster economic and societal diversification in the country. Although Mongolia possesses favourable levels of human capital compared with its peers, its unusually high ratio of natural capital to human capital highlights the necessity of reducing reliance on natural resources and promoting human capital-intensive economic activities. The paper examines the implications of declining demand for Mongolia's key minerals, primarily coal, resulting from climate change concerns and evolving investor preferences towards sustainability, China's coal consumption reduction goals, and the enduring impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. Through this analysis, the paper offers insights into pathways for Mongolia to diversify its economy and enhance the well-being of its people by striking a balance between natural resources and human and social capital.
Topic:
Natural Resources, Governance, Democracy, Economic Growth, Human Capital, Diversification, Macroeconomics, Social Capital, Transition, and ASEAN
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Malaysia, Canada, Mongolia, Kazakhstan, Colombia, Armenia, Australia, Qatar, Chile, Peru, United Arab Emirates, Ecuador, and Guyana

12. Europe’s Broken Order and the Prospect of a New Cold War

Author:
Kristi Raik and Eero Kristjan Sild
Publication Date:
10-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
The Russian and western visions of European security have profoundly different ideational roots: balance of power embedded in realist geopolitics versus liberal rules-based order. Russia is a revisionist power aiming to re-establish a European security order based on the balance of power, including a recognition of its empire and sphere of influence. Russia’s aggressive pursuit of this vision has forced the West to defend the rules-based liberal order in Europe and beyond. This report analyses the main sources and implications of Russia’s discontent with the post-Cold War European security order, which eventually led to the invasion of Ukraine. The disagreements are likely to endure beyond the war in Ukraine, leading to a new Cold War. The paper identifies three scenarios for the future of the European security order, the most likely one being a dual order, with the liberal rules-based order further strengthened and enlarged among western countries including Ukraine, while Russia will hold on to its imperialist ambitions but being forced to accept a much more limited sphere of influence than the former Soviet or tsarist empires. As long as the worldview that underlies Russia’s foreign policy does not change, any new balance of power will be temporary and under threat of renewed aggression once Russia has regained strength. In order to make it more sustainable, the West will need to eliminate grey zones, ensure credible deterrence and defence, and consistently weaken Russia’s ability to rebuild its military might.
Topic:
Security, NATO, Cold War, Authoritarianism, European Union, Democracy, Geopolitics, Deterrence, and Soviet Union
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Ukraine, North America, and United States of America

13. War and Energy Security: Lessons for The Future

Author:
Tomas Jermalavicius, Veli-Pekka Tynkkynen, Andrian Prokip, Christian Egenhofer, and Edoardo Righetti
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
Russia’s war against Ukraine has produced multiple shifts in the geopolitical landscape of Europe. Various EU member states and EU institutions broke through entire decades of dogmatic principles and established practices in security and defence policies to respond to Russia’s aggression and protect the continent. The energy domain is at the forefront of this confrontation, as Russia used its dominant market position in European energy supply in the run-up to – as well as during – the war to weaken Europe’s responses, divide the EU, and deter it from increasing its support to Ukraine. The multifaceted and far-reaching impact of the war offers an opportunity for a deeper reflection on the lessons learned for energy security at the national, regional, and EU levels. It allows for an assessment of the prospects in the geopolitical landscape where Russia is comprehensively isolated; new energy and technology players grow in importance; a new global energy order emerges; and the effects of the climate crisis become more severe and evident. It is also a rare opportunity to assess how complex energy systems retain their resilience or degrade under the conditions of a high-intensity conventional war, which has collective defence implications to the ability of the frontline states, such as Estonia, to fulfil NATO’s baseline requirements for national resilience and thus Article 3 of the North Atlantic Treaty. The report seeks to provide analysis concerning these aspects of the war’s short-, medium-, and long-term impact on energy security in Europe, the Baltic region, and Estonia. Conclusions of the report stress the importance of regulatory, policy, and technological flexibility, as well as innovation, in responding to various forms of strategic coercion through the energy sector – especially when such coercion is applied against targets under the duress of a major war, in which economic disruption, market uncertainty, geopolitical turmoil, and societal anxieties are abundant. The conclusions caution though that the appetite for resilience-enhancing investments and transformative solutions might diminish in the cost-conscious economic environment of the future or that the EU and US will start a vicious cycle of protectionist measures in green energy development, which will undercut transatlantic cooperation in energy security.
Topic:
Security, NATO, Infrastructure, European Union, Gas, Crisis Management, Renewable Energy, Hybrid Threats, and Nuclear Energy
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Finland, Poland, Lithuania, Estonia, Sweden, and United States of America

14. The Future of Arms Control: Ready to (Dis)Agree?

Author:
Tõnis Idarand, Kalev Stoicescu, and Ian Anthony
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
Having been crumbling already for years, international arms control architecture is now in a perilous state. Existing arrangements have either been losing their effectiveness or outright failing due to Russia’s non-compliance, whilst Russia’s aggression against Ukraine might have delivered the final blow to this system. Even after the war in Ukraine has ended, it will take years to re-establish the level of trust necessary to, again, engage with Russia on arms control. The return to the pre-war ‘business as usual’, where the dialogue will resume as if never interrupted, is unlikely. Arms control dialogue with Russia ‘at any cost’ cannot produce an acceptable result. Arms control as we have known it, with its legally binding and verifiable agreements, may have come to an end. The trends emerging from the expert discussions are more focused on a different set of instruments, such as political commitments, risk reduction, or transparency and confidence building measures. Development of new technologies, proliferation of new weapon systems, the rise of China as a global player, and increasing role of non-strategic nuclear weapons in Russian and Chinese military doctrines will all have an impact on global arms control. The fate of the New START Treaty will have a decisive effect on the future of arms control and the prospects of the nuclear non-proliferation regime already under immense pressure. This report attempts to summarise the developments in arms control architecture over the last decades and accentuate the trends that might be consequential when designing the arms control system of the future. The year 2023 has already demonstrated that arms control is less relevant in Russia’s security thinking. Moscow exploits the existing arrangements mainly as leverage to influence the US and NATO’s policy towards Ukraine or obtain concessions regarding its proposals on the new European security arrangements. The role of arms control in European security might be in decline, but the key elements of European security architecture are still in place, and most states continue to implement them. NATO allies – when discussing and designing arms control or confidence-building measures – shall consider how these instruments advance the security of allies. Under the current circumstances, the priority is to strengthen defence and deterrence of the Alliance. This is the only way to lay the groundwork for a constructive arms control dialogue with Russia.
Topic:
Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Weapons of Mass Destruction, Weapons, Nonproliferation, Trade, and Military
Political Geography:
Russia and Europe

15. Is There Life in the Desert? Russian Civil Society After the Full-Scale Invasion of Ukraine

Author:
Igor Gretskiy
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
By the end of 2021, all leading independent NGOs and individual human rights activists had been completely suppressed, and all issues deemed inconvenient for the Kremlin had been removed from the agenda of those still operating. This report focuses on the state of Russian civil society at the outset of Russia’s full-scale military invasion of Ukraine, as well as on how it was affected by the war and what are the prospects for its development in the future. Since Vladimir Putin came to power, Russia has been moving along the path of creating a fully state-controlled civil society in which the political potential of independent civil activism would be completely undermined. To achieve this goal, the Kremlin pro-actively advanced its network of government-organised non-governmental organisations (GONGOs) while simultaneously limiting foreign funding for NGOs. Those who did not abide by the Kremlin’s rules were systematically discriminated against and persecuted under the so-called “foreign agent” laws. Meanwhile, local authorities have stopped all formal and informal interaction with “politicised” civil actors. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine added further impetus to these trends and strengthened the Kremlin’s resolve to root out any sources of potential defiance. The independent professional NGOs that remained were in a deep crisis. Since February 2022, they have switched to survival mode. In all likelihood, they will either be co-opted by the state through a centralised system of financial support or cease to exist in the near future. The niches that they have left – including in the field of human rights advocacy – are being quickly filled by GONGOs. With their colossal resources, wider media access, and connections in the government, GONGOs are able to attract more young people to join their ranks. In many regions, even the scanty of organised independent civic activism that existed before the war was neither there nor likely to re-emerge in the coming years. In Russia, the level of involvement in NGOs has always been low and the population at large indifferent to the problems of civil society. Therefore, one should be wary of inflated expectations when contemplating the future of Russian civil activism. Even if Putin’s regime collapses, one can hardly anticipate a quick transition towards a truly independent and vibrant civil society. The study was conducted on the basis of interviews with representatives of independent NGOs from various regions who, as of February 2022, were based in Russia. The geography of this survey was expanded as much as possible to make the study more reliable and better reflect the content of the processes underway in the country. This analysis also shows that representatives from Moscow, large provincial cities, and the North Caucasus differ significantly in their perception of the current situation with civil society, whereas their visions for the future diverge considerably. A profound lack of communication among them only amplifies the divisions and fragmentations in Russia’s civil society. The situation in the North Caucasus is of particular note. Albeit being severely weakened, local independent NGOs and activists are – in contrast with the rest of Russia – more disapproving of the war unleashed by Russia against Ukraine but more optimistic about the future of their home regions. They pin their hopes on the revival of indigenous languages and cultures with the help of diasporas abroad and the emergence of civil society.
Topic:
Civil Society, Human Rights, Politics, War, Governance, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

16. Europe’s Indo-Pacific Tilt: Estonian and Japanese Interests

Author:
Frank Jüris, Steven Blockmans, Kazuto Suzuki, Sanshiro Hosaka, and Maret Nukke
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
Reshaped by the new great power competition, the international order has been undergoing revolutionary transformations. Revanchist Russia has unleashed a barbarian war against a sovereign European nation, while increasingly militarised and contentious China looms as a not-so-insidious threat in the Indo-Pacific. In response to these shifting dynamics and mounting geopolitical tensions, Europe is now awakening to the new reality and paying greater attention to the far-away region. At first glance, Estonia and Japan may seem like odd partners, yet they share vital commonalities and common interests impossible to ignore. Amidst Russia’s ongoing brutal invasion of Ukraine and China’s territorial claims over Taiwan, Japan’s strong advocacy in the Indo-Pacific region confirms how essential unity, consensus, and solidarity are for tackling global challenges in an environment of limited resources. This report brings together foreign and security policy experts to improve our understanding of each other’s security concerns — be it threats in cyber and information space, ruptures in trade, energy, and food, or authoritarian neighbours — by taking a step closer to a shared threat perception. Acknowledging unprecedented challenges to global security and rules-based order that democracy and democracies are confronted with from East to West, this report critically examines whether the European Union’s regional strategy maximises and realises the union’s full potential in the Indo-Pacific, which will test its actorness and agency and determine the role for the decades — if not centuries — to come. As the long-distance race for technological hegemony between the U.S. and China — of which Japan and Estonia are by far neither neutral nor casual observers — tightens, the report highlights national policies and capabilities needed to stay competitive, as well as to reduce known and potential vulnerabilities, from the perspective of economic security. China’s dramatic rise — as not only an economic but also a military superpower — entails an assertive and oftentimes assailing foreign policy that is felt both in Europe and the Indo-Pacific alike. The authoritarian regime in Beijing cleverly exploits the vacuum of power wherever it finds any. Cautioning against repeating the old mistakes of China-centrism, the report advocates for fostering multifaced cooperation with Japan in the framework of EU-Japan and Estonia-Japan relations. Thus, the report recommends that the EU as a whole and its individual member states should continue building on the positive momentum generated by the Indo-Pacific strategies and modify their approach to incorporate like-minded partners. From freedom of information to information- and cybersecurity, the report reminds us that leadership matters. It explains the changing tides in the Japanese mainstream public opinions that have already washed away the decades of harmful Russia-centrism from media, academia, and corridors of power and thus resulted in a society successfully resisting malign foreign disinformation campaigns. Estonia and Japan should facilitate digital transformation beyond their national borders, promote economic security, and exert geopolitical power through domestically produced sophisticated technology. The report also probes Sino-Russian relations from the perspective of Chinese strategic interests in its own neighbourhood. Able to contain the West by redirecting its focus and resources towards the war in Ukraine, Russia creates additional operation space for China in the Taiwan Strait. With the war raging In Europe, it should be clear that appeasing an aggressor with concessions and seemingly clever compromises only emboldens the latter, making it even more contentious in both territorial claims and bellicose actions. To prevent a conflict from breaking out in the Taiwan Strait, the EU should be building up allied immunity by counterbalancing China in the Indo-Pacific and proactively defending the rules-based world order.
Topic:
Defense Policy, European Union, Cybersecurity, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), ASEAN, and Economic Security
Political Geography:
Russia, Japan, China, Europe, Ukraine, Taiwan, Asia, Estonia, and Indo-Pacific

17. How Russia Brings Its Aggression Against Ukraine to The Global South

Author:
Ivan Ulises Klyszcz
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
2022 was a wake-up call for the West. The response by the Global South to the war in Ukraine highlighted Russia’s enduring strengths in Africa, Latin America, the Middle East, and South and Southeast Asia. This report explores the evolution of Russia’s relations with the countries in the Global South and the ways Russia cultivates these relationships in pursuit of its foreign policy agenda. Moscow’s current interactions in the Global South are driven by the demands of its war of aggression, as well as by its long-term goal: to challenge the international order. The latter dictate several manoeuvres found throughout such engagements: strategic communications, market substitution and sanctions evasion, and regime sheltering. This report presents three case studies meant to illustrate how Russia’s relations with the Global South have evolved since 2022. First, Tunisia exemplifies a superficial partner, with Moscow’s main tool in the country being strategic communication aimed at shaping public opinion in its favour. Second, India is illustrative of a strategic partner whom Moscow tries to engage in order to substitute for lost energy markets and evade sanctions. Third, Myanmar represents a hierarchical relationship, in which the local regime depends on Moscow for diplomatic support and arms deliveries. Notwithstanding varied perspectives on and responses to Russia’s war of aggression in Ukraine, countries in the Global South have generally sought to prioritise their economy and security by attempting to strike a balance between Russia and the West. Aware of such desires, Moscow has been exploiting this situation to maintain its influence internationally. Challenging Russia in the Global South will put pressure on the Kremlin and limit its ability to conduct aggressive foreign policy – and wage war against Ukraine. The report concludes with six recommendations on how to counter Russia in the Global South.
Topic:
Cold War, Markets, Science and Technology, Communications, Arms Trade, Defense Industry, and Military
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, Middle East, India, Asia, Tunisia, Myanmar, United States of America, and Global South

18. How Russia Went to War: The Kremlin’s Preparations for Its Aggression Against Ukraine

Author:
Kalev Stoicescu, Mykola Nazarov, Keir Giles, and Matthew Johnson
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
This report examines Russia’s preparations for its full-scale invasion of Ukraine: domestically, in Ukraine itself, in the global information domain, and in building its relationship with China. For Russia, crushing Ukraine’s quest for democracy was central to meeting its objectives of reshaping the post-Cold War order in Europe and globally, restoring its own status, and reconstituting the Russian empire and Russian world. Its preparations in the political and informational, military, and economic domains for a full-scale war in Ukraine were too extensive and overt to go unnoticed, but they were not acted upon. It is hard to avoid the conclusion that the evidence went against the dominant narrative in the West and was simply brushed aside. In the political and informational domains, Russia’s domestic preparations including cementing the regime’s authority, and taking advantage of the population’s Soviet nostalgia and aspirations for the restoration of the Russian world and the empire. Limited economic preparations were intended to safeguard Russia’s economy against current and future Western sanctions, while Russia’s extensive military preparations involved large-scale defence spending and extensive military modernisation efforts. Russia’s preparations beyond its own territory included: a campaign within Ukraine to divide society and discredit the democratically elected leadership; a campaign directed at the rest of the world about Ukraine, discrediting the country and its people as an object of sympathy and support in their resistance against Russia; and a campaign of intimidation designed to instil in western leaders and populations a fear of obstructing, impeding, or offending Russia. Russia also worked to build a relationship with China. China’s support is essential to Putin’s ambitions. But equally, China’s strategy for confronting the United States – which China cannot do alone – depends on Russia remaining at least a quasi-great power.
Topic:
Security, NATO, Development, Sanctions, Military Affairs, European Union, Resilience, and Information Warfare
Political Geography:
Russia, China, United Kingdom, Europe, Asia, and United States of America

19. Putin the Green? The Unintended Consequences of Russia’s Energy War on Europe

Author:
Mitchell Orenstein
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
Both before and during its re-invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Russia cut energy supplies to Europe in an effort to force the continent to abandon Ukraine. Instead, Vladimir Putin accelerated Europe’s transition to green energy, decimating a key market for Russian exporters. Over the long term, Europe is well-positioned to win the energy war with Russia.
Topic:
Energy Policy, Markets, Renewable Energy, Energy Crisis, Russia-Ukraine War, and Invasion
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Eurasia, and Ukraine

20. The Roots of Russian Military Dysfunction

Author:
Philip Wasielewski
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
An unwillingness to decentralize decision making authority and a failure to communicate accurate information are the most consequential weaknesses at the state level that have contributed to the Russian military’s subpar performance to date in the war with Ukraine. These characteristics are exacerbated by other historic factors found throughout Russian society, which also permeate the military as a reflection of that society. They include an imperialist national identity, endemic corruption, and societal brutality. To these systemic problems must be added the inherent difficulties of what the Russian military was supposed to achieve in its first major peer conflict since World War Two and elements of simple military incompetence. The unwillingness to decentralize decision making authority is symptomatic of over five centuries of Russian autocracy. It is why Russia lacks an effective noncommissioned officer (NCO) corps and has a top-down command-and-control system, which is slow to provide timely direction to forces at the front. This is exacerbated by a failure to communicate accurate information, especially at the strategic level, which results in decision making based on faulty information and reinforces bad decisions due to inaccurate feedback. These two characteristics create a command, control, and communications system unsuited for modern warfare but congruent with a Russian way of war that has been influenced by a culture of imperialism, corruption, and brutality. Imperialism prevented Russian national security elites from seeing agency in other peoples, which led them to underestimate possible Ukrainian resistance and Western resolve. Corruption compounded personnel and supply challenges for the Russian military. A reliance on brutality to control its own soldiers and assert control over occupied populations exacerbated factors in the Russian military that are detrimental to good order, discipline, morale, and unit cohesion and provided additional motivation to Ukrainians to resist Russian aggression. These are not really “weaknesses” of the Russian system but consequences of that system. Furthermore, despite their detrimental impact on military effectiveness, these factors have sometimes “worked” for Russia and provided, counterintuitively, advantages such as the political will to conduct attrition warfare at a cost that no Western society would accept. This is significant because all the above factors are endemic to Russian social and political culture and will continue, barring a major social revolution in Russia of the scale of 1917. This means there will be no permanent solution to the war in Ukraine even if a peace treaty is signed. These cultural factors will eventually drive Russia to regain its military capacity and renew its aggression against Ukraine and hostility to the West. As long as Russia is autocratic with a propensity for self-deception and imperialism, it will try again to assert hegemony over Ukraine and other portions of its former empire. That future war will likely resemble the war in Ukraine, a high-intensity war of attrition where Moscow is willing to make brutal sacrifices to outlast its foes. This is not a case of predicting that history will repeat itself, but that Russia’s basic political nature will. Only if Russia overcomes its history and changes internally, will it ever behave differently externally.
Topic:
Corruption, Autocracy, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Eurasia

21. The Wagner Group’s Expanding Global Footprint

Author:
Raphael Parens, Colin P. Clarke, Christopher Faulkner, and Kendal Wolf
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
1. The sanctions discussion needs to be expanded, as such designations should aim to shame Wagner’s state partners. 2. Sanctions lists should expand to include actors in third-party countries, such as Broker Expert LLC, a Russian-owned company widely reported to be shipping heavy machinery to support Wagner Group forestry activities in CAR, and First Industrial Company, a business owned by Wagner operator Dimitri Sytyi which concocts cheap “Russian” alcohol in Cameroon and sells it in CAR. 3. Perhaps one of the more important lessons for countering Wagner and other Russian PMCs is the importance of multilateralism. 4. NATO must also continue to consider proactive tools to counter Russian and other PMCs. 5. NATO should work to amplify efforts to push the adoption of the 2008 Montreux Document—an international agreement designed to reaffirm the legal obligations of states where PMCs originate and for those who hire them. 6. The Wagner Group and other Russian PMCs require consideration within a larger great power discussion, particularly as Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has firmly aligned Europe and the US against Russia. 7. US senior leaders should demonstrate a greater diplomatic commitment to African allies and put pressure on other African leaders considering, or currently contracting, the Wagner Group and other Russian PMC operations. 8. International bodies such as the African Union, ECOWAS, and the East African Community (EAC) should reevaluate their approaches to peacekeeping and instability. 9. Exploiting the friction between Wagner’s financier and the MoD should also be considered a worthwhile policy option. 10. Last, NATO members must formalize methods of blocking contact with the Wagner Group through their international activities.
Topic:
NATO, Sanctions, Wagner Group, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

22. Russia’s Military Industry Forecast 2023-2025

Author:
Pavel Luzin
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
After the start of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine on February 24, 2022, the arms expenditures and military budget of Russia skyrocketed and continue to grow for the foreseeable future. However, the military industry is under threat Despite the additional massive financial inflow. The military industry could not—with few exceptions—increase the production capacity significantly nor solve its other major problems of workforce deficit and annual net losses. Moreover, the Western embargo on the supply of components, industrial equipment, and technologies makes the further development of the Russian military industry doubtful. Even reverse engineering has become an impossible task. However, the Kremlin’s choice in this situation would be in favor of more arms expenditures and extending the practices of the command economy.
Topic:
Military Affairs, Budget, Industry, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, and Ukraine

23. The War as an Accelerator

Author:
András Tóth-Czifra
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine laid bare the problems with Russia’s domestic governance. The war caught the federal and regional governments unprepared and exacerbated existing bottlenecks in fields such as infrastructure and state capacity. Even before 2022, Russia’s domestic policymaking had prioritized the short-term political interests of a shrinking ruling class and made long-term thinking and deep structural reforms impossible. The invasion completely eliminated long-term policy planning and subordinated policymaking to war aims. One year after the invasion, these problems are causing frictions and elevating domestic political risks for the Kremlin. The botched invasion and subsequent economic sanctions have caused irreversible losses and put significant upfront costs on the Russian state. This stretches Russia’s peculiar, highly centralized system of fiscal and political governance to its limits. In particular, the interlocking challenges of reorienting trade towards Asia without the necessary infrastructure in place, improving an inflexible multi-level public administration system, and turning Russia into a digital securocracy, show how, by starting the invasion, Russia’s rulers contributed to the destabilization of their own country. They also demonstrate how international sanctions impact Russia by increasing domestic risk factors from the Kremlin’s point of view.
Topic:
Infrastructure, Governance, Trade, Domestic Policy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, and Ukraine

24. Russia’s War in Ukraine: Critical Vulnerabilities to Russia’s Military Operations and Systems

Author:
Rob Lee and Philip Wasielewski
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
Some of the critical vulnerabilities to Russia’s military operations and systems—revealed during the war in Ukraine—are due to its military culture and poor strategic choices at the beginning of the war including overly ambitious strategic aims. Deficiencies in Russian military culture include a highly centralized decision-making process, a disregard for the welfare of its soldiers, and flagrant dishonesty. Certain aspects of Russia’s military culture, especially the disconnect between front-line soldiers and senior officers, complicate the Russian military’s ability to adapt, develop solutions to obvious deficiencies, and institutionalize lessons learned from the battlefield. Other critical Russian military vulnerabilities are not inherent to its military culture but to Russia’s national demographic and industrial capabilities. Limits in these areas make it difficult for Russia to regenerate military power by either increasing the size of its military or increasing the quality of its weapons systems. Even if Russia’s military culture experiences a post-war military renaissance, its ability to regenerate military power lost in Ukraine will be limited by its declining population and industrial bases as well as Western sanctions on high technology.
Topic:
Sanctions, Armed Forces, Military Affairs, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, and Ukraine

25. Russia’s Nuclear Policy After Ukraine

Author:
Stephen Blank
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
The recent mutiny by Yevgeny Prigozhin, head of the Wagner mercenary force, generated international concern about the control of Russian nuclear weapons and Russia’s future nuclear policy.[1] Therefore we must ask, will Russia change its nuclear policy due to contemporary strategic developments? This question correctly assumes that the war in Ukraine and all its ramifications, despite their undoubted importance, are not the only factors influencing Russian decision-making on nuclear policy. Accordingly, we analyze those factors—including, among others, Russia’s aggression against Ukraine—that will likely influence the direction and nature of Russia’s nuclear policy. Those factors influencing policy, itself the outcome of myriad domestic and foreign pressures, also include Russia’s overall security policies, the global strategic environment, and the lessons Russia learns from recent wars—most prominently its aggression against Ukraine. Russian national security strategy and policy originate in what Carl Schmitt called the presupposition of unceasing conflict.[2] Since the U.S. is Russia’s principal interlocutor, it also is its primary antagonist. Russian security policy is inherently adversarial. It postulates a state of permanent conflict with Washington and its allies where Washington seeks to undermine, if not destroy, the Russian state and prevent it from restoring its empire (i.e., global great power status). As Deputy Foreign Minister Rybakov recently stated, “Russia’s foreign policy interests as a great power have a global projection. Our country plays a stabilizing role in various regions of the world.”[3] Allegedly the U.S. employs nuclear weapons, missile defenses, and advanced conventional weapons that could negate Russia’s nuclear deterrent to frustrate Russia’s policies.[4] Thus it is an article of faith in Moscow that its nuclear weapons are the main guarantees of Russia’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, great power status, and the factor that deters the West from intervening against Russia in Ukraine.[5] Moreover, those weapons, when deployed abroad, also deter NATO’s potential, largely maritime, threats to Russia. Therefore, Russia must conduct a global military—i.e., an expeditionary, nuclear, and military policy.[6] Indeed, Putin has recently and revealingly called nuclear weapons, “the key guarantee of Russia’s military security and global stability.”[7] Russian nuclear strategy and behavior also derive from a cognitive universe wholly unlike and unfamiliar to American strategic thought. Identical words often mean entirely different things to Russians and Americans; much Russian rhetoric is politicized, deliberately deceptive, or opaque, and invariably follows state requirements. Yet, despite voluminous and even insightful commentary on war, Russian forces often do not fight as its doctrine stipulates, adding to the difficulties involved in determining what its policy is.[8] Simultaneously, however, Russian strategy and policy are also inherently evolutionary—i.e., they respond to changes in the strategic environment that are then incorporated into doctrine, strategy, official statements, exercises, procurement, and policy. Finally, despite our own difficulties in understanding Russia, either willfully or because it cannot help itself due to the deep-seated paranoia in its political culture, equally misreads the West, wholly misunderstands the West, and habitually ascribes the worst motives to U.S. and Western policies.[9] This misreading of the West repeatedly generates worst-case threat assessments that frequently lead to Russian nuclear threats or procurements. Taking all these factors into account, including Russia’s aggression in Ukraine, it is quite likely if not certain that Russian nuclear strategy and policy will change in the wake of the war in Ukraine, win, lose, or draw. Unfortunately, in most potential outcomes to the war save defeat and collapse of the government, that change points to an enhanced role of nuclear weapons in Russian policy with no letup in hostility toward the West. The war in Ukraine has been instrumental in fostering still more animosity toward the West and an enhanced role for nuclear weapons.[10]
Topic:
National Security, Nuclear Weapons, Wagner Group, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Eurasia, and Ukraine

26. Fighting to Win: Ukraine, Russia, and the War for Survival

Author:
Philip Wasielewski
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
Both the Kremlin and Ukrainians see the war as an existential conflict, even as a “holy war,” and are prepared to fight for years to achieve victory. Russian war aims vis-à-vis Ukraine have morphed into creating a “frozen conflict” to maintain its land bridge with Crimea. However, its primary war aim remains weakening NATO to regain its sphere of influence in the former Soviet republics and Warsaw Pact states. To achieve this, Russia will conduct a prolonged strategic defense in Ukraine to demonstrate that Ukraine will never regain its territorial integrity and to show that American support will eventually end as it has for other client states. Ukraine’s primary war aim of restoring its territorial integrity is shared across its society. To achieve this, Ukraine’s strategy is to break the will of the Russian army and then reclaim Crimea, even if that takes several years. Ukrainians do not fear a long war but an inconclusive one that reignites in five or ten years. They want to settle this conflict with Russia once and for all, and see NATO membership as the only way to prevent it from happening again. For US policymakers, the dangers arising from the war overshadow opportunities. One opportunity is a Russian defeat that can serve both as a brake against further Kremlin aggression and as a catalyst for Russia to possibly change her imperial identity. Another opportunity is the chance to strengthen NATO’s conventional forces and geographic position to give it an overwhelming advantage against any possible future Russian aggression. For that to happen, Ukraine must enter the alliance.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, NATO, Armed Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, and Ukraine

27. The Frontline States: Conversations and Observations About Russia’s Other War in Europe

Author:
Philip Wasielewski
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
From late June to mid-July 2023, I visited Georgia, Moldova, Hungary, Poland, and Lithuania on a research trip. The analysis and conclusions in this report are based, in part, on conversations with a wide variety of individuals from former government officials, university students, academics, and members of non-governmental organizations to ordinary citizens. The Kremlin desires to reestablish a sphere of influence in former Soviet republics and Warsaw Pact states between the Black and Baltic Seas. To do so, it is fighting a conventional war in Ukraine and political wars elsewhere to remove Western influence and reestablish hegemony. Russia’s political warfare operations have a major flaw; they only offer people the past and not a future. However, US efforts against them could be more effective and citizens in frontline states facing Russian subversion have constructive criticisms to improve them. Resisting Russian subversion depends as much on the political health of the targeted state as Western countermeasures. Efforts to oppose backsliding on democratic norms are vital, even if they spark tensions with partners and allies. Several countries in the region will hold elections between the fall of 2023 and 2025 that will determine their geopolitical orientation. If the war in Ukraine is a battle of modern weapon systems, these elections will be a war of ideas between East and West. It is important that the United States not cede the narrative for these elections to Moscow and work with allies and partners to counteract anti-Western propaganda.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Regional Politics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Eurasia, and Ukraine

28. Takeaways from Russia’s Regional and Municipal Elections

Author:
András Tóth-Czifra
Publication Date:
10-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
The Kremlin, for the most part, engineered the results it desired in Russia’s 2023 regional and municipal elections. However, the campaigns showed that a positive portrayal of the war in Ukraine is not necessarily popular among Russian voters. In the occupied territories in Ukraine, elections demonstrated that Russian power remains firm, even in the face of Ukraine’s counteroffensive. Since independent observers had virtually no access to these votes and they were held illegally, it is both impossible to verify the authorities’ claims and futile to analyze the results as if real elections had been held. In many regions, the elections saw the demise of the Communist Party as the largest “alternative” party to Vladimir Putin’s ruling United Russia party. A notable exception was the Siberian region of Khakassia, where the incumbent communist governor was able to see off a threat from his Kremlin-supported opponent. The extensive use of a still-opaque online voting system, along with the overt intimidation of election observers and opposition personalities, suggests that the Kremlin is eager to evolve and test its manipulation toolkits ahead of the 2024 presidential election.
Topic:
Elections, Domestic Politics, Political Parties, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, and Ukraine

29. The Dragon and the Bear in Africa: Stress-Testing Chinese-Russian Relations

Author:
Robert E. Hamilton
Publication Date:
11-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
This report is based on a chapter of my forthcoming book on the relationship between China and Russia. For the US, this is arguably the most important bilateral relationship in the world today. A robust, resilient partnership between Beijing and Moscow has the potential to remake world order. It would usher in an era of international relations based on power and polarity, eroding the role of international law and institutions, and undermining the sovereignty and agency of smaller states. This world order would represent a serious threat to US interests, as currently defined. On the other hand, transactional, “thin” ties between China and Russia allow the US some breathing space. Instead of a revisionist authoritarian alliance, the US would confront two states that represent different types of challenges. In this case, Washington could deal with the acute, militarized threat of Russia in the near term, while remaining postured to confront the “pacing” threat of China—the only potential peer competitor to the US—over the longer term. The academic and policy worlds have been seized with the China-Russia relationship for almost two decades. Policy debates revolve around how to confront the two, with some arguing that the current focus on reversing Russia’s invasion of Ukraine puts the US at risk of being unprepared for the threat China represents. Others argue that Russia is not merely a disruptive power but represents a profound and immediate danger to US interests. Competition for resources often lurks in the background of this debate: US government organizations focused on Europe tend to argue for focusing on Russia first; those with an Indo-Pacific focus tend to argue that China should be the focus. What this debate often fails to consider is the nature of their relationship and its impact on US policy options. The scholarly debate fills this gap by focusing directly on the nature of the relationship: one camp defines it as a strategic partnership and the other defines it as an “axis of convenience.” Often missing from scholarly analysis, though, is an analysis of the implications for US policy. In other words, scholars often argue forcefully for one of these characterizations of the China-Russia relationship but then fail to advise what the US should do in response. Instead, their analysis focuses on the implications of the relationship for theoretical approaches to international relations. The book that will include this report aims to close this gap between the policy and scholarly debates. It aims to provide a better understanding of the nature of the China-Russia relationship and use that understanding to inform US policy options. It will do this through a novel approach. Instead of focusing on Chinese-Russian interaction at the level of the international system, as most approaches do, it focuses on their interaction “on the ground” in regions where both have important interests at stake. This report examines Chinese-Russian interaction in Africa; other chapters of the book focus on Central Asia, Eastern Europe, and East Asia. Africa and Central Asia provide good testing grounds for the China-Russia relationship because both have important but different interests there. How they advance and defend those interests and how they interact in doing so, can yield important insights into the nature of their overall relationship. These regions are also important because the US footprint is light. The US has been called the “binding agent” in ties between Beijing and Moscow. The idea here is that shared resistance to the US is the only major thing they have in common. In this view, removing the US from the equation will make China and Russia more likely to find reasons to compete rather than cooperate.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Africa, Russia, China, Eurasia, and Asia

30. Strength in Unity: A Sustainable US-Led Regional Security Construct in the Middle East

Author:
Robert Greenway
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
China and Russia are exploiting US indifference toward the Middle East and efforts to integrate Iran into the region, threatening regional stability, Israel’s security, and global markets. The convergence of threats encompasses an Iranian nuclear threshold state controlling a constellation of terrorist groups, resurgent non-state terrorist groups including ISIS and al-Qaeda, and Russian and Chinese exploitation of receding American presence. We are reaching an inflection point at which the United States risks the irrevocable loss of a favorable balance of both trade and forces, resulting in instability that will threaten our vital interests and the global economy. This constitutes an unprecedented range of challenges beyond our capacity, and the capacity of our partners and allies, to address threats to global energy and trade as we struggle to recover from a global pandemic. We have not faced a similar period of risk in the Middle East since the turmoil following the Iranian Revolution, Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and storming of the Grand Mosque in 1979. The US shares vital national security interests with longtime partners in the region and, as a result, they prefer US leadership in both the economic and security domains. A sustainable US-led regional security construct in the Middle East that includes effective partners based on convergent interests is the most efficient way to address the unacceptable risk, which results from the disconnect between the vital national interests of the US and its partners and the resources both have committed. A constellation of mutually beneficial trade relationships providing both the resources and rationale for a regional security construct would strengthen such an arrangement.1 Establishing a US-led enduring regional security architecture comprised of more capable partners and allies is the most effective way for the United States to safeguard our vital national security interests in the Middle East. This architecture would provide five key benefits: Secure our vital interests. The US and global economies depend on the uninterrupted flow of energy from and trade through the Middle East, which remains a vital national security interest. Compete with China. China depends on the Middle East for energy to sustain its economy and military. Beijing is exploiting the vacuum created by US indifference to securing the Middle East. Manage risk and uncertainty. Threats in the region are approaching a quantitative military advantage over America’s partners, which creates unacceptable risk to US interests. Leverage our relationships. We retain advantages in the long-term diplomatic, economic, and security relationships that we have derived from convergent interests with partners. Build on a sound foundation. Historic efforts to build collective security constructs, many of which have occurred within the Middle East, provide valuable lessons.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Non State Actors, Strategic Competition, and Regional Security
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Iran, and Middle East

31. EU – Pacific Talks: EU – Security Challenges for the Pacific, EU, and Russia

Author:
Tomáš Moudrý
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Europeum Institute for European Policy
Abstract:
If you missed the debate EU - Pacific talks: EU - Security Challenges for the Pacific, EU, and Russia, here you can read the report from the debate written by Tomáš Moudrý. During the debate, it was discussed, for example, that despite the considerable geographical distance, the EU and the Indo-Pacific region are now more interconnected than ever before and both sides are seeking to strengthen their partnership in many areas, with security policy now one of the most important due to many factors.
Topic:
Security, European Union, Partnerships, Geopolitics, Dialogue, and Regional Security
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Asia-Pacific

32. How Finnish and Swedish NATO Accession Could Shape the Future Russian Threat

Author:
Nicholas Lokker, Jim Townsend, Heli Hautala, and Andrea Kendall-Taylor
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine was a major strategic blunder. Not only will Russia emerge from the war economically and militarily weakened, but its brutal invasion has undercut Moscow’s geopolitical position, including by triggering nearby countries to take new steps to provide for their security and defense. Most notably, Russia’s aggression in Ukraine compelled Finland and Sweden to apply for NATO membership— leading to an expansion of the very alliance that Russia purports to be opposing in Ukraine. While it is unclear exactly when Finland and Sweden will join NATO—this will depend on when Hungary and Turkey, the last remaining allies to ratify the accession protocols, finalize the process—it is clear that there is no going back to the status quo ante. NATO allies should expect Russia to react to Finland and Sweden joining the organization beyond the cool response that followed their announcement. Their accession into NATO will permanently reshape the European security architecture, which Moscow is likely to see as a threat to its own security and therefore use as a basis for adjusting it calculus. Even though Moscow has not explicitly retaliated against Finland and Sweden for joining NATO beyond expressing displeasure, the Kremlin is nonetheless likely to respond, including in ways that will pose challenges to the alliance in both the near and long term. This memo discusses how Finland’s and Sweden’s entry into NATO will shape Europe’s security landscape, how Russia is likely to see these changes and respond, and how the allies can address the future challenges stemming from these changing dynamics.
Topic:
Security, NATO, Regional Security, Russia-Ukraine War, and Threat Assessment
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Finland, and Sweden

33. Russia-China Defense Cooperation

Author:
Andrea Kendall-Taylor and Nicholas Lokker
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
Russia’s war in Ukraine has been a critical test of the depth of Sino-Russian relations. Since Russia’s invasion, China has remained an essential partner for Moscow. Although there have been limits to what Beijing has been willing to do for Russia, China has served as a vital lifeline for the Kremlin including by parroting Russian talking points about the war, increasing purchases of Russian oil and gas, and continuing to export microchips and other component parts to Moscow cut off by the West. Warnings by senior U.S. officials that China is contemplating providing Russia with lethal military aid in support of its war against Ukraine underscore the depth of their partnership.1 Emerging reports that Chinese companies have provided rifles and dual-use equipment such as drone parts and body armor only add credibility to these warnings.2 Although it remains unclear at the time of writing whether China will ultimately decide to send lethal aid to Russia, the last year has provided further evidence that Russia and China are deeply aligned and that the persistence and evolution of their partnership will continue to pose challenges that the United States and its allies must navigate. This working paper will focus on the challenges that Russia-China military cooperation poses to the United States and its allies and partners. This aspect of their relationship has been one of the most consequential dimensions of their deepening partnership. Already, China has obtained key capabilities from Moscow such as Su-27 and Su-35 fighter aircrafts, S-300 and S-400 air defense systems, and anti-ship missiles, which bolster China’s military posture in the Indo-Pacific.3 Russia too has benefited from a large market for its arms sales and access to technological components it can no longer access following the imposition of Western sanctions in 2014—a need that has grown exponentially since Russia’s reinvasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Meanwhile, more frequent and elaborate joint exercises have signaled to onlooking countries the two partners’ mutual support for each other’s security priorities and willingness to push back against the United States. In the context of Russia’s ongoing war against Ukraine and increasing U.S.-China tensions in the Indo-Pacific, it has become even more urgent to understand how future military cooperation between Russia and China could evolve and what it would mean for the United States and its partners. This memo examines this aspect of the partnership, including what is driving it, how it has evolved following the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, and the implications for the United States and its allies and partners.
Topic:
Bilateral Relations, Military Affairs, Russia-Ukraine War, and Defense Cooperation
Political Geography:
Russia, China, and Asia

34. Assessing the Evolving Russian Nuclear Threat

Author:
Andrea Kendall-Taylor, Michael Kofman, Nicholas Lokker, and Heli Hautala
Publication Date:
10-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, its nuclear rhetoric has become more permissive, more inconsistent, and more instrumental. Russia has also placed greater emphasis on military exercises involving nuclear-capable weapons, and it has altered policies and planning for its nuclear forces. Although it is too soon to draw definitive conclusions as the war in Ukraine is still ongoing and the lessons that Russia draws from it uncertain, the changes in Russia’s approach to nuclear weapons since its invasion suggest that Russia is likely to adopt a more assertive nuclear force posture, especially with respect to its non-strategic nuclear weapons, in order to signal that the country will no longer be a status quo power and increase the credibility of its nuclear threats. Russia is also likely to increase its efforts to test NATO cohesion—potentially through greater nuclear provocations and/or by signaling an insincere willingness to engage in forms of arms control or cooperative threat reduction—and continue to look for opportunities to leverage nuclear weapons to signal great-power status. In a future war with NATO, Russia would likely perceive the need to use nuclear weapons earlier in the conflict, either to seek victory against superior NATO conventional forces through nuclear first use on the battlefield, or to prevent defeat by those NATO forces. Moreover, since 2022, it has become increasingly difficult for U.S. and Russian policymakers to discern each other’s red lines, raising the risk of unintended escalation. Heightened Russian nuclear rhetoric at home could also alter the public’s views of acceptable nuclear use, eroding a potential constraint on Kremlin decision-making. Finally, changes since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine indicate both reduced Russian commitment to nonproliferation as its image increasingly becomes that of a rogue actor in international affairs, and diminished opportunities for nuclear arms control, for now.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Nuclear Weapons, Russia-Ukraine War, and Threat Assessment
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

35. The Strategic Repositioning of LNG: Implications for Key Trade Routes and Choke Points

Author:
Leslie Palti-Guzman and Marc-Antoine Eyl-Mazzega
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
2022 saw the climax so far of the weaponization of energy. Following its geopolitical demise, Russia has undertaken its own gas amputation, moving from a super energy power status to a diminished role with uncertain prospects and only hard options left. Russia has cut off almost entirely pipeline gas supplies to the European Union (EU), first inflicting huge financial pain and collecting record high revenues, but then simply losing out its largest and best market with no realistic alternative, and no prospect of any significant return. However, the Kremlin could still further reduce some of the remaining pipeline gas or liquefied natural gas (LNG) supplies and thus cause some tensions in the markets. Russia also retains leverage on oil markets, where the Kremlin managed to cope with the embargo as well as the price cap and maintain the relationship with Saudi Arabia which drives OPEC+ decisions. Meanwhile, in 2022, the European energy system has managed to surprisingly adapt on the supply and demand side to the three shocks: the decoupling from Russian energy supplies, the hydropower generation crisis, and the French nuclear electricity crisis. Liquefied natural gas has made a comeback in Europe and has been a savior of industries, governments, and populations. The LNG corridor between the EU and the United States (U.S.) has become the most dominant LNG trade route in 2022. This came at a huge cost though – EU’s gas import bill soared ten times from 2020 and three times from 2021 levels. For 2023, the European gas balance is much more fragile, as the demand reduction potential has reached its limits, same for the ability to attract additional non-Russian exports to Europe, at a time when missing Russian volumes will probably reach 120 billion cubic meters (bcm), instead of about 77 bcm in 2022. More moderate price levels since November 2022 have clearly overshadowed this fundamental mismatch, especially as the weather has been mild and China was still struggling with the pandemic. With an additional 30-40 bcm of missing Russian gas to offset in 2023 compared to 2022, Europeans can be expected to benefit from an extra gas of around 20-25 bcm left in storages thanks to mild weather and available LNG. They have no choice but to continue saving energy in a hurry, that is both on gas and electricity. Gas demand in power generation had increased in the first nine months of 2022 before falling in Q4 2022, and well over 15 bcm can be saved here in 2023 as more nuclear is available altogether, alongside more renewables, and some coal. It will be critical to reduce peak loads though. The key improvement is in terms of logistics, with the massive new LNG import capacity deployed across Europe. Overall, EU’s import situation will be very tensed and fragile for the next winter. The key challenge is that EU’s gas supply security ultimately depends on the weather in Europe, China’s and Japan’s LNG demand, and weather or technical outages in the Gulf of Mexico or in other producers. Any slight disruptions in supplies can have major impacts. As a last resort, bringing back some Groningen supplies, no matter how politically sensitive this would be, must be considered and prepared. Large financial compensations and effective governmental action would notably be required to offset the hardships.
Topic:
European Union, Gas, Exports, Trade, Energy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, China, and Europe

36. Russia’s Mining Strategy: Geopolitical Ambitions and Industrial Challenges

Author:
Florian Vidal
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
In addition to being a leading gas and oil power, Russia also possesses vast geological resources that place it among the world’s leading mining countries. Nevertheless, Russia’s largely privatized mining sector faces great and numerous restrictions relating to the obsolescence of its infrastructure, lack of investment and a shortage of qualified human resources in the industry, which may be further exacerbated by the war in Ukraine. To diversify its sources of revenue, whilst also obtaining new levers of geopolitical power, particularly in Africa, Moscow is seeking to revitalize this strategic industry. Russia may focus on several of its globally significant companies, particularly in the diamond, fertilizer and nickel sectors. It also plans to extend its mining activities by reinvesting in and modernizing historic sectors such as coal, or by developing new ones like lithium. In a context of growing global demand for critical metals and minerals in order to meet the challenge of the ecological and energy transition, what role can Russia play? Moscow intends to overcome the challenge of maintaining its economic and industrial autonomy in the face of the sanctions imposed by the West following its invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. The future of Russia’s mining industry may depend upon a reorientation away from its traditional Western markets and towards Asian countries, such as India, Malaysia, and Vietnam, which have decided to retain their economic ties with Russia. Will Russia’s mining policy bolster the implementation of the “pivot to Asia” that Moscow has talked of for several years?
Topic:
Natural Resources, Geopolitics, Diversification, Mining, Modernization, and Industry
Political Geography:
Russia and Eurasia

37. The Sino-Russian Partnership Assumptions, Myths and Realities

Author:
Bobo Lo
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
When Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin announced a “no limits friendship” at their February 2022 summit, the message was that Beijing and Moscow had reached a new peak in relations. Yet Putin’s invasion of Ukraine has exposed the limits of Sino-Russian partnership and highlighted their sometimes diverging interests. Far from being an authoritarian alliance, this is a classic great power relationship centered in realpolitik. China and Russia are strategically autonomous actors, with fundamentally different attitudes toward international order. The Sino-Russian partnership remains resilient. Both sides recognize that it is too important to fail, especially given there are no viable alternatives to continuing cooperation. Nevertheless, the balance of power within the relationship is changing rapidly. Russia’s geopolitical and economic dependence on China is greater than ever. Although predictions of a clientelist relationship are premature, this widening inequality represents a major long-term source of weakness. The challenges Beijing and Moscow pose to Western interests are largely separate and should be addressed individually on their merits. Equally, it is naive to imagine that reaching out to either side could help loosen their strategic partnership. Western governments should focus instead on upping their own game—from revitalizing democracy and the rule of law at home to addressing universal threats such as climate change and food insecurity. Bobo Lo is an Associate Research Fellow with the Russia/NIS Center at Ifri. He is also a Non-Resident Fellow with the Lowy Institute, Sydney, Australia; and a Non-Resident Senior Fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA) in Washington, D.C. Previously, he was Head of the Russia and Eurasia Programme at Chatham House, and Deputy Head of Mission at the Australian Embassy in Moscow. Dr. Lo has written several books, including A Wary Embrace: What the China-Russia Relationship Means for the World (Penguin Australia, 2017); Russia and the New World Disorder (Brookings and Chatham House, 2015); and Axis of Convenience: Moscow, Beijing and the New Geopolitics (Brookings and Chatham House, 2008).
Topic:
Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Partnerships, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, China, and Asia

38. The Technology Policies of Digital Middle Powers

Author:
Alice Pannier
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
Digital technology is an element of power in the international system as well as an area for competition among countries. Considering the economic weight and political voluntarism of the U.S., China, and the EU, those three poles of power have received a lot of attention when it comes to their technology policies. This study aims to shift our gaze toward countries outside of the trio. Digital middle powers are those countries that are caught in the middle of the power play in an emerging multipolar international system where digital technology is a determining factor of power. It also refers to countries with established or growing clout in digital technology, and which are regional leaders or global ones in certain sectors. The study provides a qualitative comparison of the technology policies of nine of the digital middle powers: Brazil, India, Israel, Japan, Kenya, Nigeria, Russia, South Korea, and the United Kingdom. It seeks to reflect the diversity of national technology policies, as well as to identify those countries’ convergences and divergences with Europe, the United States, and China. Each case study introduces national technology and digital innovation ecosystems, data policies, and the state of digital infrastructure. These elements serve to examine the strengths of the country’s private sector in technology, the government’s regulatory capacity, and the degree of digital development. The chapters then look at how the digital domain is embedded in the broader dynamics of their bilateral relations with the U.S., the EU, and China. A first conclusion is that digital middle powers can usefully be differentiated between rising digital powers and established ones. Established digital powers have well-developed ecosystems, regulations, and infrastructure, but they are all having to renew and re-focus their technology policies to remain relevant. By contrast, rising digital powers tend to have budding ecosystems in digital services and mobile applications, and large ongoing infrastructure development projects, albeit with limited or patchy regulatory capacity. When it comes to foreign relations, the study confirms well-identified trends whereby the EU’s influence occurs chiefly through the elaboration of norms; the U.S.’s via the strength of its digital services and private sector investment, as well as strong bilateral security ties; while China’s growing influence is underpinned by large infrastructure projects. All the countries studied are attempting to balance their relationships with U.S., China, and the EU. None, save for Russia, has outrightly “picked a side” and severed ties with one or two of the blocs.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Strategic Competition, 5G, and Middle Power
Political Geography:
Kenya, Russia, Japan, United Kingdom, India, Israel, South Korea, Brazil, and Nigeria

39. Defunding the War Against Ukraine: Economic Strategies for Countering Russian Aggression

Author:
David Cortright and Anna Romandash
Publication Date:
12-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Fourth Freedom Forum
Abstract:
The sanctions imposed by the United States and many of its allies on Russia since 2022 have been unprecedented. The current financial, economic, trade, and other restrictions aim to constrain Russia’s ability to continue its aggression. Imposed by most developed countries, the sanctions and export controls have the potential to diminish Russia’s war-making capacity, weakening state finances and eroding its military technological base. The measures have imposed significant costs on Russia, but to date they have not achieved their objectives due to Russia’s elaborate circumvention and preparatory strategies and the lack of compliance by many countries and companies. The success of sanctions as a means of constraining Russian aggression will depend on closing channels of evasion and tightening the enforcement of these measures. This report reviews the sanctions and export controls enacted to date and the effects they are having on Russia’s industrial economy. It also examines the principal gaps in sanctions enforcement that Russia has exploited. It identifies actions by companies and countries that are profiting from sanctions circumvention and are enabling Russia to continue its illegal war and annexation of Ukrainian territory
Topic:
Sanctions, Exports, Energy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

40. The Ripple Effect: A U.S. Diplomatic Strategy for a Changing World Order

Author:
Chester A Crocker and Barbara K. Bodine
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University
Abstract:
Russia’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine upended what policymakers thought they knew about the world and territorial military aggression. The ensuing war has brought destruction to Europe unlike anything since the Second World War. Regardless of how the war ends, several strategic trends, whether entirely new or preexisting and now reinforced, have set in a motion a new strategic environment in which the United States must compete. Ultimately, the new strategic environment is being defined by a global diffusion of power, where the agency of middle powers and their importance in solving geopolitical problems rise in tandem. In the spring of 2023, ISD convened two New Global Commons/Schlesinger Strategic Surprise working group meetings with participants drawn from academia, think tanks, government, international organizations, non-governmental organizations, and the private sector. The group identified key trends and potential strategic surprises emanating from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, honed in on the issues that would affect the strategic environment regardless of the war’s outcome, and put forth policy guidelines and recommendations for the United States as it seeks to navigate a more diverse geopolitical landscape in the coming years.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Geopolitics, Strategic Competition, International Order, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, North America, and United States of America

41. Enemies Foreign and Domestic: Confronting Kleptocrats at Home and Abroad

Author:
Kelly M. McFarland
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University
Abstract:
As Putin and his kleptocratic regime of oligarchs wage a devastating war in Ukraine, the costs of corruption have never been so starkly visible. Beyond Russia, recent examples of corruption in China, Afghanistan, the Northern Triangle, the Solomon Islands, and elsewhere, prove that rampant corruption poses a significant threat to aspirations for a greener, healthier, more peaceful, and more democratic world. Countries such as Russia and China have elevated their brand of corruption into a distinct and powerful aspect of their foreign policy. They employ this strategic corruption abroad to stunt economic growth; prop-up fellow authoritarian regimes; exacerbate social inequality; erase political trust; accelerate pandemics and degrade healthcare systems; exploit the environment; and propel state oppression. As U.S. policymakers seek to counter this strategic corruption, they must first recognize the extent to which domestic laws and actors within the United States enable this corruption to fester. In the fall of 2021 and spring of 2022, ISD convened a series of New Global Commons working group meetings with participants drawn from academia, think tanks, government, international organizations, non-governmental organizations, and the private sector. The group crafted workable definitions of corruption, evaluated the unique political and related threats posed by corruption and kleptocracy, assessed Russia and China’s use of strategic corruption, and developed principles and recommendations for government and non-government entities to build a global, sustained, anti-corruption response.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Corruption, Diplomacy, Authoritarianism, and Kleptocracy
Political Geography:
Russia, China, North America, and United States of America

42. A Strategic Challenge: A Peddling Peril Index Analysis of Countries’ Restricted Russia Trade

Author:
David Albright, Sarah Burkhard, and Spencer Faragasso
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Security and International Studies (ISIS)
Abstract:
National trade control systems and sanctions enforcement across the globe have been particularly challenged by Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, the unexpected types and number of goods to control, the need for rapid control of those items, and Russia’s determination to thwart others’ trade controls. The Russian situation demonstrates that even countries with strong strategic trade control systems have vulnerabilities. • In the aftermath of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the results of the Peddling Peril Index (PPI) for 2021/2022 provide a method to assess a total of 31 countries identified by their respective roles in the transshipment of restricted goods or the supply of dual-use goods used by the Russian military. • The purpose of this study is to identify patterns in these countries’ scores and lessons in finding ways of thwarting Russia’s success in violating sanctions and export controls.
Topic:
Sanctions, Exports, Trade, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia and Europe

43. Visible Progress at Russia’s Shahed Drone Production Site: Satellite Imagery Update and Call for Action

Author:
David Albright and Sarah Burkhard
Publication Date:
11-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Security and International Studies (ISIS)
Abstract:
Nearly three months after the Institute and The Washington Post publicly revealed detailed information on the plans of JSC Alabuga1 (“Alabuga”) to produce thousands of deadly Shahed136 kamikaze drones on Russian soil, satellite imagery indicates that plans are progressing at the Alabuga Special Economic Zone. Yet, the company responsible, JSC Alabuga, and related companies are still not found on public U.S. or allied sanctions lists. The information in internal documents, analyzed by Institute staff over hundreds of hours, reveals not only detailed timelines for Alabuga’s production of weaponized drones and the establishment of mass production with Iranian assistance, but also multiple pressure points and vulnerabilities. Now, not later, is the time for the U.S. government to take the lead, work with partner governments and industry, and use leverage against those less inclined to cooperate, to hinder Alabuga from succeeding in providing the Russian military with thousands of Shahed-136 drones. With winter fast approaching, and Alabuga’s Shahed output increasing, Russia can be expected to accelerate its Shahed-136 attacks against Ukraine’s vital energy infrastructure, causing brutal living conditions for the civilian population. A key, overdue first step is for the United States and its allies to sanction JSC Alabuga and its associated companies
Topic:
Weapons, Drones, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia and Eurasia

44. Electronics in the Shahed-136 Kamikaze Drone

Author:
David Albright and Sarah Burkhard
Publication Date:
11-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Security and International Studies (ISIS)
Abstract:
Shahed-136 kamikaze drones, filled with Western electronics, continue to destroy Ukrainian lives and their civilian infrastructure. These drones, also known as Geran 2, are produced and assembled at JSC Alabuga facilities inside the Alabuga Special Economic Zone in Russia, with assistance from Iran. Yet, the company responsible, JSC Alabuga,1 and related companies are still not found on public U.S. or allied sanctions lists. Information in internal Alabuga documents, analyzed by Institute staff over hundreds of hours, show a remarkable ability to acquire sophisticated electronic components from the West and build modules aimed at defeating Ukraine’s ability to jam Shahed-136 drones and require Ukraine and its allies to keep deploying additional or more advanced jamming systems. The detailed information on the Shahed-136’s electronic components, with part numbers and manufacturer, provide a valuable opportunity to thwart exports of these specific parts to Russia and its partner Iran, which has to date supplied most of these electronic parts to Alabuga for use in the Shahed-136 drone. Starting next year, however, Alabuga has committed to outfit Shahed136 drones with electronic components it acquires on its own. The danger posed by Alabuga should mobilize governments to apply sanctions and other restrictive measures to Alabuga and the associated companies revealed in the documents. Sanctions on Alabuga would not only be helpful in disrupting Alabuga and associated companies’ procurement efforts, but they would cause stress to a giant drone factory that has to produce thousands of Shahed-136 drones on a tight schedule, with little previous experience with drone production, hundreds of new employees on its payroll, and under financial pressure to prove itself as a capable supplier to the military.
Topic:
Sanctions, Weapons, Drones, and Private Sector
Political Geography:
Russia and Eurasia

45. Russian Lancet-3 Kamikaze Drone Filled with Foreign Parts: Western Parts Enable Russian Lancet-3 Drone to Have Advanced Targeting and Anti-jamming Capabilities.

Author:
Spencer Faragasso
Publication Date:
12-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Security and International Studies (ISIS)
Abstract:
The Institute for Science and International Security has reviewed open-source images and information found on the internet, identifying several key Western parts, commonly available on the commercial market, used in the Russian Lancet-3 kamikaze drone. - The Lancet-3 is an effective combat drone that has been successful in combat operations against Ukrainian systems, including Western supplied armor and artillery. - This report follows a series of reports published in the last year by the Institute on Russian drone systems and its acquisition of foreign technology. - Russia is increasingly relying on large quantities of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) to identify, target, and attack Ukrainian positions, vehicles, and structures. - Russia has a limited capability to design and produce advanced strategic commodities. To build these UAVs, Russia depends on extensive procurement networks to acquire strategic commodities produced by foreign countries, particularly the United States. - Because of the use of civilian Western components in Russian military systems, the United States and its partners are intensifying controls on critical items used in Russian drones, but more needs to be done.
Topic:
Security, Weapons, Drones, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

46. Satellite Imagery Update on Alabuga Shahed-136 Drone Factory

Author:
David Albright, Sarah Burkhard, and Victoria Cheng
Publication Date:
12-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Security and International Studies (ISIS)
Abstract:
Iranian-designed Shahed-136 kamikaze drones continue to destroy Ukrainian lives and their civilian infrastructure. These drones, also known as Geran-2, are produced and assembled by JSC Alabuga inside the Alabuga Special Economic Zone in Russia, with critical assistance from Iran. Recent commercial satellite imagery appears to show that the buildings making the drones continue to operate, and at higher levels than other facilities located at the SEZ. The image, taken on a Wednesday morning in late November, shows a winter scene of the SEZ, with all the visible buildings covered in snow, except the two buildings making the Shahed-136 drone. The heat generated by the Shahed-136 buildings’ interior appears to have melted the snow on their roofs, implying ongoing operation.
Topic:
Security, Weapons, Drones, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia and Europe

47. The geopolitical implications of Russia's invasion of Ukraine

Author:
Paul Dibb
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
The eminent Harvard University professor of Ukrainian history, Serhii Plokhy, observed that Russia’s occupation of Crimea, Donetsk and Luhansk in 2014 raised fundamental questions about Ukraine’s continuing existence as a unified state, its independence as a nation, and the democratic foundations of its political institutions.1 This created a new and dangerous situation not only in Ukraine but also in Europe as a whole. For the first time since the end of World War II, a major European power made war on a weaker neighbour and annexed part of the territory of a sovereign state. This unprovoked Russian aggression against Ukraine threatened the foundations of international order—a threat to which, he said, the EU and most of the world weren’t prepared to respond. Two years later, Plokhy published a book called Lost kingdom: a history of Russian nationalism from Ivan the Great to Vladimir Putin 2 in which he observed—correctly, in my view—that the question of where Russia begins and ends, and who constitutes the Russian people, has preoccupied Russian thinkers for centuries. He might have added that Russia has no obvious or clear-cut geographical borders. Plokhy also stated that the current Russo-Ukrainian conflict is only the latest turn of Russian policy resulting from the Russian elite’s thinking about itself and its East Slavic neighbours as part of their joint historical and cultural space, and ultimately as the same nation. He asserts that the current conflict reprises many of the themes that have been central to political and cultural relations in the region for the previous five centuries. Those include Russia’s great-power status and influence beyond its borders; the continued relevance of religion, especially Orthodox Christianity, as defined in Russian identity and the conduct of Russian policy abroad; and, last but not least, the importance of language and culture as tools of Russian state policy in the region. Moreover, the conflict reminds the world that the formation of the modern Russian nation is still far from complete. Plokhy concludes that this threat is no less serious than the one posed in the 19th and early 20th centuries by the German question—the idea of uniting all the German lands to forge a mighty German Empire.
Topic:
Defense Policy, National Security, Geopolitics, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

48. Deciding the future: the Australian Army and the infantry fighting vehicle

Author:
Albert Palazzo
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
The aim of this report is to inform government decision-makers and the public on the ability of Project LAND 400 Phase 3—the infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) acquisition—to meet the needs of Australia. I examine a number of factors that provide context for the government’s upcoming decision, whenever that may take place. Those include how IFVs fit into the Australian strategic environment, the ease with which the ADF can deploy them, their vulnerability to threats, and the ongoing utility of armour in the light of lessons unfolding from the ongoing Russian–Ukrainian War. To set the information into a useful context, this report explains the nature of contemporary land warfare and speculates how the Australian Army is likely to fight in a future conflict. To further assist those making the IFV decision, this report offers a number of scenarios that outline potential operations that the government may direct the ADF to undertake. It also identifies current gaps in ADF capability that will need remediation if the IFV is to achieve its potential, as well as the other opportunities that might not be taken up because of the focus on this investment. The report’s analysis results in some key questions for decision-makers to consider as they decide on the infantry fighting vehicle acquisition: Does the government believe that its IFV investment will deliver an appropriate balance of protection, lethality and mobility (both tactical and operational)? Does the government agree with the requirement for an infantry vehicle with STANAG 4569 Level 6 force protection and equipped with an active protection system? Is the government confident that the number of the IFVs obtained will generate a deployable and sustainable force that represents a sufficient return on the investment? Does the government accept that the IFV options under consideration will enable the ADF to offset existing gaps in capability and allow it to conduct operations in a contested maritime environment, including sea and airlift, long-range fires and logistics? Is the government confident that the Army’s combined arms system is deployable in contested environments, particularly in a maritime scenario? Does the government believe that the IFV will provide utility in the range of contingencies that the government envisages the ADF will need to meet? Does the government agree that the IFV will contribute to the requirement that the ADF be able to shape, deter and respond to threats as mandated in the 2020 Defence Strategic Update (DSU)?
Topic:
Defense Policy, National Security, United Nations, Economy, Defense Industry, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Australia, and United States of America

49. ‘Impactful projection’: long-range strike options for Australia

Author:
Marcus Hellyer and Andrew Nicholls
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
The Australian Government has stated that the ADF requires greater long-range strike capability. This was first stated by the previous government in its 2020 Defence Strategic Update (DSU), which emphasised the need for ‘self-reliant deterrent effects’. The present government has endorsed that assessment: Deputy Prime Minister and Defence Minister Richard Marles has stated that ‘the ADF must augment its self-reliance to deploy and deliver combat power through impactful materiel and enhanced strike capability—including over longer distances.’ He’s coined the term ‘impactful projection’ to describe the intended effect of this capability, which is to place ‘a very large question mark in the adversary’s mind.’ The term may be new, but the concept is not. To us, it’s a restating of the concept of deterrence by denial; that is, having sufficiently robust capabilities to convince an adversary that the cost of acting militarily against us isn’t worth any gains that might be made. But the need for the ADF to have those kinds of capabilities has become much more urgent. As the 2020 DSU noted, we no longer have 10 years of warning time of conventional conflict involving Australia. Moreover, this is not just the prospect of conflict far from Australia’s shores. People’s Liberation Army (PLA) force-projection capabilities have grown dramatically in the past two decades and include long-range conventional ballistic missiles, bombers and advanced surface combatants that have already transited through Australian waters.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, and Economics
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Australia, and Australia/Pacific

50. The instrumentalization of migration: A geopolitical perspective and toolbox

Author:
Monika Sie Dhian Ho and Myrthe Wijnkoop
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
As armies and weapons cross borders, geopolitics re-enters the western mindset. With his full-scale invasion of Ukraine President Putin attempts to redraw the borders in Europe, and carve out a Russian sphere of influence. Whereas his armies’ achievements on the battlefield fall short of Putin’s initial expectations, they did succeed in making his fears relevant. They more tightly united the West, increased support for further enlargement of NATO, convinced Europeans that massive defence investments make sense and energy dependency is a strategic mistake. This is a geopolitical turn that was deemed impossible only one year ago. After the COVID-19 shock, the Russia-shock has made western countries realize in full that economic globalization and interdependence create vulnerabilities (e.g. dependence from medical masks imported from China, and gas imported from Russia). Adversary states can use these economic vulnerabilities as geopolitical weapons. The growing awareness and scrutiny of our vulnerabilities extends to the field of migration as well. As Ukraine is fighting back, millions flee to Europe. UNHCR has counted almost 4.8 million refugees from Ukraine that have registered for Temporary Protection or similar national protection schemes in EuropeSee https://data.unhcr.org/en/situations/ukraine. Last updated: 29 November 2022. as a direct consequence of Putin’s geopolitical aspirations. The indiscriminate bombing of civilians in Ukraine reminds one of the Russian strategy in the war in Syria. NATO’s top commander in Europe, General Philip Breedlove, warned back then that Putin and Assad were trying to create a massive displacement of people. He suggested that refugees are the war, and the target of this destabilisation strategy was Europe. That interpretation of the indiscriminate bombing is deemed farfetched by some, but recent examples of the instrumentalization of migration abound. Libya used it against EU Member States, Morocco against Spain, Turkey against Greece, and Belarus against EU Member States. In this context there is an increased interest in understanding the phenomenon of the instrumentalization of migration. The aim of this paper is to use a geopolitical perspective to better understand the phenomenon of instrumentalization of migration. Such a perspective is helpful to analyse the points of vulnerability of target countries, and to initiate a discussion about possible strategic responses to prevent, deter and combat its use. These insights could contribute to more resilience of potential target countries and better protection of potential victims.
Topic:
Migration, European Union, Borders, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

51. The Challenge of European Political Will

Author:
Rachel Lutz Ellehuus and Seth G. Jones
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
In this follow-on report to 2021’s Europe's High-End Military Challenges: The Future of European Capabilities and Missions, the CSIS Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program and International Security Program examine the other side of the coin of European military effectiveness: the political will of European countries to conduct military missions and operations. The report identifies the endogenous and exogenous factors constraining or increasing political will and maps them onto six country case studies. Four prototypes of political will emerged from the analysis: global partners, international activists, constrained partners, and minimalists. The report then assesses the political will of European allies and partners to conduct fifteen types of military missions and operations worldwide, from peacekeeping to large-scale combat. It concludes with a summary of key findings. First, it finds that internal and external factors—such as strategic culture and alliance dependence, respectively—will continue to constrain European political will in many cases, even after the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Second, European states are more likely to have the political will to engage in military missions at the lower end of the conflict spectrum (such as maritime patrol missions) and less likely at the higher ends of the spectrum, except in cases of significant collective or national defense.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, International Cooperation, Politics, Military Strategy, Regionalism, and Intervention
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

52. U.S. Strategy: Rebalancing Global Energy between Europe, Russia, and Asia and U.S. Security Policy in the Middle East and the Gulf

Author:
Anthony H. Cordesman
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
The war in Ukraine has already shown how dangerous it is for the U.S. to assume that it can rebalance its forces to one region and count on a lasting peace or detente in others. It now is all too clear that U.S. strategy must continue to focus on Europe as well as China. What is less clear is the extent to which the Ukraine War is an equal warning that the U.S. must have a truly global strategy – and one that continues to focus on other critical regions like the Middle East. The sudden escalation of the Ukraine crisis into a major regional conflict and the need for political and diplomatic support in the UN as well as for sanctions are warnings that much of the U.S. success in deterrence and defense lies in creating long-term global diplomatic and political support as well as true and lasting strategic partnerships.
Topic:
Security, Energy Policy, International Trade and Finance, Hegemony, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Middle East, Asia, North America, and United States of America

53. Narrative Warfare: How the Kremlin and Russian news outlets justified a war of aggression against Ukraine

Author:
Nika Aleksejeva and Andy Carvin
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
In the weeks and months leading up to Russia invading Ukraine on February 24, 2022, the Kremlin and pro-Kremlin media employed false and misleading narratives to justify military action against Ukraine, mask the Kremlin’s operational planning, and deny any responsibility for the coming war. Collectively, these narratives served as Vladimir Putin’s casus belli to engage in a war of aggression against Ukraine. To research this report, the Digital Forensic Research Lab (DFRLab) identified recurring pro-Kremlin narratives over two timeframes: the 2014–2021 interwar period and the seventy days leading up to the 2022 invasion. For the interwar period, we reviewed more than 350 fact-checks of pro-Kremlin disinformation. We then collected more than ten thousand examples of false and misleading narratives published by fourteen pro-Kremlin outlets over the seventy-day pre-invasion period. To understand how these narratives evolved, we catalogued them by themes, sub-narratives, and relationships to pre-invasion escalatory events. This allowed us to produce a timeline of false and misleading Kremlin narratives encompassing the year leading to the invasion, showing how Russia weaponized these narratives as its actions on the ground escalated toward war.
Topic:
News Analysis, Conflict, Narrative, Information Warfare, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

54. Facing War: Rethinking Europe’s Security and Defence

Author:
Serena Giusti and Giovanni Grevi
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI)
Abstract:
Russia’s attack on Ukraine has sent shockwaves across Europe and the world. While the current war is a geopolitical turning point, it remains unclear whether it will trigger a quantum leap forward for European defence policies and for the role of the European Union as a security provider. This Report investigates whether we can expect a further convergence of European strategic cultures, and on collaboration among Europeans to generate the required military capabilities and integrate their forces. Most importantly, it finds that the timely implementation of the EU’s Strategic Compass will be a decisive test to establish whether Europeans are rising to the challenge of taking more responsibility for their security and defence.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, European Union, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

55. Nordic resilience: Strengthening cooperation on security of supply and crisis preparedness

Author:
Mikael Wigell, Mariette Hagglund, Christian Fjader, Emma Hakala, and Johanna Ketola
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
Against the backdrop of the COVID-19 crisis and Russia’s aggression in Ukraine, crisis preparedness and security of supply have taken on a new urgency. The recent events have demonstrated the fragility of many of the international flows of critical goods, products and services on which the Nordics also depend. As one of the most interconnected regions in the world, it is only through cooperation that the Nordics can avoid supply disturbances and crises that cascade throughout the region. The Nordics are well placed to enhance such cooperation. Based on extensive comparative analysis, the report shows how the Nordics share key characteristics in their approach to crisis preparedness and security of supply. What this report calls the Nordic resilience approach thus also forms a solid basis for joint action at the regional level. Finland’s and Sweden’s pending NATO accession will further strengthen the potential for Nordic cooperation. It is with this potential in mind that the present report investigates Nordic crisis preparedness and security of supply models, reviews existing cooperation and provides practical recommendations on how to jointly strengthen Nordic resilience.
Topic:
International Cooperation, Regional Integration, Crisis Management, COVID-19, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, Finland, Sweden, and Nordic Nations

56. Will Russia Survive Until 2084?

Author:
Philip Wasielewski
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
If the Russian army collapses in defeat in Ukraine, this could be the catalyst for political violence seeking regime or leadership change to extract revenge for humiliation on the battlefield and a ruined economy at home. However, as the number of armed groups in Russia grows (regular military, security services, private military companies, ethnic-nationalist military units, etc.), political violence initially focused on the Kremlin could unleash a broader struggle as each group vies for power against the other. If Russia’s central government, with a defeated army and weakened security services, is convulsed in an armed power struggle, this situation could motivate some ethnic republics within Russia to take advantage of this opportunity and attempt to secede, which would plunge the state into further chaos. Even if a defeat in Ukraine does not lead to disintegration within Russia itself, the former Soviet republics in what Russia considers its “near abroad” will continue to spin away from Moscow’s sphere of influence and reorient themselves towards other historic powers in their regions. This will be especially true in Central Asia and the Caucasus where Chinese and Turkish power has risen over the past several decades while Russia’s has declined. In Russia’s far east, the disparity between China’s and Russia’s relative strengths—military, economic, and demographic—is turning the balance of power in Beijing’s favor.
Topic:
Domestic Politics, Armed Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

57. Cyber Posture Trends in China, Russia, the United States and the European Union

Author:
Lora Saalman, Fei Su, and Larisa Saveleva Dovgal
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
Abstract:
Current understanding of the cyber postures of China, Russia, the United States and the European Union (EU) merits re-evaluation. It is often assumed that China and Russia are aligned, yet this is not always the case. Unlike Russia, which has an ongoing focus on information security, China’s official documents incorporate both information security and cybersecurity concerns that are similar to those of the EU and the USA. Moreover, while often paired, the EU and the USA have differing regulatory structures in cyberspace. Further, both actors increasingly mirror Chinese and Russian concerns about the impact of information warfare on domestic stability. By examining key trends in each actor’s cyber posture, this SIPRI Research Report identifies points of convergence and divergence. Its conclusions will inform a broader SIPRI project that maps cyber posture trajectories and explores trilateral cyber dynamics among China, Russia and the USA to assist the EU in navigating future cyber escalation and enhancing global cyber stability.
Topic:
European Union, Cybersecurity, Geopolitics, Regulation, and Information Security
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Eurasia, Asia, and United States of America

58. Mass Atrocities in Ukraine: Assessing Risks of Significant Escalation

Author:
Daniel Solomon
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Simon-Skjodt Center for the Prevention of Genocide, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum
Abstract:
On October 11, 2022, the Simon-Skjodt Center for the Prevention of Genocide at the US Holocaust Memorial Museum convened a private roundtable to discuss potential scenarios of mass atrocity escalation in Ukraine. The discussion featured preliminary remarks by three Ukraine experts, followed by a facilitated discussion. The discussion aimed to encourage more systematic thinking about how the current pattern of mass atrocities in Ukraine could escalate, in terms of severity, lethality, and/or systematicity to inform policy makers’ consideration of preventive options. The 2022 United States Strategy to Anticipate, Prevent, and Respond to Atrocities states, “In cases of ongoing atrocities, the [Atrocity Prevention] Task Force supports regional policy processes in developing and monitoring targeted response options and adjusting course as needed.” Assessing potential pathways to escalation is one way to help identify targeted response options that could mitigate atrocity risks. Even in a case like Ukraine, where the core US strategy is to help Ukraine repel Russia’s invasion, additional options may be available to help protect vulnerable populations or head-off future escalation. At the time of the convening, little analysis of this type appeared to exist, despite the substantial attention to documenting atrocity crimes, monitoring day-to-day developments in the war, and anticipating potential future scenarios of the conflict in general. Therefore, the discussion focused on the following prompts: What are the major potential triggers or drivers of potential significant escalation of atrocities in Ukraine over the next year or so? What strategies might policy makers use to anticipate, prevent, or respond to the potential escalation of atrocities? What observable trends or events would indicate increasing likelihood of a significant escalation of atrocities in Ukraine? The discussion took place under the Chatham House rule. This rapporteur’s report summarizes key discussion points and questions without attribution.
Topic:
Atrocities, Armed Conflict, Russia-Ukraine War, and Risk Assessment
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

59. What Ukraine Taught NATO about Hybrid Warfare

Author:
Sarah J. Lohmann, Chuck Benson, Vytautas Butrimas, Georgios Giannoulis, and Gabriel Raicu
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 forced the United States and its NATO partners to be confronted with the impact of hybrid warfare far beyond the battlefield. Targeting Europe’s energy security, Russia’s malign influence campaigns and malicious cyber intrusions are affecting global gas prices, driving up food costs, disrupting supply chains and grids, and testing US and Allied military mobility. This study examines how hybrid warfare is being used by NATO’s adversaries, what vulnerabilities in energy security exist across the Alliance, and what mitigation strategies are available to the member states. Cyberattacks targeting the renewable energy landscape during Europe’s green transition are increasing, making it urgent that new tools are developed to protect these emerging technologies. No less significant are the cyber and information operations targeting energy security in Eastern Europe as it seeks to become independent from Russia. Economic coercion is being used against Western and Central Europe to stop gas from flowing. China’s malign investments in Southern and Mediterranean Europe are enabling Beijing to control several NATO member states’ critical energy infrastructure at a critical moment in the global balance of power. What Ukraine Taught NATO about Hybrid Warfare will be an important reference for NATO officials and US installations operating in the European theater.
Topic:
Security, NATO, Economics, Infrastructure, Cybersecurity, Renewable Energy, and Hybrid Warfare
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, Eastern Europe, Central Europe, Western Europe, and Southeast Europe

60. The Coming Storm: Insights from Ukraine about Escalation in Modern War

Author:
Benjamin Jensen and Adrian Bogart
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
Based on three crisis simulations held in late March 2022 with think tank fellows, military planners, and congressional staffers, The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) will likely struggle to address escalation vectors almost certain to push the current war in Ukraine beyond the country’s borders. This paper captures key insights from across these simulations based on two triggering events: (1) a Russian surgical strike on a NATO logistics hub used to provide weapons to Ukraine in southeast Poland, and (2) Russian use of chemical weapons along the Polish border while simultaneously mobilizing to threaten the Baltics. As the conflict crossed a key threshold and risked becoming a regional war, most participants found a natural pull to escalate in each scenario despite limited expectations of achieving a position of competitive advantage. Analyzing how individuals and teams approached decision making provides insights on rethinking escalation models in the twenty-first century and taking advantage of new concepts and capabilities to better support signaling during a crisis.
Topic:
Security, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

61. Cyber War and Ukraine

Author:
James Andrew Lewis
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
This is a preliminary review of cyber operations in the Ukraine conflict based on publicly available information. Ukraine was not the first “cyber war”—the term itself makes little sense—but it was the first major conflict involving large-scale cyber operations. The so-far inept Russian invasion, where cyber operations have provided little benefit, raises questions about the balance between defense and offense in cyberspace, the utility of offensive cyber operations, and the requirements for planning and coordination. Better-than-expected Ukrainian defenses seem to be one hallmark of this invasion and the primary reason why Russian cyber efforts have had limited effect. It is likely that Ukraine, forewarned by Russian cyber actions that began as early as 2014, was better prepared as a result. It was also assisted in its cyber defense by friendly countries and private actors with whom it had developed cooperative relationships before the conflict. This preparation allowed it to deflect many Russian offensive cyber operations, suggesting that a well-prepared and energetic defense can have the advantage over offense in cyberspace. Russia had previously used cyberattacks against Ukraine to destroy or damage infrastructure and data. It attempted to do so again in 2022. Based on publicly available information, Russia launched a broad cyber campaign shortly before the invasion (see the appendix for a list of known events). Some reporting showed a huge increase in exploits on the first day. The intent appears to have been to create disorder and overwhelm Ukrainian defenses. Russia sought to disrupt services and install destructive malware on Ukrainian networks included phishing, denial of service, and taking advantage of software vulnerabilities. One company identified eight different families of destructive software used by Russia in these attacks. The primary targets were Ukrainian government websites, energy and telecom service providers, financial institutions, and media outlets, but the cyberattacks encompassed most critical sectors. This was a wide-ranging attack using the full suite of Russian cyber capabilities to disrupt Ukraine, but it was not a success. Russia’s most significant cyber success so far was the disruption of the Viasat Inc’s KA-SAT satellite. This created significant damage that spread beyond Ukraine but ultimately did not provide military advantage to Russia. The attack may have been intended to be part of a larger, coordinated cyberattack that proved unsuccessful, or the Russians may not have expected the rapid restoration of service that was provided with outside assistance. The metric for Viasat and for other actions is not whether a cyberattack is effective in terms of network penetration or the disruption of services or data, but whether its effect helps achieve in this case, the occupation of Ukraine and the elimination of its elected government. By this metric, the Viasat attack was not a success.
Topic:
Security, Military Strategy, Cybersecurity, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia and Ukraine

62. Of Ships and Cyber: Transposing the Incidents at Sea Agreement

Author:
Alexander Klimburg
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
Amid the geopolitical crises caused by Russia’s February 2022 invasion of Ukraine, it may seem wildly optimistic—or even bad diplomacy—to consider future arms-control scenarios for cyber operations. However, good policy needs to prepare for the day after tomorrow, and smart policy will look at what has gone wrong today and what can be learned from yesterday. Arguably, one element that may have contributed to rising geopolitical tensions over the past decade has been a lack of clear cyber signals among the main adversaries. This makes it even more urgent to consider what can be learned from past arms-control exercises such as the vaunted Incidents at Sea (INCSEA) Agreement—especially as this accord was conceived in the wake of several of its own perilous crises. In 1962, a lack of agreed signaling protocols nearly led to World War III. According to a riveting account in the 2020 book Nuclear Folly, 1 on October 27, 1962—at the height of the Cuban Missile Crisis—the U.S. Navy cornered one of the few Soviet submarines unaccounted for off Cuba. In an effort to convince the Foxtrot-class B-59 submarine to surface, the destroyer USS Cony employed practice depth charges—which were not accurately identified as such by B-59’s beleaguered crew. When, in the middle of the night, the submarine did indeed surface, a low-flying anti-submarine aircraft dropped flares and pyrotechnics so it could take better photographs. This seemed like an attack to the submarine, and the exhausted captain of B-59 ordered a crash dive and speculated that perhaps the war had already broken out. He gave orders to prepare to launch a 10-kiloton nuclear torpedo at the U.S. Navy task force. It took a near-mutiny by senior officers to stop him. This close call remained unknown until fairly recently. But several more prominent naval incidents throughout 1960s convinced the Soviet Union and the United States that a basic common agreement was necessary, and the Cold War “thaw” of the early 1970s made this possible.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Cybersecurity, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, North America, and United States of America

63. Baltic Conflict: Russia’s Goal to Distract NATO?

Author:
Courtney Stiles Herdt and Matthew "BINCS" Zublic
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
The Baltics are a key strategic region where the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Russian military and economic interests overlap. Sabotage of the Nordstream 2 pipeline, regardless of who executed the attack, has signaled that conflict in the region is no longer left of bang. Gray zone operations are underway, and the United States, NATO, and their partners need to be ready to act in unity against an increasingly hostile Russia that is now trying to distract attention from its military shortcomings in Ukraine. In this effort, Russia’s playbook will test the limits and try to exploit the seams of the alliance. An exacting response is needed to deny Russia control and ensure full conflict is avoided. The NATO summit in Vilnius will be critical to strengthening resolve and a path forward to a combined strategy to deter further Russian aggression.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, International Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, North America, and Baltic States

64. A World in Crisis: The “Winter Wars” of 2022–2023

Author:
Anthony H. Cordesman and Paul Cormarie
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
t is obvious that the world now faces a wide range of potential wars and crises. What is far less obvious is the level of confrontation between the U.S. and its strategic partners with both Russia and China, the rising levels of other types of violence that are emerging on a global level, how serious these wars and crises can become, and what kind of future could eventually emerge out of so many different crises, confrontations and conflicts, and trends. These issues are addressed in depth in a new analysis by the Emeritus Chair in Strategy at the CSIS entitled A World in Crisis: The “Winter Wars” of 2022–2023. This analysis explores the risk on the basis that war does not have to mean actual military conflict. Here, it is important to note that avoiding or minimizing combat is scarcely peace. As Sun Tzu pointed out in the Art of War well over 2,000 years ago, “war” does not have to involve the use of military force or any form of actual combat. His statement that “the supreme art of war is to subdue the enemy without fighting” applies to every form of major military confrontation and gray area warfare between opposing powers. It recognizes that it is all too easy to predict dire outcomes from the War in Ukraine, the current arms races with Russia and China, and growing levels of violence and confrontation between other states. There is still a case, however, for examining the broader impact of the war, the growing intensity of the arms races with Russia and China, and the current overall patterns of global conflict as the world enters the winter of 2022-2023. It is already clear that this will be a deeply troubled winter in many areas of the globe, that the level of confrontation between major powers has risen sharply, that they do seek to subdue the enemy without fighting, and their rivalry has become the equivalent of political and economic warfare. It is equally clear that the wide range of lower-level conflicts between other powers, their civil wars, and the abuses many governments commit against their own citizens are also intensifying, although many of these conflicts have been going on in some form for years or even decades. In far too many cases, the world is not moving toward peace. It is moving towards repression and war. Accordingly, this analysis argues that the world already faces a series of possible and ongoing “Winter Wars” in 2022-2023 that may not escalate to open military conflict but that are wars at the political and economic level and in competition to build-up more lethal military forces both for deterrence and to exert political leverage. It also shows that these “Wars” already pose serious risks and could escalate sharply and in unpredictable ways for at least the next five to ten years.
Topic:
Security, Military Strategy, Rivalry, and Competition
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Asia, North America, and United States of America

65. Military Stockpiles: A Life-Insurance Policy in a High-Intensity Conflict?

Author:
Léo Péria-Peigné
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
For the first time after thirty years of budgetary restriction, European armies must face a high-intensity conflict involving heavy human and material losses. Having run down their military stockpiles to the bare minimum, supporting Ukraine has taken a heavy toll on their operational inventory; as modern operational inventories are limited, much decommissioned and older equipment has also been donated. Russia too has mobilized its extensive military stockpiles, inherited from the USSR, to maintain its combat capability after the initial failure of its “special military operation”. Russian efforts to retrofit older systems have also intensified as production of modern equipment has stalled. As a result, we are seeing modern and ancient weapons pitted against each other in Ukraine. This situation raises questions about France’s military storage strategy and prompts comparisons with those of other nations. US forces have kept a significant proportion of their Cold War arsenal in working condition, using it as a valuable commercial, diplomatic, and military asset. This arsenal also allows the United States to dominate the second-hand weapons market as it can supply cheap and almost immediately available systems. In Russia, despite an apparent modernization process, military power still relies on Soviet-era stocks of vehicles and weapons. For the Russian navy, modernization of old hulls is a way to compensate for the slow production of modern ships. Chinese armed forces are being modernized and rationalized: substantial quantities of older equipment could therefore become available before 2030, a potential asset for Chinese diplomacy. In Europe, military stockpiling strategies diverge along a rough east–west line. Western powers such as the United Kingdom and France chose quality over quantity, while Eastern ones, closer to the Russian threat, try to maintain large volumes while also modernizing their equipment. While the war in Ukraine may prompt Western nations to begin a reinforcement program, Eastern European countries such as Poland had already begun their own before 2014 and the Crimea crisis. After the 2015 terrorist attacks in Paris, France began to restore its military means and budgets, but the overall size of its armed forces is still inadequate to face a high-intensity conflict. The professionalization of the armed forces, the 2008 financial crisis, and budget cuts progressively led to the practice of stockpiling being replaced with a generalized “just-in-time” approach, to reduce infrastructure needs and costs more broadly. French armed forces had to make tough choices with their limited budgets, keeping what was immediately useful to their current missions and abandoning what was not. Operations in Africa and the Middle East and anti-terrorist operations in French cities absorbed considerable budgets, while specialized military units and infrastructure necessary to maintain stocks required for high-intensity conflicts were disbanded. Several initiatives and processes are at work to restore minimum storage capabilities, but a relevant stockpiling strategy, in line with France’s resources and strategic context, is still far off. The French army is building several military reserve units that could drive greater retention of older equipment and vehicles, although compatibility issues with more recent models may arise. As storing combat aircraft would be far too costly, the French Air and Space Force is trying to optimize the availability of its fleet, especially through a new approach to private industry partners in maintenance and training. The French navy has initiated a reform and rationalization process of its spare-parts-storage policy to optimize the availability of its ships as well as their capabilities. A coherent equipment reserve and stockpiling program is an essential component of a military driven by a clear strategic framework. However, in the French case, this strategy is currently being pulled in two directions: between the probable end of expeditionary operations in Africa and the Middle East, and the likelihood of a high-intensity conflict. The whole French stockpiling approach cannot be based entirely on the experience in Ukraine, and it is therefore necessary to evaluate multiple probable scenarios to develop relevant recommendations. A conflict in Eastern Europe fought by a coalition differs from one led by Europe without US support, or from a major crisis in the French territories of the Pacific or Indian Ocean. Moreover, recommendations must reflect military realities, as French resources are limited and would not allow for the creation of a reserve stock strategy similar to that of the United States. To support an allied nation under attack, the French army would need a much expanded ammunition stockpile. Similarly, the French air force lacks advanced munitions, while the French navy needs to rebuild a support fleet sufficient to enable combat operations far away from the French mainland and infrastructure.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Conflict, Industry, and Armament
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, France, and United States of America

66. Russia’s War in Ukraine: Misleading Doctrine, Misguided Strategy

Author:
Pavel Baev
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
The blame for committing the blunder of starting the war with Ukraine is deservedly placed on President Vladimir Putin, but a single-explanation interpretation of the unfolding disaster is unsatisfactory. The scope of problems with the chain of command and logistics, scant air support and poor morale indicates that Russian planning and preparations for the war were seriously flawed and misguided. On the level of doctrine, the assertion of Russia’s ability to deter North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), defined as the main adversary, by employing the complete set of nuclear, conventional and “hybrid” capabilities, laid the foundation for the failure of attack on what was presumed to be a frangible Ukraine. Strategic guidelines on gaining a quick and complete victory by establishing air dominance and executing offensive maneuvers by armored battalion tactical groups (BTGs), led to the confusion of poorly coordinated attacks without proper air support. The strategic culture, pro-forma conservative but distorted by bureaucratic sycophancy and corruption, produced inflexible chains of command, demoralization of poorly led combat units and ugly atrocities. The sum total of these flaws is too high for the Russian army to learn useful lessons in the six months of fighting, so it has fallen back on the old pattern of positional warfare based on destroying the enemy by heavy artillery fire. The strategy of protracted war of attrition can lead to victory only if the economy and society are mobilized fully for delivering the necessary resources to the fighting army, but such mobilization—while proceeding in defiant Ukraine—remains politically impossible in discontented, isolated and economically degraded Russia.
Topic:
Military Strategy, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Eurasia, and Ukraine

67. Geopolitics of Europe’s Hydrogen Aspirations: Creating Sustainable Equilibrium or a Combustible Mix?

Author:
Tomas Jermalavicius, Tomas Janeliūnas, Andrian Prokip, Iliya Kusa, Alan Riley, Andrei V. Belyi, Pier Paolo Raimondi, and Miguel Sainz de Vicuña
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
Discussions about hydrogen’s role in the transition to carbon-neutral economies and the EU’s Green Deal seldom include consideration of geopolitical aspects and/or national security imperatives. However, given the importance of energy as a factor in global and regional geopolitical trends and national security, hydrogen development will reshape not only energy relations between countries but will also alter the broader geopolitical picture. While elevating new aspects of geopolitical interplays, such as the importance of technology and regional clusters, hydrogen development might also unwittingly transplant present-day challenges—such as excessive dependence on the energy supply from hostile powers—into the carbon-neutral future. Since Europe’s energy sovereignty and geopolitical role in its neighbourhood could be at stake, the nexus of geopolitics, energy security and hydrogen development should be given serious attention. At the same time, the transformative socioeconomic impact of energy transition will create winners and losers within and between nations, which in some cases will have national security implications; hydrogen development could offer ways to mitigate this. This report focuses on exploring the impact that the European Union’s ambitions and plans for hydrogen development—including an expansion of its infrastructure in the form of the European Hydrogen Backbone—on its geopolitical position up to 2040. It first looks into the greater detail of the EU Hydrogen Strategy and how it links with the Energy Union, as well as with European strategic autonomy and energy sovereignty issues. It finds that hydrogen development—alongside the growth of the renewable energy sector—offers a great opportunity to reduce the current exposure to hostile actors through the energy sector that often hampers Europe’s ability to act as a geopolitical force in its neighbourhood. However, it also warns that the lack of unity and coherence currently afflicting the Energy Union, and manifest in such recent controversies as the Nord Stream 2 undersea gas pipeline from Russia to Germany before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022, could potentially weaken such a positive geopolitical impact of hydrogen. Although hydrogen development requires Europe to draw upon external suppliers, the fact that this supply can come from many countries provides a significant opportunity for diversification and reducing the potency of energy supply as a geopolitical weapon. In this regard, two directions stand out in the EU’s neighbourhood—Ukraine in the east, and the Mediterranean along with the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) to the south. Both have huge potential for playing major roles in the European hydrogen supply chains, and their cultivation by the EU would provide many opportunities both to strengthen the EU’s influence in its neighbourhood and to build new partnerships. Certainly, neither of those directions comes without risks and downsides: political instability and armed conflicts, poor governance, unstable investment environment, water scarcity, and in some cases dependence on the hydrocarbons industry for income will be significant factors hampering the efforts to unlock their potential. Ukraine in particular will require sustained reconstruction efforts to tackle the massive devastation caused by Russia’s war. This will divert resources and attention, but transforming its energy sector and developing its hydrogen production base could still be important strands of these efforts. Europe’s own potential for domestic hydrogen production is another direction that this report looks into as a way to disentangle from the present-day geopolitically toxic dependencies and enhance its energy sovereignty. The Baltic states and Finland represent an interesting case study on how hydrogen could underpin a regional cooperation cluster with a high degree of integration—one of the new characteristics of the hydrogen era that will have geopolitical implications. The report, however, finds that different national perspectives on hydrogen, lack of coordination, and certain issues of trust arising from recent failures of solidarity and unity when tackling the regional nexus of energy security and geopolitics might hamper future regional cooperation in hydrogen. The hydrogen economy also offers some important benefits in managing national security challenges at the national level. In Estonia, the loss of the fossil fuel-based industry in the highly sensitive north-eastern region of Ida-Virumaa will be a socioeconomic blow to the local population. This report highlights how the vulnerability of the region, dominated by the Russian-speaking ethnic minorities who are already highly exposed to Russia’s malignant influence activities, could imperil Estonia’s energy transition and its national security. Creating a national hydrogen cluster in this region, drawing upon its industrial infrastructure and human capital, could mitigate the consequences of decarbonisation and energy transition. However, these considerations do not seem to receive sufficient attention from the government and energy businesses when drawing Estonia’s hydrogen map of the future. The report recommends that various stakeholders in the EU—including those behind the European Hydrogen Backbone—continuously monitor and assess the geopolitical risks, especially in terms of their impact on European energy sovereignty, when creating and managing new hydrogen-related interdependencies with the regions and countries outside the EU. The report urges the EU to support energy transition and necessary market and governance reforms in post-war Ukraine and the MENA countries to facilitate their emergence as crucial and reliable partners in hydrogen value chains. The report also recommends closer coordination and common planning between hydrogen stakeholders of the Baltic states and Finland when forming a regional cluster of hydrogen supply that would contribute to European energy sovereignty. Last but not least, it suggests that, for national security and resilience reasons, Estonia should focus more attention on the Ida-Virumaa region when developing its national hydrogen roadmap.
Topic:
Security, European Union, Geopolitics, Hydrogen, and Energy
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, Middle East, North Africa, and Baltic States

68. Turkey's Response to the Russia-Ukraine Crisis

Author:
Aaron Stein
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
On October 26, 2021, Ukraine’s Ministry of Defense released video of a TB2 unmanned combat aerial vehicle (UCAV) striking a separatist D-30 howitzer in Russian-occupied Donbas. The strike was Ukraine’s first confirmed use of the now ubiquitous TB2, the Bayraktar-manufactured drone that the Turkish military has used to great tactical effect in Syria, Libya, and Nagorno-Karabakh. The Turkish-Ukrainian defense relationship is understudied, but it could become an important factor in how Russian elites view North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) support for non-member Ukraine, and be used to justify an invasion to assuage Moscow’s concerns about a US-allied military presence along its borders. The Turkish support for Ukraine is not the main driver of Russian discomfort about the future of Ukraine. The TB2 is also not a decisive game changer, and the use of UCAVs is almost certain to have little impact on how Russian leadership weighs risk during debates about the efficacy of armed conflict in a neighboring state. Nevertheless, Turkish-Ukrainian defense ties are worthy of deeper study, precisely because Ankara’s relationships with Kyiv and Moscow have a secondary impact on American interests in Eastern Europe. The Turkish-Russian relationship is marred by bureaucratic distrust, which is papered over by a very functional leader-to-leader dynamic that enables the two Black Sea neighbors to cooperate and manage numerous regional conflicts. The Turkish-Ukrainian dynamic, in turn, is part of a broader Turkish effort to establish itself as an independent actor, committed to pursuing a foreign policy that often clashes with much of the NATO alliance. This paper will explore Turkish-Russian and Turkish-Ukrainian relations; the reasons for Turkey’s efforts to “fence sit” and establish itself as a neutral political actor in the Black Sea; and what these efforts portend for US interests in the region.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, NATO, and Crisis Management
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Turkey, Ukraine, and Middle East

69. How Will China Respond to the Russia-Ukraine Crisis?

Author:
Chris Miller
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
How will China respond to a potential Russian military escalation against Ukraine? Relations between Russia and China have intensified in recent years, with Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping holding regular summits and the two countries’ militaries participating in joint exercises and cooperating in some defense industrial efforts. Ties between Moscow and Beijing are now closer than any time since the days of Stalin and Mao, driven by a shared perception that the United States is each country’s primary foreign policy challenge. One top Russian official told media in December 2021 that the relationship now “exceeds an alliance.”[1] Chinese state media, meanwhile, have vocally backed Russia in arguing that the current crisis stems from the US “using NATO as a tool to cannibalize and squeeze Russia’s strategic space.”[2] The 2014 war in Ukraine and annexation of Crimea was an important factor driving Russia and China closer to each other, as Russia sought to reduce post-Crimea international isolation and as Beijing realized it could drive a hard bargain in its bilateral relationship with Russia on issues like energy. China’s response to the 2014 war, however, was generally to avoid taking sides. China accepted a narrative that placed blame on the West for causing the crisis, with top diplomats citing Western “foreign interference for causing the crisis,” but didn’t approve of Russia’s seizure of Crimea or its military actions in the Donbas.[3] China abstained from voting on the key United Nations resolutions regarding Crimea, for example, and it still declines to recognize Crimea as Russian territory. Similarly, it verbally rejected US and European sanctions on Russia though it let Chinese firms, including the country’s big state-owned banks, abide by these sanctions to avoid being cut off from US financial markets and the international banking system. Compared to 2014, however, China may find it more difficult to avoid involvement in an escalating crisis. Leaders in Beijing and around the world will see the US response to any military escalation against Ukraine as sending signals about whether the US could effectively respond to future crises in the Taiwan Strait or East or South China Seas. The success or failure of US efforts to impose meaningful costs on Russia if it escalates will be seen as a test of whether the US could do something similar in Asia. Moreover, after repeated summits between Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin, including Xi’s description of Putin as his “best friend,” China’s approach to Russia amid a crisis will also be interpreted as sending signals about China’s own capabilities and influence. Because of this, China will not see a new phase of war between Russia and Ukraine as a peripheral issue in its foreign policy, even though China has no core issues at stake in Ukraine itself. China is most likely to be implicated in the crisis by potential Western sanctions on Russia, which in contrast to 2014 will impose substantially more pressure on Beijing to take sides. China’s decision either to adhere to new Western sanctions or to help Russia avoid them will shape escalation pathways and determine the magnitude of economic and political isolation that sanctions impose.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Politics, Sanctions, Military Affairs, Economy, Crisis Management, and Escalation
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Eurasia, Ukraine, and Asia

70. Russian Perceptions of Military AI, Automation, and Autonomy

Author:
Anna Nadibaidze
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
President Vladimir Putin declared 2021 to be the Year of Science and Technology in Russia, with November named as the month of artificial intelligence (AI), signaling Russian leadership’s strong interest in this umbrella term. The Russian defense sector is particularly captivated by the opportunities associated with AI-based technologies. In recent years, AI, robotics, as well as the further integration of automation and autonomy into weapons systems and military decision-making have all been highlighted as priorities for modernizing the Russian armed forces. In 2017, Putin famously said that “artificial intelligence is the future, not only for Russia, but for all humankind … Whoever becomes the leader in this sphere will become the ruler of the world.” Quoting these words, analysts often attribute Russia’s development, testing, and use of weaponized AI to the necessity of competing in the so-called global AI race or the global tech race with the current leading AI developers: the United States and China. While the perceived need to compete and catch up is part of Russia’s motivations, its interest in military AI should not only be attributed to a quest for relative power. Understanding the depth and complexity of the debates surrounding AI, autonomy, and automation in Russia requires an examination of discussions about its strategic implications for the Russian army, the perceived benefits and risks of autonomy, and, more broadly, the importance of technological modernization and innovation for Russia’s place in the world. This report aims to provide an overview of the different conceptions and motivations, both oriented towards domestic and international audiences, that have been and are guiding Russian political and military leaderships in their ambitions to pursue weaponized AI. First, it outlines the various factors, both external and internal, behind the quest for pursuing AI, autonomy, and automation in the Russian military. Second, it presents some of the Russian plans in this area, what is known about their capabilities, and the challenges to strengthening them. Third, it dives into Russian debates on autonomy, and especially autonomous weapons systems, as well as discussions on the ethics of developing so-called “killer robots,” or autonomous combat robots (боевые роботы, or военные роботы), a term often used in the Russian-language literature. The analysis is based on a survey of open-source materials, including media reports, press releases, official statements and speeches, peer-reviewed articles and think tank reports, as well as publications in Russian military journals. The author would like to present it as the first step in an ongoing doctoral research project, as well as a contribution to the emerging English-language literature on how weaponized AI is perceived in Russia.
Topic:
Cybersecurity, Artificial Intelligence, Autonomy, Automation, and Military
Political Geography:
Russia and Eurasia

71. Electronic Warfare: Russia's Approach

Author:
Pavel Luzin
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
Russia considers electronic warfare (EW) one of the key military capabilities in its ongoing confrontation with the West. EW provides a non-nuclear deterrence capability and helps Russia keep its great power status and strategic autonomy while also taking into account its long-term economic and demographic weakness. Russia has made significant advances in EW during the 2010s. However, at the beginning of 2020s, Russia still faces technological, technical, industrial, organizational, and political challenges that prevent Moscow from getting the EW capabilities it wants. Technological challenges are related to delays in developing air- and space-based EW capabilities, and to the need to unify EW systems. Technical challenges stem from the number of different types of EW systems that must be maintained, the relatively short lifespans of various EW systems, and issues integrating them with other combat systems and units. The last point also indicates why Russia has struggled to transform its quantity of the EW systems into a higher quality of combat capabilities. Industrial challenges are caused by the volatile dynamic of Russia’s arms procurements and R&D programs and the capacity of defense corporations to develop and produce advanced EW systems with acceptable costs. The main organizational challenge is that the number of EW troops that has already achieved its objective limit. Now EW troops need to be transformed from combat support into a combat branch. Finally, a political challenge appears in the confrontation between Russia and the West, which is the main driver for efforts related to EW. Russia is unable to compete with the United States and Europe in a symmetric way, and Russia’s political system does not allow Moscow to realize a “revolution in military affairs” because the centralized system struggles to implement a net-centric approach to the armed forces in effective way. For that reason, Russia has chosen a classic approach of asymmetric warfare with the goal of disrupting the command and control systems of a superior adversary. The coming decade promises to be challenging for Russia in terms of electronic warfare. Moscow will need to fix its previous EW efforts, pay more attention to the overall quality of electronic warfare rather than on the quantity of deployed EW systems, and bridge the evident gaps in EW on tactical, theater, and strategic levels. Moreover, after defense spending stabilized and even declined during the late 2010s, Russia has been forced to increase its defense budget again. This means spending for EW will also increase. Russia will try to fill gaps in air- and space-based EW capabilities, with the sea-based component continuing to play a secondary role in Russia’s military planning. It is also possible that Russia will chose to extend its ground-based EW infrastructure in Belarus with creation of an EW “chain” from Crimea to Kaliningrad.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Cybersecurity, Deterrence, Military, and Electronic Warfare
Political Geography:
Russia and Eurasia

72. How the Intervention in Kazakhstan Revitalized the Russian-led CSTO

Author:
Bruce Pannier
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
The Russian Federation-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) has existed for nearly 30 years, and, during all that time, it had never sent troops into a conflict zone in one of its members states. CSTO members Armenia and Kyrgyzstan had requested assistance in the past, but the organization did not send help as those situations were not part of the CSTO mandate. Faced with unrest that broke out in early January 2022, Kazakhstan’s government requested CSTO assistance to fend off what Kazakhstan’s president said was a threat to the country’s sovereignty from tens of thousands of terrorists. For the first time, the CSTO answered a call for aid and deployed some 2,500 troops to guard key facilities in Kazakhstan—but only in a few cities, and for less than two weeks. It looks now like there were no terrorists, and Kazakh President Kassym-Zhomart Tokayev’s call for help was not to save his country, but to save himself from elements in the government that were trying to oust him. That makes the CSTO decision to deploy forces more intriguing, as it appears the organization did not send the force to Kazakhstan to defend that country’s sovereignty, but to defend Tokayev and preserve a government that was friendly towards Russia.
Topic:
Security, Sovereignty, Regional Integration, and Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO)
Political Geography:
Russia, Central Asia, Eurasia, and Kazakhstan

73. The Wagner Group's Playbook in Africa: Mali

Author:
Raphael Parens
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
What is the Wagner Group doing in Mali? Since it rose to prominence after its involvement in the Syrian Civil War alongside the Assad regime, Wagner Group, a Russian-owned Private Military Contractor (PMC), has expanded its footprint into Africa. [1] Wagner has immersed itself in Libya, Madagascar, Mozambique, Central African Republic (CAR), and Sudan, leading training exercises, fighting anti-government forces, and brutally quelling protests. Wagner Group often overlaps with Russian state foreign policy aims, but its position as an independent contractor lends it unpredictability, while giving Russia plausible deniability. The group offers the Russian state a valuable tool: the ability to test new environments for military cooperation without appearing heavy-handed or overtly involved. Wagner has established a pattern of political, military, and economic involvement in Sudan and CAR since 2015. Wagner Group and its founder, Yevgeny Prigozhin, have followed this strategy successfully in Mali, contributing to France’s recent decision to withdraw its military forces from the country. Although Wagner group still needs to adapt its strategy to succeed in a new environment in Mali, the Kremlin has strong-armed a key competitor out of the country. This creates potential contagion effects for the rest of the Sahel, particularly those countries facing long-term insurgencies, such as Burkina Faso.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Non State Actors, Wagner Group, and Military
Political Geography:
Africa, Russia, and Mali

74. Control, Development, Legitimacy, and the 2024 Problem: Russia Two Years Before the End of Putin's 4th Term

Author:
András Tóth-Czifra
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
In 2020, the Russian Federation’s legislature adopted constitutional reforms initiated by President Vladimir Putin. The reforms allowed Putin to “zero out” his presidential term count, and thus maintain ambiguity about his plans in 2024. They also set the stage for a radical revamp of governance in the country, with hope to kick-start Russia’s economic growth before 2024 and to ensure that the system could withstand instability stemming from a potential succession crisis. The reforms did bring substantial changes. However, as it is evident from major policies regarding capital investments, public administration, and the COVID-19 pandemic, the reforms left political decision-making top-heavy, poorly informed, short-sighted, and constrained, making it highly questionable whether they could achieve the goal of stimulating growth and stabilizing the regime’s domestic position before 2024. It was amid this set of contradictions and ambiguities that Putin decided to start a war of submission against Ukraine in February 2022. As of March 2022, it is too early to conclusively evaluate the consequences of the war on Russia’s future, and having been finalized in early February, this report cannot attempt to do it. However, by undoing the foundations of economic and social development, the war seems to have set Russia on a course where the regime aims to resolve the contradictions and ambiguities detailed in this report by previously unseen levels of domestic repression and external aggression.
Topic:
Development, Reform, Constitution, Legitimacy, and Vladimir Putin
Political Geography:
Russia and Eurasia

75. Serbia on Edge

Author:
Richard Kraemer
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
The time has come to openly regard the Republic of Serbia for what it is: A stalwart Russian and Chinese ally run by a semi-authoritarian government that proactively pursues ideologically irredentist territorial expansion in the Western Balkans. Today’s Serbia poses a threat to regional and transatlantic security. Under President Aleksandar Vučić’s Serbian Progressive Party (SNS), the Serbian government is rapidly building its military, overtly backing ultranationalist provocateurs in neighboring states, cementing Belgrade’s ties to Moscow, and consolidating partnerships with the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Integral to its efforts to actualize the “Greater Serbia” ideology, Serbia’s and Russia’s Orthodox Church leadership cooperate closely and in concert with their political counterparts. Without a significant Westward shift in its orientation, Serbia will continue on an authoritarian trajectory aligned with U.S. adversaries. Contemporary Serbia presents a quandary for U.S. and European strategists and policymakers. A genuinely democratic and Euro-Atlantic-oriented Serbia has been sought by Brussels and Washington alike. Yet, decades after Yugoslavia’s violent dissolution and related North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) interventions in the 1990s, most Serbians reject NATO cooperation and are lukewarm towards the European Union (EU). Consequently, the U.S. and its democratic allies in Europe are less able to leverage prospective memberships as a means of transatlantic integration. Further complicating relations with Serbia is Aleksandar Vučić’s overt embrace of Beijing and Moscow. The depth of Serbia’s growing dependence on those powers jeopardizes U.S and European security on multiple fronts. The Vučić government’s enduring endorsement of ultranationalist narratives and their subversive purveyors continues to intensify discord in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, and North Macedonia. Its military build-up is gravely disconcerting; Belgrade responds only with specious explanations. The country’s ever-greater reliance on Russian oil and gas as a client and transit state for Gazprom, Russia’s state-owned energy giant, puts it at odds with Brussels, Washington, and several Central-Eastern European capitals. Belgrade and Beijing’s economic, technological, and increasingly military cooperation accelerates as the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) further entrenches itself in southeast Europe. In sum: Serbia’s expanding alignment with authoritarian powers and regional anti-democratic forces reflects its illiberal worldview and disabling narrative of national victimhood. Western policymakers persistently view Belgrade’s government with the misunderstanding that, given the right incentives, Serbia will moderate, democratize, and gradually integrate into transatlantic institutions. This assumption is misguided. It diminishes, if not excludes, the need for a national reckoning among the Serbian people. As with post-war Germany’s Willy Brandt, Serbia needs courageous and sincere leadership to acknowledge past sins and move the nation forward. For example: A genuine Kniefall von Warschau event could spur an honest discussion among Serbian peoples about the atrocities committed during Yugoslavia’s dissolution. Whatever the catalyst, a broad acknowledgment of past crimes against humanity is categorical if Serbia is ever to become a democratic and open society. Without it, Serbs will remain disproportionately susceptible to domestic irredentist forces fed by malign foreign powers set on keeping the Western Balkans removed from the transatlantic community. Until such a national reckoning, Western decision-makers should adopt a more pragmatic approach to relations with a Belgrade government dismissive of genuine transatlantic partnerships. For as long as Pan-Serb ultranationalism is considered by Serbia’s leaders to be acceptable in political discourse, the kind of genuine democratic values and institutions shared within the transatlantic community will remain unrealized. Accordingly, the U.S. and its European allies should encourage Serbia to focus on itself, not its neighbors. In that vein, Western policymakers would be wise to stop expecting a breakthrough in Kosovo-Serbia status negotiations. It has become an empty dialogue that only keeps Kosovo locked outside of international institutions and other benefits of recognized statehood. A revised approach should also discontinue pushing an ineffective EU integration process as the primary means of democratically transforming Serbia.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Ideology, and Expansion
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Eastern Europe, Serbia, and Balkans

76. Appraising the War in Ukraine and Likely Outcomes

Author:
Philip Wasielewski
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
After six weeks of combat, where is the Russo-Ukrainian War going? Modern technology both facilitates and hampers the answer to that question. Every day, this war is evaluated from every angle and perspective, but modern technology provides only a soda-straw view of the war’s entire canvas. This article will try to discern that larger canvas of the war, including a focus on casualties, information operations and morale, and logistics to see how they and the tactical correlation of forces may influence several possible strategic outcomes.
Topic:
Conflict, Military Tactics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Eurasia, and Ukraine

77. The Rise of Sino-Russian Biotech Cooperation

Author:
Svitlana Lebedenko
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
The People’s Republic of China’s rise as a global innovation power is rooted in the development of a sovereign innovation infrastructure, one that allows China to compete in high-technology races with the United States. This process is complemented by an intensifying science and technology partnership with the Russian Federation. By decoupling from China and Russia, the United States and its allies are pushing China and Russia closer to each other. The paper discusses recent examples of Sino-Russian biotechnology cooperation projects, offering an early account of the emerging integration of two distinct but complementary innovation infrastructures.
Topic:
Development, Science and Technology, Infrastructure, Innovation, and Biotechnology
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Eurasia, and Asia

78. Reviving the Prospects for Coercive Diplomacy in Ukraine

Author:
Sean Monaghan
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
The United States and its allies in the West have been unable to use the threat of military force to coerce Russia into stopping its war in Ukraine. In part, this is because the West is more concerned about escalation than Russia. Further analysis using Alexander L. George’s framework of coercive diplomacy, however, suggests the problem is more complex and deep-rooted: Few of the historical conditions or factors that favor coercive diplomacy are present in Ukraine. This analysis reveals three things the United States and its allies should do to revive the prospects of ending the war in Ukraine through coercive diplomacy. First, they should take smaller, more achievable steps which are less likely to inspire Russia to double-down. Second, they should exploit Russia’s deteriorating position through a mixture of carrots and sticks. Finally, the West should seek to minimize the intensity of its wider confrontation with Russia and focus on strategic stability as an end in itself. This will be challenging because of the gravity of Russian atrocities in Ukraine. But it may help end the war through coercive diplomacy, and avoid a serious miscalculation with Russia.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Conflict, Coercion, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

79. The Evolving Political-Military Aims in the War in Ukraine After 100 Days

Author:
Philip Wasielewski
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
Russian war aims have contracted from conquering Ukraine to simply expanding the territory of the statelets it supposedly went to war to protect. By contrast, Ukraine’s war aims have grown from survival to the recovery of all territory lost to Russia since 2014. These uncompromising objectives lock Russia and Ukraine into a war of attrition with little hope of a negotiated settlement. The ongoing battle in Donbas could provide Russia with some tactical successes and a propaganda victory but probably not a strategic one. In fact, further losses could weaken the Russian army to the point that it enables later Ukrainian counterattacks or even causes the Russian army to fracture. Leaders in Moscow may find that a depleted army leaves them few options for victory and that even their superiority in nuclear weapons may not be as useful as supposed.
Topic:
Politics, Armed Forces, Conflict, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Eurasia, and Ukraine

80. The Art of the Possible: Minimizing Risks as a New European Order Takes Shape

Author:
Gabriela Iveliz Rosa-Hernandez
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
Russia’s war on Ukraine is poised to bring into being a new European security order. Although the last eight months have been full of surprises, that new order may very well be marked by unstable standoffs, buildups, and dangerous activities and incidents between both Ukraine and Russia and Russia and Ukraine’s Western backers. These will risk ever more dangerous crises, all with the threat of nuclear war looming. The last eight years of military deployments, near-simultaneous exercises, and other proximate activities by Russia and NATO offer some hints as to what this future may look like. These, notably, were undertaken not to prevent an escalation in Ukraine but to deter NATO from attacking Russia and vice versa. During this time, discussions about a return to conventional arms control in Europe to mitigate the dangers of military activities gained little traction with policymakers, and the agreements and arrangements that had been in place continued to deteriorate and dwindle. In late 2021, as Russian forces massed on Ukraine’s borders, the West offered Russia a return to conventional arms control solutions. Russia countered with demands that NATO return to its 1990s-era force posture and eschew any further enlargement, and then proceeded to roll its tanks into Ukraine. During the tense months prior to Russia’s invasion, the conventional arms control mechanisms that remained, such as the Vienna Document, made it possible to call out Russia’s buildup, but not reverse it or prevent attack. Although there is little logic and less appetite for new arms control deals now, an end to fighting in Ukraine will create new imperatives to make Europe safer than it is today. While sanctions can limit Russian capacity to some extent, they may well be inadequate to prevent substantial buildups. For this reason, NATO members and their partners should be thinking in advance about how they could limit Russian capabilities via negotiated arrangements with robust verification measures and repercussions for violations. Once the shooting stops in Ukraine, deals such as these could make a more secure Europe, bolstered by more reliable deterrence, attainable.
Topic:
Security, NATO, Arms Control and Proliferation, Conflict, Deterrence, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

81. American Interests in the Ukraine War

Author:
Joshua Shifrinson
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
Policymakers have poorly defined U.S. strategic interests in the Russia-Ukraine War. Those interests that have been defined—deterring future aggression and protecting the “liberal order”—do not stand up to scrutiny. Actual U.S. interests in Ukraine are essentially negative: preventing further escalation or spillover of the conflict and limiting a wholesale collapse in U.S.-Russian relations. The limited interests that the U.S. does have in Ukraine suggest that Washington should try to convince Ukraine and Russia to accept a negotiated settlement.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Liberal Order, Conflict, Strategic Interests, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, Eastern Europe, and United States of America

82. One-Size-Fits-None: Overhauling JADC2 to Prioritize the Warfighter and Exploit Adversaries’ Weaknesses

Author:
Bryan Clark and Dan Patt
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Amazon founder Jeff Bezos famously attributes his company’s success to its customer obsession, which drove initiatives ranging from the creation of a cloud infrastructure and processing orders at unprecedented scale to establishing an entirely new logistics network that rapidly moves purchases to destinations. Amazon’s focus on shoppers is understandable, as it only makes about 1 percent of the merchandise it sells. Unlike a product-aligned business model like Apple’s, which seeks to anticipate or shape customer demand, Amazon’s bottom line depends on it being able to understand and respond to consumers better and faster than competitors. Given the urgent challenges China and Russia pose to US allies, the US Department of Defense (DoD) should adopt a fulfillment model like that of Amazon. Although analysts often treat the DoD as a single customer in a monopsonistic relationship with its thousands of suppliers across the defense industrial base, the DoD more closely resembles a market where military services, combat support agencies, and defense contractors collaborate to deliver capabilities to their ultimate customers—combatant commands such as US Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM), US Strategic Command (STRATCOM), and US European Command (EUCOM). Viewing the DoD as a market rather than a customer suggests that services and agencies should focus their efforts on understanding and meeting combatant commanders’ needs. This would reverse the Pentagon’s longstanding practice, codified in the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS), in which services and agencies predict future operational requirements and task government labs or contractors with developing solutions that will fill anticipated capability gaps. JCIDS harkens back to the 20th century’s industrial model of product development exemplified by Henry Ford, who famously said that purchasers of his Model-T could have it in any color they wanted, as long as it was black. The DoD’s customers are similarly disenfranchised. The US Joint Staff, which administers JCIDS and acts as the combatant commanders’ representative in Pentagon decision fora, lacks acquisition authorities and funding and thus can impact defense programs only by defining requirements for future systems. Because requirements are predictive, they attempt to capture the full range of use cases for a new product, leading JCIDS to produce comprehensive, generalized solutions rather than customized capabilities designed to meet combatant commanders’ operational challenges. The argument for military services “pushing” new systems to customers instead of letting end-users “pull” what they need centers on the perception that combatant commanders are focused on near-term capacity rather than next-generation capability. This assessment may have been valid in 2003 when JCIDS was first implemented. Emerging systems like the F-35 strike-fighter and DDG-1000 each took nearly two decades to reach fruition, and combatant commanders lacked the analytic processes and far-term perspective to determine what would be useful or feasible 10 to 20 years in the future. Moreover, the US military in 2003 was by far the world’s most capable force, and threats requiring substantially different US capabilities would take a decade or more to materialize. However, the assumptions underlying the DoD’s industrial model of capability development are no longer valid. INDOPACOM assesses that China could mount a successful invasion of Taiwan during the 2020s, and Russia continues to threaten imminent action against Ukraine and NATO’s eastern members. Combatant commanders’ perspectives on capability requirements should therefore be a top priority for services, agencies, and the defense industry. At the same time, in the commercial sector, computing, manufacturing, and materials technologies are delivering new products within months or several years rather than decades. New defense industrial base entrants that leverage commercial advancements and software-centric innovation could quickly provide relevant capabilities by responding directly to combatant commander’s current and emerging operational challenges. Unfortunately, the DoD’s pursuit of efficiency and centralized decision-making hinder the direct connections between combatant commander customers and commercial or government suppliers that foster innovation. The results will therefore continue to be one-size-fits-all solutions that take longer and are more expensive than concepts and capabilities tailored to meet specific needs. In addition to furthering the Pentagon’s well-documented problems delivering new systems and concepts on cost and schedule, universal solutions will be less likely to target the specific threats posed by such peer adversaries as China or Russia. Without restoring combatant commander customers to the center of the DoD’s capability development efforts, US forces will not be able to keep up with the challenges posed by peer adversaries like China or Russia and may even find themselves behind regional powers with geographic advantages and little to lose. The US military cannot afford another failed and ponderous attempt to “boil the ocean” with universal solutions and should take a page from Amazon by focusing on customer needs first.
Topic:
Defense Policy, National Security, Armed Forces, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
Russia, China, and United States of America

83. Prepare Ukraine for Victory in a Long War

Author:
Luke Coffey
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
On February 24, Russia invaded Ukraine for the second time in eight years. While many assumed that the war would be short, a stiff Ukrainian defense halted and then successfully counter-attacked against the Russian advances on Kyiv, Sumy, and Kharkiv. After capturing Kherson, Russia’s main advance from occupied Crimea in the south toward Mykolaiv also stalled. At the time of writing, Ukrainian forces are beginning a counterattack in that region and are located approximately 12 miles outside Kherson city center. Mariupol, on the Sea of Azov coastline, fell to the Russians on May 22 after Ukrainian forces made a heroic last stand in the Azovstal iron and steel works. This capture allowed Russia to create a land bridge from the Russian Federation to occupied Crimea. Mariupol’s capture also turned the Sea of Azov into a Russian lake.”1 In the Donbas, which is arguably Russia’s main effort at this stage of the war, Russian troops have made limited advances at a very high cost in equipment and manpower. In late June, Russian forces captured Sievierodonetsk after weeks of heavy fighting, leaving Russia in control of Ukraine’s Luhansk Oblast. Ukrainians are currently defending a front line that is approximately 1,250 miles long—this is equal to the straight- line distance from Washington, DC, to Houston, Texas. Russian public opinion still supports the war.”2 While Russia’s advancements in the Donbas have been slow and costly, there is no indication that Moscow will stop its offensive anytime soon. President Vladimir Putin knows that his legacy rides on Russia’s victory or defeat in Ukraine.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, National Security, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

84. Russia Can Still Be Defeated, But Time Is Short

Author:
Can Kasapoglu
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
At Davos last May, former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger sparked a controversy when he argued that Kyiv must cede territory to Moscow to achieve peace. Kissinger may well be correct to assert that a stable balance between Russia and Ukraine will require some trade-offs based on the principles of Realpolitik. But we should not delude ourselves into thinking that Putin—a former KGB officer who considers the collapse of the Soviet Union to have been the greatest catastrophe of the twentieth century—launched this war simply to secure a border readjustment. Putin’s essay, published in April 2021, expresses his view with admirable clarity: Ukraine, in the eyes of the Kremlin, is Russia. In sum, he launched this invasion to subordinate Ukraine to Moscow—totally and permanently. We should also not conclude that Russia’s battlefield setbacks have been so severe as to deflect Putin from his original goal. After he failed to subordinate Ukraine swiftly with a quick knockout blow directed at the capital, Kyiv, he moved to Plan B: a strategy of exhaustion. He is now determined to grind Ukraine down slowly and deliberately with the expectation that eventually it will have no choice but to bow to his iron fist. For its part, the West should thwart Putin’s strategy by safeguarding Ukraine’s political and economic independence. Kissinger’s comments did not bring us closer to achieving that goal. If members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) follow his lead and attempt to cajole Kyiv into ceding territory now, while Russia still believes it has the upper hand on the battlefield, their efforts will only whet Putin’s appetite for expansion. Putin will begin to entertain compromises acceptable to the West only when he comes to believe that failure to do so will lead inevitably to catastrophic losses for Russia. The bad news is that the military balance on the ground right now will not lead him to such a conclusion. If NATO members act quickly, however, there is still time to shift the dynamic in Ukraine’s favor—but it will not be easy.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, International Organization, National Security, Alliance, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

85. Six Months after the Russian Invasion, the West Needs Better Clock Management

Author:
Peter Rough, Luke Coffey, and Rebeccah L. Heinrichs
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Ukraine’s status as a borderland between Europe and Russia has often confined it to the periphery of Western strategic thought. For many, Ukraine constitutes the southeastern edge of the European continent, but not its heartland. For Russian President Vladimir Putin, however, Ukraine sits at the center of his strategic vision for Eurasia. Far from a backwater, the country is the key to his imperial aims—a prize for which he has risked his army and bet his rule. In Putin’s mind, if Russia were to control Ukraine, Moscow would dominate the Black Sea—and so would be in a stronger position in every connected region, from Eastern Europe to the South Caucasus and from the Balkans to the Caspian Basin. Russia would also complete its breakout into the Eastern Mediterranean, long a priority of Moscow, by securing the connection between its warm water ports in the Black Sea to its new bases on the Syrian coast.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, National Security, Armed Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

86. How to Strengthen US Deterrence and Weaken the Attempts of Rival Nuclear Coercion

Author:
Rebeccah L. Heinrichs
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
On February 24, 2022, Russia started the largest European war since 1945 as it intensified its invasion of Ukraine to a new level and threatened escalation to nuclear war. Though Vladimir Putin has not detonated a nuclear weapon, he used, and continues to use,1 his nuclear arsenal to threaten the United States and other NATO nations against continuing to support Ukraine’s defense. Through pre-invasion nuclear saber-rattling, verbally threatening to employ nuclear weapons on the battlefield,3 and putting such weapons on alert,4 Russia caused President Joe Biden and his administration to declare repeatedly their fears of “World War III”5 and to adopt a gradual, highly cautious approach to helping Ukraine. The White House has chosen to provide only weapons suitable for operations to allow Ukraine to achieve some tactical victories and prevent Russia from a quick and final victory,6 but this aid does not allow Ukraine to achieve and sustain the military victories necessary to win the war.7 Thus, Russia appears to have successfully used nuclear threats to deter the United States from certain actions that are on lower levels on the spectrum of escalation, enabling itself to control escalation8 to serve its aims. Russia’s explicit and implicit nuclear threats deterred US officials from providing Ukraine with real-time targeting data and heavy artillery early in the war9 and electronic warfare capabilities later in the war.10 The nuclear threats also caused US officials to press Ukraine not to hit Russian targets deep behind Russian lines.11Russian officials have ample grounds to conclude that their nuclear coercion has affected the course of the war in their favor.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, National Security, Deterrence, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, North America, and United States of America

87. NATO Needs a New Strategy for the Baltic Sea

Author:
Luke Coffey
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
With Sweden and Finland soon joining the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the alliance needs to act quickly to develop plans that acknowledge the new geopolitical reality in the Baltic Sea region. When Sweden and Finland become members, the alliance will need a comprehensive approach to security that considers the region as a whole—instead of dividing it into the traditional “Baltic” and “Nordic” camps. Since Peter the Great (1682–1725), Russia has had imperial designs on the region, and this is unlikely to change in the foreseeable future. Russia’s tactical-level defeats in eastern Ukraine should not inspire strategic complacency in NATO policymakers. They should view the entry of Sweden and Finland into NATO as the starting point, and not the finish line, for bolstering Baltic Sea security.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Imperialism, International Organization, and Alliance
Political Geography:
Russia, Finland, Sweden, and Baltic States

88. Ten Myths about US Aid to Ukraine

Author:
Luke Coffey
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Ukraine is in a national struggle that will determine its geopolitical future: the country will either be a firm member of the Euro-Atlantic community or become a Russian colony. The outcome of this struggle will have long-term implications for America’s global interests, the future of the transatlantic community, and the notion of national sovereignty in the twenty-first century. Russia is a top geopolitical adversary for the United States. For Americans who believe in strong and secure national borders, the primacy of national sovereignty, and the right to self-defense, support for Ukraine in the face of Russian aggression is natural. Considering America’s other geopolitical concerns, such as a rising China and a healthy economic relationship with Europe that benefits the American worker, US support for Ukraine is an imperative. Ukrainians are not asking for, nor do they want, US troops to help them fight Russia. All they ask for is the equipment, weapons, munitions, and financial resources required to give them a fighting chance. Providing Ukraine what it needs to fight Russia effectively will not be cheap. So far this year, the US Congress has voted on three different supplementals for Ukraine: $13.6 billion in March, $40.1 billion in May, and $12.4 billion in September. The cost that American taxpayers incur to help Ukraine is money well spent and will pale in comparison to the cost of deterring a victorious Russia or an emboldened China on the global stage. As the war continues, Congress will likely pass additional spending. It is in America’s interest that Ukraine wins the war, and that Russia is decisively defeated. Even though polling overwhelmingly shows broad and bipartisan support for Ukraine, some in Congress are against further US aid for Ukraine.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Spending, Military Aid, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, Eastern Europe, North America, and United States of America

89. Russia in the Arctic: Gauging How Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine Will Alter Regional Dynamics

Author:
Andrea Kendall-Taylor, Jim Townsend, Nicholas Lokker, Heli Hautala, and James Frey
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
Russia’s reinvasion of Ukraine in February 2022 is producing ripple effects that will reverberate far beyond Ukraine for years to come, affecting issue areas and regions where the United States and Europe must manage relations with Moscow. Such effects will certainly be felt in the Arctic (which for this study will be limited to the European Arctic or the “High North”). Already, Russia’s aggression in Ukraine has compelled Finland and Sweden to apply for NATO membership, altering the region’s security architecture. Amid the changes that are unfolding, it is critical that analysts and policymakers reexamine long-standing assessments and assumptions about Russia. To that end, this paper reexamines Russia’s approach to the Arctic in light of events in Ukraine. Given the high degree of uncertainty about the trajectory of the war in Ukraine and its effect on Russia, it is impossible to confidently project a single future for Russia’s Arctic policy. CNAS researchers, therefore, identified four drivers that are most likely to shape Russia’s approach to the Arctic: Russia’s perception of the Western threat, the impact of Western sanctions, China’s role in the Arctic, and whether Putin remains in power. Using different permutations of those drivers, the authors developed three scenarios for how the future Russian approach to the Arctic could evolve looking out to 2025.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Regional Politics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, Arctic, and United States of America

90. Assessing Russian State Capacity to Develop and Deploy Advanced Military Technology

Author:
Samuel Bendett, Richard Connolly, Jeffrey Edmonds, Andrea Kendall-Taylor, and Michael Kofman
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
Even before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, many analysts and policymakers viewed Russia as a declining power. This mindset, formed by the sharp juxtaposition between the seeming strength of the Soviet Union and the chaos and weakness of Russia in the 1990s, has been an enduring heuristic for how Russia today is understood. The country’s stagnant and resource-dependent economy, declining population, and substantial brain drain have fed a sense that Russia’s days as a global power are numbered. The war in Ukraine has only accelerated some of these trends, further reinforcing such views. The Russian military’s poor performance, the degradation of its forces, and the imposition of sanctions and export controls that will restrict Russia’s ability to regenerate its forces have already led some to dismiss the country as a Potemkin power and pronounce the end of its great power status.1 Russia undoubtedly will emerge from its war on Ukraine as a weaker power. But even during the post-Soviet period of sustained economic stagnation, brain drain, and demographic decline, the Russian state developed a new generation of hypersonic missiles, air and missile defenses, and nuclear weapons with novel means of propulsion. Russia has demonstrated that it is able not only to bring to fruition late-Soviet designs, but also to develop a follow-on generation of capabilities. Likewise, the Kremlin has continued to modernize and expand its nuclear capabilities. Despite economic constraints, the Kremlin prioritized the development of its strategic nuclear forces by investing significant resources into developing and deploying new nuclear warheads and launchers, upgrading all legs of the nuclear triad, completing work on a hypersonic glide vehicle, and building a new intercontinental, nuclear-armed, nuclear-powered undersea autonomous torpedo. Of course, Russia’s past performance was under a different set of conditions. Moving forward, as a result of its invasion of Ukraine, Russia will face new and more significant constraints on its ability to modernize its military. But it is too soon to count Russia out. Policymakers need a more nuanced assessment of the nature of the future Russian threat. This report provides such an assessment, focusing on Russia’s ability to develop and deploy its nuclear capabilities through 2030. To that end, this report first identifies Russia’s own stated goals and objectives for the development of its nuclear forces looking out to 2030. Because Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the resulting military degradation and economic sanctions and export controls introduce critical uncertainties about the Kremlin’s ability to execute these objectives, this report adopts a scenarios approach to forecasting Russia’s future nuclear capabilities. The report identifies two drivers that the authors view as most critical in shaping Russia’s ability to fulfill its stated objectives: the impact of Western sanctions on Russia’s government revenue and ability to access critical technology, and the extent of the degradation of the Russian military in Ukraine, which will force choices on the Kremlin about how to prioritize military expenditures. This report uses these two drivers to describe two scenarios that define the upper and lower boundaries of expectations for Russia’s nuclear capabilities, along with the implications of each of these scenarios for the United States and its allies. The scenarios, in other words, describe both a worst- and best-case state of affairs for Russia, and thus they help frame the problem for U.S. policymakers and planners. The report concludes with an assessment of key findings that emerge from the analysis and associated recommendations for the United States and Europe.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Science and Technology, Sanctions, Military, Russia-Ukraine War, and Policymaking
Political Geography:
Russia and Europe

91. Precision and Posture: Defense Spending Trends and the FY23 Budget Request

Author:
Stacie L. Pettyjohn and Hannah Dennis
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
This report examines the fiscal year (FY) 2023 defense budget request and assesses whether it sufficiently resources what was known of the Biden administration’s national defense strategy when the budget was released. Because of the delay of the full, unclassified version of the strategy, the analysis focuses on two factors—high-end munitions stockpiles and overseas posture—that past studies have indicated are critical for strengthening deterrence against China and Russia in the near term. This report concludes that while the FY23 request makes some strides on both issues, more must be done today to improve the United States’ chances of deterring and, if necessary, defeating the adversary tomorrow. The ongoing war in Ukraine has elevated the issue of munitions stockpiles to front-page news as both Ukrainian and Russian forces continue to consume high volumes of key weapons. We examine the sufficiency of existing critical conventional munitions stockpiles and the future procurement plans to meet the threats posed by China and Russia. We find that while the services have shifted to investing in longer-range weapons, they are still underinvesting in the specific capabilities, in particular anti-ship and area-effects weapons, that would be needed to counter China in a variety of scenarios. Moreover, the Department of Defense (DoD) is not buying enough of these weapons to blunt and defeat an initial invasion, and it certainly is not stockpiling enough precision-guided munitions (PGMs) for a protracted war.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Budget, Defense Spending, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, China, and United States of America

92. Supporting Russian Civil Society: A Report of the Transatlantic Forum on Russia

Author:
Andrea Kendall-Taylor and Maria Snegovaya
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
Since Russia re-invaded Ukraine on February 24, 2022, repression inside Russia has worsened. The trend toward greater repression predates Moscow’s unprovoked invasion. The Kremlin had already increased its crackdown on all facets of Russian civil society, including targeting journalists and political opposition and tightening the country’s information environment ahead of its parliamentary election in September 2021. Since the invasion, the Kremlin has intensified its repressive efforts to shut down the possibility of dissent and insulate its hold on power from any blowback from the war. Experience from authoritarian regimes like Putin’s Russia suggests that high levels of repression are here to stay as long as Putin remains in power—authoritarian regimes are unlikely to walk back repression for fear that doing so would indicate regime weakness and embolden activists who advocate for political change. Rising repression inside Russia created immediate risks to journalists, activists, and other Russians who support a freer and more democratic Russia (as well as to their families). In the longer term, it also creates a potential barrier to a less confrontational relationship with a post-Putin Russia. As repression has risen, the Kremlin has doubled down on anti–United States and anti-Western rhetoric and shut down opportunities for exchanges between Russian scientists and academics and their Western counterparts. The Kremlin’s propagation of anti-Western messages and the lack of exchange between Russians and the West—exacerbated by a loss of economic ties amid Western sanctions—engender mistrust and misunderstanding, creating a long-term barrier to a less confrontational relationship. Steps to deny Russian tourists visas and other forms of collective punishment, while understandable, have the potential to sour Russian attitudes toward the West, hurting the prospects for any future improvement in relations with a post-Putin Russia. This policy brief identifies how the United States and Europe together can continue to support Russian civil society despite the dismal state of relations with Russia. It outlines the state of play of the Kremlin’s crackdown on Russian civil society, U.S. and European responses to date, shared interests in coordinated support, and recommendations for what the transatlantic community can do to support Russian civil society in this new era of relations with Russia. Given the barriers to supporting activists inside Russia, this memo’s recommendations focus on assistance to those Russians who have left the country.
Topic:
Civil Society, Authoritarianism, Transatlantic Relations, Exile, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Eurasia, and United States of America

93. Long Shadows: Deterrence in a Multipolar Nuclear Age

Author:
Stacie L. Pettyjohn and Jennie Matuschak
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
This report examines the nuclear policies and postures of the United States and its three primary nuclear adversaries: China, Russia, and North Korea. It concludes that the world is entering a multipolar nuclear era, which is unprecedented, and far more complex and challenging than the Cold War. The current nuclear order has been gradually shifting over the past decade. Russia remains the United States’ only nuclear peer, but the arms control regime that constrained the superpowers’ nuclear arsenals is disintegrating. Relations between Washington and Moscow have worsened since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and Russian President Vladimir Putin’s nuclear saber-rattling. China’s nuclear arsenal is growing in size and sophistication, potentially enabling Beijing to launch conventional attacks behind its nuclear shield. This development will shape both competition among Beijing, Washington, and Moscow and potential future military confrontations. Similarly, North Korea has a small but expanding number of deployed nuclear weapons and is improving its missile technology. In this new nuclear environment, the United States must deter two nuclear-armed great powers as well as a regional nuclear power from launching conventional and nuclear attacks on itself and its allies. As the number of nuclear-armed states grow, interactions become more complex and the risks of miscalculation and misperception increase. The ramifications of this new reality are not well understood, aside from the implication that there is a growing risk that nuclear weapons might be used. The study’s findings have five primary implications for American policy and nuclear posture. To improve strategic stability and enhance deterrence, the United States should take several courses of action.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Deterrence, and Strategic Stability
Political Geography:
Russia, China, North Korea, and United States of America

94. Toward a New Transatlantic Approach to Russia Sanctions

Author:
Edward Fishman, Andrea Kendall-Taylor, and Angela Stent
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
This policy brief is a product of the Center for a New American Security Transatlantic Forum on Russia, an initiative designed to spur coordination between the United States and Europe on Russia-related policy across multiple issue areas. The policy briefs are informed by a series of dialogues with leading experts from both sides of the Atlantic. The analysis and recommendations in the memo reflect areas of agreement between U.S. and European experts. Where there are notable differences in perspective, we highlight those to better enable policymakers to navigate fissures that can hinder coordination. We thank all the experts who contributed to such fruitful dialogue, especially Nigel Gould-Davies, Brian O’Toole, and Maria Shagina. Introduction As Russia continues to build its forces on Ukraine’s border, the United States and its allies have laid out the economic costs that Russian President Vladimir Putin would face for any further aggression against Ukraine. The Biden administration has stated it is willing to pursue “economic measures that we've refrained from using in the past.”1 In addition, the United States has indicated it is prepared to use export controls on U.S.-origin technologies that are key to Russia’s industrial sectors and potentially enact a Russia-focused Foreign Direct Product Rule—a tool that, to date, has only been used against Huawei. It is unclear if such a package is enough to deter Putin, especially if he is intent on pursuing his maximalist objectives—autonomy for parts of eastern Ukraine that would give Russia a veto over Ukrainian foreign policy and closing NATO’s door to Ukraine. Nonetheless, implementing such sanctions if Putin further escalates in Ukraine is critical for raising the costs to Putin and for restricting Russia’s ability to sustain its aggressive foreign policy over the long term. Regardless of what happens in Ukraine, however, U.S.-Russia relations are on a new course. The era of working toward a stable and predictable relationship with Russia is over for now. The United States will need a new, more proactive approach—one in which sanctions will be a tool (among many) that Washington should use to deter future Russian attacks on liberal democracies and disrupt Russia’s destabilizing actions, especially the corrupt networks that Moscow uses to spread its influence and sustain its hold on power. This policy brief outlines the current state of play of U.S. and European sanctions policies on Russia and how the United States and Europe can update its sanctions approach in this new era of relations with Russia.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Sanctions, Crisis Management, Deterrence, and Transatlantic Relations
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and United States of America

95. A Modern Marshall Plan for Ukraine

Author:
Heather Conley
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
Can one of the most successful US foreign policy initiatives in the 20th century—the Marshall Plan—be replicated in the 21st century—a modern Marshall Plan for Ukraine? The unequivocal answer to this question is “yes,” but it is essential to draw upon historical and inspirational lessons from the Marshall Plan to ensure the reconstruction and long-term economic recovery of Ukraine succeeds.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Recovery, Post-Conflict, Russia-Ukraine War, Defense Cooperation, and Marshall Plan
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

96. Winter is Coming: The Baltics and The Russia-Ukraine War

Author:
Leon Hartwell, Agnė Rakštytė, Julia Ryng, and Ēriks Kristiāns Selga
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
LSE IDEAS
Abstract:
In this LSE IDEAS Special Report, the authors focus on the impact of the Russia-Ukraine war on the Baltics. The report highlights both collective and country-level impacts and responses to the conflict. It is argued that Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania have been among the top supporters of Ukraine, not merely in terms of military aid, but also with regards to providing substantial diplomatic and humanitarian support during Ukraine’s darkest hour since the breakup of the Soviet Union. Moreover, it is argued that this literal and metaphorical winter will be a key challenge, not only for Ukraine, but also for the Baltics. Given how closely the fate of Ukraine is intertwined with Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, the manner in which the Baltics and NATO respond to the winter could significantly influence the Russia-Ukraine war. A key strategic priority for the Baltics and NATO should be to promote resilience of everything from defense to energy security. Accordingly, the Report concludes with a variety of key policy recommendations aimed at the Baltics, EU and NATO.
Topic:
Security, NATO, European Union, Conflict, Resilience, Energy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, and Baltic States

97. Russia Futures: Three Trajectories

Author:
Cyrus Newlin and Andrew Lohsen
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
Beginning in 2018, the Europe, Russia, and Eurasia Program at CSIS initiated a research project to explore scenarios related to Russia’s future development and to consider the transatlantic implications of each scenario. The project, which was generously funded by the Norwegian Foreign Ministry, was intended to provide policymakers with an understanding of how Russia’s domestic political situation, economic outlook, military activities, and foreign policy might evolve in response to modern-day challenges including climate change, growing competition in the Arctic, and the fraught relationship between China and the collective West. Based on original research and workshops involving U.S., Norwegian, and European experts, CSIS identified three potential scenarios for Russia’s future development. The first scenario envisioned a path of continuity, in which Russian leaders strove to maintain the status quo. The second scenario foresaw a trend of risk reduction in the Kremlin’s decisionmaking that led to a partial normalization of relations with the West. The third scenario considered a darker future, in which Russian leaders accepted a higher degree of risk to manage mounting problems at home and abroad, leading to sustained confrontation with the West and the further detachment of the Russian government from its people. These scenarios were being prepared for publication when Russian president Vladimir Putin launched a renewed invasion of Ukraine on February 24 and ushered in a period of deep uncertainty for European and global affairs. Almost immediately, Russia’s act of aggression turned the country into a global pariah, triggering international sanctions far beyond the Kremlin’s expectations and consolidating transatlantic unity to an extent that was difficult to imagine in the tense months immediately preceding the invasion. As orthodoxies have been challenged and expectations reconsidered, contingencies that were thought impossible—from embargoes of Russian hydrocarbons to the potential use of nuclear weapons by the Kremlin—are starting to feature into conversations among policymakers and analysts.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Development, Economics, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
Russia and Europe

98. The Kremlin Playbook 3: Keeping the Faith

Author:
Heather A Conley and Donatienne Ruy
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
For six years, the Kremlin Playbook series has studied Russia’s malign influence efforts in Europe, primarily through the economic lens. This research showed the Kremlin has developed a pattern of malign economic influence in Europe through the cultivation of “an opaque network of patronage across the region that it uses to influence and direct decision-making.” The aim is to weaken democratic systems from within, using existing and creating new societal divides. But what if Russia, for its own malign purposes, were to seek to influence religious or traditional views? The Kremlin Playbook 3: Keeping the Faith aims to protect these beliefs by exposing how Russian malign influence works in this particularly challenging and very personal dimension—a new strategic seam—to ensure citizens do not unwittingly become part of an influence operation. The instrumentalization of values, traditions, and religious beliefs is a relatively recent and particularly pernicious front of the Kremlin’s influence efforts in Europe and elsewhere. This study investigates these dynamics in four case study countries: Bosnia and Herzegovina, France, Georgia, and Greece. This report explores how the United States and its European allies can protect the religious beliefs and values of their citizens from malign influence at a time when transatlantic societies are grappling with the speed of societal change. Societal anxiety and fear related to these rapid economic, demographic, and generational shifts—and the subsequent politics and political figures that seek to capitalize on them—have fueled societal divisions around the so-called cultural wars in Western societies. Through two main channels, the Orthodox world and the traditional values ecosystem, the Kremlin has taken advantage of these fears to accentuate societal wedges in Europe and Eurasia.
Topic:
Economics, Hegemony, Strategic Interests, and Influence
Political Geography:
Russia and Europe

99. Rewinding the Clock? US-Russia Relations in the Biden Era

Author:
Bobo Lo
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
The escalating crisis in Ukraine in the winter of 2021-2022 has returned US-Russia relations to center stage. Faced with the prospect of a new Russian military intervention, US President Joe Biden has re-engaged with Vladimir Putin in a manner reminiscent of the diplomacy of the superpower era. But this latest American attempt at accommodation raises more questions than answers. In the intervening three decades the world has changed out of all recognition, the international influence of the US-Russia relationship is much diminished, and their cooperation has sunk to historic lows. Can Washington and Moscow defy gravity and achieve some level of pragmatic engagement? There is good reason for skepticism. Neither side is truly invested in cooperation, but instrumentalizes it to other purposes. The Biden administration hopes to neutralize Russia in order to focus on the all-encompassing challenge of China. The Kremlin looks to undermine American influence as part of its project of promoting Russia as an independent global power. These goals are essentially irreconcilable. Looking ahead, the real question is not whether the United States and Russia can recalibrate their relationship to new “normal”, but whether they can avoid confrontation in an increasingly fluid and disorderly world.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Military Intervention, Vladimir Putin, and Joe Biden
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, North America, and United States of America

100. The Russian-Iran Partnership in a Multipolar World

Author:
Clément Therme
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
The strengthening of the partnership between Russia and Iran depends on overlapping security interests; bilaterally, regionally and on the world stage. Tehran has pursued a regional policy program that is largely in line with Russia’s interests, whether these relate to Syria (from 2011), the Caucasus, Central Asia, or Afghanistan (since 1991). This security dimension was already one of the foundations of the bilateral relationship in the post-Cold War-period. It has now appeared in regional dealings between Tehran and Moscow. In addition, the decline of US international predominance, which has been apparent since the 2000s, has allowed Russia and Iran to develop a shared ideological discourse in opposition to “Western values”. Beyond this shared ideological basis, Tehran has developed a true “Realpolitik” whereby it relies on Russian foreign policy to relieve US pressure on Iran that is aimed at regime change or, at the very least, a change in the behavior of the Islamic Republic. In other words, in seeking to preserve intact the main ideological tenets of its regime, Tehran has added a new dimension to its relationship with Moscow. Since 1991, this relationship has become a matter of survival for a regime that faces both popular opposition at home and external pressure from Washington: pressure that increased during the Trump administration of 2017-2021.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Partnerships, and Multipolarity
Political Geography:
Russia, Iran, and Middle East