Content Type: Special Report / Political Geography: North America / Publication Year: within 10 Years and within 5 Years / Topic: Foreign Policy

1. US Trade Policy Options for Pacific Islands States Require Washington’s Political Commitment

Author:: Marcus Noland
Publication Date:: 07-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: East-West Center
Abstract:: The Pacific Islands have emerged as a zone of contestation in the ongoing rivalry between China and the United States. While the US has long been the dominant military power in the region, China is raising its profile through activities like port visits, military exercises, and establishing diplomatic and security ties with regional states like Kiribati and the Solomon Islands. In 2018, Chinese leader Xi Jinping visited Papua New Guinea for the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit. President Biden was supposed to visit PNG in May 2023, in the first ever visit of a sitting US president to the Pacific Islands, but that trip was scuttled due to the debt ceiling fiasco in Washington. In the economics sphere, the US has attempted to counter China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) together with Japan and Australia through the Blue Dot Network and the Indo-Pacific Infrastructure Trilateral to promote high-quality, transparent, and sustainable infrastructure development. The region contains considerable natural resources, and the US has been working with Pacific Island nations to promote sustainable resource management, in contrast to China’s alleged illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing in the Pacific. What has been missing, however, is a trade policy component to the US strategy to counterbalance China’s exploration of a free trade agreement with the Pacific Islands Forum (PIF).
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Economics, Politics, and Trade Policy
Political Geography:: China, North America, United States of America, and Pacific Islands

2. Normalizing U.S.–Pakistan Relations

Author:: Adam Weinstein
Publication Date:: 08-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:: The U.S.–Pakistan relationship is often portrayed negatively among the lawmakers, media, and general public of both countries, with a focus on mutual resentment and dysfunction. The early relationship was burdened by mismatched expectations regarding support in conflicts with India. Different priorities from the start of U.S. involvement in Afghanistan during the 1980s further strained the relationship. The United States also sanctioned Pakistan and India for developing nuclear weapons, which had a disparate impact on Pakistan, causing ongoing tension. Many in Washington’s policy and journalistic communities hold negative views of Pakistan, viewing it as an enabler of terrorism that seeks geopolitical rents but rarely delivers. Pakistanis often resent what they view as Washington’s use of the country as a “frontline state” in both the Cold War and the War on Terror, claiming tens of thousands of lives, only to discard it later. These grievances are largely dismissed in Washington as self–inflicted. Despite the negative public debate, serving officials in both governments generally hold a more nuanced view, recognizing the broad overlapping interests shared by the United States and Pakistan in areas like climate change, trade, and counterterrorism. There is already an exhaustive literature on terrorism in Pakistan, nuclear security, and potential conflicts along the Line of Control with India. This brief will instead focus on revitalizing U.S.–Pakistan relations through innovative diplomacy in areas that have received less attention, such as trade, regional integration, people–to–people connections, and climate change. Its principal recommendation is that Washington should resist viewing Pakistan through the narrow lens of the “War on Terror” or great power competition. Instead it should pursue its interests through more normalized relations, while recognizing U.S. limitations in influencing events in Pakistan or the region.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Counter-terrorism, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: Pakistan, South Asia, North America, and United States of America

3. Less is More: A New Strategy for US Security Assistance to Africa

Author:: Elizabeth Shackelford, Ethan Kessler, and Emma Sanderson
Publication Date:: 08-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Chicago Council on Global Affairs
Abstract:: The US strategy toward Africa today is neither effective nor sustainable. It’s time to flip the script. US policy in Africa has for too long prioritized short-term security to the detriment of long-term stability by prioritizing the provision of military and security assistance. This is done in hopes that partner countries will use this capacity to suppress radical groups at home and reduce the likelihood that they will spread disorder in the region or create threats to US interests at home and abroad. Yet, this strategy has neither produced security in Africa nor reduced threats to the United States and its interests. Washington should rein in its use of security assistance with partners that fail to demonstrate commitment to the reforms necessary to build long-term stability. Partnerships and military assistance with illiberal, undemocratic countries have delivered little, if any, sustainable security improvements, and in many cases have prompted further instability and violence by building the capacity of abusive security forces. They have also provided harmful associations between the US government and the abuses committed by those we arm and assist. Since terrorism in Africa poses a low threat to US national security interests, there is no justification for focusing on short-term security issues at the cost of good governance, rule of law, and other factors that contribute to long-term stability. The costs of doing so are increasingly being recognized, with Congress today more likely to apply existing legal provisions to end security cooperation with abusive regimes. But these interventions typically come too late and are too inconsistent to influence behavior of illiberal regimes. A more systemic approach is needed to break the pattern of poor outcomes. The rise of great-power competition exacerbates the risk that the US national security establishment will double down on its security cooperation strategy in the region out of concern that doing otherwise would leave a vacuum that America’s competitors might fill. In reality, however, the argument for being more selective in distributing security assistance is even stronger with the return of great-power competition, as values and reputation become increasingly important in attracting support for the United States over other great powers. Security and military assistance will continue to play a role in the region. However, the United States would be better off being more deliberate and cautious, only pursuing it after completing a holistic assessment of the potential impact of such assistance on governance, human rights, and broader stability. Security assistance can and must be more closely scrutinized with enhanced US government oversight tools to ensure it does not undermine governance and stability, and Washington should be more willing to choose different tools when shaping relationships with weak partners, to condition assistance to ensure it does not facilitate bad outcomes, and to cut it off when partner countries use it to abuse civilians.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Strategic Competition, and Military Aid
Political Geography:: Africa, North America, and United States of America

4. The Quad's Next Chapter

Author:: Karl Friedhoff
Publication Date:: 09-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Chicago Council on Global Affairs
Abstract:: Advancing the group's pillars of prosperity and development will be at the very heart of competition with China in the coming decade. The Quad—the country grouping including the United States, Japan, Australia, and India—now stands at a crossroads as it enters its third phase. The Quad 3.0 comes as the grouping has established the dialogue as a meeting place for leaders of the four countries but must now decide what shape competition with China will take and how to best address that competition. Thus far the Quad has struggled to find function for its form. Statements issued by Quad leaders stress the importance of “development, stability, and prosperity” in an effort to roll back China’s influence across the Indo-Pacific. However, its most high-profile activities focus on stability via high-profile military exercises. Closer internal coordination along the security axis serves to highlight the lack of visible progress on the external delivery of development and prosperity to countries outside the Quad. Efforts to deliver development and prosperity are hemmed in by the Quad itself. Neither the United States or India are party to either of the major regional trade agreements—the CPTPP and RCEP. The Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF), held up by the Biden administration as America’s economic engagement with Asia, remains a mirage. Meanwhile, as the United States de-risks its economic relationship with China, it is effectively warning that doing business with Beijing may come at a cost to relations with Washington—an unpopular message across much of the Indo-Pacific. Additionally, any hint of security cooperation with China by smaller countries in the region creates a flurry of diplomatic reaction from the United States. To move forward, the Quad needs to better balance its portfolio and how it messages that portfolio. The overt promotion of the security agenda is actively undermining perceptions of the Quad’s ability to engage on development and prosperity. A first corrective step is to balance the group’s internal goal of improved security coordination and cohesion with the Quad’s external goal of delivering development and prosperity to countries in the region. Committing to an agenda that brings the people of the region, not its seas, to the fore of the Quad mission should be a top priority. This means rejecting the dogma that every China initiative in the region needs a Quad alternative. Instead, advancing Quad goals requires identifying China’s activities that can be co-opted for Quad purposes. This will mean working around, and sometimes with, China’s initiatives to better serve not only the Quad’s goals in prosperity and development but also the people of the region.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Development, Geopolitics, Trade, Strategic Competition, and Quad Alliance
Political Geography:: Japan, China, South Asia, India, East Asia, Australia, North America, United States of America, and Oceania

5. Turkey’s New Foreign Policy: Ankara’s Ambitions, Regional Responses, and Implications for the United States

Author:: Aaron Stein
Publication Date:: 02-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:: For the past century, Turkey’s foreign policy has been driven by the need to preserve the achievements of the Lausanne Treaty in the face of often serious threats from major powers. As a result, Turkey was a predominantly status quo country, and its relations with neighboring states were largely shaped by its place in broader geopolitical struggles. With the end of the Cold War, however, and the subsequent growth of Turkey’s economic, military and diplomatic strength, this has changed. Turkish foreign policy has begun to focus on reshaping the regional order in accordance with its growing desire for influence. Going forward, the nature of Ankara’s efforts, and the response they provoke from Turkey’s neighbors, will be an increasingly crucial factor in determining Turkey’s relations with the United States and Europe. Turkey’s new dynamics will remain a source of tension under any future Turkish government, but they need not, if managed well by all sides, lead to a lasting rift between Turkey and the West. The more deeply embroiled Turkey becomes in disputes with key US allies from Western Europe to the Persian Gulf, the more difficult it will be for Washington and Ankara to have a cooperative, mutually beneficial relationship. And the more Turkey views itself as a revisionist power, the more it will come into conflict with America’s allies. As a result, it is more important than ever for US policymakers to understand the historic trajectory of Turkey’s place in its region. Turkey emerged from the collapse of the Ottoman Empire as a status quo power, an orientation that it maintained for the better part of the last hundred years. Though the new country had been shorn of its former territories in Southeastern Europe and the Middle East, it had also forcefully defeated foreign efforts to occupy the territory of Anatolia itself. For modern Turkey’s founders, the success in avoiding complete colonization far outweighed the failure to preserve the full geographic scope of the Ottoman Empire. As a result, they forged a pragmatic foreign policy tradition that prioritized preserving their achievement: a Turkish state sovereign and secure within its current borders. This goal remained constant over a long and turbulent 20th century, even as its implications changed, and allowed for Ankara to be flexible about which countries to work with to maximize its self-declared interests. In the inter-war period, when threats came largely from powerful European empires like France, Italy, and Britain, the defense of Turkish sovereignty called for a policy of neutrality and non-alignment. In the immediate aftermath of World War II, however, Turkey’s geopolitical position changed dramatically. Suddenly, the Soviet Union emerged as the most direct and dangerous threat to Turkey’s territorial integrity. In this new strategic context, seeking the support of the United States and NATO became the only feasible way to preserve the imperiled status quo, equip the country’s armed forces, and ultimately defend its borders. The result was a strong and mutually beneficial alliance with the United States and much of Europe. The success of this alliance, however, sometimes obscured the complex, constantly evolving and often paradoxical relationship between Turkey’s status quo orientation and its historically-grounded relationships with regional states. The circumstances surrounding the collapse of the Ottoman Empire created a bitter legacy, giving almost all of Turkey’s neighbors both emotional and practical reasons to feel hostility towards it. With other countries that shared a commitment to the status quo, however, Ankara had equally good reason to overcome this animosity. For countries that found themselves on the wrong side of Turkey’s geopolitical alignment, by contrast, these resentments and unresolved problems were consistently exacerbated. The history of Turkey’s regional relationships can be read through the ever-shifting dynamics of power politics and unsettled history. In the case of Greece, for example, Ankara and Athens began an ambitious rapprochement in the 1930s when they both felt their security was threatened by Italian irredentism in the Eastern Mediterranean. When this shared threat was supplanted by the Soviet Union, the two countries were brought into an even closer alignment under the NATO umbrella. Soon though, the growing rebellion against British rule on Cyprus rendered the status quo unsustainable, leaving Athens and Ankara with radically divergent views on what should come next. Only in this context were a number of longstanding questions re-opened, such as maritime borders and the status of historic minorities in both countries. Crucially, even as tensions over Cyprus worsened, both sides still had Washington to help remind them of their shared security interests. Throughout the Cold War, the United States was in a position to manage Turkish-Greek tensions in order to pre-empt the risk of an intra-NATO war between two allies that would benefit the Soviets. In other words, by acting as a forceful advocate for the status quo, Washington helped ensure that both Greece and Turkey maintained their shared commitment to it. With the end of the Cold War and the rise of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s Justice and Development Party, Turkey embraced not just a new foreign policy but a new foreign policy orientation. Ankara is no longer interested in maintaining the status quo—it now wants to transform it. Just as Turkey’s status quo orientation led to different policies as circumstances change, Turkey’s new anti-status quo orientation has also led Erdoğan’s government to pursue different strategies. But to make sense of these shifts, and the reaction they have provoked in the region, it is crucial to appreciate that, no less than in the previous century, Turkey’s neighbors have responded in light of their history but also, more importantly, their own orientation toward the regional status quo.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, NATO, AKP, and Regional Power
Political Geography:: Turkey, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

6. Fighting into the Bastions: Getting Noisier to Sustain the US Undersea Advantage

Author:: Bryan Clark and Timothy A. Walton
Publication Date:: 06-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Hudson Institute
Abstract:: Airpower enthusiasts concluded after World War I that “the bomber will always get through.”1 Fast, high-flying aircraft seemed to hold a decisive edge over air defenses and offered commanders the assurance they could attack targets deep inside an opponent’s territory. But airpower advocates’ spirits were quickly dampened during World War II by the advent of interceptor fighters, radar-guided artillery, and electromagnetic warfare (EW), which together demonstrated that bombers could be stopped—often with devastating results. Air forces adapted, adding escort fighters, radar jammers and decoys, and higher-altitude bombers to sustain their ability to strike behind enemy lines. During the Cold War, this move-countermove competition continued. New surface- and air-launched missiles targeted bombers, and countries developed specialized aircraft and weapons to suppress and destroy enemy air defenses or use stealth to avoid detection and targeting altogether. Today, the US submarine force faces a similar challenge. The US fleet of nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs) has long been considered an asymmetric advantage against potential adversaries like the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Russia, which lacked robust and effective anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capabilities. Relying on this advantage, the US Department of Defense (DoD) has increasingly relied on SSNs to compensate for the impact of improved air defenses on the ability of bombers and strike fighters to execute attacks.2 However, the unfailing ability of US SSNs to reach their targets is eroding as emerging technologies and weapons proliferation combine in new approaches to ASW that could neutralize America’s undersea advantage. During the last decade, the PRC and Russian Federation began fortifying their undersea defenses in the South and East China Seas and Arctic Ocean, respectively. Leveraging geographic constraints, US adversaries have instrumented these bastions with networks of fixed and mobile acoustic and non-acoustic sensors, complemented by aircraft and ships capable of pouncing on contacts or deploying dense mine barriers.3 Improved adversary defenses could degrade or defeat US undersea operations, preventing US submarines from conducting critical missions such as sinking a Chinese invasion fleet or tracking Russian ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs). To sustain its offensive undersea advantage, the US Navy will need to take some lessons from air warfare and begin supporting submarines with systems designed to suppress or destroy enemy undersea defenses. This imperative will fundamentally shift the paradigm for US submarine operations from “alone and unafraid” to “it’s all about team.” Moreover, the emergence of new generations of capable long-range active sonars will demand that the US undersea force increasingly rely on jamming and deception to counter enemy sensors, much as their counterparts already do above the water. The US submarine force will need to learn how to use noise, rather than avoid it. The Navy should pursue four lines of effort, outlined below, to sustain its offensive undersea advantage. Except for features to be incorporated into the next-generation nuclear-powered attack submarine, the SSN(X), the concepts and capabilities proposed in this report leverage mature or maturing technologies and can be fielded within five years. Implementing these recommendations will require the US Navy to refine its use cases for offensive undersea warfare to use available uncrewed vehicle technologies, rather than continue pursuing purpose-built systems that may take a decade or more to be fielded.4
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, National Security, Armed Forces, Navy, and Maritime
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

7. From Fueling Victory to Running on Empty: Lessons from American Energy Policy in War and Peace

Author:: Arthur Herman
Publication Date:: 09-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Hudson Institute
Abstract:: The purpose of this study is to draw important lessons from how the United States has handled its national energy policy in the past in order to guide policymakers and industry leaders in the future. In the end, this is a study in contrasts. In the case of World War II, the federal government successfully used America’s energy independence and abundance to help Great Britain survive the Nazi onslaught and then to win a two-front world war, the greatest victory in history. In the case of the 1970s, the United States became dependent on others, specifically the Middle East, for its energy prosperity. As a result, America lost control over not only its ability to conduct foreign policy but also its economy. Construction of the Big Inch oil pipelines, the most extensive government energy project ever created, epitomized America’s successful national energy strategy in World War II. This project enabled the United States to literally fuel victory over the Axis. The Arab oil embargo of 1973 and the dramatic rise in the price of oil imposed by the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) severely damaged the US economy, set back global growth for nearly a generation, and symbolized the failure of America’s energy strategy in that decade. The end of this study will summarize the key lessons from these two contrasting approaches to a national energy strategy. However, two stand out: Energy independence—and having access to cheap, abundant energy—is an essential prerequisite for American national and economic security. A national energy strategy that relies on the expertise of leading energy executives and engineers in the private sector will tend to be successful; one that ignores their advice and assistance will tend to fail. Whether America will enjoy energy security as it faces the challenges of the twenty-first century will depend on many factors. But drawing the right lessons from these two contrasting historical eras can prepare the way for a new era of energy abundance and national power.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, History, and Energy
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

8. Enemies Foreign and Domestic: Confronting Kleptocrats at Home and Abroad

Author:: Kelly M. McFarland
Publication Date:: 01-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University
Abstract:: As Putin and his kleptocratic regime of oligarchs wage a devastating war in Ukraine, the costs of corruption have never been so starkly visible. Beyond Russia, recent examples of corruption in China, Afghanistan, the Northern Triangle, the Solomon Islands, and elsewhere, prove that rampant corruption poses a significant threat to aspirations for a greener, healthier, more peaceful, and more democratic world. Countries such as Russia and China have elevated their brand of corruption into a distinct and powerful aspect of their foreign policy. They employ this strategic corruption abroad to stunt economic growth; prop-up fellow authoritarian regimes; exacerbate social inequality; erase political trust; accelerate pandemics and degrade healthcare systems; exploit the environment; and propel state oppression. As U.S. policymakers seek to counter this strategic corruption, they must first recognize the extent to which domestic laws and actors within the United States enable this corruption to fester. In the fall of 2021 and spring of 2022, ISD convened a series of New Global Commons working group meetings with participants drawn from academia, think tanks, government, international organizations, non-governmental organizations, and the private sector. The group crafted workable definitions of corruption, evaluated the unique political and related threats posed by corruption and kleptocracy, assessed Russia and China’s use of strategic corruption, and developed principles and recommendations for government and non-government entities to build a global, sustained, anti-corruption response.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Corruption, Diplomacy, Authoritarianism, and Kleptocracy
Political Geography:: Russia, China, North America, and United States of America

9. The Berlin Pulse 2023/24 (full issue)

Author:: Julia Ganter, Steffen Müller, Sarah Pagung, Norbert Röttgen, and Lila Roldán Vázquez
Publication Date:: 11-2023
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Körber-Stiftung
Abstract:: What do Germans und US citizens think about the most pressing foreign policy issues? Here are the highlights of this year’s public opinion survey, addressing Germany’s international role, biggest challenges and most important partners. A majority (57 per cent) of Germans believe that Germany’s international influence has declined over the past two years, despite Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s proclaimed Zeitenwende. As a result, only 38 per cent of respondents would like to see Germany become more engaged in international crises. This is the lowest figure since the start of the survey in 2016. 76 per cent believe that this involvement should preferably be of a diplomatic nature, compared to 65 per cent last year. 71 per cent of respondents are against Germany taking a leading military role in Europe.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Public Opinion, Military Spending, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Europe, Germany, North America, and United States of America

10. 'Win Without Fighting': The Chinese Communist Party's Political and Institutional Warfare Against the West

Author:: John Lee and Lavina Lee
Publication Date:: 05-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Hudson Institute
Abstract:: When compared to Western forms of diplomatic conversation and strategic discussion, phrases emanating from Beijing and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) can appear peculiar, platitudinous, and so ambiguous as to be devoid of practical content. China’s paramount leader Xi Jinping speaks frequently about a ‘community of shared future,’ a ‘common destiny for mankind’ as part of his ‘China dream,’ or of his country’s ‘rejuvenation.’ He promises to pursue and achieve a ‘new type of great-power relations’ with the United States that will ‘expand the converging interests of all and build a big global family of harmony and cooperation.’ Yielding to the temptation to dismiss these phrases as glib and meaningless or as empty promises to the world would be a serious mistake. Emerging as the victorious side after the world was reshaped in the aftermath of the Second World War, and, more recently, the formal end of the Cold War, the United States and its allies have generally enjoyed dominance in all forms of power. The challenge and threat of China is largely understood in the context of its increase in material power, which is relatively easy to understand and quantify. In contrast, far less attention is being paid to non-material power, which is, admittedly, more nebulous and difficult to assess. However, China’s focus has been on relentlessly building its ‘comprehensive national power’ (CNP), that is, the sum-total of its powers and strengths—economic, military affair, science and technology, education, and resource—and influence. Thus, CNP encompasses both material and non-material power, and China’s buildup of both of these forms of power best explains its strategic and diplomatic successes. Chinese ‘rejuvenation’ is also not just about building GDP or having the world’s largest naval fleet. Rather, the CCP’s vision of a ‘community of shared future for mankind’ is very much about displacing the dominance enjoyed by the US and other advanced democracies in shaping global discourse and conversations, norms and standards, and influence within and through institutions. The advanced democracies have taken these less obvious forms of power for granted, a complacency that Beijing has exploited. As the CCP recognizes, “In the final analysis, the rise of a great power is a cultural phenomenon. It (that power) must be accepted by the international community. Be accommodated by the international system, rely on the international system, and be recognised by international norms.” To be sure, there is a rich and growing literature on the CCP’s various information, influence, and institutional resources and activities, and this report does not seek to reproduce the excellent work already in the public domain. Rather, it begins from the uncomfortable but growing realization that the CCP believes it has long been at war with the US and its allies, even though kinetic force has been used in only a few instances. It looks at why this war is being waged, what the hallmarks of success for Beijing look like, and how the use of non-material strategies in the form of political and institutional warfare complements and augments China’s better known material approaches in the CCP’s determined attempts to win this ongoing war or struggle. The report seeks to emphasize that, in understanding the challenge and threat of China, political and institutional warfare should not be treated as optional or interesting adjuncts to traditional notions of warfare or that their effects are peripheral to core strategic and even military objectives. On the contrary, non-material approaches are essential to the Chinese strategy and have real-world outcomes that are often the same ones that the use of force or economic coercion is intended to achieve. Just as the CCP views comprehensive power as encompassing material and non-material elements, its notion of waging and winning a war may or may not include a military element. We need to do the same when countering, deterring, and, if necessary, defeating Chinese strategies and actions. Moreover, the CCP’s approach is not just about putting its views forward in overt or veiled ways in the hope that it will change our minds about various issues. Instead, Beijing’s strategy is much more proactive and profound than that. The CCP’s political and institutional approaches are about fundamentally changing and shaping even the way we begin to think about or analyze an issue or what we perceive to be its ‘first principles.’ It is designed to shape the way we talk (or do not talk) about an issue, the presumptive and analytical frameworks we employ to do so, and the discourse regarding it that is accepted and deemed acceptable. At first glance, such a deeply cognitive approach might seem fanciful and impossible to implement. However, this report offers two recent case studies of instances where the CCP enjoyed considerable success in melding the material and the cognitive—with tangible and real-world results. This report then offers a summary of the real-world strategic effects and their impacts on the tactical decision-making of countries and their elites that should concern those in charge of our political, economic, military, and diplomatic policies and activities. In conclusion, it suggests some general responses to the CCP’s strategy, approach, and actions in these contexts.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Politics, Economy, Institutions, Strategic Competition, and Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

11. Can the U.S. Regain Battlefield Superiority against China? Applying New Metrics to Build an Adaptable and Resilient Military

Author:: Bryan Clark, Dan Patt, and Timothy A. Walton
Publication Date:: 01-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Hudson Institute
Abstract:: Organizational behavior is driven by metrics and measurements, which can compel change more effectively than a flurry of management directives from the C-suite. With Pentagon leaders calling for new ways of building and fighting the force, the time has come to re-examine some of the US military’s fundamental metrics and assess how they could better incentivize the characteristics needed for future combat.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, National Security, Armed Forces, and Artificial Intelligence
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

12. Understanding and Countering China's Approach to Economic Decoupling from the United States

Author:: John Lee
Publication Date:: 08-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Hudson Institute
Abstract:: Many experts have highlighted American efforts to partially decouple from China. Yet China began pursuing a far more ambitious and comprehensive decoupling strategy vis-à-vis the United States long before Donald Trump entered the White House. This monograph examines China’s evolving approach to economic decoupling from the US. It makes the following arguments and conclusions. First, on the back of a preexisting mercantilist political economic structure, China has been explicitly pursuing economic decoupling from US and allied economies on Chinese terms for at least a decade. Second, while the US seeks to decouple some aspects of its economic activity from China, the latter seeks to dominate vast segments of the Asian economy and to decouple these segments from the US. This is the Chinese strategy and threat that the US vastly underappreciates. Third, the most important segments are the high-tech and high-value sectors. These sectors are where competition is the most consequential and where decoupling on US terms needs to occur. Fourth, China faces increasingly serious problems and obstacles regarding its decoupling strategy. Many of these arise out of structural weaknesses inherent in its political economy. The monograph is written to assist the Biden administration and those who follow it to possess a deeper understanding of: China’s actions and the motives behind them; China’s strengths, weaknesses, and vulnerabilities; and How the US and its allies can craft an evolving approach that better plays to their individual and collective strengths and advantages. China hopes the US and its allies will adopt a cautious, gradualist, and ineffective approach to countering Beijing’s strategy and objectives. The Chinese Communist Party knows the US and other advanced economies still have immense advantages despite clever Chinese messaging to the contrary. The US and its allies continue to enjoy considerable leverage and remain well placed to partially decouple from China on their preferred terms, but they need to act quickly, collectively, and decisively.
Topic:: International Relations, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Economics, and National Security
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

13. France Should Embrace the Transatlantic Relationship—and Help Lead It

Author:: Angélique Talmor
Publication Date:: 09-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Hudson Institute
Abstract:: French President Emmanuel Macron’s assertion three years ago that the transatlantic alliance was “braindead” rings as utterly misguided today.1 The resurgence of war in Europe has reinforced NATO’s raison d’être and forced Europeans to face the fact that there is no realistic alternative to transatlantic cooperation. Further, more European policy leaders recognize China’s increasing threat,2 which bolsters the case for Western “friend shoring” on defense and other issues. This process will require leadership on both sides of the Atlantic. France, the largest military power in the European Union and the second-largest EU economy, is more reluctant to embrace Atlanticism than most of its NATO counterparts. This hesitance risks limiting the success and scope of efforts to reinforce transatlantic cooperation. Nonetheless, in the evolving geopolitical context, France’s best shot at preserving its interests and influence would be through embracing Atlanticism and helping lead the reinforcement of transatlantic cooperation in the realm of defense and beyond. American policymakers should encourage and extend a hand to their oldest ally to embrace such a shift.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Politics, European Union, and Transatlantic Relations
Political Geography:: Europe, France, North America, and United States of America

14. US Has an Opportunity to Support the National Resistance Front of Afghanistan

Author:: Luke Coffey
Publication Date:: 09-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Hudson Institute
Abstract:: Just over one year ago, the Taliban swept back into power in Afghanistan. Leading up to this takeover, in February 2020 President Donald Trump agreed to a deal with the Taliban that would have seen the phased withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan by May 2021. This agreement served as the starting point that eventually led to the Afghan government’s collapse and the Taliban’s return to power. In January 2021, President Joe Biden entered office. Instead of canceling the flawed agreement with the Taliban—something that was in his power to do—he merely delayed America’s withdrawal date from May to September. By July, almost all US and international forces had left. On August 15, the Taliban took Kabul. By the twentieth anniversary of the 9/11 attacks on September 11, 2021, the Taliban controlled more of Afghanistan than it did on September 11, 2001. Since the Taliban’s return to power, one credible and non-extremist group has been willing to take up arms in opposition: the National Resistance Front (NRF) of Afghanistan. Based in the Panjshir Province and operating in a dozen other provinces, the NRF has continued the fight against the Taliban against all odds and without any international support. While the US does not have many good policy options in Afghanistan because of the Biden administration’s actions, the US and international community need to consider how to support the NRF at this perilous time. This assistance can include establishing formal contact with the NRF leadership and inviting Ahmad Massoud to Washington, DC; refusing to recognize the Taliban as the legitimate government of Afghanistan; providing the NRF with winter gear; allocating a certain percentage of all frozen Afghan central bank funds to the NRF’s political wing, and consulting and coordinating privately with Tajikistan, which harbors sympathies for the ethnic Tajik minority that comprises much of the NRF.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Non State Actors, Armed Forces, and Taliban
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, South Asia, North America, and United States of America

15. How to Strengthen US Deterrence and Weaken the Attempts of Rival Nuclear Coercion

Author:: Rebeccah L. Heinrichs
Publication Date:: 09-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Hudson Institute
Abstract:: On February 24, 2022, Russia started the largest European war since 1945 as it intensified its invasion of Ukraine to a new level and threatened escalation to nuclear war. Though Vladimir Putin has not detonated a nuclear weapon, he used, and continues to use,1 his nuclear arsenal to threaten the United States and other NATO nations against continuing to support Ukraine’s defense. Through pre-invasion nuclear saber-rattling, verbally threatening to employ nuclear weapons on the battlefield,3 and putting such weapons on alert,4 Russia caused President Joe Biden and his administration to declare repeatedly their fears of “World War III”5 and to adopt a gradual, highly cautious approach to helping Ukraine. The White House has chosen to provide only weapons suitable for operations to allow Ukraine to achieve some tactical victories and prevent Russia from a quick and final victory,6 but this aid does not allow Ukraine to achieve and sustain the military victories necessary to win the war.7 Thus, Russia appears to have successfully used nuclear threats to deter the United States from certain actions that are on lower levels on the spectrum of escalation, enabling itself to control escalation8 to serve its aims. Russia’s explicit and implicit nuclear threats deterred US officials from providing Ukraine with real-time targeting data and heavy artillery early in the war9 and electronic warfare capabilities later in the war.10 The nuclear threats also caused US officials to press Ukraine not to hit Russian targets deep behind Russian lines.11Russian officials have ample grounds to conclude that their nuclear coercion has affected the course of the war in their favor.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, National Security, Deterrence, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Ukraine, North America, and United States of America

16. An Assessment of US and Allied Information and Influence Warfare

Author:: John Lee
Publication Date:: 10-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Hudson Institute
Abstract:: The first two policy memos in this series on Chinese information and influence warfare pointed out that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) believes it is engaged in a perpetual “struggle” against the West and makes no fundamental distinction between wartime and peacetime. These reports also explained that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) plays a central and often dominant role in leading doctrine and operations when it comes to informational and influence warfare. Additionally, the previous memos argued that Asia and the Pacific are both the primary and most suitable subregions for the conduct of such Chinese activities. For the CCP and PLA, the region has unique material, geographical, ideational, and cultural characteristics that render it especially suitable for Beijing to successfully wage political warfare. Previous memos focused on the PLA’s Three Warfares framework, which consists of public opinion, psychological, and legal warfare. The Chinese intent is not merely to disrupt, confuse, or create mischief but to craft and control grand narratives. Doing so is extremely effective because these narratives determine how we reflexively interpret information and situations, what seems possible or not, what seems prudent rather than reckless, and what appears to be rational and in one’s long-term interest. Grand narratives determine how we think about a problem, issue, or development. In doing so, they predetermine the range of “reasonable” options and solutions that we believe are available. The previous memos also offered analysis and examples of how the CCP and PLA are using political warfare to achieve strategic objectives and to undermine the interests of the United States and its allies. Ominously, and in important respects, Beijing is not just “winning without fighting” but taking the more insidious approach of achieving strategic goals without victory.1 This third memo in the series examines US and allied information and influence doctrine and operations, especially by the defense establishments. In these democracies, the government has largely allowed the defense establishments to lead doctrine and capability for the information and influence elements of political warfare. The paper looks at the strengths and shortcomings of how the US and others conceive of information and influence warfare as it relates to responding to Chinese efforts in the region, as detailed in the first two memos. In doing so, it prepares the way for the fourth and final memo, which will look at specific policies and activities that the US and its allies could engage in to advance its interests and values and to counter some of the more damaging and insidious elements of Chinese political warfare in the region. The memo focuses on the US and, to a lesser extent, Australia because these Five Eyes countries are the most active and invested in understanding and countering Chinese information and influencing warfare efforts in the region. It is important to remember that such warfare is different in nature, purpose, and implementation from the usual diplomatic and soft-power efforts undertaken by democracies. The first memo argues as follows: Engaging in information and influence operations (or countering those by other countries) is a whole-of-government enterprise. [But it is] very different from the usual public messaging and soft power efforts led by diplomats and embassies. Engagement in this kind of political warfare is far more akin to missions undertaken by defense forces in that there must be specific objectives, tactics designed based on the objectives and resources available, and quick implementation by ready and well-resourced teams formed specifically for these tasks—even if this type of warfare is relentless and a protracted struggle.2
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, National Security, and Information Warfare
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

17. Ten Myths about US Aid to Ukraine

Author:: Luke Coffey
Publication Date:: 10-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Hudson Institute
Abstract:: Ukraine is in a national struggle that will determine its geopolitical future: the country will either be a firm member of the Euro-Atlantic community or become a Russian colony. The outcome of this struggle will have long-term implications for America’s global interests, the future of the transatlantic community, and the notion of national sovereignty in the twenty-first century. Russia is a top geopolitical adversary for the United States. For Americans who believe in strong and secure national borders, the primacy of national sovereignty, and the right to self-defense, support for Ukraine in the face of Russian aggression is natural. Considering America’s other geopolitical concerns, such as a rising China and a healthy economic relationship with Europe that benefits the American worker, US support for Ukraine is an imperative. Ukrainians are not asking for, nor do they want, US troops to help them fight Russia. All they ask for is the equipment, weapons, munitions, and financial resources required to give them a fighting chance. Providing Ukraine what it needs to fight Russia effectively will not be cheap. So far this year, the US Congress has voted on three different supplementals for Ukraine: $13.6 billion in March, $40.1 billion in May, and $12.4 billion in September. The cost that American taxpayers incur to help Ukraine is money well spent and will pale in comparison to the cost of deterring a victorious Russia or an emboldened China on the global stage. As the war continues, Congress will likely pass additional spending. It is in America’s interest that Ukraine wins the war, and that Russia is decisively defeated. Even though polling overwhelmingly shows broad and bipartisan support for Ukraine, some in Congress are against further US aid for Ukraine.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Defense Spending, Military Aid, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Ukraine, Eastern Europe, North America, and United States of America

18. US Reengagement with Pakistan: Ideas for Reviving an Important Relationship

Author:: Husain Haqqani
Publication Date:: 11-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Hudson Institute
Abstract:: The US-Pakistan relationship has gone through many changes. The relationship had a high point when President Dwight Eisenhower described Pakistan as the ‘‘most allied ally of the United States,” and another high point occurred when President Ronald Reagan said that “the American people support close ties with Pakistan and look forward to expanding them.” The relationship has also had low points, such as when in January 2018 President Donald Trump said, “The United States has foolishly given Pakistan more than $33 billion in aid over the last 15 years, and they have given us nothing but lies and deceit, thinking of our leaders as fools. They give safe haven to the terrorists we hunt in Afghanistan, with little help. No more!” US administrations going back to President Eisenhower have pinned great hopes on their alliance with Pakistan only to be disappointed and frustrated. For policymakers in both countries, some of the most important recent issues have been Pakistan’s poorly veiled support for the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan, its backing for jihadi groups targeting Kashmir, its close embrace of China, and its expanding nuclear arsenal. Successive American administrations have assumed that with the right kind of incentives—economic and military—Pakistan would finally change how its policy diverges from US interests. However, neither the award of military and civilian aid nor the cutoff of aid has been able to change Pakistan’s existing national security paradigm and the policies framed by its security establishment. Pakistan, for its part, has been upset as it believes it has offered a fair exchange to the US for its aid by abetting US strategic plans: containment of communism in the 1950s and 1960s, military assistance against the Soviets in Afghanistan in the 1980s, and post-2001 logistical and political support for the American military mission. Pakistan complains that Washington does not respect its contribution or fully appreciate its security threats, regional concerns, and aspirations.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Economics, Bilateral Relations, and Strategic Engagement
Political Geography:: Pakistan, South Asia, North America, and United States of America

19. Revitalizing the U.S.-Philippines Alliance to Address Strategic Competition in the Indo-Pacific

Author:: Lisa Curtis, Joshua Fitt, and Zachary Durkee
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:: The purpose of this report is to assess the current state of the relationship and provide recommendations for revitalizing and expanding bilateral ties following a six-year period marked by turbulence and volatility. While Duterte has tested the flexibility of the alliance with his controversial counternarcotics campaign and attempted realignment toward China, his actions have also highlighted a broader need for the United States to reprioritize its oldest ally in Asia. To reinvigorate U.S.-Philippines relations, the report makes a series of policy recommendations regarding security and defense ties, foreign assistance, energy cooperation, and diplomatic ties. It further proposes ways to improve the narrative regarding U.S.-Philippines legacy issues and the two countries’ complicated colonial history.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Alliance, Strategic Competition, and Rodrigo Duterte
Political Geography:: Philippines, North America, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

20. Assessing U.S. Counterterrorism in Africa, 2001-2021: Summary Document of CTC’s Africa Regional Workshop

Author:: Jason Warner, Julia Broomer, and Stephanie Lizzo
Publication Date:: 02-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:: On October 21, 2021, the Combating Terrorism Center (CTC) at West Point, as part of the Recrudescence Project (a research collaboration with the Middle East Institute and the Center on National Security at Fordham Law), hosted a closed-door workshop with 18 top observers of U.S.-Africa policy from across government, academia, think-tanks, and the private sector. The goal of CTC’s Africa Regional Workshop was to assess the successes and challenges of U.S. policy to address terrorism by violent extremist organizations (VEOs) and to assist in counterterrorism (CT) efforts on the African continent over the past 20 years (2001-2021), and to consider how these approaches might be improved in the future. This anonymized summary document offers an overview of the findings from that workshop. Three topics of concern are the focus of this summary: assessments of U.S. kinetic counterterrorism engagement in Africa; assessments of U.S. non-kinetic counterterrorism engagement in Africa; and the future of U.S.-Africa policy beyond a counterterrorism lens.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Violent Extremism, and Counter-terrorism
Political Geography:: Africa, North America, and United States of America

21. The Inflation Weapon: How American Sanctions Harm Iranian Households

Author:: Esfandyar Batmanghelidj
Publication Date:: 01-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Fourth Freedom Forum
Abstract:: This study examines the humanitarian harms of U.S. sanctions on Iranian citizens by focusing on their principal economic impact—high rates of inflation. Although nonexperimental, the study draws upon various data to present a cohesive, if not comprehensive, narrative of the economic shocks that followed the imposition of U.S. sanctions in 2012 and 2018.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Sanctions, Economy, and Inflation
Political Geography:: Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

22. US-China Mutual Vulnerability: Perspectives on the Debate

Author:: David Santoro
Publication Date:: 05-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: The study US-China Mutual Vulnerability: Perspectives on the Debate analyzes the mutual vulnerability question in US-China strategic nuclear relations. It asks whether the United States should acknowledge mutual vulnerability with China and, if so, how and under what conditions it should do so. The goal is not to give a yes-or-no answer but to provide a comprehensive examination of the issue to better understand the benefits, costs, and risks associated with various options. The study includes chapters by US, Japanese, South Korean, Australian, and Chinese scholars.
Topic:: International Relations, Foreign Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Strategic Competition, and Vulnerability
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

23. Trouble on the Rocks: US Policy in East China Sea and South China Sea Disputes

Author:: Benjamin Tracy
Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: The South and East China Seas are strategic not only for US security and commercial interests, but are vitally so for US treaty allies Japan and the Philippines. Both countries are involved in territorial disputes with China, a rising power and security concern for the US and its allies. Despite treaty alliances with both, the United States has consistently confirmed that the Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea are covered under Article V of the US-Japan Security Treaty while stating that Philippine-claimed islands in the South China Sea are not explicitly covered in the Mutual Defense Treaty. This research project aims to understand why US policy is inconsistent in defending treaty allies’ territory. The methods used to solve this question are to look at the historical context of both disputes as well as strategic interests. UNCLOS is also analyzed to see whether international law influenced US policy. The result was that the US more consistently covered the Senkaku Islands due to the need to gain Japan’s trust as an ally in the post-war order and the US has an interest in maintaining status-quo in the region. There are three recommendations for the US in order to create a more consistent policy, which include signing UNCLOS, reengaging with regional allies such as the Philippines to establish a stronger defense commitment, and strengthening alliances with actors such as the Quad as well as the UK and France.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Treaties and Agreements, Territorial Disputes, and Alliance
Political Geography:: Japan, China, Philippines, North America, United States of America, and South China Sea

24. FSM Engagement with the United States and China: A Lesson Learned for the Pacific Islands

Author:: Gonzaga Puas
Publication Date:: 06-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: East-West Center
Abstract:: Dr. Gonzaga Puas, Professor at Pacific Islands University and Founder of Micronesia Institute of Research and Development, explains that the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM) is at a "junction, where the confluence of the two super-powers [the United States and China] meet... FSM is aware of its strategic importance and is judiciously managing the influence of both superpowers."
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Strategic Competition, and Dialogue
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, United States of America, Oceania, and Micronesia

25. From Strategic Ambiguity to Strategic Clarity? The Dynamics of South Korea’s Navigation of US-China Competition

Author:: Clint Work
Publication Date:: 07-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: East-West Center
Abstract:: Dr. Clint Work, Nonresident Fellow with the Henry L. Stimson Center's 38 North Program, explains that while President Yoon has made it clear that he will opt for strategic clarity amidst a growing US-China rivalry, he must navigate the challenges all previous ROK presidents have faced in dealing with Beijing
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, Strategic Competition, and Rivalry
Political Geography:: China, Asia, South Korea, North America, and United States of America

26. A New Horizon for Korea-US Economic Relations under the Yoon Suk-yeol Administration

Author:: Jin Kyo Suh
Publication Date:: 07-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: East-West Center
Abstract:: Dr. Jin Kyo Suh, Senior Research Fellow at the Korea Institute for International Economic Policy, explains that "Korea-US relations are entering a new era with the inauguration of the Yoon Seok-yeol government.." as "President Yoon Seok-yeol himself is well aware of the importance of universal values, such as freedom, democracy and human rights."
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, and Economy
Political Geography:: Asia, South Korea, North America, and United States of America

27. US Southeast Asia Policy: Towards A Balance of Commitment Approach

Author:: Prashanth Parameswaran
Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: East-West Center
Abstract:: Dr. Prashanth Parameswaran, a Fellow at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars and a Senior Columnist at The Diplomat Magazine, explains that "A balance of commitment approach in U.S. Southeast Asia policy can help policymakers be attentive to both the interrelationships between power, threats and resources shaping decisions in the U.S. domestic political system and the careful calibration of components in commitment level and distribution in the Southeast Asia required to sustain an expanded, balanced approach that serves U.S. interests and meets regional needs."
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Economics, Domestic Politics, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: North America, Southeast Asia, and United States of America

28. After Hegemony: Japan’s role and dilemma in maintaining the rules-based order

Author:: Yu Inagaki
Publication Date:: 11-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: East-West Center
Abstract:: The phrase “rules-based order” has recently become a recurring theme in the Japan-US alliance . This is based on the recognition that the liberal international order (LIO)—which the United States built and maintained, and that Japan has significantly benefited from—is now being challenged. While the war in Ukraine has heightened the sense of crisis over global power dynamics, China has been considered the main threat to the LIO. The United States has identified China as not just a security threat but a “ most consequential strategic competitor and the pacing challenge ,” and Japan has come to view the current international environment from a larger perspective, international order. In fact, Japan has expected to play a leading role in maintaining the LIO as US international engagement weakened under the Trump administration. However, is it possible for Japan, a constrained middle power, to maintain the existing order in the face of a declining hegemon and rising challengers? This raises a classic question in international relations: What will happen to the international order after hegemony; and what can and will Japan, occupying a particular place and role in the international system, be able and willing to do regarding international order?
Topic:: International Relations, Foreign Policy, Politics, Hegemony, and International Order
Political Geography:: Japan, China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

29. US Arms Sales Reveal Discord in Taiwan's Defense Strategy

Author:: Ethan Kessler
Publication Date:: 10-2022
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Chicago Council on Global Affairs
Abstract:: Washington has started selling arms that serve a "porcupine" defense strategy to Taiwan. Whether Taipei fully embraces this new approach remains to be seen. Taiwan, claimed by China as a rogue province and armed by the United States, is at a crossroads. Should it continue buying big-ticket US arms, such as advanced fighter jets and tanks, to counter Chinese forces in case of a blockade or invasion? Taipei’s longstanding conventional strategy, which calls for these kinds of arms, views the ambiguous US defense commitment as concerning. Since Washington may not intervene against a Chinese attack, conventionalists want to hold on to Taiwan’s traditional, long-range weapons. Conventionalists also claim that buying big-ticket arms strengthens Washington’s political commitment to Taiwan. However, officials and experts increasingly see another strategy as prudent. Recent Chinese economic growth and military modernization have greatly enhanced Beijing’s capabilities, to the point that many believe Taiwan could not hold out alone against a Chinese invasion. Reformers thus argue that Taiwan needs to start building its forces around small, easily distributed weapons such as mobile anti-ship missiles and patrol boats and make greater investments in reserve forces and territorial defense. This “porcupine” defense strategy can theoretically buy more time for US forces to arrive in a war. The fate of Taiwan’s military strategy, which also depends greatly on political relations between Beijing, Taipei, and Washington, will help determine the strength of deterrence in the Taiwan Strait. A breakdown in this deterrence could lead to US-China war. The United States not only influences Taiwan’s strategy, but has a great stake in its future.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Military Affairs, Budget, Defense Spending, and Arms Sales
Political Geography:: China, Taiwan, Asia, North America, and United States of America

30. A Principled Middle Power Diplomacy Approach For South Korea to Navigate the U.S.-China Rivalry

Author:: Saeme Kim
Publication Date:: 10-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:: In the context of growing US-China tensions, South Korean administrations have opted for degrees of strategic ambiguity, refraining from overt actions that suggest South Korea is taking sides. While strategic ambiguity has been moderately successful, there are limits to this approach which make it unsustainable. This paper will argue that rather, South Korea needs to apply a principled middle power diplomacy, which refers to a middle power carrying out roles expected of it in accordance with a set of rules or values that uphold the liberal international order. The goal of principled middle power diplomacy would be to shape the environment in which the current great power rivalry is unfolding, in order to moderate the fallout of great power competition. After an analysis of South Korea’s middle power diplomacy, this paper will recommend that South Korea double down on its commitment to multilateralism so that it can augment its roles as a facilitator and agenda-setter on the international stage.
Topic:: International Relations, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Multilateralism, and Rivalry
Political Geography:: China, Asia, South Korea, North America, and United States of America

31. Priorities for US-Africa commercial policy in the Biden Administration

Author:: Aubrey Hruby
Publication Date:: 04-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Atlantic Council
Abstract:: With a renewed focus on multilateralism, President Joe Biden, in his first one hundred days, has actively been reengaging with traditional US allies and partners repeatedly sidelined by the Trump administration. African countries have been included in this effort. When addressing the African Union Summit of African presidents in February, he reaffirmed the United States’ commitment to partnering with African nations to address challenges including climate change and erosion of democratic institutions. Biden has gained widespread praise for supporting the appointment of Dr. Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala as the first African head of the World Trade Organization (WTO), nominating officials who have deep experience in African markets to Cabinet positions, such as Linda Thomas-Greenfield as ambassador to the United Nations, and putting together a historically diverse government, including many senior members of the African diaspora. Building on this early progress, Biden has an opportunity to reset US-Africa policy by not only prioritizing it at a level unseen during the last four years, but also changing the long history of siloing Africa policy. The Biden administration should look to further integrate African nations into broader US foreign policy, acknowledging Africa’s increasing importance to US priorities and enhanced standing on the global stage. Doing so will allow the new administration to deepen commercial and people-to-people ties with African nations, benefiting US businesses, furthering US interests, and working to address global challenges, such as public health and climate change. This more multifaceted and nuanced engagement with African states will set a foundation for stronger US-Africa partnerships, support mutual economic growth, and contribute to strengthening US global leadership. While cooperation with African states is critical to regional stability and global security, this issue brief sets aside security policy and focuses on ways the Biden administration can strengthen its commercial policy and public diplomacy with African nations. This effort includes building on commercial policies started under the Trump administration, facilitating green growth, and deepening people-to-people ties. In doing so, Biden’s domestic priorities of promoting diversity and climate responsibility will be reflected in Africa policy and ensure US businesses can take advantage of increasing opportunity in African markets and remain competitive globally.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Economy, Business, and Joe Biden
Political Geography:: Africa, North America, and United States of America

32. Germany-U.S. Relations: A Return to the Strategic Partnership

Author:: Lidia Gibadło and Mateusz Piotrowski
Publication Date:: 07-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: Since Joe Biden’s presidency began, Germany’s relationship with the United States has improved. The U.S. made significant concessions, primary among them agreeing to the construction of the Nord Stream 2 (NS2) gas pipeline. This is a new opening for the U.S. in the bilateral relations and sets the foundations for the reconstruction of the strategic partnership with Germany that Biden sees as necessary to implement U.S. policy towards a post-Brexit Europe. However, the possible reluctance of the next German government to adopt a more confrontational policy towards China could be a challenge to that goal.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Partnerships, and Nord Stream 2
Political Geography:: Europe, Germany, North America, and United States of America

33. Resilient Aerial Refueling: Safeguarding the US Military’s Global Reach

Author:: Timothy A. Walton and Bryan Clark
Publication Date:: 11-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Hudson Institute
Abstract:: The US military’s aerial refueling enterprise is a critical component of its ability to project power globally in defense of American interests. As the US military adopts new concepts to enhance its lethality and gain decision advantage, aerial refueling is increasingly necessary to enable a more distributed and dynamic force. However, with an aging inventory of tanker aircraft and stiff budgetary headwinds, it is an open question whether the US Air Force is capable of fielding the aerial refueling force that the nation needs. This study assesses the current and programmed US aerial refueling enterprise and has found that it likely would be unable to support US strategy and operational concepts at scale against peer adversaries such as the People’s Republic of China. However, the US military could address these shortfalls and improve the operational resilience of its aerial refueling enterprise by adopting new concepts, capabilities, capacities, and posture.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, National Security, Science and Technology, and Military Spending
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

34. Containing Crisis: Strategic Concepts for Coercive Economic Statecraft

Author:: Emily Kilcrease, Emily Jin, and Rachel Ziemba
Publication Date:: 12-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:: As the United States and China seek to manage an increasingly tense relationship, both sides have turned to coercive economic statecraft as a core part of their broader foreign policy, with disruptive impacts on the global economic order. A growing body of research examines the use of coercive economic tools, including prior work by the CNAS Energy, Economics, and Security program. This report adds to that literature by specifically examining the use of coercive economic tools during periods of geopolitical crisis to assess their value in de-escalating tensions or deterring further economic coercion. The researchers developed scenario exercises to examine these dynamics, supported by a literature review and extensive engagement with subject matter experts. The insights from the research informed the development of two overarching strategic concepts intended to guide U.S. policymakers when deploying economic tools as part of a crisis management situation.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Economics, Bilateral Relations, and Crisis Management
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

35. Afghanistan: The Fog at the End of the Tunnel

Author:: Carl Conetta
Publication Date:: 06-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Project on Defense Alternatives
Abstract:: What is causing the uncertainty about when US ground forces will exit Afghanistan. The Biden administration insists that logistical factors explain its breach of the 2020 US-Taliban agreement, which reset the exit date from May to September. Logistical factors are also supposed to explain why the date may now be walked back to July. Actually, logistical issues explain neither. Using current data and historical precedent, this short analysis shows why. An alternative explanation for the delay is that it gave Washington more time to pursue some of its unfinished goals regarding Afghanistan. In this, the lingering troop presence serves as leverage. What goals? Improve Kabul’s military posture, polish plans and preparations for US forces to “fight from afar,” and pursue dramatic new international initiatives aiming to lock the Taliban into a cease-fire, peace settlement, and government reform plan substantially defined by the USA. This high risk-gambit won’t succeed, but it might prolong the conflict and America’s involvement in it.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Treaties and Agreements, War, Military Strategy, Armed Forces, Taliban, and Conflict
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, South Asia, North America, and United States of America

36. Preventing Nuclear Proliferation and Reassuring America's Allies

Author:: Ivo H. Daalder, Chuck Hagel, Malcolm Rifkind, and Kevin Rudd
Publication Date:: 02-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Chicago Council on Global Affairs
Abstract:: In recent decades, the threat of nuclear proliferation has emanated primarily from the Middle East and from south and northeast Asia. But the proliferation threat wasn’t always concentrated in these regions. Long before countries like North Korea and Iran topped the list of nuclear threats, leaders in Washington and elsewhere worried about a different group of countries—America’s allies in Europe and Asia. Indeed, in the early 1960s, intelligence officials projected that by the mid-1970s there likely would be 10 to 15 nuclear powers in the world within a decade, as countries like Australia, Germany, Italy, Japan, South Korea, and Turkey would opt to join a growing nuclear club. The nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1968 was designed to prevent this, and it did. But it succeeded in large part because of a concerted US effort since the 1960s to reassure its allies around the world that America’s nuclear umbrella would extend to their territory and ensure their security. Rather than developing their own national nuclear capabilities, key allies in Europe and Asia opted to rely on the US nuclear guarantee instead. Since the NPT entered into force in 1970, just four countries (India, Israel, Pakistan, and North Korea) have acquired nuclear weapons. More recently, however, questions about the credibility of the American nuclear guarantee have arisen again in Europe and Asia. Allies in both regions confront growing military threats from a resurgent Russia, a rising China, and a nuclear North Korea. At the same time, successive US administrations have sought to retreat from some longstanding commitments, leaving America’s allies around the world uncertain whether they can still rely on the United States for their defense and security—nuclear and otherwise. So far, the discussions about nuclear deterrence and reassurance have played out largely beyond public view. But the issue is becoming increasingly salient, given growing threats from Russia and China especially, and growing doubts about the United States. America and its allies cannot ignore this new reality. For if we are to prevent new nuclear proliferation among these allies, it is essential to acknowledge that what has long been unthinkable is becoming thinkable once more.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Nonproliferation, and Alliance
Political Geography:: Europe, East Asia, North America, and United States of America

37. US, Japan, and South Korea Coordination Key to Competing in Southeast Asia

Author:: Karl Friedhoff and Lea Chang
Publication Date:: 06-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Chicago Council on Global Affairs
Abstract:: In picking fronts that offer the paths of least resistance, trilateral cooperation will maximize the presence of all three countries in ASEAN, maintaining balance in the region and making collective progress toward economic and development goals. Despite its size, economic dynamism, and geographic position, Southeast Asia has received comparatively little attention in US foreign policy. Even as American policy becomes more focused on China, the United States lacks a coordinated strategy to respond to and compete with China’s vast trade and investment in Southeast Asia. But most ASEAN countries are wary of China’s growing influence and would be open to US involvement as they look to diversify. To take advantage of this opportunity, the United States must supplement its focus on the South China Sea with diplomatic and financial efforts on land. These efforts should offer an alternative to China’s largesse but should not seek a direct competition in hard infrastructure or in terms of dollar amounts invested. Nor should the United States go it alone. Instead, it should seek to cooperate with its allies—Japan and South Korea in particular—to pursue their respective competitive advantages. These include identifying and investing in small- and medium-sized enterprises in ASEAN, developing human capital in the region, and conducting joint maritime cleanup activities in coordination with ASEAN countries. Creating coordinated activities with Japan and South Korea in Southeast Asia should be the first step for the United States to roll back China’s influence in the region. But these efforts will need to be calibrated to ensure that they focus on the needs of countries in the region and not just engulf the region in the US-China competition.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Infrastructure, Investment, and Trade
Political Geography:: Japan, China, Asia, North America, Southeast Asia, and United States of America

38. Americans, Japanese, and South Koreans Wary of China's Intentions

Author:: Karl Friedhoff, Craig Kafura, and Dina Smeltz
Publication Date:: 08-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Chicago Council on Global Affairs
Abstract:: American, Japanese, and South Korean publics see China as a more of a threat than a partner. Trilateral cooperation will be key to managing China's rise. Against a backdrop of growing regional rivalry, March and April 2021 surveys conducted in the United States, Japan, and South Korea show that publics in all three countries share similar views of China’s growing influence and intentions. But the data also show that internal divisions within the US-Japan-South Korea relationship will pose challenges to deeper cooperation.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, International Cooperation, and Public Opinion
Political Geography:: Japan, China, East Asia, South Korea, North America, and United States of America

39. 2021 Chicago Council Survey: A Foreign Policy for the Middle Class—What Americans Think

Author:: Dina Smeltz, Ivo H. Daalder, Karl Friedhoff, Craig Kafura, and Emily Sullivan
Publication Date:: 10-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Chicago Council on Global Affairs
Abstract:: While the Biden administration seems to understand where Americans stand on China and domestic renewal to support global competitiveness, the data disproves their assumptions that Americans are skeptical about trade and weary of US global engagement and leadership.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Politics, Public Opinion, Trade, and Survey
Political Geography:: China, North America, and United States of America

40. Re-Thinking Assumptions for a 21st Century Middle East

Author:: Douglas A. Ollivant
Publication Date:: 04-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:: American policy in the Middle East is based on outdated assumptions. There are at least four novel elements in or impacting the Middle East that require an adjustment in strategy: North American Oil Independence: The United States no longer relies on the Middle East for its supply of energy and could choose to act without that significant tie. Rise of China: The People’s Republic of China is now a near-peer to the United States and is taking steps to protect its own interests in the Middle East. Diminishing Conventional Threats to Israel: All conceivable regional enemies are now peace signatories, wrestling with internal instability, or both. Unconventional threats continue to challenge Israel’s security, but a ground invasion is now a remote possibility. Rise of Sub-State Actors: In addition to widely recognized terror and insurgent groups, other actors, such as financial firms, technology firms, and private military firms, interact with power that rivals that of weak states. These new factors—alone and in concert—make legacy strategies at least suboptimal, if not unsuitable. Today’s Middle East exhibits very different characteristics than that of the Middle East of the past century. An acceptable and suitable strategy must incorporate these new data points.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Oil, Non State Actors, Geopolitics, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:: China, Middle East, Israel, North America, and United States of America

41. Beyond Forever Wars and Great Power Competition: Rethinking the U.S. Military Role in the Middle East

Author:: Michael Eisenstadt
Publication Date:: 06-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:: To meet future security challenges, the United States will need to reassess how it deters adversaries and conducts security force assistance in the region, while becoming more proficient in gray zone operations and information activities. Addressing cultural factors and trends such as climate change will require solutions outside the traditional national security toolkit. In the ninth in a series of TRANSITION 2021 memos, Michael Eisenstadt describes how even with a reduced military footprint, the United States can secure its interests in the Middle East while better positioning itself on the global stage. Since taking office, the Biden administration has declared that it will right-size the U.S. military presence in the Middle East and end America’s involvement in the region’s costly “forever wars” in order to focus on Great Power competition. To meet future security challenges in the Middle East, however, the United States will need to rethink how it deters adversaries and conducts security force assistance, while becoming more proficient in gray zone operations and information activities. Simultaneously, to address the structural and cultural factors that produce regional instability, along with destabilizing trends such as climate change, the United States must look outside the traditional national security toolkit. “The challenge,” the author explains, “is to develop new strategies and operational approaches that employ the military and other instruments of national power in different, more economical, and more effective ways as the attention of policymakers and U.S. force deployments increasingly shift to the Indo-Pacific region and elsewhere.” TRANSITION 2021 memos by Washington Institute experts address the broad array of issues facing the Biden-Harris administration in the Middle East. These range from thematic issues, such as the region’s strategic position in the context of Great Power competition and how to most effectively elevate human rights and democracy in Middle East policy, to more discrete topics, from Arab-Israel peace diplomacy to Red Sea security to challenges and opportunities in northwest Africa. Taken as a whole, this series of memos will present a comprehensive approach for advancing U.S. interests in security and peace in this vital but volatile region.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, National Security, Military, and Competition
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

42. The United States and Indonesia: Re-converging Security Interests in the Indo-Pacific

Author:: Jeffrey Ordaniel
Publication Date:: 09-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: Pacific Forum, with support from the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) and in collaboration with the Centre for Strategic and International Studies Indonesia (CSIS), organized the inaugural Track 2 U.S.-Indonesia Security Dialogue on June 1-3, 2021. Thought leaders from the United States and Indonesia, including scholars, policy experts, and retired military and government officials, participated in the dialogue. This report contains the general summary of the discussions. The recommendations contained in this report, unless otherwise specifically noted, were generated by the discussions as interpreted by the Principal Investigators. This is not a consensus document. Both the agenda and participant list are included in the appendix; all participants attended in their private capacity.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, and Strategic Autonomy
Political Geography:: Indonesia, North America, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

43. A New Era of US Policy Toward the Korean Peninsula

Author:: Joshua Nezam
Publication Date:: 02-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: This paper offers concrete policy recommendations and institutional tools for the incoming Biden administration and Congress to revise policy toward the Korean Peninsula. Deterring North Korea will remain a focus of the alliance, but prioritizing denuclearization must no longer monopolize the alliance’s political capital nor paralyze its global potential. The US and South Korea must clarify how shared values translate into policy convergence in security, economy, and technology domains to rediscover relevance in an era of multidimensional structural competition with China. Even without a comprehensive nuclear agreement with North Korea, the near-term priority must be to revitalize the regional security architecture to uphold extended deterrence to South Korea and Japan while institutionalizing a process of managing tensions and capping North Korea’s most destabilizing capabilities. Lastly, Congress must deliberate a viable path toward risk reduction and peace with Pyongyang while advocating for transformational change through advocacy for human rights and freedom of information.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Science and Technology, Economy, and Alliance
Political Geography:: North America, Korean Peninsula, and United States of America

44. No One is Satisfied: Two Theories of the US-China Global Rivalry and the International Order

Author:: Younn Shwe Sin Htay
Publication Date:: 04-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Pacific Forum
Abstract:: A remarkable shift is underway in the geostrategic relations between the United States, long a dominant global power, and China, a relentless economic engine with a rapidly growing military. Their competition promises to change the face of global politics in the 21st century. This paper examines that conflict from the perspectives of two discrete political theories: power transition theory and hegemonic stability theory, which come to different conclusions when applied to China and the United States separately. However, taken together with both nations in mind, they arrive at six possible futures, including regional warfare and a wholesale overhaul of the existing international order.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Hegemony, Strategic Competition, Strategic Stability, and International Order
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

45. The Prospects of Thailand-U.S. Economic Cooperation

Author:: Kaewkamol Karen Pitakdumrongkit
Publication Date:: 11-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: East-West Center
Abstract:: Dr. Kaewkamol Pitakdumrongkit, S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) of Nanyang Technological University, Singapore., explains that “data runs contrary to the perception that Bangkok is leaning towards Beijing… Thailand embraces American economic clout while dreading its Chinese counterpart.”
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Economics, Trade, and Economic Cooperation
Political Geography:: China, North America, Thailand, Southeast Asia, and United States of America

46. Proportionate Deterrence: A Model Nuclear Posture Review

Author:: George Perkovich and Pranay Vaddi
Publication Date:: 01-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:: Ever since the election of Bill Clinton in 1992, every U.S. presidential administration has published a Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) that explains the rationales behind its nuclear strategy, doctrine, and requested forces. These reviews have helped inform U.S. government personnel, citizens, allies, and adversaries of the country’s intentions and planned capabilities for conducting nuclear deterrence and, if necessary, war. The administration that takes office in January 2021 may or may not conduct a new NPR, but it will assess and update nuclear policies as part of its overall recalibration of national security strategy and policies. Nongovernmental analysts can contribute to sound policymaking by being less constrained than officials often are in exploring the difficulties of achieving nuclear deterrence with prudently tolerable risks. Accordingly, the review envisioned and summarized here explicitly elucidates the dilemmas, uncertainties, and tradeoffs that come with current and possible alternative nuclear policies and forces. In the body of this review, we analyze extant declaratory policy, unclassified employment policy, and plans for offensive and defensive force postures, and then propose changes to several of them. We also will emphasize the need for innovative approaches to arms control.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Nuclear Weapons, and Hybrid Threats
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

47. The Prospects for Changes in U.S. Policy towards Latin America

Author:: Bartlomiej Znojek
Publication Date:: 02-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: The Biden administration will seek to rebuild the U.S. reputation and influence in Latin America. It will strengthen cooperation with Latin American partners in the field of climate change and the fight against the COVID-19 pandemic, among others. The pandemic and its socio-economic impacts will increase the scale of the challenges facing the U.S. in its relations with Latin America, including in migration and development cooperation. The Biden administration’s approach to the region may facilitate the U.S.-EU dialogue, for example, on efforts to overcome the political and humanitarian crises in Venezuela.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, International Cooperation, Migration, European Union, and Joe Biden
Political Geography:: Latin America, Venezuela, North America, and United States of America

48. Partisan Biases in U.S.‐Japan Relations

Author:: Paul Nadeau
Publication Date:: 02-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: East-West Center
Abstract:: Japan will welcome the Biden administration with relief in the wake of what was perceived as Trump’s bombast, threats, and unpredictability – but it will be mixed with apprehension (fair or not) that Biden’s presidency will follow the Obama administration’s perceived weakness, or even accommodation, toward China. It’s a crude simplification, but Japan’s ruling Liberal Democratic Party’s relationship with U.S. political parties is roughly that they share preferences but not perceptions with Democrats, and share perceptions but not preferences with Republicans. In practical terms, this means that Japanese decision makers favor alliances and multilateral approaches over unilateralism and brinksmanship, but are more suspicious of China’s intentions and behavior than they believe Democrats to be. Put more indelicately, the LDP prefers working with Republicans rather than Democrats. This is combined with a traditional perception that Democrats undervalue Japan as a partner. Taken as a whole, this means that the incoming administration may have to do more to convince Japan that its priorities are being taken seriously – but will find in Japan an essential partner for advancing U.S. goals in the Indo-Pacific.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Politics, Bilateral Relations, and Domestic Politics
Political Geography:: Japan, Asia, North America, and United States of America

49. The United States and Japan Should Cooperate to Include India in Indo‐Pacific Economic Governance

Author:: Kensuke Yanagida
Publication Date:: 02-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: East-West Center
Abstract:: Both the United States and Japan consider India as an important strategic partner in their respective Indo-Pacific concepts. However, India still faces many domestic challenges as a developing country. India also has traditionally been reluctant when it comes to trade liberalization. U.S. bilateral trade negotiations with India, and Japan`s effort in promoting an East Asia regional trade agreement that includes India share objectives and interests and hence can be coordinated. On November 15, 2020, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) was signed by 15 countries with the glaring exception of India. RCEP is a regional free trade agreement (FTA) whose negotiations were initiated by ASEAN and six partner countries, namely Japan, China, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand and India in 2012. The signing of RCEP finally came after eight years of negotiations, but India decided to pull out from the pact at the final stage of negotiations. The Japanese and U.S. Indo-Pacific concepts aim to achieve regional peace, stability, and prosperity through ensuring a rules-based international order, and to enhance cooperation among like-minded countries in both economic and security spheres. RCEP can be positioned as an important economic partnership initiative that embodies the Indo-Pacific concepts of rules-based, free and fair trade and investment governance, and contributing to the economic prosperity of the region.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Treaties and Agreements, Bilateral Relations, and Trade
Political Geography:: Japan, India, Asia, North America, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

50. The U.S.‐Japan Relationship: Modeling New Frontiers in Subnational Diplomacy

Author:: Sarah Sieloff and Sean Connell
Publication Date:: 03-2021
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: East-West Center
Abstract:: In our increasingly networked world, the international activities of states, cities, and other subnational actors are expanding rapidly. Their rising importance has spurred Congress to consider legislation establishing an Office of Subnational Diplomacy within the U.S. State Department that would institutionalize and support these initiatives, while better aligning them with national diplomatic strategies. Moreover, they offer opportunities for envisioning new foreign policy approaches that directly benefit U.S. communities. The U.S.-Japan relationship — with its robust history of subnational interaction, strategic global interests and increasingly integrated economies — offers a fertile environment for developing and implementing new models for subnational diplomacy, with global applicability. While state and local governments cannot commit the federal government to action, they can conduct activities that advance both local and national interests. This is evidenced by an ever-expanding range of trade and business missions, and cultural and educational exchanges that bridge subnational actors with international partners. Increasingly, these activities are evolving into new areas, including technology-driven entrepreneurship, environmental quality and disaster resilience. At their best, subnational initiatives—which national leaders have cited as critical to U.S. foreign relations—create meaningful, long-term relationships amid often-changing national-level politics and officials. By stimulating information exchange, training and research opportunities, and business connections, they deliver concrete benefits to participants on both sides of the Pacific, especially in areas where national governments are not best positioned to engage.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Government, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:: Japan, Asia, North America, and United States of America

51. A Global Survey of US-China Competition in the Coronavirus Era

Author:: Eric B. Brown, Patrick M. Cronin, H.R. McMaster, Husain Haqqani, Aparna Pande, Satoru Nagao, John Lee, Seth Cropsey, Peter Rough, Liselotte Odgaard, Blaise Misztal, Douglas J. Feith, and Michael Doran
Publication Date:: 05-2020
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Hudson Institute
Abstract:: The outbreak of the novel coronavirus has introduced a series of new stresses and factors in the US-China relationship. While the world has struggled to contain the pandemic and its tragic repercussions, the People’s Republic of China has used the outbreak to launch a global campaign of misinformation, further its economic coercion through the Belt and Road Initiative, and continue military expansion efforts in the South China Sea. China’s attempt to exploit the pandemic for political, strategic, and economic gain is problematic in the current environment, yet it is consistent with, and a continuation of, China’s long-term strategy. This report offers a global survey and assessment of attempts by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to expand its influence, including by exploiting the pandemic. As the United States and its allies focus on combatting the virus and salvaging their economies, there is an opportunity to better understand China’s strategy and develop a unified response.
Topic:: International Relations, Foreign Policy, Economics, Strategic Competition, and COVID-19
Political Geography:: China, South Asia, Asia, North America, and United States of America

52. Sanctions by the Numbers: Spotlight on Iran

Author:: Abigail Eineman
Publication Date:: 09-2020
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:: The June edition of “Sanctions by the Numbers” illustrated a decade of U.S. sanctions policy by using heat maps to show the countries with the largest number of designations. Across both the Trump and Obama administrations, Iran was always at the top of the list. This edition of Sanctions by the Numbers explores Iran sanctions further, tracking how designations and delistings have evolved over time, the dozens of countries affected by Iran-related sanctions programs, and the top types of U.S. designations. The data add to the existing consensus that sanctions have an inverse relationship with Iran’s economic health, and designations have far outpaced delistings in the last three years as part of the Trump administration’s “maximum pressure” campaign.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Sanctions, and Economy
Political Geography:: Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

53. Congress’s Hidden Strengths: Wielding Informal Tools of National Security Oversight

Author:: Richard Fontaine and Loren DeJonge Schulman
Publication Date:: 07-2020
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:: On matters of peace and war, virtually no one seems satisfied with Congress. Constitutionally coequal to the executive, the Congress often appears more an uneasy junior partner. During the past two decades, the executive branch has expanded its authority to launch, conduct, and conceal military activity. In response, Congress—despite its formal powers to declare war, appropriate funds, and organize the armed forces—has largely deferred, putting up more of a rhetorical fight than engaging in a deliberative effort to shape American wars. Congress, even lawmakers complain, postures more than it prescribes, overlooks more than it oversees, and passes time more than it passes laws. Conventional wisdom and political consultants offer congressmen good rationale: foreign policy does not typically drive elections, Americans are increasingly disconnected from both their military and the costs of war, and there are few political incentives to dig deeply into matters of war and peace. Today the “imperial presidency” is accepted as a given division of labor rather than seen as a counter-constitutional anomaly. And yet with the nation involved in military operations across multiple countries, and with debates about possible military interventions in Iran, North Korea, and Venezuela reaching the White House, congressional attention to the use of force should today be at a premium. The Founders were correct to vest national security decisionmaking in not only one branch of government, and history shows numerous examples of Congress positively influencing matters of war and peace. An inactive or indifferent legislature leaves power overconcentrated in the executive, while an engaged Congress may not just check presidential reach but can actively improve the conduct of American conflicts.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, National Security, and Armed Forces
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

54. Sanctions by the Numbers: The Geographic Distribution of U.S. Sanctions

Author:: Abigail Eineman
Publication Date:: 06-2020
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:: In February, CNAS launched Sanctions by the Numbers, a project to track U.S. sanctions designations and delistings. In this second installment, heat maps show the most heavily targeted states in three periods of time: over the course of the Obama administration from 2009–2017, the Trump administration from 2017–June 2020, and a snapshot of the past decade through June 2020. The maps rely on ten years of sanctions data published by the Office of Foreign Assets Control at the U.S. Department of the Treasury.
Topic:: Foreign Policy and Sanctions
Political Geography:: Iran, North America, and United States of America

55. Rising to the China Challenge: Renewing American Competitiveness in the Indo-Pacific

Author:: Ely Ratner, Daniel Kliman, Susanna V. Blume, Rush Doshi, Chris Dougherty, Richard Fontaine, Peter Harrell, Martijn Rasser, Elizabeth Rosenberg, Eric Sayers, Daleep Singh, Paul Scharre, Loren DeJonge Schulman, Neil Bhatiya, Ashley Feng, Joshua Fitt, Megan Lamberth, Kristine Lee, and Ainikki Riikonen
Publication Date:: 01-2020
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:: The United States and China are locked in strategic competition over the future of the Indo-Pacific—the most populous, dynamic, and consequential region in the world. At stake are competing visions for the rules, norms, and institutions that will govern international relations in the decades to come.1 The U.S. government aspires toward a “free and open” Indo-Pacific, defined by respect for sovereignty and the independence of nations, peaceful resolution of disputes, free and fair trade, adherence to international law, and greater transparency and good governance.2 For the United States, successful realization of this regional order would include strong U.S. alliances and security partnerships; a military able to operate throughout the region, consistent with international law; U.S. firms with access to leading markets, and benefiting from updated technology standards, investment rules, and trade agreements; U.S. participation in effective regional and international institutions; and the spread of democracy and individual freedoms in the context of an open information environment and vibrant civil society.3 By contrast, China is driving toward a more closed and illiberal future for the Indo-Pacific, core aspects of which would undermine vital U.S. interests.4 Key features of China-led order would include the People’s Liberation Army controlling the South and East China Seas; regional countries sufficiently coerced into acquiescing to China’s preferences on military, economic, and diplomatic matters; an economic order in which Beijing sets trade and investment rules in its favor, with dominance over leading technologies, data, and standards; and Beijing with de facto rule over Taiwan and agenda-setting power over regional institutions. The order would be further characterized by weak civil society, a dearth of independent media, and the gradual spread of authoritarianism, reinforced by the proliferation of China’s high-tech surveillance state. The net result would be a less secure, less prosperous United States that is less able to exert power and influence in the world.5 Ultimately, the competition between the United States and China in the Indo-Pacific is a contest over which of these futures will come closer to fruition, even as neither is likely to attain in its entirety. In the two years since the 2017 National Security Strategy and 2018 National Defense Strategy aptly identified this competition over the regional order in Asia, the U.S. government has taken initial steps toward its goal of a free and open region. On balance, however, critical areas of U.S. policy remain inconsistent, uncoordinated, underresourced, and—to be blunt—uncompetitive and counterproductive to advancing U.S. values and interests. This independent assessment—mandated by the U.S. Congress in the 2019 National Defense Authorization Act—is intended to help close the considerable gap between the current administration’s stated aspirations for a free and open Indo-Pacific and the actual implementation of policies to advance that vision. Specifically, Congress called for “an assessment of the geopolitical conditions in the Indo-Pacific region that are necessary for the successful implementation of the National Defense Strategy,” with a particular focus on how to “support United States military requirements for forward defense, assured access, extensive forward basing, and alliance and partnership formation and strengthening in such region.”6 This report examines how the U.S. government as a whole, not just the Department of Defense, can realize these outcomes. Although the focus of this assessment is on the Indo-Pacific, it is critical to underscore that the China challenge is a global phenomenon, and many of the actions recommended in this report should be taken to bolster U.S. competitiveness beyond the region. Consistent with the bipartisan mission of the Center for a New American Security, the report’s authors have collectively served on both sides of the aisle in Congress and in the administrations of Presidents George W. Bush, Barack Obama, and Donald Trump at the White House, State Department, Defense Department, Treasury Department, Central Intelligence Agency, and Office of the U.S. Trade Representative. Included herein are nearly a hundred specific and actionable policy recommendations across critical vectors of American competitiveness in the Indo-Pacific. Before turning to these recommendations, the remainder of this section describes six core principles that undergird the assessment and should form the foundations of U.S. strategy in the Indo-Pacific region.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Partnerships, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

56. The Case for Withdrawing from the Middle East

Author:: Justin Logan
Publication Date:: 09-2020
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Defense Priorities
Abstract:: The Middle East is a small, poor, weak region beset by an array of problems that mostly do not affect Americans—and that U.S. forces cannot fix. The best thing the U.S. can do is leave. The immense cost and evident fruitlessness of U.S. wars in the Middle East are widely lamented in American politics, but not enough to extricate U.S. troops. And even beyond the wars, U.S. policy in the region is an expensive and unnecessary disaster. The cost of maintaining forces to protect the Middle East from itself is extraordinary, even in peacetime. Conservatively, attempting to control the Middle East costs Americans on the order of $65–70 billion each year, apart from the trillions spent on wars there. The number should be closer to zero. Nothing about the Middle East warrants the U.S. investment there over the past 30 years. The few important interests there—preventing major terrorist attacks, stopping the emergence of a market-making oil hegemon, curbing nuclear proliferation, and ensuring no regional actor destroys Israel—do not require American troops. The roughly 60,000 U.S. troops in the region should leave. American efforts to manage the Middle East make nothing about oil, Israel, or terrorism better. The U.S. would be better off withdrawing all forward-deployed troops from the region, while maintaining access agreements for naval ports with the consent of host countries. Withdrawing ground forces from the Middle East will make it harder for the U.S. to start or join any wars there. Shrinking the U.S. armed forces to reflect the lack of threat from the Middle East will free up resources for any number of higher priorities at home or abroad.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, and Defense Spending
Political Geography:: Middle East, North America, and United States of America

57. A Plan for U.S. Withdrawal from the Middle East

Author:: Mike Sweeney
Publication Date:: 12-2020
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Defense Priorities
Abstract:: Thinking through the process of transiting U.S. forces completely out of the Middle East gives additional depth to conversations on force reductions and further normalizes the idea that the United States can eventually leave the region. The underlying social and economic forces that produced the Arab Spring demonstrations of 2011 have not been adequately addressed. They will likely spark additional instability in the years ahead. This fact should affect not only U.S. considerations about decamping the region, but also the pace and speed of a withdrawal. Iranian missile capabilities—as demonstrated in the retaliatory attacks following the death of Qassem Soleimani–allow Tehran to increasingly contest U.S. presence in the region. This will be a long-term factor in U.S. basing decisions, regardless of force levels. The center of gravity for U.S. presence in the Middle East is the “core four” of Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). They account for more than half the total number of U.S. troops in the region and also host the most substantial physical basing infrastructure. The direction of a U.S. withdrawal should be away from the center and toward the periphery, with forces flowing from the Persian Gulf west and south toward redoubts in Jordan and Oman. A measured timetable of four years would allow the United States to significantly reduce its presence by as much as 50,000 military personnel when rotational deployments (like carrier deployments) are factored in. At the end of the four-year period, the United States would be postured to return to a role as offshore balancer with an option to completely withdraw from the region.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Armed Forces, and Instability
Political Geography:: Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

58. National Security Update 12: Status of 2020 Defense Authorization/Appropriations and NDAA Highlights

Author:: Jack Kelly
Publication Date:: 01-2020
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis (IFPA)
Abstract:: Our twelfth IFPA National Security Update examines the current status of the U.S. defense authorization, appropriations, and budget process with a focus on the Fiscal Year (FY) 2020 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) and assesses its strengths and weaknesses in light of key programs and policies discussed in previous Updates. Topics addressed in our National Security Update series include hypersonic missiles, missile defense priorities, nuclear modernization issues, President Trump's Executive Order on Electromagnetic Pulse, the status of the Space Force, China’s actions in the South China Sea and U.S. options, and the military applications of artificial intelligence. In early 2017, the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis initiated an online series entitled National Security Update. Its purpose is to examine key foreign policy/defense issues and to set forth policy options. These updates are made available to the broad policy community within and outside government, including key policy makers in Washington, D.C.; members of Congress and their staffs; academic specialists; and other members of the private-sector security community. Future National Security Updates will address a range of topics in an effort to provide timely analyses and policy options.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Government, National Security, Budget, Weapons, Missile Defense, and Artificial Intelligence
Political Geography:: China, North America, South China, and United States of America

59. U.S. Foreign Policy for the Middle Class: Perspectives From Nebraska

Author:: Salman Ahmed, Allison Gelman, Tarik Abdel-Monem, Wendy Cutler, Rozlyn Engel, David Gordon, Jennifer Harris, Douglas Lute, Jill O'Donnell, Daniel M. Price, David Rosenbaum, Christopher Smart, Jake Sullivan, Ashley J. Tellis, Eric Thompson, Janell C. Walther, and Tom Wyler
Publication Date:: 05-2020
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:: U.S. foreign policy has not come up often in the 2020 presidential campaign. But when it has, candidates on both sides of the aisle frequently have stressed that U.S. foreign policy should not only keep the American people safe but also deliver more tangible economic benefits for the country’s middle class. The debate among the presidential contenders is not if that should happen but how to make it happen. All too often, this debate takes place within relatively small circles within Washington, DC, without the benefit of input from state and local officials, small business owners, community leaders, local labor representatives, and others on the front lines of addressing the challenges facing middle-class households. That is why the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace convened a bipartisan task force in late 2017 to lift up such voices and inject them into the ongoing debate. The task force partnered with university researchers to study the perceived and measurable economic effects of U.S. foreign policy on three politically and economically different states in the nation’s heartland—Colorado, Nebraska, and Ohio. The first two reports on Ohio and Colorado were published in December 2018 and November 2019, respectively. This third report on Nebraska has been prepared in partnership with a team of researchers at the University of Nebraska–Lincoln (UNL). To gauge perceptions of how Nebraska’s middle class is faring and the ways in which U.S. foreign policy might fit in, the Carnegie and UNL research teams reviewed household surveys and conducted individual interviews and focus groups, between July and August 2019, with over 130 Nebraskans in Columbus, Scottsbluff/Gering, Kearney, Lincoln, North Platte, and Omaha.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Climate Change, Politics, Immigration, Economy, Domestic Politics, Class, and Trade
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

60. Palestine in Russia’s Foreign Policy

Author:: Michał Wojnarowicz
Publication Date:: 05-2020
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: Russia is strengthening its relations with both the Palestinian Authority leadership and Hamas in Gaza Strip. It is part of Russia’s consistent strategy towards the Middle East to build a network of influence among regional actors and boost its image as an attractive political partner. In developing relations with the Palestinians, Russia exploits Israel’s sensitivity to Russian activity in Syria, poor relations between Palestine and the U.S., and the deadlock in the peace process.
Topic:: International Relations, Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, Grand Strategy, and Hamas
Political Geography:: Russia, Eurasia, Middle East, Israel, Palestine, Gaza, North America, and United States of America

61. US Trade Policy in the Biden Administration: The Challenge of China’s Rise

Author:: Simon Lester and Huan Zhu
Publication Date:: 12-2020
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Georgetown Journal of International Affairs
Abstract:: The Trump administration has left the Biden administration a number of difficult trade policy issues to deal with, but the biggest challenge is likely to be China. The Biden administration will need to find a way forward in the increasingly tense US-China relationship, which covers aspects of trade, as well as foreign policy, security, and human rights issues. This article describes the rise of China as a priority in US trade policy, reviews the current set of US-China trade issues, and makes suggestions for the Biden administration going forward.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Grand Strategy, Multilateralism, Trade, Donald Trump, and Joe Biden
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

62. National Security Upate 13: Accessing the Technologies and Capabilities of the U.S. Commercial High-Tech Sector: A Defense Department Priority

Author:: Jack Kelly
Publication Date:: 03-2020
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis (IFPA)
Abstract:: Our thirteenth IFPA National Security Update examines the growing need of the Department of Defense to access and leverage the advanced dual-use technologies increasingly being developed in the commercial high-tech sector to maintain U.S. technological and military superiority. It focuses on the impediments facing the U.S. government and Defense Department in accessing commercial high-tech technologies, strategies and policies to remove these impediments, specific programs and initiatives to address the problem, and the concerns about the growing technological and military capabilities of China. Topics addressed in our National Security Update series include the FY2020 National Defense Authorization Act, hypersonic missiles, military applications of artificial intelligence, missile defense priorities, the Trump Administration’s Executive Order on Electromagnetic Pulse, the status of the Space Force, and China’s actions in the South China Sea and U.S. options.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Government, Science and Technology, Strategic Competition, and Defense Industry
Political Geography:: China, North America, and United States of America

63. Seven Ironies of Reconstructing a New Security Paradigm in the Gulf

Author:: Mohammed Cherkaoui
Publication Date:: 01-2020
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Al Jazeera Center for Studies
Abstract:: During the month of January 2020, most world capitals, diplomats, and think tanks sought to evaluate the status of the already-fragile balance of power in the Gulf. The U.S. President Donald Trump’s decision to assassinate the Iranian general Qassem Soleimani in Baghdad has triggered the most acute escalation between Washington and Tehran since 1979. The White House’s pursuit of neutralizing the second most important figure in Iran, after the spiritual leader Ayatollah Khamenei, has shifted the US-Iranian rivalry into a fierce confrontation between Washington’s “maximum pressure” and Tehran’s “maximum resistance”. There have been several interpretations and predictions of Iran’s possible direct or indirect acts of retaliation vis-à-vis Trump’s threats of targeting 52 sites, which have political and cultural significance for the Iranians. Some Washington-based analysts have been wary that “the U.S. and Iran are now in a traditional escalatory slope, and although neither side wants war, there is a real risk that it might happen.”(1) Anthony H. Cordesman, leading analyst at Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, has cautioned that the new US-Iran crisis “has now led to consistent failures in the U.S. strategy when dealing with Iraq and the Middle East for the last two decades – and has already turned two apparent ‘victories’ into real world defeats.”(2) In Doha, two research institutions, Aljazeera Centre for Studies and Qatar University’s Gulf Studies Centre, hosted a two-day conference, “Toward a New Gulf Security Order: Abandoning Zero-sum Approaches” at Qatar University January 19 and 20, to formulate new perspectives of the waning regional security order, and explore how to construct an alternative paradigm. As a point of entry, the Conference concept highlighted two manifestations of the failure of the existing security order, formally adopted by all Gulf States, since the establishment of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) May 25, 1981: First, to prevent the invasion, and later liberation, of Kuwait in the early 1990s. GCC established a coalition land force, “the Peninsular Shield Force”, with the objective of defending the six nation states, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Second, the decision of three member states - Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain - to impose a blockade on Qatar, a founding member of GCC since June 2017.(3) In this turbulent part of the world, Iran’s pursuit of creating a regional security order, but on the parsuit of the withdrawal of U.S. troops from the region—a condition rejected by Gulf states, which see the United States as the principal guarantor of their national security. Moreover, Iran still considers its own foreign interventions in the Gulf and Arab region as part of its revolutionary identity, to which it has devoted resources and agencies.(4) This paper “Seven Ironies of Reconstructing a New Security Paradigm in the Gulf” is a summary of the presentation I delivered at the Conference’s fifth panel “The Gulf and the US-Gulf Conflict”. It probes into several challenges of deconstructing the status quo, before envisioning an alternative framework of mutual security cooperation among several actors in the Gulf and the Middle East.
Topic:: International Relations, Foreign Policy, Oil, and Donald Trump
Political Geography:: Middle East, North America, United States of America, and Gulf Nations

64. A Thick Cloud in the US-Iran Climate

Author:: Ali Akbar Dareini
Publication Date:: 02-2020
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Al Jazeera Center for Studies
Abstract:: Neither Iran nor the United States want a full-fledged military war but the Trump administration’s campaign of “maximum pressure” and Soleimani’s assassination mean the two foes remain on collision course.
Topic:: Conflict Prevention, Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, and Qassem Soleimani
Political Geography:: Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

65. Making U.S. Foreign Policy Work Better for the Middle Class

Author:: Salman Ahmed, Wendy Cutler, Rozlyn Engel, David Gordon, Jennifer Harris, Douglas Lute, Daniel M. Price, Christopher Smart, Jake Sullivan, Ashley J. Tellis, and Tom Wyler
Publication Date:: 09-2020
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:: If there ever was a truism among the U.S. foreign policy community—across parties, administrations, and ideologies—it is that the United States must be strong at home to be strong abroad. Hawks and doves and isolationists and neoconservatives alike all agree that a critical pillar of U.S. power lies in its middle class—its dynamism, its productivity, its political and economic participation, and, most importantly, its magnetic promise of progress and possibility to the rest of the world. And yet, after three decades of U.S. primacy on the world stage, America’s middle class finds itself in a precarious state. The economic challenges presented by globalization, technological change, financial imbalances, and fiscal strains have gone largely unmet. And that was before the novel coronavirus plunged the country into the worst economic crisis since the Great Depression, exposed and exacerbated deep inequities across American society, led long-simmering tensions over racial injustice to boil over, and launched a level of societal unrest that the United States has not seen since the height of the civil rights movement.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Economy, Class, and Trade
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

66. 2020 Report on American Attitudes Toward the Korean Peninsula

Author:: Troy Stangarone and Juni Kim
Publication Date:: 09-2020
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:: KEI’s 2020 Report on American Attitudes Toward the Korean Peninsula focuses on U.S. views on relations with South Korea, U.S. awareness of South Korean brands and cultural products, and views on North Korea and was conducted by YouGov. The results reveal that while Americans have a favorable view of South Korea and about half are supportive of maintaining U.S. troops on the Korean Peninsula, few Americans watched or listened to Korean cultural products in the last year. Americans also view North Korea as one of the three critical challenges for the United States, but fewer than 1-in-3 approve of the administration’s handling of North Korea.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Economics, Human Rights, Politics, Culture, Public Opinion, and Domestic Policy
Political Geography:: North America, Korean Peninsula, and United States of America

67. The U.S.-Iran Showdown: Clashing Strategic Universes Amid a Changing Region

Author:: Ross Harrison
Publication Date:: 04-2020
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Al Jazeera Center for Studies
Abstract:: The United States and Iran are poised for a showdown. Understanding where we are today with this conflict and where we are likely to go in the future requires that we look at the conflicting strategic doctrines between the United States and Iran against a backdrop of a shifting Middle East.
Topic:: Conflict Prevention, Foreign Policy, Military Strategy, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:: Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

68. Into Orbit: Iran’s Nour 1 Satellite and the Two-Wing Doctrine

Author:: Ali Akbar Dareini
Publication Date:: 03-2020
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Al Jazeera Center for Studies
Abstract:: “The Central Intelligence Agency has been secretly supplying Iraq with detailed intelligence, including data from sensitive U.S. satellite reconnaissance photography, to assist Iraqi bombing raids on Iran’s oil terminals and power plants in the war between the two nations … Iraq reportedly used the intelligence to calibrate attacks with mustard gas on Iranian ground troops.” (1) This was a Washington Post report in 1986. “In 1988, during the waning days of Iraq’s war with Iran, the United States learned through satellite imagery that Iran was about to gain a major strategic advantage by exploiting a hole in Iraqi defenses. U.S. intelligence officials conveyed the location of the Iranian troops to Iraq, fully aware that (Saddam) Hussein’s military would attack with chemical weapons, including sarin, a lethal nerve agent.” (2) This was part of one of the declassified CIA documents published by Foreign Policy on 26 August 2013. Satellite imagery, communications intercepts and CIA assessments forwarded by the United States to Iraqi commanders showing ‘where the Iranian weaknesses were’ led to the death of many Iranian soldiers and civilians during the bloody 1980-88 war. That bitter and costly experience left a profound impact on the minds of Iranian military strategists. Having an intelligence eye to watch enemies from the sky and prevent similar disasters in the future preoccupied their brains. At the outset, possessing instruments of visual observation in the sky appeared to be a dream for many Iranians. But that would be a long-term project to make sure that Iran would not suffer again. Reconnaissance satellite is now widely seen as a strategic asset enabling states possessing this technology to obtain first-hand key information about the activities and resources of their enemies. It also enables states to protect their national security in this competitive world. This paper argues that great powers threaten weaker states. And regional powers like Iran have no option to survive but to get strong in order not to be bullied. It also argues that Iran, by successfully launching its “first military satellite” into orbit, has demonstrated a new capability that may shift the balance of power in its favor amid increasing tensions with the United States.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Power Politics, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:: Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

69. Majority of Iranians Oppose Development of Nuclear Weapons

Author:: Dina Smeltz and Amir Farmanesh
Publication Date:: 03-2020
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Chicago Council on Global Affairs
Abstract:: Both the United States and Iran have been among the countries worst hit by the coronavirus, but neither country has moved away from mutual confrontation. Nationwide surveys conducted by IranPoll this winter – before the spread of the virus and before the US strike against Iranian commander Qasem Soleimani – show that although Iranians say their country should not develop nuclear weapons, they have lost confidence in the nuclear agreement and think that the P5+1 countries (the five permanent members of the UN Security Council including China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States—plus Germany) have not lived up to their obligations. Chicago Council survey results from January 2020 show that a majority of Americans say they would favor rejoining the agreement if Iran restarts its nuclear weapons program.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Public Opinion, Disarmament, and UN Security Council
Political Geography:: Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

70. Do Republicans and Democrats Want a Cold War with China?

Author:: Dina Smeltz and Craig Kafura
Publication Date:: 10-2020
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Chicago Council on Global Affairs
Abstract:: Do Republicans and Democrats Want a Cold War with China? OCTOBER 13, 2020 By: Dina Smeltz, Senior Fellow, Public Opinion and Foreign Policy; Craig Kafura, Assistant Director, Public Opinion and Foreign Policy American Views of China Plummet; Public Split on Containment or Cooperation For the first time in nearly two decades, a majority of Americans describe the development of China as a world power as a critical threat to the United States, according to the 2020 Chicago Council Survey. At the same time, American feelings towards China have fallen to their lowest point in Council polling history, dating back to 1978. Reflecting these changing attitudes, Americans are now split on whether the US should cooperate and engage with China or actively seek to limit its influence. This is a significant change. Over the past four years, US-China relations have lurched from one crisis to another. Despite the sharp downturn in relations, and the growing consensus in Washington on pursing a more confrontational approach to China, Chicago Council Survey data through January 2020 showed that this consensus and the growing US-China rivalry had yet to make a deep impact on American views of China.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Cold War, Politics, Public Opinion, and Political Parties
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

71. OK, Boomer: Youth Hesitant to Use Force, Shun US Exceptionalism in Foreign Policy

Author:: Brendan Helm and Dina Smeltz
Publication Date:: 02-2020
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Chicago Council on Global Affairs
Abstract:: Millennials, the oft-referenced generation born in the ’80s and ’90s, are the first generation to have access to the internet in their youth and are the largest and most diverse generation in American history. Now for the first time, Millennials are running for US president: Pete Buttigieg and Tulsi Gabbard were born in 1982 and 1981 respectively, putting them at the upper limit of the Millennial range. The 2019 Chicago Council Survey data provide insight into how this group views key foreign policy issues compared with previous generations. While there is some evidence that younger Americans are more hesitant to engage in the world and more likely to oppose the use of force than their elders, time will tell whether the post-Cold War and 9/11 experiences have shaped a new generation with enduring preferences for a more restrained, less military-focused foreign policy.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, International Affairs, Public Opinion, and Youth
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

72. Brothers in Arms and Faith? The Emerging US-Central and Eastern Europe ‘Special Relationship’

Author:: Vibeke Schou Tjalve and Minda Holm
Publication Date:: 01-2020
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: In this policy note, we explore the nature, strength and tensions of the contemporary US-Central Eastern Europe relationship. We describe the expanding US-CEE ‘brotherhood in arms’: growing trade relations, intensified military cooperation, and rekindled diplomatic ties. Further, we unpack the striking and largely ignored dimensions of the US-CEE ‘brotherhood in faith’: the many ways in which the United States and Central and Eastern Europe are tied together by overlapping ideologies of national conservatism and a particular version of Christian ‘family values’. This involves addressing the complexities of an increasingly influential and ambitious Visegrád Group, whose key players – Poland and Hungary – may be brothers, but are by no means twins. It also means raising some broader, burning discussions about the future of NATO and the meaning of ‘Europe’. Universalist, multicultural and postnational? Or conservative, Christian and sovereigntist?
Topic:: International Relations, Foreign Policy, NATO, Military Affairs, and Trade
Political Geography:: Eastern Europe, North America, Central Europe, and United States of America

73. Stronger Together: A Strategy to Revitalize Transatlantic Power

Author:: Cathryn Clüver Ashbrook, Daniela Schwarzer, Christian Mölling, and Sophia Becker
Publication Date:: 12-2020
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:: The Harvard Kennedy School (HKS) and the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP) convened a strategy group of experts and former government officials from the United States and Europe over the past year to discuss the crisis in the transatlantic relationship and to propose a strategy to revive and strengthen it.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Economics, Energy Policy, Government, Science and Technology, Partnerships, Democracy, Trade, and Transatlantic Relations
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Europe, Middle East, North Africa, North America, and United States of America

74. Modernizing the Land-Based Leg of the Nuclear Triad: Myths and Facts

Author:: Rebeccah L. Heinrichs and Brandi Jackson
Publication Date:: 07-2019
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Hudson Institute
Abstract:: Across Democratic and Republican administrations over the past sixty years, U.S. strategists have determined that for the United States, a nuclear triad is the most strategically sound means to credibly deter adversaries. In an increasingly complex threat environment—facing nuclear adversaries and nuclear aspirants with different national objectives, military capabilities, and strategies—a nuclear triad provides the President of the United States with necessary flexibility while accounting for possible changes in adversaries’ capabilities and the geopolitical environment. To remain effective, the U.S. must modernize its Cold War legacy nuclear forces. This booklet is intended to dispel myths surrounding the land-based leg of the nuclear triad and explore the advantages of adopting the ground-based strategic deterrent missile system (GBSD) rather than continuing to recapitalize the aging Minuteman III system.
Topic:: International Relations, Foreign Policy, National Security, Nuclear Weapons, Science and Technology, Military Spending, and Missile Defense
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

75. The Cornerstone and the Linchpin: Securing America’s Northeast Asian Alliances

Author:: Patrick M. Cronin
Publication Date:: 10-2019
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Hudson Institute
Abstract:: During an era in which strategic gravity is shifting to Asia, the United States cannot be careless in tending to its alliances with Japan and South Korea (the Republic of Korea, or ROK). The three countries face persistent threats from North Korea and from China’s semi-transparent bid for regional hegemony. Meanwhile, rocky relations between Tokyo and Seoul are jeopardizing vital U.S. interests in the Indo-Pacific. The latest disagreement between America’s premier allies raises new questions about alliance strategy, commitment, and burden-sharing. These fissures have become exacerbated as the U.S. pressures allies to increase their contributions to regional security and reciprocal trade. [...] This report seeks to explain why the U.S.-Japan and U.S.-ROK alliance are still a vital means of achieving overlapping strategic interests. At the same time, it also argues that keeping these alliances fit for purpose requires radical change rather than business as usual. Both a rapidly changing security environment and growing intra-alliance squabbling pose dangers that require U.S. leadership. This report concludes with specific ideas for advancing bilateral and trilateral cooperation in the coming months and years, without trying to achieve too much too quickly.
Topic:: International Relations, Foreign Policy, Economics, International Security, and Alliance
Political Geography:: Japan, Asia, South Korea, North America, and United States of America

76. If You Can’t See ’em, You Can’t Shoot ’em: Improving US Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance, and Targeting

Author:: Seth Cropsey
Publication Date:: 11-2019
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Hudson Institute
Abstract:: This report tracks the development of naval and maritime intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and targeting (ISR/T) from the Cold War to the present day. It reveals the fluctuating relationship between ISR/T and weapons ranges that have adversely impacted the US Navy’s combat capabilities. While the United States developed longer-range weapons throughout the Cold War and revised tactics and fleet composition to better employ those weapons offensively, the gap that remained between weapons range and targeting information had a negative effect on US Navy combat power. Following the Cold War, while weapons and delivery-system range decreased, ISR/T capacity and capability rose, allowing for precision strikes against ground targets at short and medium range. Finally, the contemporary fleet, facing renewed great power competition, is increasingly receiving long-range strike weapons. However, it lacks the ISR/T complex to identify and hit targets at those ranges in most over-the-horizon combat situations. Second, this report reviews the current ISR/T capabilities to which the US Navy has access, primarily in the Pacific theater, and performs first-order sufficiency analysis to gain an understanding of the impact the current program of record has on operational requirements. Finally, the report concludes with several key recommendations to naval policymakers, civilian and military.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, National Security, Science and Technology, Military Affairs, and Surveillance
Political Geography:: Asia, North America, and United States of America

77. China’s Economic Slowdown: Root Causes, Beijing’s Response and Strategic Implications for the US and Allies

Author:: John Lee
Publication Date:: 12-2019
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Hudson Institute
Abstract:: This monograph attempts to argue and/or demonstrate three main points. First, it looks at why there were credible fears about the stability and viability of the Chinese economy — especially the financial and banking system — leading up to the end of the Twelfth Five Year Plan (2011–15), and what these were. To understand why Beijing was so concerned, the monograph draws out the serious structural problems that were leading inevitably to a permanent slowdown from the double-digit growth rates of the first three decades of reform. Second, the monograph looks at what occurred from 2015 to the present, and how China apparently overcame its economic difficulties. In fact, it has not overcome its problems, but deferred them to a future time in ways that only its unique authoritarian political economy is able to do.Third, it is clear the Communist Party is not passively awaiting an unhappy economic fate in connection with its mounting imbalances and domestic economic dysfunction. In many respects, its leaders have been highly creative in seeking solutions that do not entail a weakening of the party’s hold on economic power. On the contrary, the party has been busily shaping and pursuing grand strategic policies such as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and Made in China 2025 (MIC 2025) to solve or alleviate many of its domestic political-economic problems. This monograph argues that these and other outward-focused initiatives stem most fundamentally from Chinese weaknesses and vulnerabilities but are being remade and recast into initiatives that will strengthen the position of the CCP domestically, ensure greater resilience for its political economy, and advance its ambitious strategic and international objectives at the same time. In summary, it is about the Communist Party cleverly transforming domestic vulnerability into grand strategy and using economic approaches to gain pre-eminence and “win without fighting.”
Topic:: International Relations, Foreign Policy, National Security, Geopolitics, Economy, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

78. Crossed Wires: Recalibrating Engagement with North Korea for an Era of Competition with China

Author:: Kristine Lee, Daniel Kliman, and Joshua Fitt
Publication Date:: 12-2019
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:: The United States’ current diplomacy with North Korea has enduring implications for its strategic competition with China. Yet within the American foreign policy establishment, rising to the China challenge and managing the nuclear threat emanating from North Korea are often treated as two distinct rather than connected strands of the United States’ agenda in Northeast Asia. The rationale for maintaining some degree of bureaucratic and substantive segmentation between the two issue sets is well-founded. Addressing the North Korean threat warrants energy, resources, attention, and expertise independent of the “great power competition” framework delineated in the 2017 National Security Strategy and the 2018 National Defense Strategy. But excessive stovepiping may, at best, cause Washington to leave opportunities on the table that could advance its regional priorities, and at worst to risk the creation of mutually incompatible approaches to North Korea and China. U.S. negotiations with North Korea have already created strategic openings for China. The “security guarantees” that Pyongyang has demanded include, for example, the cessation of U.S. joint military exercises with South Korea and the removal from the Korean Peninsula of all American “strategic assets” such as nuclear-capable air and naval assets as well as anti-missile systems that could also be leveraged in a military contingency with China. As U.S. negotiators have locked horns with North Korean interlocutors since President Donald Trump and Kim Jong Un’s initial diplomatic foray in June 2018, China has touted its role as a champion of peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula, while using its relative proximity to Pyongyang to systematically undercut America’s approach. During the United States’ “maximum pressure” campaign in 2017, Beijing cast Pyongyang a vital lifeline, facilitating illegal ship-to-ship transfers of North Korean coal and petroleum in 2018, while leading a concerted push with Russia at the U.N. Security Council to try to fragment the North Korean sanctions regime. And China is poised to open the floodgates of investments into North Korea, particularly through strategic infrastructure projects in the event that Pyongyang’s demands for the relief of international sanctions yield results. Despite all of this, U.S. officials at the highest levels have publicly downplayed intimations of China’s counterproductive activities, thereby validating Beijing’s narrative that it has played a constructive role in supporting the United States’ approach to North Korea.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, and Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North Korea, North America, and United States of America

79. A More Focused and Resilient U.S.-India Strategic Partnership

Author:: Arzan Tarapore
Publication Date:: 10-2019
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:: The United States has made a “strategic bet” on India. This bet—“that India’s greater role on the world stage will enhance peace and security"—was a central pillar of the Obama administration’s rebalance to Asia, and it remains a central pillar of the Trump administration’s Indo-Pacific strategy. For nearly two decades, Washington has embraced the strategic logic that it should facilitate the rise of India as a great power because a stronger India is indispensable in counter-balancing Chinese power and ambitions. In this policy of strategic altruism, Washington should not be overly concerned with specific Indian preferences, strategies, or capabilities—the general growth in Indian power would help to uphold a favorable regional balance of power. Recently, this strategic logic has begun to show signs of strain. In part, this is the result of emerging policy divergences on a range of issues from bilateral trade to Indian arms purchases from Russia.4More fundamentally, aside from differences in policy preferences, analysts question whether India will have the capacity to play a significantly greater role in global and regional security. India’s economy and military capabilities have expanded, but only incrementally and arguably at a pace insufficient to keep up with China’s growing power and assertiveness—or with American expectations. Even the firmest proponents of this strategic bet, like senior analyst Ashley Tellis, have openly pondered, “if India continues along this path, does our bet on it become a failed bet?"6 As Indian capabilities and U.S. expectations evolve, how can the two countries work together to uphold a favorable balance of power in the Indo-Pacific? It is time for Washington to reframe its strategic bet on India. A close U.S.-India strategic partnership remains critical to meet the challenge a revisionist China poses. But the United States must adjust its policy approach to ensure the partnership is more focused on priority goals, and more resilient to inevitable disruptions. A more focused and resilient partnership would prioritize certain strategic tasks and geographic areas; in particular, the United States and India should cooperate to develop a denial strategy in the Indian Ocean.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, and Partnerships
Political Geography:: South Asia, India, North America, and United States of America

80. Escalation or Negotiation? Conclusions of a Tabletop Exercise on the Future of U.S.-Iran Relations

Author:: Elisa Catalano Ewers, Ilan Goldenberg, Nicholas Heras, and Kaleigh Thomas
Publication Date:: 06-2019
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:: On May 21, the Center for a New American Security (CNAS) hosted an all-day tabletop exercise (TTX) in Washington, D.C., to game out three scenarios related to the crisis surrounding U.S.-Iran tensions over Iran’s nuclear enrichment program and destabilizing regional policies. The intent was to understand how key players would respond and act in these potential scenarios. The TTX included seven teams: the United States, Iran, Europe (representing primarily France, Germany, and the United Kingdom but also the European Union), China, Russia, Israel, and the Gulf Arab States (one player as Saudi Arabia/UAE and the other player as Oman). Teams featured American and foreign regional and functional experts with a deep experience in their respective areas. Players were asked to play the most realistic version of their government.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:: Iran, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

81. Maintaining America’s Coercive Economic Strength: Five Trends to Watch in U.S. Sanctions

Author:: Howard Berman, Paula J. Dobriansky, Sue E. Eckert, Kimberly Ann Elliott, David L. Goldwyn, Peter Harrell, Theodore Kassinger, George A. Lopez, Richard Nephew, Michel Rademaker, Frederick Reynolds, Elizabeth Rosenberg, Daleep Singh, Julianne Smith, Adam Szubin, and Rachel Ziemba
Publication Date:: 03-2019
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:: U.S. foreign policy officials have embraced economic sanctions as a tool of choice for American foreign policy. Decisionmakers have deployed sanctions against strategic adversaries and national security threats ranging from Russia to non-state actors such as terrorist groups, drug cartels, and businesspeople who engage in corrupt activities. The appeal to both policy leaders and key constituent groups of the potent economic impacts of sanctions in several recent high-profile cases, particularly those of Iran, Russia, North Korea, and Venezuela, combined with broad bipartisan support for aggressive use of U.S. sanctions, suggests that the United States will favor this policy tool and be an active practitioner in the years ahead. This brief describes five of the most prominent and influential trends that could affect U.S. sanctions and other coercive economic measures in the future. The five trends are: (1) a shift toward more aggressive use of U.S. unilateral sanctions; (2) the growing role of Congress in enacting sanctions and managing their implementation; (3) an increased potential for unintended consequences as a result of growing complexity in sanctions; (4) accelerating efforts of foreign governments to insulate trade and payment channels from U.S. sanctions; and (5) new technological developments that may have the potential to both enhance and weaken the impact of U.S. sanctions in the years ahead.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, National Security, Sanctions, Elections, and Economy
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

82. Economic Dominance, Financial Technology, and the Future of U.S. Economic Coercion

Author:: Peter Harrell and Elizabeth Rosenberg
Publication Date:: 04-2019
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:: Coercive economic measures, such as sanctions, investment restrictions, trade controls, and tariffs, have become an increasingly important tool of U.S. foreign policy in recent years. Recent years have witnessed a strengthening of U.S. coercive economic measures, which are likely to remain powerful in the near and medium term. Over the longer term, purely commercial factors are likely to support continued U.S. coercive economic power. However, choices by both U.S. policymakers and foreign governments will be the primary determinant of whether coercive economic measures remain powerful tools of U.S. foreign policy over the longer term. Shifts in the nature of U.S. coercive economic power could prompt some shifts in the balance and nature of the type of coercive economic measures the United States deploys.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Economics, Science and Technology, Tariffs, and Trade
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

83. Monetizing The Linchpin: Trump's Foreign Policy versus the U.S.-Korea Alliance's Value to Washington

Author:: Kyle Ferrier
Publication Date:: 12-2019
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Korea Economic Institute of America (KEI)
Abstract:: The Trump administration’s increased emphasis on the cost of the U.S.-South Korea alliance has called into question its appreciation of Seoul’s contributions and raised concerns about the future of the relationship. Amid this uncertainty, this paper highlights key, yet underappreciated benefits that Washington receives from a strong alliance with Seoul. The cost-centric approach being applied to the U.S.-South Korea relationship follows an overarching trend in U.S. foreign policy under Trump, which the paper terms as “trading intangibles for tangibles.” In effect, the White House greatly underestimates the intangible value of longstanding U.S. foreign policy norms, often leveraging them—and in doing so, undermining them—in favor of short-term economic gains. Though intrinsically more difficult to quantify in dollars, intangible aspects of U.S. foreign policy have much greater financial and economic value to the United States. Consequently, and counterproductively, the Trump administration’s approach may actually prove to challenge the U.S. financially, even in areas where the economy isn’t directly involved, such as the U.S. alliance system. In the case of South Korea, Washington is putting its alliance credibility—consisting of deterrence against Pyongyang and assurance with Seoul—on the line by attempting to extract major financial concessions from Seoul, chiefly through military burden-sharing negotiations. The annual $5 billion contribution the U.S. is reportedly asking South Korea to agree to by the end of the year is a steep jump from the just under $1 billion Seoul agreed to earlier in the year. However, this annual $5 billion is dwarfed by what strong alliance credibility with Seoul provides Washington, which is at risk from the Trump administration’s intensified focus on cost. Still, the challenge remains that the nature of these benefits makes them difficult to quantify in dollars. To bridge this gap, the paper recontextualizes existing monetary figures across an array of areas to illustrate a baseline value of the key security benefits Washington enjoys through a strong U.S.-South Korea alliance—essentially, “tangibilizing” the intangibles. Though the actual list of benefits is far more expansive, the three explored in the paper are: preventing the return of armed conflict on the Korean Peninsula, fostering foreign policy convergence on the Korean Peninsula, and supporting common values in the Indo-Pacific.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Alliance, and Donald Trump
Political Geography:: Asia, South Korea, North America, and United States of America

84. Mobilizing Memories

Author:: Carol Graham
Publication Date:: 04-2019
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center for Contemporary Arab Studies (CCAS)
Abstract:: Carol Madison Graham (MAAS ’81) was the first MAAS graduate to enter the United States Foreign Service. She reflects on how the 1984 embassy bombing in Beirut inspired her current work to strengthen the Foreign Service for future generations.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Violence, and Memoir
Political Geography:: Middle East, Lebanon, North America, and United States of America

85. Grassroots Diplomacy Matters More Than Ever

Author:: Kala Carruthers Azar
Publication Date:: 04-2019
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center for Contemporary Arab Studies (CCAS)
Abstract:: Alum Kala Carruthers Azar, who serves as Assistant Cultural Affairs Officer at the U.S. Embassy in Amman, writes about the important role of people-to-people exchanges to American soft power.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Culture, and Soft Power
Political Geography:: Middle East, North America, Jordan, and United States of America

86. Q&A with Her Excellency Hunaina Al Mughairy

Author:: Isabel Roemer
Publication Date:: 05-2019
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center for Contemporary Arab Studies (CCAS)
Abstract:: Her Excellency Hunaina Sultan Al Mughairy has served as the Ambassador of the Sultanate of Oman to the United States since 2005. In this role, she has applied her extensive expertise in business and diplomacy to advocate for free trade between the U.S. and Oman. As the first Arab woman appointed to serve as ambassador to the U.S., Her Excellency also strives to dispel misconceptions of Arab women. Prior to this position, Ambassador Al Mughairy worked for the Permanent Mission of the Sultanate of Oman to the United Nations, the Omani Ministry of Commerce and Industry, and the Omani Center for Investment Promotion and Export Development. She also serves on the CCAS Board of Advisors and as Chair of the Sultan Qaboos Cultural Center in Washington, D.C., an organization that focuses on building bridges between the American and Omani peoples.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, Bilateral Relations, and Peace
Political Geography:: North America, Oman, United States of America, and Gulf Nations

87. Serving Citizens Abroad in Times of War

Author:: Julie A. Eadeh
Publication Date:: 05-2019
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center for Contemporary Arab Studies (CCAS)
Abstract:: For MAAS alum Julie Eadeh, diplomacy is all about human relationships, whether building connections with local communities or helping Americans abroad in times of crisis.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, War, and Hezbollah
Political Geography:: Middle East, Lebanon, North America, and United States of America

88. Training Georgetown’s Future Diplomats

Author:: Vicki Valosik
Publication Date:: 04-2019
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Center for Contemporary Arab Studies (CCAS)
Abstract:: A certificate program at the School of Foreign Service offers theoretical knowledge and practical training for aspiring diplomats. According to Ambassador Barbara Bodine, Director of Georgetown’s Institute for the Study of Diplomacy (ISD), the skills needed by today’s aspiring diplomats haven’t changed significantly since the days when she was preparing for her own long and successful diplomatic career. “On one level, they will need the skills diplomats have always needed: the ability to understand and shape policy, to work comfortably globally, to be able to analyze a large amount of information, and—critically important—the ability to write,” she says. “At the same time,” adds Bodine, who served as Ambassador to Yemen from 1997 to 2001, “twenty-first century diplomats also need to be able to manage large amounts of data and comfortably move from a known issue, a comfortzone issue, to something new. They need to be able to extrapolate from past experience to a new experience without rigid templates.”
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Government, and Higher Education
Political Geography:: United States of America and North America

89. National Security Update 11: Hypersonic Missiles and U.S. Security

Author:: Jack Kelly
Publication Date:: 11-2019
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis (IFPA)
Abstract:: This eleventh IFPA National Security Update examines hypersonic weapons; their unique capabilities and characteristics; their military and strategic implications; U.S., Chinese, and Russian efforts to develop hypersonic weapons; technical challenges; and the urgent need to develop missile defenses to counter the threat posed to the United States by hypersonic weapons. Previous National Security Updates have examined topics including U.S. missile defense priorities, nuclear modernization issues, U.S. options to counter the electromagnetic pulse (EMP) threat, the status of the U.S. Space Force, China’s actions in the South China Sea and U.S. options, and the military applications of artificial intelligence. In early 2017, the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis initiated an online series entitled National Security Update. Its purpose is to examine key foreign policy/defense issues and to set forth policy options. These updates are made available to the broad policy community within and outside government, including key policy makers in Washington, D.C.; members of Congress and their staffs; academic specialists; and other members of the private-sector security community. Future National Security Updates will address a range of topics in an effort to provide timely analyses and policy options.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, National Security, Science and Technology, and Weapons
Political Geography:: Russia, China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

90. U.S. Foreign Policy for the Middle Class: Perspectives from Colorado

Author:: Salman Ahmed, Allison Gelman, Wendy Cutler, Rozlyn Engel, David Gordon, Jennifer Harris, Brian Lewandowski, Douglas Lute, Daniel M. Price, Christopher Smart, Jake Sullivan, Ashley J. Tellis, Richard Wobbekind, and Tom Wyler
Publication Date:: 11-2019
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Abstract:: The American middle class is already taking center stage in the 2020 presidential electoral campaign, even in relation to debates about foreign policy. While the U.S. economy has been growing and unemployment rates have fallen, too many Americans still struggle to sustain a middle-class lifestyle. Meanwhile, major multinational corporations, China, and other foreign competitors reap enormous benefits from a global economy that U.S. leadership and security has helped underwrite. Therefore, candidates on both sides of the aisle have ample cause for debating whether changes to U.S. foreign policy are required to better advance the economic well-being of America’s middle class, even if middle-class fortunes largely depend on domestic factors and policies. This debate will be relevant long after the electoral cycle is over, however, and will influence the trajectory of U.S. global leadership and international affairs for decades to come. National security and foreign policy professionals in government need to be fully involved in this discussion, yet many are understandably consumed by geopolitical and security developments abroad and are, therefore, often distant or disconnected from economic realities at home. They rarely get to hear what Americans beyond Washington, DC, think about how U.S. foreign policy–related efforts may or may not intersect with these realities. Thus, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace initiated a new line of research on “foreign policy for the middle class” to help address this gap and bridge an important divide. In 2017, Carnegie convened a bipartisan task force of former senior policymakers to provide strategic direction to this research and ultimately make concrete recommendations. To inform these recommendations, the task force and a research team—including Carnegie scholars and university researchers—are gathering data on both the perceived and measurable economic effects of U.S. foreign policy on the middle class in three U.S. states in the nation’s heartland (Ohio, Colorado, and Nebraska). This report on Colorado, prepared with economists at the University of Colorado Boulder, is the second of the three case studies. The first study on Ohio, undertaken with The Ohio State University, was published in December 2018.1 Across multiple locales in Colorado, the research team conducted interviews and focus groups with state and local officials, economic developers, small business owners, employees, community leaders, teachers, nurses, tradesmen, and others who comprise, employ, and/or advance the interests of middle-class households. The conversation focused on how those interviewed assessed the economic well-being of Colorado’s middle class and whether they believed any significant changes in U.S. foreign policy could yield a better outcome. The interviews and focus groups took place between February and May of 2019, reflecting the events and policies up to that time.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Politics, Economy, Class, and Defense Industry
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

91. Germany and the Three Seas Initiative

Author:: Tomasz Żornaczuk
Publication Date:: 08-2019
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: This year, Germany participated for the second time in a Three Seas Initiative (TSI) summit as an observer. Its participation is motivated by the desire to strengthen cooperation with Central European countries and reduce divisions in the EU. It also aims to limit U.S. economic ambitions in the region, with TSI a potential key vehicle for them. Germany’s efforts to gain membership should be seen as a foreign policy goal. Its success could contribute to influencing infrastructure priorities in Central Europe, if implemented under the TSI.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, and Regional Cooperation
Political Geography:: Europe, Germany, North America, Central Europe, and United States of America

92. US Withdrawal from the Middle East: Perceptions and Reality

Author:: William F. Wechsler
Publication Date:: 10-2019
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Atlantic Council
Abstract:: This chapter is part of an edited volume that gathers analysis on the policy choices pursued by Washington and Moscow in the MENA region and develops case studies of the two powers’ policies in the countries beset by major crises
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Armed Forces, Military Affairs, and Crisis Management
Political Geography:: Russia, Eurasia, North America, and United States of America

93. Same Ends but Different Means: Change, Continuity and Moscow’s Middle East Policy

Author:: Mark N. Katz
Publication Date:: 10-2019
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Atlantic Council
Abstract:: This chapter is part of an edited volume that gathers analysis on the policy choices pursued by Washington and Moscow in the MENA region and develops case studies of the two powers’ policies in the countries beset by major crises.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Cold War, and Islamism
Political Geography:: Russia, Eurasia, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

94. Iraqi-Russian Relations amidst US Security-Focused Engagement

Author:: Abbas Kadhim
Publication Date:: 10-2019
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Atlantic Council
Abstract:: Iraq has a long and complicated history with the United States, and security and military engagements have been the primary driver of the relationship. Iraq’s relations with Russia, on the other hand, have been more transactional and economically-oriented. At a time when there are signs of US disengagement from the Middle East and North Africa while Russian and Chinese activities in the region are increasing, it is useful to trace the past US and Russian strategies in Iraq and assess how the United States could better tailor its strategy toward Iraq in the future in order to achieve durable outcomes that would bring benefits to both sides such as a responsive government, a thriving economy, and security. This chapter is part of an edited volume that gathers analysis on the policy choices pursued by Washington and Moscow in the MENA region and develops case studies of the two powers’ policies in the countries beset by major crises.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:: Russia, Iraq, Eurasia, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

95. Public and Opinion Leaders' Views on US-China Trade War

Author:: Craig Kafura
Publication Date:: 06-2019
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Chicago Council on Global Affairs
Abstract:: The Trump Administration has taken an aggressive line on US-China trade issues. Starting with steel and aluminum tariffs in March 2018, the United States has gradually imposed a number of tariffs on various Chinese goods. China responded in turn to each round. Recent negotiations, though initially fruitful, foundered on issues of Chinese subsidies and what US trade representative Robert Lighthizer described as “an erosion in commitments by China.” Now the escalation cycle has resumed. According to surveys conducted in 2018 among foreign policy opinion leaders by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs and the University of Texas, and the results of the 2018 Chicago Council Survey of the general US public, concerns about a potential trade war between the United States and China were already widespread before this most recent escalation.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, International Trade and Finance, Public Opinion, and Trade Wars
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

96. Rejecting Retreat

Author:: Dina Smeltz, Ivo H. Daalder, Karl Friedhoff, Craig Kafura, and Brendan Helm
Publication Date:: 09-2019
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Chicago Council on Global Affairs
Abstract:: The upending of US foreign policy under the Trump administration, the revolt against establishment politicians, and the rise of the progressive wing in US politics has led many foreign policy experts to conclude that Americans want to retreat from the world. Much of Washington and its foreign policy elite believe that “Iraq and other debacles” have left Americans wearied, worried, and inclined toward either America First or retrenchment ideas.1 They believe the American public sees the rules-based international order established after World War II as bankrupt. But that is not what the American public actually thinks. Americans may be searching for a new way to make sense of the world. But the 2019 Chicago Council Survey demonstrates that retreating from the world, abdicating international leadership, and abandoning alliances and global institutions is not what the American public has in mind.
Topic:: International Relations, Foreign Policy, Leadership, Alliance, Institutions, and Donald Trump
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

97. Rebuilding a Bipartisan Consensus on Trade Policy

Author:: Phil Levy
Publication Date:: 04-2019
Content Type:: Special Report
Institution:: Chicago Council on Global Affairs
Abstract:: Once upon a time, there was centrist, bipartisan support for US leadership in crafting an open global trading system. Over recent decades, though, as trade grew more complex, the share of US workers in manufacturing fell, and China emerged as an economic power, that consensus dissolved. By the 2016 election, both major party presidential candidates opposed the Trans-Pacific Partnership, a trade agreement central to US economic and foreign policy. Lest this opposition seem to represent a new consensus, it ushered in the recent period of political discord over trade. While some praised aggressive US actions to address trade deficits and national security concerns, others worried about the fraying of the global trading system and international markets lost to retaliatory barriers. This book provides the non-specialist reader with the background to understand the debates about trade. It begins by briefly tracing the history of US support for trade, as well as the shifts in the manufacturing sector that helped inspire calls to “make America great again.” It also considers the particular challenges posed by China’s emergence as a trading power while calling into question popular thinking on the resultant “China Shock” to US manufacturing. The book also offers an accessible guide to many of the esoteric topics that underlie today’s trade debates. It starts with tariffs, but proceeds to tackle issues such as trade deficits, intellectual property rights protection, rules of origin for goods, antidumping procedures, labor and environmental protections, and sovereignty. Finally, the book offers ways to move beyond the impasse that had emerged by 2016. Rather than focusing on a specific agreement such as the updated NAFTA (USMCA), it looks at whether deals should be bilateral or multilateral, and just how transparent negotiations need to be. It divides some particularly contentious issues into those that are easily addressed, those that might be feasible with work, and those that are nonstarters. While most of the work to restore a consensus would be difficult, the rewards would be great. The book concludes with a warning that the penalties for not restoring US leadership on trade could be severe.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Economy, Trade Policy, and Political Parties
Political Geography:: China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

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COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS