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Begin New Search Topic Syrian War Political Geography Middle East Content Type Special Report Publication Year within 3 Years Publication Year within 10 Years

1. Time to change track Assessing the UN’s conflict mediation strategy for Syria from 2019 to 2023

Author:
Malik al-Abdeh and Lars Hauch
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
The United Nations (UN) has become largely irrelevant to diplomatic efforts to resolve the Syria conflict. This report shows that the primary reason has been the fact that the main conflict parties never wanted to resolve the Syrian conflict by other than military means. Yet, the report also highlights secondary reasons within this unfavourable context, namely: the frames, methods and choices of the UN Special Envoy and his team at times misjudged or poorly corresponded with the realities of the conflict. Moreover, the capacity of the Office of the Special Envoy (OSE) remained too limited. The report suggests that the time is ripe for the OSE to reinvent itself as a principled thought leader and to develop an operational framework that brings a safe, calm and neutral environment (SCNE) closer as a practical conflict management modality.
Topic:
Diplomacy, United Nations, Syrian War, and Mediation
Political Geography:
Middle East and Syria

2. Iran Entangled: Iran and Hezbollah’s Support to Proxies Operating in Syria

Author:
Nakissa Jahanbani and Suzanne Weedon Levy
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point
Abstract:
At a time when power dynamics in the Middle East region are in flux due to the shifting circumstances of the Islamic State, the drawdown of U.S. troops in the region, and the intensification of Iranian-backed attacks on U.S. and Saudi Arabian targets in the region, an historical look at the support Iran and Lebanese Hezbollah (LH) provided to proxies during the Syrian civil war may yield insights into Iran’s past and present playbook not only in Syria but potentially other contexts. The civil war in Syria was a unique catalyst that intensified Iranian economic, political, and religious activity in the country, which was ongoing since the 1980s. During the conflict, Iran demonstrated the ability to exert influence tactically while also building a religious and social support base in Syrian society. Iran achieved these goals, in part, through raising and supporting various non-state militant groups in Syria. Drawing on open sources and interviews with subject matter experts, this report investigates the nature of Iranian and LH support to proxies operating in Syria from 2011 to 2019. While the nature of Iran’s proxy network is dynamic, it is useful to investigate the network at its peak years to understand existing and potential future structures and capabilities for Iranian external operations. This report investigates support from Iranian actors—inclusive of the IRGC and its various components, notably the Quds Force (IRGC-QF), as well as the Iranian government more generally—and LH through the lens of kinetic (e.g., joint attacks between the militias and Iranian actors and/or LH, personnel placed with militias, and training and weapons provided to militias) and non-kinetic assistance (e.g., funding, logistical support, recruitment and social service assistance, and meetings between Iranian actors and/or LH and militias). Looking at these two categories of support provides a more holistic snapshot of Iranian influence and capacity-building with proxies in Syria. The report’s findings indicate a pattern of support on the part of Iran and LH that potentially indicates a phased rollout of battlefield-related supports to be replaced with longer-term societal entrenchment efforts. Furthermore, Iran and LH share a division of labor between Iranian actors and LH for kinetic supports, but not non-kinetic ones. Specifically, this report found training, weapons provisions, funding, and joint attacks among the most common supports provided by Iran and LH. Finally, of all Iranian actors, this report found the IRGC to be the most prolific supporter to proxies operating in Syria.
Topic:
Terrorism, Weapons, Syrian War, Hezbollah, Proxy War, Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corp (IRGC), Strategy, and Military Tactics
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, and Syria

3. A new conflict management strategy for Syria: Creating a Safe, Calm and Neutral Environment

Author:
Malik al-Abdeh and Lars Hauch
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
The search for peace in Syria faces a deep crisis. The battlefield has reached a stalemate, the Constitutional Committee never emerged from its cul-de-sac, and the UN’s ‘step-for-step’ approach suffers from flawed conceptual underpinnings as well as a lukewarm reception. Meanwhile, Syria remains divided into three areas that risk drifting further apart amid deteriorating humanitarian conditions. This reality on the ground should serve as a marker for recalibrating Western policy on Syria beyond the current focus on sanctions, accountability, and humanitarian aid. Western policy makers – mostly those from the US, European Union and Turkey – must base a much-needed new conflict management strategy on three ‘ground truths’: 1) the conflict is largely frozen and Syria is likely to remain divided into competing areas of control that are supported, or overseen, by external powers for the foreseeable future; 2) questions of national legitimacy and power sharing are not currently solvable and must be temporarily put on the back burner; c) diplomatic efforts to stabilise Syria and prevent partition are likely to be more effective when they focus on restoring practical connectivity between the different areas of control in terms of flows of people, goods and trade/aid/investment, as well as education. Such a strategy can take shape by operationalising the UN-sanctioned concept of a ‘safe, calm and neutral environment’ (SCNE) via a clear set of principles for engagement, a detailed stakeholder/interest mapping of the various conflict parties, and a focus on pragmatic measures to improve daily conditions. The objective of such a strategy is to enable a durable return to relatively normal life for Syrians still living in the country, and to create linkages between the country’s war-torn parts that can open windows of opportunity in the longer term for a political process reflecting the intention of UNSCR 2254.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Diplomacy, Syrian War, Peace, and Conflict Management
Political Geography:
Middle East and Syria

4. Putin Prioritizes Syria. Biden Should Too.

Author:
Anna Borshchevskaya
Publication Date:
03-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Georgetown Journal of International Affairs
Abstract:
Moscow is in Syria for the long haul and will continue to undermine American efforts there. In recent months, Moscow intensified its activities in Syria against the backdrop of a changing US administration. The Kremlin sent additional military policy units to eastern Syria, and continued diplomatic engagement through the Astana format, a process that superficially has international backing but in practice excludes the United States and boosts Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad. Moreover, Moscow also unveiled at its airbase in Syria a statue to the patron saint of the Russian army, Prince Alexander Nevsky. A growing Russian presence in Syria will further hurt Western interests.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Conflict, and Syrian War
Political Geography:
Russia, Middle East, Syria, and United States of America

5. Henchman, Rebel, Democrat, Terrorist: The YPG/PYD during the Syrian conflict

Author:
Erwin van Veen
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
This report analyses the role of the Syrian Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) and the associated Democratic Union Party (PYD) during the Syrian civil war. The purpose of our research is to obtain a better understanding of the nature, objectives and methods of the YPG/ PYD as a combined paramilitary and rebel force that is involved in a quasi-statebuilding project during an internationalised civil war. We start by examining the critical factors that enabled the swift rise of the YPG: informal arrangements with the Assad regime, support from the Kurdistan Workers’ Party and a pragmatic partnership with the US against Islamic State. This sets the scene for an inquiry into how core YPG strategies to maintain its dominance once it was established – coercive, deal-making, identity and basic service strategies – both shape the group’s behavior and result from its current organization. Finally, we dissect a number of major challenges to future YPG rule, such as its relation with the PKK, intra-Kurdish reconciliation, the US presence in northeast Syria and its interaction with the Arab populations over which it rules. Based on our analysis, we anticipate a scenario of ‘muddling through’ in which unconditional support from the US will continue at current levels, combined with an abiding US military presence. This will provide the YPG/ PYD with a security umbrella against both regime forces and Turkey, continue the status quo of the YPG/ PYD ruling northeast Syria in authoritarian fashion, make the civil war more ethno-sectarian in nature and prolong the conflict. While such a scenario is arguably more attractive for northeast Syria than a return of the regime, it is also unlikely to improve the area’s current underdevelopment. It will keep other external actors, like the EU, away and allow the PKK to continue to take its share of the area’s revenues. The primary audience of the report are Western opinion-, policy- and decision-makers engaged with the Syrian civil war and we hope it will help them to craft policies and initiate interventions that are feasible and appropriate to the situation in northeast Syria.
Topic:
Conflict, Syrian War, and YPG
Political Geography:
Middle East, Syria, United States of America, and European Union

6. Lessons of the Syrian Conflict: Toward a Better Intervention Debate

Author:
Nick Danforth
Publication Date:
12-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
In October 2019, The New York Times published a feature story describing how “Russia, Turkey and Bashar al-Assad carved up northern Syria as the Americans retreated.”1 It is hard to think of a more telling, and damning, one-sentence encapsulation of both the failure of American policy in Syria and the skewed political discourse compounding it. Somehow the United States was retreating from a place it never wanted to occupy—and the Syrian regime’s success in partially clawing back control of a country it once ruled with an iron fist was prime evidence of American decline. This paper begins from the premise that Washington will increasingly be confronted with conflicts where it can neither determine the outcome nor stay out entirely, and the country needs better strategies for charting a middle course. Given the scale of the tragedy that has befallen Syria, and the damaging repercussions it continues to have for U.S. interests in the region, few would argue that Washington’s handling of the Syrian civil war represents a success. Yet there remains no consensus on the nature of Washington’s failure. In a highly charged debate, many critics are adamant that faster and more forceful military intervention could have secured a more favorable outcome. Others, by contrast, are equally insistent that Washington should have done even less. It is possible that the ideal form of intervention advocated by interventionists or the ideal form of nonintervention advocated by noninterventionists would have created a better outcome in Syria. Instead, Washington pursued a sometimes-inconsistent intermediate approach that achieved the worst of both worlds. The United States engaged in the conflict in a way that put its credibility at stake without positively affecting the outcome. By examining how this happened, this paper seeks to ensure that Washington can avoid similar failures in the future.
Topic:
Military Intervention, Conflict, and Syrian War
Political Geography:
Middle East and Syria