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1. China/United States: Europe off Balance

Author:
Thomas Gomart and Marc Hecker
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
As French President Emmanuel Macron (accompanied by Ursula von der Leyen) is on a state visit to China, some twenty Ifri researchers decipher the stakes of the U.S./China/Europe strategic triangle. This 16-text study follows Olaf Scholz’s visit to Beijing (November 2022) and precedes that of Emmanuel Macron (April 2023). It comes especially one year after the beginning of a geopolitical and geoeconomic shock of a rare magnitude: the invasion of Ukraine by Russia. The War in Ukraine or the Return of Bloc Geopolitics? The war in Ukraine has broken ties between the European Union (EU) and Russia for the foreseeable future, particularly in the field of energy, though not without consequences in the Middle East, Africa, and the Indo-Pacific. Furthermore, this war has become the main show of active indirect confrontation between the United States—which has provided military support to Ukrainians, with help from its European allies—and China, which has supported Russia politically and economically. In February 2022, Moscow and Beijing declared their “no limits friendship”; in March 2023, Xi Jinping offered his personal support to Vladimir Putin after the International Criminal Court issued a warrant for his arrest. In its position on the political settlement of the Ukraine crisis, presented in February 2023, China stated: “All parties should oppose the pursuit of one’s own security at the cost of others’ security, prevent bloc confrontation, and work together for peace and stability on the Eurasian Continent”. China is no more of a mediator than the United States: it would be unrealistic to believe so. We appear to be witnessing a return of bloc geopolitics, albeit in a starkly different context than that of the Cold War (1947-1991). Globalization has produced strong economic and technological interdependencies that make any prospect of decoupling very costly, if not impossible. Economic partners are no longer necessarily military allies, and vice versa. In other words, a gap is opening up between geopolitical perceptions and geoeconomic realities. The term “decoupling” is popular in the United States, though much less so elsewhere. The rejection of bloc geopolitics is particularly acute outside of the West, where a “pragmatic” approach to foreign policy is often promoted. The Saudi foreign minister summed this up during the World Policy Conference in December 2022: “Polarization is the last thing we need right now. […] We need to build bridges, strengthen connections, and find areas of cooperation”. A few months later, China pulled off an extraordinary diplomatic coup by brokering a deal to restore relations between Riyadh and Tehran. For the EU, the situation is particularly delicate: Europe is in the Western camp, but a severing of ties with Beijing would cause a crushing economic blow. In 2022, China accounted for more than 20% of the EU’s imports, while the United States accounted for around 12%. By 2030, the EU’s GDP is expected to rise to $20.5 trillion, compared to $30.5 trillion for the United States and $33.7 trillion for China. In January 2023, the President of the European Commission declared at Davos: “We still need to work and trade with China, especially when it comes to this transition. So, we need to refocus our approach on de-risking, rather than decoupling”. For its part, Beijing has encouraged European aspirations of “strategic autonomy”, understood in China as a form of detachment from the United States. At the same time, the EU is constantly strengthening its military, technological, financial and energy ties with the U.S. This collective study notes a hypothetical search for balance on the part of the Europeans, faced with a war on their territory (the Western peninsula of the heartland), who cannot escape Sino-American mechanisms, and who do not form a monolithic whole. It also analyzes the strategy of several important actors outside our continent, and shows that, from Ukraine to Taiwan, via Africa and the Middle East, Europeans have little room for maneuver. This is why the study proposes recommendations to try, at a crucial moment, to reinforce their positioning.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Climate Change, International Trade and Finance, Science and Technology, European Union, and Industry
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and United States of America

2. The EU in the South Caucasus: Navigating a geopolitical labyrinth in turmoil

Author:
Bob Deen and Wouter Zweers
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
The tectonic plates of geopolitics are shifting in such a profound way that has not been seen since the end of the Cold War. The Russian invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022 has not only increased tensions between the world’s major powers, but also severely impacted the regions in which they traditionally strive to project their power. This applies especially to areas in the wider Eurasian region that the Russian Federation unjustifiably considers as part of its sphere of influence, such as the South Caucasus. Russia’s failure to achieve a quick and decisive victory in its full-scale invasion of Ukraine has not only forced the Kremlin to limit its objectives on the battlefield, at least for the time being, to Ukraine’s east. It has also reduced the credibility of the Russian military that much of its power projection has depended upon – and has reduced its attractiveness as a security partner for countries that have traditionally regarded Russia as such. Russia has had to withdraw some of its troops and military equipment from the South Caucasus, its leadership is preoccupied with Ukraine, and it has not lived up to its security commitments to Armenia. This has contributed to a geopolitical vacuum and uncertainty in the South Caucasus that other actors are eager to exploit.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, European Union, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:
Europe and South Caucasus

3. Russia’s War in Ukraine: Rethinking the EU’s Eastern Enlargement and Neighborhood Policy

Author:
Guntram Wolff, Alexandra Gritz, Stefan Meister, and Milan Nič
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:
The stagnating EU accession process needs political will and procedural changes allowing eastern candidates to advance. In the meantime, they should be more supported to use the full potential of existing opportunities for gradual economic and sectoral integration with the EU. An upgraded Eastern Partnership needs a comprehensive security dimension linking resilience, connectivity, and defense policy, as well as cooperation in the area of the Common Security and Defence Policy. The protracted regional conflicts (in Moldova and the South Caucasus) require a more active EU engagement as existing OSCE formats continue to be blocked, and Russia’s role and military presence weaken. New openings for conflict resolution mean higher demand for the EU’s diplomatic, monitoring, and peacekeeping capacities. A new eastern Neighborhood Policy should be designed for the wider region, connecting the Black Sea and the South Caucasus with Central Asia and thus creating viable alternatives to the competing geoeconomic and governance “offers” of China, Russia, and Turkey.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Governance, European Union, International Order, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Central Asia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

4. Two Peripheries: The Ukraine War's Effect on North Korea-Russia Relations

Author:
Anthony V. Rinna
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
East-West Center
Abstract:
Spanning the Eurasian landmass, Russia’s actions in adjacent Ukraine invariably affect the geopolitical state of play on the similarly adjacent Korean Peninsula. Although ties between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) and Russia have been of largely secondary importance for both countries since their veritable rupture in the early- and mid-1990s, Moscow-Pyongyang relations became more mutually beneficial in 2022. Whereas most countries have outright condemned Russia’s invasion of Ukraine or taken up an ambiguous position, the DPRK has been vocal in its support for Russia. From the DPRK perspective, the Kremlin’s post-2022 diplomatic and economic estrangement from much of the world has provided Pyongyang with an opening to leverage ties with Russia to push for an easing of its own diplomatic and economic isolation. Meanwhile, strengthening its DPRK ties allows Russia to undermine US influence on its Asian periphery. In supporting Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, North Korea appears to be aiming toward obtaining economic benefits from closer ties with Russia, a country whose economy has managed to stay afloat despite heavy Western sanctions. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has provided the impetus for Pyongyang’s outreach to Moscow. However, the roots of the current upswing in Moscow-Pyongyang relations go back to the April 2019 summit between Kim Jong Un and Vladimir Putin. Kim received an invitation to meet with Putin in May 2018 yet waited eleven months to meet with the Russian leader, even as Kim regularly met with the leaders of other major players on the Korean Peninsula. Kim may have decided after the February 2019 Hanoi summit yielded few results that strengthening ties with Russia, which was more reluctant than China to support UN sanctions against Pyongyang in 2017, was a more viable option for sanctions relief. Aside from the fact that Russia has demonstrated a clear unwillingness to impose new sanctions against the DPRK, North Korean citizens are reported to still be working in Russia in contravention of UN Resolution 2397. North Korean workers’ earnings are said to have suffered because of Russia’s reduced access to hard currency. Yet, the ruble’s continued resilience may mean that earning currency in Russia is still worthwhile for laborers dispatched at Pyongyang’s behest.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, Economics, and Politics
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, Asia, and North Korea

5. United Kingdom Engagement with North Korea

Author:
Alastair Morgan
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
East-West Center
Abstract:
As one of the Allied Powers, The United Kingdom was involved in Post-World War II planning for the Korean peninsula, including the November 1943 Cairo Conference declaration that “… in due course, Korea shall become free and independent.” However, US President Roosevelt’s proposal at the February 1945 Yalta Conference did not establish a formal role for the UK in the trusteeship of Korea. Subsequently, the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to divide the peninsula at the 38th parallel in August 1945, and direct British involvement in the peninsula was limited prior to the Korean War. The United Kingdom’s Korean War contribution to the United Nations Command was second only to the United States, with significant deployments of maritime and air assets in addition to the provision of ground troops. Almost 60,000 British troops saw action, with nearly 5,000 killed, wounded, missing in action, or taken prisoner. Following the armistice, the United Kingdom has continued to send representation to the United Nations Command. The armistice agreement includes an obligation on so-called “Sending States” to respond to renewed hostility. Although there is no automatic UK commitment to send forces, the armistice agreement remains a consideration in engagement with North Korea.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, Economics, Education, Politics, and Strategic Engagement
Political Geography:
United Kingdom, Europe, Asia, and North Korea

6. North Korea-Germany Relations: An Ambassador's Perspective of Diplomacy with Pyongyang

Author:
Armin Schäfer
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
East-West Center
Abstract:
Germany established diplomatic relations with North Korea, also known as the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), in 2001 at the request of the South Korean government, which hoped that Germany and the European Union (EU) would play a more active role in supporting the “Sunshine Policy.” Since then, Germany, together with the other EU states, has sought to moderate North Korea through a “Policy of Critical Engagement” to convince it of the benefits of international cooperation, respect for the rule of law, and improving the political and economic situation of its people. In doing so, Germany could build on the long relationship between North Korea and the former East Germany. “Critical engagement” means being willing to talk and get involved, but without holding back on criticism—and, if need be, imposing sanctions. It also implies that comprehensive engagement is not (yet) possible because of the circumstances. There is ample cause for a constrained approach from North Korea’s aggressive foreign policy and systematic human rights violations to the absence of suitable economic and fiscal conditions for business and development cooperation. Moreover, the lack of will on the part of considerable segments of the North Korean regime to engage with other countries also hampers broader engagement.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Economics, Education, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:
Europe, Asia, North Korea, and Germany

7. The Frontline States: Conversations and Observations About Russia’s Other War in Europe

Author:
Philip Wasielewski
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
From late June to mid-July 2023, I visited Georgia, Moldova, Hungary, Poland, and Lithuania on a research trip. The analysis and conclusions in this report are based, in part, on conversations with a wide variety of individuals from former government officials, university students, academics, and members of non-governmental organizations to ordinary citizens. The Kremlin desires to reestablish a sphere of influence in former Soviet republics and Warsaw Pact states between the Black and Baltic Seas. To do so, it is fighting a conventional war in Ukraine and political wars elsewhere to remove Western influence and reestablish hegemony. Russia’s political warfare operations have a major flaw; they only offer people the past and not a future. However, US efforts against them could be more effective and citizens in frontline states facing Russian subversion have constructive criticisms to improve them. Resisting Russian subversion depends as much on the political health of the targeted state as Western countermeasures. Efforts to oppose backsliding on democratic norms are vital, even if they spark tensions with partners and allies. Several countries in the region will hold elections between the fall of 2023 and 2025 that will determine their geopolitical orientation. If the war in Ukraine is a battle of modern weapon systems, these elections will be a war of ideas between East and West. It is important that the United States not cede the narrative for these elections to Moscow and work with allies and partners to counteract anti-Western propaganda.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Regional Politics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Eurasia, and Ukraine

8. Turkey after the elections, what direction it will take

Author:
Vít Marek
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Europeum Institute for European Policy
Abstract:
On Wednesday, June 7, a debate took place as part of the Café Evropa cycle, on the topic: "Turkey after the elections, which direction will it go?". The invitation to the debate was accepted by Lucia Najšlová, political scientist and author of the book Turkey and the EU: The Politics of Belonging, as well as by Deník N journalist Dominika Píhová and Břetislav Tureček, head of the Center for Middle East Studies at the Metropolitan University in Prague. The debate was moderated by Žiga Faktor, the head of the Brussels office of the EUROPEUM Institute for European Policy.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Elections, European Union, and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan
Political Geography:
Europe and Turkey

9. Transatlantic Trends 2023: Public Opinion in a Shifting Global Order

Author:
Alexandra de Hoop Scheffer, Martin Quencez, and Gusine Weber
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
Transatlantic Trends 2023 presents the results of representative surveys conducted in 14 countries on both sides of the Atlantic: Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Sweden, Türkiye, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Divided into five chapters, this report assesses public opinion on contemporary structural issues impacting the world order, transatlantic relations, security and defense, China, and global challenges.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Public Opinion, European Union, Democracy, Geopolitics, and Transatlantic Relations
Political Geography:
China, United Kingdom, Europe, Turkey, Ukraine, France, Poland, Germany, Global Focus, and United States of America

10. The Berlin Pulse 2023/24 (full issue)

Author:
Julia Ganter, Steffen Müller, Sarah Pagung, Norbert Röttgen, and Lila Roldán Vázquez
Publication Date:
11-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Körber-Stiftung
Abstract:
What do Germans und US citizens think about the most pressing foreign policy issues? Here are the highlights of this year’s public opinion survey, addressing Germany’s international role, biggest challenges and most important partners. A majority (57 per cent) of Germans believe that Germany’s international influence has declined over the past two years, despite Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s proclaimed Zeitenwende. As a result, only 38 per cent of respondents would like to see Germany become more engaged in international crises. This is the lowest figure since the start of the survey in 2016. 76 per cent believe that this involvement should preferably be of a diplomatic nature, compared to 65 per cent last year. 71 per cent of respondents are against Germany taking a leading military role in Europe.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Public Opinion, Military Spending, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe, Germany, North America, and United States of America

11. Turkey's Response to the Russia-Ukraine Crisis

Author:
Aaron Stein
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
On October 26, 2021, Ukraine’s Ministry of Defense released video of a TB2 unmanned combat aerial vehicle (UCAV) striking a separatist D-30 howitzer in Russian-occupied Donbas. The strike was Ukraine’s first confirmed use of the now ubiquitous TB2, the Bayraktar-manufactured drone that the Turkish military has used to great tactical effect in Syria, Libya, and Nagorno-Karabakh. The Turkish-Ukrainian defense relationship is understudied, but it could become an important factor in how Russian elites view North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) support for non-member Ukraine, and be used to justify an invasion to assuage Moscow’s concerns about a US-allied military presence along its borders. The Turkish support for Ukraine is not the main driver of Russian discomfort about the future of Ukraine. The TB2 is also not a decisive game changer, and the use of UCAVs is almost certain to have little impact on how Russian leadership weighs risk during debates about the efficacy of armed conflict in a neighboring state. Nevertheless, Turkish-Ukrainian defense ties are worthy of deeper study, precisely because Ankara’s relationships with Kyiv and Moscow have a secondary impact on American interests in Eastern Europe. The Turkish-Russian relationship is marred by bureaucratic distrust, which is papered over by a very functional leader-to-leader dynamic that enables the two Black Sea neighbors to cooperate and manage numerous regional conflicts. The Turkish-Ukrainian dynamic, in turn, is part of a broader Turkish effort to establish itself as an independent actor, committed to pursuing a foreign policy that often clashes with much of the NATO alliance. This paper will explore Turkish-Russian and Turkish-Ukrainian relations; the reasons for Turkey’s efforts to “fence sit” and establish itself as a neutral political actor in the Black Sea; and what these efforts portend for US interests in the region.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, NATO, and Crisis Management
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Turkey, Ukraine, and Middle East

12. How Will China Respond to the Russia-Ukraine Crisis?

Author:
Chris Miller
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
How will China respond to a potential Russian military escalation against Ukraine? Relations between Russia and China have intensified in recent years, with Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping holding regular summits and the two countries’ militaries participating in joint exercises and cooperating in some defense industrial efforts. Ties between Moscow and Beijing are now closer than any time since the days of Stalin and Mao, driven by a shared perception that the United States is each country’s primary foreign policy challenge. One top Russian official told media in December 2021 that the relationship now “exceeds an alliance.”[1] Chinese state media, meanwhile, have vocally backed Russia in arguing that the current crisis stems from the US “using NATO as a tool to cannibalize and squeeze Russia’s strategic space.”[2] The 2014 war in Ukraine and annexation of Crimea was an important factor driving Russia and China closer to each other, as Russia sought to reduce post-Crimea international isolation and as Beijing realized it could drive a hard bargain in its bilateral relationship with Russia on issues like energy. China’s response to the 2014 war, however, was generally to avoid taking sides. China accepted a narrative that placed blame on the West for causing the crisis, with top diplomats citing Western “foreign interference for causing the crisis,” but didn’t approve of Russia’s seizure of Crimea or its military actions in the Donbas.[3] China abstained from voting on the key United Nations resolutions regarding Crimea, for example, and it still declines to recognize Crimea as Russian territory. Similarly, it verbally rejected US and European sanctions on Russia though it let Chinese firms, including the country’s big state-owned banks, abide by these sanctions to avoid being cut off from US financial markets and the international banking system. Compared to 2014, however, China may find it more difficult to avoid involvement in an escalating crisis. Leaders in Beijing and around the world will see the US response to any military escalation against Ukraine as sending signals about whether the US could effectively respond to future crises in the Taiwan Strait or East or South China Seas. The success or failure of US efforts to impose meaningful costs on Russia if it escalates will be seen as a test of whether the US could do something similar in Asia. Moreover, after repeated summits between Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin, including Xi’s description of Putin as his “best friend,” China’s approach to Russia amid a crisis will also be interpreted as sending signals about China’s own capabilities and influence. Because of this, China will not see a new phase of war between Russia and Ukraine as a peripheral issue in its foreign policy, even though China has no core issues at stake in Ukraine itself. China is most likely to be implicated in the crisis by potential Western sanctions on Russia, which in contrast to 2014 will impose substantially more pressure on Beijing to take sides. China’s decision either to adhere to new Western sanctions or to help Russia avoid them will shape escalation pathways and determine the magnitude of economic and political isolation that sanctions impose.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Politics, Sanctions, Military Affairs, Economy, Crisis Management, and Escalation
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Eurasia, Ukraine, and Asia

13. France Should Embrace the Transatlantic Relationship—and Help Lead It

Author:
Angélique Talmor
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
French President Emmanuel Macron’s assertion three years ago that the transatlantic alliance was “braindead” rings as utterly misguided today.1 The resurgence of war in Europe has reinforced NATO’s raison d’être and forced Europeans to face the fact that there is no realistic alternative to transatlantic cooperation. Further, more European policy leaders recognize China’s increasing threat,2 which bolsters the case for Western “friend shoring” on defense and other issues. This process will require leadership on both sides of the Atlantic. France, the largest military power in the European Union and the second-largest EU economy, is more reluctant to embrace Atlanticism than most of its NATO counterparts. This hesitance risks limiting the success and scope of efforts to reinforce transatlantic cooperation. Nonetheless, in the evolving geopolitical context, France’s best shot at preserving its interests and influence would be through embracing Atlanticism and helping lead the reinforcement of transatlantic cooperation in the realm of defense and beyond. American policymakers should encourage and extend a hand to their oldest ally to embrace such a shift.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Politics, European Union, and Transatlantic Relations
Political Geography:
Europe, France, North America, and United States of America

14. Competitive Connectivity: Crafting Transatlantic Responses to China’s Belt and Road Initiative

Author:
Andrea Kendall-Taylor, Lisa Curtis, Jacob Stokes, Carisa Nietsche, Joshua Fitt, and Nicholas Lokker
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
Given the uncertain future of BRI, researchers at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS) identified the major drivers likely to influence the direction of the program and examined their numerous permutations. The authors selected three scenarios and focused on how conditions of each scenario would play out in Europe and the Indo-Pacific. For each scenario, the report identifies the risks and implications for the United States and its allies. The scenarios are designed to prepare policymakers and planners for the possible futures they could face, including key challenges and opportunities that may arise in the years to come. Lastly, this paper identifies additional policy steps that will prepare the transatlantic allies to both compete with China’s investments and increase their own resilience.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Infrastructure, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Transatlantic Relations, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and United States of America

15. Russia in the Arctic: Gauging How Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine Will Alter Regional Dynamics

Author:
Andrea Kendall-Taylor, Jim Townsend, Nicholas Lokker, Heli Hautala, and James Frey
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
Russia’s reinvasion of Ukraine in February 2022 is producing ripple effects that will reverberate far beyond Ukraine for years to come, affecting issue areas and regions where the United States and Europe must manage relations with Moscow. Such effects will certainly be felt in the Arctic (which for this study will be limited to the European Arctic or the “High North”). Already, Russia’s aggression in Ukraine has compelled Finland and Sweden to apply for NATO membership, altering the region’s security architecture. Amid the changes that are unfolding, it is critical that analysts and policymakers reexamine long-standing assessments and assumptions about Russia. To that end, this paper reexamines Russia’s approach to the Arctic in light of events in Ukraine. Given the high degree of uncertainty about the trajectory of the war in Ukraine and its effect on Russia, it is impossible to confidently project a single future for Russia’s Arctic policy. CNAS researchers, therefore, identified four drivers that are most likely to shape Russia’s approach to the Arctic: Russia’s perception of the Western threat, the impact of Western sanctions, China’s role in the Arctic, and whether Putin remains in power. Using different permutations of those drivers, the authors developed three scenarios for how the future Russian approach to the Arctic could evolve looking out to 2025.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Regional Politics, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, Arctic, and United States of America

16. Toward a New Transatlantic Approach to Russia Sanctions

Author:
Edward Fishman, Andrea Kendall-Taylor, and Angela Stent
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for a New American Security (CNAS)
Abstract:
This policy brief is a product of the Center for a New American Security Transatlantic Forum on Russia, an initiative designed to spur coordination between the United States and Europe on Russia-related policy across multiple issue areas. The policy briefs are informed by a series of dialogues with leading experts from both sides of the Atlantic. The analysis and recommendations in the memo reflect areas of agreement between U.S. and European experts. Where there are notable differences in perspective, we highlight those to better enable policymakers to navigate fissures that can hinder coordination. We thank all the experts who contributed to such fruitful dialogue, especially Nigel Gould-Davies, Brian O’Toole, and Maria Shagina. Introduction As Russia continues to build its forces on Ukraine’s border, the United States and its allies have laid out the economic costs that Russian President Vladimir Putin would face for any further aggression against Ukraine. The Biden administration has stated it is willing to pursue “economic measures that we've refrained from using in the past.”1 In addition, the United States has indicated it is prepared to use export controls on U.S.-origin technologies that are key to Russia’s industrial sectors and potentially enact a Russia-focused Foreign Direct Product Rule—a tool that, to date, has only been used against Huawei. It is unclear if such a package is enough to deter Putin, especially if he is intent on pursuing his maximalist objectives—autonomy for parts of eastern Ukraine that would give Russia a veto over Ukrainian foreign policy and closing NATO’s door to Ukraine. Nonetheless, implementing such sanctions if Putin further escalates in Ukraine is critical for raising the costs to Putin and for restricting Russia’s ability to sustain its aggressive foreign policy over the long term. Regardless of what happens in Ukraine, however, U.S.-Russia relations are on a new course. The era of working toward a stable and predictable relationship with Russia is over for now. The United States will need a new, more proactive approach—one in which sanctions will be a tool (among many) that Washington should use to deter future Russian attacks on liberal democracies and disrupt Russia’s destabilizing actions, especially the corrupt networks that Moscow uses to spread its influence and sustain its hold on power. This policy brief outlines the current state of play of U.S. and European sanctions policies on Russia and how the United States and Europe can update its sanctions approach in this new era of relations with Russia.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Sanctions, Crisis Management, Deterrence, and Transatlantic Relations
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and United States of America

17. Designing Ukraine’s Recovery in the Spirit of the Marshall Plan

Author:
Ronja Ganster, Jacob Kirkegaard, Thomas Kleine-Brockhoff, and Bruce Stokes
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
The Marshall Plan is a source of inspiration and a fountain of hope for Ukraine’s recovery; evoking it is a marker of ambition. Yet, it cannot be a template for the international aspiration to help rebuild the country. A plan for Ukraine needs to take a 21st century shape. In the late 1940s, there was one hegemon and a set of newly built institutions to aid more than a dozen ailing current and future allies. Today, many countries are needed to help one. This necessitates utilizing and adapting existing aid mechanisms.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Recovery, Post-Conflict, Russia-Ukraine War, and Marshall Plan
Political Geography:
Europe and Ukraine

18. A Modern Marshall Plan for Ukraine

Author:
Heather Conley
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
Can one of the most successful US foreign policy initiatives in the 20th century—the Marshall Plan—be replicated in the 21st century—a modern Marshall Plan for Ukraine? The unequivocal answer to this question is “yes,” but it is essential to draw upon historical and inspirational lessons from the Marshall Plan to ensure the reconstruction and long-term economic recovery of Ukraine succeeds.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Recovery, Post-Conflict, Russia-Ukraine War, Defense Cooperation, and Marshall Plan
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

19. French Engagement in the Western Balkans: Boosting Strategic, Political, Economic, and Societal Cooperation

Author:
Florent Marciacq and Romain Le Quiniou
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
After years of lower interest, France has signaled its ambition to re-engage in the Western Balkans. It is not starting from scratch. Historical affinities with the countries of the region abound, in culture, sciences, politics, and economy. But shifting priorities in the past decades have eroded French presence in the region. To regain a foothold in this important part of Europe, France has taken a series of initiatives aimed at boosting its engagement. In 2016, it hosted the Berlin Process summit; in 2017, it launched with Germany an initiative to coordinate the drive against firearms trafficking in the Western Balkans; in 2018, it expanded the intervention mandate of the French Development Agency (AFD) to all Western Balkans countries and adopted a national Strategy for the Western Balkans; in 2020, after a two-year stalemate, it withdrew its reservations against the opening of accession negotiations with Albania and North Macedonia, while sketching the contours of the revised enlargement methodology. Drawing from a series of consultations in the region and structured cooperation with partner think-tanks, this policy paper is conceived as an independent, expert contribution to French efforts at re-engaging with the Western Balkans. It explores perceptions of French re-engagement in the region and reflects the potential of the 2019 Strategy for the Western Balkans in light of the forthcoming French Presidency of the European Council and in the context of the grands débats on the future of Europe.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, International Cooperation, Regional Cooperation, Multilateralism, and Engagement
Political Geography:
Europe, France, and Balkans

20. Putin’s Next, Best Move – The Logic and Limits of Russian Action on Ukraine

Author:
Carl Conetta
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Project on Defense Alternatives
Abstract:
Moscow will act when and if it declares that the West has escalated contention rather than responding positively to its entreaties – principally those regarding NATO expansion and implementation of the Minsk II agreement. Recent, new US/NATO troop deployments and weapon transfers to Ukraine may already count as relevant escalation. Russian forces surrounding Ukraine stand at an exceptionally high level of readiness and significantly exceed the scale of previous deployments. Nonetheless, a full-scale invasion aiming to seize the whole of Ukraine is highly unlikely. Indeed, Russian action may involve no more than large-scale conveyance of weapons and munitions to the rebel areas, possibly along with an influx of “volunteers.” Several other options ranging between these two are discussed below.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, NATO, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America

21. And So Now… It’s War?

Author:
Carl Conetta
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Project on Defense Alternatives
Abstract:
The battle within Ukraine and the USA-Russia contest over it has returned Europe to the darkest, most ominous period of the 1947-1989 Cold War. That this should happen with both the United States and Russia barreling grimly forward reflects a singular failure of diplomacy and common sense. There were two recent points in time when positive leadership might have turned us away from the path of disaster. Fortunately, one of these is not yet foreclosed. Movement toward resolution begins with recognizing that all sides, all stakeholders share fault for the current crisis. And no side has told the whole truth of it. Without question, Russian intervention in Ukraine’s civil conflict violates international law. Although Russia has the right to defend itself from attack, this proviso does not apply in the current situation. The annexation of Crimea was illegal, as is Russian intervention in the Donbass. This is indisputable.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, NATO, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America

22. Did NATO expansion prompt the Russian attack on Ukraine?

Author:
Carl Conetta
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Project on Defense Alternatives
Abstract:
Neither NATO nor US policy caused the Ukraine war. The invasion was Moscow’s unforced choice. But that doesn’t settle the issue of provocation. Although neither provocation nor “facilitation” amount to “cause,” such dynamics might have played a role in moving us toward this war. And knowing what role US or NATO policy may have played in bringing the world to this juncture can help illuminate ways to end the conflict (short of prosecuting it to its bitter end – however long that might take and at whatever cost it might entail).
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Foreign Policy, NATO, Alliance, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

23. The “Stable Nuclear Deterrent” collapses in the Ukraine War

Author:
Charles Knight
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Project on Defense Alternatives
Abstract:
The comforting narrative of a dependable and stable nuclear deterrence between the US and Russia has been thrown into disarray by the War in Ukraine. This narrative, propagated widely in the years following the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, held that both the Super Powers fully appreciated that they could not “win” a nuclear battle and, therefore, would avoid direct conventional warfare, which might then quickly escalate into nuclear war. In a necessary corollary, it was thought that Russia and the US would make every effort to avoid a conventional war in Europe. Why? Because there are so many paths to escalation to nuclear war in Europe. Elsewhere in the world, US and Russian interests were more diffuse and, therefore, not so vital.
Topic:
Conflict Prevention, Foreign Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Deterrence, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and United States of America

24. A transformational moment? The EU's response to Russia's war in Ukraine

Author:
Sergio Carrera, Steven Blockmans, Malorie Schaus, Willem Pieter De Groen, and Tinatin Akhvlediani
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS)
Abstract:
It is often said that the EU is forged in crisis. After weathering what feels like so many crises over the past 15 years, the EU’s swift and decisive response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine has, for the most part, been welcomed as the EU finally getting a crisis right. In the first weeks of the war, the EU adopted an impressive series of sanctions, rapidly widening the net cast over growing numbers of targeted individuals and institutions. It has also provided over EUR 2 billion of ‘lethal aid’ to Ukraine to help it fight off the invaders, a notion that would have been absolutely unthinkable only a few short months ago. In advance of our 2022 edition of the annual CEPS Ideas Lab and harnessing our broad inhouse expertise, we gave our CEPS contributors a simple instruction for compiling this special report – to dive deep into their specialist areas and provide their perspective on whether the invasion and subsequent crisis is a true ‘game changer’ in terms of the EU’s immediate and ongoing policy response. Or, to put it another way, will 2022 be viewed by future historians as a year of genuine transformation, a transformation fuelled by the largest conventional conflict in Europe since the end of the Second World War? The picture that emerges from the fog of war is a fragmented one. A general conclusion is that while there have been some positive changes in certain policy areas (such as migration, sanctions, energy and climate), the use of the term ‘game changer’ is as of yet unwarranted. The only real exception here, and where an alleged transformation can be argued is really starting to place, is in security and defence policy.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Sanctions, European Union, Crisis Management, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

25. Public Perception of Serbian Foreign Policy in the Midst of the War in Ukraine

Author:
Vuk Vuksanovic, Luka Steric, and Maja Bjelos
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Kosovar Centre for Security Studies (KCSS)
Abstract:
The war in Ukraine did not significantly affect the perception of the Serbian public regarding the major issues of Serbian foreign and security policy. In this context, this relates to how Serbian citizens think about the influence of great powers in their country and how the public perceives its relations with Russia and Western security institutions, the EU and NATO. The public opinion surveys also showed that the issue of Kosovo is still being perceived as a major foreign policy priority. There is a powerful cynicism in how the Serbian public views great power influences, as most respondents believe that external great powers bribe Serbian politicians and moguls to further their interests in the country. Russia and China are perceived as close foreign policy partners of Serbia, putting them in clear advantage over those who favour the EU on that front. The respondents also believed that Russia and China are sincere friends of Serbia and not players guided by their self-interest. As opposed to the study conducted by the Belgrade Centre for Security Policy (BCSP) in 2020, which noted that Serbs perceived Chinese influence in the country as more positive than Russian influence, the latest survey shows that those who believe Russian influence in Serbia is positive have a slight edge over those who believe the same about Chinese influence. This is most likely the result of the fact that China has not been in the spotlight in recent months.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Public Opinion, Conflict, Russia-Ukraine War, and Perception
Political Geography:
Europe, Kosovo, Serbia, and Balkans

26. Two Opposite Viewpoints: Overview on How Citizens See Kosovar Bilateral Relations with Serbia and with Albania

Author:
Dea Fetiu and Mentor Vrajolli
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Kosovar Centre for Security Studies (KCSS)
Abstract:
This report examines the perception of Kosovar citizens on bilateral relations between Kosovo and Serbia, and Kosovo and Albania. The report is divided into three chapters: elaborating the findings on citizens’ perceptions regarding ethnic distancing with the two countries, bilateral relations between Kosovo and Serbia, and bilateral relations between Kosovo and Albania.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Public Opinion, and Citizenship
Political Geography:
Europe, Kosovo, Serbia, Balkans, and Albania

27. Citizens' Perceptions on Kosovo's EU Integration Perspective and Regional and International Cooperation

Author:
Dea Fetiu and Shpat Balaj
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Kosovar Centre for Security Studies (KCSS)
Abstract:
This Western Balkans Security Barometer report examines the perceptions of Kosovo citizens about Kosovo's EU integration process, and the regional and international cooperation. This report consists of two sections. The first section analyzes the public perceptions towards the EU integration, Kosovo’s progress in fulfilling the EU membership criteria, the bilateral relations, and the influence of EU countries towards Kosovo, and an assessment of the EU as a mediator in the dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia. The second section addresses regional cooperation within the Western Balkans countries, the bilateral relations, and the influence of these countries towards Kosovo. The analysis of this report is based on the results of the survey through face-to-face interviews with randomly selected respondents throughout Kosovo, in September, 2021.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, International Cooperation, Public Opinion, European Union, Regional Integration, and Perception
Political Geography:
Europe, Kosovo, and Balkans

28. China's messaging on the Ukraine conflict

Author:
Samantha Hoffman and Matthew Knight
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
In the early days of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, social media posts by Chinese diplomats on US platforms almost exclusively blamed the US, NATO and the West for the conflict. Chinese diplomats amplified Russian disinformation about US biological weapon labs in Ukraine, linking this narrative with conspiracy theories about the origins of COVID-19. Chinese state media mirrored these narratives, as well as replicating the Kremlin’s language describing the invasion as a ‘special military operation’. ASPI found that China’s diplomatic messaging was distributed in multiple languages, with its framing tailored to different regions. In the early stage of the conflict, tweets about Ukraine by Chinese diplomats performed better than unrelated content, particularly when the content attacked or blamed the West. ASPI’s research suggests that, in terms of its international facing propaganda, the Russia–Ukraine conflict initially offered the party-state’s international-facing propaganda system an opportunity to reassert enduring preoccupations that the Chinese Communist Party perceives as fundamental to its political security.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Cybersecurity, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Ukraine, and Asia

29. A new formula for collaboration: Turkey, the EU & North Africa

Author:
Nienke van Heukelingen
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
Over recent years, relations between Turkey and the European Union (EU) have been difficult and driven more by crisis management rather than equal partnership. Yet, despite this downward spiral, both blocs remain key partners on domains such as trade, migration and counterterrorism and repeatedly express their interest in developing a more cooperative and constructive relationship. This report is a product of the ‘Searching for a New Formula for collaboration between Turkey and the EU in/with North Africa’ project, which investigated the extent to which Turkey and the EU could collaborate in and with North Africa, more specifically, Morocco, Egypt and Algeria. North Africa was chosen because it offers an underexplored area of research for Turkey-EU relations; Morocco, Egypt and Algeria were selected for specific study as they are the countries with which both Turkey and the EU have the highest trade volumes in the region. Moreover, there are currently no joint projects between Turkey and the EU in Morocco, Algeria or Egypt, although the region is an area of strategic importance for both Turkey and the EU. The recent war in Ukraine has also increased the value of North Africa as a provider of agricultural products and gas for the region. Libya and Tunisia were excluded from the research to narrow the scope of the project. To avoid the traps of reproducing ‘neo-colonial’ or ‘neo-Ottoman’ discourses and of following a top-down approach, this study used action research as a democratic, participatory and collaborative research methodology. It engaged diverse participants from Turkey, the EU and North Africa in semi-structured in-depth interviews, conferences and a survey. Through a cyclical process, the study devised a tripartite collaborative model and concrete project ideas under five major policy options in which cooperation between Turkey, the EU, Morocco, Algeria and Egypt could be actionable. This report gives a detailed account of the abovementioned tripartite collaborative model and the subsequent project ideas which were designed to be mutually beneficial for all three blocs –Turkey, the EU and North Africa. It should, nevertheless, be mentioned that current geopolitical uncertainties in the wider region could challenge the implementation of these projects. The civil war in Libya, the political tension between Turkey and Egypt or Morocco and Algeria, and the influence of China and Russia in the region could pose potential risks for collaboration. However, we maintain that such uncertainties make it even more timely to seek opportunities for a future collaborative environment in the Mediterranean as, ‘if the Mediterranean is weak, all Mediterranean countries are weak’.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Migration, European Union, Crisis Management, and Trade
Political Geography:
Europe, Turkey, and North Africa

30. The Russians are coming! The Russians are coming? Russia’s growing presence in Africa and its implication for European policy

Author:
Guido Lanfranchi and Kars de Bruijne
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
The growth of Russia’s presence across Africa over the last decade has generated significant international concern, further exacerbated after Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine. Russia’s engagement can affect the interests and policies of the European Union (EU) and its member states (MS) in Africa. How should European policymakers understand these developments and respond to them? To answer this question, this report looks at Russia’s engagement in Africa, reaching three main conclusions. First, Moscow’s engagement with Africa has so far remained limited as compared to that of other global players, particularly in the economic domain. The current level of (media) attention devoted to Russia’s role in Africa is thus not supported by sufficient evidence of its actual engagement in the continent. At the same time, however, the growth of Russia’s presence is a real trend. Second, Russian actors are guided by a rather loose strategy when it comes to Africa. The Russian state has some interests that act as a broad framework. However, the actual engagement is carried out not only by state actors, but also by state-backed conglomerates and politically connected private businesses. These latter actors have their own specific interests, which are not always fully aligned with those of the Russian state. While state actors are often driven by geopolitical considerations, Russian companies are more interested in economic opportunities. Third, Russia’s engagement in African countries is significantly shaped by the different national contexts and by the interests of African governments. For instance, in a strong state like Ethiopia, Russia’s engagement takes place exclusively at the governmental level. By contrast, in Sudan and Mali (contexts with weaker state structures), other Russian actors like PMCs and private businesses are involved. Yet, in all three cases, Moscow’s presence tends to grow when relations between African governments and their international partners (especially in the West) deteriorate, often in the wake of authoritarian turns. This shows the opportunistic nature of Russia’s engagement, as well as the complex trade-offs faced by EU/MS governments when engaging with African governments. These findings have significant consequences for the policy response of the EU and its member states. This report suggests that: (i) Rather than trying to respond reactively to Russia’s presence, EU/MS should focus on strengthening their own relations with relevant African partners. Addressing some of the political and economic imbalances in the Europe-Africa partnership may be an effective way to strengthen such relations, and by doing so to reduce the chances of an increase in Russia’s influence. (ii) In countries where this preventive strategy is difficult to implement (e.g. when facing authoritarian governments), decisions on whether/how to engage should go beyond debates about Russia’s (potential) presence, and be based instead on a comprehensive understanding of EU/MS interests and norms. Partnerships with non-governmental actors (e.g. the private sector, traditional authorities) may allow EU/MS governments to remain engaged despite souring ties with the government. (iii) In countries where Russia’s presence is already established, evidence-based and context-specific assessments of this presence should inform the EU/MS policy response. This can allow EU/MS governments to avoid overreacting to Russia’s influence, while also not underestimating its dangers. (iv) To pursue their interests in an increasingly multipolar world, EU/MS governments should try to strengthen their leverage vis-à-vis Russia (as well as other actors). To do so, EU/MS policymakers should leverage more strategically the engagement of European businesses across Africa.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, European Union, and Engagement
Political Geography:
Africa, Russia, and Europe

31. The Future of Xi’s China. Scenarios and Implications for Europe

Author:
Alessia Amighini
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI)
Abstract:
At the upcoming 20th Party Congress, which opens Sunday in China, Xi Jinping is expected to be confirmed as the country's Secretary General for an unprecedented third term. At a time of international instability caused by the Covid pandemic and the war in Ukraine, as well as rising competition between international superpowers, the Chinese leadership is called to increase the country's international standing, while ensuring economic growth at the domestic level. However, achieving these goals will not be without challenges. This Report analyses China’s hard road to international prestige and development. Which prospects for China's economic growth? Which obstacles to its rise at the global level? To which extent can the Party steer the country’s direction?
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Development, Economy, Xi Jinping, and Instability
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and Asia

32. Navigating an uncertain future: An exploration of China’s influence on the Netherlands’ future maritime logistics hub function

Author:
Frans-Paul van der Putten and Xiaoxue Martin
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
The maritime logistics hub function is of strategic importance to the Netherlands as a trading country. The Netherlands positions itself as the ‘Gateway to Europe’ thanks to its advanced logistics network and plays an important role in the global economy. This position nevertheless faces an uncertain future: there is no guarantee that the Netherlands will remain a leader in the years ahead. Geopolitics, and particularly the influence of China, will have a major impact on the Dutch maritime logistics hub function. On behalf of the Ministry of Infrastructure and Water Management and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, this report examines China’s influence on the Netherlands’ maritime logistics hub function. The main question posed in the study is: How is China’s influence on the central position of the Netherlands’ maritime logistics hub function likely to evolve in the decades ahead and what possible actions could the Dutch government take in response to it? The purpose of this study is to assess scenarios as a basis for possible actions by the Dutch government and the Dutch maritime logistics sector, particularly with regard to the Netherlands’ central position and strategic autonomy as a maritime logistics hub.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, Maritime, and Logistics
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Asia, and Netherlands

33. Small States, Different Approaches: Estonia and Norway on the UN Security Council

Author:
Kristin M. Haugevik, Piret Kuusik, Kristi Raik, and Niels Nagelhus Schia
Publication Date:
11-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
In 2021, Estonia and Norway served as elected members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Both being relatively small states, defending multilateral cooperation and rules-based international order were important common goals. In the last decade, great power tensions have returned to the Security Council, and multilateralism has again come under pressure. The opportunities of elected members to substantially influence the UNSC agenda are arguably limited by power struggles, complex subject matter and inefficient working methods. In spite of these limitations, both Estonia and Norway achieved some important outcomes as members of the Security Council. Their experiences confirm above all the value of diplomatic experience and reputation-building for elected members. To some extent, the two states have also been able to assume ownership of matters on the UNSC agenda. As in any diplomatic setting, knowing how to “play the game” is key to the ability of small states to punch above their weight. Specific methods through which elected members work to influence the UNSC agenda include coalition-building, actively using the presidency function, organising special events, and assuming the penholder role in a specific country or thematic issue. Common priority areas of Estonia and Norway in the UNSC include conflict resolution and peacebuilding, protection of human rights and especially women’s rights, and addressing new security challenges in the fields of cyber and climate. The most significant experience of cooperation during 2021 was the Estonian-Norwegian joint penholdership of the Afghanistan file which brought the two countries to the centre stage of global diplomacy and reinforced their international profile as small states that make an active and professional contribution to multilateral cooperation. Looking at Estonia’s and Norway’s performance in 2021, some interesting differences can be identified. First, the two states assess the relative importance of the UN differently. In Norway’s foreign policy, there is a strong tradition of prioritising the UN and seeing an active role in multilateral cooperation as an important contribution to national interests and security. By contrast, for Estonia, the UN has not been a foreign policy priority in the past, and its contribution to national security continues to be seen as secondary to membership in Western organisations, notably NATO and the EU. Furthermore, Norway has generally worked a bit more behind the scenes, relying on its long experience and reputation as a constructive contributor to peace diplomacy. It has been active on issues such as the UNSC’s normative protection agenda and climate security, but also the Afghanistan, Syria and North Korea files. Meanwhile, Estonia has taken a rather bold approach as a newcomer visibly promoting its priorities, most notably the cybersecurity agenda. It has also focused on controversial issues of regional security, including the situations in Ukraine and Belarus, trying to use the UN to the advantage of national security through promoting its positions and strengthening coalitions with like-minded countries. Coordination between like-minded states is an integral part of the work of the Council. With Estonia and Norway both present, 2021 saw two Nordic-Baltic states concurrently represented in the Council for the first time. In the future, there may be scope for further strengthening Nordic-Baltic cooperation in the framework of the UN structures.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, International Cooperation, United Nations, Cybersecurity, and UN Security Council
Political Geography:
Europe, Norway, Estonia, and Baltic States

34. Make Foreign Policy Feminist. A Feminist Foreign Policy Manifesto for Germany

Author:
Nina Bernarding, Kristina Lunz, Sheena Anderson, Antonia Baskakov, Damjan Denkovski, Annika Kreitlow, and Anna Provan
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Centre for Feminist Foreign Policy
Abstract:
This manifesto intends to encourage and support those inside the next government to begin the process of systematically changing how Germany’s foreign policy operates, whom it is made for, and whom it is informed by. It introduces what a Feminist Foreign Policy would look like for Germany, including a proposed definition of a German Feminist Foreign Policy. We analyse existing German Federal Foreign Policy and outline principles of a German Feminist Foreign Policy and its priority areas, presenting action items (recommendations) for a radically different way of conducting foreign policy. Among many other topics, we address climate justice, demilitarisation, health, trade and peace & security.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Government, Health, Feminism, Peace, Trade, Climate Justice, and Demilitarization
Political Geography:
Europe and Germany

35. Global Britain: views from abroad

Author:
UK in a Changing Europe
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
UK in a Changing Europe, King's College London
Abstract:
‘Global Britain’ is the term used to denote the UK’s approach to the world post-Brexit. The success of ‘Global Britain’ depends not simply on the energy and resources devoted to it by the UK Government but also on the participation of potential partners. To consider what these reactions might be, UK in a Changing Europe and the School of Security Studies at King’s College London consider perceptions of Global Britain across different states around the world in this new report.
Topic:
International Relations, Security, Foreign Policy, Government, European Union, and Brexit
Political Geography:
United Kingdom and Europe

36. Great Britain and Africa: Boris Johnson's Strategic Reversals

Author:
François Gaulme
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
In 2020-2021, Prime Minister Boris Johnson undertook to fundamentally change the operational mode and strategy of relations between the United Kingdom and the African continent bequeathed by his predecessors since 1997. Great Britain and Africa : Boris Johnson's Strategic Reversals He first put an end to the autonomy and power of the great Department for International Development (DfID), by merging it with the Foreign Office. Deciding to make the granting of aid political, he also reduced its amount on the grounds of the recession hitting the country but against British legislation itself. His strategy for external deployment, adopted in March 2021 and based primarily on an “Indo-Pacific tilt”, has marginalised the relationship with Africa to which Theresa May had wanted to give new impetus in the perspective of the Brexit in 2018. While taking up her concept of “Global Britain”, her successor now seems to want to limit ties with Africa to business relations, highly impacted by the coronavirus pandemic, as well as minimal participation in security efforts on the continent. This note analyses such reversals in a historical perspective of the end of a relational cycle. It concludes that Boris Johnson’s very personal policy towards Africa is too reductive not to be amended. In particular on aid and fundamental rights, it neglects the complexity of British positions towards this continent. By reaffirming the strength of the strategic relationship with the United States, it will also have to adapt to the new African policy of the Biden administration.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Development, Foreign Aid, and Boris Johnson
Political Geography:
Britain, Africa, and Europe

37. The French Military's Perception of the Turkish Military and Turkey's Expansion in the Eastern Mediterranean

Author:
Aris Marghelis
Publication Date:
11-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
In the summer of 2020, the Central and Eastern Mediterranean became the center of unusual tensions between France and Turkey. Given that these tensions were also military, which is uncommon for the two countries, the perception that the French military has of Turkey’s army and its doctrine is particularly relevant to address. From the interviews that were conducted with French officers, it appears that for the French military, 2016 and 2020 are two milestones in the evolution of both Turkish political and military Turkish attitudes. From 2016 onwards, the Syrian and Libyan conflicts uncovered diverging interests between France and Turkey, with military implications for France. In the same year, Turkish military behavior in the Eastern Mediterranean started shifting, but was at first seen as of little consequence. Additionally, the failed coup attempt against President R. T. Erdogan decreased the level and quality of communication and cooperation between both militaries. In 2020, Turkish aggressiveness openly manifested itself in the Eastern Mediterranean, including directly against France with the Courbet incident. This attitude was criticized by the interviewees who specified that such behavior, along with unilateral actions and faits accomplis, would not be tolerated in the future. Yet, it also appears that the French military show respect for the Turkish armed forces. The latter are generally accredited with professionalism, reliability, efficiency, and determination. The interviews revealed no sign of animosity by the French officers towards their Turkish counterparts: sometimes, even the opposite was detected.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Conflict, Army, and Military
Political Geography:
Europe, Turkey, France, and Mediterranean

38. Ukraine’s Policy Towards Turkey

Author:
Maria Piechowska
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
The current revival of Ukrainian-Turkish contacts stems from Ukraine’s efforts to win over Turkey as an economic and defence partner in the face of Russian aggression. Both countries share the common goal of limiting Russian domination in the Black Sea. Turkey supports Ukraine’s territorial integrity and stands up for the Crimean Tatars, persecuted by Russia. Close bilateral relations may make Turkey—after the EU and the U.S.—one of Ukraine’s most important partners. However, the intensity of the political dialogue will depend on the state of Russian-Turkish relations.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Bilateral Relations, European Union, and Economy
Political Geography:
Europe, Turkey, Ukraine, and Middle East

39. Germany-U.S. Relations: A Return to the Strategic Partnership

Author:
Lidia Gibadło and Mateusz Piotrowski
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
Since Joe Biden’s presidency began, Germany’s relationship with the United States has improved. The U.S. made significant concessions, primary among them agreeing to the construction of the Nord Stream 2 (NS2) gas pipeline. This is a new opening for the U.S. in the bilateral relations and sets the foundations for the reconstruction of the strategic partnership with Germany that Biden sees as necessary to implement U.S. policy towards a post-Brexit Europe. However, the possible reluctance of the next German government to adopt a more confrontational policy towards China could be a challenge to that goal.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Partnerships, and Nord Stream 2
Political Geography:
Europe, Germany, North America, and United States of America

40. The Specificity of Hungarian-Israeli Relations

Author:
Michał Wojnarowicz and Veronika Jóźwiak
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
Hungary under Viktor Orbán’s premiership has become one of Israel’s most important European partners. This is reflected in the diplomatic support for Israel by Hungary, mainly at the EU level. Close relations with Israel serve Hungary’s foreign and domestic policy goals and at the same time weaken the effectiveness of the EU’s Middle East policy. However, the new Israeli government may be less open to political cooperation with this country because of earlier criticism of Hungary on, for example, historical issues.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, International Cooperation, Bilateral Relations, and Domestic Policy
Political Geography:
Europe, Middle East, Israel, and Hungary

41. Ukraine's Foreign Policy Strategy

Author:
Maria Piechowska
Publication Date:
11-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
The president of Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelensky, approved in August this year the first Foreign Policy Strategy in the country’s history. According to the document, Ukraine’s main goal is membership in the EU and NATO and an end to the conflict with Russia. Like in the National Security Strategy, Ukraine included Poland in the second group of strategic partners. Cooperation with Poland is to be deepened and developed, not only bilaterally but also as part of multilateral formats in the region.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, NATO, National Security, European Union, and Volodymyr Zelensky
Political Geography:
Europe and Ukraine

42. Belarus in Turkey's Foreign Policy

Author:
Karol Wasilewski
Publication Date:
11-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
Turkey’s actions towards Belarus show that the country plays a greater role in Turkish foreign policy than bilateral relations might suggest. It would be beneficial for Turkey’s Western allies, including Poland, to take this factor into account in the dialogue with their Turkish partner on the political use of the migration through the Belarusian-Polish border by Alexander Lukashenka’s regime and on the political situation in Belarus.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Migration, Bilateral Relations, and Borders
Political Geography:
Europe, Turkey, Middle East, Poland, and Belarus

43. UK Economic Diplomacy in the 21st Century: The LSE Economic Diplomacy Commission Final Report

Author:
LSE Economic Diplomacy Commission
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
LSE IDEAS
Abstract:
The LSE Economic Diplomacy Commission was convened in 2019 to establish a strategic direction for a new age of foreign economic policy, to understand the domestic ramifications of changes to the UK’s trade agenda, and to present recommendations that may best advance the UK’s priorities at home and abroad. The aim of the Report is to position the UK optimally in a changed 21st century global economy while maintaining the UK’s support for an open, multilateral trade and rules-based international system. The Report proposes a refined economic diplomacy framework that seeks to balance commercial openness with strategic domestic and foreign policy aims, broadly defined.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Economics, and Trade
Political Geography:
United Kingdom and Europe

44. Preventing Nuclear Proliferation and Reassuring America's Allies

Author:
Ivo H. Daalder, Chuck Hagel, Malcolm Rifkind, and Kevin Rudd
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Chicago Council on Global Affairs
Abstract:
In recent decades, the threat of nuclear proliferation has emanated primarily from the Middle East and from south and northeast Asia. But the proliferation threat wasn’t always concentrated in these regions. Long before countries like North Korea and Iran topped the list of nuclear threats, leaders in Washington and elsewhere worried about a different group of countries—America’s allies in Europe and Asia. Indeed, in the early 1960s, intelligence officials projected that by the mid-1970s there likely would be 10 to 15 nuclear powers in the world within a decade, as countries like Australia, Germany, Italy, Japan, South Korea, and Turkey would opt to join a growing nuclear club. The nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1968 was designed to prevent this, and it did. But it succeeded in large part because of a concerted US effort since the 1960s to reassure its allies around the world that America’s nuclear umbrella would extend to their territory and ensure their security. Rather than developing their own national nuclear capabilities, key allies in Europe and Asia opted to rely on the US nuclear guarantee instead. Since the NPT entered into force in 1970, just four countries (India, Israel, Pakistan, and North Korea) have acquired nuclear weapons. More recently, however, questions about the credibility of the American nuclear guarantee have arisen again in Europe and Asia. Allies in both regions confront growing military threats from a resurgent Russia, a rising China, and a nuclear North Korea. At the same time, successive US administrations have sought to retreat from some longstanding commitments, leaving America’s allies around the world uncertain whether they can still rely on the United States for their defense and security—nuclear and otherwise. So far, the discussions about nuclear deterrence and reassurance have played out largely beyond public view. But the issue is becoming increasingly salient, given growing threats from Russia and China especially, and growing doubts about the United States. America and its allies cannot ignore this new reality. For if we are to prevent new nuclear proliferation among these allies, it is essential to acknowledge that what has long been unthinkable is becoming thinkable once more.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Nonproliferation, and Alliance
Political Geography:
Europe, East Asia, North America, and United States of America

45. Dialogue with Russia: Russia Needs to Reset Relations with the West

Author:
Kalev Stoicescu, Liana Fix, Agnieszka Legucka, Tatiana Kastouéva-Jean, Artūrs Bikovs, and Keir Giles
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
Moscow’s resurgent foreign policy and the undemocratic rule of President Vladimir Putin ended the relatively friendly relations that had been possible between Russia and the West in the 1990s. In the seven years since Russia annexed Crimea and started a war of attrition against Ukraine, the security situation in the transatlantic region has continuously deteriorated. The Kremlin has demonstrated hostility towards the West, crises and security issues have continued to multiply instead of being resolved, and the risk of outright conflict has come close to Cold War peaks. There is an obvious and urgent need to lower tensions, but Moscow prefers to demonstrate its readiness to escalate. This report analyses Western-Russian relations and proposes a way forward for conducting dialogue with Russia. It offers an analysis of Russia’s relations with NATO and the EU, an overview of the bilateral relations of various Western countries with Russia, a glimpse of China’s role, and an assessment of the main interests and contentious issues in Western-Russian relations.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, NATO, International Affairs, and European Union
Political Geography:
Russia, United Kingdom, Europe, France, Poland, Germany, Latvia, and United States of America

46. Reconceptualizing Lithuania’s Importance for U.S. Foreign Policy

Author:
Nikolas Gvosdev
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
During the immediate post-Cold War period, the importance of Lithuania, along with other Central-Eastern European countries, to U.S. foreign policy increased. Lithuania became one of the jumping-off points for further “democratic enlargement” in Europe, Eurasia, and the Greater Middle East. Today, U.S. policy is focused on retrenchment and consolidation—defined by a shift in attention and resources away from the Euro-Atlantic region and the Greater Middle East towards the Indo-Pacific region—as well as the growing priority of climate change and the environment as central organizing principles. U.S. foreign policy is also increasingly subordinated to domestic political considerations about the costs and benefits of overseas action for constituencies within the United States. In the 2020s, Lithuania’s importance will rest less on the Russia dimension and further Euro-Atlantic enlargement into the post-Soviet space, and more on its ability to play a greater role in European affairs, to assist in the rebalance to Asian affairs more generally, and to contribute to energy, supply chain, and environmental security.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Energy Policy, Geopolitics, and Supply Chains
Political Geography:
Europe, Eurasia, Lithuania, and United States of America

47. A Vanishing West in the Middle East: The Recent History of U.S.-Europe Cooperation in the Region

Author:
Charles Thépaut
Publication Date:
10-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
To encourage a new multilateralism, Europe will need to gain credibility on hard security matters, the United States will need to reimagine how it deals with allies, and both will need to figure out when to let Middle East countries handle Middle East problems. Since the end of the Cold War, developments in the Middle East have frequently caused tension between the United States and Europe, from the 2003 invasion of Iraq to the Arab uprisings of 2011 and Washington’s 2018 decision to exit the Iran nuclear deal. Today, the Biden administration is reasserting its desire to reduce America’s regional footprint, even as its predecessors struggled to realize a similar goal. At the same time, the United States and Europe share an interest in a stable Middle East where governments keep energy supplies steady and contain threats posed by jihadism and mass refugee flows. In this illuminating book—copublished by The Washington Institute and I.B. Tauris—French diplomat Charles Thépaut examines thirty years of transatlantic cooperation in the region and proposes a more manageable and effective path forward. To encourage a new multilateralism, he explains, Europe will need to gain credibility on hard security matters, the United States will need to reimagine how it deals with allies, and both parties will need to figure out when to step aside and let Middle East countries handle Middle East problems. "After a decade over which the Middle East was profoundly shaken and transformed, over which U.S. foreign policy toward this region went through various revisions, and over which the transatlantic bond risked serious erosion, this book offers serious answers to questions with a bearing on the future: Is there still one ‘West,’ at least in relation to an ‘East’? What remains of the strategic interest the Middle East represents for both America and Europe? Charles Thépaut’s unique position, as a French diplomat working on the Middle East from Washington DC, gives this work irreplaceable value."
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Multilateralism, Strategic Competition, and Military
Political Geography:
Europe, Middle East, and United States of America

48. The Berlin Pulse 2021/22 (full issue)

Author:
Julia Ganter, Heather A Conley, Nobuo Kishi, Kevin Rudd, and Manuel Muniz
Publication Date:
11-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Körber-Stiftung
Abstract:
As this fifth edition was being finalized, all eyes were on Germany. In the September federal elections, Germans decided not only about their next government, but also about the future of one of the biggest and economically most powerful countries in Europe. International interest in the outcome of the elections and Germany’s next government was high and the German capital full of correspondents. Meanwhile, foreign policy and the future of Germany’s role in the world played only a marginal role in the campaign. Although it is not unusual that voters and the media are more interested in the chancellor candidates’ positions regarding tax policy than their stance on relations with China or defence spending, the gap between international expectations and German self-perception was striking. Attentive readers of The Berlin Pulse are already familiar with this gap. Since 2017, our representative survey of German attitudes towards foreign policy shows that a majority of Germans prefer restraint over stronger international involvement. This attitude of the German public does not easily change one way or the other. Even a foreign policy earthquake like the debacle in Afghanistan did not have a notable impact. This edition of The Berlin Pulse ‘minds the gap’ by letting international decisionmakers and experts have a say about their expectations of post-Merkel Germany and by juxtaposing their positions with German public opinion. It also looks at the international implications of two megatrends: the digital transformation and climate change. As Cédric O and Marietje Schaake argue in the second chapter, German and European political inaction in the digital sphere would be disastrous for democracies around the world. And Patricia Espinosa and Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, among others, remind us in the third chapter of the impact a failed response to the climate crisis would have for everyone. The public is aware of this: In this year’s survey, Germans mention climate change and the environment as one of the greatest foreign policy challenges for their country.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Climate Change, Diplomacy, Migration, Science and Technology, Public Opinion, Elections, and Domestic Politics
Political Geography:
Europe and Germany

49. A Crash Test: EU Strategic Autonomy in the Foreign Policy of France

Author:
Łukasz Maślanka
Publication Date:
03-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
France uses the idea of EU strategic autonomy as a tool in its own foreign policy. France’s aim is to redefine the Union’s partnership with the U.S. and NATO. Hence, the activity of President Emmanuel Macron in emphasising the differences between the positions of the U.S. and the EU, especially in relations with China and Russia. Macron’s rhetoric worries other European countries and hides the real problems in EU security policy, such as insufficient financing of the Common Security and Defence Policy as well as the lack of a clear definition of strategic autonomy.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, European Union, and Strategic Autonomy
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, France, and United States of America

50. Almost Best Friends: Austria’s Relations with Germany

Author:
Adam S. Czartoryski
Publication Date:
03-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
No other neighbour is as closely connected to Austria as Germany. For years, bilateral relations have been based on deep economic connection and mutual understanding of interests. However, Austria under Chancellor Sebastian Kurz is more and more often and more decisively able to express a different opinion from Germany on important issues in European politics.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Politics, Bilateral Relations, and European Union
Political Geography:
Europe, Germany, and Austria