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Begin New Search Topic Foreign Policy Political Geography Eastern Europe Content Type Special Report Publication Year within 5 Years

1. Little substance, considerable impact Russian influence in Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Montenegro

Author:
Wouter Zweers and Niels Drost
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
This Clingendael report explores the role of the Russian Federation in Serbia, Montenegro, and Bosnia and Herzegovina. It examines Russia’s objectives in its relations with the three countries, as well the various sources of influence the Kremlin holds in each of the three countries. The report places this analysis within the changed geopolitical circumstances resulting from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Russia’s main objectives for the Western Balkans are threefold. First, the Kremlin seeks to project great power status globally. Second, it seeks to obstruct the Euro-Atlantic integration of the region by advocating against NATO and EU integration and by raising instabilities. Third, the Kremlin uses the Balkans, especially the Kosovo issue, as an argument for its foreign policy agenda elsewhere, particularly when it comes to defending its perceived dominance over its near abroad. Instead of building a sustainable, all-encompassing, and meaningful relation with Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), and Montenegro, Russia instead pursues an opportunistic approach depending on fragmented entry points for influence in each country. The Kremlin displays moderate ambitions for building positive relationships with the three countries, which is reflected also in the instruments it uses to influence the region. It nurtures contacts with, and influence through, a wide range of individual politicians, the Orthodox Church, the media and malign proxy groups, making use of energy links as well as local tensions and historical memories. Moscow pursues this approach deliberately, and it has proven relatively successful. At the political level, Russia’s clout stretches especially to (pro-)Serb politicians, who often make use of similar narratives and use Russia as an external supporter to promote their own ideas. In particular, its position on Kosovo, Russian support for Republika Srpska leader Milorad Dodik and its Orthodox Church links remain important entry points for Russia’s political influence in the region at large. Of the three countries, entry points for Russian influence are most widespread In Serbia, followed by Bosnia and Herzegovina. Economically, Russia’s influence is outperformed substantially by that of the EU, especially in terms of trade. Russia’s far-reaching influence in the energy sectors of BiH and Serbia, however, yield substantial political leverage, even if its investments often prove economically inviable. When it comes to military influence, Russia seeks to maintain its military cooperation with its main partner, Serbia, while also supporting the militarisation of Republika Srpska. Belgrade is satisfied with its current degree of cooperation with Moscow but seeks to avoid becoming Russia’s foothold in the Balkans. Factually, Russia is only one of multiple security actors in the Balkans, overshadowed by NATO and challenged by China. While presenting itself as a partner to Serbia and Republika Srpska in particular, Russia also resorts to malign instruments which have often proven to be effective in shaping the political environment of the Western Balkans. Lacking a military presence in the region, Russia supports far-right nationalist figures and organisations, which generally better resemble organised crime groups than paramilitary organisations, to attain its goal of destabilisation by stirring up polarisation and anti-Western sentiment. The Kremlin is perhaps most successful in the field of media and disinformation. Russian propaganda penetrates Serbia, Montenegro, and Bosnia and Herzegovina through Russian-funded portals, local media and social media. Russian disinformation and narratives have penetrated the region to such an extent that considerable sections of society hold a positive image of Russia and its political leadership. In all these fields, the Russian invasion of Ukraine has moderately affected but not fully altered Russia’s approach towards Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Montenegro. While the invasion has led to sharper dividing lines between Russia and the West and decreases in Russian financial and diplomatic capacities, we observe continuity in terms of Russian strategies and objectives. Russia’s sources of influence in the three countries have been moderately strained, among other causes as a result of BiH and Serbia’s first steps to diversify energy sources and Western pressure to diminish their political and security links with the Russian Federation. For the time being, this has not yet affected Moscow’s ability to act as a spoiler to the Euro-Atlantic integration of the three countries. The extent to which the European Union and NATO are effective in countering Russian influence in Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Montenegro will be part of a follow-up Clingendael report to be published in fall 2023. As part of the same research project, analyses of societal and political perceptions towards Russia in the three countries will be published in summer 2023 by Clingendael partners the Atlantic Council of Montenegro, the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia, and the Atlantic Initiative in BiH.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, European Union, Disinformation, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
Russia, Eastern Europe, Serbia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina

2. Russia’s War in Ukraine: Rethinking the EU’s Eastern Enlargement and Neighborhood Policy

Author:
Guntram Wolff, Alexandra Gritz, Stefan Meister, and Milan Nič
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:
The stagnating EU accession process needs political will and procedural changes allowing eastern candidates to advance. In the meantime, they should be more supported to use the full potential of existing opportunities for gradual economic and sectoral integration with the EU. An upgraded Eastern Partnership needs a comprehensive security dimension linking resilience, connectivity, and defense policy, as well as cooperation in the area of the Common Security and Defence Policy. The protracted regional conflicts (in Moldova and the South Caucasus) require a more active EU engagement as existing OSCE formats continue to be blocked, and Russia’s role and military presence weaken. New openings for conflict resolution mean higher demand for the EU’s diplomatic, monitoring, and peacekeeping capacities. A new eastern Neighborhood Policy should be designed for the wider region, connecting the Black Sea and the South Caucasus with Central Asia and thus creating viable alternatives to the competing geoeconomic and governance “offers” of China, Russia, and Turkey.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Governance, European Union, International Order, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Central Asia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

3. Turkey’s Place and Role in the Russia-Ukraine War

Author:
Zurab Batiashvili
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
Abstract:
In recent decades, Ankara has maintained a kind of balance in foreign policy and this approach naturally applied to Russia and Ukraine as well. NATO member Turkey sought to develop lucrative military-political and trade-economic relations with both Russia and Ukraine. However, after the Kremlin's war with Ukraine, Ankara clearly saw the facing imminent Russian threat, precipitating the change in its position (supply additional weaponry to Ukraine, close the Bosporus and Dardanelles Straits, etc.). At the same time, the longer the Russia-Ukraine war lasts, the more drastic consequences it will have for Turkey. Consequently, Ankara will have to take even more decisive retaliatory steps.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, NATO, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Turkey, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

4. Positions, Role and Activity of the International Community in the War Waged by Russia against Ukraine

Author:
Nika Petriashvili
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
Abstract:
This volume of the Security Review focuses on the Russia-Ukraine war. Regardless of the outcome of the war, it will fundamentally alter the post-Cold War world order and have a major impact on Georgia's security environment. Alex Petriashvili tells us about the reaction of the international community to the start of the war by Russia, what the West has done so far and what we should expect from it in the future. To what extent is the Georgian security system ready to withstand such challenges?
Topic:
Foreign Policy, International Community, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

5. Serbia on Edge

Author:
Richard Kraemer
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
The time has come to openly regard the Republic of Serbia for what it is: A stalwart Russian and Chinese ally run by a semi-authoritarian government that proactively pursues ideologically irredentist territorial expansion in the Western Balkans. Today’s Serbia poses a threat to regional and transatlantic security. Under President Aleksandar Vučić’s Serbian Progressive Party (SNS), the Serbian government is rapidly building its military, overtly backing ultranationalist provocateurs in neighboring states, cementing Belgrade’s ties to Moscow, and consolidating partnerships with the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Integral to its efforts to actualize the “Greater Serbia” ideology, Serbia’s and Russia’s Orthodox Church leadership cooperate closely and in concert with their political counterparts. Without a significant Westward shift in its orientation, Serbia will continue on an authoritarian trajectory aligned with U.S. adversaries. Contemporary Serbia presents a quandary for U.S. and European strategists and policymakers. A genuinely democratic and Euro-Atlantic-oriented Serbia has been sought by Brussels and Washington alike. Yet, decades after Yugoslavia’s violent dissolution and related North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) interventions in the 1990s, most Serbians reject NATO cooperation and are lukewarm towards the European Union (EU). Consequently, the U.S. and its democratic allies in Europe are less able to leverage prospective memberships as a means of transatlantic integration. Further complicating relations with Serbia is Aleksandar Vučić’s overt embrace of Beijing and Moscow. The depth of Serbia’s growing dependence on those powers jeopardizes U.S and European security on multiple fronts. The Vučić government’s enduring endorsement of ultranationalist narratives and their subversive purveyors continues to intensify discord in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, and North Macedonia. Its military build-up is gravely disconcerting; Belgrade responds only with specious explanations. The country’s ever-greater reliance on Russian oil and gas as a client and transit state for Gazprom, Russia’s state-owned energy giant, puts it at odds with Brussels, Washington, and several Central-Eastern European capitals. Belgrade and Beijing’s economic, technological, and increasingly military cooperation accelerates as the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) further entrenches itself in southeast Europe. In sum: Serbia’s expanding alignment with authoritarian powers and regional anti-democratic forces reflects its illiberal worldview and disabling narrative of national victimhood. Western policymakers persistently view Belgrade’s government with the misunderstanding that, given the right incentives, Serbia will moderate, democratize, and gradually integrate into transatlantic institutions. This assumption is misguided. It diminishes, if not excludes, the need for a national reckoning among the Serbian people. As with post-war Germany’s Willy Brandt, Serbia needs courageous and sincere leadership to acknowledge past sins and move the nation forward. For example: A genuine Kniefall von Warschau event could spur an honest discussion among Serbian peoples about the atrocities committed during Yugoslavia’s dissolution. Whatever the catalyst, a broad acknowledgment of past crimes against humanity is categorical if Serbia is ever to become a democratic and open society. Without it, Serbs will remain disproportionately susceptible to domestic irredentist forces fed by malign foreign powers set on keeping the Western Balkans removed from the transatlantic community. Until such a national reckoning, Western decision-makers should adopt a more pragmatic approach to relations with a Belgrade government dismissive of genuine transatlantic partnerships. For as long as Pan-Serb ultranationalism is considered by Serbia’s leaders to be acceptable in political discourse, the kind of genuine democratic values and institutions shared within the transatlantic community will remain unrealized. Accordingly, the U.S. and its European allies should encourage Serbia to focus on itself, not its neighbors. In that vein, Western policymakers would be wise to stop expecting a breakthrough in Kosovo-Serbia status negotiations. It has become an empty dialogue that only keeps Kosovo locked outside of international institutions and other benefits of recognized statehood. A revised approach should also discontinue pushing an ineffective EU integration process as the primary means of democratically transforming Serbia.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Ideology, and Expansion
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Eastern Europe, Serbia, and Balkans

6. American Interests in the Ukraine War

Author:
Joshua Shifrinson
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
Policymakers have poorly defined U.S. strategic interests in the Russia-Ukraine War. Those interests that have been defined—deterring future aggression and protecting the “liberal order”—do not stand up to scrutiny. Actual U.S. interests in Ukraine are essentially negative: preventing further escalation or spillover of the conflict and limiting a wholesale collapse in U.S.-Russian relations. The limited interests that the U.S. does have in Ukraine suggest that Washington should try to convince Ukraine and Russia to accept a negotiated settlement.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Liberal Order, Conflict, Strategic Interests, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, Eastern Europe, and United States of America

7. Prepare Ukraine for Victory in a Long War

Author:
Luke Coffey
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
On February 24, Russia invaded Ukraine for the second time in eight years. While many assumed that the war would be short, a stiff Ukrainian defense halted and then successfully counter-attacked against the Russian advances on Kyiv, Sumy, and Kharkiv. After capturing Kherson, Russia’s main advance from occupied Crimea in the south toward Mykolaiv also stalled. At the time of writing, Ukrainian forces are beginning a counterattack in that region and are located approximately 12 miles outside Kherson city center. Mariupol, on the Sea of Azov coastline, fell to the Russians on May 22 after Ukrainian forces made a heroic last stand in the Azovstal iron and steel works. This capture allowed Russia to create a land bridge from the Russian Federation to occupied Crimea. Mariupol’s capture also turned the Sea of Azov into a Russian lake.”1 In the Donbas, which is arguably Russia’s main effort at this stage of the war, Russian troops have made limited advances at a very high cost in equipment and manpower. In late June, Russian forces captured Sievierodonetsk after weeks of heavy fighting, leaving Russia in control of Ukraine’s Luhansk Oblast. Ukrainians are currently defending a front line that is approximately 1,250 miles long—this is equal to the straight- line distance from Washington, DC, to Houston, Texas. Russian public opinion still supports the war.”2 While Russia’s advancements in the Donbas have been slow and costly, there is no indication that Moscow will stop its offensive anytime soon. President Vladimir Putin knows that his legacy rides on Russia’s victory or defeat in Ukraine.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, National Security, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

8. Russia Can Still Be Defeated, But Time Is Short

Author:
Can Kasapoglu
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
At Davos last May, former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger sparked a controversy when he argued that Kyiv must cede territory to Moscow to achieve peace. Kissinger may well be correct to assert that a stable balance between Russia and Ukraine will require some trade-offs based on the principles of Realpolitik. But we should not delude ourselves into thinking that Putin—a former KGB officer who considers the collapse of the Soviet Union to have been the greatest catastrophe of the twentieth century—launched this war simply to secure a border readjustment. Putin’s essay, published in April 2021, expresses his view with admirable clarity: Ukraine, in the eyes of the Kremlin, is Russia. In sum, he launched this invasion to subordinate Ukraine to Moscow—totally and permanently. We should also not conclude that Russia’s battlefield setbacks have been so severe as to deflect Putin from his original goal. After he failed to subordinate Ukraine swiftly with a quick knockout blow directed at the capital, Kyiv, he moved to Plan B: a strategy of exhaustion. He is now determined to grind Ukraine down slowly and deliberately with the expectation that eventually it will have no choice but to bow to his iron fist. For its part, the West should thwart Putin’s strategy by safeguarding Ukraine’s political and economic independence. Kissinger’s comments did not bring us closer to achieving that goal. If members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) follow his lead and attempt to cajole Kyiv into ceding territory now, while Russia still believes it has the upper hand on the battlefield, their efforts will only whet Putin’s appetite for expansion. Putin will begin to entertain compromises acceptable to the West only when he comes to believe that failure to do so will lead inevitably to catastrophic losses for Russia. The bad news is that the military balance on the ground right now will not lead him to such a conclusion. If NATO members act quickly, however, there is still time to shift the dynamic in Ukraine’s favor—but it will not be easy.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, International Organization, National Security, Alliance, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

9. Six Months after the Russian Invasion, the West Needs Better Clock Management

Author:
Peter Rough, Luke Coffey, and Rebeccah L. Heinrichs
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Ukraine’s status as a borderland between Europe and Russia has often confined it to the periphery of Western strategic thought. For many, Ukraine constitutes the southeastern edge of the European continent, but not its heartland. For Russian President Vladimir Putin, however, Ukraine sits at the center of his strategic vision for Eurasia. Far from a backwater, the country is the key to his imperial aims—a prize for which he has risked his army and bet his rule. In Putin’s mind, if Russia were to control Ukraine, Moscow would dominate the Black Sea—and so would be in a stronger position in every connected region, from Eastern Europe to the South Caucasus and from the Balkans to the Caspian Basin. Russia would also complete its breakout into the Eastern Mediterranean, long a priority of Moscow, by securing the connection between its warm water ports in the Black Sea to its new bases on the Syrian coast.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, National Security, Armed Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

10. Ten Myths about US Aid to Ukraine

Author:
Luke Coffey
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Ukraine is in a national struggle that will determine its geopolitical future: the country will either be a firm member of the Euro-Atlantic community or become a Russian colony. The outcome of this struggle will have long-term implications for America’s global interests, the future of the transatlantic community, and the notion of national sovereignty in the twenty-first century. Russia is a top geopolitical adversary for the United States. For Americans who believe in strong and secure national borders, the primacy of national sovereignty, and the right to self-defense, support for Ukraine in the face of Russian aggression is natural. Considering America’s other geopolitical concerns, such as a rising China and a healthy economic relationship with Europe that benefits the American worker, US support for Ukraine is an imperative. Ukrainians are not asking for, nor do they want, US troops to help them fight Russia. All they ask for is the equipment, weapons, munitions, and financial resources required to give them a fighting chance. Providing Ukraine what it needs to fight Russia effectively will not be cheap. So far this year, the US Congress has voted on three different supplementals for Ukraine: $13.6 billion in March, $40.1 billion in May, and $12.4 billion in September. The cost that American taxpayers incur to help Ukraine is money well spent and will pale in comparison to the cost of deterring a victorious Russia or an emboldened China on the global stage. As the war continues, Congress will likely pass additional spending. It is in America’s interest that Ukraine wins the war, and that Russia is decisively defeated. Even though polling overwhelmingly shows broad and bipartisan support for Ukraine, some in Congress are against further US aid for Ukraine.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Spending, Military Aid, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, Eastern Europe, North America, and United States of America

11. So Far, Yet So Close: Japanese and Estonian Cybersecurity Policy Perspectives and Cooperation

Author:
Henry Rõigas, Tomas Jermalavicius, Jun Osawa, Kadri Kaska, Liis Rebane, Toomas Vaks, Anna-Maria Osula, and Koichiro Komiyama
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
Estonia and Japan are among the leaders in cyber diplomacy and cybersecurity on the global stage, Japan also being a key strategic partner for the EU and NATO. They have many similarities in their approaches to cybersecurity and state behaviour in cyberspace, which has established solid ground for closer bilateral ties. This report, authored by leading Estonian and Japanese researchers of cybersecurity policy, gives a valuable insight into the experiences and perspectives of these two countries, their success stories and challenges in building a secure cyberspace, as well as the potential for cooperation.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, International Affairs, Cybersecurity, and Resilience
Political Geography:
Japan, Eurasia, Eastern Europe, and Estonia

12. Legitimising external missions: Deconstructing citizens' perceptions towards EULEX in Kosovo

Author:
Emma-Louise Rose
Publication Date:
08-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Kosovar Centre for Security Studies (KCSS)
Abstract:
On the EU’s part, EULEX has been its largest ever civilian mission in an attempt to strengthen what is considered to be the EU’s weakest spot: foreign and security policy. Despite its lengthy presence, EULEX has not gained the trust of the citizens of Kosovo. The Kosovo Security Barometer (KSB) conducted annually by KCSS has been measuring the amount of trust that Kosovo citizens have in the mission and have found the number to be consistently low when compared to other local and international institutions. The lack of trust, and therefore support, from the public seems to stem from many different areas particularly EU/EULEX’s neutrality on the issue of Kosovo independence (due to lack of recognition by 5 member states) and a failure to carry out its mission. Based on the quantitative measurement of KSB, the lack of trust has remained fairly stable over the years, with all of the given statistics being within 15% of each other (between 16% and 31%), the lowest amount of trust was recorded in 2015. This brought the legitimacy and public support for the mission into question.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, European Union, Institutions, and EULEX
Political Geography:
Eastern Europe and Kosovo

13. Ukraine 2020-2021: Inflated Expectations, Unexpected Challenges (Assessments

Author:
Yuri Yakymenko, A. Bychenko, M. Bielawski, V. Zamyatin, K. Markevych, O. Melnyk, M. Mishchenko, V. Omelchenko, M. Pashkov, O. Pyshchulina, O. Rozumniy, V. Sidenko, A. Stetskiv, P. Stetsyuk, M. Sunhurovskiy, S. Chekunova, L. Shangina, and V. Yurchyshyn
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Razumkov Centre
Abstract:
Ukraine has entered 2020 with some positive and often inflated public expectations, largely associated with a radical change of government. However, from the first to the last day of 2020, the country was affected by new, unpredictable challenges and by its own problems, both old and new.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Agriculture, Law, Domestic Policy, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Europe, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

14. President Zelensky's First Year: Achievements and Miscalculations (Summary of the Analytical Report)

Author:
Razumkov Center
Publication Date:
07-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Razumkov Centre
Abstract:
The Razumkov Centre’s Project “Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s Year of Presidency: Achievements and Miscalculations” was implemented with the support of Hanns Seidel Foundation in Ukraine. It focuses on: National Security and Defence; Foreign Policy; Domestic and Legal Policy; Economic Policy, Situation in Economy; Energy Sector; Social Policy; Public Policy; The Assessment of the First Year of V.Zelenskyy’s Presidential Term by Citizens and Experts.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Economics, Energy Policy, National Security, Social Policy, and Public Policy
Political Geography:
Ukraine and Eastern Europe

15. Brothers in Arms and Faith? The Emerging US-Central and Eastern Europe ‘Special Relationship’

Author:
Vibeke Schou Tjalve and Minda Holm
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Norwegian Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
In this policy note, we explore the nature, strength and tensions of the contemporary US-Central Eastern Europe relationship. We describe the expanding US-CEE ‘brotherhood in arms’: growing trade relations, intensified military cooperation, and rekindled diplomatic ties. Further, we unpack the striking and largely ignored dimensions of the US-CEE ‘brotherhood in faith’: the many ways in which the United States and Central and Eastern Europe are tied together by overlapping ideologies of national conservatism and a particular version of Christian ‘family values’. This involves addressing the complexities of an increasingly influential and ambitious Visegrád Group, whose key players – Poland and Hungary – may be brothers, but are by no means twins. It also means raising some broader, burning discussions about the future of NATO and the meaning of ‘Europe’. Universalist, multicultural and postnational? Or conservative, Christian and sovereigntist?
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, NATO, Military Affairs, and Trade
Political Geography:
Eastern Europe, North America, Central Europe, and United States of America

16. Supporting Political Stability by Strengthening Local Government: Decentralization in Ukraine

Author:
Lily Salloum Lindegaard and Neil Anthony Webster
Publication Date:
11-2018
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
The government that followed the 2014 Maidan revolution in Ukraine has pushed a decentralisation agenda. After decades of Soviet style top-down governance, the status and role of local governments – hromadas – has been pushed to the fore. If implemented successfully, it could increase local development and political engagement, ultimately contributing to increased political stability in Ukraine and Europe. Yet the significance of decentralization reforms is often lost in the noise surrounding Crimea, the secessionist conflict in the east, and the political power struggles in Kiev. For legal reasons, the current decentralisation process is ‘voluntary’, with local communities having to agree to the changes. This has introduced unintended challenges, but also a bottom-up political dynamic to the process. At the same time, uncertainty and opposition to decentralisation reforms remain, perhaps understandable given a rapidly shifting political and legal landscape, the diverse political and personal interests involved, and the fear of political fragmentation that could benefit Russia. Denmark is one of several EU countries supporting the reform process. This DIIS Report focuses in on the processes unfolding in local communities and political arenas, affecting peoples’ lives, their hopes, and their relationship to the state from local to national level.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Development, Fragile States, and Peace
Political Geography:
Europe, Ukraine, Eastern Europe, and Denmark

17. Kosovo's Foreign Policy and Dialogue with Serbia - Special Edition of Kosovo Security Barometer

Author:
Donika Marku and Donika Emini
Publication Date:
02-2018
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Kosovar Centre for Security Studies (KCSS)
Abstract:
The Kosovo Security Barometer (KSB) is a specific programme of Kosovar Centre for Security Studies (KCSS) designed to serve as an annual publication. The primary focus of the KSB is to measure the public opinion perceptions towards security and justice institutions. It also measures the public perception on the internal and external security threats to Kosovo, perceptions on Kosovo’s foreign policy and dialogue with Serbia. In general, the KSB targets a wide variety of actors interested in the public opinion trends in Kosovo in the field of security and justice. It targets the following stakeholders: policymakers in Kosovo as well as the western Balkans; the international organizations in Kosovo and their headquarters; local and international civil society organizations; academia and the media.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Public Opinion, and Dialogue
Political Geography:
Eastern Europe, Kosovo, and Serbia

18. KSB Special Edition - De-constructing public perceptions: Kosovo’s foreign policy and dialogue with Serbia

Author:
Donika Emini
Publication Date:
12-2018
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Kosovar Centre for Security Studies (KCSS)
Abstract:
Kosovar Centre for Security Studies continues to narrow down the results of public opinion on the broader issues of foreign policy and dialogue with Serbia in a form of Special Edition of Kosovo Security Barometer Programme. For the purpose of the trends, the main survey questions remained unchanged. KCSS continues to measure the way regional and international strategic partners of Kosovo are seen in the eye of it’s citizens, how does an average citizen of Kosovo perceive the pool of external influences in the Western Balkans and Kosovo specifically and what is the opinion toward the EU and NATO memberships. Similarly to the previous editions, KCSS has given a special focus to the EU facilitated dialogue with Serbia. However, following the debates over the potential epilogue of the dialogue, KCSS has included additional questions related to the legally bindings agreement and the leading negotiator on Kosovo’s side.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Public Opinion, Survey, and Dialogue
Political Geography:
Eastern Europe, Kosovo, and Serbia