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1. What is Serbia’s “Project 5000” and why Should we be concerned?

Author:
Kosovar Centre for Security Studies (KCSS)
Publication Date:
03-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Kosovar Centre for Security Studies (KCSS)
Abstract:
This paper examines the potential consequences and concerns surrounding Serbia’s “Project 5000,” emphasizing why it warrants attention not just from neighboring states in the Western Balkans but also from NATO. Given the geopolitical landscape, any escalation of conflict within this region directly impacts NATO’s strategic interests, considering its significant presence in the Balkans. Moreover, Russia’s overt military backing of Serbia and its advocacy for a militaristic approach towards Kosovo are of particular concern. This stance by Russia can be interpreted as an attempt to embolden Serbia to adopt a military intervention in Kosovo, serving dual purposes for Russia: shifting international focus from the brutal invasion of Ukraine and undermining NATO’s credibility and influence in the region. The unfolding situation underscores a broader strategy by Russia to exploit regional tensions, thereby challenging the Euro-Atlantic integration process. Such maneuvers not only threaten to destabilize the Western Balkans but also aim to fracture European unity and weaken NATO’s strategic coherence, particularly as it pertains to its eastern flank and broader engagement in conflict resolution and peacekeeping efforts.
Topic:
Security, NATO, Geopolitics, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Eastern Europe and Serbia

2. Toward Innovation-driven Growth: Innovation Systems and Policies in EU Member States of Central Eastern Europe

Author:
Alexandra Bykova, Viktrória Döme, Richard Grieveson, Francesca Guadagno, and Doris Hanzl-Weiss
Publication Date:
09-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies (WIIW)
Abstract:
This study builds on our previous analyses of a new growth model for the EU member states of Central and Eastern European (CEE), focusing on fostering innovation-driven development. We aim to explain the types of innovation systems and policies that enhance domestic innovation capabilities, drawing on global best practices. A critical evaluation of the current innovation landscape in EU-CEE countries is conducted, particularly in the context of the green and digital transitions. The study assesses the strengths and weaknesses of both national innovation initiatives and opportunities provided by EU industrial and technology policy frameworks. Based on these insights, we offer actionable policy recommendations to promote innovation-driven growth, enhance productivity, and boost economic convergence over the medium term, taking into account the unique political and historical contexts of the EU-CEE countries. Additionally, we prepare country-specific briefing notes tailored to the individual development needs and opportunities of each nation.
Topic:
Development, International Trade and Finance, Science and Technology, Economic Growth, Innovation, Economic Competition, and Convergence
Political Geography:
Europe, Eastern Europe, and Central Europe

3. Northern Kosovo: Asserting Sovereignty amid Divided Loyalties

Author:
International Crisis Group
Publication Date:
04-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
Tensions are rising in Kosovo’s restive Serb-majority north, as Pristina enforces its writ against the backdrop of continuing disputes with Belgrade. The parties and outside supporters should first work on defusing the short-term risk of violence and then look for ways to foster lasting stability.
Topic:
Sovereignty, Political stability, Domestic Politics, and Violence
Political Geography:
Europe, Eastern Europe, and Kosovo

4. Ukraine: How to Hold the Line

Author:
International Crisis Group
Publication Date:
05-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
The gruelling war in Ukraine continues, with Russian forces creeping forward amid fierce fighting. To stop Russia’s immediate momentum and withstand its assault, Kyiv and its backers will need to move quickly to fix problems that have hindered the Ukrainian effort to date.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Armed Conflict, Military Aid, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

5. A Fraught Path Forward for Ukraine’s Liberated Territories

Author:
International Crisis Group
Publication Date:
06-2024
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
Even as Ukraine continues to resist Russia’s onslaught, it faces the challenge of reintegrating lands its army freed from Russian occupation in 2022. With aid from donors, there is much Kyiv can do to help make these areas peaceful and productive once more.
Topic:
Humanitarian Aid, Occupation, Donors, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

6. Women's Security in Local Communities

Author:
Lajla Leko and Sabahudin Harčević
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Centre for Security Studies
Abstract:
With the project "Improvement of Women's Safety and Security in Local Communities - AwareBiH", CSS aims to point out the state of security from the point of view of women, therefore it is necessary that some of the biggest cities, namely Mostar, Sarajevo and Banja Luka, are bearers of positive changes in the implementation of the project's results. In addition, the project aims to show the ability of women in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) to influence changes that would make their environment safer. This topic is not discussed in BiH as much as it should be, while the security sector is still perceived as a sector dominated by men. Therefore, this project will help society and decisionmakers to better understand the needs and feelings of women in BiH about their own security.
Topic:
Security, Law Enforcement, Women, Violence, and Survey
Political Geography:
Europe, Eastern Europe, Balkans, and Bosnia and Herzegovina

7. Anti-corruption Capacities of Public Procurement in the Security Sector: Report for 2020 and 2021 - Part I

Author:
Erdin Halimić, Dajana Bašić, and Aleksandar Maletić
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Centre for Security Studies
Abstract:
Investigations into corruption in the security sector are often focused on contracting, that is, on the stages of public procurement in which civil servants prepare and sign contracts with suppliers of equipment and services and manage their implementation. However, in order to discover the functioning mechanisms of public procurement and potential critical points for the emergence of corruption, we must investigate the entire public procurement procedure and then prepare appropriate conclusions and recommendations for its suppression. In our case, this implies an indepth analysis of relevant normative acts, practices and challenges in public procurement in the security sector. The report was made on the basis of qualitative and quantitative parameters based on which the anti-corruption capacities of 13 security sector institutions from different levels of government in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) were measured and evaluated. The time period covered by the research refers to two years, 2020 and 2021.
Topic:
Security, Corruption, Government, Law Enforcement, Institutions, and Public Procurement
Political Geography:
Europe, Eastern Europe, Balkans, and Bosnia and Herzegovina

8. Anti-corruption Capacities of Public Procurement in the Security Sector: Report for 2020 and 2021 - Part II

Author:
Erdin Halimić, Ajla Popović, Haris Vejezović, Aleksandar Maletić, and Dajana Bašić
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Centre for Security Studies
Abstract:
Investigations into corruption in the security sector are often focused on contracting, that is, on the stages of public procurement in which civil servants prepare and sign contracts with suppliers of equipment and services and manage their implementation. However, in order to discover the functioning mechanisms of public procurement and potential critical points for the emergence of corruption, we must investigate the entire public procurement procedure and then prepare appropriate conclusions and recommendations for its suppression. In our case, this implies an indepth analysis of relevant normative acts, practices and challenges in public procurement in the security sector. The report was made on the basis of qualitative and quantitative parameters based on which the anti-corruption capacities of 12 security sector institutions from different levels of government in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) were measured and evaluated. The time period covered by the research refers to two years, 2020 and 2021.
Topic:
Security, Corruption, Government, Law Enforcement, Institutions, and Public Procurement
Political Geography:
Europe, Eastern Europe, Balkans, and Bosnia and Herzegovina

9. What Does the Russian Army Think About its War in Ukraine? Criticisms, Recommendations, Adaptations

Author:
Dimitri Minic
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
The Russian army is very critical of its war in Ukraine. Not just of the first phase of the failed special military operation (SVO), which was inspired by the theorization of bypassing, but also of the strategic deterrence phase that preceded it. What Does the Russian Army Think About its War in Ukraine? Criticisms, Recommendations, Adaptations Download 0.98 Mo Russian military theorists have commented on the profound lack of preparation not just for the SVO, but also—in many areas—for the heterotelic war the SVO has become. The Russian army’s weaknesses vis-à-vis the Ukrainian army are generally, and sometimes quite directly, recognized. The Russian military elites have made numerous recommendations for improving Russia’s military performance, primarily focusing on the ground and aerospace forces. Meanwhile, the Russian army has mostly adapted (more or less successfully) to the difficulties it has encountered in the last year and a half in Ukraine. Although the Putin regime is authoritarian and intent on reducing freedom of expression in Russian society, the existence and tolerance of a certain amount of truth-telling at this level of the military apparatus indicate that the Russian army’s and state’s ability to adapt should not be underestimated.
Topic:
Armed Forces, Deterrence, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

10. Women Police Officers’ Perception of Gender Integration in the Kosovo Police

Author:
Adelina Hasani
Publication Date:
11-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Kosovar Centre for Security Studies (KCSS)
Abstract:
Kosovo has made significant strides in improving women’s political representation by implementing gender quotas to enhance the presence of women in its all state institutions. The enactment of Kosovo’s Law on Gender Equality in May 2015 marked a crucial milestone in strengthening the nation’s legal framework for promoting gender equality. However, despite progress, Kosovo still faces numerous gender equality challenges, particularly in the realms of women’s leadership positions, equal political participation, and ending violence against women. Traditional gender role mentalities, discrimination, and stereotyping have presented significant barriers to women’s involvement in decision-making at all levels, including within the security sector. Despite some notable improvements, the journey towards increased representation of women in the Kosovo Police remains a work in progress. Nevertheless, in many countries, likewise in Kosovo, security sector policies and programming have failed to analyze women’s security needs and priorities adequately and involve women and men equally by integrating their gender perspectives. In such cases, security institutions are often rife with equality gaps and may be unable to provide security for all community members. Efforts aimed at integrating a gender perspective into policies and practices of the security sector have predominantly focused on women’s representation rather than on their specific needs. The data conducted shows that Kosovo’s policies have demonstrated significant efforts to enhance the gender perspective within the Kosovo Police. However, challenges persist, stemming from factors such as the limited participation of women in managerial and decision-making roles, traditional male dominance, patriarchal mindsets, and the need for comprehensive integration of gender perspectives into all laws and regulations governing the Kosovo Police. This report highlights and analyzes women’s critical challenges in the Kosovo Police from the perspective of women police officers. Women’s issues are often not treated as a priority and do not receive the necessary attention. Through this report, we will examine the working environment for women in the Kosovo Police, the primary challenges they encounter, unaddressed issues that have not been taken seriously, policies that should promote gender diversity, and the impact and contribution of women within the the Kosovo Police. The report employs a qualitative methodology and relies on semi-structured interviews with experienced and high-ranking women in the Kosovo Police. These interviews have focused on gaining insights into the working environment, gender sensitivity within security institutions, and the primary challenges faced by women in the sector. Additionally, we have conducted seven focus groups with women in the Kosovo Police who do not hold high-ranking positions. The aim is to analyze and comprehend the dynamics and factors that hinder women’s advancement to higher ranks within the Kosovo Police. These focus groups were organized in Prizren, Prishtina, Mitrovica, Gjilan, Gjakova, Ferizaj, and Peje. Through these focus groups, we have collected comprehensive information about the working environment and gender integration within the Kosovo Police.
Topic:
Security, Women, Legislation, Police, Integration, and Gender
Political Geography:
Eastern Europe and Kosovo

11. Are Non-Governmental Organizations prepared to deal with Cyberthreats?- An analysis of perceptions of cybersecurity capacities among NGOs in Kosovo

Author:
Donika Elshani
Publication Date:
09-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Kosovar Centre for Security Studies (KCSS)
Abstract:
NGOs in Kosovo are increasingly relying on digital tools to conduct their work. From online correspondence via different applications, storing important organizational data on electronic devices and establishing an online presence through social media accounts, they are leveraging technology to streamline processes, improve communication, and engage with stakeholders. However, with the benefits of these digital tools come certain challenges and risks that, if left unaddressed, can undermine the effectiveness and security of NGOs and potentially even threaten their very existence. Malign actors are increasingly using the online sphere to perpetrate malicious activities, including stealing sensitive data, committing financial crimes, spreading falsehoods and hate speech, to name but a few. The aim of this report is to provide a analysis of perceptions of key digital threats and digital capacity-building needs of the non-governmental sector in Kosovo. It seeks to fill the existing data gap by conducting an initial assessment of the key challenges faced by NGOs in terms of digital security and identifying their specific needs for enhancing their digital capacity. The report draws on a quantitative survey conducted among 48 NGOs to assess their cybersecurity landscape. The findings reveal that NGOs in Kosovo face significant challenges in terms of their capacity to identify, mitigate, and respond to cyber threats. The analysis highlights a lack of adequate resources, expertise, and cybersecurity measures within these organizations to effectively tackle potential digital threats in the future.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Cybersecurity, NGOs, and Non-Traditional Threats
Political Geography:
Eastern Europe and Kosovo

12. Kosovo citizens’ perceptions on EU integration, Kosovo-Serbia bilateral relations, and Regional Cooperation

Author:
Dea Fetiu and Gramos Sejdiu
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Kosovar Centre for Security Studies (KCSS)
Abstract:
This report of Western Balkans Security Barometer analyzes the Kosovo citizens’ perceptions on EU integration, Kosovo-Serbia bilateral relations, and Regional Cooperation. Over the course of our measurement period, the public perception of EU integration has consistently maintained a high level of support. In 2020, 92.5 percent of citizens expressed support, followed by 92.3 percent in 2021, and 94.2 percent in 2022. These findings indicate a stable and high level of support for the integration process, with no significant changes observed over the last three years. Turning to the citizens’ perceptions of the Kosovo-Serbia bilateral relations and the dialogue process, the second part of the report highlights an increase in support for the dialogue among Kosovo citizens. In 2021, 74.3 percent expressed their support to the dialogue, which rose to 83 percent in 2022. Furthermore, the chapter touches upon the shift of citizens’ perspectives on the impact of the dialogue on Kosovo – Serbia relations, with 40 percent of the respondents believing it had improved in 2022 compared to 14.6 percent in 2021. A majority of respondents (68.8 percent) expressed support for regional cooperation in the Western Balkans, indicating a positive inclination among Kosovo’s population. Additionally, respondents consistently expressed support for free movement, information exchange, and the establishment of a common market for goods and workforce in the Western Balkans. When specifically asked about the Open Balkan Initiative, responses were very divided and varied over the years, with fluctuating levels of support and opposition. Overall, the findings highlight the strong aspiration for EU integration and the continuation of the Kosovo – Serbia dialogue, with citizens understanding the complexity and challenges of both processes and the challenges ahead.
Topic:
Security, Bilateral Relations, Public Opinion, European Union, Regional Integration, Survey, and Perception
Political Geography:
Eastern Europe, Kosovo, and Serbia

13. Citizens’ Perceptions on Foreign Actors Influence in Kosovo and Regional Cooperation

Author:
Dorjeta Rukiqi
Publication Date:
07-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Kosovar Centre for Security Studies (KCSS)
Abstract:
The general perception of respondents towards Western countries such as the USA (91 percent), Germany (90 percent), Austria (84 percent), and the United Kingdom (83 percent) is positive. Conversely, negative perceptions are held towards states that do not recognize Kosovo, such as Russia (86 percent), Greece (69 percent), China (65 percent), Spain (61 percent), and Iran (49 percent). The positive impact of Western actors in Kosovo is evident in their aid, assistance, and support throughout the state-building process of Kosovo. Their foreign agendas, aimed at promoting democracy and providing economic and financial support, have greatly facilitated Kosovo’s advancement as a young state. Conversely, perceptions of malign influences align with the hindrances posed by countries like Russia, China, and Spain. These nations have impeded Kosovo’s progress by obstructing its participation in crucial processes, blocking its membership in international organizations, refusing to acknowledge its independence, and disregarding its institutions. These actions have contributed to the negative perceptions of these countries among respondents, reflecting their adverse impact on Kosovo’s development. Regarding regional countries, 90 percent of the respondents view Albania as having the most positive impact, while Serbia is perceived as the regional country with the most negative impact. In terms of regional cooperation, 69 percent of respondents support it, while 24 percent oppose it. Similarly, 70 percent of respondents support the free movement of labor and goods within the region, while 24 percent hold an opposing view. However, only 31 percent of respondents support the so-called Open Balkan Initiative, while 52 percent are against it. The Open Balkan Initiative, a regional effort to promote cooperation in the Western Balkans, has elicited a mixed response among the public in Kosovo. The lack of a clear written statute and undefined objectives have led to confusion, with many perceiving the initiative as a means for Serbia to consolidate its dominance in the region. These factors contribute to the complex dynamics and uncertainties surrounding the Open Balkan Initiative in Kosovo. Respondents who support the Open Balkan Initiative argue that it improves regional cooperation, establishes freedom of movement in the region, generates employment, and fosters economic development. On the other hand, those who oppose it argue that it empowers Serbia, discriminates against Kosovo’s position in the region, and weakens Kosovo’s economy.
Topic:
Regional Cooperation, Public Opinion, Citizenship, Regional Integration, and Survey
Political Geography:
Eastern Europe and Kosovo

14. Kosovo COVID-19 Management

Author:
Plator Avdiu, Donika Elshani, and Shpat Balaj
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Kosovar Centre for Security Studies (KCSS)
Abstract:
The purpose of this research is to provide a general overview of the manifestation of the COVID-19 pandemic in Kosovo and the overall management of the pandemic by relevant institutions. The analysis is based on data collected through publicly available information, national statistics, news articles, as well as research reports by local non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and international organizations and missions in the country. The COVID-19 pandemic of the novel coronavirus was first identified in Wuhan, China in December 2019. It quickly spread to other parts of the world, leading to the World Health Organization declaring a pandemic on March 11, 202012. Countries across the globe implemented various measures to control the spread of the virus, including lockdowns, travel restrictions and mask mandates. The COVID-19 vaccine was soon developed, and the vaccine roll out began in the first months of 2021, with many countries still being in the process of vaccinating their populations. The COVID-19 pandemic has had a significant impact on Kosovo, as it has had in many countries around the world. The first cases of COVID-19 in Kosovo were reported in March 202014, and since then the country has implemented measures such as lockdowns, mask mandates, and travel restrictions to try to control the spread of the virus. Kosovo faced many challenges in its efforts to control the spread of the virus, including limited healthcare resources, vaccine hesitancy, political instability and economic hardship, to name a few.15 The COVID-19 vaccine roll-out in Kosovo began in the first months of 2021 and was implemented with a phased approach, whereby some groups, such as healthcare workers, the elderly, and persons with underlying conditions, were given priority, before vaccinating the rest of the population. AstraZeneca and Pfizer BioNTech were the two vaccinees administered in Kosovo. These vaccines were secured through various sources, including through the COVAX facility.
Topic:
Public Policy, Public Health, Vaccine, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Eastern Europe and Kosovo

15. Little substance, considerable impact Russian influence in Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Montenegro

Author:
Wouter Zweers and Niels Drost
Publication Date:
08-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
This Clingendael report explores the role of the Russian Federation in Serbia, Montenegro, and Bosnia and Herzegovina. It examines Russia’s objectives in its relations with the three countries, as well the various sources of influence the Kremlin holds in each of the three countries. The report places this analysis within the changed geopolitical circumstances resulting from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Russia’s main objectives for the Western Balkans are threefold. First, the Kremlin seeks to project great power status globally. Second, it seeks to obstruct the Euro-Atlantic integration of the region by advocating against NATO and EU integration and by raising instabilities. Third, the Kremlin uses the Balkans, especially the Kosovo issue, as an argument for its foreign policy agenda elsewhere, particularly when it comes to defending its perceived dominance over its near abroad. Instead of building a sustainable, all-encompassing, and meaningful relation with Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), and Montenegro, Russia instead pursues an opportunistic approach depending on fragmented entry points for influence in each country. The Kremlin displays moderate ambitions for building positive relationships with the three countries, which is reflected also in the instruments it uses to influence the region. It nurtures contacts with, and influence through, a wide range of individual politicians, the Orthodox Church, the media and malign proxy groups, making use of energy links as well as local tensions and historical memories. Moscow pursues this approach deliberately, and it has proven relatively successful. At the political level, Russia’s clout stretches especially to (pro-)Serb politicians, who often make use of similar narratives and use Russia as an external supporter to promote their own ideas. In particular, its position on Kosovo, Russian support for Republika Srpska leader Milorad Dodik and its Orthodox Church links remain important entry points for Russia’s political influence in the region at large. Of the three countries, entry points for Russian influence are most widespread In Serbia, followed by Bosnia and Herzegovina. Economically, Russia’s influence is outperformed substantially by that of the EU, especially in terms of trade. Russia’s far-reaching influence in the energy sectors of BiH and Serbia, however, yield substantial political leverage, even if its investments often prove economically inviable. When it comes to military influence, Russia seeks to maintain its military cooperation with its main partner, Serbia, while also supporting the militarisation of Republika Srpska. Belgrade is satisfied with its current degree of cooperation with Moscow but seeks to avoid becoming Russia’s foothold in the Balkans. Factually, Russia is only one of multiple security actors in the Balkans, overshadowed by NATO and challenged by China. While presenting itself as a partner to Serbia and Republika Srpska in particular, Russia also resorts to malign instruments which have often proven to be effective in shaping the political environment of the Western Balkans. Lacking a military presence in the region, Russia supports far-right nationalist figures and organisations, which generally better resemble organised crime groups than paramilitary organisations, to attain its goal of destabilisation by stirring up polarisation and anti-Western sentiment. The Kremlin is perhaps most successful in the field of media and disinformation. Russian propaganda penetrates Serbia, Montenegro, and Bosnia and Herzegovina through Russian-funded portals, local media and social media. Russian disinformation and narratives have penetrated the region to such an extent that considerable sections of society hold a positive image of Russia and its political leadership. In all these fields, the Russian invasion of Ukraine has moderately affected but not fully altered Russia’s approach towards Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Montenegro. While the invasion has led to sharper dividing lines between Russia and the West and decreases in Russian financial and diplomatic capacities, we observe continuity in terms of Russian strategies and objectives. Russia’s sources of influence in the three countries have been moderately strained, among other causes as a result of BiH and Serbia’s first steps to diversify energy sources and Western pressure to diminish their political and security links with the Russian Federation. For the time being, this has not yet affected Moscow’s ability to act as a spoiler to the Euro-Atlantic integration of the three countries. The extent to which the European Union and NATO are effective in countering Russian influence in Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Montenegro will be part of a follow-up Clingendael report to be published in fall 2023. As part of the same research project, analyses of societal and political perceptions towards Russia in the three countries will be published in summer 2023 by Clingendael partners the Atlantic Council of Montenegro, the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia, and the Atlantic Initiative in BiH.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, European Union, Disinformation, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
Russia, Eastern Europe, Serbia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina

16. Double-Edged Sword: How to Engage Returnee Networks in Migrant Reintegration

Author:
Victoria Rietig and Sophie Meiners
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:
Migrants increasingly have a say in migration policies. Diaspora and migrant associations rightfully step into the spotlight to bring their much-needed perspectives to policy development. But the work of associations of returned migrants has stayed in the shadows despite their having firsthand experiences that can guide the design of reintegration policies.
Topic:
Migration, Networks, Reintegration, and Immigration Policy
Political Geography:
Africa, Middle East, and Eastern Europe

17. Russia’s War in Ukraine: Rethinking the EU’s Eastern Enlargement and Neighborhood Policy

Author:
Guntram Wolff, Alexandra Gritz, Stefan Meister, and Milan Nič
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:
The stagnating EU accession process needs political will and procedural changes allowing eastern candidates to advance. In the meantime, they should be more supported to use the full potential of existing opportunities for gradual economic and sectoral integration with the EU. An upgraded Eastern Partnership needs a comprehensive security dimension linking resilience, connectivity, and defense policy, as well as cooperation in the area of the Common Security and Defence Policy. The protracted regional conflicts (in Moldova and the South Caucasus) require a more active EU engagement as existing OSCE formats continue to be blocked, and Russia’s role and military presence weaken. New openings for conflict resolution mean higher demand for the EU’s diplomatic, monitoring, and peacekeeping capacities. A new eastern Neighborhood Policy should be designed for the wider region, connecting the Black Sea and the South Caucasus with Central Asia and thus creating viable alternatives to the competing geoeconomic and governance “offers” of China, Russia, and Turkey.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Governance, European Union, International Order, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Central Asia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

18. CEFTA: Trade and Growth Patterns Fifteen Years since Establishment

Author:
Nina Vujanović
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies (WIIW)
Abstract:
This research report investigates the trade and growth benefits of the CEFTA agreement for its members. Although the countries have not reached their end goal of membership of the European Union, the report shows that CEFTA has supported their economic growth. However, there is trade heterogeneity in terms of the extent to which individual countries use CEFTA value added in their manufacturing exports. Less-developed economies seem to rely more on regional (CEFTA) supply chains, while manufacturing-based economies are increasingly coming to rely on EU supply chains. The countries have not built a strong export advantage abroad, as very little of their value added is used in EU exports.
Topic:
European Union, Economic Growth, Trade, Supply Chains, and CEFTA
Political Geography:
Moldova, Eastern Europe, Kosovo, Serbia, Balkans, Albania, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and North Macedonia

19. Economic Priorities in Post-war Ukraine

Author:
Dmytro Boyarchuk
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center for Social and Economic Research - CASE
Abstract:
Ukraine has been a stellar example of a little reform going a long way. First invaded by Russia in 2014, the Ukraine of 2022 was a different country, with more resilience, more ability, and more depth. As it pushes to repel the Russian aggressor, it is never too early to think about how Ukraine can continue its reform process and become a state that is free of Russia, economically strong, and a model for policy reform. The ways in which Ukraine can attain this goal are contained in the economic roadmap, “Economic Priorities in Post-war Ukraine,” produced by Ukrainian experts and world-class policy advisors under CASE-Center for Social Research and CASE Ukraine and funded by agencies from around Europe and the United States. This report focuses on the essential reforms that will help Ukraine with the post-war reconstruction, as well as enable progress in its efforts on the way to EU membership. Over 30 years of independence, Ukraine has launched almost all of the necessary reforms to build and develop a market economy. In 2014, Ukraine signed the EU-Ukraine Association Agreement, and substantial progress has been demonstrated since then. However, the country fought against a legacy of start-stop reforms and inattention to major objectives such as building the rule of law and encouraging private sector competition. Before the full-scale Russian invasion, it had been making progress in institutional reforms but still had far to go. This report addresses many of the complex tasks that Ukraine needs to complete, with the main challenge being the rule of law, a problem lasting for three decades. Our team of experts propose specific mechanisms to make the transition to a country which respects the rule of law, including ways to improve the judiciary, respect property rights, and encourage private sector competition. The report also examines the question on how the Ukrainian government can attract funding and rebuild the country after the war is over, discussing ways in which the EU and the donor community can be involved. The eventual end of the war also provides Ukraine with a unique opportunity to leap ahead in the European integration process and to finish its institutional reforms. With Ukraine now a candidate for EU membership, the prospects of the integration process, the unprecedented support for integration with the EU in Ukrainian society and the continued support of the West, present Ukraine with a way forward and overcoming the obstacles that have delayed, stalled, or even caused the abandonment of reforms in the past.
Topic:
Development, Reform, Economy, Institutions, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

20. Toward Inclusive Recovery in Ukraine: Engaging Women and Civil Society in Ukraine’s Relief, Recovery, and Reconstruction

Author:
Jess Keller
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace and Security (GIWPS)
Abstract:
Women’s participation in the design and implementation of Ukraine’s recovery programs is critical to maximize the effectiveness of the reconstruction process, take into account differentiated needs, and bolster post-conflict development. Key recommendations: Promote women’s participation, leadership, and decision-making in Ukraine’s planning frameworks and recovery process. Ensure new funding enables women’s active participation in Ukraine’s recovery and advances gender equality. Establish a gender-sensitive monitoring mechanism for the Ukrainian government to report on recovery progress and collect and analyze sex-disaggregated data. Prioritize the re-establishment of critical social infrastructure and services. Integrate gender equality in Ukraine’s EU accession commitments.
Topic:
Civil Society, Reconstruction, Women, Recovery, Participation, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

21. Safeguarding Critical Infrastructure in Kosovo

Author:
Kosovar Centre for Security Studies (KCSS)
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Kosovar Centre for Security Studies (KCSS)
Abstract:
Critical infrastructure is a segment which is related to several other areas of security and defense, namely some strategic and legal documents which are in force as well as some new initiatives. This analysis provided a detailed overview of the protection of critical infrastructure in the Republic of Kosovo, becoming the first document published in this field. While the MIA has done a very good job in drafting the law on critical infrastructure, putting Kosovo one step ahead of other Western Balkan countries, the law remains unimplementable for almost 2 years following the date of its entry into force. Initially, strategic documents that are in the process of being drafted such as the draft National Security Strategy, the draft Defense Strategy, the draft Counter-Terrorism Strategy and the draft Cyber Security Strategy should include the protection of critical infrastructure by ensuring coordination of actions and by avoiding duplication or overlap of actions. The Strategic Planning Office within the Office of the Prime Minister should coordinate this process in cooperation with the relevant ministries. On the other hand, the draft law on cyber security should pay attention to the drafting of legal provisions which may cause overlap with the law on infrastructure, while the initiative for drafting the law on Security Measures for Networks and Information Systems needs to be reviewed. Moreover, the draft law on private security services should be finalized as soon as possible.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Infrastructure, and Cybersecurity
Political Geography:
Eastern Europe and Kosovo

22. Citizens perceptions of integrity of public institutions in Kosovo

Author:
Shpat Balaj
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Kosovar Centre for Security Studies (KCSS)
Abstract:
The Kosovo Security Forces, the Kosovo Police, the President of Kosovo and the Municipalities are the most trusted public institutions in Kosovo, with over 50 percent of respondents declaring that they trust or completely trust these institutions. This is followed by the Kosovo Customs and the Kosovo Intelligence Agency with 45 percent of respondents sharing such an opinion. On the other hand, less than 40 percent of the respondents declared that they trust or completely trust Courts, Prosecution, Kosovo Correctional Services, the Government of Kosovo and the Kosovo Assembly. The results of the report show that citizens of Kosovo find the security institutions more reliable with a higher level of trust towards them, compared to other public institutions in Kosovo, such as the justice institutions which citizens perceive less trustworthy and with weak integrity. The citizen confidence in the institutions of the Courts and the Prosecution in Kosovo has been consistently in decline, and this is concerning. Citizens have higher confidence in the public institutions from the central level, especially when compared to the previous year (2020), however, the skepticism towards these institutions generally prevails.
Topic:
Security, Public Opinion, Survey, and Public Institutions
Political Geography:
Eastern Europe and Kosovo

23. E-mobility: An OPPORTUNITY for Central-Eastern Europe

Author:
Michal Hrubý
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Europeum Institute for European Policy
Abstract:
The transition to e-mobility is happening more slowly in CEE than other parts of Europe and even faces resistance from some quarters, which was heavily debated at the conference. Although some CEE policymakers might pretend as if this path is not yet decided – especially challenging since leadership is one of the characteristics most needed to seize the e-mobility opportunity – the private sector realizes the opposite.
Topic:
Infrastructure, Mobility, Innovation, and Transportation
Political Geography:
Europe, Eastern Europe, and Central Europe

24. Developing Nuclear Energy in Estonia: An Amplifier of Strategic Partnership with the United States?

Author:
Tomas Jermalavicius, Max Bergmann, Peter Crall, Thomas O'Donnell, Tomas Janeliūnas, and Tõnis Idarand
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:
Estonia’s climate neutrality commitments and its simultaneous pursuit of national security mean that it will need to develop and cultivate new zero- or low-carbon, affordable, secure and safe domestic sources of energy. Nuclear energy is increasingly regarded as one of the critical ingredients of successful transition to climate-neutral energy system and as a viable part of the future decarbonised mix of energy supply. Therefore, Estonia is officially considering the possibility to adopt nuclear energy generated by new-design Small Modular Reactors (SMR). This choice, however, is not purely environmental, economic or technical, but also has geopolitical implications. It would create new long-term inter-dependencies with foreign partners which could represent fresh opportunities for closer cooperation in security and foreign policy domain, but also could create some new political, reputational, and national security risks. This geopolitical dimension is of particular importance to countries such as Estonia that seek greater involvement of key allies such as the United States, United Kingdom, France, and Germany in the Nordic-Baltic area to counter the geopolitical pressure from Russia and, increasingly, China. The report assumes that Estonia might eventually opt for nuclear energy and would then choose the US as its SMR technology supplier. It explores how Estonia’s foreign and security policy interests would benefit from a potential adoption of nuclear energy and development of technological and commercial relations in this field with the US. The report also maps various potential risks in relations with several key fellow member states of the European Union that may arise from Estonia turning to nuclear power as a major source of energy and to the US for a technological solution. It considers how certain structural issues in national energy policies and divergent geopolitical perspectives of Germany, France, and Poland – as well as some persistent characteristics of intra-European relations manifest through the EU’s common policies – may impair or facilitate Estonian nuclear aspirations. The study also highlights that Estonia’s affirmative decision concerning nuclear energy is likely to draw the attention and actions of malignant actors such as Russia aiming to discredit nuclear energy in general, as a viable pathway to energy security and climate neutrality, and US SMR technology in particular; undermine trust – domestically and internationally – in the ability of the Estonian government and enterprises to ensure competent and responsible stewardship of nuclear energy, and pit Estonia against some key regional and European allies. The report articulates some recommendations on how to better exploit the opportunities related to the US involvement in the development of Estonia’s nuclear energy programme and mitigate the identified risks.
Topic:
Climate Change, National Security, Partnerships, and Nuclear Energy
Political Geography:
Eastern Europe, Estonia, North America, and United States of America

25. Serbia on Edge

Author:
Richard Kraemer
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI)
Abstract:
The time has come to openly regard the Republic of Serbia for what it is: A stalwart Russian and Chinese ally run by a semi-authoritarian government that proactively pursues ideologically irredentist territorial expansion in the Western Balkans. Today’s Serbia poses a threat to regional and transatlantic security. Under President Aleksandar Vučić’s Serbian Progressive Party (SNS), the Serbian government is rapidly building its military, overtly backing ultranationalist provocateurs in neighboring states, cementing Belgrade’s ties to Moscow, and consolidating partnerships with the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Integral to its efforts to actualize the “Greater Serbia” ideology, Serbia’s and Russia’s Orthodox Church leadership cooperate closely and in concert with their political counterparts. Without a significant Westward shift in its orientation, Serbia will continue on an authoritarian trajectory aligned with U.S. adversaries. Contemporary Serbia presents a quandary for U.S. and European strategists and policymakers. A genuinely democratic and Euro-Atlantic-oriented Serbia has been sought by Brussels and Washington alike. Yet, decades after Yugoslavia’s violent dissolution and related North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) interventions in the 1990s, most Serbians reject NATO cooperation and are lukewarm towards the European Union (EU). Consequently, the U.S. and its democratic allies in Europe are less able to leverage prospective memberships as a means of transatlantic integration. Further complicating relations with Serbia is Aleksandar Vučić’s overt embrace of Beijing and Moscow. The depth of Serbia’s growing dependence on those powers jeopardizes U.S and European security on multiple fronts. The Vučić government’s enduring endorsement of ultranationalist narratives and their subversive purveyors continues to intensify discord in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, and North Macedonia. Its military build-up is gravely disconcerting; Belgrade responds only with specious explanations. The country’s ever-greater reliance on Russian oil and gas as a client and transit state for Gazprom, Russia’s state-owned energy giant, puts it at odds with Brussels, Washington, and several Central-Eastern European capitals. Belgrade and Beijing’s economic, technological, and increasingly military cooperation accelerates as the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) further entrenches itself in southeast Europe. In sum: Serbia’s expanding alignment with authoritarian powers and regional anti-democratic forces reflects its illiberal worldview and disabling narrative of national victimhood. Western policymakers persistently view Belgrade’s government with the misunderstanding that, given the right incentives, Serbia will moderate, democratize, and gradually integrate into transatlantic institutions. This assumption is misguided. It diminishes, if not excludes, the need for a national reckoning among the Serbian people. As with post-war Germany’s Willy Brandt, Serbia needs courageous and sincere leadership to acknowledge past sins and move the nation forward. For example: A genuine Kniefall von Warschau event could spur an honest discussion among Serbian peoples about the atrocities committed during Yugoslavia’s dissolution. Whatever the catalyst, a broad acknowledgment of past crimes against humanity is categorical if Serbia is ever to become a democratic and open society. Without it, Serbs will remain disproportionately susceptible to domestic irredentist forces fed by malign foreign powers set on keeping the Western Balkans removed from the transatlantic community. Until such a national reckoning, Western decision-makers should adopt a more pragmatic approach to relations with a Belgrade government dismissive of genuine transatlantic partnerships. For as long as Pan-Serb ultranationalism is considered by Serbia’s leaders to be acceptable in political discourse, the kind of genuine democratic values and institutions shared within the transatlantic community will remain unrealized. Accordingly, the U.S. and its European allies should encourage Serbia to focus on itself, not its neighbors. In that vein, Western policymakers would be wise to stop expecting a breakthrough in Kosovo-Serbia status negotiations. It has become an empty dialogue that only keeps Kosovo locked outside of international institutions and other benefits of recognized statehood. A revised approach should also discontinue pushing an ineffective EU integration process as the primary means of democratically transforming Serbia.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Ideology, and Expansion
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Eastern Europe, Serbia, and Balkans

26. American Interests in the Ukraine War

Author:
Joshua Shifrinson
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Defense Priorities
Abstract:
Policymakers have poorly defined U.S. strategic interests in the Russia-Ukraine War. Those interests that have been defined—deterring future aggression and protecting the “liberal order”—do not stand up to scrutiny. Actual U.S. interests in Ukraine are essentially negative: preventing further escalation or spillover of the conflict and limiting a wholesale collapse in U.S.-Russian relations. The limited interests that the U.S. does have in Ukraine suggest that Washington should try to convince Ukraine and Russia to accept a negotiated settlement.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Liberal Order, Conflict, Strategic Interests, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, Eastern Europe, and United States of America

27. Prepare Ukraine for Victory in a Long War

Author:
Luke Coffey
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
On February 24, Russia invaded Ukraine for the second time in eight years. While many assumed that the war would be short, a stiff Ukrainian defense halted and then successfully counter-attacked against the Russian advances on Kyiv, Sumy, and Kharkiv. After capturing Kherson, Russia’s main advance from occupied Crimea in the south toward Mykolaiv also stalled. At the time of writing, Ukrainian forces are beginning a counterattack in that region and are located approximately 12 miles outside Kherson city center. Mariupol, on the Sea of Azov coastline, fell to the Russians on May 22 after Ukrainian forces made a heroic last stand in the Azovstal iron and steel works. This capture allowed Russia to create a land bridge from the Russian Federation to occupied Crimea. Mariupol’s capture also turned the Sea of Azov into a Russian lake.”1 In the Donbas, which is arguably Russia’s main effort at this stage of the war, Russian troops have made limited advances at a very high cost in equipment and manpower. In late June, Russian forces captured Sievierodonetsk after weeks of heavy fighting, leaving Russia in control of Ukraine’s Luhansk Oblast. Ukrainians are currently defending a front line that is approximately 1,250 miles long—this is equal to the straight- line distance from Washington, DC, to Houston, Texas. Russian public opinion still supports the war.”2 While Russia’s advancements in the Donbas have been slow and costly, there is no indication that Moscow will stop its offensive anytime soon. President Vladimir Putin knows that his legacy rides on Russia’s victory or defeat in Ukraine.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, National Security, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

28. Russia Can Still Be Defeated, But Time Is Short

Author:
Can Kasapoglu
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
At Davos last May, former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger sparked a controversy when he argued that Kyiv must cede territory to Moscow to achieve peace. Kissinger may well be correct to assert that a stable balance between Russia and Ukraine will require some trade-offs based on the principles of Realpolitik. But we should not delude ourselves into thinking that Putin—a former KGB officer who considers the collapse of the Soviet Union to have been the greatest catastrophe of the twentieth century—launched this war simply to secure a border readjustment. Putin’s essay, published in April 2021, expresses his view with admirable clarity: Ukraine, in the eyes of the Kremlin, is Russia. In sum, he launched this invasion to subordinate Ukraine to Moscow—totally and permanently. We should also not conclude that Russia’s battlefield setbacks have been so severe as to deflect Putin from his original goal. After he failed to subordinate Ukraine swiftly with a quick knockout blow directed at the capital, Kyiv, he moved to Plan B: a strategy of exhaustion. He is now determined to grind Ukraine down slowly and deliberately with the expectation that eventually it will have no choice but to bow to his iron fist. For its part, the West should thwart Putin’s strategy by safeguarding Ukraine’s political and economic independence. Kissinger’s comments did not bring us closer to achieving that goal. If members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) follow his lead and attempt to cajole Kyiv into ceding territory now, while Russia still believes it has the upper hand on the battlefield, their efforts will only whet Putin’s appetite for expansion. Putin will begin to entertain compromises acceptable to the West only when he comes to believe that failure to do so will lead inevitably to catastrophic losses for Russia. The bad news is that the military balance on the ground right now will not lead him to such a conclusion. If NATO members act quickly, however, there is still time to shift the dynamic in Ukraine’s favor—but it will not be easy.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, International Organization, National Security, Alliance, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

29. Six Months after the Russian Invasion, the West Needs Better Clock Management

Author:
Peter Rough, Luke Coffey, and Rebeccah L. Heinrichs
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Ukraine’s status as a borderland between Europe and Russia has often confined it to the periphery of Western strategic thought. For many, Ukraine constitutes the southeastern edge of the European continent, but not its heartland. For Russian President Vladimir Putin, however, Ukraine sits at the center of his strategic vision for Eurasia. Far from a backwater, the country is the key to his imperial aims—a prize for which he has risked his army and bet his rule. In Putin’s mind, if Russia were to control Ukraine, Moscow would dominate the Black Sea—and so would be in a stronger position in every connected region, from Eastern Europe to the South Caucasus and from the Balkans to the Caspian Basin. Russia would also complete its breakout into the Eastern Mediterranean, long a priority of Moscow, by securing the connection between its warm water ports in the Black Sea to its new bases on the Syrian coast.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, National Security, Armed Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

30. Ten Myths about US Aid to Ukraine

Author:
Luke Coffey
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Ukraine is in a national struggle that will determine its geopolitical future: the country will either be a firm member of the Euro-Atlantic community or become a Russian colony. The outcome of this struggle will have long-term implications for America’s global interests, the future of the transatlantic community, and the notion of national sovereignty in the twenty-first century. Russia is a top geopolitical adversary for the United States. For Americans who believe in strong and secure national borders, the primacy of national sovereignty, and the right to self-defense, support for Ukraine in the face of Russian aggression is natural. Considering America’s other geopolitical concerns, such as a rising China and a healthy economic relationship with Europe that benefits the American worker, US support for Ukraine is an imperative. Ukrainians are not asking for, nor do they want, US troops to help them fight Russia. All they ask for is the equipment, weapons, munitions, and financial resources required to give them a fighting chance. Providing Ukraine what it needs to fight Russia effectively will not be cheap. So far this year, the US Congress has voted on three different supplementals for Ukraine: $13.6 billion in March, $40.1 billion in May, and $12.4 billion in September. The cost that American taxpayers incur to help Ukraine is money well spent and will pale in comparison to the cost of deterring a victorious Russia or an emboldened China on the global stage. As the war continues, Congress will likely pass additional spending. It is in America’s interest that Ukraine wins the war, and that Russia is decisively defeated. Even though polling overwhelmingly shows broad and bipartisan support for Ukraine, some in Congress are against further US aid for Ukraine.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Spending, Military Aid, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, Eastern Europe, North America, and United States of America

31. Economic and Social Impacts of FDI in Central, East and Southeast Europe

Author:
Doris Hanzl-Weiss and Branimir Jovanovic
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies (WIIW)
Abstract:
This study assesses the economic and social impacts of foreign direct investment (FDI) in 17 economies in Central, East and Southeast Europe (CESEE). More precisely, we investigate how different FDI inflows have affected various economic and social indicators, such as GDP growth, labour market outcomes, and poverty and inequality, for the period since the fall of communism until 2020. We pay particular attention to FDI that originates from the EU, as well as FDI from Germany and Austria, in order to evaluate whether their effects are different from the effects of FDI from other places of origin. We also examine whether there are differences in the impacts of different types of FDI – equity capital, reinvested earnings and intra-company debt, as well as of FDI that goes to different sectors of the economy – the primary, secondary and tertiary sectors. We find that FDI inflows have had, in general, a positive effect on economic growth in CESEE, and that this effect has been particularly strong for German and Austrian FDI. For total FDI, higher inflows of 1 percentage point (pp) of GDP are associated with 0.19 pp higher GDP growth. For FDI from Germany and Austria, this effect is five times higher – FDI inflows of 1 pp of GDP have led to 0.9 pp higher GDP growth. The positive GDP effects have come from the higher consumption and exports that the FDI has induced. FDI inflows have also reduced unemployment and increased wages, but have had no effects on labour productivity. Total FDI has had only limited effects on inequality and poverty, but FDI from Germany and Austria has been found to reduce both inequality and poverty, likely because they have benefitted mainly lower-income persons. There are differences in the effects of the different types of FDI, with reinvested earnings and equity capital having in general more beneficial effects than intra-company loans. Also, FDI in different sectors of the economy has had different effects, with inflows to the secondary and tertiary sectors having greater effects than inflows to the primary sector. The policy implications of these results are that CESEE economies should not give up on their efforts to attract more FDI, but also that their endeavours should be more targeted, focusing on investments that have greater economic and social impacts. Moreover, foreign investment should not be criticised for the perhaps unsatisfactory economic and social performances of the economies from this region. Instead, the reasons for this should be sought in domestic factors and in the modest growth of the European Union during the past two decades.
Topic:
Development, International Trade and Finance, Poverty, Foreign Direct Investment, Inequality, Economic Growth, and Unemployment
Political Geography:
Europe, Eastern Europe, Germany, and Austria

32. What Ukraine Taught NATO about Hybrid Warfare

Author:
Sarah J. Lohmann, Chuck Benson, Vytautas Butrimas, Georgios Giannoulis, and Gabriel Raicu
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College
Abstract:
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022 forced the United States and its NATO partners to be confronted with the impact of hybrid warfare far beyond the battlefield. Targeting Europe’s energy security, Russia’s malign influence campaigns and malicious cyber intrusions are affecting global gas prices, driving up food costs, disrupting supply chains and grids, and testing US and Allied military mobility. This study examines how hybrid warfare is being used by NATO’s adversaries, what vulnerabilities in energy security exist across the Alliance, and what mitigation strategies are available to the member states. Cyberattacks targeting the renewable energy landscape during Europe’s green transition are increasing, making it urgent that new tools are developed to protect these emerging technologies. No less significant are the cyber and information operations targeting energy security in Eastern Europe as it seeks to become independent from Russia. Economic coercion is being used against Western and Central Europe to stop gas from flowing. China’s malign investments in Southern and Mediterranean Europe are enabling Beijing to control several NATO member states’ critical energy infrastructure at a critical moment in the global balance of power. What Ukraine Taught NATO about Hybrid Warfare will be an important reference for NATO officials and US installations operating in the European theater.
Topic:
Security, NATO, Economics, Infrastructure, Cybersecurity, Renewable Energy, and Hybrid Warfare
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, Eastern Europe, Central Europe, Western Europe, and Southeast Europe

33. Impact of the Russia-Ukraine War on the Global Energy Policy

Author:
Mamuka Komakhia
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
Abstract:
The Russia-Ukraine war has been going on for five months, and it can be said that it is a war that has changed the world, and not only in military and security terms. In this edition of “The Security Review”, we will discuss the food, energy, and transportation aspects of this conflict. Mamuka Komakhia deals with one of the most important aspects of the war - energy, and discusses Europe's dependence on Russian oil and gas and the possible scenarios to escape from it.
Topic:
Energy Policy, Oil, War, European Union, Gas, Exports, Energy Dependence, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

34. The War in Ukraine and the Threat of a Global Food Crisis

Author:
Davit Natroshvili
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
Abstract:
The Russia-Ukraine war has been going on for five months, and it can be said that it is a war that has changed the world, and not only in military and security terms. In this edition of “The Security Review”, we will discuss the food, energy, and transportation aspects of this conflict. Davit Natroshvili analyzes Russia's use of food as a weapon of war and reviews the impact of the Kremlin's grain blockade on the world’s food security.
Topic:
Food Security, Imports, Instability, Food Crisis, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, Eastern Europe, and Global Focus

35. Foreign fighters in the Russia-Ukraine war

Author:
Aleksandre Kvakhadze
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
Abstract:
Since the beginning of the large-scale phase of the Russia-Ukraine war, hundreds and possibly thousands of volunteers from all over the world have expressed their desire to fight on the side of Ukraine. Although foreign volunteers also helped the armed forces of Ukraine in the 2014 Donbas conflict, the current war has further increased the mobilization of foreign fighters. Foreign fighters were participants in many conflicts of the 20th century. According to Cerwyn Moore and Paul Tumelty, foreign fighters differ from mercenaries in that their main motivation is ideology, religion, and/or ethnicity, rather than material benefit. Along with the development of information technologies and the simplification of movement between countries, the number of foreign fighters and the scale of their mobilization have increased in the world. This article aims to review the major groups of foreign volunteers fighting on the side of the Ukrainian Armed Forces.
Topic:
Security, Armed Forces, Conflict, Foreign Fighters, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

36. The Impact of the Russian-Ukrainian War on the North Caucasus and Occupied Territories of Georgia

Author:
Aleksandre Kvakhadze
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
Abstract:
From the first days of the Russian-Ukrainian war, it became clear that the Caucasus region was widely represented in the conflict. Caucasian fighters are fighting on both the Russian and Ukrainian sides. The war also has a great impact on the socio-political situation in the region. We will try to describe the contribution of the peoples of the North Caucasus, Abkhazia and Tskhinvali to this war and the possible long-term effects of the conflict on these regions.
Topic:
War, Conflict, Foreign Fighters, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Caucasus, Eastern Europe, and Georgia

37. Turkey’s Place and Role in the Russia-Ukraine War

Author:
Zurab Batiashvili
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
Abstract:
In recent decades, Ankara has maintained a kind of balance in foreign policy and this approach naturally applied to Russia and Ukraine as well. NATO member Turkey sought to develop lucrative military-political and trade-economic relations with both Russia and Ukraine. However, after the Kremlin's war with Ukraine, Ankara clearly saw the facing imminent Russian threat, precipitating the change in its position (supply additional weaponry to Ukraine, close the Bosporus and Dardanelles Straits, etc.). At the same time, the longer the Russia-Ukraine war lasts, the more drastic consequences it will have for Turkey. Consequently, Ankara will have to take even more decisive retaliatory steps.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, NATO, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Turkey, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

38. Russian Military Aggression in Ukraine and Georgia's National Security System

Author:
Giorgio Bilanishvili
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
Abstract:
In the modern era, due to the increased and diversified variety of threats which are mostly intertwined, the security system of any country faces serious new challenges. These threats can arise as a result of the actions of specific countries or different groups as well as through various events. Against this background, it is quite natural that the terms "hybrid threats" and "hybrid warfare" have become established in our daily lives. Russia's military aggression in Ukraine which, unfortunately, takes civilian lives, is still ongoing and it is too early to draw any in-depth conclusions. However, the Ukrainian example has already vividly illustrated the importance of a proper planning and implementation of a national security policy. Already at this stage, military experts give a high assessment to the effectiveness of the territorial and civil defense conducted by the Ukrainian military and special forces. At the same time, Ukraine is successfully operating on the diplomatic as well as informational and psychological warfare front lines. The actions of the Ukrainian intelligence services deserve special attention.
Topic:
Intelligence, National Security, Armed Forces, Hybrid Warfare, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, Eastern Europe, and Georgia

39. Positions, Role and Activity of the International Community in the War Waged by Russia against Ukraine

Author:
Nika Petriashvili
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
Abstract:
This volume of the Security Review focuses on the Russia-Ukraine war. Regardless of the outcome of the war, it will fundamentally alter the post-Cold War world order and have a major impact on Georgia's security environment. Alex Petriashvili tells us about the reaction of the international community to the start of the war by Russia, what the West has done so far and what we should expect from it in the future. To what extent is the Georgian security system ready to withstand such challenges?
Topic:
Foreign Policy, International Community, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

40. Ukraine Russia Crisis: Terrorism Briefing

Author:
Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP)
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Economics & Peace (IEP)
Abstract:
On 24 February 2022, Russia launched an attack on Ukraine. Figure 1 highlights that the invasion comes after a decade of deteriorating relations between Russia, Ukraine and the West. This brief covers several aspects relating to the current Ukrainian war, including the frequency of past acts of terrorism in Russia, Ukraine and Georgia and covers likely future scenarios. It also analyses cyberattacks on Ukraine over the last decade and lead up to the current war. The main finding is that terrorism increases with the intensity of conflict. Both the Georgian conflict in 2008 and the Ukrainian conflict of 2014 saw substantial spikes in terrorist activity around the wars, and as the current war intensifies increased terrorist activity should be expected. Secondly, cyberattacks on Ukraine have markedly increased over the last decade, and especially in the months and weeks leading up to the war. Further, cyberattacks have the potential to unintentionally spill over into other countries because of global connectivity, the effects of which have been seen on numerous occasions. As cyberattacks by nefarious actors are a recent phenomenon, and given the difficulty in the attribution of such attacks, the demarcation between what constitutes a cyberattack, cyber warfare or cyber terrorism are unclear. Regardless, this briefing looks at the broad phenomena of cyberattacks in Ukraine to offer background on recent events.
Topic:
Terrorism, Cybersecurity, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, Eastern Europe, and Georgia

41. World Risk Poll: Spotlight on Ukraine and Russia

Author:
Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP)
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institute for Economics & Peace (IEP)
Abstract:
The Lloyd’s Register Foundation World Risk Poll, when combined with associated data from the Gallup World Poll and a number of other sources, reveals a complex and sometimes counterintuitive view of the world for both Ukrainians and Russians prior to the Russian invasion in 2022. Ukrainian citizens’ positive sentiments on a number of questions on social wellbeing were on the rise at a time when global averages were in decline. In the lead-up to the invasion, Ukrainians’ perceptions of safety and security were improving, with the percentage of people reporting feeling safer than five years prior rising from 19 to 26 per cent, bringing it closer to the global average. This represents a major increase, especially as it came at a time when the global average fell markedly, from 36 to 27.4 per cent, and for Russians the rate fell from 19.2 to 17.4 per cent. The conflict has unfolded within the context of Ukraine’s increasing socio-political reorientation toward the West. By November 2021, 58 per cent of Ukrainians said that, if the country were to join just one economic union, it should join the European Union (EU), compared to 21 per cent that said it should join the Russia-led Eurasian Economic Union. This was the highest rating ever recorded. Similarly, 54 per cent said they would vote to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), compared to 28 per cent who would vote against joining. Surprisingly, “war and terrorism” was only the sixth highest-rated concern in Ukraine in 2021. Ukrainians rated health-related risks (not including COVID-19) as their top concern. Transportation-related risks, crime and violence, economic concerns and financial hardship were more frequently cited than “war and terrorism."
Topic:
Security, NATO, European Union, Conflict, Risk, Polls, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

42. Axis of collusion: The fragile Putin-Xi partnership

Author:
Harley Balzer
Publication Date:
12-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
The close relationship between Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping is driving what many Russian officials call a developing Sino-Russian alliance. Major achievements have resulted from what the two presidents can accomplish through a top-down approach. However, positive portrayals in official media and some cooperation in diplomatic and military realms have not been accompanied by economic and societal linkages that could produce “thick” connections. Differences over geostrategic, economic, and regional issues and in cultural values have caused some elites and social groups in both countries to express concerns about the growing costs of the partnership. The COVID-19 pandemic has exacerbated these problems, leading a growing number of Russian analysts to say that the Sino-Russian relationship has peaked.
Topic:
International Organization, Bilateral Relations, Sanctions, Economy, Trade, Xi Jinping, and Vladimir Putin
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Central Asia, and Eastern Europe

43. The Pandemic in the Balkans: Geopolitics and Democracy at Stake

Author:
Giorgio Fruscione, Michael L. Giffoni, Gentiola Madhi, Chiara Milan, Jovana Marovic, Giorgio Fruscione, and Nikolaos Tzifakis
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Italian Institute for International Political Studies (ISPI)
Abstract:
One year after it landed in Europe, the Covid-19 pandemic has left a deep mark on the Western Balkans. On the one hand, it has exacerbated geopolitical dynamics that had been ongoing for decades, especially with regards to the activity of external actors. And while the EU has continued to be inconclusive, proceeding at a snail’s pace with its carrot-and-stick approach, China has seized on the opportunity and expanded its footprint. On the other hand, the pandemic has had deep consequences on domestic politics, too. The two keywords explaining local trends are continuity and new hopes. They are both shaping the speed and direction of democratic transitions or consolidations, which remain far from complete. How has the geopolitical competition among big powers evolved in the Balkans over the last year? What have been the effects of the pandemic on local democratic standards? Is there room for new hopes in terms of regime change and citizen participation?
Topic:
Democracy, Geopolitics, Domestic Politics, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Eastern Europe and Balkans

44. Poles Waive the Rainbow Flag in “LGBTQI+-free zones”

Author:
Patrice C. McMahon and Lukasz W. Niparko
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Georgetown Journal of International Affairs
Abstract:
Although LGBTQI+ activists in Poland are under attack from the Law and Justice government’s conservative agenda, domestic activists are finding ways to resist and persist.
Topic:
Development, Human Rights, Political Activism, and LGBT+
Political Geography:
Eastern Europe and Poland

45. Security Review: Russia-Ukraine Confrontation

Author:
Giorgio Bilanishvili, Zurab Batiashvili, Nika Petriashvili, and Giorgi Surmava
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Georgian Foundation for Strategic International Studies -GFSIS
Abstract:
After the occupation and annexation of Crimea in 2014, the epicenter of hostilities shifted to eastern Ukraine, specifically to the Donetsk and Luhansk regions. The Russian-speaking population was not loyal to Kyiv even before that but the events in Crimea and the Russian assistance invigorated the local separatists who, along with adventurers backed by the regular Russian troops, managed to gain control over parts of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions. The fighting turned out to be quite bloody and long lasting. There were large casualties on both sides, including civilians. Coupled with a high-profile incident of the downing of a passenger plane, it caused a wide international reverberation and world interest in resolving the conflict. The efforts of the leading OSCE countries had led to a certain agreement and the cessation of intense hostilities by September 2014. A quadripartite agreement (Germany, France, Russia, Ukraine) was achieved on the separation of the parties and a ceasefire. The line of contact was divided into sectors and precincts where a group of OSCE military observers began to monitor the “silence” regime. Since then, the intensity and scale of the hostilities have been significantly reduced. However, every now and then the situation would worsen which was followed by a new agreement on a ceasefire and the establishment of a “silence” regime. It should be noted that since March 2021, the number of incidents has increased dramatically. At the same time, regular Russian troops began to gather along Ukraine's eastern borders and Crimea.
Topic:
International Relations, National Security, Military Affairs, Conflict, Separatism, and Annexation
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, Ukraine, Eastern Europe, and Crimea

46. Kosovo’s regional cooperation and EU Integration - Kosovo citizen’s perspective

Author:
Plator Avdiu and Mentor Vrajolli
Publication Date:
03-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Kosovar Centre for Security Studies (KCSS)
Abstract:
In its tenth edition, KSB has taken a regional dimension and marks the first edition of the Western Balkans Security Barometer (WBSB) implemented simultaneously in Kosovo and Serbia in September-October 2020. 1 This report examines the perceptions of Kosovar respondents on the following issues: i) Kosovo’s bilateral cooperation, cross-border cooperation and regional security, and ii) attitudes of Kosovars towards the EU membership process.
Topic:
Security, Regional Cooperation, Bilateral Relations, and European Union
Political Geography:
Eastern Europe, Kosovo, and Serbia

47. Community perceptions on violent extremism and repatriation of Kosovo Citizens' from ISIS battlegrounds

Author:
Skender Perteshi and Shpat Balaj
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Kosovar Centre for Security Studies (KCSS)
Abstract:
This report provides an overview of Kosovo citizens’ perceptions on violent extremism. The report specifically focuses on their views on the repatriation of Kosovo citizens from the battlegrounds of the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq, as well as the citizens’ perception on the efforts of institutions and CSOs in regard to the reintegration and rehabilitation of the returnees and their families. The report, presenting both qualitative and quantitative analyses, provides first-hand insights gathered on the ground through extensive research of KCSS. The key data that shape the qualitative aspect of the report derive from the discussions with local communities in eight municipalities of Kosovo, organized by KCSS within the project Building Resilience: Communities against Violent Extremism. On the other hand, the quantitative results derive from the Kosovo Security Barometer (KSB), a KCSS program that measures public opinion on various security issues.
Topic:
Security, Public Opinion, Violent Extremism, Islamic State, and Repatriation
Political Geography:
Iraq, Middle East, Eastern Europe, Kosovo, and Syria

48. Between denial and respond: Citizens' perceptions on Kosovo Institutions dealing with COVID-19

Author:
Plator Avdiu
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Kosovar Centre for Security Studies (KCSS)
Abstract:
First section of the report presents perceptions whether Kosovar respondents believe on the existence of the COVID-19 pandemic. It also interprets perceptions on how the Kosovo institutions handled the COVID-19 situation in Kosovo from March – September 2020. The second section is related to the degree the COVID-19 has impacted everyday life of citizens from socio-economic to human rights points of view. Whilst, the third section of the report highlights perceptions on political influence of foreign countries/organisations towards Kosovo on handling the COVID-19 as well as their financial and humanitarian aid donated to Kosovo amidst the coronavirus crisis in Kosovo.
Topic:
Human Rights, Public Opinion, Institutions, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Eastern Europe and Kosovo

49. Kosovo Security Barometer Special Edition on Corruption, Rule of Law and Police integrity in Kosovo

Author:
Shpat Balaj
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Kosovar Centre for Security Studies (KCSS)
Abstract:
The first section introduces the level of trust expressed by respondents on the relevant institutions (justice, security and municipal institutions), as well as the direct contact of the surveyed respondents with these institutions during 2018. Similar to previous years, security institutions are leading when it comes to public trust when compared to other institutions analysed in this special edition. The second section of the report interprets key security threats and risks in Kosovo. Given that corruption has been ranked as the highest problem to Kosovo’s national security, this section is focused on views of respondents towards corruption in the relevant institutions. Apart from general interpretation of data on corruption in Courts, Prosecution, Kosovo Police and Municipalities, the report offers cross-tabulated data analysis based on regions, rural/urban areas, gender balance, and ethnic composition of respondents for all targeted institutions. While, the third or final section of the report provides a detailed interpretation of open-ended and closed-ended questions of the 2018 survey of Kosovo Security Barometer on main issues harming police integrity in Kosovo. Accordingly, results presenting opinions of respondents on corruption within sectors of the Kosovo Police mirror a better understanding on what are the most and the least corrupted police sectors in Kosovo. Furthermore, data analysis through cross-tabulated results (based on regions, areas, gender balance, and ethnic background) provides an exhaustive elaboration of respondents’ attitudes towards police corruption in Kosovo. Given that the Kosovo Security Barometer’s survey was conducted in the second half of 2018 (September-October 2018), thus it does not reflect some of the developments that have occurred from November 2018 to March 2019.
Topic:
Security, Corruption, Rule of Law, and Police
Political Geography:
Eastern Europe and Kosovo

50. Authoritarian protectionism in Central, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe: diversity, commonality and resistance

Author:
Luke Cooper
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
LSE IDEAS
Abstract:
Authoritarianism has become a major buzzword of global politics today. But the public debate has often focused on headline-catching cases of democratic decline. In the European Union (EU), Hungary and Poland, have tended to dominate discussion and critique with the implication that a modern-day ‘containment’ strategy might suffice to withstand the authoritarian advance. This brings dangers for how we think about politics in Central, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe (CESEE), involving a problematic reading of the region as a source of threat to democracy, rather than a theatre for its renewal. This new LSE IDEAS report, Authoritarian protectionism in Central, Eastern and South-Eastern Europe: diversity, commonality and resistance, seeks to provide a wider regional contextualisation through the examination of Hungary and Poland in tandem with four other case studies in the region: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Romania and Slovakia. The paper argues that the recent histories of these states provide a vantage point for reflection on the broader tendencies driving democratic decay globally. As the populaces of these states have shown tremendous civic energy in their willingness to resist authoritarianism, often in very large numbers, these case studies also point to the need to re-frame how this topic is discussed in the European public sphere. They suggest we should highlight how events in the region may be a harbinger of new opportunities for democratic advance. The snapshot comparative analysis of these states is undertaken through the frame of what the author, Dr Luke Cooper, calls authoritarian protectionism. This emphasises the importance of a politics of ethnonational partisanship to the contemporary challenge to democracy. In the cases examined in the report, authoritarian protectionism draws particular attention to the coherence that exists amongst such actors– despite the fact the examples are drawn from the left, centre and right of the political spectrum.
Topic:
Politics, Authoritarianism, European Union, Democracy, Diversity, and Protectionism
Political Geography:
Europe, Eastern Europe, Central Europe, and Southern Europe