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Begin New Search Topic Climate Change Political Geography China Content Type Special Report Publication Year within 25 Years

1. China/United States: Europe off Balance

Author:
Thomas Gomart and Marc Hecker
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
As French President Emmanuel Macron (accompanied by Ursula von der Leyen) is on a state visit to China, some twenty Ifri researchers decipher the stakes of the U.S./China/Europe strategic triangle. This 16-text study follows Olaf Scholz’s visit to Beijing (November 2022) and precedes that of Emmanuel Macron (April 2023). It comes especially one year after the beginning of a geopolitical and geoeconomic shock of a rare magnitude: the invasion of Ukraine by Russia. The War in Ukraine or the Return of Bloc Geopolitics? The war in Ukraine has broken ties between the European Union (EU) and Russia for the foreseeable future, particularly in the field of energy, though not without consequences in the Middle East, Africa, and the Indo-Pacific. Furthermore, this war has become the main show of active indirect confrontation between the United States—which has provided military support to Ukrainians, with help from its European allies—and China, which has supported Russia politically and economically. In February 2022, Moscow and Beijing declared their “no limits friendship”; in March 2023, Xi Jinping offered his personal support to Vladimir Putin after the International Criminal Court issued a warrant for his arrest. In its position on the political settlement of the Ukraine crisis, presented in February 2023, China stated: “All parties should oppose the pursuit of one’s own security at the cost of others’ security, prevent bloc confrontation, and work together for peace and stability on the Eurasian Continent”. China is no more of a mediator than the United States: it would be unrealistic to believe so. We appear to be witnessing a return of bloc geopolitics, albeit in a starkly different context than that of the Cold War (1947-1991). Globalization has produced strong economic and technological interdependencies that make any prospect of decoupling very costly, if not impossible. Economic partners are no longer necessarily military allies, and vice versa. In other words, a gap is opening up between geopolitical perceptions and geoeconomic realities. The term “decoupling” is popular in the United States, though much less so elsewhere. The rejection of bloc geopolitics is particularly acute outside of the West, where a “pragmatic” approach to foreign policy is often promoted. The Saudi foreign minister summed this up during the World Policy Conference in December 2022: “Polarization is the last thing we need right now. […] We need to build bridges, strengthen connections, and find areas of cooperation”. A few months later, China pulled off an extraordinary diplomatic coup by brokering a deal to restore relations between Riyadh and Tehran. For the EU, the situation is particularly delicate: Europe is in the Western camp, but a severing of ties with Beijing would cause a crushing economic blow. In 2022, China accounted for more than 20% of the EU’s imports, while the United States accounted for around 12%. By 2030, the EU’s GDP is expected to rise to $20.5 trillion, compared to $30.5 trillion for the United States and $33.7 trillion for China. In January 2023, the President of the European Commission declared at Davos: “We still need to work and trade with China, especially when it comes to this transition. So, we need to refocus our approach on de-risking, rather than decoupling”. For its part, Beijing has encouraged European aspirations of “strategic autonomy”, understood in China as a form of detachment from the United States. At the same time, the EU is constantly strengthening its military, technological, financial and energy ties with the U.S. This collective study notes a hypothetical search for balance on the part of the Europeans, faced with a war on their territory (the Western peninsula of the heartland), who cannot escape Sino-American mechanisms, and who do not form a monolithic whole. It also analyzes the strategy of several important actors outside our continent, and shows that, from Ukraine to Taiwan, via Africa and the Middle East, Europeans have little room for maneuver. This is why the study proposes recommendations to try, at a crucial moment, to reinforce their positioning.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Climate Change, International Trade and Finance, Science and Technology, European Union, and Industry
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and United States of America

2. Humanitarian aid: Defining new areas of US-LAC collaboration

Author:
Pepe Zhang and Isabel Bernhard
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
The US humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) system—well practiced and extensively developed—could further serve US and partners’ needs in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) and beyond through targeted improvements. Based on our experience as HADR practitioners with operational and academic expertise, we share insights from many years of working with partners in the Americas. The task is urgent: fragile governments and organizations further impacted by COVID-19 and climate change have exposed HADR deficiencies that need to be rapidly strengthened. Redoubling the US’s HADR commitment to allies and partners can also have strategic benefits during a period of renewed competition with the People’s Republic of China. We believe that the United States can strengthen its HADR work globally, and particularly with LAC countries, through partnership and relationship building as well as education and exercises. By deepening its strengths and address- ing room for improvement, the United States can remain the partner of choice for LAC countries and conserve its positional advantage over China and other strategic competitors. How can LAC and partner nations (such as the United States), nongovernmental organizations, and regional and other global organizations strengthen their abilities to respond to natural disasters? What can the United States do to improve its disaster preparedness and response in LAC? And what can Washington learn from Beijing’s approach to disaster assistance in LAC? In crafting this report to address these questions, we drew from a roundtable discussion, verbal and written consultations with subject matter experts, and written material. A full description of the methodology is provided in the appendix. The findings of the report include eight recommendations grouped under two mutually complementary areas: (1) partnership and relationship building, and (2) education and exercises. Not only are these recommendations timely and relevant for HADR practitioners, but taking these steps would strengthen Western hemispheric security by investing in the region’s infrastructure and human capital. As the United States and its LAC partners consider future room for cooperation and collaboration, HADR work will form an indispensable centerpiece of their strategies.
Topic:
NATO, Climate Change, Diplomacy, Environment, Humanitarian Aid, International Organization, Politics, Partnerships, Resilience, and Energy
Political Geography:
China, Latin America, Caribbean, North America, and United States of America

3. General Equilibrium Analysis of Cost-Effectiveness and Distributional Impacts of China’s Nationwide CO2 Emissions Trading System

Author:
Xianling Long, Da Zhang, Lawrence Goulder, and Chenfei Qu
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
China introduced the world's largest emissions trading system in 2021 which is intended to help cost-effectively achieve its pledges of reaching a peak in CO2 emissions before 2030 and carbon neutrality before 2060. The system is a tradable performance standard (TPS) with a bottom-up intensity-based emissions cap, unlike a top-down absolute cap approach commonly used globally. General Equilibrium Analysis of Cost-Effectiveness and Distributional Impacts of China’s Nationwide CO2 Emissions Trading System developed and applied a multi-sector, multi-period general equilibrium model to assess the emissions, energy mix, and economic impacts of a series of options for the future development of this policy. These included cap-setting, benchmark design, auction design, and sectoral expansion, with valuable insights provided on the potential future evolution of this policy.
Topic:
Climate Change, Economy, Trade, and Carbon Emissions
Political Geography:
China and Asia

4. China, climate and conflict in the Indo-Pacific

Author:
Anastasia Kapetas
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
This paper surveys the current reporting and analysis on climate and security to explore the implications that climate change may have for China’s ability to prosecute its security goals in the region’s three major hotspots: the SCS, Taiwan and the India–China border conflict. Those three hotspots all involve longstanding border and territorial disputes between China and other nations and may draw in various levels of US involvement should China continue to escalate tensions.
Topic:
Security, Climate Change, and Conflict
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and Indo-Pacific

5. Military capabilities affected by climate change: An analysis of China, Russia and the United States

Author:
Adaja Stoetman, Dick Zandee, Ties Dams, Niels Drost, and Louise Van Schaik
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
Climate change is one of the most pressing challenges of the present and the future. Rising temperatures and sea levels, as well as extreme weather events are manifestations of climate change that also influence military capabilities. Increased attention for the climate change-security nexus is visible both at the national and the international level: nationally through the incorporation of climate change in security strategies and internationally through incorporation in important strategic documents such as the EU’s Strategic Compass and NATO’s Strategic Concept. Given its transnational nature, governments around the world have a shared responsibility to face climate change. A particular role is laid down for the global powers, China, Russia and the United States, given their position in the world. It is, however, questionable whether the global powers’ interests align. They differ in their approaches to address climate change, and even more so in their views on how it affects the armed forces. China and particularly Russia are more reluctant towards depicting climate change as a matter of international security. This is for example visible in international forums, such as the UN Security Council. In contrast, in the US, support for climate action is subject to political preferences, but climate related security risks are widely recognised within the defence establishment. This report reviews various aspects of the relationship between climate and security, with a particular focus on the military. It discusses the role of climate change in a country’s security and defence strategy and, vice versa, the changing tasks and deployment of the armed forces in response to climate change, the effects of climate change on military infrastructure, and measures to realise a greener defence sector.
Topic:
Security, Climate Change, European Union, and Military
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

6. Five Years after China’s Plastic Import Ban Have Europeans Taken Responsibility?

Author:
Eugénie Joltreau
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
After the 2017 Chinese waste import ban, the international and European Union (EU) legislative framework on waste exports has been revised. • The amendment to the Basel Convention is stricter on the possibility to export plastic waste outside the EU, which has integrated the amendment in the waste shipment regulation (WSR) and is considering further export restrictions. Moreover, a Directive to reduce the use of single-use plastics and stimulate local demand for recycled plastics has been adopted. • The recycling rate of plastic packaging has been deteriorating since 2016 in view of the growing quantities of plastic packaging waste and limited export outlets, despite an increase in the tonnage recycled. Exports of plastic waste from the European Union have been reduced and partly redirected, with some negative environmental impacts reported. The EU demand for certain recycled plastics has boomed, encouraged by the new regulation, yet overall, EU plastic packaging consumption keeps increasing. • The debate on the export ban opposes a view of responsibility for the treatment of waste with the promotion of international waste trade as a means to achieve a global circular economy (for plastics). However, there is no evidence that the waste trade enables to increase the global recycling rate, reduces the use of virgin plastic, and reinforces sustainability. • The European Commission (EC) has released a new legislative proposal that tightens up waste export possibilities but does not ban it.
Topic:
Climate Change, Economy, Recycling, Waste, Imports, and Plastic
Political Geography:
China and Europe

7. Arctic: Toward the End of the Exception? Strategic, Nuclear and Maritime Issues in the Region

Author:
Jean-Louis Lozier
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
Through multiple international initiatives, including the creation of the Arctic Council at the end of the Cold War in 1996, the Arctic appears to be one of the last areas of peaceful cooperation in the world. This “Arctic exception” is also devoid of any serious territorial dispute between the neighboring countries, some of which are nevertheless great powers: Russia, the United States, Canada, but also Sweden, Norway, Denmark (via Greenland), Iceland and Finland. However, this peaceful cooperation is not exempt from strategic rivalries: for some years now, these States in the Arctic have been redefining their strategic postures, notably through the publication of roadmaps and the deployment of new military forces trained to fight in this hostile environment. Russia thus remains the dominant power in the Arctic, in the face of a China with growing ambitions and a Western world – represented in particular by the United States – which is lagging behind after years concentrated on other military conflicts. Furthermore, the war in Ukraine that started in February 2022 also carry the germs of a broader destabilization of the region. Conventional competition is therefore renewed between these great powers, while the nuclear balance is partially maintained. It is indeed worth noticing that the Arctic is an area of direct contact between the Russian Federation and the United States. As such, it had a special significance during the Cold War as the shortest route between both adversaries for a potential ballistic missile and was a privileged position for deploying chains of radars and advanced detection systems. Finally, the shrinkage of the ice pack caused by global warming is also triggering the neighboring or more distant states’ greed, whether through the drilling possibilities for raw materials under the ice floe or the creation of new maritime routes. The latter would notably enable Russia to revitalize its northern flank and offer alternatives to existing transit routes.
Topic:
International Relations, Climate Change, Cold War, and Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Arctic, United States of America, and North Pole

8. Greenhouse Gas Emissions from State-Owned Enterprises: A Preliminary Inventory

Author:
Alex Clark and Philippe Benoit
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Center on Global Energy Policy (CGEP), Columbia University
Abstract:
State-owned enterprises (SOEs) play a major role in the production of goods and services across many of the world’s largest economies, particularly in electricity generation, oil and gas, and heavy industry. SOEs (defined in this report as companies for which 50 percent or more of voting shares are held by a government) are also major sources of greenhouse gas emissions. The governments that control these SOEs are also signatories to the Paris Agreement on climate change. State ownership provides these governments with a major direct point of control over the climate and energy outcomes of these companies, both in terms of reducing emissions and directing future investment into low-carbon technologies and infrastructure. Improving the measurement of SOEs’ contribution to both national and global-level emissions provides important information to help understand to what extent SOEs should be targeted and to design strategies to maximize their potential role in the broader energy transition. This report provides an accounting of direct emissions associated with SOEs globally. It is challenging to comprehensively identify every SOE, as the total is estimated at well over 100,000. In addition, most identified SOEs do not disclose their emissions nor are estimates of these emissions available in the public domain. Despite these limitations, data compiled for this report covering almost 300 major SOEs suggest that SOEs globally are responsible for at least 7.49 gigatons of carbon dioxide equivalent (GtCO2e) annually in direct (Scope 1) emissions. While the true scale of SOE-related emissions is likely to be substantially higher, particularly when accounting for national oil companies and iron and steel manufacturers that do not currently report their emissions, this figure is over 1 GtCO2e greater than various previous estimates, and larger than the total annual emissions of any country except China.
Topic:
Climate Change, Energy Policy, Environment, and Green Technology
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and Global Focus

9. Can the Biggest Emitters Set Up a Climate Club? A Review of International Carbon Pricing Debates

Author:
Carole Mathieu
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
The world’s largest emitting countries are reconsidering the role of carbon pricing instruments and increasingly looking at carbon border adjustment mechanisms (CBAMs) to address leakage concerns. This renewed momentum should trigger a broader discussion on how to make trade policies compatible with the climate agenda. With the Glasgow climate conference (COP26) approaching, the concept of putting a price on carbon is generating unprecedented interest in Canada and the United States (US), China and Japan. But the European Union (EU) still stands as an exception; it is the only regional trading bloc that is determined to leverage the full potential of its emissions trading system (ETS). To date, others have lacked the political backing to deploy nation-wide carbon pricing initiatives with a design sturdy enough to drive meaningful emission reductions. Canada has made significant progress with the adoption of a national framework for carbon pricing in 2018. The country’s draft regulations foresee the introduction of a federal ETS as of 2022 and a gradual increase in carbon prices, but its ambitions risk being upset by the lack of consistent efforts in the US, its largest trading partner. Given US political divides, a federal carbon pricing scheme is unlikely to materialize in the short run. In China, the long-delayed national ETS has finally been launched. However, its scope is restricted to the power sector for now, and it is likely to only have a modest impact on coal use with its current design. Several arguments may discourage China from fully extending its ETS as planned and rather argue in favor of introducing a complementary carbon tax. Japan has also engaged an expert debate on the benefits of introducing carbon pricing at the national level, but the government is struggling to find a balance between the risk of worsening competitiveness and the need to mobilize investment in clean technologies. For the EU, the upcoming reform of the EU ETS is an opportunity to introduce a truly demanding cap reduction for the 2023-2030 period and make this flagship instrument more robust, predictable, and fair. To initiate in-depth decarbonization of its industry, the EU will need to phase out free allowances. Therefore, other measures addressing unfair competition will have to be introduced and CBAM could be part of the solution. A unilateral application is however no panacea. The EU should move cautiously and start implementing the CBAM to a small set of sectors. This also means that the challenge of leveling the playing field with non-EU producers will remain largely unresolved. There is little chance that an international alliance on carbon pricing or “climate club” can be set up within a timeframe compatible with the climate emergency. Yet, the EU’s CBAM proposal can encourage trading partners to accelerate decision-making on carbon pricing, at least to obtain partial exemption. In addition, having a concrete anti-leakage proposal on the table leads to a sense of the inevitable mismatches between the global trade and climate agendas. Large emitters are starting to acknowledge the need for a multilateral discussion on how to decarbonize industries while maintaining a level playing field. The next step should be to kickstart an open discussion in all possible multilateral fora (G20, International Energy Agency, global industry associations, etc.) and mandate the World Trade Organization (WTO) to develop guidance on a wide range of instruments (including CBAM, but also eco-design labelling and standards, differentiated tariffs based on CO2 intensity, etc.) and including a common exemption approach for Least Developed Countries. Exploring a set of workable solutions should be more attractive to trade partners than pushing for a uniform solution, but results would still take time to materialize. Hence, establishing a level playing field with imports will likely require the EU – and all countries with an aggressive decarbonization agenda for their industries – to strengthen their financial and regulatory support to the deployment of innovative low-carbon manufacturing processes. Again, this almost-unavoidable resort to State aid would strongly benefit from a multilateral discussion.
Topic:
Climate Change, International Trade and Finance, European Union, Carbon Tax, and Carbon Emissions
Political Geography:
Japan, China, Europe, and Canada

10. Ambitious Plans and Economic Pragmatism - China in the Face of Climate Change

Author:
Marcin Przychodniak
Publication Date:
10-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
China’s policy on climate change mainly serves to improve its international image, increase the competitiveness of its economy, and strengthen the legitimacy of the Communist Party’s (CPC) power. China’s activities include the development of green technologies and the announcement of a plan to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by around 2030. However, the plans are unevenly implemented, sometimes even contrary to expectations, as evidenced by the construction of new coal-fired power plants. The problem of satisfying the country’s energy needs while protecting the environment means that the EU and the U.S. should treat China’s pro-climate declarations with caution.
Topic:
Climate Change, Economics, European Union, Green Technology, and Pragmatism
Political Geography:
China and Asia

11. The post-Covid city: the ongoing spatial and technological reconfiguration in China and the world

Author:
Philip Yang, Carlo Ratti, Kamila Aben Athar, and Yung Ho Chang
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Brazilian Center for International Relations (CEBRI)
Abstract:
Considering the impacts of the Covid-19 pandemic on our everyday life, the XXV China Analysis Group Meeting focused on the organization of large cities and the reordering of urban agglomerations. According to the participants, the maintenance of this model and the rearrangement, focused on urban sprawl, are valid alternatives, each with its own set of advantages and disadvantages. Another issue discussed was the impact of technologies on how cities are shaped in the 21st century, to which participants responded by mentioning the role of artificial intelligence and big data in making the architecture behave like a living organism. However, they also warned about the importance of developing a balance between the natural and the artificial world. Finally, the participants said that for achieving carbon neutrality by 2050, it is necessary for each city to adopt specific policies that suit its own reality, because there is not a universal formula.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Climate Change, Science and Technology, Cities, Carbon Emissions, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and Global Focus

12. A Vision of the Future: The U.S. Intelligence Report “Global Trends 2040”

Author:
Marcin Andrzej Piotrowski
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
The Polish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
In April 2021, the U.S. intelligence community published the extensive report “Global Trends 2040: A More Contested World”. It analyses the main demographic, political, and strategic trends that will likely shape the world for the next two decades. The report will be intensively used by the Biden administration in the preparation of the new U.S. National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy, as well as in new military doctrines. The “Global Trends” document reflects the main tendencies in American strategic thinking, such as the growing “Sinocentrism” and traditional U.S. attachment to transatlantic relations.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Climate Change, Intelligence, and Strategic Planning
Political Geography:
China and United States of America

13. Prospects of a Hydrogen Economy with Chinese Characteristics

Author:
Kevin Tu
Publication Date:
10-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
This study assesses the prospects of a hydrogen economy with Chinese characteristics. Against the backdrop of an escalating US-China trade war and the ongoing novel coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic, key Chinese stakeholders become increasingly interested in moving the hydrogen economy agenda forward. During the first six months of 2020 alone, 37 policies in support of the hydrogen economy have been published by various level governments, including 7 by central government authorities, and 30 by local governments. Shandong alone issued 6 hydrogen supporting policies, followed with 5 by Guangdong. In sum, hydrogen economy development not only gains traction in China, but also is in great danger of overheating. The ambition in China is to expand hydrogen production and create new end-uses: in the transport segment (e.g. 1 million fuel cell electric vehicles – FCEVs – and 1,000 hydrogen refueling stations by 2030), but possibly also, in other hard-to-abate sectors such as steel and cement manufacturing or in the electricity storage segment (Power to X). Hydrogen production from low carbon electricity could bring many benefits, notably to address curtailments of renewable electricity from wind, solar and hydro. It could also be blended into the nation-wide gas grid especially for low-concentration hydrogen (e.g. 5-10%). Until recently, China’s interest in developing the hydrogen economy has not been primarily triggered by the decarbonization objective. Nevertheless, on September 22, 2020, Chinese president Xi Jinping announced that China aims to peak national carbon emissions before 2030 and achieve carbon neutrality before 2060. Given the significant amount of carbon emissions reduction implied by the above announcement, hydrogen is now expected to play a much more important role to drastically decrease the country’s greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) over time. China’s very large hydrogen production from fossil fuels, mainly coal, would make it quite challenging to consider decarbonizing the current uses of hydrogen. What decisively drives the current interest into hydrogen is innovation and technological leadership on the one hand, which China can achieve through industrial clusters and economies of scale, and energy security on the other: reducing dependence on imported oil and gas, with rising importance of air pollution control- and decarbonization-related considerations. It remains to be seen whether China can avoid the shortcomings of its electric vehicles (EV) supporting policies as it aims to boost a hydrogen economy with Chinese characteristics. A simplified SWOT analysis presented in the report identifies the most important strength, weakness, opportunity and threat for hydrogen economy development in China: Strength - ability to significantly bring down unit manufacturing cost through industrial network clustering and economy of scale. Weakness – lag far behind advanced economies in key hydrogen-related technologies. Opportunity – enthusiasm on hydrogen economy by local governments against the backdrop of the COVID-19 pandemic. Threat - looming danger of global supply chain decoupling caused by an escalating US-China trade war. In order to move the hydrogen economy agenda forward, a preliminary “to do list” for Chinese decision-makers in this field would include: A coordinated national mechanism should be established at the central government level to lay out principles for moving the hydrogen economy agenda forward in China. Comprehensive and transparent statistical reporting and accounting throughout the Chinese hydrogen value chain should be established. In the hydrogen production segment, renewable hydrogen should be prioritized for intensive Research and Development (R&D) and deployment in the near future, and greening China's existing hydrogen flow should be on the Chinese government's policy radar especially in the longer term. In the hydrogen storage and transport segment, national and local government should continuously direct subsidies towards hydrogen refueling stations, and also consider to encourage low concentration blending of hydrogen into China’s natural gas network. In the hydrogen consumption segment, China should selectively focus on R&D and deployment of advanced hydrogen end-use technologies notably for cement and steel, ideally coupled with expansion of the horizon of national energy planning framework. Opening up the Chinese market to better integrate technology innovations in advanced economies and manufacturing-related competitive advantages of the Chinese economy, aiming to create a win-win situation between China and the international community.
Topic:
Climate Change, Economy, Decarbonization, and Hydrogen
Political Geography:
China and Asia

14. Eyes wide open: Managing the Australia-China Antarctic relationship

Author:
Anthony Bergin and Tony Press
Publication Date:
04-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI)
Abstract:
Given recent broader tensions in the China–Australia relationship, China’s global ambitions, lack of progress on key Antarctic policy initiatives and the potential for significant geopolitical consequences for the future of Antarctica and for Australia’s strategic interests, it’s important that Australian policymakers reconsider our long-term Antarctic policy settings. The report found no clear evidence that China is violating the Antarctic Treaty. But it argues we should apply a more sharply focused assessment of the costs and benefits of cooperation, given China’s more assertive international posture and increasing interests in Antarctica. The recommendations in the report are designed to maximise the value and mitigate the downside risks of China engagement for our Antarctic and broader national interests. Overall, we should adopt a more transactional approach in our Antarctic engagement with China, making it clear what we require from cooperation and what we expect from China. Given the track record Beijing has in moving rapidly on a broad front, as it’s done in the South China Sea, we need to be prepared to respond to a rapid increase in the speed and scale of China’s actions in Antarctica.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Climate Change, National Security, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:
China, Asia, Australia, Australia/Pacific, and Antarctica

15. U.S. and China Climate Goals: Scenarios for 2030 and Mid-Century

Author:
Asia Society Policy Institute and Climate Analytics
Publication Date:
11-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Asia Society
Abstract:
In September 2020, President Xi Jinping announced new goals for China to reach carbon neutrality before 2060, as well as to strengthen its existing 2030 commitments under the Paris Agreement. With these announcements, China has signaled a move to join the European Union—as well as the United States under a Biden administration—in leading long-term climate action among the big emitters. Our analysis demonstrates that if China’s new long-term goal covers all greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, and not just carbon dioxide (CO₂), this could bring the country within reach of the emissions reductions required by mid-century for its actions to be in line with the Paris Agreement’s long-term goal of limiting average global temperature increases to 1.5°C. However, if President Xi’s announcement is only meant to cover CO₂, then China would need to achieve carbon neutrality around 2050 for this to be compatible with the Paris Agreement.1 Either way, China’s short-term actions will also need to be quickly brought into line with its new long-term trajectory. This includes doing more than simply peaking CO₂ emissions before 2030 as President Xi foreshadowed. Instead, our analysis demonstrates that China would need to peak its emissions by 2025 and rapidly reduce these thereafter to be compatible with the Paris Agreement. This also implies a need for significant adjustments to the other quantifiable targets identified in China’s existing Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) under the Paris Agreement and the ramping up of action to achieve these. Reducing coal-fired power generation quickly and phasing it out entirely by 2040 would be an important step toward achieving this early peak and rapid reductions. Under the Trump administration, the United States has reneged on past climate action promises and rolled back existing policies resulting in an increase in emissions compared with the Obama administration. As a result, this report highlights that even under a Biden administration, the United States is likely to miss its previous 2025 target under the Paris Agreement. However, a Biden administration means that the United States now has the potential to reverse the Trump administration’s rollbacks and make a significant contribution to closing the Paris Agreement’s ambition gap in a new 2030 NDC. Indeed, by taking the initiative to reboot U.S. action in line with the Energy and Climate Package touted by President-elect Biden during his campaign, including its goal to reach net-zero emissions by 2050, U.S. emissions could be reduced substantially by 2030.2 For example, our analysis indicates that if the Biden campaign’s policies were to be fully implemented with the support of Congress (see below), and continue to be supported by strong subnational action, they could bridge more than half of the U.S. share of the global ambition gap by 2030 through reducing emissions by up to 38%–54% below 2005 levels (GHGs, including land use, land-use change and forestry)3. This would also reduce estimates for average global temperature increases in 2100 by 0.1°C, on top of the 0.2°C–0.3°C reduction achieved by China’s recent announcement. As this report shows, President-elect Biden’s plan to decarbonize the U.S. electricity system by 2035 would represent by far the biggest contribution to this effort and is in line with the Paris Agreement temperature goal. It would result in savings of ~1,350 MtCO₂ out of a total abatement potential of ~1,810 MtCO₂e [1,630–2,100] in 2030 across his Energy and Climate Package. However, this report also estimates that potentially only half of this potential could still be achieved through Executive Authority in the event of Congress not supporting action, although this estimate carries a large degree of uncertainty. We also outline how additional emissions reductions could come from action in other areas, including freight transport and industry—with the electrification of end-use sectors and green hydrogen important opportunities to achieve this. If the United States and China fully implement these ambitious goals and are able to achieve net-zero GHG emissions around mid-century, it would be a monumental step forward toward bringing the Paris Agreement goals within reach. It would also mean that for the first time more than 60% of the world’s emissions are in countries with a clear pathway to decarbonize their economies. However, achieving the goals will require bold action in all sectors of the economy, with an early coal phaseout being paramount for both countries.
Topic:
Climate Change, Carbon Emissions, Paris Agreement, and Decarbonization
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

16. New Solutions for a Changing Climate

Author:
Molly Jahn
Publication Date:
09-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Chicago Council on Global Affairs
Abstract:
US public investment in agricultural research in the 20th and 21st centuries has resulted in unprecedented worldwide production of a few staple crops and the improvement of dozens more. Increased crop yields and animal production have drastically reduced famine compared to previous centuries and supported an overall increase in global affluence. Today, agricultural producers around the world are facing new challenges as global climate changes become increasingly unpredictable. Inconsistent rain, extreme temperatures, droughts, flooding, wildfires, and shifting pest and disease patterns are just a few of the obstacles farmers face as they try to feed their families and produce enough food to feed the world. In spite of these dire challenges, US public agricultural research funding has been decreasing over the past several decades. This has allowed competitors such as China and Brazil to outpace American ingenuity, take over American markets, and put American farmers at a disadvantage. The lack of investment in agricultural research and development is a critical national security concern. Historical US agricultural strength has contributed to US hard and soft power around the world. As the US food system is beset by increasing climate, economic, financial, and security threats, US rural communities have been left behind, undermining US power and domestic well-being. Increasing global food insecurity, which has been amplified by increasing weather extremes, will lead to economic and political instability in many areas of the world, further threatening US national security. Although the private sector plays a crucial role in the development of new agricultural techniques and products, public funding has been the backbone of many agriculture and food system advances. While agricultural research and development has historically focused primarily on increasing yields, this narrow focus does not adequately support the food requirements of today’s growing global population. There must be a revitalization of public investment in agricultural research, American food systems, and international agricultural development that focuses on the challenges of the future. US leadership is vital to ensuring the global research agenda does not leave farmers behind. Opportunities to build upon and enhance existing US agricultural research infrastructure across many diverse government entities abound. The US government should recognize these investment opportunities to address current and future climate challenges.
Topic:
Agriculture, Climate Change, Environment, and Research
Political Geography:
China, Brazil, North America, Global Focus, and United States of America

17. Looking for Trouble: Sources of Violent Conflict in Central Asia

Author:
Gavin Helf
Publication Date:
11-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
United States Institute of Peace
Abstract:
This report offers a road map for understanding the most likely sources of violent conflict in the post-Soviet nations of Central Asia—ethno-nationalism and nativism, Islam and secularism, water resources and climate change, and labor migration and economic conflict. The analysis draws from emerging trends in the region and identifies the ways in which Central Asia’s geography and cultural place in the world interact with those trends. It suggests that the policy goals of the United States, Russia, and China in the region may be more compatible than is often assumed.
Topic:
Conflict Prevention, Climate Change, Migration, Economy, Conflict, and Peace
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Central Asia, and United States of America

18. Direction of Energy Strategy for the Sustainable Development of China’s Economy — Clean Utilization of Coal

Author:
Bai Yunfeng, Yi Peng, Du Shaozhong, and Wang Ying
Publication Date:
12-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Pangoal Institution
Abstract:
China is at the stage of urbanization and industrialization. The Chinese economy, which is mainly based on a large consumption of energy and resources, is growing extensively with an increasing demand for energy. Resources are exhausted, and a series of environmental problems occur with the rapid development of the economy. At present, China has surpassed the United States as the country with the highest carbon dioxide emission. As the world’s second largest economy, China is under a considerable amount of pressure to save energy and reduce its carbon emission. The persistent and severe large-scale smog in the country deeply affects people’s daily lives. Coal is the main source of air pollution. The extensive development and utilization of coal has largely caused pressure on the ecological environment and has directly influenced the socioeconomic development of the country. China is the world’s largest coal producer and consumer. Coal accounts for 68% of China’s energy consumption structure. The characteristics of resource endowment and the current industrial structure of China indicate that the dominant role of coal in China’s energy structure will not change for a quite a long time. Therefore, clean and efficient methods of energy utilization should be adopted to promote the sustainable development of China’s economy. The clean utilization of coal will be the strategic choice and landing point of the sustainable development of China’s economy.
Topic:
Climate Change, Development, Economy, Coal, and Sustainability
Political Geography:
China and Asia

19. China’s Quest for Blue Skies: The Astonishing Transformation of the Domestic Gas Market

Author:
Sylvie Cornot-Gandolphe
Publication Date:
09-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
China’s gas industry has been moving into a new era. China’s natural gas demand has skyrocketed amid a state campaign that encourages coal-to-gas switching. In just two years, China added 75 billion cubic meters (bcm) to global gas demand, the equivalent of the UK gas market, the second largest European market. Despite steadily rising, Chinese gas production has not been able to cope with such a huge increase in demand and gas imports have also surged.
Topic:
Security, Climate Change, Energy Policy, Gas, and Renewable Energy
Political Geography:
China and Asia

20. Complementarity and dependency in the Energy sector and the transition to a low-carbon economy

Author:
Clarissa Lins, Izabella Teixeira, Adilson de Oliveira, Ricardo Besada, and Zhou Xizhou
Publication Date:
04-2018
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Brazilian Center for International Relations (CEBRI)
Abstract:
At its sixth meeting, CEBRI’s China Analysis Group Meeting promoted a wide-ranging debate on the opportunities and challenges emerging for China and Brazil by the new geopolitics of carbon and the ongoing energy transition – characterized, among other trends, by falling costs of renewable sources and by the rise of natural gas as a strategic transition fuel. In this context, participants highlighted the merger between the agendas of energy security and sustainable development worldwide, with implications for both policymaking and investment priorities – since the energy sector accounts for approximately a third of total greenhouse gas emissions globally.
Topic:
Climate Change, Development, Energy Policy, Economy, and Carbon Emissions
Political Geography:
China, Asia, Brazil, and South America