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Begin New Search Topic Conflict Content Type Special Report Publishing Institution Middle East Institute (MEI)

1. The Tiger Forces: Pro-Assad fighters backed by Russia

Author:
Gregory Waters
Publication Date:
10-2018
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Middle East Institute (MEI)
Abstract:
The Tiger Forces is a Syrian Air Intelligence-affiliated militia fighting for the Syrian government and backed by Russia. While often described as the Syrian government’s elite fighting force, this research portrays a starkly different picture. The Tiger Forces are the largest single fighting force on the Syrian battlefield, with approximately 24 groups comprised of some 4,000 offensive infantry units as well as a dedicated artillery regiment and armor unit of unknown size. Beyond these fighters are thousands of additional so-called flex units, affiliated militiamen who remain largely garrisoned in their hometowns along the north Hama and Homs borders until called on to join offensives as needed. Despite a decentralized command structure, the Tiger Forces' capabilities far exceed any other unit currently fighting in the Syrian civil war. The main source of the unit’s success stems from its two full-strength infantry brigades with dedicated logistical support and the ability to call on the Syrian air force—and after September 2015 the Russian air force—at will. While there is likely some degree of higher-than-average competence among the Tiger Forces’ officer corps, this research demonstrates that the true power of the unit does not come from their alleged status as elite fighters but instead from their large size, supply lines, and Russian support.
Topic:
Security, Armed Forces, Military Affairs, Conflict, and Syrian War
Political Geography:
Russia, Middle East, and Syria

2. Iran's Use of Shi'i Militant Proxies: Ideological and Practical Expediency Versus Uncertain Sustainability

Author:
Alex Vatanka
Publication Date:
06-2018
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Middle East Institute (MEI)
Abstract:
Since its 1979 revolution, the Islamic Republic of Iran has incited violent, radical, and often sectarian nonstate groups across the Middle East to serve as proxies in its military campaigns to influence regional and international politics. This “proxy model” has become increasingly salient since the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 and more recently in Iraq and Syria, and is now Iran’s primary tool for advancing its regional intersts. The U.S. and the West in general have largely paid attention only to radical Sunni groups such as al-Qaeda and ISIS. With a few exceptions, such as Lebanon’s Hezbollah, nonstate Shi‘i militant groups have generally avoided the same intense Western scrutiny. This study compares and contrasts regional conflicts that have been shaped by Iranian proxies and Iran’s successful—and unsuccessful—attempts to recruit to its militant groups. It also identifies the key forces that have shaped Iran’s ideological and operational sponsorship of nonstate militant groups, both Sunni and Shi‘i, as well as its motivations and preferred modus operandi.
Topic:
Non State Actors, Violent Extremism, Conflict, Ideology, Shia, and Proxy War
Political Geography:
Iraq, Iran, Lebanon, Syria, and United States of America

3. Beyond the proxy powder keg: The specter of war between Saudi Arabia and Iran

Author:
Bilal Y. Saab
Publication Date:
05-2018
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Middle East Institute (MEI)
Abstract:
An Iran-Saudi Arabia war is unlikely, but it is now more likely than ever before. A military confrontation between Saudi Arabia and Iran should command respect and inspire concern because it could cause tremendous harm to an already volatile Middle East and possibly to the global economy. Iran seems to have an upper hand in a direct military confrontation with Saudi Arabia because of its combat experience, geography, manpower, strategic depth, and greater cost tolerance. However, none of these attributes give Iran any decisive advantages in a contest with Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia is neither helpless nor without military options. While it is easy to start a war with Iran, it is anything but to finish it. Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman would have to think hard about the capabilities of the Saudi military and the resilience of Saudi society before embarking on such a risky course. In any war dynamic between Iran and Saudi Arabia, U.S. military intervention or support would be the most decisive exogenous factor for both Riyadh and Tehran. The United States has a security commitment to Saudi Arabia, but the extent to which Washington can tolerate subtle Iranian aggression against the kingdom that falls below the threshold of conventional warfare, while potentially upending Saudi stability, is unclear.
Topic:
Security, Military Affairs, Conflict, and Proxy War
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Saudi Arabia, North America, and United States of America

4. Libya’s Terrorism Challenge: Assessing the Salafi-Jihadi Threat

Author:
Lydia Sizer
Publication Date:
10-2017
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Middle East Institute (MEI)
Abstract:
Salafi-jihadis have maintained an active presence in Libya due to a mix of push and pull factors. Historic participation in such groups, declining standards of living, the historical marginalization of minorities, and a pervasive sense of victimhood have all made Libya a ripe jihadi recruiting ground. Many Salafi-jihadis offer the status, salary, and services that the fractured state cannot provide. These movements can be diminished through investments like educational programs, aid to war-torn regions, demilitarization programs, and improved intelligence sharing by border officials in Libya’s neighboring states. However, until the political crisis that has plagued Libya for over three years ends, there is little Libya’s international partners can do to help confront these movements. And as long as the crisis continues, civil unrest will persist and institutions will remain weak. Such a scenario would provide the requisite chaos for the present Salahi-jihadi movements to flourish.
Topic:
Terrorism, Violent Extremism, Conflict, and Jihad
Political Geography:
Middle East, Libya, and North Africa

5. Climate Challenges in the Middle East: Rethinking Environmental Cooperation

Author:
Gerald Stang
Publication Date:
05-2016
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Middle East Institute (MEI)
Abstract:
This Policy Paper is part of The Middle East Institute's Regional Cooperation Series. Throughout 2016, MEI will be releasing several policy papers by renowned scholars and experts exploring possibilities to foster regional cooperation across an array of sectors. The purpose is to highlight the myriad benefits and opportunities associated with regional cooperation, and the high costs of the continued business-as-usual model of competition and intense rivalry.
Topic:
Climate Change, Environment, Regional Cooperation, Conflict, and Pollution
Political Geography:
Middle East

6. Natural Cooperation: Facing Water Challenges in the Middle East

Author:
Aysegul Kibaroglu
Publication Date:
09-2016
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Middle East Institute (MEI)
Abstract:
This Policy Paper is part of the Middle East Institute's Regional Cooperation Series. Throughout 2016, MEI will be releasing several policy papers by renowned scholars and experts exploring possibilities to foster regional cooperation across an array of sectors. The purpose is to highlight the myriad benefits and opportunities associated with regional cooperation, and the high costs of the continued business-as-usual model of competition and intense rivalry. The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) is regarded as one of the most water-challenged regions in the world. The destabilizing impact of its resource constraints is compounded by the fact that some 60 percent of the region’s water flows across international borders, generating and exacerbating political tensions between states. Water insecurity will increase in the MENA region if the current situation of minimal water cooperation persists under the disabling conditions of political volatility, economic disintegration, institutional failure, and environmental degradation. Experiences from around the world demonstrate that countries that have achieved regional water cooperation have prospered together and kept the threat of conflict a remote possibility. It is time for the countries in the Middle East to realize that there is no alternative to sustainable water cooperation.
Topic:
Security, Water, Infrastructure, Geopolitics, Political stability, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Middle East and Syria

7. Syria’s New Media Landscape: Independent Media Born Out of War

Author:
Antoun Issa
Publication Date:
12-2016
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Middle East Institute (MEI)
Abstract:
The Syrian Civil War has shaken the country’s media landscape and provided space for the nascent emergence of an independent Syrian media. Syria’s media culture is undergoing significant transformation from a top-down, state-run industry, to a diverse arena populated by competing viewpoints and driven by communities. This paper maps the changes in Syrian media since the beginning of the uprising in 2011, and explores the constraints facing independent media moving forward. Stronger mechanisms to support independent media in Syria are needed—such as additional and consistent funding, industry associations, and ease of travel—to develop a more open media culture in Syria, and foster a democratic and pluralistic post-conflict society.
Topic:
Media, Conflict, and Syrian War
Political Geography:
Middle East and Syria

8. Yemen's National Dialogue

Author:
Charles Schmitz
Publication Date:
03-2014
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Middle East Institute (MEI)
Abstract:
Facing popular protests, a secessionist movement in the south, a spiraling security crisis, and a deep fracturing of political factions, Yemen’s political elite acceded to the Gulf initiative in 2011, which established a caretaker transitional government. The agreement signed in Riyadh stipulated a two-year transitional period and created a National Dialogue Conference (NDC) as a forum to solve the country’s political problems. The results of the National Dialogue will form the basis for a new constitution, and Yemenis will then elect a new government to conclude the transitional period. The National Dialogue has concluded, but it is not clear whether it can really solve Yemen’s political problems. The two-year transitional period ended without a new constitution or elections—these will be held at some undetermined later date—and facts on the ground may be outpacing the deliberations of the political elite and their international backers. The government cannot prevent attacks on its oil pipelines or electrical grid; al-Qa`ida operates with almost impunity in the capital city Sana; the Houthi movement is expanding its area of control, recently taking the symbolically important towns of Huth in Amran and Dammaj in Sa`ada; and the south remains unsettled and far from accepting of any solutions proposed by the Sana elite. In February 2014 the committee created to “resolve” the issue of southern rebellion decided on a federal system of government composed of six regions. Yet most Yemenis do not know what federalism is, and what’s more, they don’t care. Deteriorating security and the rise of poverty have overwhelmed any interest most citizens might have in the details of the elite’s visions for the future of the country. Both Saudi Arabia and the United States, the most important foreign actors in Yemen and backers of the Gulf initiative, are focused on their own regional interests, sometimes to the detriment of Yemeni interests. The Saudis want to maintain their influence on the Yemeni government, fight Iranian influence, and control threats from Yemeni soil spilling over into Saudi Arabia. However, the Saudis recently expelled from the Kingdom hundreds of thousands of Yemeni workers, exacerbating Yemen’s desperate economic situation. The United States is focused on al-Qa`ida and Iran. The American drone campaign continues to wreak havoc, recently killing members of a wedding party in spite of President Obama’s new procedures to bring the targeted assassinations under the color of law, and the United States seems unable to relinquish its misperception that the Houthis in Sa`ada constitute a new Hezbollah. With such deep divisions in Yemen’s political body and in the competing regional agendas of Yemen’s foreign backers, Yemen’s prospects for a peaceful political settlement that will allow the country to stabilize and grow seem dim.
Topic:
Security, Politics, Conflict, and Negotiation
Political Geography:
Middle East, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, United States of America, and Gulf Nations