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1. Political Coalitions in Turkey in the Run-Up to the 2023 Elections

Author:
Aurélien Denizeau
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
The year 2023, already marked by a deadly double earthquake in the south-east of the country in February, is the year of the centenary of the Republic, but above all an election year for Turkey. The general elections (parliamentary and presidential) will take place on May 14 and are unanimously considered to be crucial for the political future of the country. The electoral campaign is polarized around two major coalitions: the People’s Alliance, led by the presidential AKP and the MHP, which supports the re-election of President Erdoğan; and the Nation Alliance, formed by the main Kemalist party CHP with five other parties, and supporting Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu as a presidential candidate. Two other coalitions are also present and could tip the election one way or the other: the Labor and Freedom Alliance, centered around the progressive and pro-Kurdish HDP, and the Ancestral Alliance, which supports the nationalist Sinan Oğan. While this political configuration may seem familiar to European observers – where cross-party coalitions are common, especially in parliamentary regimes – there are indications, such as the tensions between the İYİ Party and its partners in the Nation Alliance over support for Kılıçdaroğlu, that call into question the nature of these coalitions: are they motivated by ideological proximity, or are they merely tactical tools for gaining power? In particular, these coalitions seem to derive from the nature of the Turkish political regime and its evolution over the last decade, with an ultra-presidentialization of the system under the successive presidential terms of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan which has led all political actors to position themselves in relation to his personal power. As socio-economic conditions weaken the AKP’s electoral base, the prospects for this election seem more open than ever.
Topic:
Elections, Domestic Politics, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, AKP, and Coalition
Political Geography:
Turkey and Middle East

2. The Strategic Repositioning of LNG: Implications for Key Trade Routes and Choke Points

Author:
Leslie Palti-Guzman and Marc-Antoine Eyl-Mazzega
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
2022 saw the climax so far of the weaponization of energy. Following its geopolitical demise, Russia has undertaken its own gas amputation, moving from a super energy power status to a diminished role with uncertain prospects and only hard options left. Russia has cut off almost entirely pipeline gas supplies to the European Union (EU), first inflicting huge financial pain and collecting record high revenues, but then simply losing out its largest and best market with no realistic alternative, and no prospect of any significant return. However, the Kremlin could still further reduce some of the remaining pipeline gas or liquefied natural gas (LNG) supplies and thus cause some tensions in the markets. Russia also retains leverage on oil markets, where the Kremlin managed to cope with the embargo as well as the price cap and maintain the relationship with Saudi Arabia which drives OPEC+ decisions. Meanwhile, in 2022, the European energy system has managed to surprisingly adapt on the supply and demand side to the three shocks: the decoupling from Russian energy supplies, the hydropower generation crisis, and the French nuclear electricity crisis. Liquefied natural gas has made a comeback in Europe and has been a savior of industries, governments, and populations. The LNG corridor between the EU and the United States (U.S.) has become the most dominant LNG trade route in 2022. This came at a huge cost though – EU’s gas import bill soared ten times from 2020 and three times from 2021 levels. For 2023, the European gas balance is much more fragile, as the demand reduction potential has reached its limits, same for the ability to attract additional non-Russian exports to Europe, at a time when missing Russian volumes will probably reach 120 billion cubic meters (bcm), instead of about 77 bcm in 2022. More moderate price levels since November 2022 have clearly overshadowed this fundamental mismatch, especially as the weather has been mild and China was still struggling with the pandemic. With an additional 30-40 bcm of missing Russian gas to offset in 2023 compared to 2022, Europeans can be expected to benefit from an extra gas of around 20-25 bcm left in storages thanks to mild weather and available LNG. They have no choice but to continue saving energy in a hurry, that is both on gas and electricity. Gas demand in power generation had increased in the first nine months of 2022 before falling in Q4 2022, and well over 15 bcm can be saved here in 2023 as more nuclear is available altogether, alongside more renewables, and some coal. It will be critical to reduce peak loads though. The key improvement is in terms of logistics, with the massive new LNG import capacity deployed across Europe. Overall, EU’s import situation will be very tensed and fragile for the next winter. The key challenge is that EU’s gas supply security ultimately depends on the weather in Europe, China’s and Japan’s LNG demand, and weather or technical outages in the Gulf of Mexico or in other producers. Any slight disruptions in supplies can have major impacts. As a last resort, bringing back some Groningen supplies, no matter how politically sensitive this would be, must be considered and prepared. Large financial compensations and effective governmental action would notably be required to offset the hardships.
Topic:
European Union, Gas, Exports, Trade, Energy, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, China, and Europe

3. Russia’s Mining Strategy: Geopolitical Ambitions and Industrial Challenges

Author:
Florian Vidal
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
In addition to being a leading gas and oil power, Russia also possesses vast geological resources that place it among the world’s leading mining countries. Nevertheless, Russia’s largely privatized mining sector faces great and numerous restrictions relating to the obsolescence of its infrastructure, lack of investment and a shortage of qualified human resources in the industry, which may be further exacerbated by the war in Ukraine. To diversify its sources of revenue, whilst also obtaining new levers of geopolitical power, particularly in Africa, Moscow is seeking to revitalize this strategic industry. Russia may focus on several of its globally significant companies, particularly in the diamond, fertilizer and nickel sectors. It also plans to extend its mining activities by reinvesting in and modernizing historic sectors such as coal, or by developing new ones like lithium. In a context of growing global demand for critical metals and minerals in order to meet the challenge of the ecological and energy transition, what role can Russia play? Moscow intends to overcome the challenge of maintaining its economic and industrial autonomy in the face of the sanctions imposed by the West following its invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. The future of Russia’s mining industry may depend upon a reorientation away from its traditional Western markets and towards Asian countries, such as India, Malaysia, and Vietnam, which have decided to retain their economic ties with Russia. Will Russia’s mining policy bolster the implementation of the “pivot to Asia” that Moscow has talked of for several years?
Topic:
Natural Resources, Geopolitics, Diversification, Mining, Modernization, and Industry
Political Geography:
Russia and Eurasia

4. China/United States: Europe off Balance

Author:
Thomas Gomart and Marc Hecker
Publication Date:
04-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
As French President Emmanuel Macron (accompanied by Ursula von der Leyen) is on a state visit to China, some twenty Ifri researchers decipher the stakes of the U.S./China/Europe strategic triangle. This 16-text study follows Olaf Scholz’s visit to Beijing (November 2022) and precedes that of Emmanuel Macron (April 2023). It comes especially one year after the beginning of a geopolitical and geoeconomic shock of a rare magnitude: the invasion of Ukraine by Russia. The War in Ukraine or the Return of Bloc Geopolitics? The war in Ukraine has broken ties between the European Union (EU) and Russia for the foreseeable future, particularly in the field of energy, though not without consequences in the Middle East, Africa, and the Indo-Pacific. Furthermore, this war has become the main show of active indirect confrontation between the United States—which has provided military support to Ukrainians, with help from its European allies—and China, which has supported Russia politically and economically. In February 2022, Moscow and Beijing declared their “no limits friendship”; in March 2023, Xi Jinping offered his personal support to Vladimir Putin after the International Criminal Court issued a warrant for his arrest. In its position on the political settlement of the Ukraine crisis, presented in February 2023, China stated: “All parties should oppose the pursuit of one’s own security at the cost of others’ security, prevent bloc confrontation, and work together for peace and stability on the Eurasian Continent”. China is no more of a mediator than the United States: it would be unrealistic to believe so. We appear to be witnessing a return of bloc geopolitics, albeit in a starkly different context than that of the Cold War (1947-1991). Globalization has produced strong economic and technological interdependencies that make any prospect of decoupling very costly, if not impossible. Economic partners are no longer necessarily military allies, and vice versa. In other words, a gap is opening up between geopolitical perceptions and geoeconomic realities. The term “decoupling” is popular in the United States, though much less so elsewhere. The rejection of bloc geopolitics is particularly acute outside of the West, where a “pragmatic” approach to foreign policy is often promoted. The Saudi foreign minister summed this up during the World Policy Conference in December 2022: “Polarization is the last thing we need right now. […] We need to build bridges, strengthen connections, and find areas of cooperation”. A few months later, China pulled off an extraordinary diplomatic coup by brokering a deal to restore relations between Riyadh and Tehran. For the EU, the situation is particularly delicate: Europe is in the Western camp, but a severing of ties with Beijing would cause a crushing economic blow. In 2022, China accounted for more than 20% of the EU’s imports, while the United States accounted for around 12%. By 2030, the EU’s GDP is expected to rise to $20.5 trillion, compared to $30.5 trillion for the United States and $33.7 trillion for China. In January 2023, the President of the European Commission declared at Davos: “We still need to work and trade with China, especially when it comes to this transition. So, we need to refocus our approach on de-risking, rather than decoupling”. For its part, Beijing has encouraged European aspirations of “strategic autonomy”, understood in China as a form of detachment from the United States. At the same time, the EU is constantly strengthening its military, technological, financial and energy ties with the U.S. This collective study notes a hypothetical search for balance on the part of the Europeans, faced with a war on their territory (the Western peninsula of the heartland), who cannot escape Sino-American mechanisms, and who do not form a monolithic whole. It also analyzes the strategy of several important actors outside our continent, and shows that, from Ukraine to Taiwan, via Africa and the Middle East, Europeans have little room for maneuver. This is why the study proposes recommendations to try, at a crucial moment, to reinforce their positioning.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Climate Change, International Trade and Finance, Science and Technology, European Union, and Industry
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and United States of America

5. The Sino-Russian Partnership Assumptions, Myths and Realities

Author:
Bobo Lo
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
When Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin announced a “no limits friendship” at their February 2022 summit, the message was that Beijing and Moscow had reached a new peak in relations. Yet Putin’s invasion of Ukraine has exposed the limits of Sino-Russian partnership and highlighted their sometimes diverging interests. Far from being an authoritarian alliance, this is a classic great power relationship centered in realpolitik. China and Russia are strategically autonomous actors, with fundamentally different attitudes toward international order. The Sino-Russian partnership remains resilient. Both sides recognize that it is too important to fail, especially given there are no viable alternatives to continuing cooperation. Nevertheless, the balance of power within the relationship is changing rapidly. Russia’s geopolitical and economic dependence on China is greater than ever. Although predictions of a clientelist relationship are premature, this widening inequality represents a major long-term source of weakness. The challenges Beijing and Moscow pose to Western interests are largely separate and should be addressed individually on their merits. Equally, it is naive to imagine that reaching out to either side could help loosen their strategic partnership. Western governments should focus instead on upping their own game—from revitalizing democracy and the rule of law at home to addressing universal threats such as climate change and food insecurity. Bobo Lo is an Associate Research Fellow with the Russia/NIS Center at Ifri. He is also a Non-Resident Fellow with the Lowy Institute, Sydney, Australia; and a Non-Resident Senior Fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA) in Washington, D.C. Previously, he was Head of the Russia and Eurasia Programme at Chatham House, and Deputy Head of Mission at the Australian Embassy in Moscow. Dr. Lo has written several books, including A Wary Embrace: What the China-Russia Relationship Means for the World (Penguin Australia, 2017); Russia and the New World Disorder (Brookings and Chatham House, 2015); and Axis of Convenience: Moscow, Beijing and the New Geopolitics (Brookings and Chatham House, 2008).
Topic:
Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Partnerships, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, China, and Asia

6. The Technology Policies of Digital Middle Powers

Author:
Alice Pannier
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
Digital technology is an element of power in the international system as well as an area for competition among countries. Considering the economic weight and political voluntarism of the U.S., China, and the EU, those three poles of power have received a lot of attention when it comes to their technology policies. This study aims to shift our gaze toward countries outside of the trio. Digital middle powers are those countries that are caught in the middle of the power play in an emerging multipolar international system where digital technology is a determining factor of power. It also refers to countries with established or growing clout in digital technology, and which are regional leaders or global ones in certain sectors. The study provides a qualitative comparison of the technology policies of nine of the digital middle powers: Brazil, India, Israel, Japan, Kenya, Nigeria, Russia, South Korea, and the United Kingdom. It seeks to reflect the diversity of national technology policies, as well as to identify those countries’ convergences and divergences with Europe, the United States, and China. Each case study introduces national technology and digital innovation ecosystems, data policies, and the state of digital infrastructure. These elements serve to examine the strengths of the country’s private sector in technology, the government’s regulatory capacity, and the degree of digital development. The chapters then look at how the digital domain is embedded in the broader dynamics of their bilateral relations with the U.S., the EU, and China. A first conclusion is that digital middle powers can usefully be differentiated between rising digital powers and established ones. Established digital powers have well-developed ecosystems, regulations, and infrastructure, but they are all having to renew and re-focus their technology policies to remain relevant. By contrast, rising digital powers tend to have budding ecosystems in digital services and mobile applications, and large ongoing infrastructure development projects, albeit with limited or patchy regulatory capacity. When it comes to foreign relations, the study confirms well-identified trends whereby the EU’s influence occurs chiefly through the elaboration of norms; the U.S.’s via the strength of its digital services and private sector investment, as well as strong bilateral security ties; while China’s growing influence is underpinned by large infrastructure projects. All the countries studied are attempting to balance their relationships with U.S., China, and the EU. None, save for Russia, has outrightly “picked a side” and severed ties with one or two of the blocs.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Strategic Competition, 5G, and Middle Power
Political Geography:
Kenya, Russia, Japan, United Kingdom, India, Israel, South Korea, Brazil, and Nigeria

7. The Politics of New Cities: Diversification of Actors and Recentralization of State Power in the Case of Diamniadio

Author:
Sina Schlimmer
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
The construction of new cities on the African continent is in vogue. From multifunctional urban hubs to eco-districts, the images that accompany the announcement of these projects promote an African urban future based on modernity and technology. This trend for urban planning that claims to make a clean sweep of pre-existing approaches is not unique to African countries, whose governments are inspired in particular by North African and Asian models. However, the promotion of new cities in Africa is part of the lively debate that has been going on for several years on the rapid urbanization of the continent's countries. The creation of modern cities, organized and corresponding to the urban planning standards of international metropolises, is presented as a means of avoiding haphazard, chaotic urban development. This paper offers a critical analysis of the policy of new cities based on an empirical study of the new urban pole of Diamniadio (PUD) in Senegal. Two key arguments are put forward in this paper. First, the analysis deconstructs the ex nihilo character of these urban projects and emphasizes that they are part of public policy trajectories. Due to its geo-economic and strategic position, Diamniadio has been at the heart of the Dakar region's territorial planning policies since at least the end of the 1990s. Secondly, new towns are far from being neutral and technical urban planning instruments; rather, they are political devices that convey interests and stimulate power games. By delimiting the boundaries of the PUD, which is presented as President Macky Sall's political footprint, the central government regains certain administrative powers, particularly in terms of land planning and allocation. In addition, the PUD reflects competition from foreign actors, both public and private, and the growing importance of emerging actors such as Turkey.
Topic:
Infrastructure, Governance, State, Urban, and Cities
Political Geography:
Africa and Senegal

8. Europe and the Geopolitics of 5G Walking a Technological Tightrope

Author:
Julien Nocetti
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
The acute Sino-American tensions which started in 2018 have been coupled with controversies around 5G technology, exemplified by the spotlight placed on Chinese equipment manufacturer Huawei and the security risks associated with its use. For Europe, the 5G challenge at the international level is drawing a very complex landscape. Just like artificial intelligence, 5G materializes a very strong geopolitical sensitivity around the control of critical technologies. 5G is indeed critical because of its expected quasi-ubiquitous use, the gradual shift towards network technologies based entirely on software, and the potential strengthening of already dominant players (including digital platforms via cloud services). The United States-China rivalry is limiting the European Union’s room for action, against a backdrop of security considerations and low levels of investment. The continent’s various players (the European Commission, the main European powers, private players such as Nokia and Ericsson) have not adopted a uniform stance, reflecting an entanglement of technological dependencies on China and the United States. Meanwhile, the issue of semiconductors, symbolizing both the technological decline and the renewal of the EU’s ambitions, is fully integrated into the development of 5G. These chips constitute the "muscle" of the system and trigger new geo-economic challenges in which Europe must still find its place.
Topic:
European Union, Internet, 5G, Telecommunications, and Digital Sovereignty
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Asia, North America, and United States of America

9. Rewinding the Clock? US-Russia Relations in the Biden Era

Author:
Bobo Lo
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
The escalating crisis in Ukraine in the winter of 2021-2022 has returned US-Russia relations to center stage. Faced with the prospect of a new Russian military intervention, US President Joe Biden has re-engaged with Vladimir Putin in a manner reminiscent of the diplomacy of the superpower era. But this latest American attempt at accommodation raises more questions than answers. In the intervening three decades the world has changed out of all recognition, the international influence of the US-Russia relationship is much diminished, and their cooperation has sunk to historic lows. Can Washington and Moscow defy gravity and achieve some level of pragmatic engagement? There is good reason for skepticism. Neither side is truly invested in cooperation, but instrumentalizes it to other purposes. The Biden administration hopes to neutralize Russia in order to focus on the all-encompassing challenge of China. The Kremlin looks to undermine American influence as part of its project of promoting Russia as an independent global power. These goals are essentially irreconcilable. Looking ahead, the real question is not whether the United States and Russia can recalibrate their relationship to new “normal”, but whether they can avoid confrontation in an increasingly fluid and disorderly world.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Military Intervention, Vladimir Putin, and Joe Biden
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, North America, and United States of America

10. French Engagement in the Western Balkans: Boosting Strategic, Political, Economic, and Societal Cooperation

Author:
Florent Marciacq and Romain Le Quiniou
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
After years of lower interest, France has signaled its ambition to re-engage in the Western Balkans. It is not starting from scratch. Historical affinities with the countries of the region abound, in culture, sciences, politics, and economy. But shifting priorities in the past decades have eroded French presence in the region. To regain a foothold in this important part of Europe, France has taken a series of initiatives aimed at boosting its engagement. In 2016, it hosted the Berlin Process summit; in 2017, it launched with Germany an initiative to coordinate the drive against firearms trafficking in the Western Balkans; in 2018, it expanded the intervention mandate of the French Development Agency (AFD) to all Western Balkans countries and adopted a national Strategy for the Western Balkans; in 2020, after a two-year stalemate, it withdrew its reservations against the opening of accession negotiations with Albania and North Macedonia, while sketching the contours of the revised enlargement methodology. Drawing from a series of consultations in the region and structured cooperation with partner think-tanks, this policy paper is conceived as an independent, expert contribution to French efforts at re-engaging with the Western Balkans. It explores perceptions of French re-engagement in the region and reflects the potential of the 2019 Strategy for the Western Balkans in light of the forthcoming French Presidency of the European Council and in the context of the grands débats on the future of Europe.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, International Cooperation, Regional Cooperation, Multilateralism, and Engagement
Political Geography:
Europe, France, and Balkans

11. Governing Cities in Africa. A Panorama of Challenges and Perspectives

Author:
Sina Schlimmer
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
By 2050, about 60% of the population of Sub-Saharan Africa will live in urban areas. The governance of the rapid growth of capital and intermediary cities in Africa is one of the priorities of the international development agenda. Between 2020 and 2050, African cities, and especially secondary cities, have to absorb more than 700 million urban dwellers. Given these projections, urban growth in Africa has become a central concern of the international community, including experts from international organizations, researchers, aid agencies, and the private sector. While expert meetings and research initiatives on the future of cities are accumulating, this study aims to take stock of the debate. First, it provides an overview of the major issues that mostly policy-oriented research on cities in Africa has dealt with since independence. Based on this review, our paper builds on the concept of urban governance to approach the transformation and growth of African cities. Hereby we take into consideration the multiple actors (public, private, civil society, etc.), policy sectors (land, housing, infrastructure, etc.), and scales (local, national, international) that shape the political, economic, and social aspects of urban life. The paper also addresses African cities as part of a broader urban-rural continuum. Second, this study proposes concrete avenues to contribute to ongoing research and technical initiatives on urban governance in Africa. More knowledge and data are needed to inform the debate on urban infrastructure financing and the role of intermediate cities in the broader urbanization process in Sub-Saharan Africa. We argue that a more detailed comprehension of land tenure systems is fundamental to understanding the challenges of future urban development in Africa.
Topic:
Infrastructure, Governance, Urban, Rural, and Cities
Political Geography:
Kenya, Africa, Tanzania, and Sub-Saharan Africa

12. Convince and Coerce: U.S. Interference in Technology Exchanges Between its Allies and China

Author:
Mathilde Velliet
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
The tough-on-China policy adopted by the Trump and Biden administrations has – and will increasingly have – important consequences for Washington’s allies, both on their infrastructure choices (5G, submarine cables...) and on their technological exchanges with China. Indeed, the U.S. objective of slowing down China’s technological development has been translated into multiple policies, primarily targeting China but also – directly or indirectly – U.S. partners. On the one hand, Washington deploys a range of coercive and incentive tools to prevent its allies from adopting certain technologies, supplied by Chinese companies and « untrusted » by American authorities (in terms of cyber, data or infrastructure security). Case studies of U.S. efforts against the deployment of Huawei’s 5G or Hengtong Group’s undersea cables reveal a similar strategy, combining direct diplomatic pressure, a threat awareness campaign, and financial incentives. On the other hand, in line with the United States’ historical use of the extraterritoriality of its law and its position as an economic superpower to influence its allies’ decisions, Washington seeks to restrict transfers of critical technologies from allies to China. As the main manufacturers (along with the United States) of these technologies, American allies are increasingly constrained by these legal and diplomatic restrictions, which target one of their main trading partners and tend to extend beyond strictly military or cutting-edge technologies. For example, in order to limit sales of semiconductor manufacturing equipment, U.S. authorities are combining changes to the American export control regime with diplomatic efforts (bilaterally and multilaterally) to persuade allies to align their own export policies with those of the United States. While the Biden administration appears to be placing greater emphasis on cooperative and incentive approaches, it seems likely that the multidimensional U.S. strategy serving these two objectives will continue, and even be strengthened. Among allies (and especially in Europe), this trend has raised awareness of the security challenges posed by certain Chinese suppliers, but also of the risks associated with the growing coercive practices of the great powers.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Internet, 5G, Semiconductors, and Submarine Cable
Political Geography:
Japan, China, Europe, Asia, North America, and United States of America

13. India–East Africa: A Not So Healthy Relationship?

Author:
Isabelle Saint-Mezard and Françoise Nicolas
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
Due to historical as well as geographical reasons, India and East Africa have long been close partners. In the recent period however, and even more so since the early 2000s, these ties have tightened as a result of combined efforts by the government of India and its business community. The presence of communities of Indian origin in several East African countries has also acted as a catalyst. East Africa is perceived as a valuable partner both by Indian authorities and by Indian private companies. Although the two types of Indian players may not explicitly coordinate their actions, their interests dovetail nicely in this particular region. The health sector sticks out as one major sector on which Indian actors focus in East Africa. It provides a striking example of the multilayered complementarity between India and East Africa, on the one hand, and between public and private Indian players’ interests on the other. However, India’s activism in the health sector is not necessarily perceived positively by the East African host countries. Despite some technology transfers and efforts by the Indian actors, be they public or private, to promote capacity-building, East African countries find themselves in a situation of dependence as a result of Indian companies exporting and producing drugs, building hospitals, improving hospital management and Information Technology (IT) infrastructure, or digitalizing healthcare. However, the major point of tension pertains to the promotion of medical tourism. Although offshore healthcare comes with many benefits, it is unlikely to be sustainable for the East African economies in the long run. Moreover, the money spent on medical tourism could arguably be used more usefully to develop local medical facilities and competence. The recent developments in the context of the pandemic have made the associated risk very clear. The challenge in the coming years will be for the two parties to find a way to better balance their relationship and set it on firmer ground – in other words, to make it healthier.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Health, Bilateral Relations, and Partnerships
Political Geography:
Africa, South Asia, and India

14. The Russian-Iran Partnership in a Multipolar World

Author:
Clément Therme
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
The strengthening of the partnership between Russia and Iran depends on overlapping security interests; bilaterally, regionally and on the world stage. Tehran has pursued a regional policy program that is largely in line with Russia’s interests, whether these relate to Syria (from 2011), the Caucasus, Central Asia, or Afghanistan (since 1991). This security dimension was already one of the foundations of the bilateral relationship in the post-Cold War-period. It has now appeared in regional dealings between Tehran and Moscow. In addition, the decline of US international predominance, which has been apparent since the 2000s, has allowed Russia and Iran to develop a shared ideological discourse in opposition to “Western values”. Beyond this shared ideological basis, Tehran has developed a true “Realpolitik” whereby it relies on Russian foreign policy to relieve US pressure on Iran that is aimed at regime change or, at the very least, a change in the behavior of the Islamic Republic. In other words, in seeking to preserve intact the main ideological tenets of its regime, Tehran has added a new dimension to its relationship with Moscow. Since 1991, this relationship has become a matter of survival for a regime that faces both popular opposition at home and external pressure from Washington: pressure that increased during the Trump administration of 2017-2021.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Partnerships, and Multipolarity
Political Geography:
Russia, Iran, and Middle East

15. Arctic: Toward the End of the Exception? Strategic, Nuclear and Maritime Issues in the Region

Author:
Jean-Louis Lozier
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
Through multiple international initiatives, including the creation of the Arctic Council at the end of the Cold War in 1996, the Arctic appears to be one of the last areas of peaceful cooperation in the world. This “Arctic exception” is also devoid of any serious territorial dispute between the neighboring countries, some of which are nevertheless great powers: Russia, the United States, Canada, but also Sweden, Norway, Denmark (via Greenland), Iceland and Finland. However, this peaceful cooperation is not exempt from strategic rivalries: for some years now, these States in the Arctic have been redefining their strategic postures, notably through the publication of roadmaps and the deployment of new military forces trained to fight in this hostile environment. Russia thus remains the dominant power in the Arctic, in the face of a China with growing ambitions and a Western world – represented in particular by the United States – which is lagging behind after years concentrated on other military conflicts. Furthermore, the war in Ukraine that started in February 2022 also carry the germs of a broader destabilization of the region. Conventional competition is therefore renewed between these great powers, while the nuclear balance is partially maintained. It is indeed worth noticing that the Arctic is an area of direct contact between the Russian Federation and the United States. As such, it had a special significance during the Cold War as the shortest route between both adversaries for a potential ballistic missile and was a privileged position for deploying chains of radars and advanced detection systems. Finally, the shrinkage of the ice pack caused by global warming is also triggering the neighboring or more distant states’ greed, whether through the drilling possibilities for raw materials under the ice floe or the creation of new maritime routes. The latter would notably enable Russia to revitalize its northern flank and offer alternatives to existing transit routes.
Topic:
International Relations, Climate Change, Cold War, and Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Arctic, United States of America, and North Pole

16. Software Power The Economic and Geopolitical Implications of Open Source Software

Author:
Alice Pannier
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
Open source plays a central role in software development, both in parallel with proprietary software and increasingly intertwined with it. It has become a major factor for companies’ innovation processes and for the success and popularity of their products. For users, using open source software can alleviate risks stemming from proprietary solutions, including data privacy concerns or trade restrictions. Beyond that, open source is the foundation of critical software bricks and Internet languages and protocols. However, open source is a victim of its own success. It suffers of a lack of resources dedicated to the maintenance of open source components, even though vulnerabilities in open source code can have serious consequences, as illustrated by the Log4Shell vulnerability in December 2021. For these reasons, private companies are investing ever more money and human resources in the development and maintenance of open source software, and acquiring structuring roles in the governance of the ecosystem. This support, however, is not without risk for the open source ecosystem, which is increasingly shaped by the private interests of Big Tech companies. Meanwhile, governments are getting increasingly concerned with the cybersecurity implications of open source software, and with risks not only of accidental vulnerabilities, but also manipulation of codes by criminals and foreign agents. The interest of governments in open source is not new, but it is evolving: governments are no longer only seeking to adopt open source or to develop software solutions, but also to contribute to the financing or even the governance of open source ecosystems, at the national and/or global level. An analysis of the United States, Chinese and European cases show that government involvement in open source is not only pragmatic; it is increasingly politicized, and serves to uphold governments’ ambitions for national security, international influence, or digital sovereignty. The study highlights the dilemmas that emerge, for public authorities, from the tensions between the desire to secure universally used, critical open source components, the desire to develop “sovereign” technologies, and the risk of encroaching on the horizontal and decentralized functioning of open source.
Topic:
European Union, Cybersecurity, Geopolitics, Economy, Software, and Open Source
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and United States of America

17. Military Stockpiles: A Life-Insurance Policy in a High-Intensity Conflict?

Author:
Léo Péria-Peigné
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
For the first time after thirty years of budgetary restriction, European armies must face a high-intensity conflict involving heavy human and material losses. Having run down their military stockpiles to the bare minimum, supporting Ukraine has taken a heavy toll on their operational inventory; as modern operational inventories are limited, much decommissioned and older equipment has also been donated. Russia too has mobilized its extensive military stockpiles, inherited from the USSR, to maintain its combat capability after the initial failure of its “special military operation”. Russian efforts to retrofit older systems have also intensified as production of modern equipment has stalled. As a result, we are seeing modern and ancient weapons pitted against each other in Ukraine. This situation raises questions about France’s military storage strategy and prompts comparisons with those of other nations. US forces have kept a significant proportion of their Cold War arsenal in working condition, using it as a valuable commercial, diplomatic, and military asset. This arsenal also allows the United States to dominate the second-hand weapons market as it can supply cheap and almost immediately available systems. In Russia, despite an apparent modernization process, military power still relies on Soviet-era stocks of vehicles and weapons. For the Russian navy, modernization of old hulls is a way to compensate for the slow production of modern ships. Chinese armed forces are being modernized and rationalized: substantial quantities of older equipment could therefore become available before 2030, a potential asset for Chinese diplomacy. In Europe, military stockpiling strategies diverge along a rough east–west line. Western powers such as the United Kingdom and France chose quality over quantity, while Eastern ones, closer to the Russian threat, try to maintain large volumes while also modernizing their equipment. While the war in Ukraine may prompt Western nations to begin a reinforcement program, Eastern European countries such as Poland had already begun their own before 2014 and the Crimea crisis. After the 2015 terrorist attacks in Paris, France began to restore its military means and budgets, but the overall size of its armed forces is still inadequate to face a high-intensity conflict. The professionalization of the armed forces, the 2008 financial crisis, and budget cuts progressively led to the practice of stockpiling being replaced with a generalized “just-in-time” approach, to reduce infrastructure needs and costs more broadly. French armed forces had to make tough choices with their limited budgets, keeping what was immediately useful to their current missions and abandoning what was not. Operations in Africa and the Middle East and anti-terrorist operations in French cities absorbed considerable budgets, while specialized military units and infrastructure necessary to maintain stocks required for high-intensity conflicts were disbanded. Several initiatives and processes are at work to restore minimum storage capabilities, but a relevant stockpiling strategy, in line with France’s resources and strategic context, is still far off. The French army is building several military reserve units that could drive greater retention of older equipment and vehicles, although compatibility issues with more recent models may arise. As storing combat aircraft would be far too costly, the French Air and Space Force is trying to optimize the availability of its fleet, especially through a new approach to private industry partners in maintenance and training. The French navy has initiated a reform and rationalization process of its spare-parts-storage policy to optimize the availability of its ships as well as their capabilities. A coherent equipment reserve and stockpiling program is an essential component of a military driven by a clear strategic framework. However, in the French case, this strategy is currently being pulled in two directions: between the probable end of expeditionary operations in Africa and the Middle East, and the likelihood of a high-intensity conflict. The whole French stockpiling approach cannot be based entirely on the experience in Ukraine, and it is therefore necessary to evaluate multiple probable scenarios to develop relevant recommendations. A conflict in Eastern Europe fought by a coalition differs from one led by Europe without US support, or from a major crisis in the French territories of the Pacific or Indian Ocean. Moreover, recommendations must reflect military realities, as French resources are limited and would not allow for the creation of a reserve stock strategy similar to that of the United States. To support an allied nation under attack, the French army would need a much expanded ammunition stockpile. Similarly, the French air force lacks advanced munitions, while the French navy needs to rebuild a support fleet sufficient to enable combat operations far away from the French mainland and infrastructure.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Conflict, Industry, and Armament
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, France, and United States of America

18. Connectivity in Central Asia at the Crossroads of International Crises: Transport, Energy and Water from Interdependence to New Cooperation Ways

Author:
Michaël Levystone
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
From the reestablishment of an Islamic Emirate in Afghanistan by the Taliban to the war in Ukraine, not forgetting climate change, the most serious international crises, whether circumstantial or systemic, are having a severe impact on connectivity in Central Asia with regard to transport, energy, and water. While the search, which is an existential one for the countries of this landlocked region (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan), for foreign partners has been legitimized and even encouraged by the troubling context in which they are evolving, the steps they have taken in this respect since the outbreak of the war in Ukraine on February 24, 2022, show an obvious desire to bypass Russia, which has been heavily sanctioned by the West. As a result, Central Asian transportation networks are developing in two directions: to the west, with Kazakhstan and the Caspian Sea as key links in Sino-European trade routes; and to the south, whether by sea (development of port links from Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan to Azerbaijan and Iran) or by land (creation of a railway line between Uzbekistan, Afghanistan, and Pakistan). In the energy sector, Kazakhstan, hindered by Russian blockades of its main oil pipeline, is turning to the Caspian Sea in order to be able to continue transporting oil to European markets. Turkmenistan exports its gas to the Chinese and South Asian markets, where its projects, but also those of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan in the field of hydropower, are being hampered by developments in Afghanistan. Lastly, the question of water highlights the paradox of interdependent countries that are divided between those that control Central Asia's water resources (Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan) and the rest, located downstream of the Syr Darya and the Amu Darya (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan). While a growing number of initiatives are being launched to promote smart management of the region's significant water resources, this remains the most polarizing issue in Central Asia, despite its urgent nature.
Topic:
Water, Regional Integration, Transportation, Connectivity, and Energy
Political Geography:
Central Asia

19. What Strategic Posture Should France Adopt in the Middle East?

Author:
Héloïse Fayet
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
France has a historical presence in the Middle East, where it has many interests to defend: the fight against terrorism, the promotion of the arms industry, the dissemination of humanitarian values, etc. To this end, it has a number of resources at its disposal, notably military: French forces are deployed in Iraq, Syria and Jordan as part of Operation Chammal, in Lebanon for the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), and in the United Arab Emirates. This strategic posture, inherited from the history and "Arab policy" of the 20th century, is now being called into question by the geopolitical upheavals in the region. The resizing of the American presence in the Middle East, initiated by the withdrawal from Afghanistan, is accompanied by a growing assumption of responsibility for their own security by local actors. This evolution is embodied, for example, in the signing of the Abraham Accords, which redefine the place of Israel. The American pulling out also allows extra-regional powers such as China and Russia to become progressively involved in the area. These transformations require an adaptation of the French posture in order to position itself as a credible actor in the strategic competition. It is therefore necessary to move away from the sole focus on counterterrorism, which no longer gathers partners, and more broadly to redefine the partnership strategy and the mechanism deployed on the ground. A strengthened interministerial, or even European, dynamic also seems essential in order to mobilize all the levers available to France.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Armed Forces, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Iraq, Middle East, France, and Syria

20. Neither Surveillance Nor Algorithm-driven Consumerism: Toward an Alternative European Model for Smart Cities

Author:
Jacques Priol and Joé Vincent-Galtié
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
Smart city projects take many forms, ranging from the installation of connected street lights to total initiatives such as The Line – the gargantuan and futuristic project carried out by Saudi Arabia. In one form or another, these initiatives are multiplying, guided by the objectives of efficiency and the improvement of public policies. What they have in common is that they mobilize various digital tools and use data to develop and manage public services. As they are exported, these projects also become levers for international influence. Where does Europe stand on this spectrum? While many smart territory projects have already been implemented on the continent, Europe is still looking for its own model. Two models are unanimously rejected: the one promoted by China, and the one implemented by certain North American cities. The first subordinates the smart city to security and social control imperatives and contributes to the constant surveillance of the population. In contrast to this model, which is primarily concerned with control and surveillance on behalf of the State, the Californian-inspired North American model is criticized for its massive use of personal data, which is collected and used by private actors. Users are alarmed by the potential use of this data for commercial purposes and denounce the replacement of democratic decision-making by automated tools. From there, developing a European model requires taking these pitfalls into account and respecting both the issues related to privacy protection and the maintenance of open and democratic procedures. Europe can rely on an ambitious regulatory framework, capable of encouraging the development of smart cities in its territory. This framework can also be a real asset for exporting its model to other continents. European initiatives in the field of smart cities are also part of efforts to promote digital sovereignty. In this respect, matters of standardization, interoperability and infrastructure are at the heart of the debate and must be fully integrated into the projects implemented. They are also subject to intense international competition.
Topic:
Infrastructure, Governance, Geopolitics, Urban, Smart Cities, and Data
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and United States of America

21. Russia’s War in Ukraine: Misleading Doctrine, Misguided Strategy

Author:
Pavel Baev
Publication Date:
10-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
The blame for committing the blunder of starting the war with Ukraine is deservedly placed on President Vladimir Putin, but a single-explanation interpretation of the unfolding disaster is unsatisfactory. The scope of problems with the chain of command and logistics, scant air support and poor morale indicates that Russian planning and preparations for the war were seriously flawed and misguided. On the level of doctrine, the assertion of Russia’s ability to deter North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), defined as the main adversary, by employing the complete set of nuclear, conventional and “hybrid” capabilities, laid the foundation for the failure of attack on what was presumed to be a frangible Ukraine. Strategic guidelines on gaining a quick and complete victory by establishing air dominance and executing offensive maneuvers by armored battalion tactical groups (BTGs), led to the confusion of poorly coordinated attacks without proper air support. The strategic culture, pro-forma conservative but distorted by bureaucratic sycophancy and corruption, produced inflexible chains of command, demoralization of poorly led combat units and ugly atrocities. The sum total of these flaws is too high for the Russian army to learn useful lessons in the six months of fighting, so it has fallen back on the old pattern of positional warfare based on destroying the enemy by heavy artillery fire. The strategy of protracted war of attrition can lead to victory only if the economy and society are mobilized fully for delivering the necessary resources to the fighting army, but such mobilization—while proceeding in defiant Ukraine—remains politically impossible in discontented, isolated and economically degraded Russia.
Topic:
Military Strategy, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Eurasia, and Ukraine

22. The Geopolitics of Seawater Desalination

Author:
Marc-Antoine Eyl-Mazzega and Élise Cassignol
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
Water desalination is gradually emerging as the leading solution to cope with increasing water stress: i.e., the imbalance between water demand and quantities available. The United Nations estimates that by 2025, two-thirds of the world’s population will be affected by such challenges. The causes of water scarcity are multiple, including climate change, intensive agriculture, and population growth. This requires states to rethink their water policies, which are central to preserving their stability, resilience and sovereignty. A real “boom” in desalination industries is at work. The majority of Gulf countries now largely depend on desalinated water for their inhabitants’ consumption: in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), 42% of drinking water comes from desalination plants producing more than 7 million cubic meters (m3) per day, in Kuwait it is 90%, in Oman 86%, and in Saudi Arabia 70%. In 2022, there were more than 21,000 seawater desalination plants in operation worldwide, almost twice as many as a decade ago, and the sector’s capacity is growing at between +6% and +12% per year. By 2030, desalination capacity in Middle Eastern countries is expected to almost double, as part of plans announced in the region to prepare these economies for their transition to “post-oil” and to foster resilience. Saudi Arabia’s desalination capacity is set to increase from 5.6 million cubic meter (m3) per day in 2022 to 8.5 million m3 per day in 2025, and it will have to cover more than 90% of the country’s water consumption. The same holds for the UAE, Kuwait, Bahrain and Israel, where the production of desalinated water will more than double by 2030. With the rise of available solutions to meet all such needs, these technologies are now in demand on virtually every continent, while the Middle East today represents only 50% of installed capacity worldwide. In Africa, large-scale projects have recently been announced in Algeria and Morocco, countries that until now have had sufficient resources. Other countries such as Ghana, Senegal and Kenya supply many cities with desalinated seawater. This is also the case for Cairo. In the Indo-pacific region, particularly in China and India, the needs for desalinated water are increasing, driven by growing industries and decreasing available water. In 2020 alone, the construction of more than 35 desalination plants was announced in China, as well as six in the Philippines, and six in Taiwan. In the Americas, the west coast of the United States stands out with important projects in California, and Texas is not far behind. In Latin America, new projects are emerging in Peru and Chile, driven mainly by the needs of the mining industry, while in Mexico the demand for desalinated water notably comes from the population. Finally, island areas stand out for their strong needs for desalinated water: Cebu in the Philippines, Cape Verde, the Canary Islands and the Maldives are increasingly using desalination capabilities. European firms still lead, but Asian or local players are taking off There are many industrial players of varied size, although some have emerged for more than ten years as undisputed market leaders: in France, they include Engie and Veolia, whose merger with Suez opened up new prospects in the Americas, the Middle East and Europe; but there is also IDE Technologies, the Israeli champion of desalination; Korea’s Doosan Heavy, China’s Abengoa, and Spain’s Acciona. More recently, companies in emerging countries have distinguished themselves by obtaining large-scale contracts. This is particularly the case of Gulf players like the Emirati company Metito and the Saudi firm Advanced Water Technologies. Egypt also has industrial actors. Overall, the technology of reverse osmosis is largely mastered, while production differentiation concerns capacity, operational costs, electricity consumption and plant life.
Topic:
Agriculture, Climate Change, Water, Industry, and Desalination
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Qatar, and Gulf Nations

23. The Pacific caught in the World Wide Web? Geopolitics of submarine cables in Oceania

Author:
Camille Morel
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
This article provides a review of the digital connectivity of the Pacific Islands nations (Polynesia, Melanesia, and Micronesia) and the main challenges and prospects arising from it, at a time when the submarine cable market is undergoing profound change and a growing politicization of this technology on the international scene. In 2022, the 450 fiber-optic cables stretching across the world’s seabed carry more than 98 percent of international data and have become essential to the proper functioning of our societies. Submarine cable connection is all the more important to the geographically isolated Pacific islands because it enables them to digitize various sectors of the economy and society (industry, education, health, etc.) and to maintain a virtual link to the rest of the world. When a submarine cable is disabled, satellite links cannot completely offset this loss. The topic of submarine cables in Oceania is inextricably tied up with the geopolitics of the Indo-Pacific and rivalries between powers. Because of the long distances separating them from the rest of the world and the high cost of cables, the island territories of the Pacific are more liable to be dependent on other countries and subject to outside influence. Cables are also involved in the escalation of maritime competition between states, in a context of military, economic, demographic, and environmental issues, including seabed warfare. Against the backdrop of growing connectivity in the Pacific region since 2011 and the rise of China, the Pacific Ocean has become one of the three main routes for data in the twenty-first century. Within the region, the insular Pacific has several distinguishing features: Because of its particular geography, it appears under-meshed compared with the northern trans-Pacific route and the inter-Asia links. It looks more like a transit zone than a genuine space for investment. Its ecosystem and the methods used by public and private actors to commission, manage, and operate submarine links in the region have been adapted to local constraints and challenges. The main winners in this scenario are Australia and the United States, while the main loser is China, whose growing ambitions in the region are continuously thwarted. As a stage for Sino-American rivalry, the insular Pacific has to adapt to circumvent political difficulties and respond to its population’s urgent need for digital resilience. This challenge seems likely to result in a number of alternative cable projects emerging, offering new opportunities in the digital domain.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Geopolitics, and Connectivity
Political Geography:
Japan, China, Australia, United States of America, and Pacific Ocean

24. Five Years after China’s Plastic Import Ban Have Europeans Taken Responsibility?

Author:
Eugénie Joltreau
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
After the 2017 Chinese waste import ban, the international and European Union (EU) legislative framework on waste exports has been revised. • The amendment to the Basel Convention is stricter on the possibility to export plastic waste outside the EU, which has integrated the amendment in the waste shipment regulation (WSR) and is considering further export restrictions. Moreover, a Directive to reduce the use of single-use plastics and stimulate local demand for recycled plastics has been adopted. • The recycling rate of plastic packaging has been deteriorating since 2016 in view of the growing quantities of plastic packaging waste and limited export outlets, despite an increase in the tonnage recycled. Exports of plastic waste from the European Union have been reduced and partly redirected, with some negative environmental impacts reported. The EU demand for certain recycled plastics has boomed, encouraged by the new regulation, yet overall, EU plastic packaging consumption keeps increasing. • The debate on the export ban opposes a view of responsibility for the treatment of waste with the promotion of international waste trade as a means to achieve a global circular economy (for plastics). However, there is no evidence that the waste trade enables to increase the global recycling rate, reduces the use of virgin plastic, and reinforces sustainability. • The European Commission (EC) has released a new legislative proposal that tightens up waste export possibilities but does not ban it.
Topic:
Climate Change, Economy, Recycling, Waste, Imports, and Plastic
Political Geography:
China and Europe

25. Strategic Risk Reduction between Nuclear-Weapons Possessors

Author:
Corentin Brustlein
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
The topic of nuclear risk reduction has gained momentum in the international security debate among policymakers, nongovernmental organizations, and experts. The current and expected demise of the traditional arms-control architecture, the renewed strategic competition, and the polarization of the multilateral debate on nuclear weapons have contributed to this renewed salience. Building upon the 2019 G7 Statement on Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, this report defines strategic risk reduction as the set of unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral measures that aim at lowering the likelihood of nuclear weapons use through improved communication, predictability, and restraint, and underlines the need to adopt a strategic approach to nuclear risk reduction. Risks emanating from conflict dynamics between nuclear powers are different in nature and severity from those arising from technical incidents. This report argues that in a context of growing geopolitical rivalries, diplomats should prioritize mitigating the former type of risk. Risk reduction efforts should aim at hindering the most dangerous behaviors in crisis time, through measures focusing both on nuclear forces and on nonnuclear capabilities, whose impact on strategic balances keeps growing. Strategic risk reduction can strengthen international security and strategic stability by complementing arms control measures and deterrence policies. It is therefore crucial to ensure that diplomatic initiatives aimed at limiting nuclear risks do not ultimately, and paradoxically, increase the risk of war. Historical experience shows not only the feasibility of such an approach, but also the concrete security benefits that can be derived from it, by channeling the behavior of nuclear powers in times of tensions, reducing the ambiguity inherent in certain strategies and behaviors, or laying the foundations for international regimes based on operational and strategic restraint as well as on transparency.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Disarmament, Deterrence, Strategic Stability, and Confidence Building Measures
Political Geography:
Pakistan, Russia, China, United Kingdom, India, North Korea, France, and United States of America

26. Once a Jihadist, Always a Jihadist? A Deradicalization Program Seen from the Inside

Author:
Marc Hecker
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
France has traditionally taken a security-based approach to the fight against terror. It was a latecomer to the field of radicalization prevention and the establishment of disengagement programs aimed at jihadists. It only started to think seriously about the issue in 2013 and its first attempts involved certain irregularities. For that reason, deradicalization suffers from a persistent bad reputation in France. The disengagement and reintegration programs established since 2016—RIVE from 2016 until 2018 and PAIRS, which started in 2018 and is still running—have operated behind closed doors. Discreetness was preferred to overcommunication. This study—the result of a long-term field survey of the staff, participants, and partners of PAIRS—opens the black box of disengagement methods. It offers a nuanced assessment of these initiatives, which, after four years of operations, have produced reassuring results: among the dozens of terrorist offenders who have participated in RIVE and PAIRS in open custody, none have reoffended.
Topic:
Terrorism, Radicalization, Islamism, Jihad, and Deradicalization
Political Geography:
Europe and France

27. Tanzania’s 2020 Election: Return of the One-Party State

Author:
Michaela Collord
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
Beginning with early voting in Zanzibar on October 27, 2020, Tanzanians went to the polls in a general election for district councilors, Members of Parliament (MPs) and the President. As official results began to be declared, it became clear that Tanzania’s long-time ruling party, Chama Cha Mapinduzi, had won a landslide. After significant opposition party gains in recent elections, these results constituted a dramatic reversal and a de facto return to one-party rule. Opposition parties continue to challenge this outcome, denouncing what they affirm was not a genuine election but a state-orchestrated sham. Reflecting on these dramatic shifts, this study addresses two questions: What explains the election results? And what are the implications for Tanzanian politics going forward? The main point is that the 2020 elections were a result of President John Pombe Magufuli’s efforts to consolidate authoritarian control after he first came to power in 2015. The study outlines how Magufuli used his first term not only to marginalize opposition parties but also to centralize power within the ruling party. It then examines how these processes intensified ahead of the election, culminating in the official declaration of an overwhelming Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) victory at all levels. The note concludes by discussing the implications of this election outcome for Magufuli’s second term, focusing on his control of parliament and the possibility of a constitutional amendment lifting presidential term limits.
Topic:
Authoritarianism, Elections, Domestic Politics, and Political Parties
Political Geography:
Africa and Tanzania

28. Collective Collapse or Resilience? European Defense Priorities in the Pandemic Era

Author:
Corentin Brustlein
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
To what extent has the COVID-19 pandemic affected defense priorities across Europe? When the pandemic reached its cities, Europe was already under severe internal and external stress. By throwing the continent and the world into an unprecedented economic crisis while security challenges abound, the pandemic has exposed Europe to a risk of irreversible loss of capacity for collective action, hampering its influence and control over its regional areas of interest. One year after, this report provides a comparative assessment of the impact of the pandemic on the foreign and defense policies and spending levels of ten different European countries. It not only aims at assessing the immediate impact of the pandemic on the defense posture of each country but more importantly at mapping in which areas the pandemic did or might prove disruptive for European defense priorities, whether directly or indirectly. Although uncertainty remains about the long-term effects of the current crisis, the different case studies highlight that, contrary to the most pessimistic scenarios, the pandemic has so far had a relatively modest impact on defense and security policies. Monitored European countries have so far shown resilience in their individual and collective responses to the crisis. If anything, changes brought by the pandemic are less striking than the continuity observed in most cases when it comes to foreign and defense policies, from stated levels of ambition to defense spending plans. It is, however, unclear how enduring this resilience can prove in the longer-term in the face of disruptive developments such as new variants of the virus, sweeping domestic political developments in Europe, radical changes in the US commitment to European security, or an intensified strategic competition in Europe’s neighborhood and beyond it.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Resilience, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Europe

29. The Automotive Industry: The Achilles’ Heel of German Economy?

Author:
Marie Krpata
Publication Date:
03-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
The global car market has been shrinking since 2018. This is a key economic sector for Germany whose producers belong to the Top 15 carmakers worldwide. Yet they are running the risk of being outclassed and eventually replaced, given emerging actors in the USA and China. These new competitors benefit from the growing digitization of the mobility sector, disruptive economic models and the obsolescence of vehicles with an internal combustion engine. This form of propulsion is progressively being replaced by less-polluting alternatives, which are being endorsed by public authorities. The Chinese-American rivalry is also impacting German carmakers, whose strategy greatly relies on the globalization of production chains. This has led to major successes in the past, but the threat of a technological decoupling between the USA and China limits German carmakers’ activities in terms of production and exports. Access to the Chinese market, which accounts for nearly 20% of the global population, is indispensable for the German brands that intend to benefit from China’s catch-up effects. European industrial and political actors plan to invest in promising sectors whilst seeking to respect environmental and social objectives. Also, the European Union (EU), led by a German powerhouse, intends to prevent market distortions such as hurdles to market access, while supporting the emergence of technologies and the compliance with production standards. However, developments in the automotive sector are challenging the EU’s capacity to act in a unified fashion, even if the EU is not seeking to impose its vision on the industry’s private sector, in a top-down manner.
Topic:
Climate Change, Economics, Energy Policy, Industrial Policy, European Union, Social Policy, Mobility, Industrialization, Green Deal, and Automotive Industry
Political Geography:
Europe and Germany

30. Green Batteries: a Competitive Advantage for Europe’s Electric Vehicle Value Chain?

Author:
Carole Mathieu
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
Aligning its climate and industrial policies, the European Union (UE) is introducing sustainability requirements for the whole life-cycle of electric vehicle (EV) batteries. This initiative would not only ensure that EVs fit with Europe’s climate-neutrality and resource-efficiency pledges, but also give European new entrants a better chance to compete. Since 2017, the EU’s nascent green industrial policy has made the EV battery value chain its favored experimental field. The wave of investments in battery cell manufacturing projects suggests that the worst-case scenario of Europe subsidizing massive battery cell imports will not materialize. Cell manufacturers have a direct commercial interest in setting up operations closer to the European automakers’ EV assembly factories, and Member States can provide an additional argument for local cell production with their large financial support for EU-based industrial projects. However, strategic autonomy remains a distant dream, as most confirmed projects are being developed by non-EU stakeholders. In addition, Europe has not yet managed to attract corresponding investments in the manufacturing of battery cell components, while its very limited control on raw material supply chains does not match its political aspirations. Despite pressure from civil society, the lack of consensual calculation methodologies makes it almost impossible for manufacturers to substantiate their green claims, especially with regards to carbon footprints. Yet, the life-cycle assessment (LCA) literature points to cell and active material manufacturing as key climate hotspots. Thus, efforts should concentrate on reducing energy consumption for these critical production steps and covering incompressible needs with grid-based or contract-based low-carbon electricity, provided the latter option guarantees the additionality of renewable electricity supplies. In addition, the extraction and refining of raw materials offer the second largest and mostly untapped potential for green differentiation, especially when combining climate and local environmental impact considerations. Ultimately, manufacturing green batteries does not necessarily require locating all production steps in Europe, but European players may have a competitive edge thanks to their expertise in measuring and improving the sustainability of their operations. In addition, reducing the environmental footprint of products requires a holistic view of supply chain management, which pleads for building closer ties between industrial stakeholders. Should the final text of the Batteries Regulation retain an ambitious timeframe for information and labelling requirements, it could be a game changer for the European EV market. The methodological and practical challenges should not be underestimated, but the best way to obtain robust implementation rules is to engage the industry in the drafting process. If the EU legislator confirms that customers should be able to compare the environmental performance of EV batteries as of 2023, companies should see the urgency of sharing their knowledge with the EC, and Member States will allocate appropriate resources to enforcement procedures. Likewise, the political signal will encourage EU automakers to place greater focus on sustainability in their ongoing supplier selection processes, instead of waiting for future industrial cycles to take serious action. The Batteries Regulation is not just about the EV value chain, it is an opportunity to demonstrate the high potential of Europe’s green industrial policy, delivering consumer trust, jobs, and strategic autonomy.
Topic:
Climate Change, Industrial Policy, Batteries, and Electric Vehicles
Political Geography:
Europe

31. Denmark: A Case Study for a Climate-Neutral Europe

Author:
Thibault Menu
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
In recent years, Denmark has steadily emerged as a leader and role model in the global green energy transition. Its greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions since 2010 have been reduced at greater pace than those of the European Union (EU) average. This transformation is all the more impressive, given that the country used to be a significant oil and gas producer which also relied heavily on coal for power generation. From its highly publicized success in offshore wind, to its ambitious goal of cutting GHG emissions by 70% by 2030 - which would put Denmark as a European and global frontrunner, with only Finland being more ambitious and planning to be climate neutral already by 2035 – as well as its pioneering green energy policies, the country has transformed itself into a beacon for low carbon technologies and public policies. The country has a record high share of renewable energy sources in power generation, with wind in the lead. Given the recent announcements and climate goals set by the Von der Leyen Commission, Denmark serves as an interesting case study for other European and world nations alike on how to embark on their own energy transitions. This paper assesses whether the country is really successful in accelerating even more than its European peers in its decarbonization process. And if so, what is so special about Denmark and what can be learned from its transformation? Policies range from well-publicized successes, such as the country’s ability to nearly rid itself from coal in its power mix in less than thirty years by increasingly developing its wind power potential, in leading the offshore wind segment and championing repowering, but also its lesser-known achievements, such as the diffusion of combined heat and power (CHP) and district heating across the country. Another success point of the country’s strategy relies in promoting energy efficiency in the industrial sector as well as its use of energy taxation for enhanced decarbonization, even in challenging sectors such as transportation. Questions remain open, especially concerning the sustainability credentials of biomass, a fuel which is a key component of the country’s energy mix, but also the future role of natural gas, which has an important balancing role in power generation, given the country decision to rid itself of oil and gas (O&G) production by the middle of the century. To a large extent, the Danish success story so far can be linked to a combination of socio-political factors including: a high level of stability and predictability in energy policy stemming from Denmark’s long historical tradition of broad energy agreements, a cross-sectoral and holistic approach to developing the nation’s energy policy involving a high level of participation from various public and private actors, a willingness to back innovative technologies, combined with generous public policy schemes in order to bring them to market-level competitiveness. Next frontiers will consist of large-scale carbon capture and sequestration projects, as well as low carbon energy islands. However, it would be somewhat reductive to simply equate Denmark’s success story to these previously mentioned factors. Indeed, the Scandinavian nation also benefits from certain geographical dispositions which are great assets for its path to decarbonization. For one, the country is ideally placed to develop variable renewable energy sources, most notably wind power given its topography and its strong wind resources. On top of this, Denmark also benefits from an incredibly reliable and interconnected power grid thereby making renewable energy integration into the wide energy system all the easier. In addition, the fact that its power grid is one of the most interconnected in Europe entails that excess renewable energy production can quickly be exported when the wind blows, just as imports can hastily be called upon when wind is found to be lacking. Finally, from a more socio-political perspective, the relatively flat social structure of Danish society as well as the country’s high level of institutional trust, makes policymaking and policy implementation simpler as well as more effective than in other European states. As such, although this paper identifies important lessons to be learnt from Denmark’s decarbonization strategies, the context as well as the particular characteristics of the country in which these were implemented should nevertheless be considered when seeking to establish similarly successful carbon reduction policies. In any case, Denmark is still far from coming close to achieving its objectives and will have to accelerate its decarbonization on all fronts: the country’s current total primary energy supply still relies for 60% on fossil fuels.
Topic:
Climate Change, Energy Policy, Decarbonization, and Green Deal
Political Geography:
Europe and Denmark

32. Complementarity or Competition? Franco-British Cooperation and the European Horizon of French Defense Policy

Author:
Alice Pannier
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
What does future hold for the Franco-British defense partnership after Brexit? France and the United Kingdom have, for long, enjoyed a close defense relationship, thanks in part to their analogous strategic cultures. The 2010 Lancaster House treaties built on this proximity to expand cooperation in the fields of nuclear weapons, force projection, interoperability and industrial integration. In spite of genuine progress in the first years following the treaties, the Franco-British strategic partnership has had to face two pitfalls: on the one hand, Brexit and its political consequences for the United Kingdom, and, on the other hand, President Macron’s attempt to revive European defense and Franco-German cooperation. The tenth anniversary of Lancaster House should offer the opportunity to rethink the convergence between bilateral cooperation and the resolutely European horizon of French defense policy.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Bilateral Relations, European Union, and Cooperation
Political Geography:
United Kingdom, Europe, France, and Germany

33. Mavi Vatan, the "Blue Homeland": the Origins, Influences and Limits of an Ambitious Doctrine for Turkey

Author:
Aurélien Denizeau
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
Turkey’s activism in the Eastern Mediterranean now appears to be guided by an ambitious legal and geopolitical doctrine, based on the claim of a vast maritime domain – the “Blue Homeland” or Mavi Vatan in Turkish. Developed by admirals of Turkey’s Navy, who are aware of the strategic importance of the sea, this approach is influential among Turkey's military, political, economic, and intellectual elites. Although it presents certain contradictions with the traditional vision of the Islamo-conservatives, Mavi Vatan has been adopted by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, offering him the opportunity to consolidate his alliance with nationalist movements and to provide a legal framework for his action in Libya. However, the success of this doctrine also depends on Turkey's ability to modernize its naval forces, an effort that will require the maintenance of strong international partnerships.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Nationalism, Navy, Grand Strategy, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, and Military
Political Geography:
Turkey and Mediterranean

34. Russia and Turkey. Strategic Partners and Rivals

Author:
Pavel K. Baev
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
The extraordinarily troublesome year 2020 tested many international institutions and bilateral ties, but few experienced sharper challenges than the complex relations between Russia and Turkey, which have a strong impact on crisis developments in Europe’s immediate neighborhood. Moscow can be content that Ankara is now perceived in Paris, Berlin and Washington DC as a major troublemaker, but it finds itself rather too often on the receiving end of Turkish attempts at projecting power. It was the unreserved and forceful support granted by Turkey to Azerbaijan in the war against Armenia in autumn 2020 that forced many Russian analysts to re-evaluate the status and prospects of relations with this important and difficult neighbor. There is a degree of compatibility between the autocratic political systems maturing in Russia and Turkey, but the latter state is a NATO member, while the former perceives the Atlantic Alliance as the inexorable adversary. Many drivers shaping Russian-Turkish relations, from deepening domestic discontent with corrupt authoritarian rule to the shifts in the European energy market, are outside the control of their ambitious autocrats. This analysis will focus on the most recent and ongoing shifts in the character of this relationship. Evaluation of the key dimensions of bilateral interactions, from historical and economic to personal, is followed by an investigation of the dynamics of interplay in four key intersections: the Syrian warzone, the Black Sea area, the Libyan conflict, and the Caucasus, shaken by the new spasm of war around Nagorno Karabakh.
Topic:
Bilateral Relations, Partnerships, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Vladimir Putin, and Rivalry
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, Turkey, and Middle East

35. Great Britain and Africa: Boris Johnson's Strategic Reversals

Author:
François Gaulme
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
In 2020-2021, Prime Minister Boris Johnson undertook to fundamentally change the operational mode and strategy of relations between the United Kingdom and the African continent bequeathed by his predecessors since 1997. Great Britain and Africa : Boris Johnson's Strategic Reversals He first put an end to the autonomy and power of the great Department for International Development (DfID), by merging it with the Foreign Office. Deciding to make the granting of aid political, he also reduced its amount on the grounds of the recession hitting the country but against British legislation itself. His strategy for external deployment, adopted in March 2021 and based primarily on an “Indo-Pacific tilt”, has marginalised the relationship with Africa to which Theresa May had wanted to give new impetus in the perspective of the Brexit in 2018. While taking up her concept of “Global Britain”, her successor now seems to want to limit ties with Africa to business relations, highly impacted by the coronavirus pandemic, as well as minimal participation in security efforts on the continent. This note analyses such reversals in a historical perspective of the end of a relational cycle. It concludes that Boris Johnson’s very personal policy towards Africa is too reductive not to be amended. In particular on aid and fundamental rights, it neglects the complexity of British positions towards this continent. By reaffirming the strength of the strategic relationship with the United States, it will also have to adapt to the new African policy of the Biden administration.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Development, Foreign Aid, and Boris Johnson
Political Geography:
Britain, Africa, and Europe

36. Commercial Space in Europe: A Balancing Act between Physics, Politics and Profession

Author:
KP Ludwig
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
Satellite constellations have become core elements of the digital transition. Over the next decade, several thousand satellites will have to be launched, to build these constellations. For positioning satellites, preferably in Low Earth Orbit (LEO), reliable and affordable launch services are essential. At the end of 2020, the European Space Agency (ESA) awarded three German space start-ups competing contracts in order to support its small-launch system. One may identify a change in Germany’s space policy, since the ESA Ministerial Council (MC) in Seville in late 2019. Besides supporting programs in its traditional fields of interest, Germany showed a special interest in supporting the Commercial Space Transportation Service acceleration program for the above-mentioned German space start-ups. This report is focused on a technical analysis of the market demands and the special commercial market conditions in LEO. It describes the competitive situation and, especially, the limiting conditions, which may hinder private investors from continuing to support a sound technical solution. These are: the size of the accessible market share, the natural risks of operating complex systems in a hostile environment, and the regulatory hurdles in acquiring formal approval by the authorities. A major factor for the expected business success is and will be the governmental support that the consortia can acquire.
Topic:
Space, Digitization, Satellite, and Airspace
Political Geography:
Germany and European Union

37. Can the Biggest Emitters Set Up a Climate Club? A Review of International Carbon Pricing Debates

Author:
Carole Mathieu
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
The world’s largest emitting countries are reconsidering the role of carbon pricing instruments and increasingly looking at carbon border adjustment mechanisms (CBAMs) to address leakage concerns. This renewed momentum should trigger a broader discussion on how to make trade policies compatible with the climate agenda. With the Glasgow climate conference (COP26) approaching, the concept of putting a price on carbon is generating unprecedented interest in Canada and the United States (US), China and Japan. But the European Union (EU) still stands as an exception; it is the only regional trading bloc that is determined to leverage the full potential of its emissions trading system (ETS). To date, others have lacked the political backing to deploy nation-wide carbon pricing initiatives with a design sturdy enough to drive meaningful emission reductions. Canada has made significant progress with the adoption of a national framework for carbon pricing in 2018. The country’s draft regulations foresee the introduction of a federal ETS as of 2022 and a gradual increase in carbon prices, but its ambitions risk being upset by the lack of consistent efforts in the US, its largest trading partner. Given US political divides, a federal carbon pricing scheme is unlikely to materialize in the short run. In China, the long-delayed national ETS has finally been launched. However, its scope is restricted to the power sector for now, and it is likely to only have a modest impact on coal use with its current design. Several arguments may discourage China from fully extending its ETS as planned and rather argue in favor of introducing a complementary carbon tax. Japan has also engaged an expert debate on the benefits of introducing carbon pricing at the national level, but the government is struggling to find a balance between the risk of worsening competitiveness and the need to mobilize investment in clean technologies. For the EU, the upcoming reform of the EU ETS is an opportunity to introduce a truly demanding cap reduction for the 2023-2030 period and make this flagship instrument more robust, predictable, and fair. To initiate in-depth decarbonization of its industry, the EU will need to phase out free allowances. Therefore, other measures addressing unfair competition will have to be introduced and CBAM could be part of the solution. A unilateral application is however no panacea. The EU should move cautiously and start implementing the CBAM to a small set of sectors. This also means that the challenge of leveling the playing field with non-EU producers will remain largely unresolved. There is little chance that an international alliance on carbon pricing or “climate club” can be set up within a timeframe compatible with the climate emergency. Yet, the EU’s CBAM proposal can encourage trading partners to accelerate decision-making on carbon pricing, at least to obtain partial exemption. In addition, having a concrete anti-leakage proposal on the table leads to a sense of the inevitable mismatches between the global trade and climate agendas. Large emitters are starting to acknowledge the need for a multilateral discussion on how to decarbonize industries while maintaining a level playing field. The next step should be to kickstart an open discussion in all possible multilateral fora (G20, International Energy Agency, global industry associations, etc.) and mandate the World Trade Organization (WTO) to develop guidance on a wide range of instruments (including CBAM, but also eco-design labelling and standards, differentiated tariffs based on CO2 intensity, etc.) and including a common exemption approach for Least Developed Countries. Exploring a set of workable solutions should be more attractive to trade partners than pushing for a uniform solution, but results would still take time to materialize. Hence, establishing a level playing field with imports will likely require the EU – and all countries with an aggressive decarbonization agenda for their industries – to strengthen their financial and regulatory support to the deployment of innovative low-carbon manufacturing processes. Again, this almost-unavoidable resort to State aid would strongly benefit from a multilateral discussion.
Topic:
Climate Change, International Trade and Finance, European Union, Carbon Tax, and Carbon Emissions
Political Geography:
Japan, China, Europe, and Canada

38. Health Data Governance: Lessons Learned from the COVID-19 Pandemic in Europe, China, and the United States

Author:
Clément Tonon and Julie Martinez
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
The health crisis has triggered a tectonic movement in the recomposition of health data governance and protection models around the world, while accelerating the investment of large digital companies in the field of e-health. The COVID-19 pandemic has revealed the shortcomings of pre-existing governance models in every region of the world and the need to move towards a model of public health crisis management "through health data". For Europe and for France in particular, the health crisis has revealed a long "technological innocence". Despite a strategic awakening, questions remain about the ability of Europeans to cooperate effectively and move towards a common digital space in health. In the United States, the pandemic has created tensions around the health data governance model – particularly on the articulation between the federal government and state authorities. Changes are announced by President Joe Biden, which tend towards a model of global regulation of personal data. In China, the pandemic has accelerated the transition to a model of surveillance capitalism which could lead in the short term to a new power struggle between the regime and the Chinese digital giants. Finally, the COVID-19 crisis has accelerated the rise of digital companies, which are now positioning themselves on the entire value chain of health data, from its raw collection via connected objects to its mass processing for insurance purposes. They now have all the levers in hand to economically value this massive data with the help of artificial intelligence.
Topic:
Health, Governance, Geopolitics, Data, COVID-19, and Digital Policy
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and United States of America

39. Geopolitics of the World’s Forests: Strategies for Tackling Deforestation

Author:
Alain Karsenty
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
Deforestation continues at a worrying pace worldwide, except in temperate and boreal countries. It is caused by the race for land, underpinned by population growth and rising global demand for “deforestation-prone” products. Moreover, with climate change, mega-fires are now posing unprecedented threats to forests. China has a major influence on the evolution of the world’s forests through its trade and investment in infrastructures for the Belt and Road Initiative. The country has stopped the exploitation of its natural forests, but it is using imports to meet its huge timber needs, while its demand for agricultural products carrying risks of deforestation is also growing, such as soybeans and palm oil. In Africa and Southeast Asia, large European forestry firms are in retreat, given the expansion of Asian firms (from Malaysia, China, and Vietnam), and agribusiness firms are gaining influence everywhere. Major reforestation operations are, at best, of limited effectiveness when they are not accompanied by the recognition of land rights, and when they lead to monoculture plantations with fast-growing tree species. By contrast, independent certifications appear to be essential tools for forest management and ensuring zero-deforestation production. Finally, the United Nations’ REDD+ mechanism pays countries that reduce emissions from deforestation and forest degradation, or that increase their carbon stocks through plantations. Yet, REDD+ is criticized because it relies on reference scenarios: the anticipated emissions paths presented by the countries themselves. Moreover, it always faces the problem of the “non-permanence” of carbon storage in forests or plantations that may burn or simply die. At the same time, companies’ growing concerns to offset some of their emissions has generated strong demand for carbon credits from forest projects. Hundreds of “REDD+ projects” have emerged, relying on specific certifications to support the issuance of carbon credits in “voluntary markets.” This entails risks of double-counting emission reductions at the national level. Moreover, the uncertain additionality and the risks of “leakage” (shifting deforestation pressures elsewhere) cast doubt on the environmental integrity of these private initiatives. Finally, the success of “REDD+ projects” remains conditional on taking into account the problems of land security of rural inhabitants, a key factor in reforestation, and in their access to land. While institutionalized consensuses continue to pile up, there is in fact an urgent need to reconsider existing instruments, taking into account systemic and political economy questions which are too often ignored. The 15th meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity (COP15) is scheduled to take place in China in October 2021, and needs to participate in the necessary leap forward on global forest governance: The principle of “results-based payment” (RBP) should be complemented by broad support for the investments needed to “produce” these results. It should only retain the coherence of public policies that have real potential impacts on forests as an essential criterion for assessing results. The demand for products linked to deforestation must be strictly controlled. Governments should review trade agreements with countries that encourage land-forest conversion and include measures to tackle deforestation that are legally binding. Imports of products involved in illegal deforestation must be banned, and tariffs must favor products certified as involving zero deforestation. Developing countries should be helped to implement incentive-based environmental taxation to support agricultural production based on zero-deforestation and sustainable forests. Fiscally neutral bonus-malus systems could favor traced and certified production and penalize production whose origin is uncertain and presumably unsustainable. A common agenda for food security, tackling deforestation and restoring degraded natural ecosystems needs to be built with developing countries. Ecological intensification through peasant-farmer agroecology, crop-livestock associations and agroforestry should become priorities. Necessary investments could be channeled through programs of payments for ecosystem services (PES). Finally, the forest concession regimes must evolve to include the recognition of overlapping rights, the commercial management of new resources and the sharing of profits.
Topic:
Climate Change, Governance, Carbon Emissions, Forest, and Deforestation
Political Geography:
Global Focus

40. Strategic Calculation: High-Performance Computing and Quantum Computing in Europe’s Quest for Technological Power

Author:
Alice Pannier
Publication Date:
10-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
Computing power plays a key role in enabling machine learning, for scientific research, and in the military domain. Therefore, the race for computing power has become a key element of the US-China technological competition, and it is also a strategic priority for Europe. This study focuses on two complementary segments of computing: high-performance computing (HPC, also known as “supercomputing”), and quantum computing. HPC has for several decades been used in scientific research, meteorology, and the military. While states continue to drive the needs for massive computers, the field is also witnessing a diversification of uses in industry. Meanwhile, quantum computing is still at an experimental stage but has highly disruptive potential, as it promises to multiply computing power exponentially. As such, it has become a focal point for government, industry, and investors around the globe. In the global race, European countries are seeking to pool resources by encouraging the development of federated computing services, data infrastructures, and a local industry. Of course, Europe faces multiple challenges (the design and production of processors, energy consumption constraints, and scarce private investment) and risks (such as export restrictions and company takeovers). Yet, today, quantum computing does offer an opportunity to learn lessons from past developments in the field of classical computing, and to take the right actions early on, to reap the societal, economic and security benefits of this technology.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Artificial Intelligence, Data, Quantum Computers, Digital Sovereignty, and Supercomputers
Political Geography:
Europe

41. The French Military's Perception of the Turkish Military and Turkey's Expansion in the Eastern Mediterranean

Author:
Aris Marghelis
Publication Date:
11-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
In the summer of 2020, the Central and Eastern Mediterranean became the center of unusual tensions between France and Turkey. Given that these tensions were also military, which is uncommon for the two countries, the perception that the French military has of Turkey’s army and its doctrine is particularly relevant to address. From the interviews that were conducted with French officers, it appears that for the French military, 2016 and 2020 are two milestones in the evolution of both Turkish political and military Turkish attitudes. From 2016 onwards, the Syrian and Libyan conflicts uncovered diverging interests between France and Turkey, with military implications for France. In the same year, Turkish military behavior in the Eastern Mediterranean started shifting, but was at first seen as of little consequence. Additionally, the failed coup attempt against President R. T. Erdogan decreased the level and quality of communication and cooperation between both militaries. In 2020, Turkish aggressiveness openly manifested itself in the Eastern Mediterranean, including directly against France with the Courbet incident. This attitude was criticized by the interviewees who specified that such behavior, along with unilateral actions and faits accomplis, would not be tolerated in the future. Yet, it also appears that the French military show respect for the Turkish armed forces. The latter are generally accredited with professionalism, reliability, efficiency, and determination. The interviews revealed no sign of animosity by the French officers towards their Turkish counterparts: sometimes, even the opposite was detected.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Conflict, Army, and Military
Political Geography:
Europe, Turkey, France, and Mediterranean

42. Turkish Airlines: An International Strategic Instrument for Turkey

Author:
Julien Lebel
Publication Date:
04-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
Turkey has undergone significant transformations since the Justice and Development Party (AKP) came to power in 2002, as illustrated by the notable growth of its airline industry. Turkish Airlines (THY) is the main company based in the country, and has dramatically extended its network of destinations in the past 15 years. It benefits from the support of the national authorities, who consider the carrier as a strategic instrument in consolidating Turkey’s influence internationally and in building solid cooperation with foreignStates in different fields. Meanwhile, the opening of a new airport in Istanbul at the end of 2018 emphasises the ambition displayed by the government to make the country a major global hub, competing with airport hubs in Western Europe, and especially in certain Gulf States.
Topic:
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Airline Companies, Political Parties, and AKP
Political Geography:
Turkey, Middle East, and Mediterranean

43. Perspectives on a Hydrogen Strategy for the European Union

Author:
Cédric Philibert
Publication Date:
04-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
There is now a wide understanding that larger use of clean hydrogen in future can be an important mean to achieve decarbonisation of the European economy. A robust, cost-effective European hydrogen strategy could become a pillar of an EU economic recovery plan which should, in line with the Green Deal, accelerate the decarbonization of European economies. The challenge for the upcoming EU strategy is to identify the most important future uses of cost-effective clean hydrogen, ensure sound scale-up through efficient public support schemes and system approaches driving significant cost reductions. Opportunities to maximise the economic benefits for the European economy in terms of jobs, value creation and competitiveness will also matter. And, of course, effective decarbonisation. The European hydrogen industry is now largely ripe for a progressive scale up that needs to be planned for the coming 20 years. While clean hydrogen will be indispensable, it comes with technical and economic challenges. There is an undisputed potential for decrease, but costs and availability of energy inputs, as well as transport and distribution systems, and an enabling policy environment, matter as much or more than simple scale-up. The EU will have to take stock of strategies developed by other countries. Japan and South Korea have robust industrial strategies that push carbon intensive hydrogen in the automotive, residential and power sectors with strong public support. Decarbonization is not always the primary objective. The current demand for hydrogen in fuel refineries and to produce ammonia and methanol for agriculture, mining and industry purposes figures at the top of the possible demand for clean hydrogen. Moreover, steel making in the industrial sub-sector is most likely to create considerable demand for clean hydrogen in complement to scrap recycling. In the transport sector, clean hydrogen could be primarily used for long-haul trucking and coaches. European products exist and deployment is already underway. Long-haul trucks and coaches may demand significant amounts of clean hydrogen, with some complements from other terrestrial transport means although the European carmakers prioritise battery electric cars and light duty vehicles. For hydrogen fuel cell vehicles and supporting infrastructures the challenge is of cost reduction through upscaling and mass production. Deep sea shipping is a sub-sector in which ammonia as a fuel is most likely to generate considerable additional demand for hydrogen. Aviation is a sub-sector that may call for large amounts of clean hydrogen in various forms unless offsetting emissions with verifiable carbon storage is available at scale and more competitive. Clean hydrogen may be used to achieve full decarbonisation of the power sector as an inter-seasonal option, via sector coupling with the gas infrastructure – but this will probably not be needed before 2035. Clean hydrogen can mainly be produced from electrolysis of water with low carbon electricity generation, from natural gas steam reforming with carbon capture and storage, and from natural gas pyrolysis. The clean hydrogen production comes with costs/challenges: hence why future demand must be carefully identified and prioritised. A sound hydrogen strategy for the EU should initially: Assess all available reference studies and international developments in terms of system benefits and costs, certainties and uncertainties, primary and secondary priorities, timelines as well as strengths and weaknesses of the European industry; Deploy progressively and cost-efficiently clean hydrogen for the applications where it has a potential proven advantage over competing solutions for decarbonisation to evaluate merit in terms of EUR/CO2 of each application under different assumptions; Support hydrogen clusters at city or territorial/ regional levels were production, demand and distribution can be effectively organized into systems that allow scale up, job creations, cost reductions and decarbonisation; Organize the scale up of demand and competition over supplies via regulation, IPCEIs in providing clarity over future needs/timelines; Develop roadmaps and demonstration projects for clean hydrogen-based solutions where the possibility of hydrogen proving a superior solution for decarbonisation is high enough; Protect EU hydrogen industry stakeholders at all levels and seizes from external takeovers; Ensure a level playing field for clean-hydrogen and hydrogen-rich fuels and feedstocks both within the EU and externally when there is a global market and competition, via regulatory tools and/or via a carbon border adjustment mechanism.
Topic:
Climate Change, European Union, Decarbonization, Hydrogen, Green Deal, and Energy
Political Geography:
Europe

44. Migrant and Refugee Participation: Approaches to Rethinking Integration Policies

Author:
Sophie Bilong
Publication Date:
05-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
In France, people participating in policies and programs that affect them is not a new concept. It has been widely studied in the field of social work and the fight against poverty, and is at the heart of many experiments. How can this concept of participation, as is outlined for people experiencing poverty, be applied to refugees and migrants? Does the participation of refugees and migrants present specific characteristics? The aim of this study is to take stock of the issue of refugee and migrant participation, which is often discussed, but has not been systematically studied in France. Employees, professionals, volunteers, activists, beneficiaries of programs who are also involved in running them, organization leaders, representatives of local authorities and institutions, and founders of non-profit organizations with experience of migration were interviewed. They described the experiences of refugee and migrant participation at work within their organizations, the motivation of the people who implemented them and the difficulties encountered. While many organizations (nonprofit organizations, groups of volunteers, local authorities) are convinced that refugee and migrant participation is key to the success of reception and integration programs and public policies, so far, few initiatives have been developed with them based on their expertise. Programs offered to new arrivals in France are often developed in advance by people who have no experience of migration without involving migrants and refugees. The participation of migrants and refugees indeed faces many obstacles and limits. This study also proposes to identify methodological elements in the form of advice for those working on the field. These will help identify ways of overcoming the difficulties encountered in the implementation of participation mechanisms, or, perhaps, provide useful ideas for initiating action-taking capacity development processes for individuals in need of support. Finally, this study identifies measures that aim to support and consolidate initiatives promoting migrant and refugee participation, that encourage new structures to experiment with them, and that enable public authorities to become more involved in the issue and eventually enshrine the necessity and relevance of participation in the law making process.
Topic:
Migration, Refugees, and Integration
Political Geography:
Europe

45. One Year of Zelensky’s Presidency: One Step Forward, One Step Back

Author:
Leonid Litra and Alyona Getmanchuk
Publication Date:
10-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
The election of Volodymyr Zelensky as president of Ukraine created very high expectations in the society. He built his campaign narrative around three central messages: peace in Donbas, the curtailment of corruption and the end of poverty. The hope that he could deliver on his promises was strengthened with the victory of his party (Servant of the People) in the snap parliamentary elections in summer 2019. It is the first time in the history of independent Ukraine that a single party has a majority in parliament. Therefore, President Zelensky enjoys unprecedented conditions, and, while he still has four years in office, the one-year anniversary is the right moment to make the first assessment.
Topic:
Elections, Domestic Politics, and Volodymyr Zelensky
Political Geography:
Europe and Ukraine

46. The Renovation Wave: A Make or Break for the European Green Deal

Author:
Thibaud Voïta
Publication Date:
10-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
European buildings are old and too often inefficient, past policies have not delivered and the amount of investment into energy efficiency must be scaled up dramatically to meet the 2030 targets and ultimately, the carbon neutrality objective. Building renovations are too slow and insufficient. The European Union (EU) and its Member States (MS) need to critically accelerate its efforts, for instance by multiplying by up to 4 the number of deep building renovations every year. Why is the renovation market so difficult to kick-start? The sector is extremely complex, with number of different buildings, regulations and actors, at all levels, from the European to the local one. This means that coordination of the different stakeholders is a major challenge. In addition, building renovation policies may be slowed down by some of the traditional European weaknesses: lengthy processes, different interests of lobbying groups, weak implementation of the regulations, a lack of knowledge or trust from the tenant or home-owners, financing and technology issues, etc. There are reasons to be cautiously optimistic though. Regulations have accelerated energy efficiency investments in buildings over the past decade, despite the 2008 crisis, and altogether, household energy efficiency has improved of approximately 30% since 2000. Some innovative and promising policies are being implemented in many countries. The call of Ursula von der Leyen to establish a European Bauhaus points to new creative and efficient ways to promote building renovation across the continent. The construction sector needs clear signals on the future of the building renovation market in order to adapt its training strategies with less emphasis on new building and more on renovation. Lastly, the Renovation Wave cannot succeed without a sustained effort to ramp up skills and the number of qualified jobs in this sector, with state-of-the art technologies becoming a standard all across the EU, alongside the use of low carbon and ideally, sustainable renovation materials.
Topic:
Climate Change, European Union, Green Deal, and Energy Efficiency
Political Geography:
Europe

47. Technology Strategies in China and the United States, and the Challenges for European Companies

Author:
Laurence Nardon
Publication Date:
10-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
As international relations are increasingly reorganized around the US-China rivalry, the tensions between these two great powers are shaping a growing number of sectors, and the exchange of sensitive technologies in particular. This is a critical issue for European companies today. Indeed, European companies, as manufacturers, importers and exporters, risk finding themselves at the heart of the deepening technological competition opposing the United States and China (Éric-André Martin). The United States has a long history of using multiple regulatory instruments in managing the export of dual-use technologies, in particular towards China. Even beyond the Trump administration’s aggressive positions, these regulations are expanding and increasingly strict, hinting at a potential protectionist technological warfare (Pierre Girard). Despite China’s progress in innovation (5G, artificial intelligence, Internet of Things), and an expansion of measures meant to protect intellectual property rights both for domestic and foreign firms, Beijing’s predatory industrial practices and the weight of the Chinese Communist Party on the economy and society clearly live on (John Seaman). French and European companies are thus hindered both by the prohibition of re-exporting American technologies and products enacted by Washington and by Beijing’s predatory practices. How much leeway do European companies have? What role should the European Union (EU) play in the face of such challenges? Since 2016, new propositions to reform the EU export-control regime regulating dual-use items are being intensely debated (Sofia Bournou). The three chapters of this report examine the norms currently in place in the United States, China, and Europe, and delve more deeply into specific case studies: the battle between the Trump administration and Huawei (Marion Welles), the problems facing European companies in China (Laurence Nardon and Mathilde Velliet), and the case of the communications satellites (Jean-François Bureau). The conclusion of this report draws up a list – of great interest for decision-makers – of the infrastructures and technologies that will be critical for European strategic autonomy in the years to come (André Loesekrug-Pietri).
Topic:
Science and Technology, European Union, Internet, and 5G
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Asia, and United States of America

48. Prospects of a Hydrogen Economy with Chinese Characteristics

Author:
Kevin Tu
Publication Date:
10-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
This study assesses the prospects of a hydrogen economy with Chinese characteristics. Against the backdrop of an escalating US-China trade war and the ongoing novel coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic, key Chinese stakeholders become increasingly interested in moving the hydrogen economy agenda forward. During the first six months of 2020 alone, 37 policies in support of the hydrogen economy have been published by various level governments, including 7 by central government authorities, and 30 by local governments. Shandong alone issued 6 hydrogen supporting policies, followed with 5 by Guangdong. In sum, hydrogen economy development not only gains traction in China, but also is in great danger of overheating. The ambition in China is to expand hydrogen production and create new end-uses: in the transport segment (e.g. 1 million fuel cell electric vehicles – FCEVs – and 1,000 hydrogen refueling stations by 2030), but possibly also, in other hard-to-abate sectors such as steel and cement manufacturing or in the electricity storage segment (Power to X). Hydrogen production from low carbon electricity could bring many benefits, notably to address curtailments of renewable electricity from wind, solar and hydro. It could also be blended into the nation-wide gas grid especially for low-concentration hydrogen (e.g. 5-10%). Until recently, China’s interest in developing the hydrogen economy has not been primarily triggered by the decarbonization objective. Nevertheless, on September 22, 2020, Chinese president Xi Jinping announced that China aims to peak national carbon emissions before 2030 and achieve carbon neutrality before 2060. Given the significant amount of carbon emissions reduction implied by the above announcement, hydrogen is now expected to play a much more important role to drastically decrease the country’s greenhouse gas emissions (GHG) over time. China’s very large hydrogen production from fossil fuels, mainly coal, would make it quite challenging to consider decarbonizing the current uses of hydrogen. What decisively drives the current interest into hydrogen is innovation and technological leadership on the one hand, which China can achieve through industrial clusters and economies of scale, and energy security on the other: reducing dependence on imported oil and gas, with rising importance of air pollution control- and decarbonization-related considerations. It remains to be seen whether China can avoid the shortcomings of its electric vehicles (EV) supporting policies as it aims to boost a hydrogen economy with Chinese characteristics. A simplified SWOT analysis presented in the report identifies the most important strength, weakness, opportunity and threat for hydrogen economy development in China: Strength - ability to significantly bring down unit manufacturing cost through industrial network clustering and economy of scale. Weakness – lag far behind advanced economies in key hydrogen-related technologies. Opportunity – enthusiasm on hydrogen economy by local governments against the backdrop of the COVID-19 pandemic. Threat - looming danger of global supply chain decoupling caused by an escalating US-China trade war. In order to move the hydrogen economy agenda forward, a preliminary “to do list” for Chinese decision-makers in this field would include: A coordinated national mechanism should be established at the central government level to lay out principles for moving the hydrogen economy agenda forward in China. Comprehensive and transparent statistical reporting and accounting throughout the Chinese hydrogen value chain should be established. In the hydrogen production segment, renewable hydrogen should be prioritized for intensive Research and Development (R&D) and deployment in the near future, and greening China's existing hydrogen flow should be on the Chinese government's policy radar especially in the longer term. In the hydrogen storage and transport segment, national and local government should continuously direct subsidies towards hydrogen refueling stations, and also consider to encourage low concentration blending of hydrogen into China’s natural gas network. In the hydrogen consumption segment, China should selectively focus on R&D and deployment of advanced hydrogen end-use technologies notably for cement and steel, ideally coupled with expansion of the horizon of national energy planning framework. Opening up the Chinese market to better integrate technology innovations in advanced economies and manufacturing-related competitive advantages of the Chinese economy, aiming to create a win-win situation between China and the international community.
Topic:
Climate Change, Economy, Decarbonization, and Hydrogen
Political Geography:
China and Asia

49. Israel-Africa Relations: What Can We Learn from the Netanyahu Decade?

Author:
Benjamin Augé
Publication Date:
11-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
Since he came to power in 2009, Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has not made Israeli-African relations a priority in his foreign policy. After they broke off diplomatic relations with Israel following the Yom Kippur War in 1973, most African states – besides Malawi, South Africa (apart from between 1975 and 1979), Swaziland and Lesotho – finally resumed relations with the Jewish state during the 1980s and 1990s and more recently for some others. The resumption of diplomatic ties was gradual, as peace efforts were initiated regarding Palestine. Israel now enjoys diplomatic relations with more than 40 sub-Saharan African states, but only has 12 embassies throughout the entire continent, including in Cairo. The last ones to be opened were in Kigali (Rwanda) in 2019 and Accra (Ghana) in 2011. The Israeli government today views Africa either as a longstanding sphere of influence (Ethiopia, Eritrea, Cameroon, Ghana, Côte d’Ivoire, Uganda and for the last two decades Rwanda) that needs to be strengthened, or as a new sphere of influence to be developed (the Sahel countries, central Africa, etc.) These relations operate through various conventional channels, including some that have been significantly weakened by Benjamin Netanyahu when he was Israeli prime minister between 1996 and 1999 and since 2009. This is particularly true for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and its counterpart, Mashav, responsible for development cooperation. However, the security and intelligence sectors (Mossad), controlled by the Prime Minister’s Office, are strong drivers of Israeli foreign policy, hence Benjamin Netanyahu’s dominance over foreign affairs in general, and Africa in particular. The objective of this paper is to explain how political, economic and security relationships between Africa and Israel have developed in practice during the decade 2009-2020. The aim here is to go beyond a mere account of the history of these relationships. Since 2009, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu – still in power at the time of writing – has frequently talked about his country’s return to the African stage, without necessarily providing his government with the financial resources to achieve this.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, International Affairs, and Benjamin Netanyahu
Political Geography:
Africa, Middle East, and Israel

50. Israeli Cyberpower: The Unfinished Development of the Start-up Nation?

Author:
Thierry Noël
Publication Date:
11-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
Israel’s economic success in the cyber sector is undeniable. It is due to the development of an ecosystem encouraging the mastery of digital innovation. It is supported by proactive digital diplomacy and underpinned by unmatched military cybercapabilities in the region. However, its rapid growth exposes structural weaknesses from an economic point of view and raises questions about the role that Israeli democracy seeks to play on the world stage.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Cybersecurity, Innovation, and Digital Policy
Political Geography:
Middle East and Israel

51. GovTech, The New Frontier in Digital Sovereignty

Author:
Clément Tonon
Publication Date:
11-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
The COVID-19 crisis has been a catalyst for a surge in the GovTech market, while triggering debate around the use of new technologies in the public health response to the pandemic. More broadly, the health crisis has shed a new light on the strategic importance of some domains relevant to GovTech such as HealthTech, smart cities and EdTech. The French State has developed a comprehensive policy of government digitization but still suffers from a lack of investment in the GovTech sector: so far, it has been unable to nurture a GovTech ecosystem comparable to the French defense technological and industrial base. At the European level, the rise of GovTech solutions could deepen existing divides between member states, as shown by the uncoordinated development of tracing apps by European countries during the crisis. In the long run, the lack of European industrial and political strategy focusing on GovTech could turn Europe into a battleground for Chinese and American actors, which benefit from governmental support at home and abroad. The rise of GovTech companies challenges deeply rooted ideas on the meaning of the public sector and the role of the State. It underlines how technology can affect the values and core principles of democratic societies. In that sense, the growing technological competition between the US, China and Europe means much more than economic rivalry: it is a real threat to European democracy and strategic autonomy.
Topic:
Government, Science and Technology, Sovereignty, COVID-19, Digital Policy, and Health Crisis
Political Geography:
China, United Kingdom, France, Estonia, Singapore, and United States of America

52. Current and Future Trends in Chinese Counterspace Capabilities

Author:
Brian Weeden
Publication Date:
11-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
China is in the midst of a long-term effort to develop a world-class space program with a strong military and national security component. Since 2015, Chinese official and unofficial writings have increasingly emphasized the importance of space warfare, including for offensive and coercive uses. In parallel, China has engaged in a significant and dedicated effort to develop a wide array of destructive and non-destructive offensive counterspace capabilities since the early 2000s, some of which are – or soon will become – operational. This study explores the multiple areas of Chinese counterspace capability developments, from co-orbital rendezvous operations to direct ascent antisatellite interceptors and electronic and cyber warfare. It summarizes what is known about current programs, offers estimates regarding the unique characteristics of each capability area and how advanced Chinese capabilities are in each field. While China’s search for a large array of counterspace capabilities is not unique, it could both directly and indirectly affect U.S. and European strategic interests and thus has vast implications for transatlantic security.
Topic:
National Security, Space, Satellite, and Military
Political Geography:
China and Asia

53. Towards a More Principled European China Policy?

Author:
Stephan Frühling
Publication Date:
11-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
Promoting political values (democracy, human rights and the rule of law) in China is a colossal undertaking, but the EU could be more effective than we think. To do so, it must act strategically, in unity, and in concert with like-minded partners. It must also strengthen its record of upholding political values and reform its procedures for foreign policy decision-making. On 30 June 2020, China adopted a National Security Law for the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region that not only undermines human rights and the rule of law that were promised to its citizens, but also violates international law. A few weeks before, when China’s intention became public, the European Union reacted cautiously, expressing concern but clarifying that the introduction of the law would not adversely affect its relations with China. The EU’s first reaction fell far short of statements released by the United States, the United Kingdom and Australia, among others. But the EU’s reaction grew more critical over time. The first EU institution to adopt a tougher approach was the European Parliament. Shortly after, the European Commission and – to a lesser extent – the European Council followed with statements by its presidents after the EU-China summit held on 22 June 2020. This episode could turn out to be exemplary for the role of political values in the European Union’s relations with China. China and Europe have fundamentally divergent political values, even though they often use the same terminology. For a long time, many Europeans believed that China’s definition of democracy, human rights and the rule of law –, the three constitutive values enshrined in the Treaty of the European Union – would ultimately converge with the European understanding. This has not turned out to be the case. China is growing more self-confident, not only defending but starting to spread its own definitions of the triad of political values. This comes at a time when the EU is realigning its China policy more generally. The new European Commission strives to be a “geopolitical” entity strategically engaging to achieve concrete results in its bilateral relations with China. The starting point of this shift is the 2019 “Strategic Outlook” developed by the European External Action Service, which defines China not only as a “partner”, but also a “competitor” and a “systemic rival”. On political values, China clearly is a “systemic rival”. The crucial question is whether “systemic rivalry” in the field of political values carries implications for other policy fields in which the EU and China are partners or competitors. A general consensus that the EU should adopt a more principled China policy and defend and promote its political values spells out very differently across EU institutions. By institutional design, the European Council is a pragmatic rather than principled institution. Compromise resulting from bargaining among member states with different interests shapes its approach. At the other end of the spectrum, the European Parliament serves a principled watchdog function, but has very limited competencies in foreign and security affairs. The European Commission strives to overcome the decades-old challenge of policy silos resulting from its fragmented institutional structure and the more than 60 sectoral dialogues with China. This carries the potential to turn more principled. However, to this day it is not clear whether the European Commission will make the promotion of political values a policy priority even if this comes at the cost of economic cooperation. This paper outlines ongoing debates on the EU’s new China policy and the role of political values in it, and provides 25 concrete policy recommendations for a more principled China policy that defends and promotes democracy, human rights and the rule of law.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Human Rights, Democracy, and Rule of Law
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and Asia

54. The Outsider: Russia in the Race for Artificial Intelligence

Author:
Julien Nocetti
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
When analyzing the global state of play around artificial intelligence (AI), Russia so far looks like an “outsider” compared to the two technological leaders, the United States and China. Yet, like the European Union, Russia exhibits two apparently contradictory but fundamental trends: it is trying to reap the benefits of technological interdependence—digital, scientific, financial etc.—while also protecting its internal market and thereby achieving the “technological sovereignty” it so ardently desires. Russia’s state-led approach is compounded by the same problems that afflict Russia in the conventional digital sector: lack of investment, weak integration into international scientific and normative networks, political pressure on private companies, dependence on global technological value chains and brain drain. Might these factors lead us to underestimate Moscow’s potential in AI? This paper argues that although these weaknesses are significant, continue to hold Russia back and threaten to amplify pre-existing asymmetries of power with the United States and China, Moscow intends to preserve niches of expertise that it can deploy in foreign policy and domestic governance. The Russian authorities have also handed big parts of AI development to the armed forces and the defense industry, as part of modernization plans and for asymmetric use.
Topic:
Science and Technology, European Union, Artificial Intelligence, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
Russia and Eurasia

55. How the French Understand Immigrant Integration and Citizenship

Author:
Christophe Bertossi
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
On December 9, 2020 will be celebrated the 115th anniversary of the 1905 law on French secularism (laïcité). On the very same day, a new law project will be presented by the French government, with the objective of further strengthening the “republican values” in order to fight against so-called “Islamist separatism” within French society. This dramatic emphasis on France’s political tradition of universalism and secularism is difficult to understand outside France. Such misunderstanding created a situation unseen before whereby a sitting French president replied to an online column published in the Financial Times (which was eventually withdrawn from the FT website), and phoned Ben Smith, a NYTimes journalist, and complained about the US media coverage of the 2020 terrorist attacks in France. It seems that the French model of immigrant integration and citizenship is difficult to understand outside France, even more so at a time when France is once again the target of jihadist terrorism and responds to this challenge with a dramatic emphasis on its national political tradition of universalism and secularism – what the French refer to in terms of laïcité. In order to address this misunderstanding, this research proposes to analyze 10 terms that have been central to French debates on immigration and citizenship, namely: integration, communalism (communautarisme), secularism (laïcité), discrimination, Islam, citizenship, migrant, migration crisis, the nation-state, and Europe. The lexicographic application Ngram Viewer is used for each of these terms in order to show evolutions over time. These evolutions are part of what needs to be understood. Behind these evolutions, the analysis emphasizes ambiguities and a plurality of meanings surrounding the vocabulary of the French political tradition, and the subsequent misunderstandings these ambiguities and multiple meanings generate not only between French and international observers but also within French society. A related claim is that evolutions that can be identified in French political and public debates about immigrant integration are not specific to France but are part of a broader transformation that concerns all Western countries in their relation to immigration, ethnicity and Islam.
Topic:
Islam, Immigration, Secularism, and Integration
Political Geography:
Europe and France

56. The Recycling of Lithium-Ion Batteries: A Strategic Pillar for the European Battery Alliance

Author:
Raphaël Danino-Perraud
Publication Date:
03-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
Although it is still marginal, the market for electric vehicles (EVs) is growing. According to the French Institute of Petroleum and Renewable Energies (IFPEN, Institut Français du Pétrole et des Énergies Renouvelables), EVs accounted for a little more than 2% of the light vehicle market in 2019. This was up by 54% compared to 2018, but EVs still only represent 0.8% of the global car fleet. That said, the International Energy Agency (IEA) estimates EVs could make up between 15% and 30% of vehicle sales in 2030. However, while European manufacturers have so far developed EVs such as the Renault Zoé or the BMW i3, they are highly dependent on Asian companies for the supply and manufacture of materials for cells and electric batteries, such as nickel, cobalt, lithium used to build precursors, or cathodes and their components. Asia provides more than 90% of world car battery output, half of which comes from China alone. European dependence is not only related to the manufacture of batteries, but occurs throughout much of their value chain, from extraction and processing of raw materials to the preparation of necessary treatment processes for recycling. The recycling market for batteries from small electronic objects (smartphones, computers, tablets, etc.) has also been led by Asian countries.
Topic:
Energy Policy, Environment, Regional Cooperation, Science and Technology, Business, and Recycling
Political Geography:
Europe and European Union

57. Confettis d’empire ou points d’appui? L’avenir de la stratégie française de présence et de souveraineté

Author:
Élie Tenenbaum, Morgan Paglia, and Nathalie Ruffié
Publication Date:
02-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
France is one of the few nations in the world to benefit from a permanent global military presence. With more than 10,000 military personnel from all three services, deployed across the five continents and the three main oceanic basins, it benefits from the second largest network of prepositioned forces in the world. This global military posture is structured around five “presence forces”, based in Senegal, Ivory Coast, Gabon, Djibouti and the United Arab Emirates, as well as five “sovereignty forces” in the dependent overseas territories of the Antilles, French Guyana, Southern Indian Ocean, New Caledonia and French Polynesia. Over the past twenty years, this unique force posture has been hit by a series of deep budgetary cuts, translating into staff reductions and persisting delays in equipment delivery. As a result, the current military presence is under serious strain, as some capability are now weighing on the ability of these prepositioned forces to contribute as much as they could to the five strategic functions reiterated in the 2017 Strategic Review. These considerations are all the more important given the coming demographic, climatic, economic, geopolitical, and of course military challenges that will dramatically constrain the operational environment of the French forces in the coming years.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Military Strategy, Armed Forces, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:
Africa, Europe, France, Latin America, and Asia-Pacific

58. The Sanctions Policy of the European Union: Multilateral Ambitions Versus Power Politics

Author:
Éric-André Martin
Publication Date:
10-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
Restrictive measures are a major instrument of the European Union (EU)’s external action, which has emerged as one of the world’s leading sanctions emitters. The EU has thus leveraged the size of its market and its economic and financial clout (trade relations, aid policy and bilateral agreements). Through its significant activity in the field of sanctions, the EU has been able to reinforce its image as a normative power and a global player, contributing actively to international peace and stability. The EU’s restrictive measures were adopted in a favorable international context, marked by the legitimacy that was conferred, most of the time, by United Nations resolutions, and by close coordination with the United States (US). This privileged period culminated with the management of the Iranian crisis and the conclusion of the 2015 Vienna Agreement. More recently, however, sanctions have tended to lose their function as an instrument contributing to shape a shared vision of the world order, and to become what they are in essence, namely an instrument of statecraft dedicated to the protection of States’ national interests. This trend is illustrated on the one hand by the affirmation of a unilateral United States policy on sanctions, which tends to extend the scope of coercion to third parties, including European entities, and on the other hand, by the increasing use of sanctions by powers like China and Russia as a geo-economic tool.
Topic:
Sovereignty, Power Politics, Sanctions, and Multilateralism
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Asia, and European Union

59. Russia’s Energy Strategy-2035: Struggling to Remain Relevant

Author:
Tatiana Mitrova and Vitaly Yermakov
Publication Date:
12-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
Russia’s Energy Strategy to 2035 (ES-2035) enters, finally, the home stretch. The Ministry of Energy submitted its version of the document to the Russian Government in early October 2019. Once approved (this is expected before year’s end), ES-2035 will become the best available indication of Russian energy policymakers’ plans. It therefore merits careful consideration. This paper reviews the key goals, scenarios and indicative ranges for output and consumption contained in ES-2035. It thus contributes to understanding the strategic compromises that Russia might be ready to take, as well as those that are unlikely to be acceptable. Our review of the draft ES-2035 suggests that it provides general guidelines to the future evolution of Russia’s energy sectors, but struggles to remain relevant amid fast-paced changes in the global markets. Several crucial but politically sensitive energy issues still need further clarification of policies: the future fiscal regime for oil and gas that could incentivize output and prevent production declines; industrial and technological policy; the choice of the future model for Russia’s gas industry and whether it is going to develop under continued state regulation or in the market environment; climate policy and the strategy to promote (or not) renewables and other technologies of energy transition; and the future of competition in wholesale and retail power markets.
Topic:
Energy Policy, Oil, Politics, and Gas
Political Geography:
Russia and Eurasia

60. China’s Smart Cities: The New Geopolitical Battleground

Author:
Alice Ekman
Publication Date:
12-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
“Smart city” development has become a fashionable policy and research topic. A growing number of central and local governments in Europe, Asia, Africa and Latin America, in partnership with companies from diverse sectors (construction, transport, energy, water, etc), consulting firms, NGOs and experts, are now developing smart-city-related projects. This report looks at the smart city from a broader, geopolitical perspective, and considers it, for the first time, as a potential area of geopolitical competition between countries. This approach is relevant given the strategic nature of the infrastructure involved in smart-city development (telecommunication and energy grids, mobile networks, data centers, etc). It is also relevant at a time of prolonged tensions between China and the United States – a period during which 5G and other technologies that are key to developing smart cities are generating global debate and diverging positions across countries.
Topic:
Development, Science and Technology, Urbanization, Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and Smart Cities
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

61. Emirates Airline, Etihad Airways and Qatar Airways: Global Airline Companies Promoting the International Position and Reputation of Dubai, Abu Dhabi and Qatar

Author:
Julien Lebel
Publication Date:
07-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
Airports in the Gulf emirates are major transit hubs in global airline networks today. Apart from their “advantageous” geographical location, their development results primarily from the ambitions of political actors seeking to maintain their power. This has led especially to the creation of the “Gulf companies”, namely Emirates Airline (Dubai), Etihad Airways (Abu Dhabi) and Qatar Airways (Doha). However, the three emirates are not following identical strategies. Within the unstable context of the Middle East, it is important to look at the development dynamics of these companies which symbolize the global reach of small but powerful political entities on the international stage.
Topic:
Development, Diplomacy, Business, and Airline Companies
Political Geography:
Middle East, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Dubai, and Gulf Nations

62. Offshore Wind Power Floating in its Industrial and Technological Dimension

Author:
Michel Cruciani
Publication Date:
07-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
Europe has become a frontrunner in fixed offshore wind. Can this success story be replicated with floating offshore wind, a technology that would lift the sea depth constraint and thus open up wider market opportunities? This research study looks at the main success factors for this emerging industry.
Topic:
Climate Change, Energy Policy, Electricity, Renewable Energy, and Wind Power
Political Geography:
France and European Union

63. The Strategic Role of Land Forces: A French Perspective

Author:
Élie Tenenbaum
Publication Date:
07-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
Although the first and foremost domain in the history of warfare, Land power has been dissociated from the concept of “strategic forces” for some time now, as these generally referred to long-range and/or high-yield strike capabilities, above all nuclear weapons. The growing importance of the command of the commons at the operational level of war has sometimes led to a conception of land forces as mere consumers of air-, sea- and information-borne effects. Yet, such a dynamic is now being challenged, as Western forces’ supremacy over “fluid spaces” is increasingly contested. The time has therefore come to reassess the contribution of land forces to the main strategic functions: intervention and stabilization, deterrence and prevention, protection and anticipation. For each of these key missions, land forces prove to be essential tools to which there is no readily available workaround. As the future operational environment is bound to become more contested and demanding, land forces will have to prove their renewed relevance in the face of challenges such as anti-access and area denial capabilities, hybrid actors and ambiguous warfare strategies. Given this outlook, they will play a key role as integrators and multi-domain effects providers, improving joint forces’ overall resilience and maneuver capability.
Topic:
International Relations, Military Strategy, Weapons, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
France and European Union

64. Another Story from the "Refugee Crisis". Resettlement in Small Towns and Rural Areas in France

Author:
Matthieu Tardis
Publication Date:
07-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
Since 2015, refugee resettlement programmes have grown significantly in Europe becoming a key component of European asylum strategy. In 2017, Emmanuel Macron committed to resettle in France 10,000 refugees until the end of 2019. Refugees from Syria and Africa are increasingly welcome in small towns and rural areas. There are plenty of challenges to address when it comes to receiving refugees in smaller communities. Small towns are often less accustomed to refugees, and above all, they do not have the same human and financial resources as large cities to provide services adapted to this population’s needs. The lack of opportunities, in particular job opportunities, affects the attractiveness of these areas for newcomers. On the top of that, the continuous rise of the far right in France since the 1980s is often perceived as a political hurdle in sized cities and rural areas. However, this study shows another picture altogether. Following interviews and field visits with some 40 practitioners, the study offers an alternative picture to the stereotypes usually associated with areas. Indeed, small towns and rural areas prove to be places of hospitality. Refugees in small towns are not perceived as anonymous newcomers. Instead, they quickly become new members of the local community and receive strong support from many local residents. Likewise, in order to address specific needs of the refugees, local actors are drivers of innovation who often manage to design new solutions in an informal fashion. Of course, this positive image of the reception and integration of resettled refugees in small towns and rural areas should not obstruct the difficulties encountered such as lack of public transportation, access to healthcare, learning French. However, the strong mobilisation of local residents mitigates the handicaps of these areas. They have proved to be a powerful driver for integration. For example, access to labour market is facilitated by interpersonal networks in areas where there is a shortage of manpower. This study highlights that many obstacles to refugee integration are not specific to refugees. Lack of transportation, of doctors and of public services affect local populations all the same. But local actors proved to be innovative to address these issues for refugees and provide lessons to learn for big cities and for the future of migration policies in France. This study is published in partnership with ICMC Europe as part of the SHARE Integration project.
Topic:
Refugees, Public Policy, Asylum, and Integration
Political Geography:
France and European Union

65. China’s Quest for Blue Skies: The Astonishing Transformation of the Domestic Gas Market

Author:
Sylvie Cornot-Gandolphe
Publication Date:
09-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
China’s gas industry has been moving into a new era. China’s natural gas demand has skyrocketed amid a state campaign that encourages coal-to-gas switching. In just two years, China added 75 billion cubic meters (bcm) to global gas demand, the equivalent of the UK gas market, the second largest European market. Despite steadily rising, Chinese gas production has not been able to cope with such a huge increase in demand and gas imports have also surged.
Topic:
Security, Climate Change, Energy Policy, Gas, and Renewable Energy
Political Geography:
China and Asia

66. China’s Quest for Gas Supply Security: The Global Implications

Author:
Sylvie Cornot-Gandolphe
Publication Date:
09-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
The major transformations that are occurring on the Chinese gas market have profound repercussions on the global gas and LNG markets, especially on trade, investment and prices. In just two years, China has become the world’s first gas importer and is on track to become the largest importer of Liquefied natural gas (LNG). China alone explained 63% of the net global LNG demand growth in 2018 and now accounts for 17% of global LNG imports. The pace and scale of China’s LNG imports have reshaped the global LNG market. Over the past two years, fears of an LNG supply glut have largely been replaced by warnings that the lack of investments in new LNG capacity would lead to a supply shortage in the mid-2020s unless more LNG production project commitments are made soon. There is now a bullish outlook for future global LNG demand which has encouraged companies to sanction additional LNG projects, based on the anticipated supply shortage. China’s gas imports can be expected to continue to grow strongly, from 120 billion cubic meters (bcm) in 2018 to up to 300 bcm by 2030.
Topic:
Security, Energy Policy, International Trade and Finance, and Gas
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Asia, Global Focus, and United States of America

67. (De)globalization of International Plastic Waste Trade: Stakes at Play and Perspectives

Author:
Eugénie Joltreau
Publication Date:
09-2019
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
The world plastic production has been multiplied by 23 since 1964 to reach 348 million tonnes (mt) in 2017. This production level is expected to double in the next 20 years, largely because of the significant growth in plastic consumption in developing countries. Today, China is the largest producer of plastics (representing nearly 30% of global production) and the European Union (EU) comes second (18.5%) with 64 mt. About 40% of plastics are single use, and thus quickly accumulate as waste. For example, in the EU, plastic packaging waste accounts for more than 60% of the total plastic waste generated each year (16.3 mt in 2016). Since the 2000s, the backbone of the EU’s waste management policy has been to define mandatory recycling objectives along with a reverse financing scheme requiring producers to take over a significant part of their products’ waste management costs. In line with these objectives, the European recycling rate for plastic packaging waste should reach 50% by 2025, against about 42% in 2016 (6.9 mt). In the EU, 30% of total plastics were collected for recycling (in 2016), and half of it was exported for recycling, mainly to China. Yet in 2017, China announced a ban on the importation of almost all plastic waste effective as of early 2018. Since then, over-dependence on China for recycling plastics has put the global recycling industry in crisis. Without the possibility to export their waste, the ability of the EU and other developed economies to reach ambitious recycling objectives is called into question. It also sheds light on the limits of plastic recycling and of low-cost recycling strategies.
Topic:
Energy Policy, Environment, Sanitation, and Recycling
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and European Union

68. Macron, Diplomat: A New French Foreign Policy?

Author:
Thomas Gomart and Marc Hecker
Publication Date:
04-2018
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
How can we define Emmanuel Macron’s foreign policy since he took office? After Nicolas Sarkozy’s brazen style of “gutsy diplomacy” and François Hollande’s “normal diplomacy”, the eighth president of the Fifth Republic seems to have opted for an agile classicism. In substance, he makes no claim to any radical break with the past, but sees his approach as being in line with historical tradition. In relation to his predecessors, he has adjusted the balance between alliances, values, and interests in favor of the latter, while giving his policies an unambiguous European orientation. Formally, his approach is characterized by recourse to symbolism, strict control of communications, and an agile personal style. A term used within the business world to encourage organizations and individuals to adapt and innovate, “agility” also connotes a will to utilize and master new technologies. [...] Comprising 14 brief analyses, this collective study contributes to the initiative launched by Ifri in 2016 to analyze French foreign policy, and follows on directly from the earlier study published on the eve of the presidential election. It aims to give an update on the action Emmanuel Macron has taken on the principal international issues since his arrival in office. It should therefore be read not as an overall assessment, which would be impossible at this early stage of the presidential term, but more as an impressionist tableau giving a sense of an overall movement containing many different hues. Emmanuel Macron has four years left to perfect it.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Diplomacy, Trade Policy, and Emmanuel Macron
Political Geography:
Africa, Russia, Middle East, Asia, France, United States of America, and European Union

69. The Gulf Monarchies' Armed Forces at the Crossroads

Author:
David B. Roberts
Publication Date:
05-2018
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
Something is happening with the military forces of the Arab monarchies in the Gulf. Traditionally, the armed forces of the Gulf monarchies played an incidental role when it comes to securing the states. The ultimate fighting power of the monarchies was relatively unimportant; rather, the monarchies’ security was derived from international relations that were sometimes founded on, and often sustained and fed by, ongoing military sales. But, for some monarchies at least, this is changing. Saudi Arabia and the UAE are now deploying their own forces in hitherto unseen kinetic ways, as in Yemen, indicating that they genuinely seek their own fighting power. In the midst of the Gulf crisis, Qatar has doubled down on defense procurement both to boost its military and to increase its international entanglements. Meanwhile, Oman and Kuwait continue their methodical military procurement, as is Bahrain, in addition to assiduously following Saudi Arabia’s regional policies to boost relations with Riyadh.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Regional Cooperation, Governance, Armed Forces, Military Affairs, Weapons, and Military Spending
Political Geography:
Middle East, Kuwait, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman, and Gulf Nations

70. Coal Exit or Coal Expansion? A Review of Coal Market Trends and Policies in 2017

Author:
Sylvie Cornot-Gandolphe
Publication Date:
05-2018
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
Coal in the power sector is the principal focus of climate-related policies due to its high carbon intensity, making CO2 emissions from coal a leading contributor to climate change. While 38% of global power generation come from coal (in 2017), coal-related CO2 emissions represent more than 70% of power sector emissions. Coal-fired power plants are also the leading source of all primary air pollutants within the power sector, causing respiratory diseases and premature deaths. Structural changes are fast sweeping through global electricity markets. A key driver is the fast deployment of renewable energy sources and their falling costs, making renewables increasingly competitive with coal. Coal is also becoming less competitive than other sources of electricity in several regions, due to the fall in gas prices, the rising cost of the carbon price and higher coal import prices. Pressures against investment in coal activities increasingly create challenges for financing coal projects. Global coal power investment has passed an all-time peak and has contracted over the past two years. Investment in greenfield coal mines is also at a standstill in all major coal exporting countries. Nevertheless, while the future of coal is dark, 2017 has been a good year for the sector. World coal production increased after three consecutive years of decline. Global coal demand and international trade rose again, and high coal prices (above $80/tonne since summer 2016) boosted the financial results of coal-mining companies. As a result of growing fossil fuel demand, global energy-related CO2 emissions rose again in 2017. These short-term results do not call into question global decarbonization trends but demonstrate that current efforts are insufficient to meet the objectives of the Paris Agreement. The world is still divided about the future role of coal. A major change came in 2015 with the Paris Agreement, which prompted many nations across the world to accelerate their efforts to reduce coal consumption. Since then, several governments and power utilities have decided to phase out coal from their electricity mixes and joined the “Powering Past Coal Alliance”. Coal reduction or phase-out policies are being adopted or considered by more and more countries, and the reduction in the share of coal power generation goes faster than expected in several coal-consuming countries. But South and Southeast Asia remains a region for short to medium term growth in coal demand and Africa is a potential area for new growth. In this, new coal markets can also develop thanks to the support of countries eager to export their coal combustion technologies, led by China and Japan, and by the desire of coal exporters to find new outlets. Despite this growth, the sustainability of the relative good performance of the coal sector in 2017 is far from being ensured.
Topic:
Climate Change, Energy Policy, Markets, Treaties and Agreements, Electricity, Renewable Energy, and Coal
Political Geography:
Global Focus

71. Making Sense of Russia’s Policy in Afghanistan

Author:
Stephen Blank and Younkyoo Kim
Publication Date:
09-2018
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
For some time, Western sources have been accusing Moscow of backing the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. However, little effort has been done to analyze the modalities of this support and the way it relates to Moscow's overall policies and objectives in Central and Southern Asia. This essay sets out to explain both the trend in Russia’s policies towards Afghanistan between 2013 and 2017, and the reasons underneath them. It explores Russia's actions vis-à-vis contending forces in Afghanistan and Central Asia in the broader context of Moscow’s rapprochement with Pakistan, its ties to India and China and overall anti-Americanism that has grown exponentially since 2014. We argue that this approach would provide a better understanding of Russia’s policies and objectives in Afghanistan.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Taliban, and Grand Strategy
Political Geography:
Afghanistan, Russia, and Central Asia

72. The Trump-led Trade War with China: Energy Dominance Self-destructed?

Author:
Sylvie Cornot-Gandolphe and Jean-François Boittin
Publication Date:
09-2018
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
Under particular US legal rationale, such as calling foreign imports a “national security threat”, President Donald Trump has started imposing tariffs and/or quotas and has launched national security investigations on a growing number of imported goods from US allies and others alike.In March and June 2018, the US imposed tariffs or quotas on steel and aluminium on all trading partners, but Australia. In July and August 2018, the US began imposing tariffs on $50 billion in Chinese industrial goods on the ground of unfair trade practices. As China has retaliated with tit-for-tat measures, President Trump has imposed tariffs on $200 billion in Chinese goods from 24 September 2018 onwards, and in an unprecedented escalation of his trade war with China, he has also threatened to impose tariffs on an additional $267 billion in Chinese goods. If eventually carried out, Trump’s latest threat could result in tariffs on all Chinese goods entering the US. China has retaliated and imposed tariffs on $60 billion in US goods, including a 10% duty on liquefied natural gas (LNG). For the time being, trade tensions have had a limited impact on the energy market. But the new round of US tariffs and retaliation measures by China suggest that this is going to change.
Topic:
Climate Change, Energy Policy, International Trade and Finance, Gas, Renewable Energy, and Coal
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

73. 137 Shades of Terrorism. French Jihadists Before the Courts

Author:
Marc Hecker
Publication Date:
04-2018
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
This study, based on original judicial sources, assesses the profiles of 137 individuals sentenced in France for cases related to jihadism. Among other things, the study reveals several common denominators including a lower level of education, poorer integration into the labor market, higher levels of criminal activity, and stronger ties to the Maghreb and to sub-Saharan Africa than the average French citizen. Moreover, a qualitative analysis provides an understanding of the processes of radicalization and subsequent participation in terrorist activities. As such, it expounds the role played by group dynamics, the internet, and prisons. This study further illustrates the strains imposed on the judicial and penal systems by the jihadist phenomenon. Relapse is specifically explored, notably through the cases of individuals convicted of terrorism, who, after serving their sentence, launched attacks on French soil. The subject is all the more topical in light of the likely release from prison of some sixty individuals, sentenced for acts of terrorism, in the upcoming two years.
Topic:
Crime, Terrorism, Islamic State, Courts, and Jihad
Political Geography:
Europe, Middle East, and France

74. The Niger-Libya Border: Securing It without Stabilising It?

Author:
Mathieu Pellerin
Publication Date:
11-2018
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
Often described as an “ungoverned area”, the Niger-Libya border is nevertheless at the centre of major economic, political and security challenges. Both the Libyan authorities and the Nigerien state are struggling to establish tight control over this particularly isolated area. However, local actors who live there are making their own modes of governance, based on individual and so far, barely institutionalised relationships. These local forms of regulation provide states in the sub-region and their international partners with the opportunity to consider the possibilities of indirect administration. The current priority appears to be for outsourced forms of security, as the agendas of these actors are geared towards anti-terrorism and the fight against so-called irregular immigration. Indeed, this area is nowadays facing unprecedented militarisation, raising a key question: does excessive militarisation not risk producing more insecurity than it fights in the medium or long term? The stability of this border area is partly based on maintaining economic, political and social balance which risks being challenged by a purely security-based approach. Designing a holistic governance of security requires states being able to arbitrate sovereignly on the cornerstone of long-term human security.
Topic:
Security, Governance, Border Control, Counter-terrorism, and Borders
Political Geography:
Africa, Libya, North Africa, and Niger