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Begin New Search Topic Politics Content Type Special Report Publishing Institution Foreign Policy Research Institute Publication Year within 5 Years

1. How Will China Respond to the Russia-Ukraine Crisis?

Author:
Chris Miller
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
How will China respond to a potential Russian military escalation against Ukraine? Relations between Russia and China have intensified in recent years, with Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping holding regular summits and the two countries’ militaries participating in joint exercises and cooperating in some defense industrial efforts. Ties between Moscow and Beijing are now closer than any time since the days of Stalin and Mao, driven by a shared perception that the United States is each country’s primary foreign policy challenge. One top Russian official told media in December 2021 that the relationship now “exceeds an alliance.”[1] Chinese state media, meanwhile, have vocally backed Russia in arguing that the current crisis stems from the US “using NATO as a tool to cannibalize and squeeze Russia’s strategic space.”[2] The 2014 war in Ukraine and annexation of Crimea was an important factor driving Russia and China closer to each other, as Russia sought to reduce post-Crimea international isolation and as Beijing realized it could drive a hard bargain in its bilateral relationship with Russia on issues like energy. China’s response to the 2014 war, however, was generally to avoid taking sides. China accepted a narrative that placed blame on the West for causing the crisis, with top diplomats citing Western “foreign interference for causing the crisis,” but didn’t approve of Russia’s seizure of Crimea or its military actions in the Donbas.[3] China abstained from voting on the key United Nations resolutions regarding Crimea, for example, and it still declines to recognize Crimea as Russian territory. Similarly, it verbally rejected US and European sanctions on Russia though it let Chinese firms, including the country’s big state-owned banks, abide by these sanctions to avoid being cut off from US financial markets and the international banking system. Compared to 2014, however, China may find it more difficult to avoid involvement in an escalating crisis. Leaders in Beijing and around the world will see the US response to any military escalation against Ukraine as sending signals about whether the US could effectively respond to future crises in the Taiwan Strait or East or South China Seas. The success or failure of US efforts to impose meaningful costs on Russia if it escalates will be seen as a test of whether the US could do something similar in Asia. Moreover, after repeated summits between Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin, including Xi’s description of Putin as his “best friend,” China’s approach to Russia amid a crisis will also be interpreted as sending signals about China’s own capabilities and influence. Because of this, China will not see a new phase of war between Russia and Ukraine as a peripheral issue in its foreign policy, even though China has no core issues at stake in Ukraine itself. China is most likely to be implicated in the crisis by potential Western sanctions on Russia, which in contrast to 2014 will impose substantially more pressure on Beijing to take sides. China’s decision either to adhere to new Western sanctions or to help Russia avoid them will shape escalation pathways and determine the magnitude of economic and political isolation that sanctions impose.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Politics, Sanctions, Military Affairs, Economy, Crisis Management, and Escalation
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Eurasia, Ukraine, and Asia

2. Correlates of Politics and Economics: How Chinese Investment in Africa Changes Political Influence

Author:
Carla D. Jones, Mengge Li, and Hermann A. Ndofor
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
This study investigates the impact of Chinese economic engagement in Africa (FDI and loans from China to African countries) on African countries’ international political alignment as evidenced by voting patterns in the UN General Assembly. We find three seasons of Chinese policy in Africa. Pre 2008, Chinese economic engagement in Africa was driven primarily by economic considerations, market seeking for FDI and likely resource seeking for loans. During the Great Recession, China came to terms with its rise as an economic power and thus started leveraging its economic power in international relationships. During this season, both Chinese FDI and loans were no longer driven by economic considerations but rather by international relations which led to increased political alignment with recipient African countries. The final season captured the Xi Jinping era beginning 2013. During this season, Chinese FDI had no effect on African countries’ foreign policy alignment with China, but Chinese loans still had a significant positive effect. This likely reflects a movement away from FDI to less transparent bilateral loans as a means of utilizing Chinese economic power to influence foreign policy. During the entire period of the study, Chinese FDI to Africa resulted in reduced political alignment between African countries and the United States.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Economics, Politics, Investment, and Influence
Political Geography:
Africa, China, and Asia

3. The Evolving Political-Military Aims in the War in Ukraine After 100 Days

Author:
Philip Wasielewski
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
Russian war aims have contracted from conquering Ukraine to simply expanding the territory of the statelets it supposedly went to war to protect. By contrast, Ukraine’s war aims have grown from survival to the recovery of all territory lost to Russia since 2014. These uncompromising objectives lock Russia and Ukraine into a war of attrition with little hope of a negotiated settlement. The ongoing battle in Donbas could provide Russia with some tactical successes and a propaganda victory but probably not a strategic one. In fact, further losses could weaken the Russian army to the point that it enables later Ukrainian counterattacks or even causes the Russian army to fracture. Leaders in Moscow may find that a depleted army leaves them few options for victory and that even their superiority in nuclear weapons may not be as useful as supposed.
Topic:
Politics, Armed Forces, Conflict, Military, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Eurasia, and Ukraine

4. Continuity and Change in Iraq’s Sunni Politics: Sunni Arab Political Trends, Factions, and Personalities Since 2014

Author:
Kirk H. Sowell
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
The year 2014 was a horrible one for Iraq. The national election held in April was preceded by two ominous trends: an increasingly strong, armed insurgency from the Sunni Arab population and an increasingly sharp sectarian conflict within the mainstream political system, driven by actions of both the Shia Islamist-dominated government and Sunni Arab political leaders. A divisive election with a disputed result was followed by a strong insurgency, and while both pan-Arab and Iraqi Sunni media tended to frame it as a “revolution” driven by oppressed Sunni tribesmen, the self-proclaimed Islamic State (ISIS), a brutal terrorist group with a globalist Salafi-Jihadist ideology, was its primary driver. The crucible event of the year was the fall of Mosul, Iraq’s most populous Sunni-majority city in the northwest province of Nineveh, to ISIS jihadists on June 10. The city did not fall without resistance, as is sometimes said, as federal police units fought a four-day gun battle for the city, while army divisions, including two garrisoned right outside the city, watched on. Once resistance in the city collapsed, several Iraqi army divisions, weakened by sectarian divisions and riddled with corruption, collapsed almost overnight, and terrorists overran much of northern and western Iraq. These events were a watershed for Iraq, and especially for its Sunni Arab population, and it is Sunni Arab politics since 2014 which is the focus of this chapter.
Topic:
Corruption, Politics, Sectarianism, Elections, Sunni, and Shia
Political Geography:
Iraq and Middle East

5. Iraq in Transition: Competing Actors and Complicated Politics

Author:
Aaron Stein
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
The Republic of Iraq has faced considerable challenges after the American-led invasion in 2003 to oust Saddam Hussein, ranging from insurgency to endemic corruption and poor government services. Baghdad has emerged as the epicenter of a broader geopolitical struggle between the United States and Islamic Republic of Iran, two hostile adversaries at odds since the Islamic Revolution toppled the American-friendly Shah in 1979. Amidst these broader challenges, Iraq faced an existential security threat in 2014, after the Islamic State gained strength in Syria, augmented its ranks with foreign fighters, and took control over eastern Syria and parts of western Iraq, including the Iraqi city of Mosul, the country’s second largest city. The war to defeat this group was brutal and fraught, with the Iraqi military bearing the brunt of the casualties fighting for control over densely populated urban areas and vast expanses of desert terrain. The fighting consumed Iraqi affairs for years, blunted the sharp tensions that underpin U.S.-Iran relations, and focused military efforts on the defeat of a common enemy. In the year since the defeat of the Islamic State, the American role in Iraq has become less clear. The United States has undertaken an aggressive policy, dubbed “Maximum Pressure,” to economically coerce the Iranian government to make a series of concessions, including limits on the development of ballistic missiles and foreign policy changes. This effort included the American withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the multi-national agreement that placed considerable limits on Iran’s nuclear program and instituted an expansive inspection regime to verify the terms of the deal in exchange for Iran receiving American and European sanctions relief. The Trump administration’s decision to reimpose sanctions severely complicated the arrangement, depriving Iran of the reward for its compliance and setting in motion a series of Iranian steps to try to coerce Europe to continue to uphold trade with the Islamic Republic. The United States, however, has threatened to sanction European entities should they not comply with American policy. The tensions over sanctions have had a deleterious effect on stability in Iraq and the Middle East, more broadly. The Iranian government has gradually increased its efforts to impose a cost on the United States for using sanctions to end its export of oil, beginning with a series of attacks on oil tankers near the Strait of Hormuz, escalating to include missile strikes on important oil centers in Saudi Arabia’s Abqaiq and Khurais, and then a shooting down an American surveillance drone. In response to rocket attacks inside Iraq, the United States has struck Iraqi militia’s linked to Iran and, in January 2020, assassinated Major General Qasem Soleimani, the now-deceased leader of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corp. (IRGC), and Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, an Iranian-linked actor that oversaw Iraqi militias sympathetic to the Islamic Republic. In retaliation, the Iranian military fired a salvo of ballistic missiles at bases in Iraq, striking targets with precision, but luckily resulting in no American deaths. The strikes still resulted in over one hundred cases of traumatic brain injury in the soldiers at the targeted bases. The tit-for-tat underscores Iran’s appetite for risk, particularly at time when its economy is under siege from U.S. actions.
Topic:
Politics, Insurgency, Sectarianism, Islamic State, Sunni, Transition, Muqtada al-Sadr, and Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF)
Political Geography:
Iraq, Middle East, and Kurdistan

6. Making Sense of the Sadrists: Fragmentation and Unstable Politics

Author:
Benedict Robin-D'Cruz and Renad Mansour
Publication Date:
03-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
Iraq’s Sadrist movement, led by populist Shi’i cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, has been at the heart of Iraqi politics since 2003. The movement’s political strategies have shifted dramatically during this time, encompassing militant insurgency, sectarian violence, electoral politics, and reform-oriented street protests. Consequently, despite their prominence, the Sadrists’ shifting positions mean they remain one of the most complex and frequently misunderstood movements in Iraq. This is further compounded by the near-total absence of engagement between the Sadrists and Western, particularly American, governments. As Sadr has changed his movement’s politics again, this time toward a counter-protest stance, U.S. policymakers are once more grappling with the dilemmas posed by a movement that is both powerful and obscure.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Politics, Non State Actors, and Muqtada al-Sadr
Political Geography:
Iraq and Middle East