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Begin New Search Topic Conflict Content Type Special Report Publishing Institution Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations

1. Countering hybrid threats: The role of the Joint Expeditionary Force

Author:
Adaja Stoetman and Dick Zandee
Publication Date:
03-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
Russia’s war in Ukraine has fundamentally changed the international order that is based on norms and values of state sovereignty and international law. While the Balkan wars in the nineties were the result of internal turmoil leading to the collapse of Yugoslavia, the Russian-Ukrainian armed conflict marks the return of large-scale interstate warfare in Europe for the first time since the end of the Second World War. A year after the Russian invasion was launched on 24 February 2022, valuable lessons can already be drawn for the characteristics of modern warfare. The conflict has shown – both in the run-up to the invasion as well as after the start of the war – that non-military aspects are part of Russia’s strategy. Well-known examples are the abuse of the European ‘oil and gas dependency’ on Russia, the spread of disinformation, cyberattacks and the channelling of refugees and migration flows. What these means have in common is that they are aimed at undermining the unity of the West and destabilising their societies and democracies. This very complex set of hybrid threats raises new questions on how to respond to them, as the hybrid domain requires the involvement of many different actors at the national and international level: from various ministries and even private companies (such as the energy sector) to the EU and NATO. As hybrid challenges have become an integral part of modern conflict, the question has arisen what kind of role should be laid down for the armed forces. Hybrid challenges are very often of a transboundary and non-military nature. Therefore, they have to be addressed primarily by civil actors. But in addition, the military can also play a role in countering hybrid threats, and this raises the question of the role of multinational (military) formats such as the Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF). The JEF is a multinational military formation of northern European countries with the United Kingdom as the lead nation. Since 2019, the JEF has increasingly focused its activities on the hybrid domain. The war in Ukraine has been a catalyst for increased cooperation in the JEF context at the political, policy and military operational levels. The Russian threat, both physically (conventional forces) and virtually/digitally, has become the main focus of attention. It is in the latter category of threats that the JEF Nations are struggling with the question of what its role should be. This report explores the possible role of the JEF in hybrid conflicts and how cooperation in the JEF can be attained. The first chapter addresses the role of military forces in responding to hybrid threats and what the JEF has realised in this context so far. Particular attention will be given to the challenges of but also the opportunities for connecting military activities with those of non-military actors. The second chapter focusses on the roles of NATO and the EU in the hybrid domain and how the JEF could relate to the efforts of these international organisations. The potential impact of the future NATO membership of Finland and Sweden – both JEF Participating Nations – is also addressed. The third chapter zooms in on the potential of the JEF’s role and functions in the hybrid domain and how this should be implemented. The growing political character of the JEF cooperation is also addressed. The report ends with a list of conclusions and recommendations for the Netherlands. The methodology used for this report consists of a mix of literature research and a series of interviews with government representatives and members of think tanks in a selection of JEF Nations as well as with staff officers at the JEF Headquarters, at the NATO Headquarters and at EU institutions. These interviews were held under the application of the Chatham House rule. The authors are grateful to all interviewees for their valuable contributions.
Topic:
Conflict, Hybrid Threats, International Order, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe

2. Twilight Institutions: Land conflict and hybrid authorities in Benin’s Borgou department

Author:
Kars de Bruijne
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
The Borgou Department is a large administrative area with eight communes and 43 districts spanning over 25,856 square kilometers. The department primarily comprises the Bariba, Dendi, Boo (about 40%) and Fulani ethnic groups (about 33%). The majority of the first three groups are farmers, and the Fulani are primarily nomadic or semi-nomadic cattle and sheepherders. The Borgou Department in Northern Benin has seen communal conflict over the past few years. There are escalating tensions between farmers and herders, even though there has also been more violence between the supporters of the former president Boni Yayi and those of the sitting President Patrice Talon (particularly in 2019 and 2020). Communal conflicts between farmers and herders in Borgou have multiple driving forces. This report explores one of these: changing land management systems. It is argued that recent changes in land management are in any event likely to become a stronger driver of tensions in Borgou in the near future. Exploring land management systems and their impact on the Borgou is relevant for two reasons. First, there is simply very little literature on changing land management systems in Benin. For example, in August 2017 Benin’s authorities modified the 2013 Land Code to limit land conflicts and to modernize the institutional framework governing land acquisition and management. But exactly what the impact of this change has been has not been fully explored. Second, Northern Benin has experienced the problem of increasing violent extremist activity. While this activity is concentrated in the Alibori and Atacora regions, it is conceivable that once it has become established it might further escalate, with Borgou being a possible area of expansion. Being able to focus on vulnerabilities with the aim of addressing them is important for Benin’s stability. Research and media reports point to an increase in both the number and intensity of farmer-herder confrontations in the Borgou Department over the past five years. From the literature, it is apparent that this shift is driven by two factors. On the one hand, it is the effect of the demographic growth of and the increase in the cattle population which results in more competition for land. On the other hand, the introduction of land reforms by successive governments has tended to reinforce the feeling of insecurity among essentially illiterate farmers and herders.
Topic:
Violent Extremism, Conflict, Institutions, and Land Rights
Political Geography:
Africa and Benin

3. Conflict in the Penta-Border Area: Benin’s Northern Jihad from the perspective of its neighbours

Author:
Kars de Bruijne
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
Since December 2021, Benin has suffered an increasing number of armed conflicts linked to violent extremist groups. The Beninese government publicly acknowledges that there have been around 20 violent events in the period between December 2021 and May 2022. This report records 43 discrete violent events involving Violent Extremist Organisations (VEOs) from December 2021 to September 2022 (92 when including non-violent activities). This report makes an uncommon point: that violence in Benin presently comes from its neighbours and not from within. Developments in Burkina Faso, Niger, Togo and even Nigeria generate the problems in Alibori and Atactora (the Northern Provinces of Benin), for now. This report explores the activity of four main groups and the rational for expansion. A JNIM group under the command of Mouslimou, the Emir of the East, in Kompienga; a JNIM group in Tapoa (Burkina Faso); a JNIM group in Torodi (Niger) under the command of Emir of Torodi, Abu Anifa; and finally the Islamic State of the Greater Sahel (ISGS)."
Topic:
Violent Extremism, Conflict, Borders, and Armed Conflict
Political Geography:
Africa and Benin

4. From indices to insight: A proposal to enhance the risk assessment of the Dutch Early Warning/Early Action process

Author:
Bob Deen, Adaja Stoetman, and Kars de Bruijne
Publication Date:
11-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
Over the course of the last three decades, countless scholars, diplomats and experts have sought to develop reliable ways to predict and prevent violent conflict and instability. These efforts have yielded a vast array of analytical instruments, ranging from indices that measure various proximate and structural causes of instability to forecasting models that estimate the probability of an outbreak of violent conflict. Predicting and preventing violent conflict and instability Presently, there is a great deal of data available ranging from better measures of political violence and better predictors of violence. Moreover, as data sciences advance, social scientists have been able to develop new models and refine their predictions. However, as such tools proliferate, so do the challenges for policymakers. First, more data does not always mean ‘better’ data. Key indicators such as on political inclusivity, local grievances and competition are often still not readily available. Second, more data and better methodologies have not always meant a better insight into conflict risks. While we have generally become better in predicting the continuation and intensity of ongoing conflict, it remains a major challenge to predict which countries will become unstable and when. Third, perhaps the biggest problem is that even when having a clear insight into conflict risks, converting these insights into actionable policies remains difficult. In these instances, it is often not a lack of information or insufficient early warning signals per se that pose the key obstacles, but rather the ability to convert these data points into policy-relevant analysis and to identify relevant entry points for preventive efforts.
Topic:
Political Violence, Conflict, Risk, and Instability
Political Geography:
Europe and Netherlands

5. Costing Conflict: An early warning method to assess the impact of political violence on vital security interests

Author:
Kars de Bruijne
Publication Date:
11-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
Early Warning and Early Action (EWEA) processes seek to identify the risk of conflict, instability and violence. A large number of foresight models can predict which countries and areas may experience what type and what levels of violence. From this, they produce lists of countries and regions at risk which then qualify for policy measures to help improve stability. However, in order to prioritise countries and regions it is equally important to assess the implications (or the cost) of conflict. For example, Early Warning by the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM) seeks to “prevent tensions from escalating into conflict” and focus on all forms of tension accordingly. UNDP Early Warning seeks to understand how conflict impacts development initiatives and will prioritise countries with those problems. Mandates and interests thus determine priorities.
Topic:
Security, Political Violence, Conflict, and Instability
Political Geography:
Global Focus

6. Turkey’s love-in with Qatar: A marriage of convenience

Author:
Engin Yüksel
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
This report assesses the impact of Turkish-Qatari cooperation between 2002 and 2020 on conflict and geopolitical competition across the Middle East, North Africa, and the Horn of Africa based on close examination of its drivers. The report notes that neither ideological nor economic drivers adequately explain the recent blossoming of Turkish-Qatari relations. Converging political interests and pragmatism offer a more compelling explanation. On the one hand, Turkey aspires to play a regional leadership role and uses its cooperation with Qatar to strengthen its soft power claim to leadership of the Sunni world. On the other hand, Qatar seeks to ensure its territorial and dynastical safety from Saudi Arabia and its allies – the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, and Bahrain (the Quartet) – by working with Turkey, the recent thaw of the Al-Ula declaration notwithstanding. Turkish-Qatari collaboration is therefore best seen as a pragmatic partnership enabled by compatible geopolitical perspectives, particularly regarding the Muslim Brotherhood.
Topic:
Economics, International Cooperation, Partnerships, Geopolitics, Conflict, and Muslim Brotherhood
Political Geography:
Turkey, Middle East, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Bahrain, Qatar, and United Arab Emirates

7. Band-aids, not bullets: EU policies and interventions in the Syrian and Iraqi civil wars

Author:
Erwin van Veen and Nancy Ezzeddine
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
Engaging in the conflict cycle in other countries to gain outcomes favourable to one’s own interests is akin to playing in the champions league of foreign policy. Doing this effectively and responsibly requires a coherent and full-spectrum political strategy as well as the diplomatic, financial, developmental and military means to deliver it. It is clear from the scope of the security interests articulated in the European Union’s (EU) Global Strategy (2016) and its many associated foreign policy statements that the EU intends to meet these requirements. However, study of EU institutional policies and interventions in the Syrian and Iraqi civil wars highlights that it falls well short of doing so. As a result, EU institutions are not well placed to intervene effectively in high intensity conflicts with existential features such as these two civil wars. With this problem in mind, the core recommendation of the paper is to increase the effectiveness of EU interventions in high-intensity conflicts by institutionalising full-spectrum decision making, policy implementation and force deployment modalities for the EU as a whole, as well as for EU coalitions of the willing. The parallel existence of such tracks will enable the EU to act jointly in conflicts where Member States have more or less compatible foreign policy preferences with matching intensity preferences, and to act in part in conflicts where Member States have more or less compatible foreign policy preferences with a mixed distribution of intensity preferences (like Iraq or arguably Syria). EU foreign policy inaction, including institutional paralysis, will continue to occur where Member States’ foreign policy preferences are largely not compatible and have high-intensity preferences.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, European Union, Military Intervention, Conflict, and Institutions
Political Geography:
Iraq, Europe, Middle East, and Syria

8. Henchman, Rebel, Democrat, Terrorist: The YPG/PYD during the Syrian conflict

Author:
Erwin van Veen
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
This report analyses the role of the Syrian Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) and the associated Democratic Union Party (PYD) during the Syrian civil war. The purpose of our research is to obtain a better understanding of the nature, objectives and methods of the YPG/ PYD as a combined paramilitary and rebel force that is involved in a quasi-statebuilding project during an internationalised civil war. We start by examining the critical factors that enabled the swift rise of the YPG: informal arrangements with the Assad regime, support from the Kurdistan Workers’ Party and a pragmatic partnership with the US against Islamic State. This sets the scene for an inquiry into how core YPG strategies to maintain its dominance once it was established – coercive, deal-making, identity and basic service strategies – both shape the group’s behavior and result from its current organization. Finally, we dissect a number of major challenges to future YPG rule, such as its relation with the PKK, intra-Kurdish reconciliation, the US presence in northeast Syria and its interaction with the Arab populations over which it rules. Based on our analysis, we anticipate a scenario of ‘muddling through’ in which unconditional support from the US will continue at current levels, combined with an abiding US military presence. This will provide the YPG/ PYD with a security umbrella against both regime forces and Turkey, continue the status quo of the YPG/ PYD ruling northeast Syria in authoritarian fashion, make the civil war more ethno-sectarian in nature and prolong the conflict. While such a scenario is arguably more attractive for northeast Syria than a return of the regime, it is also unlikely to improve the area’s current underdevelopment. It will keep other external actors, like the EU, away and allow the PKK to continue to take its share of the area’s revenues. The primary audience of the report are Western opinion-, policy- and decision-makers engaged with the Syrian civil war and we hope it will help them to craft policies and initiate interventions that are feasible and appropriate to the situation in northeast Syria.
Topic:
Conflict, Syrian War, and YPG
Political Geography:
Middle East, Syria, United States of America, and European Union

9. Pandora’s Box in Syria: Anticipating negative externalities of a re-entrenching regime

Author:
Samar Batrawi
Publication Date:
05-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
During 2019, the original Syrian conflict entered its closing phases, except for the battlefields of Idlib and in the north east. As a result, conflict dynamics have become somewhat easier to read, as the regime and its key allies have shifted towards a triumphalist ‘post-war’ narrative and corresponding governance styles, deal-making and decision-making. These developments can be witnessed in three interlinked spheres: security, civil, and political economic practices. Together, they largely form the Assad regime’s political economy, which – although poorly understood due to limited access – is crucial to understand to assess the negative externalities likely to result from its wartime survival and re-entrenchment. The paper analyses six such externalities: 1. risk of conflict relapse due to economic pressures 2. the politics of refugees 3. risks and instrumentalisation of terrorism 4. regional instability 5. humanitarian culpability 6. deterioration of the international legal order. These externalities are interconnected and emerge from the political economy of the regime – the accumulation of its security, civil and political economic practices. Their nature and volume suggest that the Syrian civil war will plague its neighbors, as well as Europe, for a long time to come. These externalities also focus our attention on the fact that adequate containment strategies should be designed as a matter of urgency, to limit their negative impact.
Topic:
Security, International Law, Political Economy, Terrorism, Refugees, Conflict, Syrian War, and Bashar al-Assad
Political Geography:
Middle East, Syria, and Idlib

10. Navigating the Regional Chessboard: Europe’s Options to Address Conflicts in the Mena Region

Author:
Erwin van Veen
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Special Report
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
As 2020 draws to a close, the conflicts in Syria, Libya and Yemen have been ongoing for nearly a decade. Conflict and political crisis in Iraq have alternated non-stop since 2003. The Middle East also witnesses growing tensions between the Gulf States, Iran and the US, as well as more engagement of Turkish and Russian forces. In contrast, the European Union has often been passive and divided. This has resulted in missed windows of opportunity for conflict prevention, a loss of credibility and growing externalities that reach Europe unfiltered. This wide-ranging volume by the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung offers detailed analysis of conflicts in Yemen, Syria, Iraq and Libya in search of options for Europe to help bring them to a close. Powerfully, it brings a rich set of regional, and some international, perspectives together to contribute to smart thinking on what Europe can do. What is in Yemen for Iran: Research associate Maysam Behravesh gives a realistic assessment of Tehran's strategic calculus in the Arabian peninsula. A time for principled pragmatism: In the volume’s analysis of the Syrian conflict, Clingendael’s senior research fellow Erwin van Veen explores possibilities for EU-Russian collaboration, together with Alexey Khlebnikov, on humanitarian aid diplomacy and fighting extremism. Although the EU and Russia are mostly at loggerheads in Syria, the authors seek to deconstruct the current political stalemate in a bid to identify the least controversial issues on which joint initiatives might be possible. In turn, this might lay a foundation for further dialogue. The alternative is ongoing confrontation.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Europe, Iran, Middle East, Yemen, North Africa, and Syria