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Begin New Search Topic Military Strategy Content Type Research Paper Publication Year within 10 Years Publication Year within 5 Years

1. Modelling Nuclear W Modelling Nuclear Weapon E eapon Effects in W ects in Wargaming Using Monte gaming Using Monte Carlo Simulations

Author:
Tyler Guetzke
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
Department of Social Sciences at West Point, United States Military Academy
Abstract:
The United States Army’s interpretation of nuclear weapon effects needs change and modernization. Wargaming exercises are commonplace in today’s military, however, despite the growing threat of non-strategic nuclear weapons (NSNW), little has been done to inform battlefield commanders on their true effects. Our research seeks to develop a tool for commanders to easily interpret quantifiable effects of a NSNW. Utilizing Monte Carlo simulation, we are developing a new methodology to analyze NSNW effects. Our model allows a commander to calculate the expected unit strength following a NSNW strike which will aid in their operational decision making ability. The Monte Carlo simulation method for analyzing nuclear effects offers a novel approach to account for variation while giving the commander an analytically interpretable output as descriptive statistics that avoids probabilities.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, and Command and Control
Political Geography:
Global Focus

2. Strategic Shifts and NATO’s new Strategic Concept

Author:
Thierry Tardy
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
NATO currently faces a fundamental challenge. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, NATO adopted a de facto strategy of political, geographical and functional extension, welcoming new members, launching operations in new regions and multiplying its activities to address new low-intensity security threats.1 However, the pillars on which this strategy rested are now weakening. Today, strategic competition has returned and NATO’s military primacy is eroding, as much due to China’s impressive military modernization as because of the diffusion of military power enabled by globalization.2 Likewise, the liberal international order which allowed NATO to endure an uncertain military balance and a competitive international system during the Cold War is also under pressure. Free trade is under attack, democracy is receding, financial stability is harder to maintain and, last but not least, a seismic redistribution of wealth and power away from the Euro-Atlantic area and towards the Asia-Pacific is underway.3 Lastly, the non-traditional security threats which characterized the post-Cold War era remain, having even expanded in number and intensity.4
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Alliance
Political Geography:
Europe and North America

3. War in Europe: preliminary lessons

Author:
Thierry Tardy
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
The 24th of February, 2022, will remain a watershed date in European history; that day, the Russian regime led by President Vladimir Putin launched a military invasion of Ukraine, marking the return of war in Europe for the first time in decades. Much of what has transpired since the war’s onset has come as a surprise, whether in its political and strategic dimensions or in operational and tactical terms. The war was not an impossibility prior to 24 February, but it was certainly viewed in the West as improbable from the perspective of a rational cost-benefit analysis. This is especially so when one considers Putin’s attempt to swallow the entirety of Ukrainian territory. The means with which Russia attempted its conquest also raise a number of questions as to its armed forces’ level of preparedness, organisation, and operational ability. Today, it is clear that Russia’s military capacity was overestimated while Ukraine’s capacity to resist was underestimated. We have witnessed Russian forces encountering difficulties in achieving their military objectives and a Ukrainian nation-state – including its armed forces and its society – determined to deny Russia any gains. Politically, the Russian regime misread the very nature of the Ukrainian nation, which proved strong and unanimous in its rejection of the Russian endeavour – even in the country’s supposedly Russian-leaning East (with the exception of part of the Donbas). For its part, the Atlantic Alliance has displayed a political unity that was admittedly lacking in recent years prior. The United States has demonstrated unequivocal commitment to the defence of Europe, while European Allies have shown both political resolve and a will to take defence spending seriously. Very little dissent or freeriding has occurred in the West. Solidarity with Ukraine has been optimal, both politically and through the delivery of weapons. Still, Allied support is constrained by the imperative of non-belligerence. NATO Allies have made it clear upfront that they have no desire to directly confront Russia, hence the rejection of a no-fly-zone or any other move carrying the risk of inadvertent escalation. That said, NATO has deployed part of its NATO Response Force and activated its defence plans. Allies have strengthened their presence in each of the enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) four existing battlegroups, and committed to the deployment of four additional battlegroups in Romania, Slovakia, Hungary and Bulgaria. 40,000 troops are officially deployed under direct NATO command on the Eastern flank as of the beginning of April, together with ships and air assets. Most importantly, the US has staged a comeback in Europe, with an overall deployment of 100,000 troops, among which approximately 20,000 have deployed since the beginning of 2022. The European Union (EU) too has acted swiftly, most notably through the imposition of sanctions on Russia in lockstep with US and UK sanctions. The EU has also flexed its muscle through the newly created European Peace Facility (EPF), which has delivered three instalments of EUR 500 million to finance the delivery of weapons to Ukraine. At the time of writing, EU states had not taken the decision to extend sanctions to oil and gas imports from Russia, unlike the US and the UK. If such a decision is taken, this would lead to a major energy crisis – and therefore economic crisis – in the whole of Europe. The war, then, raises a series of questions about the current and future European security order. First, will Western unity endure over time? What are the risks that the US or some European states will defect once the initial shock of the invasion has faded, once sanctions begin harming European economies, once the possibility of a re-engagement with Russia is floated, or once the Indo-Pacific inevitably regains US attention? Second, how will the war impact European security institutions – most notably NATO and the EU – and to what extent will the current situation positively shape the partnership between the two? Third, how resilient will Europe be in the face of a possible energy crisis provoked by the cessation of oil and gas deliveries from Russia? Fourth, from a military perspective, what lessons can be drawn from the first months of the Russian offensive regarding both Russia’s capacity (or incapacity) as a first-tier military power and in the changing (or unchanging) character of modern war? Finally, what initial lessons should we draw regarding nuclear deterrence and the Atlantic Alliance’s ability to dissuade harmful Russian nuclear-related actions? This collective Research Paper, authored by NDC Researchers and the NDC Commandant, explores these questions directly, identifying some preliminary lessons from the war. In the first chapter, Lt. Gen. Olivier Rittimann looks at the war’s potential impact on the distribution of tasks between NATO and the EU. The second chapter, written by Thierry Tardy, examines NATO’s response to Russia’s aggression and outlines implications for both the EU and for NATO’s forthcoming Strategic Concept. The third chapter, co-authored by Andrea Gilli and Pierre de Dreuzy, analyses Russia’s military performance on the Ukrainian battlefield and draws early conclusions about Russian military power. Fourth, Marc Ozawa explores the war’s impact on European energy security and Europe’s dependence on Russian oil and gas. Finally, Cynthia Salloum assesses how the crisis questions the very concept of deterrence and Allies’ ability to deter the Putin regime. This Research Paper is published alongside a series of related events and publications (notably in the Policy Brief series) that the NATO Defense College Research Division has organized in relation to the ongoing revision of the Alliance’s Strategic Concept. To that end, it arrives in tandem with an adjacent NDC study on the strategic shifts impacting NATO’s core tasks and in anticipation of a multi-authored analysis (to be released in September 2022) of the forthcoming Madrid Strategic Concept.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, International Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
Europe and North America

4. Detailed Velocity and Heat Transfer Measurements in an Advanced Gas Turbine Vane Insert Using Magnetic Resonance Velocimetry and Infrared Thermometry

Author:
Michael Benson, David Bindon, Mattias Cooper, F. Todd Davidson, . David Helmer, Robert Woodings, Benjamin Duhaime, Bret P. Van Poppel, Christopher Elkins, and John P. Clark
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
Department of Social Sciences at West Point, United States Military Academy
Abstract:
This work reports the results of paired experiments for a complex internal cooling flow within a gas turbine vane using magnetic resonance velocimetry (MRV) and steady-state infrared (IR) thermometry. A scaled model of the leading edge insert for a gas turbine vane with multi-pass impingement was designed, built using stereolithography fabrication methods, and tested using MRV techniques to collect a three-dimensional, three-component velocity field data set for a fully turbulent test case. Stagnation and recirculation zones were identified and assessed in terms of impact on potential cooling performance. A paired experiment employed an IR camera to measure the temperature profile data of a thin, heated stainless steel impingement surface modeling the inside turbine blade wall cooled by the impingement from the vane cooling insert, providing complementary data sets. The temperature data allow for the calculation of wall heat transfer (HT) characteristics, including the Nusselt number distribution for cooling performance analysis to inform design and validate computational models. Quantitative and qualitative comparisons of the paired results show that the flow velocity and cooling performance are highly coupled. Module-to-module variation in the surface Nusselt number distributions is evident, attributable to the complex interaction between transverse and impinging flows within the apparatus. Finally, a comparison with internal HT correlations is conducted using the data from Florschuetz et al. [1981, “Streamwiseflow and Heat Transfer Distributions for Jet Array Impingement With Crossflow,” ASME 1981 International Gas Turbine Conference and Products Show, American Society of Mechanical Engineers. doi:10.1115/1.3244463]. Measurement uncertainty was assessed and estimated to be approximately ±7% for velocity and ranging from ±3% to ±10% for Nusselt number.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Military Strategy, and Innovation
Political Geography:
Global Focus

5. Sharing Cyber Capabilities within the Alliance - Interoperability Through Structured Pre-Authorization Cyber

Author:
Jan Kalberg, Todd Arnold, and Stephen S. Hamilton
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
Department of Social Sciences at West Point, United States Military Academy
Abstract:
Sharing cyber weapon/cyber capabilities requires trust between the member states, becoming a high-end policy decision due to the concerns of proliferation and the investment in designing a cyber-weapon that has a limited ’shelf-life’. The digital nature of cyber weapons creates a challenge. A cyber weapon can spread quickly, either self-propagating such as worms or via disclosure (and subsequent reuse) by malware researchers or malicious actors, raising proliferation concerns. Additionally, a cyber-weapon can be copied by the adversary or reverse engineered. Once the weapon is released, the adversary will eventually address the vulnerability, and the opportunity is gone. These factors raise the threshold between member states to share cyber weapons and cyber capabilities. Alliances, like NATO, prepare for a unified multinational, multi-domain fight; meanwhile, the national cyber forces are still operating as solitaires with limited interoperability and sharing. There is a need in the collective defence posture to integrate the multinational cyber force to achieve interoperability.
Topic:
Security, NATO, Military Strategy, Cybersecurity, and Alliance
Political Geography:
Europe and North America

6. Regional security and alliances in the Middle East and the Indo-Pacific: implications for European security

Author:
Bastain Giegerich, Emile Hokayem, and Sharinee Jagtiani
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:
Regional security dynamics and the constructs to manage them are in flux around the world. Governments are attempting to address a multitude of simultaneous security challenges; determine the depth and scope of achievable and desirable security autonomy versus the unavoidable interdependencies with friends and opponents alike; and maintain a focus on their specific regional hotspots, whilst also positioning themselves for the era of systemic competition between an assertive China and the United States. This research paper analyses the challenges and implications of regional security dynamics in the Middle East and the Indo-Pacific for European security to inform discussions in NATO and the EU on their respective global role and help decide on an achievable level of ambition for dealing with partners and challengers. Against this background, both the European Union and NATO are revising their strategic guidance to produce in 2022 – in the case of the EU – the so-called Strategic Compass, a document to give further shape and substance to the Union’s international security role, and – in the case of NATO – a new Strategic Concept to replace an earlier version developed in 2010. Aspects of international order, geopolitics and regional stability will inform these documents as both organisations will need to tackle their respective global role and decide on an achievable level of ambition for dealing with partners and challengers. NATO’s 2021 Brussels Summit Communiqué suggested that NATO would work to improve its ‘ability to contribute to preserve and shape the rules-based international order in areas that are important to Allied security… [and] increase… dialogue and practical cooperation with existing partners’. In addition, NATO heads of state and government decided to ‘strengthen NATO’s ability to provide training and capacity building support to partners’. The draft Strategic Compass document debated by EU ministers in November 2021 stated that the EU would ‘bolster partnerships where they are mutually beneficial and serve EU values and interests, particularly when there is a shared commitment to an integrated approach to crises and capacity building’, and proposed a range of multilateral, regional and bilateral initiatives to deepen and strengthen partnership formats.
Topic:
Security, Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Alliance
Political Geography:
Middle East and Indo-Pacific

7. Assessing military cyber maturity: strategy, institutions and capability

Author:
Greg Austin and Jason Blessing
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:
Few governments have reached an enduring consensus on just how quickly and how deeply reforms to their military cyber forces must be made. While consensus points have been reached, these are usually tested within a short period of time by international circumstances and technological trends. The main dilemma is whether military cyber strategies and capabilities need more than routine development as just one more element of military power, or whether they warrant radical development pathways and a higher priority than others. One of the most profound influences on the evolution of a country’s military cyber forces and strategies is politics. This paper offers insights into how the governance and organisational factors of domestic politics facilitate or inhibit the dissemination of cyber concepts and capabilities throughout military forces beyond the main signals or cyber intelligence agency. There are at least three reasons to analyse military cyber maturity. The countries currently pursuing such capabilities are not satisfied with the development levels in policy and strategy they have so far reached. There is increasing potential for crippling cyber attacks on key elements of military capability or supporting infrastructure. And no country has yet succeeded in the broad dissemination of cyber capabilities through its armed forces in ways that leading military planners would like. Few governments have reached an enduring consensus on just how quickly and how deeply reforms in the armed forces must be made to satisfy national security needs. While consensus points have been reached, these are usually tested within a short period of time by inter-national circumstances and technological trends. The main dilemma is whether military cyber strategies and capabilities need more than routine development as just one more element of military power, akin to artillery or submarines; or whether they are sufficiently transformative of military power to warrant radical development pathways and a higher priority than others. This paper provides an impact matrix which can be used by governments, their armed forces and research analysts to understand the ways in which military cyber reforms can be facilitated or inhibited by governance and organisational processes.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Science and Technology, Military Strategy, Cybersecurity, and Digitization
Political Geography:
Global Focus

8. Military capabilities in Europe: a framework for assessing the qualitative dimension

Author:
Bastain Giegerich and James Hackett
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:
There is renewed focus in Europe on deterring and defending against state-level aggression. However, after decades of mainly crisis-management operations abroad, questions are being asked about the capability of European armed forces to achieve these tasks. Within the context of a deteriorating security environment, limited resources and a need for governments to better explain the benefits of defence, this report examines factors important in assessing military capability. There is particular focus on six input areas that are central to assessing the qualitative dimension of capability. The report includes contributions from seven specialists from across Europe, offering perspectives on these lines of enquiry and their relative importance to European states’ military capability now and in the future.
Topic:
Security, Military Strategy, State Building, and Resource Management
Political Geography:
Europe

9. Military ambitions and competition in space: the role of alliances

Author:
Greg Austin, Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan, and Tim Wright
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:
Emerging trends in space ambitions and capabilities of major state actors have given renewed urgency to efforts by NATO and other coalitions to build stronger alliance relations to secure shared interests in space. This report reviews the military ambitions, operations and capabilities of leading and aspiring space powers in order to assess their likely impact on alliances, partnerships or other national-security coalitions. China wants to overtake Russia as a space power by 2035 and become at least a co-equal with the United States by 2045. For its part, Russia is determined to maintain its standing as a space power. Both are testing the boundaries of the existing order in space through various actions, including weapons testing, and both are keen to demonstrate that they now have the capabilities to attack adversary space assets. Partly in response to this, in 2020 the US declared its intention to radically reshape the operating environment of space to better meet its interests, while its allies and partners have announced new space ambitions as well. India and Japan are setting new strategic goals for space policy in response to China’s threatening behaviour. France is positioning itself to climb higher up the ladder of military space power, while the United Kingdom and Germany have set new aspirations for economic gain and further influence on the diplomatic aspects of space. In this environment, military alliances have become more prominent in shaping space policy. The US has stepped up its engagement with other governments, either through existing alliances or new partnerships, to secure its interests. China and Russia, which have few allies of relevance, except perhaps each other, are concentrating on constraining the effectiveness of the United States’ alliances. The three space powers harbour renewed fears of technological surprise by their rivals, and this makes sharing research on space warfare among allies more important than ever. For example, testing of the most visible space weapons, direct-ascent anti-satellite (ASAT) missiles, is escalating – and this is now only one of more than 20 forms of attack on space assets being tested or already in place. But there remain questions about how to achieve scale and military effect using all these methods for wartime operations, including kinetic ASAT weapons: would China or Russia be able to launch successful attacks against the entire military satellite fleet of the US (all 173 units) in the opening stages of a war? Assuming they could not, what proportion of the fleet would have to be disabled for the attack to have a positive military or strategic effect for the attacker?
Topic:
Security, Military Strategy, Conflict, Space, Strategic Competition, and Territory
Political Geography:
Global Focus

10. Challenges to NATO's Nuclear Strategy

Author:
Andrea Gilli
Publication Date:
12-2021
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
In 2022, NATO will present its new Strategic Concept. Since 2010, when the previous Strategic Concept was published, NATO and the world have changed significantly. At the time, NATO was primarily engaged in crisis management, including in operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Strategic Concept enabled the Alliance to further expand – conceptually and geographically – its out-of-area activities, together with the core tasks of cooperative security. Eleven years later, the dominant paradigm of international politics is great power competition: in other words, countries like Russia and China are competing with the West strategically, economically, militarily, and in terms of values. Many things have remained constant, however: one is the centrality of nuclear weapons for NATO’s deterrence and defence posture. Since 2010, Allies have continued to affirm that as long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO will remain a nuclear alliance, notwithstanding the Alliance’s ultimate goal of a world free of nuclear weapons.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Europe and North America

11. NATO and the future of arms control

Author:
Dominik P. Jankowski
Publication Date:
11-2021
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
The crisis of arms control1 is obvious and broadly discussed among states, within the world’s expert community and to a lesser extent the media. This crisis has at least three building blocks: Russia continues to violate or undermine key arms control treaties and commitments; China rejects to join the existing arms control architecture; and both countries heavily invest in the modernization of their armed forces, including development of the nuclear arsenals. In the current highly competitive environment, arms control is more difficult to achieve and is likely to accomplish less than what was optimistically anticipated a generation ago. The growing pressure to “save arms control at all cost”, often expressed by the Western expert community, further complicates the situation. The excessively aspirational and ideological approach to arms control – in which arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation (ADN) become a silver bullet solution – is as dangerous as security and defence policies which entirely exclude ADN. As James Cameron rightly points out, “history should teach policy-makers to look beyond formulae for strategic stability to other ways in which arms control can help to contain disruptive challenges to the balance of power and minimize the chances of war”.2 This Research Paper analyzes the past, present, and future of arms control in the Euro- Atlantic region, through an examination of what arms control actually does well, and what it does not do. It puts an emphasis on the role of NATO Allies in this regard, based on the Alliance’s past experience and taking into consideration current multilateral and multi- domain environment. The paper is based on three assumptions. First, arms control is not dead and its goals remain valid. Second, arms control is a policy tool, not an end in itself. In practice, for NATO Allies it means that any decisions on arms control must reflect the requirements of the Allies’ strategy of deterrence and defence. Third, in their approach o arms control, NATO Allies should be guided by the principles of security, stability, and verification.3
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Military Strategy, and Alliance
Political Geography:
Europe and North America

12. The Crisis After the Crisis: How Ladakh Will Shape India’s Competition with China

Author:
Arzan Tarapore
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center
Abstract:
In May 2020, China launched several near-simultaneous incursions across the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in Ladakh, into territory hitherto controlled by India. Both sides reinforced their positions with tens of thousands of troops, engaged in a deadly skirmish, and reportedly came close to war. An agreement to disengage troops was announced in February 2021, but implementation has been halting. Regardless of how disengagement progresses, the crisis poses significant challenges for India’s long-term strategic competition with China. As a result of the Ladakh crisis, India faces a new strategic reality in which China is a clear and abiding adversary. For India, the political relationship is now defined by hostility and distrust, and the LAC will remain more heavily militarised and violence-prone. Given this new reality, India is likely to further defer military modernisation and maritime expansion into the Indian Ocean. In the face of unremitting Chinese naval expansion, India risks losing significant political and military leverage in the Indian Ocean. At the same time, China appears to have escaped significant harm. Its better-resourced military could better absorb the material costs of the mobilisation. It may have been more concerned by the prospect of an increasingly hostile India, but the disengagement agreement has limited even those modest political costs. The central policy challenge for India is balancing the heightened Chinese military threat on the northern border with the rapidly growing Chinese military presence in the Indian Ocean. It can manage this challenge by focusing on military strategies of denial rather than punishment, focusing on imposing political rather than material costs on China, and accepting more risk at the LAC in exchange for long-term leverage in the Indian Ocean region. How India responds will shape not only its strategic competition with China, but also the interests of likeminded partners including Australia, which depend on an increasingly capable and active India.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Military Strategy, Territorial Disputes, Hegemony, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
China, India, and Asia

13. Scientific Risk Assessment of Genetic Weapons Systems

Author:
Richard Pilch, Jill Luster, Miles A. Pomper, and Timothy Shaw
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:
For any emerging technology, defense and homeland security analysts strive to understand (1) its dual-use potential, meaning whether the same research and technology applied for peaceful purposes may be diverted to illicit ends, for example to develop a weapon; (2) the State and sub-State actors with access to that dual-use potential, whether peacefully or illicitly directed; and (3) motivational factors and indicators of intent that might suggest these actors would divert the emerging technology to illicit ends. Precision medicine represents one such emerging technical space. Precision medicine is defined as medical care designed to optimize benefit for particular groups, especially based on genetic (or molecular) profiling. A long-speculated but incompletely understood dual-use consideration of precision medicine is the possible development of a genetic weapon system, defined as a weapon system designed to optimize effect on particular groups based on genetic profiling. This Occasional Paper assesses the potential for precision medicine to be diverted to develop a population-specific genetic weapon system, examines relevant state capabilities and motivations to pursue such an effort, and offers policy recommendations to manage the dual-use implications of this emerging biomedical field while still preserving its potential benefit for human welfare.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Science and Technology, Military Strategy, Weapons, and Emerging Technology
Political Geography:
Global Focus

14. Implications of Russia’s Activities in the Middle East and North Africa Region for U.S. Strategy and Interests

Author:
Chen Kane and Miles A. Pomper
Publication Date:
12-2021
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:
Russia’s ability to project power into the region remains limited today, and the status quo seems tolerable. But there are risks to U.S. interests in the future. The United States’ military withdrawals from Afghanistan, the Gulf and Iraq have significantly affected both U.S. regional posture and perceptions of U.S. commitment. Against that backdrop, the United States confronts multiple challenges as it seeks to “do more with less” in the region. Russia’s opportunities in the region increase as U.S. involvement decreases. Moscow’s “low investment, high disruption” approach works because it leverages the self-interest of actors, stakeholders, and governments in pursuit of limited aims. The U.S. approach of “high investment, low disruption” to preserve favorable regional balances of power is more costly and affords the United States less latitude, since it is rooted in principles and values. Russia is well-positioned (along with China) to undermine U.S. interests incrementally. That is true in MENA itself and, given the impact of Russia’s activities in this region for U.S. strategic advantages, in other regions of importance to the U.S., such as Europe and Asia. Countering Moscow’s efforts now should, therefore, be an important element of a revised and more comprehensive, yet also tailored, U.S. approach to the MENA region. What is needed is an adapted approach that leverages the United States’ comparative advantages to mitigate Moscow’s influence and that includes shifting some of the current U.S. presence to a more agile and unpredictable posture. Throughout the report, regional countries are categorized into four groups reflecting their anticipated vulnerability to Russian influence-building: (1) “Russia’s friends” (Iran and Syria); (2) “Balancers critical to NATO’s power projection” (Libya and Turkey); (3) “U.S. friends requiring sustained attention” (Egypt and Iraq); and (4) “U.S. allies seeking limited engagement with Russia” (the GCC and Israel). The U.S. should tailor its efforts to: contain Russia’s influence in Iran and Syria, roll back Russia’s influence in Libya and Turkey, manage Russia’s influence — especially on the military and defense sectors —in Egypt and Iraq, and offer reassurance to the GCC and Israel in order to minimize Russian influence in those countries.
Topic:
Military Strategy, Hegemony, Conflict, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Africa, Russia, Europe, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

15. Corrosion Evaluation of a Navy MK50 Weapon Station Friction Brake Assembly

Author:
Ruby L. Romsland and Kenneth McDonald
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
Department of Social Sciences at West Point, United States Military Academy
Abstract:
The presence of corrosion on or within structures is of major concern as corrosion reduces the integrity of the materials which could potentially result in large-scale failures of structures and equipment. The United States Navy is an organization that actively works to prevent large equipment failure due to corrosion. One such problem is the corrosion of the friction brake assembly on the MK50 Weapon Station, which has recently been experiencing corrosion between the friction brake and its set screw preventing it from operating correctly. The friction brake was known to be stainless steel; however, the set screw was of unknown composition. Through elemental analysis it was determined that the MK50 Weapons Station friction brake set screw was similar in composition to commonly available black oxide coated steel screws. Electrochemical polarization measurements of the friction brake assembly components revealed that the set screw and the friction brake were electrochemically dissimilar metals which resulted in the galvanic corrosion of the assembly when out at sea. The electrochemical polarization measurements of a stainless steel screw showed a corrosion potential similar to that of the friction brake; therefore, replacing the current set screw with a stainless steel screw would decrease the galvanic potential difference between the set screw and the friction brake. This proposed solution is expected to slow or prevent further corrosion of the MK50 Weapon Station ensuring the combat readiness of the equipment.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Military Strategy, Navy, and Engineering
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

16. Managing the looming missile-proliferation problem in the Asia-Pacific

Author:
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Publication Date:
03-2021
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:
In light of the range of capabilities that contemporary missile systems and associated technologies can provide, it is unsurprising that more and more states around the world aspire to acquire them. In the Asia-Pacific, the involvement of the three major nuclear powers – China, Russia and the United States – as well as middle powers make the situation even more complex and unstable. When the US withdrew from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty on 2 August 2019, the Asia-Pacific seemed to enter a ‘post-INF’ era in which regional states may face dim prospects for arms control and potentially a fierce theatre-level, missile-led arms race. This essay reviews emerging trends in missile proliferation and analyses the relevant risks of these trends before assessing some of the mechanisms that address proliferation challenges. It then explores ways of curbing and even reversing these trends from a Chinese perspective. It is increasingly clear that since 2010 the world has been undergoing a period of nuclear modernisation and missile proliferation. The US and Russia, which possess the majority of the world’s nuclear weapons, have both recently accelerated efforts to modernise their respective nuclear arsenals. As highlighted in the 2018 US Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) and the subsequent policy and budget decisions of former US president Donald Trump, Washington has abandoned a pledge – made by former president Barack Obama − to abstain from researching and deploying new kinds of nuclear warheads. Since then, the US has deployed a low-yield nuclear warhead (W76-2) on a submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) in late 2019 and begun to redevelop a nuclear sea-launched cruise missile (SLCM) as another key component of its nuclear-modernisation plan. For the air-leg of the US triad, the US Air Force received a final proposal for the Long-Range Standoff Weapon (LRSO) in November 2020 ahead of its preparations to seek approval for the system’s development. The LRSO is a nuclear-armed cruise missile intended to serve as a replacement for the AGM-86B air-launched cruise missile (ALCM). Furthermore, the US also tested a groundlaunched cruise missile (GLCM) in August 2019 and a ground-launched intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) in December 2019 following Washington’s withdrawal from the INF Treaty. All these capabilities are deemed by the US to be effective measures to counter a limited nuclear attack from Russia or China. Russia, which maintains a stockpile of approximately 4,310 warheads assigned for use and an estimated further 2,060 awaiting retirement and dismantlement, is in the middle of a decades-long nuclear-forces modernisation programme. This modernisation also incorporates the addition of new types of strategic delivery systems, which were unveiled by Russian President Vladimir Putin in March 2018. These include a new nuclear-armed hypersonic glide vehicle (HGV), Avangard, a nuclear-powered and nuclear-armed cruise missile, Burevestnik, a new anti-ship hypersonic cruise missile, Zircon, and a nuclear-powered and nuclear-tipped uninhabited underwater delivery vehicle, Poseidon.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Missile Defense
Political Geography:
Asia-Pacific

17. The Nagorno-Karabakh war: a spur to Moscow’s UAV efforts?

Author:
Julian Cooper
Publication Date:
03-2021
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:
For Russian observers and analysts, the 44-day war in 2020 between Azerbaijan and Armenia highlighted the comparative lack in Russia’s own armed uninhabited aerial vehicle (UAV) inventory, as well as the patchy performance of Russian-made short-range ground-based air-defence systems in countering UAVs. Nearly two decades after the US began to operate armed UAVs and as the number of countries possessing armed UAVs around the world steadily increases, Russia has yet to field a similar capability. Factors contributing to this failing include the collapse of Russian defence spending in the 1990s, the more recent focus on recapitalising in-service capabilities, the neglect of some of the required-technology building blocks for UAV systems, and Western sanctions. In 2009 Russia imported ten small Birdeye 400 and two larger Searcher Mk II UAVs and the associated ground-control and support systems from Israel. In September 2011 the Defence Ministry opened a tender for ISR and armed UAVs, and a far higher-performance uninhabited combat air vehicle (UCAV) with Sukhoi eventually being the preferred UCAV developer. Two medium-altitude long-endurance designs were selected, the Kronstadt Orion (Inokhodets-BLA) single-engine UAV, and the now-UWCA Altius twin-engine platform. As of early-2021, neither project has entered service in significant numbers. Engine-supply issues have been a contributory factor. For Moscow, the task of producing a modern, competitive small piston engine suitable for UAV applications has represented a challenge. This engine-supply problem is rooted in a decades-long focus on advanced propulsion technologies at the cost of the humble piston engine, and – at the time – the capacity to source these from elsewhere within the USSR. By the time the gap was beginning to be recognised in the 1990s funding was not available to revive the domestic development of piston aeroengines. Other contributing factors to the Russian UAV gap include the fact that relatively cheap piston engines for UAVs lack the prestige to command resources and administrative authority, especially in a decision-making system where the development of advanced weapons appears to be in the hands of a relatively small circle of people with little involvement of civilian experts. Inter-service rivalry may also have hindered the introduction of ISR and armed UAVs into the inventory. Given the extended difficulties Russia has had in getting ISR and armed UAVs into service there remains a question as to why it has not turned more to the international market to address the capability gap. While Beijing might have been willing to supply armed UAVs to Russia, this would have required Moscow to purchase from what was previously a client state in terms of weapons sales. It would also be considered a tacit admission it was lagging China in UAV development. In addition, for all its difficulties, Russia may well still view the UAV-export market as one it could enter. In this context China would be a competitor. The Nagorno-Karabakh war and Russia’s experience in Syria have underscored the challenges to current ground-based air-defence systems when defending against UAVs and loitering munitions. Along with gun and missile-based counters the Defence Ministry is looking at electronic countermeasures. A more novel approach has been to look at using certain UAVs as a counter measure. Training now also includes more counter-UAV activities.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Russia and Europe

18. Open-source analysis of Iran’s missile and UAV capabilities and proliferation

Author:
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:
Iran’s ballistic missile systems, supplemented by cruise missiles and UAVs, are intended not only for deterrence, but for battle, including by Iran’s regional partners. In a new report, the IISS provides a detailed assessment of Iran’s missiles, and the manner and purposes for which it has been proliferating them. Nuclear issues are the exclusive focus of the negotiations on the restoration of the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, which have taken place in Vienna. The Western powers are keen, however, to engage in follow-on talks to address Iran’s missiles and activities in the region. To inform the public policy debate on the latter matters, the IISS has produced a fact-rich technical assessment of Iran’s current missile and uninhabited aerial vehicle (UAV) capabilities and its proliferation of these technologies to Iran’s regional partners.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Military Strategy, Nonproliferation, and Missile Defense
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East

19. Missile multinational: Iran’s new approach to missile proliferation

Author:
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:
How does Iran equip its proxies and allies with increasingly sophisticated and longer-range ballistic missiles and artillery rockets? Fabian Hinz considers Iran’s new missile-proliferation strategy. The proliferation of ballistic missiles and artillery rockets to non-state actors by the Islamic Republic of Iran is a constant source of tension in the Middle East. Yemen’s Houthi rebels conduct ballistic-missile strikes on Saudi Arabian cities, airports and oil installations; Hizbullah’s ever-growing rocket and missile arsenal sparks Israeli consideration of military options; and Iranian proxies rocket the United States’ installations in Iraq on an almost weekly basis. But how does Iran equip its proxies and allies with increasingly sophisticated and longer-range ballistic missiles and artillery rockets? For years, the answer has been through smuggling. In one example, on 19 March 2021 Saudi Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Adel al-Jubeir claimed that all Houthi missiles fired at the Kingdom were ‘made in Iran’, and there is ample evidence that Houthis were the recipients of weapons such as Iran’s short-range Qiam ballistic missile. Iran doubtlessly continues to directly transfer missiles outside its borders to some degree. However, in recent years smuggling has been augmented by two other transfer methods: the provision of guidance kits to modify existing stockpiles of artillery rockets, and the wholescale provision of manufacturing capabilities. Iranian support for enabling local rocket production is not new. Reports about the rocket arsenals of Palestinian factions in Gaza regularly cite Iranian assistance for domestic manufacturing, and Hizbullah’s alleged missile factory in the Beqaa Valley became the topic of competing accusations in the Israeli–Hizbullah relationship. However, closer examination of Iranian sources, documents likely leaked by Israeli intelligence and the missiles unveiled by the Houthis reveal a strategy of empowering Iranian proxies that is more comprehensive than previously thought. In cooperation with Iran’s missile industry, the Quds Force (QF) of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) appears intent on enabling all its main proxies to be able to autonomously manufacture artillery rockets and precision-guided missiles. Also, a special development effort seems to be aimed at creating simple artillery rockets and short-range-missile systems and production units custom-tailored for local production.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Military Strategy, and Missile Defense
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East

20. Missile developments in South Asia: a perspective from Pakistan

Author:
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:
India and Pakistan continue to develop their missile-delivery systems and associated nuclear inventories, raising concerns of a regional arms race. While Indian doctrine appears intended to fight a ‘two-front war’ against Pakistan and China, the extent to which India’s missile inventory is balanced, or otherwise, is a cause of disquiet in Islamabad. Many of the new missile systems being added to India’s inventory appear to be more suited to target Pakistan than China. This disconnect between India’s threat perception and missile developments not only risks eroding the credibility of its deterrence posture vis-à-vis China, but also courts an action–reaction dynamic with Pakistan. Islamabad, in response to how it views Indian developments, is in turn making qualitative improvements to its missile arsenal, with the intention of deterring limited conflict to an all-out war. The resultant arms race in the missile arena, however, is moving on two different trajectories. This paper discusses ongoing missile developments in South Asia, and how India and Pakistan have used different delivery systems as signalling mechanisms during past crises in an attempt to achieve their respective military or political objectives. It is also useful to examine Pakistan’s posture of Full-Spectrum Deterrence (FSD) in the context of India’s Cold Start doctrine, introduced in 2004 and apparently intended to allow India to explore options for a limited war in cases where there is a risk of crossing the nuclear threshold. The paper also reviews whether doctrinal ambiguities can be discerned in India’s declaratory nuclear policies, especially New Delhi’s claim of maintaining a credible minimum deterrence (CMD) and how this can be squared with the goal of being able to cope with a ‘two-front war’.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, Missile Defense, and Rivalry
Political Geography:
Pakistan, China, India, and Asia

21. The evolving nature of China’s military diplomacy: from visits to vaccines

Author:
Meia Nouwens
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:
The People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) military-to-military cooperation in response to the global coronavirus pandemic signals a growing role for the military within China’s diplomatic activities. Historically, the PLA played a minor role in Chinese foreign policy. However, in the wake of a more nationalist and assertive Chinese foreign policy, the PLA’s role in national diplomacy and security strategy has grown to serve both strategic and operational goals and has reached new heights in the context of the coronavirus pandemic. Military-to-military COVID-19-related engagement has taken place within a larger context of Beijing’s expanded diplomatic efforts to improve China’s global reputation following its initial delayed and mishandled response at the start of the coronavirus outbreak in 2020. Publicly available data shows that COVID-19 military diplomacy began in March 2020, when the PLA sent protective equipment and clothing to Iran. In February 2021, the PLA began to donate COVID-19 vaccines to overseas militaries. The PLA’s vaccine assistance to 13 countries globally fits within a wider vaccine-centric diplomatic effort by the Chinese government but so far has been far smaller in scale. Between March 2020 and April 2021, the PLA has provided military medical assistance or donations to 56 countries around the world, and a United Nations peacekeeping mission. In all but two cases, the PLA’s medical diplomatic activities were directed at countries belonging to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Geographically, the PLA mostly engaged with countries in the Asia–Pacific and Africa. The focus on the BRI and South–South diplomacy also reflects China’s wider diplomatic narrative and foreign policy objectives. The PLA’s activities were usually framed within the ‘responsible stakeholder’ narrative that China sought to promote through its civilian aid diplomacy. It is likely that the PLA sought to cooperate with militaries wherever it could and focussed on countries with which it already enjoyed established friendly relations, rather than using the PLA’s military diplomacy to establish new strategic relations. The PLA’s military diplomatic activities relating to the coronavirus demonstrate that the PLA will increasingly play a greater role in China’s foreign diplomacy, in line with President Xi’s instructions.
Topic:
Security, Diplomacy, Military Strategy, and Hegemony
Political Geography:
China and Asia

22. Nuclear deterrence and stability in South Asia: perceptions and realities

Author:
Antoine Levesques
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:
This IISS report examines nuclear deterrence and stability in South Asia by separating perceptions from facts in order to assess the extent to which India and Pakistan may be at risk from imprudent or mistaken use of nuclear weapons. The authors start from an uncomfortable truth: chance played an important ameliorative role in the February 2019 India–Pakistan security crisis. India and Pakistan risk stumbling into using their nuclear weapons through miscalculation or misinterpretation in a future crisis. This report presents evidence suggesting grave deficiencies and asymmetries in India’s and Pakistan’s nuclear doctrines, which are compounded by mutual disbelief, existing and emerging military capabilities, and the prolonged absence of related dialogue mechanisms. India and Pakistan are seeking new technologies and capabilities that dangerously undermine each other’s defence under the nuclear threshold. Whatever they learn from past crises, the uncharted territory they are now exploring requires enlightened judgement about their doctrines, their nuclear and conventional capabilities, and their unpredictable implications in future crises. India and Pakistan already possess sufficient nuclear weapons to ensure a robust, largely stable mutual nuclear deterrence. Nuclear expansion casts doubt on stated policies of minimalism, risks a high-cost arms race in the post-pandemic era and may put overall deterrence stability at risk. China’s evolving profile as a nuclear-weapons state is compounding India’s security challenges. Yet control over the drivers of the India–Pakistan nuclear-deterrence and stability equation remains almost entirely in the hands of leaders in New Delhi and Islamabad. Only India and Pakistan can choose to creatively overcome the challenges to adopting new risk-reduction measures, as an imperfect but realistic stopgap until trust-building and eventual political dialogue make arms control possible. This report identifies a list of potentially useful confidence-building measures (CBMs) and other practical steps both countries could take early on. It concludes that a robust, trusted, reliable, deniable backchannel between their leaderships is the most promising means by which India and Pakistan could achieve greater strategic and nuclear-deterrence stability. This is in their interests and operationalising it is their decision. Such a mechanism should help avoid or mitigate the costs of any future crisis as well as eventually help India and Pakistan to adopt new CBMs on the way to building greater trust.
Topic:
Security, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
South Asia and Asia

23. DPRK strategic capabilities and security on the Korean Peninsula: looking ahead

Author:
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:
Believing that Russian–US cooperation could play an important role in developing and implementing proposals for denuclearisation and creating lasting peace on the Korean Peninsula, the Moscow-based Center for Energy and Security Studies and the IISS undertook a joint assessment of North Korea’s progress in developing nuclear and missile capabilities and an examination of possible international steps towards a solution. The spectre of nuclear war has haunted the Korean Peninsula for nearly seven decades. In November 1950, United States president Harry Truman publicly raised the option of using nuclear weapons in the Korean War. For about 40 years after the war, the US deployed several types of tactical nuclear weapons in the Republic of Korea (ROK, or South Korea). The ROK and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK, or North Korea) also launched their own nuclear-weapons programmes. While Seoul abandoned its dedicated weapons effort soon after ROK president Park Chung-hee was assassinated in October 1979, Pyongyang persisted, announcing its withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 2003 and subsequently making rapid progress in building up nuclear and missile capabilities, while enshrining a nuclear-armed status in the country’s constitution. In September 2017, North Korea’s sixth nuclear test achieved a thermonuclear yield. Two months later, the DPRK launched a Hwasong-15 ballistic missile, which Pyongyang says is an intercontinental weapon system that can reach the entire US mainland. At that point, North Korea announced that its mission to build its nuclear forces was accomplished. The year 2017 saw military escalation on the Korean Peninsula reach an unprecedented level in the post-Korean War period. Many analysts believed that the situation had become the most volatile since the 1968 USS Pueblo crisis, or even since the end of Korean War hostilities in 1953. Some experts drew parallels with the Cuban Missile Crisis. Given Russia’s historical relationship with North Korea and the US alliance with South Korea, Moscow and Washington have special roles to play in promoting stability on the Korean Peninsula. As permanent members of the UN Security Council and depository states of the NPT, Russia and the US also bear special responsibility for upholding peace and international security. Their joint efforts, along with other major powers, were instrumental, for example, in resolving the crisis over the Iranian nuclear programme through the adoption of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in July 2015. Despite US president Donald Trump’s decision in May 2018 to take the US out of the JCPOA, the deal remains a model of what can be achieved through multilateral diplomacy, especially when US–Russian cooperation is harnessed to promote nuclear non-proliferation. Similarly, should the key players demonstrate the political will to seek a sustainable solution to the security problems on the Korean Peninsula, Russian–US cooperation in a multilateral framework could play an important role in developing and implementing proposals. The opportunities are clear. For example, more than 67 years since the shooting stopped, the Korean War still remains officially unresolved. The Armistice Agreement of 1953 has yet to be replaced by a proper peace treaty or a more comprehensive accord. In these circumstances, the Moscow-based Center for Energy and Security Studies (CENESS) and the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) agreed in 2017 to conduct a joint assessment of North Korea’s progress in developing nuclear and missile capabilities. They also undertook to develop proposals on possible international steps to facilitate the denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula and create lasting peace and security mechanisms. The two parties began their work in January 2018 and completed it in about 33 months. They received valuable assistance from a Russian working group led by CENESS and a US working group led by the IISS. The two working groups included former military officials, diplomats, nuclear specialists and scholars specialising in Korean studies. The two groups worked independently, then compared and consolidated their drafts. The results are summarised in this joint report prepared by the project co-chairs. All the contributing experts, listed in annexes one and two, participated in a personal capacity. The report does not necessarily reflect the views of all the experts involved in the study, or of the organisations they represent. CENESS and IISS hope that the report will serve as a catalyst for further discussions between researchers and officials on possible measures to reduce tensions and nuclear-related risks and build confidence in the region. We also hope that the report will help to facilitate discussions on how to promote pragmatic and effective Russian–US cooperation, an aim which has also been emphasised by the leadership of the two countries.
Topic:
Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Asia, South Korea, North Korea, North America, and United States of America

24. Missile arms-racing and insecurity in the Asia-Pacific

Author:
Masako Ikegami
Publication Date:
08-2021
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:
Although the INF Treaty was originally intended to reverse the deployment of Soviet and US missiles in Europe, its demise may be felt more keenly in the Asia-Pacific where a missile arms race is arguably already under way. The development of new missile technologies has implications for stability as the region’s nuclear-weapons states could see them as threats to the credibility and survivability of their second-strike systems. This could trigger a diversification of missile systems across different platforms or an increase in the number of warheads and launchers to complicate an adversary’s targeting options. The Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty ended on 2 August 2019 due to the United States’ withdrawal over long-standing concerns of Russian violations. The agreement between Russia and the US had prohibited the development and deployment of ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometres. Although the implementation of the INF Treaty was originally motivated to reverse the deployment of Soviet and US medium-and intermediate-range ground-launched missiles in Europe, its demise may be felt more keenly in the Asia-Pacific. Despite its primary rationale that Russia’s prolonged violation of the treaty rendered it void, then US president Donald Trump’s administration also cited China as an ancillary reason behind its decision to suspend its treaty obligations. As China was not a party to the INF Treaty, Beijing has been free to make substantial quantitative and qualitative improvements in its medium- and intermediate-range missile arsenal as an important part of its strategy to counter the US and allies’ military power in Asia. Following Washington’s decision to withdraw from the INF Treaty, US policymakers made it clear that they intend to counter China’s growing capabilities by deploying to the region additional missile defences and the previously prohibited classes of ground-launched surface-to-surface systems that now are under development. China’s ballistic-and cruise-missile arsenal, however, is viewed with concern beyond just Washington. Other regional states such as Australia and India also regard the expansion of China’s missile forces with unease, resulting in Canberra and New Delhi developing their own missile systems in response. In the case of the latter this could have downstream effects by causing Pakistan to adjust its own nuclear and conventional missile forces in response, illustrating the potential possibilities and consequences of action/reaction dynamics in Asia spiralling into regional arms-racing. Although the erosion of the arms-control architecture provided in part by the INF Treaty could potentially herald the beginning of more sustained arms-racing in the Asia-Pacific, a regional competition is arguably already under way. The proliferation of conventional and nuclear ballistic missiles in the region is not only apparent in China’s force structure, but also across Northeast Asia, which has had immediate and associated implications in the local and wider region. Developments in North Korea’s nuclear and missile programmes have been especially destabilising, given fears that Pyongyang could threaten the use of nuclear weapons in a conventional conflict were the survival of the Kim Jong-un regime in question. Cumulatively, North Korea’s strengthened missile forces have caused the US and its allies and partners in the region, especially Japan and South Korea, to pursue countermeasures, including strengthening missile defences and developing counterforce capabilities. Doctrines regarding the use of conventional precision attack have also correspondingly shifted, with South Korea embracing the option of using pre-emptive conventional counterforce strikes to deter missile attacks from North Korea. Japan, however, continues to debate how its armed forces might utilise the long-range strike capabilities that Tokyo is pursuing. Some of these developments, especially improved missile-defence capabilities, have resulted in a diplomatic and economic response from China, as Beijing argued that some of these measures undermine its strategic deterrent. China has also warned US allies in the region of possible repercussions if they decide to host US missiles previously proscribed by the INF Treaty. There is therefore the potential that decisions by some regional states to develop their missile capabilities might not only result in immediate action–reaction responses by the instigator’s adversaries, but also wider cumulative consequences undermining the security of multiple states across the region. Against this backdrop, emerging missile technologies carry additional risks and implications for regional stability. As part of a trend that one analyst has described as a ‘missile renaissance’, hypersonic boost-glide vehicle and cruise-missile technologies are being pursued by several states in the Asia-Pacific region, including Australia, China, India, Japan, Russia and the US. The development of these technologies has implications for regional stability since they could be seen as threats to the credibility and survivability of second-strike systems of the region’s nuclear-weapons states, potentially triggering a diversification of nuclear systems across different platforms or an increase in the number of nuclear warheads and launchers to complicate an adversary’s targeting options
Topic:
Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Military Strategy, and Missile Defense
Political Geography:
Asia

25. Cruise missiles in the Middle East

Author:
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:
While both the proliferation and combat use of ballistic missiles in the Middle East have attracted a lot of attention, cruise missiles remain an often-overlooked regional proliferation challenge. Once the exclusive realm of the Middle East’s sole nuclear power, Israel, the proliferation of cruise-missile systems has steadily picked up pace in the last two decades. Iran and Turkey have joined Israel in the club of nations developing and producing their own cruise missiles, with the United Arab Emirates (UAE) appearing to take first steps in this direction. Other countries, such as Algeria, Egypt, Kuwait, Qatar and Saudi Arabia, have already purchased cruise missiles from abroad or appear intent on doing so in the near future. This trend is not limited to state actors, however. With strong technical and material support from Iran, Yemen’s Houthi rebels have employed cruise missiles in their ongoing missile and uninhabited aerial vehicle (UAV) campaign against the Saudi-led coalition. The drivers of cruise-missile proliferation in the region are as diverse as the systems themselves. Their ability to evade or overcome defensive systems makes them an attractive option in a region experiencing a proliferation of increasingly advanced surface-to-air missiles as well as ballistic-missile-defence systems. Cruise missiles also give actors that lack modern air forces the ability to strike targets deep inside the territory of better-equipped adversaries. They are therefore well suited to serve as tools of asymmetric warfare as well as asymmetric deterrence. At the same time, however, they have also become an essential piece of weaponry for advanced modern fighter jets and therefore a logical choice for countries already operating highly capable air forces. Naval-based cruise missiles offer a long-range strike capability for expeditionary warfare and serve as a tool for regional power projection. In the case of Israel, submarine-launched cruise missiles also serve as the primary pillar of the country’s nuclear second-strike capability. However, the drivers of cruise-missile proliferation go beyond narrow military needs and considerations. Several Middle Eastern states are engaged in ambitious efforts to develop local arms industries, with precision-guided munitions, aerial stand-off weaponry and UAVs being a particular focus. Benefiting from the existing technological overlap with these systems, cruise missiles represent both an attractive and realistic option for ambitious military-development projects. They are also an advanced weapons system whose production and development was for a long time limited to a small number of highly developed countries, thus lending their producers considerable prestige. There is little doubt that cruise missiles have an impact on regional stability. As with other uninhabited systems, cruise missiles do not entail the risk of human losses for their users, and this factor potentially lowers the threshold for their use. Cruise missiles’ ability to evade detection and interception, and their effectiveness in conducting long-range precision strikes, might also provide incentives for the adoption of pre-emptive strategies, thus lending another element of instability to local crises. Most importantly, however, cruise missiles – like ballistic missiles and, to some extent, UAVs – defy traditional air superiority and by extension the military hierarchies associated with it. They can therefore serve as powerful tools for actors seeking to upend existing military balances, and they incentivise attempts to so.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Military Strategy, and Missile Defense
Political Geography:
Middle East

26. Emerging Challenges for European Security and Defence

Author:
Douglas Barrie and Ben Barry
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:
The challenges of climate change for the military and the security aspects of space are the latest critical issues explored as part of a joint programme between the IISS and the Hanns Seidel Foundation. On 23 and 24 June 2021 the Hanns Seidel Foundation and the IISS held the fourth meeting of the High-Level Study Group on the Future Defence of Europe. While earlier sessions of the study group had focused on threat perceptions, military capabilities, the implications of intensifying great-power competition, and the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on European defence, the growing impact of climate change on defence and security was the focus of the first day’s discussion. The second day considered developments in space exploitation, and the challenges and opportunities this raises for defence and security. The following paper draws on these discussions and includes the key themes and topics that were raised.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Strategic Stability
Political Geography:
Europe

27. Revitalising arms control: the MTCR and the HCoC

Author:
William Alberque
Publication Date:
11-2021
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:
The paper examines the two most important multilateral frameworks for curbing the spread of uninhabited aerial systems (missiles and UAVs) capable of delivering large conventional payloads and weapons of mass destruction – the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCoC). Specifically, the paper discusses the origins and history of the MTCR and HCoC, their evolution over time (or lack thereof) and seeks to measure them against their intended goals. In the end, it urges for radical reform, but also provides suggested incremental changes that should be enacted immediately. It includes analysis of several specific regional security issues and related action–reaction defence-modernisation trends. This paper was drafted within the framework of the Missile Dialogue Initiative (MDI). The MDI was launched by the German Federal Foreign Office in 2019 and is administered by the IISS. The MDI has created a Track 1.5 dialogue (government and non-government experts working together) to contribute to state-level discussions of potential policy responses to the accelerating spread of missile capabilities to state and non-state actors. The MDI appears in the context of the erosion of the global and regional arms-control architecture and during a period of rapid technological change, which includes the evolution and spread of new, advanced missile systems that have contributed to growing instability.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Military Strategy, Conflict, Missile Defense, and Instability
Political Geography:
Global Focus

28. Leading edge: key drivers of defence innovation and the future of operational advantage

Author:
Simona R. Soare and Fabrice Pothier
Publication Date:
11-2021
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:
The ability to develop and integrate emerging and disruptive technologies in defence is rapidly becoming a metric of success in the global competition for power. In this paper, Simona R. Soare and Fabrice Pothier provide a systematic conceptualisation of defence innovation. By empirically analysing innovation efforts in five countries – notably, China, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States – the paper identifies and analyses four key drivers of defence innovation, provides a better understanding of how the five nations prioritise among them, and explores how they are linked to future operational advantage.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Science and Technology, Military Strategy, Innovation, and Strategic Stability
Political Geography:
Global Focus

29. Armed uninhabited aerial vehicles and the challenges of autonomy

Author:
Douglas Barrie, Oskar Glaese, Niklas Ebert, and Franz-Stefan Gady
Publication Date:
12-2021
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:
Two decades ago, the notion of arming an uninhabited aerial vehicle (UAV) was little more than a niche pursuit. Today, at least 20 countries have weaponised UAV systems in their inventories, with other nations pursuing acquisition, while the capability is also proliferating to non-state actors. The air vehicles range from small, crude, hobbyist-style UAVs favoured by some non-state groups, to large, long-endurance platforms capable of being fitted with a range of sensors and air-to-surface weapons. Technological development continues apace with an increasing emphasis on greater automation and reducing the human workload, along with the emergence of a type of hybrid UAV and air-to-surface munition along side the more established loitering munition. While uninhabited systems are increasingly embraced by many armed forces, they remain an uneasy subject in the wider public realm, where the perceived lack of human control remains an ethical issue. There also continues to be concern in the legal community regarding how increasingly automated – and perhaps one day autonomous – weapon systems fit within the law of armed conflict – legal concept rather than legislation, sometimes also referred to as international humanitarian law. These subjects were the focus of a 21–22 June 2021 seminar organised by IISS Europe to help further the debate and to better understand the implications of weapons-capable uninhabited systems. This paper reflects the discussions and many of the issues raised by the participants.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Innovation
Political Geography:
Europe

30. Ballistic and cruise missiles in the Middle East: the current landscape and options for arms control

Author:
Hassan Elbahtimy
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:
The determination of regional actors in the Middle East to procure or develop ballistic and cruise missiles shows no immediate signs of abating, and the possibility of even further regional proliferation has driven calls to explore the application of arms controls to manage regional missile developments. This paper surveys the evolving missile landscape in the Middle East and considers some of the possible options for regional missile control. Missiles have long played a key, if relatively understudied, role in Middle Eastern security dynamics. According to Dennis Gormley’s 2017 estimate, over 90% of all missiles used in conflict since the Second World War have been in the Middle East. Today, the determination of regional actors to procure or develop ballistic and cruise missiles shows no immediate signs of abating. Missiles play a growing role in national defence doctrines in the region and many states are driven to acquire them due to the increasing appreciation of their utility as conventional precision-strike systems, as well as symbols of military prowess. Their frequent use by local and external powers in recent and ongoing conflicts in the Middle East and the possibility of even further regional proliferation have driven calls to explore the application of arms controls to manage regional missile developments. This paper surveys the evolving missile landscape in the Middle East and considers some of the possible options for regional missile control. These two themes form the paper’s two parts. The paper starts by exploring some of the key contemporary trends related to missiles in the Middle East. It examines the various regional powers interested in advanced missiles and the emergence of non-state actors as users and developers of missile technology. It also explores the regional appeal of cruise missiles and considers the growing use of advanced missiles as conventionally armed stand-off weapons. Finally, this section explores the regional interplay between offensive and defensive missiles. The second part of the paper charts some of the recent attempts to develop regional arms controls and considers some of the approaches to missile control, including some cross-cutting themes that any missile control efforts might wish to address. While missile holdings in the Middle East have grown in terms of the types, ranges and platforms used, this paper focuses its examination on ballistic and cruise missiles of ranges exceeding 250 kilometres. The value and reach of this range can vary in different sub-regional settings but is used here as a rough metric indicating the ability to target across borders, as well as a reflection of a degree of technical capability. While the paper incorporates land-attack missiles, it excludes missiles that are closely tied with battlefield or tactical missions, such as those with shorter ranges as well as anti-ship and air-defence platforms. Similarly, armed uninhabited aerial vehicles (UAVs) are excluded from the analysis. While their use has grown in prominence, particularly in some regional conflicts including in Syria, Libya and Yemen, they form a separate category of weapons with distinct dynamics, and thus pose different questions for arms control.
Topic:
Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Missile Defense
Political Geography:
Middle East

31. Straddling Liminality and Active Engagement: Understanding Mobilization Patterns of the Libyan Diaspora

Author:
Houda Mzioudet
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
Arab Reform Initiative (ARI)
Abstract:
The NATO campaign to unseat long-time Libyan dictator Muammar Gaddafi in 2011 was met largely with support by Libyans living in exile. Many had not set foot in their country in decades – some not even since 1969, the year Gaddafi carried out his coup d'état against King Idris I – and in diaspora they formed a close-knit community of intellectuals, doctors, professors, artists, politicians, and other civil society activists who acted as an opposition force to the regime. With the tragic unfolding of what started as the Libyan uprising in 2011, which morphed into a protracted civil and proxy war, the Libyan diaspora has enlarged to include new categories of activists and political actors seeking refuge abroad but also new socio-economic groups who are fleeing the deteriorating economic and security conditions. Yet despite this diversification in the profiles of those in diaspora, the conflict has never undermined the efforts of Libyans in exile to rebuild a semblance of a community that can mobilize for promoting peace and reconciliation. Building on the rich networks that were made with Western and Arab policymakers during the long years of exile, the Libyan diaspora, which has never been a monolithic entity, has been able to contribute to changes that have occurred in the country since the fall of the Gaddafi regime. This study explores the formation of Libyan exile communities since 2011, the different relationships they harbor vis-à-vis the homeland, and some of the different roles they have assumed in building the imagined community and in participating in the rebuilding of the country. Through exploration of the nature of the diaspora and its geographical distribution, and with particular focus on those in Tunisia vs. those in the UK and US, the study assesses the diasporic character of Libyans in exile. The research finds that issues related to peacebuilding, reconciliation, and the empowerment of women and minority groups act as nodal points for diasporic Libyans who, despite their different ideological, cultural, and tribal affiliations, can find common ground when discussing the future of post-Gaddafi Libya.1 Yet, in exploring the work of Libyan diaspora organizations and contextualizing the different waves and destinations of exodus, the research also observes quite different patterns of diaspora mobilization. More precisely, the research finds that the relationships between those in diaspora and the Libyan homeland differ according to relationship, as do the political opportunity structures, which have an implication on the type of mobilization that occurs. In this way, Libyans in diaspora in Tunisia – who maintain patterns of circular mobility and often harbor hopes of return, and who perceive more threats if engaged in political mobilization – tend to either remain under the radar or to engage through the activities and frameworks of international organizations located in Tunis. On the contrary, those in Western capitals have been able to cultivate relationships with foreign policymakers and international organizations for advocacy and lobbying purposes in favor of transitional processes. In all cases, though, direct political participation of Libyans in diaspora in homeland politics has faced a number of institutional, legal, and perceptional barriers, which nonetheless show signs of being able to be overcome through shared belonging to the Libyan imagined community. Based on structured and semi-structured interviews with four members of the Libyan diaspora, an online questionnaire distributed through a popular Libyan podcast series, a conversation with the Libyan podcast series’ creator and my attendance of two Zoom conferences of a Libyan diasporic organization, and drawing on existing statistical data as well as a qualitative review of social media content of Libyan exile groups, carried out between September 2019-January 2021, the study provides an assessment of how members of the Libyan diaspora relate to the homeland and to each other, and how these relationships contribute to different patterns of mobilization. The study concludes with a few recommendations to Libyan and international policymakers regarding how best to support the Libyan diaspora in the implementation of their efforts designed to promote reconciliation, peacebuilding, institutional reform, and transitional justice for Libya.
Topic:
NATO, Development, Nationalism, Military Strategy, Transitional Justice, Conflict, and State Building
Political Geography:
Africa and Libya

32. Toward an Inclusive & Balanced Regional Order: A New U.S. Strategy in East Asia

Author:
Michael D. Swaine, Jessica J. Lee, and Rachel Esplin Odell
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:
The world faces twin crises — a global pandemic and rising climate chaos — even as an epochal change in the balance of power unfolds in East Asia. In response to these trends, the United States has doubled down on efforts to contain a rising China and maintain its eroding military dominance in the region. Simultaneously, it has neglected economic engagement and diplomatic cooperation with East Asian nations, thereby undermining its ability to manage the Covid–19 pandemic and the climate change challenge. This failed approach is directly harming the interests of the American people.
Topic:
International Relations, Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, and International Order
Political Geography:
United States and East Asia

33. Russia in NATO's South Expansionist Strategy or Defensive Posture?

Author:
Chloe Berger and Cynthia Salloum
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
Russia’s presence in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) is a significant component of contemporary Russian foreign and security policy. Moscow’s approach to NATO’s South1 has undoubtedly undergone considerable change since the collapse of the Soviet Union. During the Cold War, it had built a set of alliances with Egypt, Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Algeria and Libya, among others, which gave Moscow important leverage throughout the region. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan stirred resistance and opposition in the Muslim world, marking a major turning point in its Middle Eastern foreign policy. With the demise of its empire, in addition to its economic and military weaknesses, Russia faced a series of new challenges: a further disintegration of its own south, notably in the South Caucasus, the rise of radical extremism in Chechnya and Dagestan and a NATO programme of partnerships and cooperation that threatened its influence. All of these constrained Moscow’s foreign policy at large, including its Middle Eastern arrangements. In pursuing interests above values, Russia, in the last twenty years, developed channels of dialogue and cooperation with several Sunni Arab states traditionally close to the US, including Saudi Arabia, while deepening diplomatic and military ties with Iran and the Syrian regime. Russia maintained relations with Fatah and recognized Hamas after it won the Palestinian parliamentary elections in 2006, while successfully engaging pragmatically with Israel.2 Keeping contacts open with all relevant parties marks continuity between Soviet and Russian foreign policies. Moreover, in the last decade, the increasing instability across the Middle East and North Africa after the Arab Spring, from which Moscow kept its distance, offered new opportunities for influence and power projection, most notably in Syria and Libya. Putin is tracking two main objectives there: one is building status as a regional actor; the other is enhancing his prestige domestically.3 From the Libyan power vacuum to the US retreat from Afghanistan, the Kremlin is making the most of strategic opportunities and may continue to do so. However, it remains to be seen whether its regained confidence will lead to a more permanent Russian presence and influence. In the South, Moscow has today a relative free rein. But an increasingly mature European Union and most importantly a powerful and more strategically oriented US under President Biden may seriously constrain Russia’s room for manoeuvre. Several drivers, ranging from domestic and economic politics to regional and global geopolitics, could explain Russian involvement in the MENA. Firstly, Russia is building a defensive strategy aimed at reinforcing its front line against Western encroachment and Islamist terrorist attacks. Secondly, it is displaying an expansionist drive, aimed at controlling at least parts of the Eastern and Southern Mediterranean by consolidating old alliances and building new coalitions including with business and arms traders. Thirdly, Russia’s presence in the MENA can be seen as a classic zero-sum game of power politics with the US whereby Moscow is trying to fill the void left by Washington. Last, but certainly not least, it is also driven by domestic considerations that strengthen Putin’s grip on power, and Russia’s regional influence and international prestige. While all these factors play a role, this edited volume shows that opportunism and contingency remain key variables to explain Russian behaviour in the MENA. All of these drivers were somehow on display in Syria, which became an ideal case-study to explain Russian policy in the South. Yet, beyond the specific rationale, some questions still remain about Russia’s future role and influence in the region. Is the MENA region significant enough to help Russia recover a status of global power beyond regional leadership? Do status and prestige suffice, and if so, at what cost? What are Russia’s current and future investments in the region and what are their consequences on trade, energy, and its military posture? What would the real benefits of a Russian return to the MENA region be for its economy and power? Most importantly, what would be the consequences of an assertive Russia for NATO and its partners in the South?
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, North Atlantic, and North America

34. NATO 2030: New Technologies, New Conflicts, New Partnerships

Author:
Thierry Tardy
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
NATO’s history is marked by both profound continuity and deliberate adaptation. Over the past seven decades, NATO’s mission, the defense of the Euro-Atlantic area, and its constitutive values – democracy, individual liberty, the rule of law – have not changed. Similarly, the Alliance’s founding principle, namely the commitment Allies have made to defend each other and work together for their common security and defense, is as relevant today as it was when the Alliance was established in 1949. At the same time, NATO has adapted throughout its history to ensure it always remained capable to fulfil its mission and guarantee the defense and security of the almost one billion citizens it was established to protect. In the last decade, this meant that the Alliance had to boost its ability to tackle more sophisticated non-conventional threats. It has done so by investing in resilience as well as by enhancing its tools to fight terrorism, counter cyber threats, and respond to hybrid challenges. Even more fundamentally, since 2014, NATO has responded to the changing security environment by implementing the biggest adaptation of its collective defense since the end of the Cold War. This has led to deploying combat- ready troops in the East of the Alliance, modernizing NATO’s command structure and Headquarters, enhancing the readiness of Allied forces and to an increased and sustained Allied commitment to invest more in defense. In this context, NATO 2030, Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg’s initiative, is driven by the belief that, to remain a strong and agile Alliance, NATO must continue its adaptation and focus on how to respond to a rapidly changing security environment. At the December 2019 NATO Leaders Meeting, Allied Heads of State and Government asked the Secretary General to lead a forward-looking reflection on NATO’s future. They asked him to provide concrete recommendations to NATO leaders in time for the 2021 Summit. In response, the Secretary General launched NATO 2030, focusing on the key question of how to prepare the Alliance for the next decade. To inform his thinking, the Secretary General decided to reach out and gather ideas from a wide number of actors: he appointed an independent group to provide him with their advice, established the NATO 2030 Young Leaders to hear the recommendations of the “next” generation, and launched a number of dialogues with civil society, youth and the private sector. The rationale behind this approach is solid: in an increasingly complex world where security challenges are more diverse and diffuse, it is especially important to engage with a broad set of stakeholders and to take different perspectives into consideration. The NATO Defense College’s work on NATO 2030 fits within this broader set of discussions and contributes to the policy debate on NATO 2030 and on NATO’s future more broadly. The timing is especially ripe for a reflection on NATO’s future adaptation. Looking at 2030, the Alliance needs to prepare for a more uncertain and competitive world. This requires understanding how the shifting global balance of power will affect both the international rules-based order as well as Allied security. It will be essential to consider how to best ready the transatlantic Alliance and how to forge a common approach to tackle these systemic challenges. At the same time, preparing for the future also means accounting for exponential technological changes and their impact on how conflicts are understood and fought; as well as stepping up efforts to combat climate change and prepare to mitigate and counter its security impact. It is also important to stress that while NATO needs to adapt to new challenges, it must also continue to strengthen its ability to tackle existing ones. NATO 2030 thus gives the Alliance an opportunity to both take stock of the impressive adaptation occurred over the past decade and to redouble its efforts to prepare for the upcoming one. To do so, the Secretary General put forward three broad goals: to keep NATO strong militarily, to make the Alliance stronger politically, and to ensure it adopts a more global approach. The papers presented in this volume contribute to the thinking on how to meet each of these goals. First, keeping NATO strong militarily is of course central to ensuring the Alliance’s ability to fulfil its mandate. Collective strength and solidarity are equally crucial to maintain Allied unity and cohesion and to underpin the Alliance’s political role. Ensuring NATO stays strong militarily requires sustained Allied investment in defense, but also a focus on Allied resilience and on technological innovation. Andrea Gilli’s paper on “NATO, Technological Superiority and Emerging and Disruptive Technologies” tackles the crucial question of how to ensure NATO’s technological superiority in the future. The paper rightly recognizes that historically the Alliance’s ability to deter and defend has always been predicated upon maintaining a technological edge over competitors and potential adversaries. Looking at a future of exponential technological change and geopolitical competition, it is evident that preserving Allied technological superiority will become simultaneously more complex and more important. NATO has recognized the growing importance of investing in innovation and in preventing a transatlantic gap when it comes to the adoption of emerging and disruptive technologies in security and defense. This is why, in recent years, the Alliance has redoubled its efforts in this field. Building on this progress, it is important to examine what more NATO could do towards 2030 when it comes to technological innovation in general and emerging and disruptive technologies specifically. Gilli’s paper points to a number of important areas, including by stressing the need to think creatively about what role NATO can play to foster transatlantic innovation and encourage more Allied investments and cooperation on R&D. A similarly interesting and related notion is the need for NATO to reflect on its role when it comes to transatlantic training and education, both crucial to fostering cooperation and boosting interoperability. Second, NATO 2030 focuses on how to strengthen NATO’s political role. On the one hand, this means ensuring NATO remains the platform where North America and Europe consult and coordinate on all issues relevant to their common security and defense. On the other hand, a more political NATO is also an Alliance that is better able to rely on both military and non-military tools to fulfil its mandate. The importance of this issue emerges clearly in Marc Ozawa’s paper “Adapting NATO to grey zone challenges”. The essay examines NATO’s tools and responses to a world in which competitors and potential adversaries increasingly rely on political, diplomatic, economic and military tools to challenge Allied security. The author argues that responding to these hybrid challenges requires the Alliance to update its broad strategy and expand its toolkit. This conclusion aligns with the Secretary General’s call to update the 2010 Strategic Concept to take into account the new strategic environment. In addition, enhancing NATO’s ability to respond to grey zone challenges, from information warfare, to asymmetric approaches and economic coercion, also means continuing and enhancing the Alliance’s work on resilience, as the first line of defense against both conventional and non-conventional challenges. In this respect, Ozawa rightly argues that NATO should both expand the lens through which it looks at resilience and widen the actors it involves in its consultations on this issue. Expanding NATO’s work on resilience could include, among others, using NATO more as a platform to discuss, identify and mitigate economic vulnerabilities that could be exploited to both sow disagreements and undermine Allied security. Similarly, broadening consultations on issues related to resilience and countering hybrid threats could lead to both more regular NATO meetings of Allied national security advisors and more robust engagement with the private sector. Finally, the Secretary General’s vision for NATO 2030 highlights the importance of adopting a more global outlook. Even though NATO is a regional Alliance, the challenges it faces are global, from terrorism to climate change. In this context, the question of how to better leverage NATO’s partnerships becomes especially important. Thierry Tardy’s essay, “From NATO’s partnerships to security networks” affirms the importance of partnerships as one of NATO’s key political tools and looks at how to further enhance them towards 2030. In a world of growing geopolitical competition, one of the key questions for NATO 2030 is how to further strengthen the Alliance’s political dialogue and practical cooperation with like-minded partners to deal with global challenges and defend the rules-based international order. Another important priority should be to examine how to further invest and leverage in partnerships to contribute to peace and stability in NATO’s immediate neighborhood. The three papers developed by the NATO Defense College’s researchers engage with the Secretary General’s 2030 vision by looking at how the Alliance can enhance its ability to innovate, strengthen its toolkit against hybrid threats and further leverage its partnerships as an important political tool. The breadth of topics reflects the fact that NATO finds itself in the most complex and challenging security environment since the end of the Cold War. In turn, this requires in-depth thinking about how to continue to deter and defend and tackle existing challenges as well as how to redouble efforts to adapt and innovate to address emerging ones.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Regional Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
Europe, North Atlantic, and North America

35. NATO Strategy: Integrating Defense and Collaborative Security

Author:
Schuyler Foerster and Jeffrey A. Larsen
Publication Date:
03-2021
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
This Research Paper addresses four key issues: 1) a holistic definition of strategic stability, highlighting the principal sources of instability in Europe and identifying requirements for strengthening stability in Europe; 2) an examination of recent NATO efforts to shore up its defense and deterrent capabilities, while underscoring the need to address defense against non-military threats to stability; 3) a discussion of how a comprehensive arms control agenda could contribute to strategic stability, including wide-ranging discussions with Moscow about Russia’s place in an evolving European security framework; and 4) an analysis of three different strategic approaches that NATO might pursue, each of which combines enhancements to military and non-military defense and the possibility of a broader collaborative security agenda. The continuing volatility of NATO’s strategic environment will require that NATO maintain its long-established strategies of deterrence, defense, and reassurance. However, a strategy that depends almost exclusively on the deployment of military forces will be insufficient to sustain strategic stability in the long run. NATO also requires a clear and purposeful strategy that incorporates both defense and dialogue – including arms control policies – as integral and complementary tools for addressing threats. The authors recommend that NATO should proceed to shape a new Strategic Concept by outlining a 21st century Harmel Doctrine, emphasizing both defense and dialogue with Russia as complementary paths to improving strategic stability. Simultaneously, NATO should fulfill its requirements for a 21st century strategy for deterrence and defense in dealing with nuclear, conventional, cyber, hybrid, and other military and non-military threats. For the foreseeable future, NATO will need to craft a strategy for security and stability in Europe based on the assumption that Russia does not share the West’s worldview and will likely continue to seek to undermine the stability and cohesion achieved in Europe following the end of the Cold War. If Russia proves unwilling to engage in a meaningful collaborative security relationship, NATO will be justified in embarking on a 21st century version of a renewed “containment” policy that includes the reintroduction of even greater military capabilities in Europe. In all cases, NATO should ensure that Alliance cohesion – including its transatlantic security link – is preserved even as it deliberates difficult strategic questions.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Regional Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, North Atlantic, and North America

36. Principles of Nuclear Deterrence and Strategy

Author:
Bruno Tertrais
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
This Research Paper seeks to describe and explain the principles of nuclear deterrence and nuclear strategy. It does not defend or take sides – in favour of or against – a particular thesis, concept, idea or school of thought. While it mostly applies to Western conceptions and debates (i.e., the United States, the United Kingdom, France, NATO), most of the points made seem widely shared.1 The paper is structured as an investigation of nuclear strategy, moving stage by stage from the conceptual level to the planning level before setting out the issues that revolve around nuclear deterrence. Following an initial conceptualization of deterrence, the paper looks at its implementation in the nuclear domain. It then describes the various notions associated with nuclear deterrence and nuclear strategy, as well as the related interactions with weapons systems. It also explains the main dilemmas and questions associated with nuclear strategy, offering food for thought on the future of nuclear deterrence. One author suggests that there have been four waves of nuclear deterrence analysis.2 The first of these, in response to the invention of the atom bomb, conceptualized the basis of nuclear deterrence. The second focused on formal theorizing (with the occasional help of game theory), in a world of increasingly diversified nuclear arsenals. The third wave, based on trends observed over a period of many years, used case studies to judge how efficient nuclear weapons had been in deterring aggressions. The fourth wave, leveraging advances in cognitive sciences to challenge the initial “rational actor assumption”, grappled with post-Cold War problems such as so-called rogue states and terrorist networks. We may now be entering a fifth wave, as the expansion of cyberspace and the advent of artificial intelligence and quantum computing may have ramifications for nuclear deterrence. This Research Paper seeks to take stock of this corpus of studies, so as to produce a contemporary framework designed for policy-makers, practitioners and scholars.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Nuclear Weapons, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Europe, North Atlantic, and North America

37. Sharpening the Blunt Tool: Why Deterrence Needs an Update in the Next U.S. National Security Strategy

Author:
Kyle J Wolfley
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
Department of Social Sciences at West Point, United States Military Academy
Abstract:
The 2017 U.S. National Security Strategy appeared to bring deterrence back: departing from its predecessor, the document prioritized the concept by including “preserving peace through strength” as a vital national interest. From nuclear weapons to cyberspace, the strategy emphasized the logics of denial and punishment, which were hallmarks of the classical deterrence theory that emerged after World War II. However, recent thinking on deterrence has evolved beyond these simple logics. Now emerging concepts such as tailored deterrence, cross-domain deterrence, and dissuasion offer new ideas to address criticisms of deterrence in theory and practice. Therefore, the most vital question for the new administration is: how should the U.S. revise its deterrence policy to best prevent aggression in today’s complex environment? A review of the problems and prospects in deterrence thinking reveals that in addition to skillfully tailoring threats and risks across domains, U.S. policymakers should dissuade aggression by offering opportunities for restraint to reduce the risk of escalation.
Topic:
Security, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, Cybersecurity, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

38. The Shape of Things to Come: Why the Pentagon Must Embrace Soft Power to Compete with China

Author:
Kyle J Wolfley
Publication Date:
03-2021
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
Department of Social Sciences at West Point, United States Military Academy
Abstract:
As the COIVD-19 pandemic forced the United States to scale down its massive Defender exercise in Europe, the Chinese military continued its multinational exercise programs with Cambodia, Russia, and Pakistan, despite China’s strict domestic lockdowns. These exercises highlight how China is wielding a form of military power commonly overlooked in assessments of its rise. Today, states leverage their armed forces not only for warfighting or coercion, but also to manage international relationships. Military power includes not only the capacity to conquer and compel, but also the ability to create advantage through attraction and persuasion—a concept I call “shaping.” Unlike military strategies of warfighting or coercion, shaping relies less on force and more on the use of persuasion to change the characteristics of other militaries, build closer ties with other states, and influence the behavior of allies. China’s leaders increasingly understand the value of using their military to shape the international system in their favor. American policymakers, if they wish to compete effectively, ought to take shaping more seriously as well.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Military Strategy, Hegemony, Pandemic, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

39. Syria and Libya’s Contributions to the Evolution of the Turkish “Forward Defence” Doctrine

Author:
Nebahat Tanriverdi Yasar
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
In the last decade, there have been considerable changes in Turkey’s regional policies, especially in terms of the increasing use of hard power. Such changes are largely in response to regional rivalry, refugee flow from Syria and the revival of Kurdish issues, as well as strained relations with Turkey’s traditional allies, such as the United States and the European Union, among other factors. In the first decade of its rule, the AKP government moved away from Turkey’s traditional approach to foreign policy by adopting soft power in its relations with the states in the Middle East region. However, following the Arab Spring, and especially 2016, the AKP government embraced a “forward defence” doctrine, reminiscent of the security policies of the 1990s. At the end of the Cold War, Turkey reoriented its defence posture around a security-oriented approach due to its geostrategic location. This defence posture was based on the belief that Turkey has an unstable but strategically important location and hence needs powerful armed forces to employ hard power to protect its interests and security. Naturally, security threat perceptions reached their peak in Turkish foreign policy and Turkey came to the brink of using military force against several states such as Greece, Cyprus and Syria. Modernisation of armed forces and development of national defence industry were among the policies adopted during this era. The forward defence doctrine is key to Turkey’s policy in Syria and Libya. Given the dominant role played by Turkey in Syria, AKP has intensified its military activities beyond the Syrian border with the aim of preventing the expansion of the YPG and advance of the Syrian army into Idlib, which would trigger a large influx of refugees. Maritime disputes between Turkey, Greece and Cyprus in the Aegean Sea and Eastern Mediterranean intertwined with geopolitical tensions and rivalry between Turkey and its regional rivals such as France, Egypt and the United Arab Emirates. In response to its regional isolation and to block these developments, Turkey signed two Memoranda of Understanding, on maritime delimitation and on security cooperation, with the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) in Libya. The recent shift in Turkey’s security policy is in line with the basic principles of the AKP government’s grand strategy, which seeks to reposition Turkey as a central state in the international and regional system.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, International Cooperation, Regional Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
Europe, Turkey, Middle East, Libya, and Syria

40. Ending the Self-Fulfilling Prophecy: Realigning Our Engagement with Our Interests in Somalia

Author:
Elizabeth Shackelford
Publication Date:
11-2020
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:
In U.S. foreign policy circles today, the bar to justify ending a military intervention is higher than it is to keep one going. Small wars have become routine foreign policy tools, executed with minimal oversight or scrutiny. Somalia offers a clear example of how this approach leads to high accumulated costs for the American people with little to show in gains for the U.S. national interest. The current military-led strategy promises no end to lethal interventions, and the costs and risks associated with it exceed the threats it is meant to address. Expanding U.S. military activity over the past five years has done little to impede the Somali terrorist insurgency group al–Shabaab, but it has continued to overshadow and undermine diplomatic and development efforts to address Somalia’s political and governance problems. At the same time, military intervention has propped up an ineffective government, disincentivizing Somali political leaders from taking the hard steps necessary to reach a sustainable peace and build a functioning state. The U.S. military cannot be expected to stay indefinitely in Somalia to maintain a messy stalemate. Rather than reflexively increase U.S. military activity when it falls short of stated objectives, the United States should reassess its overall strategy in Somalia by returning to basic questions: Why is the U.S. military fighting a war there? What U.S. national interest is the war serving? And are America’s actions in Somalia and the region furthering that national interest?
Topic:
Diplomacy, War, Military Strategy, Governance, Military Affairs, Military Intervention, and Peace
Political Geography:
United States and Somalia

41. "NATO-Mation": Strategies for Leading in the Age of Artificial Intelligence

Author:
Andrea Gilli
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
The increasing power of processors, accuracy of algorithms, and availability of digital data are driving the dramatic artificial intelligence (AI)-centred technological transformation now in progress. These changes have already turned companies, industries and markets upside down, and we are also starting to see their effects on the battlefield. The employment of unmanned vehicles, reliance on big data for target detection, identification and acquisition, as well as the potentials of machine learning in other critical functions such as logistics and maintenance are only some of the possible examples of how warfare will evolve in the near future. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and its Allies cannot be bystanders during this technological transition. Some countries and organizations have already taken important steps. Others are more hesitant. The Atlantic Alliance has a moral obligation to act, both to preserve and extend its military leadership – and thus the wealth and security of its citizens – and to shape this process in keeping with its democratic principles, freedom-inspired values and commitment to fundamental human rights. As NATO works on its Artificial Intelligence Strategy, which could be published in 2021, this Research Paper aims at contributing to both the policy debate and the public discussion about AI and its implications for the Alliance. The paper offers a series of analyses, lessons learned, proposals, and recommendations, that build on best practices and solutions adopted in the civilian and military fields, on perspectives drawn from the academic literature as well as on ideas generated in the broader AI community. The various parts of the paper are all linked to the single overarching concept of “NATO-mation”, or the idea that NATO has an important role to play so as to prepare for and to shape this technological transformation. NATO Allies need to be proactive: without common, coordinated, cooperative or joint solutions, they will not be able to achieve all their goals effectively and efficiently.
Topic:
NATO, Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, Leadership, and Artificial Intelligence
Political Geography:
Europe, North Atlantic, and North America

42. The Utility of Civil-Military Relations for Intelligence Professionals

Author:
George Fust
Publication Date:
02-2020
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
Department of Social Sciences at West Point, United States Military Academy
Abstract:
This article seeks to help intelligence professionals better define an operating environment through the use of civil military relations theory.
Topic:
Intelligence, Military Strategy, Military Affairs, and Civil-Military Relations
Political Geography:
Global Focus