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Begin New Search Topic Economics Political Geography United States Content Type Research Paper

1. Structural Exchange Pays Off: Reciprocity in Boards and Executive Compensations in US Firms (1990–2015)

Author:
Olivier Godechot, Joanne Horton, and Yuval Millo
Publication Date:
06-2019
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
Max Planck Sciences Po Center on Coping with Instability in Market Societies (MaxPo)
Abstract:
We study the influence of the corporate board network on executive pay for 3,395 US firms over the period from 1990 to 2015. Drawing on structural anthropology and social exchange theory, we identify three elementary structures through which the interlocking network captures an obvious form of objective reciprocity between executives from different firms: restricted exchange, when two executives sit on each other’s respective boards; delayed exchange, when y sits on the board of x after the end of x’s mandate on the board of y ; and generalized exchange, when x sits on the board of y, who sits on the board of z, who sits on the board of x. Our results suggest that these ties, although not very common, are more frequent than those calculated by chance. We also find that the three structures of reciprocity have a positive impact on executive pay, especially on bonuses and total cash. We use the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002) as a natural experiment to confirm our first findings. The impact on pay disappears after 2004, once these types of exchanges are constrained. Although linked to executive pay, these structures are not tied to any indicator of firm performance. This leads us to interpret them as a rent extraction phenomenon.
Topic:
Economics, Political Economy, Income Inequality, Business, and Public Sector
Political Geography:
United States

2. The Power of Weak Interests in Financial Reforms: Explaining the Creation of a US Consumer Agency

Author:
Lisa Kastner
Publication Date:
06-2016
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
Max Planck Sciences Po Center on Coping with Instability in Market Societies (MaxPo)
Abstract:
Dodd-Frank, the US financial reform law passed in response to the 2008 financial crisis, established the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), a new federal regulator with the sole responsibility of protecting consumers from unfair, deceptive, or abusive practices. This decision marked the end of a highly politicized reform debate in the US Congress, involving lobbying from business associations and civil society groups, in which proponents of the new bureau would normally have been considered to be much weaker than its opponents. Paradoxically, an emerging civil society coalition successfully lobbied decisionmakers and countered industry attempts to prevent industry capture. What explains the fact that rather weak and peripheral actors prevailed over more resourceful and dominant actors? The goal of this study is to examine and challenge questions of regulatory capture by concentrated industry interests in the reform debates in response to the credit crisis which originated in the US in 2007. The analysis suggests that for weak actors to prevail in policy conflicts over established, resource-rich opponents, they must undertake broad coalitionbuilding among themselves and with influential elite allies outside and inside of Congress who share the same policy goals.
Topic:
Economics, Government, Political Economy, Regulation, Finance, Economic Policy, Macroeconomics, and Consumerism
Political Geography:
United States

3. Crucial Collaborators or Petty Players? The Globalization of R and the Rise of China and India

Author:
Andrew B. Kennedy
Publication Date:
11-2013
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
Center for the Advanced Study of India
Abstract:
In recent decades, research and development has become a key new arena of globalization. Whereas multinational corporations once conducted R primarily in their home countries, it is now often dispersed across multiple locations around the world. Has this process transformed economic ties between the world's dominant state and its would-be rising powers in ways that imply an important power shift? Focusing on China and India's growing collaboration with the U.S., this paper argues that it has not. China and India remain considerably more reliant on the globalization of R than the U.S. does, and this remains a potential source of leverage for Washington. This vulnerability mainly reflects the fact that U.S. R investments in China and India are far more important for these two Asian countries than they are for the U.S. These investments loom larger in the Chinese and Indian innovation systems than they do in their American counterpart, and it is difficult to imagine any country substituting for the U.S. in this regard. In contrast, the U.S. cannot derive a great deal of leverage as a platform for R Both China and India are considerably less dependent on the U.S. in this respect.
Topic:
Development, Economics, Globalization, International Trade and Finance, and Markets
Political Geography:
United States, China, and India