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21. Unpacking solid waste management policies in Lebanon: Public policies based on power-sharing politics rather than evidence-based decision-making

Author:
Cynthia Kreidy
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
Arab Reform Initiative (ARI)
Abstract:
iles of garbage have again been accumulating on the streets of major Lebanese cities.1 2 A scenario that is all too familiar and takes us back to 2014 when Sukleen – the company contracted to manage solid waste in Beirut and Mount Lebanon – halted its operations and streets were filled with piles of garbage for months. 3 Once again Lebanon is on the verge of another waste crisis, but this time from a more vulnerable and dire state. Solid waste has been ravaging the streets of Beirut and Mount Lebanon for numerous reasons. These include the contractor not getting paid, the high cost of transportation which reduces the frequency of collection,4 the closure of landfills which are at capacity, or even the obstruction of works at the landfills due to trespassers waiting to collect metals and other valuable materials to sell them amid Lebanon’s heaviest economic and financial crises.5 The absence of sustainable and integrated solid waste management (SWM) in Lebanon has denied citizens their right to health.6 Open dumping and burning, which have been occurring due to the inaction of regulatory authorities, have negative health impacts on nearby residents. Some individuals have reported respiratory illnesses and skin problems, while others complain about bad mental health.7 Additionally, open burning could be linked to cancer and heart disease. These practices have disproportionately affected poor communities, given that burning sites are often in their vicinity and that they cannot afford health care.8 Moreover, the cost of environmental degradation due to the lack of a comprehensive SWM plan was equivalent to $66.5 million in 20129 ) and $200 million in 201810 . The cost of environmental degradation is reflected by a loss of welfare demonstrated by the degradation in the quality of life, economic losses, and environmental losses, among others.11 The solid waste sector contributed to around 10% of the country’s greenhouse gas emissions in 2011, largely due to open dumping and burning across the country.12 13 An integrated solid waste management strategy at the national level is the only long-term solution to the solid waste problem. In the absence of such a plan, and following the solid waste crisis in 2015, several grassroots movements, civil society organizations and municipalities have tried to remedy the absence of a national plan by leading small-scale interventions based on sorting at source and waste valorization in order to minimize volumes of waste sent to landfills.14 15 16 However, none of these projects is implementable at the national level, since these initiatives rely on a municipality’s rare, and voluntary will. This paper employs a systems analysis to explore how solid waste mismanagement has been an intentional political decision-making process tailored to nurture and protect dysfunctionality through elite capture and clientelism. The hypothesis will be presented using a Causal Loop Diagram (CLD) which will then be analyzed and validated via case studies involving the municipalities of Beit Mery, Dhour Choueir, and Brih.
Topic:
Leadership, Waste, and Resource Management
Political Geography:
Middle East and Lebanon

22. Perceptions and Trajectories of Youth in Baghdad, Al-Basra, and Mosul after the 2014 Conflict with ISIS

Author:
Farah Al Shami
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
Arab Reform Initiative (ARI)
Abstract:
This infographics report analyzes and interprets quantitative data that was collected by the Arab Reform Initiative (ARI) in Summer 2021 using an extensive in-person/face-to-face survey targeting 676 youth (aged 18-28) in three Iraqi cities (Baghdad, Al-Basra, and Nineveh-Mosul). By doing so, the report aims at assessing the impact of the 2014 conflict with ISIS in Iraq on the perceptions, aspirations, and actual trajectories of youth living in these three cities, namely in terms of education, employment and livelihoods, political participation, civic engagement and peacebuilding efforts, as well as choices for personal life. The survey is part of the Arab Reform Initiative’s broader work on how youth in Iraq and other Arab countries have navigated armed conflicts in the last decade. We find that the conflict has had a significant negative impact on Iraqi youth’s education and employment, and that this impact is more pronounced on education compared to employment. This impact happened mainly through the channel of economic hardship and – to a lesser extent – the channel of fear, uncertainty, and security concerns. This impact has also largely shaped the surveyed youth’s personal lives and choices. Moreover, surveyed youth expressed apathy towards formal politics and fear of engaging in politics or expressing political views/affiliations/support because of security concerns. The 2014 conflict has had a significantly more negative impact on Iraqi youth’s political participation than on their civic engagement. Although our data shows that the overall impact of the conflict on these different dimensions is significant, the magnitude of this impact is substantially less than one may have expected. We found that the negative impact of the conflict is of a higher magnitude on the actual status quo of Iraqi youth compared to their aspirations and their perceptions of its actual impact. For instance, when asked general questions about the factors affecting their trajectories, Iraqi youth did not or rarely chose “the Iraqi ISIS conflict,” whereas when they were directly asked about the impact of this conflict on their trajectories, their answers exhibited a significant importance given to the conflict. In our report, we present various reasons that explain these observations and discrepancies, some of which come from our data and others from our understanding of the Iraqi context.
Topic:
Security, Youth Culture, ISIS, Youth, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Iraq and Middle East

23. Open-source analysis of Iran’s missile and UAV capabilities and proliferation

Author:
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:
Iran’s ballistic missile systems, supplemented by cruise missiles and UAVs, are intended not only for deterrence, but for battle, including by Iran’s regional partners. In a new report, the IISS provides a detailed assessment of Iran’s missiles, and the manner and purposes for which it has been proliferating them. Nuclear issues are the exclusive focus of the negotiations on the restoration of the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, which have taken place in Vienna. The Western powers are keen, however, to engage in follow-on talks to address Iran’s missiles and activities in the region. To inform the public policy debate on the latter matters, the IISS has produced a fact-rich technical assessment of Iran’s current missile and uninhabited aerial vehicle (UAV) capabilities and its proliferation of these technologies to Iran’s regional partners.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Military Strategy, Nonproliferation, and Missile Defense
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East

24. Missile multinational: Iran’s new approach to missile proliferation

Author:
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:
How does Iran equip its proxies and allies with increasingly sophisticated and longer-range ballistic missiles and artillery rockets? Fabian Hinz considers Iran’s new missile-proliferation strategy. The proliferation of ballistic missiles and artillery rockets to non-state actors by the Islamic Republic of Iran is a constant source of tension in the Middle East. Yemen’s Houthi rebels conduct ballistic-missile strikes on Saudi Arabian cities, airports and oil installations; Hizbullah’s ever-growing rocket and missile arsenal sparks Israeli consideration of military options; and Iranian proxies rocket the United States’ installations in Iraq on an almost weekly basis. But how does Iran equip its proxies and allies with increasingly sophisticated and longer-range ballistic missiles and artillery rockets? For years, the answer has been through smuggling. In one example, on 19 March 2021 Saudi Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Adel al-Jubeir claimed that all Houthi missiles fired at the Kingdom were ‘made in Iran’, and there is ample evidence that Houthis were the recipients of weapons such as Iran’s short-range Qiam ballistic missile. Iran doubtlessly continues to directly transfer missiles outside its borders to some degree. However, in recent years smuggling has been augmented by two other transfer methods: the provision of guidance kits to modify existing stockpiles of artillery rockets, and the wholescale provision of manufacturing capabilities. Iranian support for enabling local rocket production is not new. Reports about the rocket arsenals of Palestinian factions in Gaza regularly cite Iranian assistance for domestic manufacturing, and Hizbullah’s alleged missile factory in the Beqaa Valley became the topic of competing accusations in the Israeli–Hizbullah relationship. However, closer examination of Iranian sources, documents likely leaked by Israeli intelligence and the missiles unveiled by the Houthis reveal a strategy of empowering Iranian proxies that is more comprehensive than previously thought. In cooperation with Iran’s missile industry, the Quds Force (QF) of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) appears intent on enabling all its main proxies to be able to autonomously manufacture artillery rockets and precision-guided missiles. Also, a special development effort seems to be aimed at creating simple artillery rockets and short-range-missile systems and production units custom-tailored for local production.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Military Strategy, and Missile Defense
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East

25. Cruise missiles in the Middle East

Author:
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:
While both the proliferation and combat use of ballistic missiles in the Middle East have attracted a lot of attention, cruise missiles remain an often-overlooked regional proliferation challenge. Once the exclusive realm of the Middle East’s sole nuclear power, Israel, the proliferation of cruise-missile systems has steadily picked up pace in the last two decades. Iran and Turkey have joined Israel in the club of nations developing and producing their own cruise missiles, with the United Arab Emirates (UAE) appearing to take first steps in this direction. Other countries, such as Algeria, Egypt, Kuwait, Qatar and Saudi Arabia, have already purchased cruise missiles from abroad or appear intent on doing so in the near future. This trend is not limited to state actors, however. With strong technical and material support from Iran, Yemen’s Houthi rebels have employed cruise missiles in their ongoing missile and uninhabited aerial vehicle (UAV) campaign against the Saudi-led coalition. The drivers of cruise-missile proliferation in the region are as diverse as the systems themselves. Their ability to evade or overcome defensive systems makes them an attractive option in a region experiencing a proliferation of increasingly advanced surface-to-air missiles as well as ballistic-missile-defence systems. Cruise missiles also give actors that lack modern air forces the ability to strike targets deep inside the territory of better-equipped adversaries. They are therefore well suited to serve as tools of asymmetric warfare as well as asymmetric deterrence. At the same time, however, they have also become an essential piece of weaponry for advanced modern fighter jets and therefore a logical choice for countries already operating highly capable air forces. Naval-based cruise missiles offer a long-range strike capability for expeditionary warfare and serve as a tool for regional power projection. In the case of Israel, submarine-launched cruise missiles also serve as the primary pillar of the country’s nuclear second-strike capability. However, the drivers of cruise-missile proliferation go beyond narrow military needs and considerations. Several Middle Eastern states are engaged in ambitious efforts to develop local arms industries, with precision-guided munitions, aerial stand-off weaponry and UAVs being a particular focus. Benefiting from the existing technological overlap with these systems, cruise missiles represent both an attractive and realistic option for ambitious military-development projects. They are also an advanced weapons system whose production and development was for a long time limited to a small number of highly developed countries, thus lending their producers considerable prestige. There is little doubt that cruise missiles have an impact on regional stability. As with other uninhabited systems, cruise missiles do not entail the risk of human losses for their users, and this factor potentially lowers the threshold for their use. Cruise missiles’ ability to evade detection and interception, and their effectiveness in conducting long-range precision strikes, might also provide incentives for the adoption of pre-emptive strategies, thus lending another element of instability to local crises. Most importantly, however, cruise missiles – like ballistic missiles and, to some extent, UAVs – defy traditional air superiority and by extension the military hierarchies associated with it. They can therefore serve as powerful tools for actors seeking to upend existing military balances, and they incentivise attempts to so.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Military Strategy, and Missile Defense
Political Geography:
Middle East

26. Ballistic and cruise missiles in the Middle East: the current landscape and options for arms control

Author:
Hassan Elbahtimy
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:
The determination of regional actors in the Middle East to procure or develop ballistic and cruise missiles shows no immediate signs of abating, and the possibility of even further regional proliferation has driven calls to explore the application of arms controls to manage regional missile developments. This paper surveys the evolving missile landscape in the Middle East and considers some of the possible options for regional missile control. Missiles have long played a key, if relatively understudied, role in Middle Eastern security dynamics. According to Dennis Gormley’s 2017 estimate, over 90% of all missiles used in conflict since the Second World War have been in the Middle East. Today, the determination of regional actors to procure or develop ballistic and cruise missiles shows no immediate signs of abating. Missiles play a growing role in national defence doctrines in the region and many states are driven to acquire them due to the increasing appreciation of their utility as conventional precision-strike systems, as well as symbols of military prowess. Their frequent use by local and external powers in recent and ongoing conflicts in the Middle East and the possibility of even further regional proliferation have driven calls to explore the application of arms controls to manage regional missile developments. This paper surveys the evolving missile landscape in the Middle East and considers some of the possible options for regional missile control. These two themes form the paper’s two parts. The paper starts by exploring some of the key contemporary trends related to missiles in the Middle East. It examines the various regional powers interested in advanced missiles and the emergence of non-state actors as users and developers of missile technology. It also explores the regional appeal of cruise missiles and considers the growing use of advanced missiles as conventionally armed stand-off weapons. Finally, this section explores the regional interplay between offensive and defensive missiles. The second part of the paper charts some of the recent attempts to develop regional arms controls and considers some of the approaches to missile control, including some cross-cutting themes that any missile control efforts might wish to address. While missile holdings in the Middle East have grown in terms of the types, ranges and platforms used, this paper focuses its examination on ballistic and cruise missiles of ranges exceeding 250 kilometres. The value and reach of this range can vary in different sub-regional settings but is used here as a rough metric indicating the ability to target across borders, as well as a reflection of a degree of technical capability. While the paper incorporates land-attack missiles, it excludes missiles that are closely tied with battlefield or tactical missions, such as those with shorter ranges as well as anti-ship and air-defence platforms. Similarly, armed uninhabited aerial vehicles (UAVs) are excluded from the analysis. While their use has grown in prominence, particularly in some regional conflicts including in Syria, Libya and Yemen, they form a separate category of weapons with distinct dynamics, and thus pose different questions for arms control.
Topic:
Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Missile Defense
Political Geography:
Middle East

27. Which Tax Policies for Lebanon? Lessons from the Past for a Challenging Future

Author:
Alain Bifani, Karim Daher, Lydia Assouad, and Ishac Diwan
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
Arab Reform Initiative (ARI)
Abstract:
The tax system in Lebanon is unfair and inefficient. As part of rethinking Lebanon’s policies in light of the current crisis, this paper proposes key reforms to make tax incidence more progressive; strengthen tax compliance; and broaden the tax base. It also calls for considering a one-off wealth tax to help resolve the current crisis in a socially fair manner. It posits that the fight for fiscal justice and effectiveness needs to become more central in political debates as a just fiscal system is a requisite of any vision for a “new Lebanon”.
Topic:
Economics, Tax Systems, Economic Inequality, Fiscal Policy, and Wealth
Political Geography:
Middle East and Lebanon

28. The UK Iraqi Diaspora and their Mobilization towards Iraq: Homeland Politics, Internal Dynamics, and the Fragmentation of Diasporic Transnationalism

Author:
Oula Kadhum
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
Arab Reform Initiative (ARI)
Abstract:
In 2003, for the first time in decades, Iraqis in the diaspora were able to return to their former homeland and help in the rebuilding of their country. Many returned in 2003 with ambitious plans and ideas to help in the country’s development, some through political parties and others through civil society. Due to political developments in Iraq however, and the subsequent ethno-sectarian political system installed under the US-led intervention, diaspora mobilization has been affected and shaped by homeland politics and dynamics, privileging some while thwarting others. Indeed, the post-2003 political system contributed to the fragmentation of diasporic mobilization along ethnic and sectarian lines due to homeland political dynamics. This, in turn, has shaped the issues and the type of transnational and translocal mobilization carried out by different groups. Focusing predominantly on the UK context and to a lesser extent the Swedish one,[i] this study explores both top-down and bottom-up approaches to Iraqi diaspora transnational mobilization, and assesses the opportunities and constraints for coordination in diasporic transnationalism. Drawing on 15 semi-structured interviews conducted with community gatekeepers, organizational representatives, and professionals working in specific sectors, as well as numerous informal interviews, and supplemented by interviews conducted from 2013 to 2018 in both London and Stockholm, this study assess the different waves of migration and socio-economic profiles of Iraqi migrants, how pivotal moments in Iraq’s recent history have affected diasporic transnationalism, and underlines the hindrances to mobilization. The study finds that where the first waves of UK migration saw the arrival of political and religious elites, medical professionals, and artists, latter waves saw the arrival of less skilled and educated workers, as well as refugees. This provides the background both to Iraqi diasporic mobilization and links to the post-2003 political system and to the fragmentation that would ensue. While some diasporic elites went on to serve in the Iraqi government, other diaspora individuals worked through civil society, providing development, training, knowledge transfer, and social welfare. The study also finds that the instability in Iraq, homeland dynamics affecting the positionality of groups vis-à-vis the country, and lack of funds are major obstacles to broader mobilization. To this point, while there is no denying the will of the diaspora to help in the rebuilding of Iraq, distrust in the diaspora among ethnic and sectarian groups presents a particular challenge to collaboration and cooperation. Building trust and reconciliation, helping to create a platform between diaspora groups, the wider public, and Iraqi organizations, and focusing efforts on cultural, heritage, health, and developmental issues – and avoiding party politics – could help overcome these obstacles to allow the diaspora to play a greater role in supporting the Iraqi state and society.
Topic:
Migration, Diaspora, Immigration, transnationalism, Humanitarian Crisis, and Mobilization
Political Geography:
Iraq, United Kingdom, Europe, and Middle East

29. Introduction: What is New about Post-2011 MENA Diasporas?

Author:
Sarah Anne Rennick
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
Arab Reform Initiative (ARI)
Abstract:
The phenomenon of mobilization among the diasporas emanating from the MENA region is in many ways not new. Historic diasporas communities, such as the Armenian, Palestinian, Kurdish, and Lebanese, have existed for multiple decades, and their contributions to their homelands has been both documented in the literature and promoted by policymakers and development organizations alike. This includes both the economic impact of MENA diasporas and the critical importance of financial remittances to supporting development and growth back home,1 but also various forms of political mobilization that have been undertaken by diasporic communities for the purpose of contributing to nation/state-building2 and recognition processes3 or, under certain conditions, contesting homeland regimes.4 In this vein, much of the literature has focused on more traditional forms of diaspora political mobilization,5 including lobbying and advocacy work designed to shape international public opinion and pressure foreign governments. The idea that Arab diaspora communities can be viewed not only as an economic actor but also, potentially, a political one is not in itself new. Yet, much of this literature on Arab diasporas has been focused on unidirectional flow of remittance – from those in diaspora back to the homeland. Likewise, the view of diaspora communities as either a resource to be harnessed or a threat to be contained has been largely informed by the political and geopolitical realities of host and home states.6 Our observations of diaspora political mobilization dynamics and the role that Arab diasporas can play in shaping homeland politics have been enlarged since 2011. Over the last decade, the many political, social, and economic upheavals that have transpired in the region – spanning national uprisings challenging the existing order, deepened authoritarianism and the closure of civic space, economic collapse and the undermining of collective morale, and the onset of violent intractable conflict – have produced multiple waves of migration of those seeking safe harbor abroad.7 While the image of Syrian migrants partaking in dangerous journeys to reach European shores dominates the popular narrative, the reality of this exodus from the Arab region over the last decade is much more complex.8 Indeed, what has evolved in the post-2011 period are Arab diaspora communities that have different and more diverse sociopolitical profiles from earlier epochs, with different degrees of attachment, identification to, and engagement with their homeland – both among new arrivals but also, importantly, those who have long since been in diaspora or who are second or third generation abroad. These Arab diaspora communities have also seen increased dispersal in terms of the geographic locations of resettlement, including both the enlargement and heterogenization of existing host sites but also the emergence of new destinations. Alongside these transformations in the profiles and locations of these Arab diasporas has been the emergence of new forms of political remittances, involving the transfer of political ideas, norms, and practices in multidirectional flows that challenge the state-bounded concept of transnational politics.9 These new political remittances and forms of diaspora community organization and mobilization are in many cases actively seeking to make substantive changes to homeland politics and to respond to the cascading crises at home. Yet in other cases, they are instead efforts on the parts of diaspora members to navigate the liminal and uncertain status of being caught somewhere along the spectrum of “here” and/or “there.” This collection of studies, written by Oula Kadhum, Houda Mzioudet, and Maysaa Shuja Al-Deen, seeks to investigate more closely these transformations within Arab diasporas in the post-2011, and to shed light onto what is actually “new” about them. Through three in-depth case studies looking at Iraqi, Libyan, and Yemeni communities in different locations abroad, the studies presented here assess the transformations within these diasporas in terms of profiles of members and locations of exile and how conflict dynamics at home inform not only patterns of migration but also relationships within diaspora communities themselves. The studies also expose new forms and directional flows of political remittances that are taking place, and the various factors that mediate the act of remitting politically. This includes assessing how political identity is formed/transformed through the experience of exile and observation of conflict dynamics from quite different external vantage points, as well as the impact of multiple and overlaying political opportunity structures. Finally, the studies shed light on the impact of these political remittances and offer an assessment of the opportunities and constraints that these new Iraqi, Libyan, and Yemeni diasporas face in their own efforts to contribute to rebuilding, reconstructing, and reimagining their homelands.
Topic:
Diaspora, Immigrants, Humanitarian Crisis, Identity, and Emigration
Political Geography:
Africa, Middle East, North Africa, and MENA

30. Lebanon’s Student Movement: A New Political Player?

Author:
Tala Majzoub
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
Arab Reform Initiative (ARI)
Abstract:
The victory of independent student groups in student council elections in late 2020 was hailed as a milestone in the fight against the influence of traditional sectarian political parties in Lebanon. This paper examines the significance of these student elections and the renewed mobilization of the student body. It aims to better understand the politics and strategies of the new student groups, notably their understanding of notions like independence, and attempts to address the role that these student groups can eventually play in national politics.
Topic:
Politics, Democracy, Youth, and Political Participation
Political Geography:
Middle East and Lebanon