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Begin New Search Political Geography Europe Content Type Research Paper

1. Russia’s Aggression Against Ukraine: Concept, Ideology, Objectives, Means, Consequences

Author:
Plamen Pantev
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
Institute for Security and International Studies (ISIS)
Abstract:
The study tries to outline interim conclusions about the concept, the ideology, the objectives and the tools used by the Russian federation in this barbaric war of attrition against Ukraine – a war of a nuclear superpower against a smaller neighbouring country. The study does not aim to analyse the strange way the war is developing – Russians carry on military attacks in both a regular and terrorist manner 7 on the whole territory of Ukraine, while the Ukrainians are deterred to counter-attack the aggressor on the latter’s own territory and to fight with longer-range arms even on their own land. The author understands how many issues from the theoretic fields of international relations, foreign, security and defense studies need to be considered to understand in a holistic way the final result of the interaction of domestic Russian, international, political, economic, governance, psychological and other problems that led to launching an aggressive and devastating war in the European continent by Moscow. The purpose of the study is not to outline the avalanche of mistakes in the policy of the collective West towards a showing for decades signs of revenge imperialist Russia. Neither it aims to point to the multitude of military mistakes by the aggressor in the last year. The aim of the study is to outline and discuss the concept, the ideology, the objectives and the means of the Russian aggression. Revealing the Nazi-like behaviour of the Russian leadership and its armed forces could serve to construct the broader picture of the developing conflict and learn how to prevent a similar invasion by Moscow. The study aims to prove that the legal and moral consequences of the war will be the conviction of the aggressor for the genocide and the war crimes. This would be the only possibility for normalising the life of the Ukrainians and the Russians as well as of the broader international relations system.
Topic:
International Relations, Security, NATO, Imperialism, Sovereignty, European Union, Conflict, Ideology, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

2. Café Evropa: The future of energy in the Czech Republic - how to further reduce dependence on fossil fuels?

Author:
Barbora Kociánová
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
Europeum Institute for European Policy
Abstract:
As part of the Café Evropa debate series, a debate was held on the topic The future of energy in the Czech Republic - how to further reduce dependence on fossil fuels? Is the Czech Republic succeeding in diversifying its resources and reducing its dependence on fossil fuels? Will the Czech Republic be energy independent from other countries if it moves away from coal? You can read a summary of the outputs of each guest in the report written by our intern Barbora Kociánová.
Topic:
Fossil Fuels, Coal, Energy, and Debates
Political Geography:
Europe and Czech Republic

3. The Unfulfilled Promise of EU Foreign and Security Policy towards Iran

Author:
Riccardo Alcaro, Steven Blockmans, Akin Unver, and Sine Özkaraşahin
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS)
Abstract:
With the 2015 nuclear deal dead in all but name, Iran is getting closer to Russia and more repressive at home, while EU member states’ priorities about the Islamic Republic now extend beyond nuclear proliferation to human rights and European security. This shift in priorities cements a re-orientation of the EU’s approach to Iran from conditional engagement to confrontation. EU member states’ options are limited, however. Pressure worked prior to the nuclear agreement because the EU cut off significant trade with Iran. But US extraterritorial sanctions, re-imposed after the United States left the deal in 2018, have rendered EU-Iran trade so modest that cutting it would have little impact. The EU could get more leverage by providing incentives, yet the political inexpediency of rewarding Iran at a time of rising belligerence of the Islamic Republic greatly restricts the range of benefits potentially on offer. Still, in the mid- to longer term, the EU and its member states will need to combine pressure with some form of incentives if they want to defend their interests in non-proliferation, European security and the protection of human rights in Iran. They also need to resort to a variety of international partnerships in order to maximise their residual leverage.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, European Union, and JCPOA
Political Geography:
Europe, Iran, and Middle East

4. How to Reduce the Impact of Internal Contestation, Regional Fragmentation and Multipolar Competition on EU Foreign and Security Policy

Author:
Sarah van Bentum, Caterina Bedin, Gregor Walter-Drop, Steven Blockmans, Agnès Levallois, and Tiffany Guendouz
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS)
Abstract:
In a Union of 27 Member States, differences in (geo)political interests, socio-economic realities, historical trajectories and national identity construction constantly threaten internal unity and thus also the external coherence of the EU’s Foreign and Security Policy (EUFSP). The following three factors and their mutually reinforcing interplay appear to have a significant impact on the creation and shaping of EUFSP, especially when it comes to managing international crises and conflicts: internal contestation, regional fragmentation and multipolar competition. The analysis in this paper draws on the main findings from nine case studies carried out under the Horizon 2020 JOINT project. The paper first assesses the (generally negative) impact of the three factors on EUFSP in these contexts of international crises, identifies common patterns and divergent approaches. The second part of the paper identifies strategies to mitigate and/or reduce the (negative) impact of these challenges on EUFSP and points towards windows of opportunity to take action moving forward. The ultimate aim of this research is to provide experts and officials with concrete ideas about how EU policy decision-making processes can enable greater coherence among EU institutions and Member States in their response to international crises and conflicts.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, European Union, Regional Integration, Multipolarity, and Fragmentation
Political Geography:
Europe

5. Military capabilities in Europe: a framework for assessing the qualitative dimension

Author:
Bastain Giegerich and James Hackett
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:
There is renewed focus in Europe on deterring and defending against state-level aggression. However, after decades of mainly crisis-management operations abroad, questions are being asked about the capability of European armed forces to achieve these tasks. Within the context of a deteriorating security environment, limited resources and a need for governments to better explain the benefits of defence, this report examines factors important in assessing military capability. There is particular focus on six input areas that are central to assessing the qualitative dimension of capability. The report includes contributions from seven specialists from across Europe, offering perspectives on these lines of enquiry and their relative importance to European states’ military capability now and in the future.
Topic:
Security, Military Strategy, State Building, and Resource Management
Political Geography:
Europe

6. Green Defence: the defence and military implications of climate change for Europe

Author:
Ben Barry and Shiloh Fetzek
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:
Climate change is a national security threat to Europe. It is an accelerator of conflict and requires European forces to adapt accordingly. Concurrently, armed forces can help mitigate climate change by reducing their greenhouse-gas emissions. For states that plan to reduce carbon emissions, decarbonisation of armed forces without disarming will be a challenge. This new report assesses not only the implications for European armed forces of operating in climate changed worlds, but also the opportunities for reducing carbon footprint from new technologies. It assesses the challenges of implementing the necessary changes to military operations, training and capability and identifies success factors for this essential transformation.
Topic:
Security, Climate Change, Environment, Science and Technology, Armed Forces, and Green Technology
Political Geography:
Europe

7. Attentive, assertive, supportive EU support to nonviolent movements

Author:
Sergio Rodriguez Prieto
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
Berghof Foundation
Abstract:
Recent years have seen a dramatic increase of mass nonviolent movements around the globe, taking the street and the online space to demand radical reforms towards greater democracy, justice, peace or equal rights. External support to nonviolent movements can help prevent violent escalation, mitigate repression, protect civic space, facilitate conflict transformation and foster sustainable peace. In a global context where the shrinking of civic space is coupled with the proliferation of protests, the European Union needs to develop a strategy to deal with nonviolent movements consistently and effectively. This paper explores the role that different EU institutional actors can play in supporting nonviolent movements and puts forward some basic recommendations to develop a more coherent conceptual framework and factor peaceful protests into the EU’s external action.
Topic:
Regional Cooperation, Social Movement, European Union, and Nonviolence
Political Geography:
Europe

8. Strategic Shifts and NATO’s new Strategic Concept

Author:
Thierry Tardy
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
NATO currently faces a fundamental challenge. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, NATO adopted a de facto strategy of political, geographical and functional extension, welcoming new members, launching operations in new regions and multiplying its activities to address new low-intensity security threats.1 However, the pillars on which this strategy rested are now weakening. Today, strategic competition has returned and NATO’s military primacy is eroding, as much due to China’s impressive military modernization as because of the diffusion of military power enabled by globalization.2 Likewise, the liberal international order which allowed NATO to endure an uncertain military balance and a competitive international system during the Cold War is also under pressure. Free trade is under attack, democracy is receding, financial stability is harder to maintain and, last but not least, a seismic redistribution of wealth and power away from the Euro-Atlantic area and towards the Asia-Pacific is underway.3 Lastly, the non-traditional security threats which characterized the post-Cold War era remain, having even expanded in number and intensity.4
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Alliance
Political Geography:
Europe and North America

9. War in Europe: preliminary lessons

Author:
Thierry Tardy
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
The 24th of February, 2022, will remain a watershed date in European history; that day, the Russian regime led by President Vladimir Putin launched a military invasion of Ukraine, marking the return of war in Europe for the first time in decades. Much of what has transpired since the war’s onset has come as a surprise, whether in its political and strategic dimensions or in operational and tactical terms. The war was not an impossibility prior to 24 February, but it was certainly viewed in the West as improbable from the perspective of a rational cost-benefit analysis. This is especially so when one considers Putin’s attempt to swallow the entirety of Ukrainian territory. The means with which Russia attempted its conquest also raise a number of questions as to its armed forces’ level of preparedness, organisation, and operational ability. Today, it is clear that Russia’s military capacity was overestimated while Ukraine’s capacity to resist was underestimated. We have witnessed Russian forces encountering difficulties in achieving their military objectives and a Ukrainian nation-state – including its armed forces and its society – determined to deny Russia any gains. Politically, the Russian regime misread the very nature of the Ukrainian nation, which proved strong and unanimous in its rejection of the Russian endeavour – even in the country’s supposedly Russian-leaning East (with the exception of part of the Donbas). For its part, the Atlantic Alliance has displayed a political unity that was admittedly lacking in recent years prior. The United States has demonstrated unequivocal commitment to the defence of Europe, while European Allies have shown both political resolve and a will to take defence spending seriously. Very little dissent or freeriding has occurred in the West. Solidarity with Ukraine has been optimal, both politically and through the delivery of weapons. Still, Allied support is constrained by the imperative of non-belligerence. NATO Allies have made it clear upfront that they have no desire to directly confront Russia, hence the rejection of a no-fly-zone or any other move carrying the risk of inadvertent escalation. That said, NATO has deployed part of its NATO Response Force and activated its defence plans. Allies have strengthened their presence in each of the enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) four existing battlegroups, and committed to the deployment of four additional battlegroups in Romania, Slovakia, Hungary and Bulgaria. 40,000 troops are officially deployed under direct NATO command on the Eastern flank as of the beginning of April, together with ships and air assets. Most importantly, the US has staged a comeback in Europe, with an overall deployment of 100,000 troops, among which approximately 20,000 have deployed since the beginning of 2022. The European Union (EU) too has acted swiftly, most notably through the imposition of sanctions on Russia in lockstep with US and UK sanctions. The EU has also flexed its muscle through the newly created European Peace Facility (EPF), which has delivered three instalments of EUR 500 million to finance the delivery of weapons to Ukraine. At the time of writing, EU states had not taken the decision to extend sanctions to oil and gas imports from Russia, unlike the US and the UK. If such a decision is taken, this would lead to a major energy crisis – and therefore economic crisis – in the whole of Europe. The war, then, raises a series of questions about the current and future European security order. First, will Western unity endure over time? What are the risks that the US or some European states will defect once the initial shock of the invasion has faded, once sanctions begin harming European economies, once the possibility of a re-engagement with Russia is floated, or once the Indo-Pacific inevitably regains US attention? Second, how will the war impact European security institutions – most notably NATO and the EU – and to what extent will the current situation positively shape the partnership between the two? Third, how resilient will Europe be in the face of a possible energy crisis provoked by the cessation of oil and gas deliveries from Russia? Fourth, from a military perspective, what lessons can be drawn from the first months of the Russian offensive regarding both Russia’s capacity (or incapacity) as a first-tier military power and in the changing (or unchanging) character of modern war? Finally, what initial lessons should we draw regarding nuclear deterrence and the Atlantic Alliance’s ability to dissuade harmful Russian nuclear-related actions? This collective Research Paper, authored by NDC Researchers and the NDC Commandant, explores these questions directly, identifying some preliminary lessons from the war. In the first chapter, Lt. Gen. Olivier Rittimann looks at the war’s potential impact on the distribution of tasks between NATO and the EU. The second chapter, written by Thierry Tardy, examines NATO’s response to Russia’s aggression and outlines implications for both the EU and for NATO’s forthcoming Strategic Concept. The third chapter, co-authored by Andrea Gilli and Pierre de Dreuzy, analyses Russia’s military performance on the Ukrainian battlefield and draws early conclusions about Russian military power. Fourth, Marc Ozawa explores the war’s impact on European energy security and Europe’s dependence on Russian oil and gas. Finally, Cynthia Salloum assesses how the crisis questions the very concept of deterrence and Allies’ ability to deter the Putin regime. This Research Paper is published alongside a series of related events and publications (notably in the Policy Brief series) that the NATO Defense College Research Division has organized in relation to the ongoing revision of the Alliance’s Strategic Concept. To that end, it arrives in tandem with an adjacent NDC study on the strategic shifts impacting NATO’s core tasks and in anticipation of a multi-authored analysis (to be released in September 2022) of the forthcoming Madrid Strategic Concept.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, International Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
Europe and North America

10. Analyzing European Union Institutions’ Flows for Total Official Support for Sustainable Development

Author:
Brian Tomlinson
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
Oxfam Publishing
Abstract:
This report analyses the first round of Total Official Support for Sustainable Development (TOSSD) data from European Union (EU) Institutions. The EU is a key stakeholder in the development of TOSSD, as Co-Chair of the International TOSSD Task Force, and in the promotion of this as an essential metric in the implementation of Agenda 2030. It is our hope that this paper’s detailed examination of the scope of what has been reported by the EU Institutions identifies trends and issues arising from the first reporting round for TOSSD, which can be addressed going forward. It is timely to acknowledge the level of transparency in the proceedings of the TOSSD Task Force, which has been open to comments and suggestions since its inception, and has recently seated CSO representatives as observers. This transparency has put into practical effect the notion that data validation can, to some extent, be entrusted to third parties provided that the relevant information is available to all interested stakeholders on a timely basis. Good norms, such as good reporting instructions, can help steer the development agenda in the right direction for the benefit of the communities of the Global South.
Topic:
Development, Regional Cooperation, European Union, and Sustainability
Political Geography:
Europe

11. Sharing Cyber Capabilities within the Alliance - Interoperability Through Structured Pre-Authorization Cyber

Author:
Jan Kalberg, Todd Arnold, and Stephen S. Hamilton
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
Department of Social Sciences at West Point, United States Military Academy
Abstract:
Sharing cyber weapon/cyber capabilities requires trust between the member states, becoming a high-end policy decision due to the concerns of proliferation and the investment in designing a cyber-weapon that has a limited ’shelf-life’. The digital nature of cyber weapons creates a challenge. A cyber weapon can spread quickly, either self-propagating such as worms or via disclosure (and subsequent reuse) by malware researchers or malicious actors, raising proliferation concerns. Additionally, a cyber-weapon can be copied by the adversary or reverse engineered. Once the weapon is released, the adversary will eventually address the vulnerability, and the opportunity is gone. These factors raise the threshold between member states to share cyber weapons and cyber capabilities. Alliances, like NATO, prepare for a unified multinational, multi-domain fight; meanwhile, the national cyber forces are still operating as solitaires with limited interoperability and sharing. There is a need in the collective defence posture to integrate the multinational cyber force to achieve interoperability.
Topic:
Security, NATO, Military Strategy, Cybersecurity, and Alliance
Political Geography:
Europe and North America

12. The Rise of Nationalism: Lessons from Europe

Author:
Sivamohan Valluvan and Leon Sealey-Huggins
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
Center on International Cooperation
Abstract:
Sivamohan Valluvan and Leon Sealey-Huggins discuss the rise of ethno-nationalism in Europe, and provides a helpful list on the actions that can be taken to counter ethno-nationalism – school curriculums that encourage empathy and provide historic context, tackling fearmongering and lies in the media, and a call for political leaders to resist cheap, short-term anti-immigration scapegoating.
Topic:
Nationalism, Immigration, Curriculum, and Ethnonationalism
Political Geography:
Europe

13. Sharing Cyber Capabilities within the Alliance - Interoperability Through Structured Pre-Authorization Cyber

Author:
Jan Kallberg, Todd Arnold, and Stephen S. Hamilton
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
Department of Social Sciences at West Point, United States Military Academy
Abstract:
S haring cyber weapon/cyber capabilities requires trust between the member states, becoming a high-end policy decision due to the concerns of proliferation and the investment in designing a cyber-weapon that has a limited ’shelf-life’. The digital nature of cyber weapons creates a challenge. A cyber weapon can spread quickly, either self-propagating such as worms or via disclosure (and subsequent reuse) by malware researchers or malicious actors, raising proliferation concerns. Additionally, a cyber-weapon can be copied by the adversary or reverse engineered. Once the weapon is released, the adversary will eventually address the vulnerability, and the opportunity is gone. These factors raise the threshold between member states to share cyber weapons and cyber capabilities. Alliances, like NATO, prepare for a unified multinational, multi domain fight; meanwhile, the national cyber forces are still operating as solitaires with limited interoperability and sharing. There is a need in the collective defence posture to integrate the multinational cyber force to achieve interoperability.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Regional Cooperation, Cybersecurity, and Alliance
Political Geography:
Europe and North America

14. The Significance of Convening the European Union – Israel Association Council

Author:
Maya Sion-Tzidkiyahu
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
Mitvim: The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies
Abstract:
On July 18, 2022, the Foreign Affairs Council of the European Union (EU) decided to move ahead with convening the EU-Israel Association Council (AC) after a decade-long hiatus. What does this mean? What opportunities does it offer, and what were the costs of not convening it so far? This paper explains what the AC is, the reasons for its suspension and for the decision to re-convene it. Assuming it will re-convene, the paper recommends future measures between Israel and the EU.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, International Cooperation, European Union, and Economy
Political Geography:
Europe, Middle East, Israel, and Palestine

15. Democratic Backsliding and Securitization: Challenges for Israel, the EU, and Israel-Europe Relations

Author:
Muriel Asseburg and Nimrod Goren
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
Mitvim: The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies
Abstract:
The report “Democratic Backsliding and Securitization: Challenges for Israel, the EU and Israel-Europe Relations” analyses the illiberal trends and democratic backsliding that can be seen in both Europe and Israel. Over the course of a two year project, experts from Mitvim – The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP, the German Institute for International and Security Affairs) as well as external experts reflected on the implications these developments have. The authors offer highly relevant recommendations and insights for anyone interested in EU-Israel relations, eroding democratic trends and securitization policies. The report specifically highlights the relationship between the EU and Israel and how these have adapted in light of the illiberal trends, also showing the impact and lack of prospect in light of Israeli-Palestinian peacemaking and advancement towards a resolution of the Palestinian struggle. The relevance of this report goes beyond the specific relations between the EU and Israel, however, also showing global tendencies. It demonstrates the eroding global democratic trend and impact on liberal values. Therefore, this report is not only a research but also a call to action to counter the negative trend in order to protect the liberties we have. Below you can find the full report, as well as three short policy briefs: one on Democracy and Foreign Affairs in Israel, one on Illiberalism in the EU and Israel, and one on the International Alliances with the Israeli left. The findings from this report were presented at both an international conference in Brussels on July 12th, and will be presented in the future in Jerusalem. Mitvim thanks PAX for Peace – Netherlands and the SWP for their continued partnership in creating this successful, collaborative work.
Topic:
International Relations, European Union, Securitization, and Democratic Backsliding
Political Geography:
Europe, Middle East, Israel, and Palestine

16. The European Union in the COVID-19 storm: economic, political and stability challenges

Author:
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:
The COVID-19 shock intensified existing imbalances and divergence trends within the EU as well as underlying societal tensions, with potentially long-lasting consequences for social and political stability. The EU response to the epochal challenge posed by the pandemic has been strong and thorough, with the relaxation of fiscal rules and an unprecedented mobilisation of regional resources. However, implementation challenges abound, amid growing political instability and governance flaws in many member countries. The effectiveness of the long-term response to the pandemic also represents an inflection point for the durability and strength of the European project, offering the opportunity to turn the tide of existing trends of popular dissatisfaction with traditional politics and institutions (including the EU) and rising political risk.
Topic:
Economics, International Cooperation, European Union, Pandemic, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Europe

17. The geo-economics and geopolitics of COVID-19: implications for European security

Author:
Bastain Giegerich, Fenella McGerty, and Peter Round
Publication Date:
03-2021
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:
The pandemic was not an unforeseen event. Foresight reports, policy simulations and national risk assessments had long included a similar challenge among the possibilities. Nevertheless, when the coronavirus pandemic came the world was not prepared and despite the existence of a myriad of international organisations, alliances and friendships, the reactions were mostly national and inward-looking. Governments started to spend vast amounts of resources on fighting the pandemic, looking for preventatives and cures, and propping up their own economies when the primary weapon in the arsenal to fight the pandemic was the so-called ‘lockdown’. Many governments will emerge from the coronavirus pandemic laden with debt and a severely depressed outlook for economic growth. It is conceivable that among the second- and third-order effects of the pandemic is an accelerated rebalancing of power away from the Euro-Atlantic community. This could threaten the ability of NATO and EU member states to shape and defend the rules-based international order. The pandemic itself may be a driver of instability and insecurity at a time when the ability to deliver stabilising measures and crisis-management capacity is weakened. Divergent recoveries could create conditions that see an accelerated rebalancing of global power and the development or disintegration of global alliances. While levels of uncertainty caused by the pandemic remain high, it is now possible to attempt a first assessment of the geo-economic and geopolitical implications of the pandemic. In geo-economic terms, it is useful to take stock of the costs of the pandemic and attempt to evaluate who wins and who loses as a result. In geopolitical terms, there are important questions relating to international order and great-power politics, as well as the ability of multinational institutions to contribute to problem solving in the age of COVID-19, especially in the face of a resurgence of nation-state power. From the perspective of security and defence policy, the pandemic further complicates an already challenging picture, straining resources while adding to a long list of relevant threat vectors and risks. Between September and December 2020, the IISS and the Hanns Seidel Foundation convened six web-based discussion meetings, bringing together a group of international experts and officials to pursue three parallel strands of debate – economics, international order, and security and defence. This paper, written by IISS staff, draws on these conversations and is informed by them. It does not represent a shared assessment or a consensus view among the participants, but it hopefully serves to provide some orientation and fuel for constructive debate in a world that very much remains in flux.
Topic:
Security, Economics, Geopolitics, Pandemic, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Europe

18. The Nagorno-Karabakh war: a spur to Moscow’s UAV efforts?

Author:
Julian Cooper
Publication Date:
03-2021
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:
For Russian observers and analysts, the 44-day war in 2020 between Azerbaijan and Armenia highlighted the comparative lack in Russia’s own armed uninhabited aerial vehicle (UAV) inventory, as well as the patchy performance of Russian-made short-range ground-based air-defence systems in countering UAVs. Nearly two decades after the US began to operate armed UAVs and as the number of countries possessing armed UAVs around the world steadily increases, Russia has yet to field a similar capability. Factors contributing to this failing include the collapse of Russian defence spending in the 1990s, the more recent focus on recapitalising in-service capabilities, the neglect of some of the required-technology building blocks for UAV systems, and Western sanctions. In 2009 Russia imported ten small Birdeye 400 and two larger Searcher Mk II UAVs and the associated ground-control and support systems from Israel. In September 2011 the Defence Ministry opened a tender for ISR and armed UAVs, and a far higher-performance uninhabited combat air vehicle (UCAV) with Sukhoi eventually being the preferred UCAV developer. Two medium-altitude long-endurance designs were selected, the Kronstadt Orion (Inokhodets-BLA) single-engine UAV, and the now-UWCA Altius twin-engine platform. As of early-2021, neither project has entered service in significant numbers. Engine-supply issues have been a contributory factor. For Moscow, the task of producing a modern, competitive small piston engine suitable for UAV applications has represented a challenge. This engine-supply problem is rooted in a decades-long focus on advanced propulsion technologies at the cost of the humble piston engine, and – at the time – the capacity to source these from elsewhere within the USSR. By the time the gap was beginning to be recognised in the 1990s funding was not available to revive the domestic development of piston aeroengines. Other contributing factors to the Russian UAV gap include the fact that relatively cheap piston engines for UAVs lack the prestige to command resources and administrative authority, especially in a decision-making system where the development of advanced weapons appears to be in the hands of a relatively small circle of people with little involvement of civilian experts. Inter-service rivalry may also have hindered the introduction of ISR and armed UAVs into the inventory. Given the extended difficulties Russia has had in getting ISR and armed UAVs into service there remains a question as to why it has not turned more to the international market to address the capability gap. While Beijing might have been willing to supply armed UAVs to Russia, this would have required Moscow to purchase from what was previously a client state in terms of weapons sales. It would also be considered a tacit admission it was lagging China in UAV development. In addition, for all its difficulties, Russia may well still view the UAV-export market as one it could enter. In this context China would be a competitor. The Nagorno-Karabakh war and Russia’s experience in Syria have underscored the challenges to current ground-based air-defence systems when defending against UAVs and loitering munitions. Along with gun and missile-based counters the Defence Ministry is looking at electronic countermeasures. A more novel approach has been to look at using certain UAVs as a counter measure. Training now also includes more counter-UAV activities.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Russia and Europe

19. DPRK strategic capabilities and security on the Korean Peninsula: looking ahead

Author:
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:
Believing that Russian–US cooperation could play an important role in developing and implementing proposals for denuclearisation and creating lasting peace on the Korean Peninsula, the Moscow-based Center for Energy and Security Studies and the IISS undertook a joint assessment of North Korea’s progress in developing nuclear and missile capabilities and an examination of possible international steps towards a solution. The spectre of nuclear war has haunted the Korean Peninsula for nearly seven decades. In November 1950, United States president Harry Truman publicly raised the option of using nuclear weapons in the Korean War. For about 40 years after the war, the US deployed several types of tactical nuclear weapons in the Republic of Korea (ROK, or South Korea). The ROK and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK, or North Korea) also launched their own nuclear-weapons programmes. While Seoul abandoned its dedicated weapons effort soon after ROK president Park Chung-hee was assassinated in October 1979, Pyongyang persisted, announcing its withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 2003 and subsequently making rapid progress in building up nuclear and missile capabilities, while enshrining a nuclear-armed status in the country’s constitution. In September 2017, North Korea’s sixth nuclear test achieved a thermonuclear yield. Two months later, the DPRK launched a Hwasong-15 ballistic missile, which Pyongyang says is an intercontinental weapon system that can reach the entire US mainland. At that point, North Korea announced that its mission to build its nuclear forces was accomplished. The year 2017 saw military escalation on the Korean Peninsula reach an unprecedented level in the post-Korean War period. Many analysts believed that the situation had become the most volatile since the 1968 USS Pueblo crisis, or even since the end of Korean War hostilities in 1953. Some experts drew parallels with the Cuban Missile Crisis. Given Russia’s historical relationship with North Korea and the US alliance with South Korea, Moscow and Washington have special roles to play in promoting stability on the Korean Peninsula. As permanent members of the UN Security Council and depository states of the NPT, Russia and the US also bear special responsibility for upholding peace and international security. Their joint efforts, along with other major powers, were instrumental, for example, in resolving the crisis over the Iranian nuclear programme through the adoption of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in July 2015. Despite US president Donald Trump’s decision in May 2018 to take the US out of the JCPOA, the deal remains a model of what can be achieved through multilateral diplomacy, especially when US–Russian cooperation is harnessed to promote nuclear non-proliferation. Similarly, should the key players demonstrate the political will to seek a sustainable solution to the security problems on the Korean Peninsula, Russian–US cooperation in a multilateral framework could play an important role in developing and implementing proposals. The opportunities are clear. For example, more than 67 years since the shooting stopped, the Korean War still remains officially unresolved. The Armistice Agreement of 1953 has yet to be replaced by a proper peace treaty or a more comprehensive accord. In these circumstances, the Moscow-based Center for Energy and Security Studies (CENESS) and the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) agreed in 2017 to conduct a joint assessment of North Korea’s progress in developing nuclear and missile capabilities. They also undertook to develop proposals on possible international steps to facilitate the denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula and create lasting peace and security mechanisms. The two parties began their work in January 2018 and completed it in about 33 months. They received valuable assistance from a Russian working group led by CENESS and a US working group led by the IISS. The two working groups included former military officials, diplomats, nuclear specialists and scholars specialising in Korean studies. The two groups worked independently, then compared and consolidated their drafts. The results are summarised in this joint report prepared by the project co-chairs. All the contributing experts, listed in annexes one and two, participated in a personal capacity. The report does not necessarily reflect the views of all the experts involved in the study, or of the organisations they represent. CENESS and IISS hope that the report will serve as a catalyst for further discussions between researchers and officials on possible measures to reduce tensions and nuclear-related risks and build confidence in the region. We also hope that the report will help to facilitate discussions on how to promote pragmatic and effective Russian–US cooperation, an aim which has also been emphasised by the leadership of the two countries.
Topic:
Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Asia, South Korea, North Korea, North America, and United States of America

20. Emerging Challenges for European Security and Defence

Author:
Douglas Barrie and Ben Barry
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:
The challenges of climate change for the military and the security aspects of space are the latest critical issues explored as part of a joint programme between the IISS and the Hanns Seidel Foundation. On 23 and 24 June 2021 the Hanns Seidel Foundation and the IISS held the fourth meeting of the High-Level Study Group on the Future Defence of Europe. While earlier sessions of the study group had focused on threat perceptions, military capabilities, the implications of intensifying great-power competition, and the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on European defence, the growing impact of climate change on defence and security was the focus of the first day’s discussion. The second day considered developments in space exploitation, and the challenges and opportunities this raises for defence and security. The following paper draws on these discussions and includes the key themes and topics that were raised.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Strategic Stability
Political Geography:
Europe

21. Armed uninhabited aerial vehicles and the challenges of autonomy

Author:
Douglas Barrie, Oskar Glaese, Niklas Ebert, and Franz-Stefan Gady
Publication Date:
12-2021
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:
Two decades ago, the notion of arming an uninhabited aerial vehicle (UAV) was little more than a niche pursuit. Today, at least 20 countries have weaponised UAV systems in their inventories, with other nations pursuing acquisition, while the capability is also proliferating to non-state actors. The air vehicles range from small, crude, hobbyist-style UAVs favoured by some non-state groups, to large, long-endurance platforms capable of being fitted with a range of sensors and air-to-surface weapons. Technological development continues apace with an increasing emphasis on greater automation and reducing the human workload, along with the emergence of a type of hybrid UAV and air-to-surface munition along side the more established loitering munition. While uninhabited systems are increasingly embraced by many armed forces, they remain an uneasy subject in the wider public realm, where the perceived lack of human control remains an ethical issue. There also continues to be concern in the legal community regarding how increasingly automated – and perhaps one day autonomous – weapon systems fit within the law of armed conflict – legal concept rather than legislation, sometimes also referred to as international humanitarian law. These subjects were the focus of a 21–22 June 2021 seminar organised by IISS Europe to help further the debate and to better understand the implications of weapons-capable uninhabited systems. This paper reflects the discussions and many of the issues raised by the participants.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Innovation
Political Geography:
Europe

22. The UK Iraqi Diaspora and their Mobilization towards Iraq: Homeland Politics, Internal Dynamics, and the Fragmentation of Diasporic Transnationalism

Author:
Oula Kadhum
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
Arab Reform Initiative (ARI)
Abstract:
In 2003, for the first time in decades, Iraqis in the diaspora were able to return to their former homeland and help in the rebuilding of their country. Many returned in 2003 with ambitious plans and ideas to help in the country’s development, some through political parties and others through civil society. Due to political developments in Iraq however, and the subsequent ethno-sectarian political system installed under the US-led intervention, diaspora mobilization has been affected and shaped by homeland politics and dynamics, privileging some while thwarting others. Indeed, the post-2003 political system contributed to the fragmentation of diasporic mobilization along ethnic and sectarian lines due to homeland political dynamics. This, in turn, has shaped the issues and the type of transnational and translocal mobilization carried out by different groups. Focusing predominantly on the UK context and to a lesser extent the Swedish one,[i] this study explores both top-down and bottom-up approaches to Iraqi diaspora transnational mobilization, and assesses the opportunities and constraints for coordination in diasporic transnationalism. Drawing on 15 semi-structured interviews conducted with community gatekeepers, organizational representatives, and professionals working in specific sectors, as well as numerous informal interviews, and supplemented by interviews conducted from 2013 to 2018 in both London and Stockholm, this study assess the different waves of migration and socio-economic profiles of Iraqi migrants, how pivotal moments in Iraq’s recent history have affected diasporic transnationalism, and underlines the hindrances to mobilization. The study finds that where the first waves of UK migration saw the arrival of political and religious elites, medical professionals, and artists, latter waves saw the arrival of less skilled and educated workers, as well as refugees. This provides the background both to Iraqi diasporic mobilization and links to the post-2003 political system and to the fragmentation that would ensue. While some diasporic elites went on to serve in the Iraqi government, other diaspora individuals worked through civil society, providing development, training, knowledge transfer, and social welfare. The study also finds that the instability in Iraq, homeland dynamics affecting the positionality of groups vis-à-vis the country, and lack of funds are major obstacles to broader mobilization. To this point, while there is no denying the will of the diaspora to help in the rebuilding of Iraq, distrust in the diaspora among ethnic and sectarian groups presents a particular challenge to collaboration and cooperation. Building trust and reconciliation, helping to create a platform between diaspora groups, the wider public, and Iraqi organizations, and focusing efforts on cultural, heritage, health, and developmental issues – and avoiding party politics – could help overcome these obstacles to allow the diaspora to play a greater role in supporting the Iraqi state and society.
Topic:
Migration, Diaspora, Immigration, transnationalism, Humanitarian Crisis, and Mobilization
Political Geography:
Iraq, United Kingdom, Europe, and Middle East

23. Mediterranean trends 2030/2050. A prospective approach to the Southern neighbourhood

Author:
Itxaso Dominguez de Olazabal and Alfonso Casani
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
Fundación Alternativas
Abstract:
Launched a quarter of a century ago, the Barcelona Process began a process of reflection and unification regarding Spanish and European Union (EU) policies towards the Mediterranean. However, this has not always translated into coherent, prudent, and timely policies given the changing structural conditions that occurred in the region, such as the 2010/2011 anti-authoritarian revolts. A more anticipatory approach needs to be applied to policy-making, re-examining both the vision and policies. This document undertakes an in-depth foresight analysis of the Southern Neighbourhood, with a view to the medium- and long-term horizons of 2030 and 2050 respectively. Consequently, it aims to contribute towards developing long-term, proactive strategies both nationally and within Europe, which commit to developing coherent and responsible policies that could help the region’s societies develop inclusively, sustainably, and democratically. As such, this exercise aspires to identify the paths, realities, and phenomena that can lead to somewhat sustainable and friendly scenarios for the affected populations in the future. The work identifies of these scenarios. This involves reporting six megatrends in the nine dynamics. Based on available data and knowledge gleaned from interviews, they can define the evolution and range of possible directions in which the Southern Neighbourhood countries are heading. This document profiles and compares two of them: one positive, characterised by the appeasement of social conflicts, the adoption of good governance practices, and greater regional stability; and a second scenario that will bear witness to a worsening of political, social, and economic issues and conflicts, within a context marked by the stiffening of authoritarian trends and a deepening of social inequalities. The difference between each scenario resides in the will of Southern Neighbourhood countries to adopt measures aimed at better governance and the adoption of more multilateral action frameworks that favour cooperation. Both scenarios offer a set of opportunities, applicable mainly to the Southern Neighbourhood countries, with Spain and the EU eventually joining them on the process. These opportunities point to areas of particular importance in order to achieve a sustainable future for the region’s societies.
Topic:
Regional Cooperation, European Union, Strategic Stability, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Europe, Spain, and Mediterranean

24. The Disinformation Threat and International Cooperation

Author:
Kyoko Kuwahara
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
Japan Institute Of International Affairs (JIIA)
Abstract:
An open democratic society is one that allows its members to access information from both inside and outside the country presenting a diversity of viewpoints, to freely express their own thoughts, and to involve themselves in free and fair national governance. The role of the media has traditionally been emphasized with regard to accessing information. Traditional media play an important role in shaping public opinion and in providing information that enables members of the public to participate actively and effectively in a democratic society (see Figure 1). Freedom of the press1 as guaranteed by Article 21 of the Constitution of Japan is also one of the core values of democracy.
Topic:
International Cooperation, Science and Technology, Media, and Disinformation
Political Geography:
Europe, Global Focus, and United States of America

25. Russia in NATO's South Expansionist Strategy or Defensive Posture?

Author:
Chloe Berger and Cynthia Salloum
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
Russia’s presence in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) is a significant component of contemporary Russian foreign and security policy. Moscow’s approach to NATO’s South1 has undoubtedly undergone considerable change since the collapse of the Soviet Union. During the Cold War, it had built a set of alliances with Egypt, Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Algeria and Libya, among others, which gave Moscow important leverage throughout the region. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan stirred resistance and opposition in the Muslim world, marking a major turning point in its Middle Eastern foreign policy. With the demise of its empire, in addition to its economic and military weaknesses, Russia faced a series of new challenges: a further disintegration of its own south, notably in the South Caucasus, the rise of radical extremism in Chechnya and Dagestan and a NATO programme of partnerships and cooperation that threatened its influence. All of these constrained Moscow’s foreign policy at large, including its Middle Eastern arrangements. In pursuing interests above values, Russia, in the last twenty years, developed channels of dialogue and cooperation with several Sunni Arab states traditionally close to the US, including Saudi Arabia, while deepening diplomatic and military ties with Iran and the Syrian regime. Russia maintained relations with Fatah and recognized Hamas after it won the Palestinian parliamentary elections in 2006, while successfully engaging pragmatically with Israel.2 Keeping contacts open with all relevant parties marks continuity between Soviet and Russian foreign policies. Moreover, in the last decade, the increasing instability across the Middle East and North Africa after the Arab Spring, from which Moscow kept its distance, offered new opportunities for influence and power projection, most notably in Syria and Libya. Putin is tracking two main objectives there: one is building status as a regional actor; the other is enhancing his prestige domestically.3 From the Libyan power vacuum to the US retreat from Afghanistan, the Kremlin is making the most of strategic opportunities and may continue to do so. However, it remains to be seen whether its regained confidence will lead to a more permanent Russian presence and influence. In the South, Moscow has today a relative free rein. But an increasingly mature European Union and most importantly a powerful and more strategically oriented US under President Biden may seriously constrain Russia’s room for manoeuvre. Several drivers, ranging from domestic and economic politics to regional and global geopolitics, could explain Russian involvement in the MENA. Firstly, Russia is building a defensive strategy aimed at reinforcing its front line against Western encroachment and Islamist terrorist attacks. Secondly, it is displaying an expansionist drive, aimed at controlling at least parts of the Eastern and Southern Mediterranean by consolidating old alliances and building new coalitions including with business and arms traders. Thirdly, Russia’s presence in the MENA can be seen as a classic zero-sum game of power politics with the US whereby Moscow is trying to fill the void left by Washington. Last, but certainly not least, it is also driven by domestic considerations that strengthen Putin’s grip on power, and Russia’s regional influence and international prestige. While all these factors play a role, this edited volume shows that opportunism and contingency remain key variables to explain Russian behaviour in the MENA. All of these drivers were somehow on display in Syria, which became an ideal case-study to explain Russian policy in the South. Yet, beyond the specific rationale, some questions still remain about Russia’s future role and influence in the region. Is the MENA region significant enough to help Russia recover a status of global power beyond regional leadership? Do status and prestige suffice, and if so, at what cost? What are Russia’s current and future investments in the region and what are their consequences on trade, energy, and its military posture? What would the real benefits of a Russian return to the MENA region be for its economy and power? Most importantly, what would be the consequences of an assertive Russia for NATO and its partners in the South?
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, North Atlantic, and North America

26. NATO 2030: New Technologies, New Conflicts, New Partnerships

Author:
Thierry Tardy
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
NATO’s history is marked by both profound continuity and deliberate adaptation. Over the past seven decades, NATO’s mission, the defense of the Euro-Atlantic area, and its constitutive values – democracy, individual liberty, the rule of law – have not changed. Similarly, the Alliance’s founding principle, namely the commitment Allies have made to defend each other and work together for their common security and defense, is as relevant today as it was when the Alliance was established in 1949. At the same time, NATO has adapted throughout its history to ensure it always remained capable to fulfil its mission and guarantee the defense and security of the almost one billion citizens it was established to protect. In the last decade, this meant that the Alliance had to boost its ability to tackle more sophisticated non-conventional threats. It has done so by investing in resilience as well as by enhancing its tools to fight terrorism, counter cyber threats, and respond to hybrid challenges. Even more fundamentally, since 2014, NATO has responded to the changing security environment by implementing the biggest adaptation of its collective defense since the end of the Cold War. This has led to deploying combat- ready troops in the East of the Alliance, modernizing NATO’s command structure and Headquarters, enhancing the readiness of Allied forces and to an increased and sustained Allied commitment to invest more in defense. In this context, NATO 2030, Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg’s initiative, is driven by the belief that, to remain a strong and agile Alliance, NATO must continue its adaptation and focus on how to respond to a rapidly changing security environment. At the December 2019 NATO Leaders Meeting, Allied Heads of State and Government asked the Secretary General to lead a forward-looking reflection on NATO’s future. They asked him to provide concrete recommendations to NATO leaders in time for the 2021 Summit. In response, the Secretary General launched NATO 2030, focusing on the key question of how to prepare the Alliance for the next decade. To inform his thinking, the Secretary General decided to reach out and gather ideas from a wide number of actors: he appointed an independent group to provide him with their advice, established the NATO 2030 Young Leaders to hear the recommendations of the “next” generation, and launched a number of dialogues with civil society, youth and the private sector. The rationale behind this approach is solid: in an increasingly complex world where security challenges are more diverse and diffuse, it is especially important to engage with a broad set of stakeholders and to take different perspectives into consideration. The NATO Defense College’s work on NATO 2030 fits within this broader set of discussions and contributes to the policy debate on NATO 2030 and on NATO’s future more broadly. The timing is especially ripe for a reflection on NATO’s future adaptation. Looking at 2030, the Alliance needs to prepare for a more uncertain and competitive world. This requires understanding how the shifting global balance of power will affect both the international rules-based order as well as Allied security. It will be essential to consider how to best ready the transatlantic Alliance and how to forge a common approach to tackle these systemic challenges. At the same time, preparing for the future also means accounting for exponential technological changes and their impact on how conflicts are understood and fought; as well as stepping up efforts to combat climate change and prepare to mitigate and counter its security impact. It is also important to stress that while NATO needs to adapt to new challenges, it must also continue to strengthen its ability to tackle existing ones. NATO 2030 thus gives the Alliance an opportunity to both take stock of the impressive adaptation occurred over the past decade and to redouble its efforts to prepare for the upcoming one. To do so, the Secretary General put forward three broad goals: to keep NATO strong militarily, to make the Alliance stronger politically, and to ensure it adopts a more global approach. The papers presented in this volume contribute to the thinking on how to meet each of these goals. First, keeping NATO strong militarily is of course central to ensuring the Alliance’s ability to fulfil its mandate. Collective strength and solidarity are equally crucial to maintain Allied unity and cohesion and to underpin the Alliance’s political role. Ensuring NATO stays strong militarily requires sustained Allied investment in defense, but also a focus on Allied resilience and on technological innovation. Andrea Gilli’s paper on “NATO, Technological Superiority and Emerging and Disruptive Technologies” tackles the crucial question of how to ensure NATO’s technological superiority in the future. The paper rightly recognizes that historically the Alliance’s ability to deter and defend has always been predicated upon maintaining a technological edge over competitors and potential adversaries. Looking at a future of exponential technological change and geopolitical competition, it is evident that preserving Allied technological superiority will become simultaneously more complex and more important. NATO has recognized the growing importance of investing in innovation and in preventing a transatlantic gap when it comes to the adoption of emerging and disruptive technologies in security and defense. This is why, in recent years, the Alliance has redoubled its efforts in this field. Building on this progress, it is important to examine what more NATO could do towards 2030 when it comes to technological innovation in general and emerging and disruptive technologies specifically. Gilli’s paper points to a number of important areas, including by stressing the need to think creatively about what role NATO can play to foster transatlantic innovation and encourage more Allied investments and cooperation on R&D. A similarly interesting and related notion is the need for NATO to reflect on its role when it comes to transatlantic training and education, both crucial to fostering cooperation and boosting interoperability. Second, NATO 2030 focuses on how to strengthen NATO’s political role. On the one hand, this means ensuring NATO remains the platform where North America and Europe consult and coordinate on all issues relevant to their common security and defense. On the other hand, a more political NATO is also an Alliance that is better able to rely on both military and non-military tools to fulfil its mandate. The importance of this issue emerges clearly in Marc Ozawa’s paper “Adapting NATO to grey zone challenges”. The essay examines NATO’s tools and responses to a world in which competitors and potential adversaries increasingly rely on political, diplomatic, economic and military tools to challenge Allied security. The author argues that responding to these hybrid challenges requires the Alliance to update its broad strategy and expand its toolkit. This conclusion aligns with the Secretary General’s call to update the 2010 Strategic Concept to take into account the new strategic environment. In addition, enhancing NATO’s ability to respond to grey zone challenges, from information warfare, to asymmetric approaches and economic coercion, also means continuing and enhancing the Alliance’s work on resilience, as the first line of defense against both conventional and non-conventional challenges. In this respect, Ozawa rightly argues that NATO should both expand the lens through which it looks at resilience and widen the actors it involves in its consultations on this issue. Expanding NATO’s work on resilience could include, among others, using NATO more as a platform to discuss, identify and mitigate economic vulnerabilities that could be exploited to both sow disagreements and undermine Allied security. Similarly, broadening consultations on issues related to resilience and countering hybrid threats could lead to both more regular NATO meetings of Allied national security advisors and more robust engagement with the private sector. Finally, the Secretary General’s vision for NATO 2030 highlights the importance of adopting a more global outlook. Even though NATO is a regional Alliance, the challenges it faces are global, from terrorism to climate change. In this context, the question of how to better leverage NATO’s partnerships becomes especially important. Thierry Tardy’s essay, “From NATO’s partnerships to security networks” affirms the importance of partnerships as one of NATO’s key political tools and looks at how to further enhance them towards 2030. In a world of growing geopolitical competition, one of the key questions for NATO 2030 is how to further strengthen the Alliance’s political dialogue and practical cooperation with like-minded partners to deal with global challenges and defend the rules-based international order. Another important priority should be to examine how to further invest and leverage in partnerships to contribute to peace and stability in NATO’s immediate neighborhood. The three papers developed by the NATO Defense College’s researchers engage with the Secretary General’s 2030 vision by looking at how the Alliance can enhance its ability to innovate, strengthen its toolkit against hybrid threats and further leverage its partnerships as an important political tool. The breadth of topics reflects the fact that NATO finds itself in the most complex and challenging security environment since the end of the Cold War. In turn, this requires in-depth thinking about how to continue to deter and defend and tackle existing challenges as well as how to redouble efforts to adapt and innovate to address emerging ones.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Regional Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
Europe, North Atlantic, and North America

27. NATO Strategy: Integrating Defense and Collaborative Security

Author:
Schuyler Foerster and Jeffrey A. Larsen
Publication Date:
03-2021
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
This Research Paper addresses four key issues: 1) a holistic definition of strategic stability, highlighting the principal sources of instability in Europe and identifying requirements for strengthening stability in Europe; 2) an examination of recent NATO efforts to shore up its defense and deterrent capabilities, while underscoring the need to address defense against non-military threats to stability; 3) a discussion of how a comprehensive arms control agenda could contribute to strategic stability, including wide-ranging discussions with Moscow about Russia’s place in an evolving European security framework; and 4) an analysis of three different strategic approaches that NATO might pursue, each of which combines enhancements to military and non-military defense and the possibility of a broader collaborative security agenda. The continuing volatility of NATO’s strategic environment will require that NATO maintain its long-established strategies of deterrence, defense, and reassurance. However, a strategy that depends almost exclusively on the deployment of military forces will be insufficient to sustain strategic stability in the long run. NATO also requires a clear and purposeful strategy that incorporates both defense and dialogue – including arms control policies – as integral and complementary tools for addressing threats. The authors recommend that NATO should proceed to shape a new Strategic Concept by outlining a 21st century Harmel Doctrine, emphasizing both defense and dialogue with Russia as complementary paths to improving strategic stability. Simultaneously, NATO should fulfill its requirements for a 21st century strategy for deterrence and defense in dealing with nuclear, conventional, cyber, hybrid, and other military and non-military threats. For the foreseeable future, NATO will need to craft a strategy for security and stability in Europe based on the assumption that Russia does not share the West’s worldview and will likely continue to seek to undermine the stability and cohesion achieved in Europe following the end of the Cold War. If Russia proves unwilling to engage in a meaningful collaborative security relationship, NATO will be justified in embarking on a 21st century version of a renewed “containment” policy that includes the reintroduction of even greater military capabilities in Europe. In all cases, NATO should ensure that Alliance cohesion – including its transatlantic security link – is preserved even as it deliberates difficult strategic questions.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Regional Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, North Atlantic, and North America

28. Principles of Nuclear Deterrence and Strategy

Author:
Bruno Tertrais
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
This Research Paper seeks to describe and explain the principles of nuclear deterrence and nuclear strategy. It does not defend or take sides – in favour of or against – a particular thesis, concept, idea or school of thought. While it mostly applies to Western conceptions and debates (i.e., the United States, the United Kingdom, France, NATO), most of the points made seem widely shared.1 The paper is structured as an investigation of nuclear strategy, moving stage by stage from the conceptual level to the planning level before setting out the issues that revolve around nuclear deterrence. Following an initial conceptualization of deterrence, the paper looks at its implementation in the nuclear domain. It then describes the various notions associated with nuclear deterrence and nuclear strategy, as well as the related interactions with weapons systems. It also explains the main dilemmas and questions associated with nuclear strategy, offering food for thought on the future of nuclear deterrence. One author suggests that there have been four waves of nuclear deterrence analysis.2 The first of these, in response to the invention of the atom bomb, conceptualized the basis of nuclear deterrence. The second focused on formal theorizing (with the occasional help of game theory), in a world of increasingly diversified nuclear arsenals. The third wave, based on trends observed over a period of many years, used case studies to judge how efficient nuclear weapons had been in deterring aggressions. The fourth wave, leveraging advances in cognitive sciences to challenge the initial “rational actor assumption”, grappled with post-Cold War problems such as so-called rogue states and terrorist networks. We may now be entering a fifth wave, as the expansion of cyberspace and the advent of artificial intelligence and quantum computing may have ramifications for nuclear deterrence. This Research Paper seeks to take stock of this corpus of studies, so as to produce a contemporary framework designed for policy-makers, practitioners and scholars.
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Nuclear Weapons, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Europe, North Atlantic, and North America

29. The Political Economy of Law Enforcement

Author:
Matías Dewey, Cornelia Woll, and Lucas Ronconi
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
Max Planck Sciences Po Center on Coping with Instability in Market Societies (MaxPo)
Abstract:
The legal order is the legitimate foundation of liberal democracy. Its incomplete enforcement of the law can therefore appear dysfunctional, reflecting weak institutions, state capture, and corrupt practices. This paper casts doubt on such categorical assessments by systematically examining the reasons for and intentions behind incomplete enforcement. It argues that law enforcement is part of the political process that is deeply affected by the constellation of actors concerned. Choices over law enforcement produce social order that is analytically distinct from the production of legal norms and their formal implementation. By analyzing different types of partial enforcement, its rationales, and intended effects, we propose an approach that studies law enforcement as an integral part of public policy analysis and of the study of socioeconomic orders.
Topic:
Economics, International Political Economy, Law Enforcement, Law, Police, and Legal Sector
Political Geography:
Europe and Global Focus

30. Recognition, Non-recognition, and Misrecognition of Minority Communities. What Lessons Can Be Drawn from a Comparison between European and Central Asian Approaches?

Author:
Sergiusz Bober and Aziz Berdiqulov
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
European Centre for Minority Issues
Abstract:
This Research Paper focuses on practices concerning recognition and non-recognition of minority communities in six European and Central Asian countries (Denmark, Germany, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Poland, and Tajikistan). Additionally, it also assesses the risk of misrecognition with regard to some of the minority communities resulting from these practices. The text is structured as a dual comparative analysis, first scrutinizing approaches to recognition within two macro-regions, and afterwards confronting them in order to identify similarities and discrepancies. This results in the identification of two “cultures” of recognition: a “strong” one in Europe and a “weak” one in Central Asia, with their characteristics originating mainly from differences concerning social, political, and legal contexts. At the same time, some features are shared by both macro-regions: hierarchization of minority communities, general limited access to minority rights, and sometimes a severe risk of misrecognition. Moreover, the paper argues in favour of formal mechanisms of recognition, a wider scope of application of minority rights (especially in Europe), as well as the strengthening of minority rights frameworks in Central Asia.
Topic:
Culture, Minorities, Ethnicity, and Community
Political Geography:
Europe, Central Asia, and Asia

31. Identity and Nation-Building in Ukraine: Reconciliation of Identities from a Conflict Prevention Perspective

Author:
Nina Henke
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
European Centre for Minority Issues
Abstract:
In less than 20 years after gaining its independence from the Soviet Union, Ukraine has faced several events, which have shaped the process of nation-building. The Euromaidan, the annexation of Crimea and the armed conflict with Russia have intensified the ‘us–them’ line of self-identification of the “Ukrainians” versus the “Others”. Ongoing “Ukrainisation” is spreading insecurity among minority groups and endangers possibilities to establish a cohesive Ukrainian society with a shared sense of belonging. In the context of a multicultural Ukrainian space and the international commitments of the State to protect and promote rights of its national, ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities, adopting an ethnocentric approach to the nation-building of the country is a conflict-prone factor. By examining and discussing identities in the perspective of the ongoing nation-building process in Ukraine, this research paper aims to identify the potential of the State and individuals to find mechanisms and grounds for reconciliation and integration. This is approached through a series of in-depth interviews and a complex analysis of current political guidelines on education, language and decommunisation.
Topic:
Conflict Prevention, Nationalism, Minorities, Ethnicity, Conflict, State Building, and Identity
Political Geography:
Europe and Ukraine

32. Conceptual Disputes over the Notions of Nation and National Minority in the Western Balkan Countries

Author:
Ljubica Djordjevic
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
European Centre for Minority Issues
Abstract:
The paper analyses the texts of the constitutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, North Macedonia, and Serbia as a basis for exploring how these states deal with the (ethnic) diversity and balance between civic and ethnic concepts of nation. The four countries offer an interesting spectrum of different approaches, caused by different social contexts: the main feature of the approach in Bosnia and Herzegovina is the category of “constituent peoples”; Montenegro has opted for a civic concept; North Macedonia tries to balance between multiculturalism and a binational state; and Serbia juggles the concept of the nation-state combined with comprehensive protection for national minorities. The analysis shows that the constitutions struggle to various degrees with the balance between the civic (political) concept of a (supra-ethnic) nation and the ethnic (cultural) concept of nation(s), and, in essence, fail to contribute to interethnic interaction and wider social cohesion. Although it is clear that the recognition of specific group identities and accommodation of (minority) rights is essential for pursuing peace, stability, diversity and genuine equality in each of the four analysed countries, it is also evident that imbalance favouring the ethnic concept of nation and failure to establish stronger institutional links of common citizenship, inevitably leads to parallel (one could even argue “segregated”) societies where different groups simply live next to each other but do not genuinely interact, which is detrimental to social cohesion and social stability and prosperity in the long run.
Topic:
Nationalism, Minorities, Ethnicity, Community, and Identity
Political Geography:
Europe and Balkans

33. The pandemic will not stop us: The impact of COVID-19 on women’s peace activism in Colombia, the Philippines, South Sudan and Ukraine

Author:
Anne Marie Goetz
Publication Date:
03-2021
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
Global Network of Women Peacebuilders (GNWP)
Abstract:
In Fall 2020, a rapid review of the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on women peace activists in Colombia, South Sudan, the Philippines and Ukraine was conducted as part of an ongoing partnership between the Global Network of Women Peacebuilders (GNWP) and the New York University Center for Global Affairs (NYU CGA).1 The review found that the crisis has delayed implementation of peace agreements, in particular their gender provisions, shifted women’s peace advocacy to online spaces, impacted the membership composition of women’s peace groups, and diverted women’s organizational energies into humanitarian action to support community resilience.
Topic:
Gender Issues, Women, Pandemic, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Africa, Europe, Ukraine, Asia, Philippines, Colombia, South America, and South Sudan

34. Challenges to NATO's Nuclear Strategy

Author:
Andrea Gilli
Publication Date:
12-2021
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
In 2022, NATO will present its new Strategic Concept. Since 2010, when the previous Strategic Concept was published, NATO and the world have changed significantly. At the time, NATO was primarily engaged in crisis management, including in operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Strategic Concept enabled the Alliance to further expand – conceptually and geographically – its out-of-area activities, together with the core tasks of cooperative security. Eleven years later, the dominant paradigm of international politics is great power competition: in other words, countries like Russia and China are competing with the West strategically, economically, militarily, and in terms of values. Many things have remained constant, however: one is the centrality of nuclear weapons for NATO’s deterrence and defence posture. Since 2010, Allies have continued to affirm that as long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO will remain a nuclear alliance, notwithstanding the Alliance’s ultimate goal of a world free of nuclear weapons.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Europe and North America

35. NATO and the future of arms control

Author:
Dominik P. Jankowski
Publication Date:
11-2021
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
The crisis of arms control1 is obvious and broadly discussed among states, within the world’s expert community and to a lesser extent the media. This crisis has at least three building blocks: Russia continues to violate or undermine key arms control treaties and commitments; China rejects to join the existing arms control architecture; and both countries heavily invest in the modernization of their armed forces, including development of the nuclear arsenals. In the current highly competitive environment, arms control is more difficult to achieve and is likely to accomplish less than what was optimistically anticipated a generation ago. The growing pressure to “save arms control at all cost”, often expressed by the Western expert community, further complicates the situation. The excessively aspirational and ideological approach to arms control – in which arms control, disarmament, and non-proliferation (ADN) become a silver bullet solution – is as dangerous as security and defence policies which entirely exclude ADN. As James Cameron rightly points out, “history should teach policy-makers to look beyond formulae for strategic stability to other ways in which arms control can help to contain disruptive challenges to the balance of power and minimize the chances of war”.2 This Research Paper analyzes the past, present, and future of arms control in the Euro- Atlantic region, through an examination of what arms control actually does well, and what it does not do. It puts an emphasis on the role of NATO Allies in this regard, based on the Alliance’s past experience and taking into consideration current multilateral and multi- domain environment. The paper is based on three assumptions. First, arms control is not dead and its goals remain valid. Second, arms control is a policy tool, not an end in itself. In practice, for NATO Allies it means that any decisions on arms control must reflect the requirements of the Allies’ strategy of deterrence and defence. Third, in their approach o arms control, NATO Allies should be guided by the principles of security, stability, and verification.3
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Military Strategy, and Alliance
Political Geography:
Europe and North America

36. How ASEAN Can Improve Its Response to the Economic Crisis Generated by the COVID-19 Pandemic: Inputs drawn from a comparative analysis of the ASEAN and EU responses

Author:
Antonio Fanelli
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA)
Abstract:
This paper conducts a comparative review of the evolution of the economic crisis generated by the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic and the responses enacted by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the European Union. It highlights differences and common elements in the strategic approaches, the intensity of the interventions, and governance structures. In the final section, it identifies short- and medium-term actions, inspired by the comparative analysis, which could contribute to improve the ASEAN response.
Topic:
Regional Cooperation, Governance, European Union, Leadership, Pandemic, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Europe, Asia, and Southeast Asia

37. The EU–China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment: Lessons Learnt for Indonesia

Author:
Yan Lili Ing and Junianto James Losarili
Publication Date:
08-2021
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA)
Abstract:
The European Union (EU) and China have recently reached an agreement: the EU–China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI). As one of the most recent investment agreements concluded by the EU, the paper aims to assess specific concessions made in the agreement, and provides lessons learnt for Indonesia on the ongoing negotiations of the Indonesia–EU free trade agreement, the Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (IEU CEPA). The paper will present an overview of the main areas covered under the CAI, assess the potential impacts of the CAI on EU investment into Indonesia, and set out lessons that can be learnt from the CAI.
Topic:
Economics, International Cooperation, International Trade and Finance, European Union, and Investment
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Indonesia, and Asia

38. Making a Better Open Skies Treaty

Author:
Peter Jones
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:
The US withdrawal from the Treaty on Open Skies was motivated by ideological considerations within the Trump Administration. In response, Russia announced its intention to withdraw on January 15, but has not yet notified the depositaries of the treaty to begin the six-month clock. If the treaty is to be sustained, its two main members must reconsider these decisions. This paper proposes ideas as to how the Biden Administration may wish to re-join the treaty, how Russia may be persuaded to stay in it, and also steps that the other treaty members can take to facilitate these objectives. Going further, the paper argues that the treaty, which is now almost 30 years old, could be strengthened in its operations and applied in other contexts. Proposals are advanced in the paper as to how all of this might be done in a phased manner, with basic steps required to sustain the treaty coming first and then more ambitious reforms being considered over time.
Topic:
Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Treaties and Agreements, Reform, and Peace
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, North America, and United States of America

39. Implications of Russia’s Activities in the Middle East and North Africa Region for U.S. Strategy and Interests

Author:
Chen Kane and Miles A. Pomper
Publication Date:
12-2021
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies
Abstract:
Russia’s ability to project power into the region remains limited today, and the status quo seems tolerable. But there are risks to U.S. interests in the future. The United States’ military withdrawals from Afghanistan, the Gulf and Iraq have significantly affected both U.S. regional posture and perceptions of U.S. commitment. Against that backdrop, the United States confronts multiple challenges as it seeks to “do more with less” in the region. Russia’s opportunities in the region increase as U.S. involvement decreases. Moscow’s “low investment, high disruption” approach works because it leverages the self-interest of actors, stakeholders, and governments in pursuit of limited aims. The U.S. approach of “high investment, low disruption” to preserve favorable regional balances of power is more costly and affords the United States less latitude, since it is rooted in principles and values. Russia is well-positioned (along with China) to undermine U.S. interests incrementally. That is true in MENA itself and, given the impact of Russia’s activities in this region for U.S. strategic advantages, in other regions of importance to the U.S., such as Europe and Asia. Countering Moscow’s efforts now should, therefore, be an important element of a revised and more comprehensive, yet also tailored, U.S. approach to the MENA region. What is needed is an adapted approach that leverages the United States’ comparative advantages to mitigate Moscow’s influence and that includes shifting some of the current U.S. presence to a more agile and unpredictable posture. Throughout the report, regional countries are categorized into four groups reflecting their anticipated vulnerability to Russian influence-building: (1) “Russia’s friends” (Iran and Syria); (2) “Balancers critical to NATO’s power projection” (Libya and Turkey); (3) “U.S. friends requiring sustained attention” (Egypt and Iraq); and (4) “U.S. allies seeking limited engagement with Russia” (the GCC and Israel). The U.S. should tailor its efforts to: contain Russia’s influence in Iran and Syria, roll back Russia’s influence in Libya and Turkey, manage Russia’s influence — especially on the military and defense sectors —in Egypt and Iraq, and offer reassurance to the GCC and Israel in order to minimize Russian influence in those countries.
Topic:
Military Strategy, Hegemony, Conflict, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Africa, Russia, Europe, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

40. Cybersecurity Policy Dev elopement and Capacity Building - Increasing Regional Cooperation in the Western Balkans

Author:
Drazen Maravic
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance (DCAF)
Abstract:
Increased cooperation between Western Balkan economies in the face of continuously increasing cyberattacks, cybercrime and hybrid threats present a key goal of numerous recent European declarations and initiatives. The Declaration of the 2020 Zagreb Summit between the European Union and Western Balkan leaders notes that so-called hybrid activities originating from third-state actors, including disinformation around COVID-19, have become increasingly prevalent in the Western Balkans and calls for increased cooperation to address such threats. Additionally, The Digital and Green Agenda for the Western Balkans, the Regional Cooperation Council, the Regional School of Public Administration and other regional initiatives provide a general framework for enhanced cooperation. In addressing these important issues, this paper identifies the ways in which closer regional collaboration is beneficial for building resilience, enhancing regional cybersecurity and enhancing strategic communication, collaboration and partnerships. The cybersecurity workforce shortage, skills gap and slow progress in public administration reforms are significant concerns for economic development and national security in the region, especially given the rapid digitization of global and regional economies.
Topic:
Security, Development, Regional Cooperation, and Cybersecurity
Political Geography:
Europe and Balkans

41. Turning the Tide on Housing: Alternatives to the Modern Orthodoxies of North America and Europe

Author:
Paula Sevilla Núñez and Adam Almeida
Publication Date:
12-2021
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
Center on International Cooperation
Abstract:
This research paper analyzes six case studies across North America and Europe (Berlin, New York City, Seattle, Portland, Minneapolis, Barcelona, Lisbon, and Vancouver) where the orthodoxies of modern housing policy are being challenged. It also addresses the exclusionary practices and spatial inequality that have become common fixtures across the Global North. These fall under three distinct categories: protecting renters, building coalitions and new narratives, and curbing harmful demand.
Topic:
Inequality, Public Policy, Housing, and Rent
Political Geography:
Europe and North America

42. Syria and Libya’s Contributions to the Evolution of the Turkish “Forward Defence” Doctrine

Author:
Nebahat Tanriverdi Yasar
Publication Date:
06-2021
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy
Abstract:
In the last decade, there have been considerable changes in Turkey’s regional policies, especially in terms of the increasing use of hard power. Such changes are largely in response to regional rivalry, refugee flow from Syria and the revival of Kurdish issues, as well as strained relations with Turkey’s traditional allies, such as the United States and the European Union, among other factors. In the first decade of its rule, the AKP government moved away from Turkey’s traditional approach to foreign policy by adopting soft power in its relations with the states in the Middle East region. However, following the Arab Spring, and especially 2016, the AKP government embraced a “forward defence” doctrine, reminiscent of the security policies of the 1990s. At the end of the Cold War, Turkey reoriented its defence posture around a security-oriented approach due to its geostrategic location. This defence posture was based on the belief that Turkey has an unstable but strategically important location and hence needs powerful armed forces to employ hard power to protect its interests and security. Naturally, security threat perceptions reached their peak in Turkish foreign policy and Turkey came to the brink of using military force against several states such as Greece, Cyprus and Syria. Modernisation of armed forces and development of national defence industry were among the policies adopted during this era. The forward defence doctrine is key to Turkey’s policy in Syria and Libya. Given the dominant role played by Turkey in Syria, AKP has intensified its military activities beyond the Syrian border with the aim of preventing the expansion of the YPG and advance of the Syrian army into Idlib, which would trigger a large influx of refugees. Maritime disputes between Turkey, Greece and Cyprus in the Aegean Sea and Eastern Mediterranean intertwined with geopolitical tensions and rivalry between Turkey and its regional rivals such as France, Egypt and the United Arab Emirates. In response to its regional isolation and to block these developments, Turkey signed two Memoranda of Understanding, on maritime delimitation and on security cooperation, with the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) in Libya. The recent shift in Turkey’s security policy is in line with the basic principles of the AKP government’s grand strategy, which seeks to reposition Turkey as a central state in the international and regional system.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, International Cooperation, Regional Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
Europe, Turkey, Middle East, Libya, and Syria

43. Economic Costs of Ex ante Regulations

Author:
Hosuk Lee-Makiyama and Badri Narayanan Gopalakrishnan
Publication Date:
10-2020
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:
Regulations are an indispensable part of an economy and are proven to generate a significant impact on the economic, environment and social landscape. Through an extensive survey of literature and empirical study, the paper contrasts the benefits and costs arising in the light of the imposition of ex ante regulations of attempting to regulate a market sector, before a market failure has even occurred. It diverges from the norm of regulating ex-post, i.e. addressing market failures as they arise, which is the case in most modern open economies. The study highlights the economic impacts of shifting from ex post to ex ante in the online services sector as stipulated by the proposals for the Digital Services Act. It estimates a loss of about 85 billion EUR in GDP and 101 billion EUR in lost consumer welfare, due to a reduction in productivity, after accounting for other control variables. These costs are equivalent to losing all the gains that the EU has achieved to date from all its bilateral free trade agreements; or losing the contribution of passenger cars to the EU trade balance with the rest of the world. In the context of the pandemic-induced economic contraction, the GDP loss is equivalent to one-quarter of EU current account surplus projected for 2020. The extraordinarily high costs and rarity of ex ante rules warrant a discussion on the true objectives of the Digital Services Act. It is unclear which market failures it is envisaged to address – or how these failures can be so critical for the well-being for the European citizens, yet so irreparable and impossible to remedy ex post.
Topic:
Economics, Environment, International Political Economy, Markets, Treaties and Agreements, Social Policy, and Trade
Political Geography:
Europe

44. Globalization Comes to the Rescue: How Dependency Makes Us More Resilient

Author:
Florian Forsthuber and Oscar Guinea
Publication Date:
09-2020
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:
A new consensus is growing across the European Union – and other parts of the world too: that globalization has gone too far. The argument goes as follows: as an exchange for higher efficiency and lower prices, Europe has sacrificed its ability to take care of itself and protect its own citizens. The Covid-19 crisis has revealed how much Europe depends on the rest of the world for products like medical goods and medicines. Therefore, if Europe does not want to live through another shortage of essential supplies, the lesson of the Covid-19 crisis is that the EU has to produce these products itself. This conclusion may sound intuitive but it is fundamentally wrong. Europe is not overly dependent on the rest of the world because most trade in the EU is done within its own borders. New evidence presented in this paper shows that there were only 112 products, making just 1.2% of the value of EU total imports, for which the four largest suppliers were non-EU countries as compared to more than two thousand products for which the four largest suppliers were from EU member states. And while not every product is equally important in the face of a global pandemic, there is not a single Covid-19 related good for which all EU imports only came from non-EU countries. This paper debunks the idea that the EU is too reliant on other countries. Instead, our analysis shows that imports from the rest of the world make every EU member state more resilient by diversifying its sources of supply. Because of their geographical location and economic integration, if there was to be a shock like a pandemic, a plague, or a nuclear disaster, groups of EU countries are likely to be hit simultaneously. Having sources of supply outside the EU is therefore critical to reduce Europe’s vulnerability to these shocks. Europe’s recent experience has shown that international trade is a strength, not a weakness, and the EU was blessed to be able to tap into the manufacturing capacity of the rest of the world to buy urgently needed medical goods from abroad during the hardest months of the pandemic. Preparing for future crisis like Covid-19 is extremely complex. Nobody knows which type of shock will come after Covid-19, which economic activities will be impacted, or what kind of goods will be needed to protect our citizens. Yet, any debate about the merits of re-shoring should be based on figures and not on narratives. This paper analyzes EU imports on more than 9,000 products and concludes that Europe should not build its resilience by the mandatory re-shoring of economic activities. That is the opposite of diversification. Besides, re-shoring will increase costs and hit citizens in the poorest countries the hardest. An economy that is served by multiple firms across multiple locations is more resilient to random shocks than one where goods are produced by fewer firms in the same location. While re-shoring may bring the illusion of control, in reality, the EU will be more vulnerable and dependent on fewer and larger companies. This is why globalization and the EU’s reliance on the rest of the world is what makes the EU more resilient.
Topic:
Globalization, International Political Economy, International Trade and Finance, and Economic Development
Political Geography:
Europe

45. Learning to Love Trade Again

Author:
Frank Lavin and Oscar Guinea
Publication Date:
06-2020
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:
We are at the moment, the first in seventy-five years, where there is no international consensus in support of trade. Indeed, trade is unloved, unsupported, and even unwanted. There is no shortage of topics in the rhetoric of trade complaints: from the rapid rise of China to Coronavirus as a metaphor for the evils of greater connectivity. Regardless of the validity of these complaints, none of them negate the central truth of trade: countries that engage in trade move ahead, and those that do not, stagnate. Our political leaders disagree. Anti-trade positions are held by leaders across the political spectrum, from Donald Trump to Bernie Sanders. And yet, the public is increasingly warm to the idea of trade. When Gallup asks Americans, “Do you see foreign trade more as an opportunity for economic growth through increased U.S. exports or a threat to the economy from foreign imports?” a record high of 79% see trade as an opportunity, with 18% viewing it as a threat. How did the world arrive at this moment where the benefits of trade are clearly evidenced while trade has become politically toxic? We identify four main factors: (i) U.S. absenteeism from the leadership role; (ii) detachment between trade and security architecture; (iii) no alternative leadership in Europe or elsewhere; and (iv) the cumbersome WTO process. Against this background we put forward five initiatives that will be big enough to count but unobjectionable enough to be adopted. The Big Three. The U.S., EU, and Japan, should establish a consultative body on trade to forge a new approach that allows trade to move ahead in the absence of universal consensus. No harm, no foul. Each of the Big Three should commit to zero tariffs on any item not produced in each particular market. A de minimis strategy. Tariffs should be eliminated on all products where the current tariff is less than 2%. At that level tariffs are simply a nuisance fee. Mind the social costs. Expand the Nairobi Protocols to include health products and green tech. Scrapping import tariffs on medical and green goods would not only encourage additional trade but will also provide health and environmental benefits. Harmonize down. The Big Three should commit that on every tariff line each of the three will be no worse than the next worse. In other words, each of the Big Three will agree to reduce its tariff on every product where it has the highest tariff of the three. These actions will spur the WTO, not undermine it. The measures we propose can be set up on a plurilateral basis that would allow other trading powers to participate. By breaking away from the tyranny of universal consensus, these actions will encourage the trading community – including the WTO – to get back in forward motion. In some respect, convergence between the Big Three is already happening. The EU and Japan signed an FTA that lowers import tariffs between these two economies, while the U.S. and Japan agreed to negotiate a comprehensive FTA. And if China is willing to step up? China should be welcomed into this group if it supports the four initiatives, changing the Big Three to the Big Four.
Topic:
International Political Economy, International Trade and Finance, Global Markets, Trade, and WTO
Political Geography:
United States, Japan, China, Europe, and Global Focus

46. Europe’s Quest for Technology Sovereignty: Opportunities and Pitfalls

Author:
Fredrik Erixon and Matthias Bauer
Publication Date:
05-2020
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:
Covid-19 and its broader implications have highlighted the importance of Europe’s digital transformation to ensure Europeans’ social and economic well-being. It provides important new learnings about Europe’s quest for “technology sovereignty”. While the debate about technology sovereignty is timely, the precise meaning of sovereignty or autonomy in the realm of technologies remains ambiguous. It should be noted that the political discussions about European technology sovereignty emerged far before the outbreak of the Coronavirus. The European Commission’s recently updated industrial and digital policy strategies “institutionalised” different notions of sovereignty, reflecting perceptions that more EU action is needed to defend perceived European values and to secure Europe’s industrial competitiveness. Often the political rhetoric reflected perceptions that Europe is losing global economic clout and geopolitical influence. It was said that dependency on technological solutions, often originating abroad, would require a European industrial and regulatory response. Against this background, the Corona crisis provides two important lessons for EU technology policymaking. Firstly, during the crisis digital technologies and solutions made European citizens stronger. Technology kept Europe open for business despite the lock-down by enabling Europeans to work from home, receive essential home deliveries, home schooling, online deliveries and to use online payments, etc. In addition, Europe’s citizens became more sovereign with respect to accessing information and data that helped track and contain the spread of the virus. Secondly, the crisis tested Europe’s resilience and perceived dependency on (foreign) technology solutions. Early developments indicate that Member States’ homemade solutions did not fare better than existing European and international solutions. A few national and EU IT solutions failed while existing European and global solutions, from cloud infrastructure to communications, payments to streaming services, all continued to work well. Politically, however, the crisis could be used to justify more EU or national government interference in Europe’s digital transformation. Indeed, for some the debate about European technology sovereignty is largely about designing prescriptive policies, which paradoxically risk reducing Europeans’ access to the innovative technologies, products and services that helped Europe through the crisis. Policies taken into consideration include new subsidies to politically picked companies, or new rules and obligations for certain online business models. Policy-makers advocating for such policies tend to ignore critical insights from the Covid-19 crisis and failed industrial policy initiatives, including sunk public investments and protracted subsidies for industrial laggards. In a time of economic hardship, the EU and national governments should be wary of spending even more taxpayer money to replicate existing world-class technology solutions, that in most cases are used in combination with local technologies, with “Made in EU” services of inferior quality and reliability. Moreover, due to different levels of economic development and differences in regulatory cultures, prescriptive technology policies would exclude many Member States from utilising existing and new opportunities that arise from digitalisation, slowing down economic renewal and convergence. The EU cannot be considered a monolithic block that thrives on a unique set of prescriptive technology policies. Before the Corona pandemic, initiatives towards European technology sovereignty were mainly pushed by France and Germany, fed by concerns over their companies’ industrial strength in times of growing economic and geopolitical competition. Industrial and technology policies favoured by the EU’s two largest countries will have a disproportionately negative impact on Europe’s smaller open economies, whose companies and citizens could be deprived from cutting-edge technologies, new economic opportunities and partnerships on global markets, undermining these economies’ development and international competitiveness. Any EU-imposed technology protectionism along the lines suggested by some policy-makers in large EU Member States would leave the entire EU worse off. It would disproportionately hurt countries in Europe’s northern, eastern and southern countries more than the large countries whose economies are generally more diverse than Europe’s smaller Member States. It would, however, make sense for the EU to agree on a shared definition of “technology sovereignty”. Different interpretations could cause serious policy inconsistencies, undermining the effectiveness of EU and national economic policies. Anchored in technological openness, technology sovereignty can indeed be a useful ambition to let Europe’s highly diverse economies leapfrog by using existing technologies. To become more sovereign in a global economy, Europeans need to focus on becoming global leaders in economic innovation – not just in regulation. If anchored in mercantilist or protectionist ideas, technological sovereignty would make it harder for many Member States to access modern technologies, adopt new business models and attract foreign investment – with adverse implications on future global competitiveness, economic renewal and economic convergence. Policymaking towards a European technology sovereignty that benefits the greatest number of Europeans – not just a few politically selected “winners” – should aim for a regulatory environment in which technology companies and technology adopters can thrive across EU Member States’ national borders. The European Single Market has deteriorated in recent years and significantly during the crisis. The new von der Leyen Commission has now repeatedly called for a strengthening of the Single Market. Becoming a world leader in innovation requires a real Single Market in which companies can scale up, with as few hurdles as possible, and then compete globally. It should be supplemented by pro-competitive policies and incentives for research and investment. Brussels cannot set the global standards in technology policymaking alone. Europe’s policy-makers should aim for closer market integration and regulatory cooperation with trustworthy international partners such as the G7 or the larger group of the OECD countries. It is in the EU’s self-interest to advocate for a rules-based international order with open markets. International cooperation should be extended beyond trade to include cooperation on technology policies, e.g. artificial intelligence. Regulatory cooperation with allies such as the USA is essential to jointly set global standards that are based on shared values. Both the EU and the US have much more to gain if they prioritise such alignment, to advance a shared vision for a revamped open international trading system, in a world increasingly influenced by regimes with fundamentally different views on state intervention and human rights. Anchored in technological openness, the EU and the US can promote technology sovereignty that allows for development and renewal elsewhere in the world.
Topic:
Industrial Policy, International Political Economy, Science and Technology, Sovereignty, European Union, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
United States, Europe, and Global Focus

47. The Role of Trade Policy in Promoting Sustainable Agriculture

Author:
Philipp Lamprecht and Fredrik Erixon
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:
There is now a long history of countries improving sustainability standards in most parts of the economy while at the same time pursuing the ambitions of rules-based international trade and economic integration with other countries. It is not surprising that countries at the vanguard of sustainability also tend to be the countries that are most open to trade. This Report looks closer at the interplay between the formulation of domestic standards and provisions in Free Trade Agreements that either acknowledge domestic standards or establish standards in a direct way. This interplay is crucial for two reasons: first to establish market access arrangements that help to promote sustainability standards, second to provide the policy basis to make standards and possible market access restrictions conducive to basic trade rules. It lays a focus particularly on the growing importance of sustainability standards in international trade agreements, or Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) – in particular for the food sector. Such standards are relevant for all new high-ambition Free Trade Agreements – from the EU-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement to the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership between eleven trans-pacific nations. The Report considers especially nine modern FTAs. The purpose of the Report is to investigate how governments with high sustainability ambitions approach the issue of trade and sustainability – in particular how they work with, on the one hand, specific provisions in FTAs and, on the other hand, the development of domestic standards and their linkage to trade. The Report also looks directly at how these standards are designed, and what lessons that can be learned for governments that want to raise sustainability ambitions. It puts the results of the analysis in the context of Norwegian ambitions to improve its sustainability standards for food placed on the Norwegian market. The analysis of how trade and sustainability have been made compatible starts with the rules of the World Trade Organisation (WTO). These rules are important in their own right, but they also carry political significance. WTO-rules form the basis of the bilateral free trade agreements that countries sign with each other – and that now make up the main plank of international trade negotiations. In the language of the WTO, basic trade rules serve to protect the principles of national treatment and non-discrimination. Sustainability policies that are grounded on solid evidence and that follow international scientific norms will be compatible with WTO rules. Sustainability policies that confer advantages to domestic producers or that are arbitrary will get a harsh treatment. Consequently, the bilateral free trade deals that the European Union or the European Free Trade Area (EFTA) have concluded with other parts of the world are not just compatible with WTO rules, they rely on these rules as the foundation stone. Moreover, these rules inform governments how they should organise their sustainability policy if they also want the opportunity to take part in modern trade agreements. If countries aren’t willing to play by these rules, they should also accept that they won’t be able to enjoy the benefits of trade agreements. What member countries of the WTO have agreed in past multilateral trade accords are not a blockage of sustainability policy, but they bar countries from pursuing such policies in a way that would lead to unequal application of trade rules – between home and foreign producers, or between different foreign producers. In addition, it is of interest – also to the Norwegian policy discussion – to consider how EU policies are likely to change in the forceable future. The analysis provides a discussion of issues that are likely to remain very high on the agenda of the next European Commission. These include possible improvements in the TSD Chapters of trade agreements in particular with regard to enforcement mechanisms, the engagement of civil society, and climate action. Further policy highlights include a possible introduction of a carbon border tax, as well as the discussions related to due diligence of supply chains, and multilateralism. In terms of conclusions, the Report identifies four main observations that should inform future policy development in Norway: First, there is clearly a case to be made for aligning Norwegian trade policy to EU trade policy when it comes to provisions on trade and sustainability in Free Trade Agreements. Second, there is a substantial body of scientific evidence, risk assessments and international experience of standards in areas that are related to sanitary and phyto-sanitary standards and to environmental standards which any government that want to raise sustainability standards can draw on. Third, many countries struggle to formulate their domestic sustainability standards in a structured way. Arguably, this is a critical point for governments that are considering to introduce higher standards with consequence for market access for foreign producers. To avoid confusion or accusation of standards being a disguised trade restrictions, countries like Norway would have to structure and systematise its standards if the ambitions were to be raised and formed part of market access policy. A first step for a policy that seeks to condition import on the compliance with a stand is to make the standard clear and explicit. Fourth, there are direct and indirect relations between domestic standards and provisions in FTAs. FTAs often deal with policies that cannot be directly formulated in a domestic standard, like some aspects of labour laws. They also deal with other forms of standards that need policy convergence in order to guarantee smooth trade between the contracting parties. Generally, it cannot be said that the EU or other entities use FTAs to “regulate” or to establish the standard. That rather happens bottom-up – through domestic regulations that later get reflected in trade agreements.
Topic:
International Political Economy, International Trade and Finance, Partnerships, Global Markets, Free Trade, Trade, and Sustainability
Political Geography:
Europe and Global Focus

48. What drives them to invest in the sustainable mobility transition ? Evidence from a conjoint experiment on European investors' policy preferences

Author:
Eva Bortolotti
Publication Date:
10-2020
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
Centre for International Environmental Studies, The Graduate Institute (IHEID)
Abstract:
Substantial private investment is required if public policy objectives aim to increase the market share of Electric Vehicles (EVs) and prevent locking-in emissions-intensive development pathways. To maximize the effectiveness of future policies and successfully attract private capital, policy makers need to gain a better understanding of how investors behave, and of how policy design can drive investments decisions. This paper leverages an adaptive conjoint analysis (ACA) method to investigate the policy preferences of 41 European investors affiliated with different investment institutions. Findings reveal that investors' characteristics as institution type and size of assets under management affect investors' preferences over different e-mobility policy attributes. Furthermore, this study shows that behavioral factors, namely investors' a-priori beliefs on the impacts of climate change and the COVID-19 crisis, play a role in determining investors' policy preferences. By providing an analysis of investors' behavior, this research can support policymakers to design more effective policy instruments to attract investments in electric mobility during and after the COVID-19 crisis.
Topic:
Environment, Green Technology, Investment, Private Sector, COVID-19, Ecology, Motor Vehicles, and Cars
Political Geography:
Europe

49. The heterogeneous impact of coal prices on the location of cleaner and dirtier steel plants

Author:
François Cohen and Giulia Valacchi
Publication Date:
11-2020
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
Centre for International Environmental Studies, The Graduate Institute (IHEID)
Abstract:
Climate policy will predominantly affect industries that primarily rely on fossil fuels, such as steelmaking. Within these industries, exposure may be different by country according to the energy-intensity of national plants. We estimate the effect of coal prices on steel plant location worldwide and production preferences for BOF, a polluting technology, and EAF, a greener one. A 1% increase in national coal prices reduces BOF installed capacity by around 0.37%, while it has no statistically significant impact on EAF capacity. We simulate the implementation of a stringent European carbon market with no border adjustment and find a non-negligible shift in steel production outside Europe, with a concomitant impact on the technologies employed to produce steel. If applied worldwide, the same policy would primarily affect production in Asia, which relies on BOF and currently benefits from lower coal prices than those expected to emerge in the future.
Topic:
Climate Change, Natural Resources, Green Technology, Fossil Fuels, Coal, and Price
Political Geography:
Europe

50. "NATO-Mation": Strategies for Leading in the Age of Artificial Intelligence

Author:
Andrea Gilli
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
The increasing power of processors, accuracy of algorithms, and availability of digital data are driving the dramatic artificial intelligence (AI)-centred technological transformation now in progress. These changes have already turned companies, industries and markets upside down, and we are also starting to see their effects on the battlefield. The employment of unmanned vehicles, reliance on big data for target detection, identification and acquisition, as well as the potentials of machine learning in other critical functions such as logistics and maintenance are only some of the possible examples of how warfare will evolve in the near future. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and its Allies cannot be bystanders during this technological transition. Some countries and organizations have already taken important steps. Others are more hesitant. The Atlantic Alliance has a moral obligation to act, both to preserve and extend its military leadership – and thus the wealth and security of its citizens – and to shape this process in keeping with its democratic principles, freedom-inspired values and commitment to fundamental human rights. As NATO works on its Artificial Intelligence Strategy, which could be published in 2021, this Research Paper aims at contributing to both the policy debate and the public discussion about AI and its implications for the Alliance. The paper offers a series of analyses, lessons learned, proposals, and recommendations, that build on best practices and solutions adopted in the civilian and military fields, on perspectives drawn from the academic literature as well as on ideas generated in the broader AI community. The various parts of the paper are all linked to the single overarching concept of “NATO-mation”, or the idea that NATO has an important role to play so as to prepare for and to shape this technological transformation. NATO Allies need to be proactive: without common, coordinated, cooperative or joint solutions, they will not be able to achieve all their goals effectively and efficiently.
Topic:
NATO, Diplomacy, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, Leadership, and Artificial Intelligence
Political Geography:
Europe, North Atlantic, and North America