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Begin New Search Political Geography Europe Content Type Research Paper Publication Year within 10 Years Publication Year within 25 Years

1. Russia’s Aggression Against Ukraine: Concept, Ideology, Objectives, Means, Consequences

Author:
Plamen Pantev
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
Institute for Security and International Studies (ISIS)
Abstract:
The study tries to outline interim conclusions about the concept, the ideology, the objectives and the tools used by the Russian federation in this barbaric war of attrition against Ukraine – a war of a nuclear superpower against a smaller neighbouring country. The study does not aim to analyse the strange way the war is developing – Russians carry on military attacks in both a regular and terrorist manner 7 on the whole territory of Ukraine, while the Ukrainians are deterred to counter-attack the aggressor on the latter’s own territory and to fight with longer-range arms even on their own land. The author understands how many issues from the theoretic fields of international relations, foreign, security and defense studies need to be considered to understand in a holistic way the final result of the interaction of domestic Russian, international, political, economic, governance, psychological and other problems that led to launching an aggressive and devastating war in the European continent by Moscow. The purpose of the study is not to outline the avalanche of mistakes in the policy of the collective West towards a showing for decades signs of revenge imperialist Russia. Neither it aims to point to the multitude of military mistakes by the aggressor in the last year. The aim of the study is to outline and discuss the concept, the ideology, the objectives and the means of the Russian aggression. Revealing the Nazi-like behaviour of the Russian leadership and its armed forces could serve to construct the broader picture of the developing conflict and learn how to prevent a similar invasion by Moscow. The study aims to prove that the legal and moral consequences of the war will be the conviction of the aggressor for the genocide and the war crimes. This would be the only possibility for normalising the life of the Ukrainians and the Russians as well as of the broader international relations system.
Topic:
International Relations, Security, NATO, Imperialism, Sovereignty, European Union, Conflict, Ideology, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

2. Café Evropa: The future of energy in the Czech Republic - how to further reduce dependence on fossil fuels?

Author:
Barbora Kociánová
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
Europeum Institute for European Policy
Abstract:
As part of the Café Evropa debate series, a debate was held on the topic The future of energy in the Czech Republic - how to further reduce dependence on fossil fuels? Is the Czech Republic succeeding in diversifying its resources and reducing its dependence on fossil fuels? Will the Czech Republic be energy independent from other countries if it moves away from coal? You can read a summary of the outputs of each guest in the report written by our intern Barbora Kociánová.
Topic:
Fossil Fuels, Coal, Energy, and Debates
Political Geography:
Europe and Czech Republic

3. The Unfulfilled Promise of EU Foreign and Security Policy towards Iran

Author:
Riccardo Alcaro, Steven Blockmans, Akin Unver, and Sine Özkaraşahin
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS)
Abstract:
With the 2015 nuclear deal dead in all but name, Iran is getting closer to Russia and more repressive at home, while EU member states’ priorities about the Islamic Republic now extend beyond nuclear proliferation to human rights and European security. This shift in priorities cements a re-orientation of the EU’s approach to Iran from conditional engagement to confrontation. EU member states’ options are limited, however. Pressure worked prior to the nuclear agreement because the EU cut off significant trade with Iran. But US extraterritorial sanctions, re-imposed after the United States left the deal in 2018, have rendered EU-Iran trade so modest that cutting it would have little impact. The EU could get more leverage by providing incentives, yet the political inexpediency of rewarding Iran at a time of rising belligerence of the Islamic Republic greatly restricts the range of benefits potentially on offer. Still, in the mid- to longer term, the EU and its member states will need to combine pressure with some form of incentives if they want to defend their interests in non-proliferation, European security and the protection of human rights in Iran. They also need to resort to a variety of international partnerships in order to maximise their residual leverage.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, European Union, and JCPOA
Political Geography:
Europe, Iran, and Middle East

4. How to Reduce the Impact of Internal Contestation, Regional Fragmentation and Multipolar Competition on EU Foreign and Security Policy

Author:
Sarah van Bentum, Caterina Bedin, Gregor Walter-Drop, Steven Blockmans, Agnès Levallois, and Tiffany Guendouz
Publication Date:
05-2023
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS)
Abstract:
In a Union of 27 Member States, differences in (geo)political interests, socio-economic realities, historical trajectories and national identity construction constantly threaten internal unity and thus also the external coherence of the EU’s Foreign and Security Policy (EUFSP). The following three factors and their mutually reinforcing interplay appear to have a significant impact on the creation and shaping of EUFSP, especially when it comes to managing international crises and conflicts: internal contestation, regional fragmentation and multipolar competition. The analysis in this paper draws on the main findings from nine case studies carried out under the Horizon 2020 JOINT project. The paper first assesses the (generally negative) impact of the three factors on EUFSP in these contexts of international crises, identifies common patterns and divergent approaches. The second part of the paper identifies strategies to mitigate and/or reduce the (negative) impact of these challenges on EUFSP and points towards windows of opportunity to take action moving forward. The ultimate aim of this research is to provide experts and officials with concrete ideas about how EU policy decision-making processes can enable greater coherence among EU institutions and Member States in their response to international crises and conflicts.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, European Union, Regional Integration, Multipolarity, and Fragmentation
Political Geography:
Europe

5. Military capabilities in Europe: a framework for assessing the qualitative dimension

Author:
Bastain Giegerich and James Hackett
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:
There is renewed focus in Europe on deterring and defending against state-level aggression. However, after decades of mainly crisis-management operations abroad, questions are being asked about the capability of European armed forces to achieve these tasks. Within the context of a deteriorating security environment, limited resources and a need for governments to better explain the benefits of defence, this report examines factors important in assessing military capability. There is particular focus on six input areas that are central to assessing the qualitative dimension of capability. The report includes contributions from seven specialists from across Europe, offering perspectives on these lines of enquiry and their relative importance to European states’ military capability now and in the future.
Topic:
Security, Military Strategy, State Building, and Resource Management
Political Geography:
Europe

6. Green Defence: the defence and military implications of climate change for Europe

Author:
Ben Barry and Shiloh Fetzek
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:
Climate change is a national security threat to Europe. It is an accelerator of conflict and requires European forces to adapt accordingly. Concurrently, armed forces can help mitigate climate change by reducing their greenhouse-gas emissions. For states that plan to reduce carbon emissions, decarbonisation of armed forces without disarming will be a challenge. This new report assesses not only the implications for European armed forces of operating in climate changed worlds, but also the opportunities for reducing carbon footprint from new technologies. It assesses the challenges of implementing the necessary changes to military operations, training and capability and identifies success factors for this essential transformation.
Topic:
Security, Climate Change, Environment, Science and Technology, Armed Forces, and Green Technology
Political Geography:
Europe

7. Strategic Shifts and NATO’s new Strategic Concept

Author:
Thierry Tardy
Publication Date:
06-2022
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
NATO currently faces a fundamental challenge. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, NATO adopted a de facto strategy of political, geographical and functional extension, welcoming new members, launching operations in new regions and multiplying its activities to address new low-intensity security threats.1 However, the pillars on which this strategy rested are now weakening. Today, strategic competition has returned and NATO’s military primacy is eroding, as much due to China’s impressive military modernization as because of the diffusion of military power enabled by globalization.2 Likewise, the liberal international order which allowed NATO to endure an uncertain military balance and a competitive international system during the Cold War is also under pressure. Free trade is under attack, democracy is receding, financial stability is harder to maintain and, last but not least, a seismic redistribution of wealth and power away from the Euro-Atlantic area and towards the Asia-Pacific is underway.3 Lastly, the non-traditional security threats which characterized the post-Cold War era remain, having even expanded in number and intensity.4
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, International Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Alliance
Political Geography:
Europe and North America

8. War in Europe: preliminary lessons

Author:
Thierry Tardy
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
NATO Defense College
Abstract:
The 24th of February, 2022, will remain a watershed date in European history; that day, the Russian regime led by President Vladimir Putin launched a military invasion of Ukraine, marking the return of war in Europe for the first time in decades. Much of what has transpired since the war’s onset has come as a surprise, whether in its political and strategic dimensions or in operational and tactical terms. The war was not an impossibility prior to 24 February, but it was certainly viewed in the West as improbable from the perspective of a rational cost-benefit analysis. This is especially so when one considers Putin’s attempt to swallow the entirety of Ukrainian territory. The means with which Russia attempted its conquest also raise a number of questions as to its armed forces’ level of preparedness, organisation, and operational ability. Today, it is clear that Russia’s military capacity was overestimated while Ukraine’s capacity to resist was underestimated. We have witnessed Russian forces encountering difficulties in achieving their military objectives and a Ukrainian nation-state – including its armed forces and its society – determined to deny Russia any gains. Politically, the Russian regime misread the very nature of the Ukrainian nation, which proved strong and unanimous in its rejection of the Russian endeavour – even in the country’s supposedly Russian-leaning East (with the exception of part of the Donbas). For its part, the Atlantic Alliance has displayed a political unity that was admittedly lacking in recent years prior. The United States has demonstrated unequivocal commitment to the defence of Europe, while European Allies have shown both political resolve and a will to take defence spending seriously. Very little dissent or freeriding has occurred in the West. Solidarity with Ukraine has been optimal, both politically and through the delivery of weapons. Still, Allied support is constrained by the imperative of non-belligerence. NATO Allies have made it clear upfront that they have no desire to directly confront Russia, hence the rejection of a no-fly-zone or any other move carrying the risk of inadvertent escalation. That said, NATO has deployed part of its NATO Response Force and activated its defence plans. Allies have strengthened their presence in each of the enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) four existing battlegroups, and committed to the deployment of four additional battlegroups in Romania, Slovakia, Hungary and Bulgaria. 40,000 troops are officially deployed under direct NATO command on the Eastern flank as of the beginning of April, together with ships and air assets. Most importantly, the US has staged a comeback in Europe, with an overall deployment of 100,000 troops, among which approximately 20,000 have deployed since the beginning of 2022. The European Union (EU) too has acted swiftly, most notably through the imposition of sanctions on Russia in lockstep with US and UK sanctions. The EU has also flexed its muscle through the newly created European Peace Facility (EPF), which has delivered three instalments of EUR 500 million to finance the delivery of weapons to Ukraine. At the time of writing, EU states had not taken the decision to extend sanctions to oil and gas imports from Russia, unlike the US and the UK. If such a decision is taken, this would lead to a major energy crisis – and therefore economic crisis – in the whole of Europe. The war, then, raises a series of questions about the current and future European security order. First, will Western unity endure over time? What are the risks that the US or some European states will defect once the initial shock of the invasion has faded, once sanctions begin harming European economies, once the possibility of a re-engagement with Russia is floated, or once the Indo-Pacific inevitably regains US attention? Second, how will the war impact European security institutions – most notably NATO and the EU – and to what extent will the current situation positively shape the partnership between the two? Third, how resilient will Europe be in the face of a possible energy crisis provoked by the cessation of oil and gas deliveries from Russia? Fourth, from a military perspective, what lessons can be drawn from the first months of the Russian offensive regarding both Russia’s capacity (or incapacity) as a first-tier military power and in the changing (or unchanging) character of modern war? Finally, what initial lessons should we draw regarding nuclear deterrence and the Atlantic Alliance’s ability to dissuade harmful Russian nuclear-related actions? This collective Research Paper, authored by NDC Researchers and the NDC Commandant, explores these questions directly, identifying some preliminary lessons from the war. In the first chapter, Lt. Gen. Olivier Rittimann looks at the war’s potential impact on the distribution of tasks between NATO and the EU. The second chapter, written by Thierry Tardy, examines NATO’s response to Russia’s aggression and outlines implications for both the EU and for NATO’s forthcoming Strategic Concept. The third chapter, co-authored by Andrea Gilli and Pierre de Dreuzy, analyses Russia’s military performance on the Ukrainian battlefield and draws early conclusions about Russian military power. Fourth, Marc Ozawa explores the war’s impact on European energy security and Europe’s dependence on Russian oil and gas. Finally, Cynthia Salloum assesses how the crisis questions the very concept of deterrence and Allies’ ability to deter the Putin regime. This Research Paper is published alongside a series of related events and publications (notably in the Policy Brief series) that the NATO Defense College Research Division has organized in relation to the ongoing revision of the Alliance’s Strategic Concept. To that end, it arrives in tandem with an adjacent NDC study on the strategic shifts impacting NATO’s core tasks and in anticipation of a multi-authored analysis (to be released in September 2022) of the forthcoming Madrid Strategic Concept.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, International Cooperation, and Military Strategy
Political Geography:
Europe and North America

9. Analyzing European Union Institutions’ Flows for Total Official Support for Sustainable Development

Author:
Brian Tomlinson
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
Oxfam Publishing
Abstract:
This report analyses the first round of Total Official Support for Sustainable Development (TOSSD) data from European Union (EU) Institutions. The EU is a key stakeholder in the development of TOSSD, as Co-Chair of the International TOSSD Task Force, and in the promotion of this as an essential metric in the implementation of Agenda 2030. It is our hope that this paper’s detailed examination of the scope of what has been reported by the EU Institutions identifies trends and issues arising from the first reporting round for TOSSD, which can be addressed going forward. It is timely to acknowledge the level of transparency in the proceedings of the TOSSD Task Force, which has been open to comments and suggestions since its inception, and has recently seated CSO representatives as observers. This transparency has put into practical effect the notion that data validation can, to some extent, be entrusted to third parties provided that the relevant information is available to all interested stakeholders on a timely basis. Good norms, such as good reporting instructions, can help steer the development agenda in the right direction for the benefit of the communities of the Global South.
Topic:
Development, Regional Cooperation, European Union, and Sustainability
Political Geography:
Europe

10. Sharing Cyber Capabilities within the Alliance - Interoperability Through Structured Pre-Authorization Cyber

Author:
Jan Kalberg, Todd Arnold, and Stephen S. Hamilton
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
Department of Social Sciences at West Point, United States Military Academy
Abstract:
Sharing cyber weapon/cyber capabilities requires trust between the member states, becoming a high-end policy decision due to the concerns of proliferation and the investment in designing a cyber-weapon that has a limited ’shelf-life’. The digital nature of cyber weapons creates a challenge. A cyber weapon can spread quickly, either self-propagating such as worms or via disclosure (and subsequent reuse) by malware researchers or malicious actors, raising proliferation concerns. Additionally, a cyber-weapon can be copied by the adversary or reverse engineered. Once the weapon is released, the adversary will eventually address the vulnerability, and the opportunity is gone. These factors raise the threshold between member states to share cyber weapons and cyber capabilities. Alliances, like NATO, prepare for a unified multinational, multi-domain fight; meanwhile, the national cyber forces are still operating as solitaires with limited interoperability and sharing. There is a need in the collective defence posture to integrate the multinational cyber force to achieve interoperability.
Topic:
Security, NATO, Military Strategy, Cybersecurity, and Alliance
Political Geography:
Europe and North America

11. The Rise of Nationalism: Lessons from Europe

Author:
Sivamohan Valluvan and Leon Sealey-Huggins
Publication Date:
03-2022
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
Center on International Cooperation
Abstract:
Sivamohan Valluvan and Leon Sealey-Huggins discuss the rise of ethno-nationalism in Europe, and provides a helpful list on the actions that can be taken to counter ethno-nationalism – school curriculums that encourage empathy and provide historic context, tackling fearmongering and lies in the media, and a call for political leaders to resist cheap, short-term anti-immigration scapegoating.
Topic:
Nationalism, Immigration, Curriculum, and Ethnonationalism
Political Geography:
Europe

12. Attentive, assertive, supportive EU support to nonviolent movements

Author:
Sergio Rodriguez Prieto
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
Berghof Foundation
Abstract:
Recent years have seen a dramatic increase of mass nonviolent movements around the globe, taking the street and the online space to demand radical reforms towards greater democracy, justice, peace or equal rights. External support to nonviolent movements can help prevent violent escalation, mitigate repression, protect civic space, facilitate conflict transformation and foster sustainable peace. In a global context where the shrinking of civic space is coupled with the proliferation of protests, the European Union needs to develop a strategy to deal with nonviolent movements consistently and effectively. This paper explores the role that different EU institutional actors can play in supporting nonviolent movements and puts forward some basic recommendations to develop a more coherent conceptual framework and factor peaceful protests into the EU’s external action.
Topic:
Regional Cooperation, Social Movement, European Union, and Nonviolence
Political Geography:
Europe

13. The Significance of Convening the European Union – Israel Association Council

Author:
Maya Sion-Tzidkiyahu
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
Mitvim: The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies
Abstract:
On July 18, 2022, the Foreign Affairs Council of the European Union (EU) decided to move ahead with convening the EU-Israel Association Council (AC) after a decade-long hiatus. What does this mean? What opportunities does it offer, and what were the costs of not convening it so far? This paper explains what the AC is, the reasons for its suspension and for the decision to re-convene it. Assuming it will re-convene, the paper recommends future measures between Israel and the EU.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, International Cooperation, European Union, and Economy
Political Geography:
Europe, Middle East, Israel, and Palestine

14. Democratic Backsliding and Securitization: Challenges for Israel, the EU, and Israel-Europe Relations

Author:
Muriel Asseburg and Nimrod Goren
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
Mitvim: The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies
Abstract:
The report “Democratic Backsliding and Securitization: Challenges for Israel, the EU and Israel-Europe Relations” analyses the illiberal trends and democratic backsliding that can be seen in both Europe and Israel. Over the course of a two year project, experts from Mitvim – The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik (SWP, the German Institute for International and Security Affairs) as well as external experts reflected on the implications these developments have. The authors offer highly relevant recommendations and insights for anyone interested in EU-Israel relations, eroding democratic trends and securitization policies. The report specifically highlights the relationship between the EU and Israel and how these have adapted in light of the illiberal trends, also showing the impact and lack of prospect in light of Israeli-Palestinian peacemaking and advancement towards a resolution of the Palestinian struggle. The relevance of this report goes beyond the specific relations between the EU and Israel, however, also showing global tendencies. It demonstrates the eroding global democratic trend and impact on liberal values. Therefore, this report is not only a research but also a call to action to counter the negative trend in order to protect the liberties we have. Below you can find the full report, as well as three short policy briefs: one on Democracy and Foreign Affairs in Israel, one on Illiberalism in the EU and Israel, and one on the International Alliances with the Israeli left. The findings from this report were presented at both an international conference in Brussels on July 12th, and will be presented in the future in Jerusalem. Mitvim thanks PAX for Peace – Netherlands and the SWP for their continued partnership in creating this successful, collaborative work.
Topic:
International Relations, European Union, Securitization, and Democratic Backsliding
Political Geography:
Europe, Middle East, Israel, and Palestine

15. Sharing Cyber Capabilities within the Alliance - Interoperability Through Structured Pre-Authorization Cyber

Author:
Jan Kallberg, Todd Arnold, and Stephen S. Hamilton
Publication Date:
07-2022
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
Department of Social Sciences at West Point, United States Military Academy
Abstract:
S haring cyber weapon/cyber capabilities requires trust between the member states, becoming a high-end policy decision due to the concerns of proliferation and the investment in designing a cyber-weapon that has a limited ’shelf-life’. The digital nature of cyber weapons creates a challenge. A cyber weapon can spread quickly, either self-propagating such as worms or via disclosure (and subsequent reuse) by malware researchers or malicious actors, raising proliferation concerns. Additionally, a cyber-weapon can be copied by the adversary or reverse engineered. Once the weapon is released, the adversary will eventually address the vulnerability, and the opportunity is gone. These factors raise the threshold between member states to share cyber weapons and cyber capabilities. Alliances, like NATO, prepare for a unified multinational, multi domain fight; meanwhile, the national cyber forces are still operating as solitaires with limited interoperability and sharing. There is a need in the collective defence posture to integrate the multinational cyber force to achieve interoperability.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Regional Cooperation, Cybersecurity, and Alliance
Political Geography:
Europe and North America

16. The European Union in the COVID-19 storm: economic, political and stability challenges

Author:
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:
The COVID-19 shock intensified existing imbalances and divergence trends within the EU as well as underlying societal tensions, with potentially long-lasting consequences for social and political stability. The EU response to the epochal challenge posed by the pandemic has been strong and thorough, with the relaxation of fiscal rules and an unprecedented mobilisation of regional resources. However, implementation challenges abound, amid growing political instability and governance flaws in many member countries. The effectiveness of the long-term response to the pandemic also represents an inflection point for the durability and strength of the European project, offering the opportunity to turn the tide of existing trends of popular dissatisfaction with traditional politics and institutions (including the EU) and rising political risk.
Topic:
Economics, International Cooperation, European Union, Pandemic, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Europe

17. The geo-economics and geopolitics of COVID-19: implications for European security

Author:
Bastain Giegerich, Fenella McGerty, and Peter Round
Publication Date:
03-2021
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:
The pandemic was not an unforeseen event. Foresight reports, policy simulations and national risk assessments had long included a similar challenge among the possibilities. Nevertheless, when the coronavirus pandemic came the world was not prepared and despite the existence of a myriad of international organisations, alliances and friendships, the reactions were mostly national and inward-looking. Governments started to spend vast amounts of resources on fighting the pandemic, looking for preventatives and cures, and propping up their own economies when the primary weapon in the arsenal to fight the pandemic was the so-called ‘lockdown’. Many governments will emerge from the coronavirus pandemic laden with debt and a severely depressed outlook for economic growth. It is conceivable that among the second- and third-order effects of the pandemic is an accelerated rebalancing of power away from the Euro-Atlantic community. This could threaten the ability of NATO and EU member states to shape and defend the rules-based international order. The pandemic itself may be a driver of instability and insecurity at a time when the ability to deliver stabilising measures and crisis-management capacity is weakened. Divergent recoveries could create conditions that see an accelerated rebalancing of global power and the development or disintegration of global alliances. While levels of uncertainty caused by the pandemic remain high, it is now possible to attempt a first assessment of the geo-economic and geopolitical implications of the pandemic. In geo-economic terms, it is useful to take stock of the costs of the pandemic and attempt to evaluate who wins and who loses as a result. In geopolitical terms, there are important questions relating to international order and great-power politics, as well as the ability of multinational institutions to contribute to problem solving in the age of COVID-19, especially in the face of a resurgence of nation-state power. From the perspective of security and defence policy, the pandemic further complicates an already challenging picture, straining resources while adding to a long list of relevant threat vectors and risks. Between September and December 2020, the IISS and the Hanns Seidel Foundation convened six web-based discussion meetings, bringing together a group of international experts and officials to pursue three parallel strands of debate – economics, international order, and security and defence. This paper, written by IISS staff, draws on these conversations and is informed by them. It does not represent a shared assessment or a consensus view among the participants, but it hopefully serves to provide some orientation and fuel for constructive debate in a world that very much remains in flux.
Topic:
Security, Economics, Geopolitics, Pandemic, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Europe

18. The Nagorno-Karabakh war: a spur to Moscow’s UAV efforts?

Author:
Julian Cooper
Publication Date:
03-2021
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:
For Russian observers and analysts, the 44-day war in 2020 between Azerbaijan and Armenia highlighted the comparative lack in Russia’s own armed uninhabited aerial vehicle (UAV) inventory, as well as the patchy performance of Russian-made short-range ground-based air-defence systems in countering UAVs. Nearly two decades after the US began to operate armed UAVs and as the number of countries possessing armed UAVs around the world steadily increases, Russia has yet to field a similar capability. Factors contributing to this failing include the collapse of Russian defence spending in the 1990s, the more recent focus on recapitalising in-service capabilities, the neglect of some of the required-technology building blocks for UAV systems, and Western sanctions. In 2009 Russia imported ten small Birdeye 400 and two larger Searcher Mk II UAVs and the associated ground-control and support systems from Israel. In September 2011 the Defence Ministry opened a tender for ISR and armed UAVs, and a far higher-performance uninhabited combat air vehicle (UCAV) with Sukhoi eventually being the preferred UCAV developer. Two medium-altitude long-endurance designs were selected, the Kronstadt Orion (Inokhodets-BLA) single-engine UAV, and the now-UWCA Altius twin-engine platform. As of early-2021, neither project has entered service in significant numbers. Engine-supply issues have been a contributory factor. For Moscow, the task of producing a modern, competitive small piston engine suitable for UAV applications has represented a challenge. This engine-supply problem is rooted in a decades-long focus on advanced propulsion technologies at the cost of the humble piston engine, and – at the time – the capacity to source these from elsewhere within the USSR. By the time the gap was beginning to be recognised in the 1990s funding was not available to revive the domestic development of piston aeroengines. Other contributing factors to the Russian UAV gap include the fact that relatively cheap piston engines for UAVs lack the prestige to command resources and administrative authority, especially in a decision-making system where the development of advanced weapons appears to be in the hands of a relatively small circle of people with little involvement of civilian experts. Inter-service rivalry may also have hindered the introduction of ISR and armed UAVs into the inventory. Given the extended difficulties Russia has had in getting ISR and armed UAVs into service there remains a question as to why it has not turned more to the international market to address the capability gap. While Beijing might have been willing to supply armed UAVs to Russia, this would have required Moscow to purchase from what was previously a client state in terms of weapons sales. It would also be considered a tacit admission it was lagging China in UAV development. In addition, for all its difficulties, Russia may well still view the UAV-export market as one it could enter. In this context China would be a competitor. The Nagorno-Karabakh war and Russia’s experience in Syria have underscored the challenges to current ground-based air-defence systems when defending against UAVs and loitering munitions. Along with gun and missile-based counters the Defence Ministry is looking at electronic countermeasures. A more novel approach has been to look at using certain UAVs as a counter measure. Training now also includes more counter-UAV activities.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Russia and Europe

19. DPRK strategic capabilities and security on the Korean Peninsula: looking ahead

Author:
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:
Believing that Russian–US cooperation could play an important role in developing and implementing proposals for denuclearisation and creating lasting peace on the Korean Peninsula, the Moscow-based Center for Energy and Security Studies and the IISS undertook a joint assessment of North Korea’s progress in developing nuclear and missile capabilities and an examination of possible international steps towards a solution. The spectre of nuclear war has haunted the Korean Peninsula for nearly seven decades. In November 1950, United States president Harry Truman publicly raised the option of using nuclear weapons in the Korean War. For about 40 years after the war, the US deployed several types of tactical nuclear weapons in the Republic of Korea (ROK, or South Korea). The ROK and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK, or North Korea) also launched their own nuclear-weapons programmes. While Seoul abandoned its dedicated weapons effort soon after ROK president Park Chung-hee was assassinated in October 1979, Pyongyang persisted, announcing its withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 2003 and subsequently making rapid progress in building up nuclear and missile capabilities, while enshrining a nuclear-armed status in the country’s constitution. In September 2017, North Korea’s sixth nuclear test achieved a thermonuclear yield. Two months later, the DPRK launched a Hwasong-15 ballistic missile, which Pyongyang says is an intercontinental weapon system that can reach the entire US mainland. At that point, North Korea announced that its mission to build its nuclear forces was accomplished. The year 2017 saw military escalation on the Korean Peninsula reach an unprecedented level in the post-Korean War period. Many analysts believed that the situation had become the most volatile since the 1968 USS Pueblo crisis, or even since the end of Korean War hostilities in 1953. Some experts drew parallels with the Cuban Missile Crisis. Given Russia’s historical relationship with North Korea and the US alliance with South Korea, Moscow and Washington have special roles to play in promoting stability on the Korean Peninsula. As permanent members of the UN Security Council and depository states of the NPT, Russia and the US also bear special responsibility for upholding peace and international security. Their joint efforts, along with other major powers, were instrumental, for example, in resolving the crisis over the Iranian nuclear programme through the adoption of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in July 2015. Despite US president Donald Trump’s decision in May 2018 to take the US out of the JCPOA, the deal remains a model of what can be achieved through multilateral diplomacy, especially when US–Russian cooperation is harnessed to promote nuclear non-proliferation. Similarly, should the key players demonstrate the political will to seek a sustainable solution to the security problems on the Korean Peninsula, Russian–US cooperation in a multilateral framework could play an important role in developing and implementing proposals. The opportunities are clear. For example, more than 67 years since the shooting stopped, the Korean War still remains officially unresolved. The Armistice Agreement of 1953 has yet to be replaced by a proper peace treaty or a more comprehensive accord. In these circumstances, the Moscow-based Center for Energy and Security Studies (CENESS) and the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) agreed in 2017 to conduct a joint assessment of North Korea’s progress in developing nuclear and missile capabilities. They also undertook to develop proposals on possible international steps to facilitate the denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula and create lasting peace and security mechanisms. The two parties began their work in January 2018 and completed it in about 33 months. They received valuable assistance from a Russian working group led by CENESS and a US working group led by the IISS. The two working groups included former military officials, diplomats, nuclear specialists and scholars specialising in Korean studies. The two groups worked independently, then compared and consolidated their drafts. The results are summarised in this joint report prepared by the project co-chairs. All the contributing experts, listed in annexes one and two, participated in a personal capacity. The report does not necessarily reflect the views of all the experts involved in the study, or of the organisations they represent. CENESS and IISS hope that the report will serve as a catalyst for further discussions between researchers and officials on possible measures to reduce tensions and nuclear-related risks and build confidence in the region. We also hope that the report will help to facilitate discussions on how to promote pragmatic and effective Russian–US cooperation, an aim which has also been emphasised by the leadership of the two countries.
Topic:
Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Asia, South Korea, North Korea, North America, and United States of America

20. Emerging Challenges for European Security and Defence

Author:
Douglas Barrie and Ben Barry
Publication Date:
09-2021
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:
The challenges of climate change for the military and the security aspects of space are the latest critical issues explored as part of a joint programme between the IISS and the Hanns Seidel Foundation. On 23 and 24 June 2021 the Hanns Seidel Foundation and the IISS held the fourth meeting of the High-Level Study Group on the Future Defence of Europe. While earlier sessions of the study group had focused on threat perceptions, military capabilities, the implications of intensifying great-power competition, and the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on European defence, the growing impact of climate change on defence and security was the focus of the first day’s discussion. The second day considered developments in space exploitation, and the challenges and opportunities this raises for defence and security. The following paper draws on these discussions and includes the key themes and topics that were raised.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Regional Cooperation, Military Strategy, and Strategic Stability
Political Geography:
Europe