Search

Begin New Search Topic Science and Technology Political Geography China Content Type Research Paper Publication Year within 10 Years Publication Year within 5 Years Publication Year within 3 Years

1. China’s Digital Silk Road: integration into national IT infrastructure and wider implications for Western defence industries

Author:
Meia Nouwens
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
International Institute for Strategic Studies
Abstract:
The geopolitical dispute between the United States and China is taking place on the fault line of global telecommunications infrastructure and digital technologies. As this competition grows, so too does the likelihood of a potential bifurcation in the global information and security technological ecosystems, split between US-allied liberal democracies on the one side and countries dependent on Chinese-based information and communications technology (ICT) on the other. The impact of this competition reaches beyond telecommunications companies and those involved in their supply chains. Indeed, second and third order of magnitude implications exist for the security and defence sectors. While this competition unfolds, the Chinese Government’s Digital Silk Road (DSR) continues apace and leverages the strengths of Chinese public- and private-sector giants to further integrate Chinese technologies and standards into the digital ecosystems of the least-developed, emerging and developed economies alike. The existing literature on the security and defence implications of the integration of Chinese ICT into national digital ecosystems is primarily concerned with the potential threats posed to intelligence and defence cooperation. However, the implication of China’s global digital investments for US and other Western defence industries is an understudied subject that deserves greater attention. To provide greater clarity to Western defence industries on these issues, this project has sought to answer four forward-looking questions. Firstly, what risks does the possibility of a bifurcated global digital ecosystem pose for the national and industrial security of key Asian, European and Middle Eastern states and economies? Secondly, to what extent does the integration of Chinese information technology and digital infrastructure create challenges for alliance intelligence and defence cooperation? Thirdly, what level of integration should be considered significant and how might security-cooperation efforts (e.g. Western arms exports) be affected? Lastly, can security risks to companies doing business abroad be mitigated when the integration of Chinese digital technology into national digital ecosystems is already high? This report has aimed to address this gap in current analysis by outlining the potential risks posed by China’s global digital and technological investments to defence industries. It follows with an analysis of the extent of Chinese DSR activity in five case-study countries across Asia, the Middle East and Europe that are of high security and defence importance to the US: Indonesia, the Republic of Korea (ROK), Israel, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Poland. In doing so, the report aims to provide greater insight into government decision-making and lessons learned for Western defence industries.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Communications, Infrastructure, Hegemony, Digital Economy, Conflict, Silk Road, and Rivalry
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

2. China's Civil Nuclear Sector: Plowshares to Swords?

Author:
Henry D. Sokolski
Publication Date:
03-2021
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
Abstract:
Although much has been said about the fusion of China’s civilian and military sectors, no detailed, unclassified analysis has been done of how Beijing’s “peaceful” nuclear efforts might be exploited to make more nuclear warheads. Even the U.S. Department of Energy’s own explanations of the export restrictions it imposed on “advanced” nuclear exports to China failed to discuss this. This volume is dedicated to clarifying just what the connection could be. Much of it focuses on China’s advanced fast breeder reactor program and its related plutonium recycling efforts. As explained in this volume’s first chapter, “How Many Nuclear Warheads China Might Acquire by 2030,” the least burdensome way for China to achieve nuclear weapons parity with the United States is simply to use the weaponsgrade plutonium that its planned “peaceful” fast breeder reactor and reprocessing programs will produce to make primaries for the two-stage thermonuclear weapons designs they already have perfected. By exploiting this weapons plutonium and the highly enriched uranium and tritium that China can easily access or make, Beijing by 2030 could conservatively assemble an arsenal of 1,270 warheads (nearly as many as the US currently has deployed on its intercontinental missiles).
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Science and Technology, Military Affairs, Nonproliferation, Missile Defense, Denuclearization, and Nuclear Energy
Political Geography:
United States and China

3. New Frontiers for Security Cooperation with Seoul and Tokyo

Author:
Henry D. Sokolski
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
Abstract:
With a new Democratic administration, Washington is almost certain to moderate its demands that Japan and South Korea pay more for American forces on their soil. This should ease tensions with Seoul to Tokyo. To strengthen security relations with Japan and South Korea, though, more will be required. Rather than simply increase their conventional military deployments, Washington, Seoul, and Tokyo will need to collaborate in new ways to enhance allied security. This will entail working more closely on new military frontiers, such as enhancing allied command of outer and cyber space as well as in underwater warfare. Washington, Seoul, and Tokyo will also want to carve out new functional areas of cooperation to make existing energy sources more secure, communications more reliable, data sharing easier and safer, and allied economic assistance to developing nations in strategic zones more effective. Enhanced collaboration in each of these areas has begun but is not yet locked in or fully institutionalized. It should be. Washington, Seoul, and Tokyo need one another to deal with China and North Korea. Yet, how each currently strategically views Beijing and Pyongyang differs. Nor is America’s preferred military approach to deterring Chinese and North Korean adventurism — by preventing Beijing and Pyongyang from projecting military strikes against their neighbors — all that easy to achieve. Adding new, more tractable items to America’s Asian security alliance agenda won’t immediately eliminate these misalignments. But it will strengthen the security ties they have as liberal democracies — bonds Beijing and Pyongyang are straining to fray.
Topic:
International Cooperation, Nuclear Weapons, Science and Technology, International Security, Military Affairs, Cyberspace, and Nuclear Energy
Political Geography:
United States, Japan, China, and South Korea

4. China Strengthens Its Economic Security

Author:
Takahiro Tsuchiya
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
Japan Institute Of International Affairs (JIIA)
Abstract:
"Economic security" has been gathering attention in recent years. The main reasons for this are (1) neo-globalization, (2) the achievement of objectives by major powers using the "economic statecraft"1 approach, and (3) the development of "game-changing" and other emerging technologies. In particular, there has been a heightened sense of international concern about China's attempts to coerce, demand obedience, or persuade other countries by acquiring/securing technologies (resorting to economic espionage if necessary) and human resources and by leveraging its economic power.
Topic:
Development, Science and Technology, Xi Jinping, and Economic Security
Political Geography:
China and Asia

5. Digital Activism and Authoritarian Adaptation in the Middle East

Author:
Larry Diamond, Eileen Donahoe, Ahmed Shaheed, Benjamin Greenacre, James Shires, Alexei Abrahams, Joshua Tucker, Xiao Qiang, Marwa Fatafta, Andrew Leber, Alexei Abrahams, Marc Owen Jones, Afef Abroughi, Mohamed Najem, Mahsa Alimardani, Mona Elswah, Alexandra A. Siegel, H. Akin Unver, Ahmet Kurnaz, Anita Gohdes, and Zachary Steinert-Threlkeld
Publication Date:
08-2021
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
Project on Middle East Political Science (POMEPS)
Abstract:
The Project on Middle East Political Science partnered with Stanford University’s Center for Democracy, Development and the Rule of Law and its Global Digital Policy Incubator for an innovative two week online seminar to explore the issues surrounding digital activism and authoritarianism. This workshop was built upon more than a decade of our collaboration on issues related to the internet and politics in the Middle East, beginning in 2011 with a series of workshops in the “Blogs and Bullets” project supported by the United States Institute for Peace and the PeaceTech Lab. This new collaboration brought together more than a dozen scholars and practitioners with deep experience in digital policy and activism, some focused on the Middle East and others offering a global and comparative perspective. POMEPS STUDIES 43 collects essays from that workshop, shaped by two weeks of public and private discussion.
Topic:
Security, Civil War, Government, Human Rights, Science and Technology, Infrastructure, Authoritarianism, Political Activism, Democracy, Media, Inequality, Social Media, Surveillance, Borders, Digital Culture, and Cyberspace
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Middle East, and North Africa