Search

Begin New Search Topic Conflict Content Type Research Paper Publishing Institution Arab Reform Initiative (ARI) Publication Year within 10 Years Publication Year within 5 Years Publication Year within 3 Years

1. Libyan Youth in Limbo: Coming of Age in Conflict

Author:
Asma Khalifa
Publication Date:
02-2022
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
Arab Reform Initiative (ARI)
Abstract:
This study seeks to understand how the transition to adulthood for Libyan youth has been impacted by the context of the past 10 years in conflict. Through in-depth qualitative research carried out with 75 Libyan youth in 2020-2021, the study explores decision-making processes and the types of opportunities and constraints that youth face in terms of education and livelihood, the impact of war on their political beliefs and participation, their understandings of peace and security, and the ways in which war has changed gender norms and relations. The study finds that 2014 represents the pivotal year in terms of their personal trajectories, their critical understandings of dynamics of war and peace, and their own personal sense of wellbeing and hope for the future. With regards to livelihood and employment paths, youth trajectories reveal a complicated dynamic, where opportunities come at a price or with consequences that are counterproductive. On one hand, the conflict in Libya has dismantled old repressive structures, and in the absence of that, there are chances of more independent and ingenious efforts to improve livelihoods. For nearly all participants, for example, the preferred choice of study actually expanded as a result of the opening of society and the political sphere in 2011. Likewise, dynamics of necessity since 2011 have seen the emergence of a new culture for entrepreneurship that is innovative and resilient. Yet at the same time, the destruction of war means that education pathways have been cut short and that the infrastructure needed to make entrepreneurship sustainable for young people, such as a strong financial system and operating legal framework, does not exist. In regards to political beliefs and participation, many youth attest that the 2011 uprising served as a political awakening of sorts, creating new interest in politics and political processes. However, the descent into war has had an almost universally negative impact on their view towards politics and politicians. Deep distrust in politics and a widespread belief in the systemic depths of corruption translates to pervasive apathy for formal political processes and participation. Yet at the same time, Libyan youth who have come into adulthood in a context of conflict have nuanced views regarding how peace can be constructed and the responsibilities required for this peacebuilding process at different levels. This includes the necessity of rehabilitation and the promotion of tolerance, respect for differences, and values of coexistence – all of which must be carried out both by the State, but also critically by communities themselves. For peace to truly exist, though, youth insist on the necessity for justice as a prerequisite. With regards to social relations and gender norms, the conflict has had a dualistic impact on both challenging and reinforcing traditional tropes of masculinity and femininity. Because of extreme loss of economic wellbeing, women youth have found themselves in new jobs, with new responsibilities, and in new public spaces that sometimes break away from traditional gender norms. Yet at the same time, the conflict has also reinforced norms regarding masculinity and the role of men in the family and society. As a result, while youth participating in this study do acknowledge profound shifts in the gender roles and gender relations, the extent to which this is viewed as something positive to be maintained in the post-conflict period is much less certain. Overall, the study finds that youth, facing important psychological trauma and in a perpetual state of uncertainty and instability, have little hope for the future and little ability to plan for their lives. The most reliable strategy they have adopted is that of flexibility and adaptability, with most viewing life outside of Libya as the only real option for the future. In other words, young people are seeking to build their lives elsewhere. Their lack of trust in politics and in the ability that they have to effect change means that core issues related to the resolving conflict and building peace, such as economic and political reform, will continue to be a problem without the younger generation taking active part in contributing to rebuilding of the country. This new generation no longer has the mentality of relying only on the State, but believes instead on pursuing good educational and work opportunities that are more personally fulfilling. They are also acutely aware of the extremely difficult environment in which they try to study or work in, as well as the lack of a broader context that can support them. For youth in Libya today, the pervasive feeling is that they are not safe and cannot set deep roots for fear everything will collapse.
Topic:
Security, Education, Youth, Conflict, and Peace
Political Geography:
Africa and Libya

2. Perceptions and Trajectories of Youth in Baghdad, Al-Basra, and Mosul after the 2014 Conflict with ISIS

Author:
Farah Al Shami
Publication Date:
09-2022
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
Arab Reform Initiative (ARI)
Abstract:
This infographics report analyzes and interprets quantitative data that was collected by the Arab Reform Initiative (ARI) in Summer 2021 using an extensive in-person/face-to-face survey targeting 676 youth (aged 18-28) in three Iraqi cities (Baghdad, Al-Basra, and Nineveh-Mosul). By doing so, the report aims at assessing the impact of the 2014 conflict with ISIS in Iraq on the perceptions, aspirations, and actual trajectories of youth living in these three cities, namely in terms of education, employment and livelihoods, political participation, civic engagement and peacebuilding efforts, as well as choices for personal life. The survey is part of the Arab Reform Initiative’s broader work on how youth in Iraq and other Arab countries have navigated armed conflicts in the last decade. We find that the conflict has had a significant negative impact on Iraqi youth’s education and employment, and that this impact is more pronounced on education compared to employment. This impact happened mainly through the channel of economic hardship and – to a lesser extent – the channel of fear, uncertainty, and security concerns. This impact has also largely shaped the surveyed youth’s personal lives and choices. Moreover, surveyed youth expressed apathy towards formal politics and fear of engaging in politics or expressing political views/affiliations/support because of security concerns. The 2014 conflict has had a significantly more negative impact on Iraqi youth’s political participation than on their civic engagement. Although our data shows that the overall impact of the conflict on these different dimensions is significant, the magnitude of this impact is substantially less than one may have expected. We found that the negative impact of the conflict is of a higher magnitude on the actual status quo of Iraqi youth compared to their aspirations and their perceptions of its actual impact. For instance, when asked general questions about the factors affecting their trajectories, Iraqi youth did not or rarely chose “the Iraqi ISIS conflict,” whereas when they were directly asked about the impact of this conflict on their trajectories, their answers exhibited a significant importance given to the conflict. In our report, we present various reasons that explain these observations and discrepancies, some of which come from our data and others from our understanding of the Iraqi context.
Topic:
Security, Youth Culture, ISIS, Youth, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Iraq and Middle East

3. The Long Shadow of War: Mobilization Dynamics of the Yemeni Diaspora since 2011

Author:
Maysaa Suja Al-Deen
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
Arab Reform Initiative (ARI)
Abstract:
In the aftermath of the 2011 uprising and ensuing descent into protracted conflict, a new wave of Yemeni migration has transpired, marked by different sociopolitical profiles than previous waves of migration but the transformation in places of destination. As a result, existing Yemeni diaspora communities in countries such as the UK and the US have seen important changes in the economic and political make-up of their members, while new diaspora communities have emerged in countries heretofore largely off the radar of Yemeni migration. Importantly, these transformations in Yemeni migration are also a reflection of conflict dynamics, which pattern the destination of migrants but also the relationships within diaspora communities and their mobilization dynamics towards Yemen. This latest wave of conflict-motivated migration is characterized by the large number of intellectual and political elites; however, this has not necessarily translated into sustained political engagement or mobilization for the sake of peacebuilding and/or reconstruction. Looking at Yemeni diaspora communities in three countries of destination – the UK, Egypt, and Turkey – reveals how the space of freedom for organization that each country provides, as well as conflict dynamics back home, impact the nature and positionality of the particular community in question and shape the forms of and possibilities for diaspora mobilization. Based on more than twenty interviews and a review of the activities of more than twelve Yemeni diaspora organizations working in UK, Egypt and Turkey, this paper assesses the political, cultural, and social roles that the Yemeni diaspora is trying to play both towards the diaspora itself and towards Yemen, and how these are impacted by the long shadow of the conflict in Yemen. While the UK diaspora does engage in political mobilization, this is marked by trends of polarization and the external intervention of parties to the conflict that seek to garner support for their cause through their diasporic communities. Meanwhile, for the Yemeni diasporas in Turkey and Egypt, the constrained civic space and fear of exacerbating internal frictions that mirror those back home has meant that mobilization is geared towards the provision of social services and culture activities rather than political remittances towards Yemen. Thus, while diaspora political organization in support of conflict resolution could in theory be possible, the characteristics of these diaspora communities, along with the political opportunity structures of host societies, have translated to a decreased overall capacity for political mobilization for the purpose of peacebuilding.
Topic:
Diaspora, Conflict, Humanitarian Crisis, Mobilization, and Peacebuilding
Political Geography:
Yemen and Gulf Nations

4. Straddling Liminality and Active Engagement: Understanding Mobilization Patterns of the Libyan Diaspora

Author:
Houda Mzioudet
Publication Date:
07-2021
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
Arab Reform Initiative (ARI)
Abstract:
The NATO campaign to unseat long-time Libyan dictator Muammar Gaddafi in 2011 was met largely with support by Libyans living in exile. Many had not set foot in their country in decades – some not even since 1969, the year Gaddafi carried out his coup d'état against King Idris I – and in diaspora they formed a close-knit community of intellectuals, doctors, professors, artists, politicians, and other civil society activists who acted as an opposition force to the regime. With the tragic unfolding of what started as the Libyan uprising in 2011, which morphed into a protracted civil and proxy war, the Libyan diaspora has enlarged to include new categories of activists and political actors seeking refuge abroad but also new socio-economic groups who are fleeing the deteriorating economic and security conditions. Yet despite this diversification in the profiles of those in diaspora, the conflict has never undermined the efforts of Libyans in exile to rebuild a semblance of a community that can mobilize for promoting peace and reconciliation. Building on the rich networks that were made with Western and Arab policymakers during the long years of exile, the Libyan diaspora, which has never been a monolithic entity, has been able to contribute to changes that have occurred in the country since the fall of the Gaddafi regime. This study explores the formation of Libyan exile communities since 2011, the different relationships they harbor vis-à-vis the homeland, and some of the different roles they have assumed in building the imagined community and in participating in the rebuilding of the country. Through exploration of the nature of the diaspora and its geographical distribution, and with particular focus on those in Tunisia vs. those in the UK and US, the study assesses the diasporic character of Libyans in exile. The research finds that issues related to peacebuilding, reconciliation, and the empowerment of women and minority groups act as nodal points for diasporic Libyans who, despite their different ideological, cultural, and tribal affiliations, can find common ground when discussing the future of post-Gaddafi Libya.1 Yet, in exploring the work of Libyan diaspora organizations and contextualizing the different waves and destinations of exodus, the research also observes quite different patterns of diaspora mobilization. More precisely, the research finds that the relationships between those in diaspora and the Libyan homeland differ according to relationship, as do the political opportunity structures, which have an implication on the type of mobilization that occurs. In this way, Libyans in diaspora in Tunisia – who maintain patterns of circular mobility and often harbor hopes of return, and who perceive more threats if engaged in political mobilization – tend to either remain under the radar or to engage through the activities and frameworks of international organizations located in Tunis. On the contrary, those in Western capitals have been able to cultivate relationships with foreign policymakers and international organizations for advocacy and lobbying purposes in favor of transitional processes. In all cases, though, direct political participation of Libyans in diaspora in homeland politics has faced a number of institutional, legal, and perceptional barriers, which nonetheless show signs of being able to be overcome through shared belonging to the Libyan imagined community. Based on structured and semi-structured interviews with four members of the Libyan diaspora, an online questionnaire distributed through a popular Libyan podcast series, a conversation with the Libyan podcast series’ creator and my attendance of two Zoom conferences of a Libyan diasporic organization, and drawing on existing statistical data as well as a qualitative review of social media content of Libyan exile groups, carried out between September 2019-January 2021, the study provides an assessment of how members of the Libyan diaspora relate to the homeland and to each other, and how these relationships contribute to different patterns of mobilization. The study concludes with a few recommendations to Libyan and international policymakers regarding how best to support the Libyan diaspora in the implementation of their efforts designed to promote reconciliation, peacebuilding, institutional reform, and transitional justice for Libya.
Topic:
NATO, Development, Nationalism, Military Strategy, Transitional Justice, Conflict, and State Building
Political Geography:
Africa and Libya

5. Framing what's breaking: Empirical analysis of Al Jazeera and Al Arabiya Twitter coverage of the Gaza-Israel conflict

Author:
Tala Majzoub
Publication Date:
12-2021
Content Type:
Research Paper
Institution:
Arab Reform Initiative (ARI)
Abstract:
The role of social media’s fast coverage is ever more important in shaping grander narrative and exposing state bias. Al Jazeera and Al Arabiya, both state-sponsored media, are emblematic of how these narratives are formed in the MENA region. This paper analyzes and compares the content of tweets from the official Twitter breaking news accounts of Al Jazeera and Al Arabiya in order to observe the narratives and better identify the bias. Doing so, it aims to expose the tight link between the framing of breaking news and the changing political dynamics in the region.
Topic:
Mass Media, Territorial Disputes, Media, Social Media, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and Gaza