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301. Lessons in Resilience: Moldova’s Response to Russia’s Hybrid Interference

Author:
Alina Doroftei
Publication Date:
10-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
Following the pro-EU outcome of the 2024 presidential election and constitutional referendum, Russia intensified its hybrid campaign against Moldova for the 2025 parliamentary elections. The aim was clear: destabilize the government, weaken public trust in democratic processes, derail Moldova’s EU accession path, and bring to power pro-Moscow actors. Russia deployed a broad set of tactics, including political proxies, oligarchic networks, disinformation, illicit financing, cyberattacks, and attempts at street-level disruption. Despite the sophistication of these measures and the outsourcing to third-country actors, Moldova’s institutions, civil society, and media responded decisively through rapid exposure, dismantling of interference networks, and transparent public communication. The country’s international partners played an important role in bolstering its resilience. The success of the pro-EU Party of Action and Solidarity, which won another parliamentary majority, if reduced, dealt a heavy blow to Moscow and its allied oligarchs. Russia’s interference was part of a long-term multi-layered destabilization campaign abusing democratic freedoms. At its core, it sought to normalize the perception that Moldova could not conduct a fair, sovereign vote while empowering pro-Russia or anti-establishment forces. Ultimately, the strategy relied on mercenaries, corrupt networks, and short-term political technologies that lacked broad appeal. Moldova’s legislative and institutional reforms curbing illicit financing and safeguarding electoral integrity blunted these tactics, although uneven judicial interventions related to the exclusion of certain parties also risked casting a shadow over the process. There are now three main priorities for Moldova’s democracy. First, Moldova must consolidate institutional readiness against hybrid threats and restore public trust, especially in the judiciary. The swift interagency response around the elections should be developed into a permanent, institutionalized framework. Clearly defined roles for the Supreme Security Council, the Strategic Communication Centre, and the Crisis Management Centre are essential. Second, the fight against polarization and erosion of public trust must be intensified. Strengthening communication capacities, working with civil society experts, promoting digital literacy, and cooperating with independent watchdogs and platforms are all needed to counter disinformation and coordinated inauthentic behavior. There is a risk of civic pluralism shrinking under the pressure of malicious lawsuits, polarization, and economic constraints. Platforms could be established that provide civic actors with timely access to legal aid, cyber defense, and more sustainable funding. Third, international engagement with Moldova must be sustained and predictable. Following the successful completion of its EU accession screening in September, negotiations need to be fasttracked. With US assistance cut, the EU and other donors need to step in more consistently, focusing on long-term core funding for civil society organizations and media. Moldova’s experience should also inform EU-wide resilience mechanisms, including developing new bilateral and cross-border cooperation targeting mainly inauthentic online behavior and illegal political financing. Moldova’s elections have showed that determined institutions, an active civil society, and international solidarity can resist Russia’s hybrid campaigns. Yet resilience remains fragile. Sustained reforms, economic development, societal cohesion, and long-term donor commitment are indispensable for consolidating Moldova’s democratic path and for ensuring stability in a region that remains a target of Moscow’s disruptive strategies.
Topic:
Security, Elections, European Union, and Resilience
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Moldova

302. How to Help Ukraine Strengthen Democratic Resilience During and After the War

Author:
Yana Brovdiy
Publication Date:
10-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
Russia’s full-scale invasion since 2022 has transformed Ukraine’s domestic landscape, forcing the state to balance wartime governance with the pursuit of long-term transformative reforms. Despite the centralization of power under martial law, the government has continued efforts toward EU integration and institutional strengthening. Political competition has narrowed but not disappeared: while opposition parties challenge aspects of governance, they support the war effort and reform trajectory. Civil society and volunteer groups have assumed unprecedented roles in oversight, service delivery, and sustaining national morale, compensating for state limitations. Independent media, though operating under pressure, remain critical in keeping the government accountable and countering disinformation. The public’s confidence increasingly rests with the country’s wartime leaders, reflecting a shift in political legitimacy. Even under severe economic and humanitarian strain, the population’s commitment to democratic values and a European future endures. Ukraine’s integration into Western political, economic, and security structures deepened after Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014 and accelerated following the full-scale invasion. International assistance remains vital for sustaining its defense, economy, and reform agenda. The EU’s €50 billion Ukraine Facility and progress in accession talks highlight its continued commitment, yet divisions among member states, notably Hungary’s veto threats and differing priorities, slow collective action. Meanwhile, US policy toward Ukraine under President Donald Trump has become more transactional and unpredictable, creating uncertainty over long-term military support. NATO members and partners have stepped up coordination through mechanisms such as the Prioritized Ukraine Requirements List, but the lack of unified Western leadership complicates strategic planning. This brief outlines for the medium term three scenarios for Ukraine’s democratic resilience, depending on how the war, diplomatic efforts, and domestic political dynamics evolve. The most likely one is the war continuing without a ceasefire, and ongoing martial law, societal fatigue, and political uncertainty eventually create the conditions for a government of national unity. The second-most likely scenario is a ceasefire providing temporary relief and space for governance, and opening the way for increased pressure for elections, even with the war unresolved and the country exposed to Russian interference. A peace agreement followed by elections is the least likely scenario at the time of writing, which, without complete domestic acceptance and strong international security guarantees, could destabilize Ukraine politically. To help Ukraine sustain its sovereignty, democratic governance, and European integration, its international partners should provide continuous, reliable military support and concrete security guarantees. They should reinforce independent institutions, including anti-corruption bodies and the judiciary, while backing civil society and independent media to maintain accountability. Supporting the development of new political actors and harnessing the growing influence of veterans can also strengthen democratic norms and political pluralism. Assistance should also promote cohesion across government and society to prevent and to reduce polarization and external Russian interference, ensuring Ukraine’s resilience during the war and in the ongoing and postwar reconstruction.
Topic:
Sovereignty, European Union, Democracy, Resilience, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe and Ukraine

303. How To Help Moldova Secure Its Fragile Democracy

Author:
Laurențiu Pleșca
Publication Date:
08-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
As it approaches its parliamentary elections, Moldova is in a turbulent situation, with ongoing economic and social challenges, society polarized, and the political landscape marked by a split among pro-EU forces while pro-Russia ones appear increasingly united. Moldova is no longer a captured state, but oligarchic networks are still influential. The elections will be decisive for its geopolitical trajectory. Pro-EU actors faces the challenge of overcoming their divisions and forming a credible governing coalition, while pro-Russia and populist forces aim to exploit societal grievances, economic vulnerability, and external disinformation to erode trust in democratic institutions. Vote-buying, illegal campaign financing, and disinformation, particularly via digital platforms beyond the state’s regulatory reach, remain potent tools for those seeking to manipulate the elections’ outcome. At the same time, an active civil society and independent media keep a close watch on democratic backsliding and political shifts. They play an indispensable role in strengthening the country’s resilience, but resource limitations and the termination of US assistance threaten their effectiveness. Moldova’s international environment further complicates its trajectory. The war in Ukraine, the presence of Russian forces in Transnistria, and the frozen negotiation format for solving the situation there heighten security concerns. Russia continues to undermine its EU integration through political pressure, energy leverage, and hybrid influence campaigns. Simultaneously, Moldova has deepened its ties with the EU, the United States, and regional partners such as Romania and Ukraine, receiving substantial financial, technical, and security support. It benefits from the EU’s Black Sea Security Strategy, the European Peace Facility, and a three-year €1.9 billion EU Economic Growth Plan, alongside EU and US military and development assistance. The pro-EU parties are fragmenting and ostracizing each other, while the left-wing and pro-Russia parties are coalescing to be as effective as possible. It will be difficult for a single party or bloc to win an absolute majority. Moldova thus faces three near-term scenarios around the elections, reflecting the political polarization and, in two cases, highlighting the likely fragility of a resulting governing coalition. The most probable outcomes are continuity in government and in EU integration under the PAS or a fragile pro-EU coalition government. The less likely outcome is an unstable broad pro-Russia coalition government that would be destructive for Moldova’s EU path. For the EU, its member states, and other Western actors, supporting Moldova is a matter of reinforcing its democratic resilience. They need to help its institutions withstand pressures in the short term, and to strengthen the political, civic, and security foundations that can anchor the country in Europe in the long run. This requires a wide range of financial, technical, and political measures to give Moldova the tools to resist foreign interference and the confidence to pursue reforms. They include supporting the consolidation of democratic institutions, enhancing electoral integrity, reinforcing civil society, and maintaining a credible path toward EU accession.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, European Union, Democracy, Geopolitics, and Democratic Backsliding
Political Geography:
Moldova, Eastern Europe, and Black Sea

304. A National Recovery Strategy for Ukraine

Author:
Valeriia Ivanova
Publication Date:
09-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
From the first day of Russia’s full-scale invasion, it has been clear that the consequences of the war would not be limited to physical destruction. What Ukraine faced was a systemic breakdown of infrastructure, the economy, social ties, and governance mechanisms. Within the first few months of the hostilities, the country suffered tremendous losses, and it became evident that the scale of the necessary recovery ahead would be unprecedented. This immediately underscored the need for strategic planning: The more complex the challenge, the more systemic the response must be. Damage assessments conducted by international partners recorded billions of dollars in losses just for the first year after the full-scale invasion. Subsequent international assessments have shown a significant increase in losses in Ukraine’s infrastructure and other assets. Yet the indirect consequences have been no less significant: The most dire challenge of all is the demographic crisis fuelled by mass migration. All of these factors have triggered a deep systemic shock, one that exists to this day and will persist until a sustainable ceasefire is established. During a protracted war, recovery is not merely about repairing what was destroyed. It is a strategic choice and an opportunity not just to rebuild, but to reimagine the state, the economy, and national infrastructure. But in the absence of clear priorities, financing, coordination mechanisms, and performance criteria, Ukraine’s recovery process has become fragmented. This is at best ineffective and at worst harmful. It is increasingly evident that Ukraine’s way out of this lack of strategic vision is through a coherent, comprehensive, and legitimate framework. A national recovery strategy can fulfill that role, not only uniting institutions, but also setting up a shared vision of the future. It is a political and governance decision to enable the country to chart the most rational path forward during wartime. The development of a national recovery strategy is not a bureaucratic formality; it is a necessary precondition for turning recovery into a structured, transparent, and results-oriented process. The idea of a national recovery strategy is not an attempt to create a separate strategic instrument that would be inconsistent with the Public Investment Management Reform (PIM Reform), which is implemented by Ukraine and broadly supported by international partners. This strategy can be fully integrated into the PIM Reform framework to serve as a safeguard for public spending that funds wartime reconstruction objectives and ensures efficient postwar recovery. As long as such a unified strategy is absent, Ukraine’s recovery ecosystem will remain vulnerable. The country is already moving in the direction of adopting a comprehensive framework, and the question is when such a framework can be implemented. The longer this strategic decision is delayed, the greater the losses caused by duplication, inconsistency, and missed opportunities will be.
Topic:
NATO, Reconstruction, Transatlantic Relations, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Europe and Ukraine

305. Europe Between the United States and China

Author:
Gesine Weber
Publication Date:
09-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
Competition between the United States and China directly affects other players in the international system, and Europe is no exception. Since the United States is historically Europe’s closest ally, and the Indo-Pacific is becoming increasingly important to European strategy, the trajectory of the US-China relationship significantly impacts European security. However, what has changed under the second administration of US President Donald Trump is the volatility of the competition: Differing views and approaches within the US administration and uncertainty about Washington’s approach to China make it particularly challenging for Europe to carve out room to maneuver as a security actor.
Topic:
Science and Technology, European Union, Innovation, Transatlantic Relations, and Defense Cooperation
Political Geography:
China, Europe, United States of America, and Indo-Pacific

306. The New Political Economy of Supply: resources, rare earths and finance

Author:
Philip Andrews-Speed
Publication Date:
08-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
LSE IDEAS
Abstract:
China is the dominant player in the global low-carbon energy transition in two respects: it has deployed the largest fleet of low-carbon electricity generation capacity in the world, and it dominates several international supply chains for clean energy minerals, metals and equipment. China has installed a massive amount of infrastructure for both solar and wind energy since 2010. The total capacity reached 1,300 GW by the end of 2024, which is more than 45% of the global total. Investment in hydro power and nuclear power also continues. These non-fossil fuels accounted for about 40% of the nation’s power generation in 2024. At the same time, the country has built up the world’s largest electric vehicle industry and is likely to take the lead in the manufacture and use of green hydrogen. This success has been built upon several foundations. Most important are the various policies of central and local government that supported investment and innovation along the clean energy supply chains over two decades or more. In the early days, this relied on technology transfer from abroad. More recently, the development of technology and manufacturing clusters have assisted scaling up and innovation, all supported by abundant and skilled human capital (Hove, 2024). All this adds credibility to Xi Jinping’s pledge to peak carbon emissions by 2030 and ‘strive for’ carbon neutrality by 2060. However, energy and fossil fuel consumption are still rising, as are carbon emissions. Coal is the main culprit as the country has large reserves, and the government sees coal as providing the foundation for energy security. Coal accounted for about 55% of power generation in 2024 and remains an important fuel in some industries. The continued increase in the use of coal will result in the peak of carbon emissions being significantly higher than might have been projected ten years ago. The good news is that the declining rate of GDP growth combined with the increasing electrification of the economy may result in emissions peaking in the next two-to-three years.
Topic:
Political Economy, Natural Resources, Finance, Carbon Emissions, Rare earth elements (REEs), and Energy Transition
Political Geography:
China and Asia

307. Critical Minerals and the New Industrial Order

Author:
Sophia Kalantzakos
Publication Date:
09-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
LSE IDEAS
Abstract:
On 16 June 2025, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen (European Commission, 2025a) presented a rare earth permanent magnet made in Estonia at the G7 summit. The move was on point. It spoke to a major geoeconomic challenge troubling governments and industry; how to ensure uninterrupted access to critical minerals to power the global seismic green and digital shifts currently underway. Von der Leyen spotlighted that this magnet was produced by a Canadian company supported by the European Union Just Transition Fund and that the materials it contained were sourced from Australia, not China. Europe was now one step closer to building resilience and derisking the supply chains necessary to electrify transport, deploy renewables, and build its tech capacity for the fourth industrial revolution.
Topic:
Supply Chains, Geoeconomics, Fourth Industrial Revolution, and Critical Minerals
Political Geography:
Global Focus

308. Somalia at Risk of Becoming a Jihadist State

Author:
Matt Bryden
Publication Date:
11-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Africa Center for Strategic Studies
Abstract:
Al Shabaab poses a serious threat of taking Mogadishu—largely due to a breakdown in political cooperation between federal and state authorities. Such an outcome would empower a militant Islamist alliance with global ties, profoundly reshaping the international fight against terrorist groups. Somalia is becoming an increasingly regionalized conflict with Gulf states supporting rival Somali actors and ambitions. Pulling Somalia back from the abyss may still be possible but would require fundamental political and security reforms and a reinvigorated African Union peacekeeping force.
Topic:
Counter-terrorism, Islamism, Al Shabaab, and Armed Conflict
Political Geography:
Africa, Somalia, and Mogadishu

309. Intersectionality and Atrocity Crimes: Reflecting on the Experiences of Youth in Atrocity Situations

Author:
Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect
Publication Date:
07-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect
Abstract:
Mass atrocity crimes are often perpetrated against populations based on shared identity characteristics, such as ethnicity, religion, race or language. In many contexts, individuals who belong to more than one marginalized group face heightened and compounded risks. These risks are shaped by the unique social and political dynamics of a given context, where assumptions about power and identity intersect. There is growing recognition that failing to address complex and overlapping identities can obscure or deny the human rights inherent to all. Effective atrocity prevention must reflect the diversity of populations around the world and recognize how intersecting identities contribute to vulnerability and risk. Applying an intersectional lens is essential to identifying early warning signs, understanding the drivers of identity-based violence and ensuring no one is overlooked. This new policy brief focuses on the specific risks faced by youth in atrocity situations, particularly when multiple forms of identity compound their vulnerability. This brief underscores the urgent need to meaningfully center youth perspectives, in all their diversity, within national, regional and multilateral atrocity prevention strategies and decision-making processes. The brief draws on case studies from the Gaza Strip, El Salvador, Sudan and the Uyghur community in and beyond China. These examples are informed by testimony and insights shared by youth activists during an event hosted by the Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect and the European Union on 18 April 2024. Participants included young advocates for marginalized ethnic groups, people with disabilities and LGBTQIA+ youth, who shared their lived experiences and strategies for more inclusive, effective prevention
Topic:
Human Rights, Youth, Atrocities, Uyghurs, Identity, and Activism
Political Geography:
China, Sudan, Gaza, and El Salvador

310. When Peace Starts Local, Prevention Works: Reimagining the UN’s Approach to Atrocity Prevention and Peacebuilding

Author:
Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect
Publication Date:
04-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect
Abstract:
September 2025 marks 20 years since states gathered at the UN World Summit and unanimously adopted the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) and established key components of the UN’s peacebuilding architecture. At a time of significant shifts within the multilateral system and unprecedented global conflict, this year presents a critical opportunity for the international community to understand the connections between conflict prevention, peace processes, atrocity prevention and R2P, and to recommit – with renewed urgency – to upholding the enduring individual and collective responsibility to consistently protect the world’s most vulnerable populations. In light of the 20th anniversary of R2P and the 2025 Peacebuilding Architecture Review, the Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect and Peace Direct have co-authored a policy brief that examines the essential linkages between atrocity prevention and peacebuilding. The brief highlights the shared objectives and overlapping tools of these two fields and emphasizes the central role of locally-led efforts and national ownership when designing and implementing prevention and peacebuilding programs. The publication concludes with actionable recommendations to strengthen peacebuilding practices and enhance the UN’s capacity to prevent conflict and atrocity crimes and sustain durable peace. We hope this brief will contribute meaningfully to discussions around the future of multilateral action on atrocity prevention and peacebuilding in 2025 and beyond.
Topic:
United Nations, Multilateralism, Peace, Responsibility to Protect (R2P), Peacebuilding, and Atrocity Prevention
Political Geography:
Global Focus

311. Trading with Illegal Settlements: How Foreign States and Corporations Enable Israel’s Illegal Settlement Enterprise

Author:
Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect
Publication Date:
09-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect
Abstract:
As humanitarian, development, human rights organisations and faith-based organisations, many with a presence in the Occupied Palestinian Territory and Israel, we witness daily the devastating impact of the settlement economy on the Palestinian communities we work with. Together with Palestinian and Israeli partner organisations, we advocate for an end to the illegal Israeli military occupation and a just and sustainable solution to the conflict, based on the parameters of international law. We support calls for the European Union, the United Kingdom and others in the international community more broadly to implement laws that ban all trade, including investments and the provision of services, with businesses that are based in or operate from illegal Israeli settlements in the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, and the Golan Heights. We believe that any trade with Israeli settlements legitimises their presence on illegally occupied territory, undermines the viability of a future Palestinian state, and exacerbates the poverty of Palestinians. Without prejudice to the respective positions taken by organisations endorsing this report, this report does not call for a boycott of Israel, or of Israeli corporations not involved in the settlement economy. The report is produced by the signatory organisations below and has benefited from research contributions by Who Profits Research Center and the Palestine Economic Policy Research Institute (MAS).
Topic:
Economy, Occupation, Trade, and Settlements
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and West Bank

312. Costly Adaptation, Not Capitulation: Iran’s Likely Trajectory Under the Post—JCPOA Pressure Campaign

Author:
Hadi Kahalzadeh
Publication Date:
12-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:
Following the 12-day war with Israel, the reinstatement of U.N. Security Council snapback sanctions, and Washington’s renewed maximum pressure campaign, the Islamic Republic is now experiencing the most intense external political and economic coercion in its history. Yet this strategy is unlikely to deliver on the United States’ intended goals of regime change or nuclear restraint. Instead, it is pushing Iran toward deeper poverty, more complex security postures, and a trajectory that increases, not reduces, the likelihood of a costly military confrontation. From Tehran’s standpoint, Washington’s objectives extend beyond nuclear limits toward regime change. Negotiations are viewed as potential ambushes for another round of conflict, and accepting U.S. demands would be politically humiliating. In this deadlock, Tehran opts for resistance as the only survivable path. Iran has adapted its economy to withstand the strains caused by far-reaching Western sanctions through a wide range of measures. These include diversification, trade restructuring, de-dollarization, alternative banking pathways including offshore banking to circumvent U.S. control, shifting trade eastward to China (now Iran’s top trading partner), and import substitution in manufacturing and agriculture. When intense external political and economic pressures fail to produce the expected capitulation, a misinterpretation of Iran’s vulnerability could invite further pressure. Without a credible diplomatic path, this dynamic creates the possibility for a dangerous escalation cycle. While U.S. strikes on Iran this past June did considerable damage to nuclear facilities, Iran retains enough nuclear fissile material and technical expertise to preserve a position of strategic ambiguity. Iran’s adaptation strategy has preserved core state function and regime cohesion, even as the general public has suffered. Increasingly, Iran has become a patron welfare state, rewarding regime loyalty and shielding public employees and politically connected groups from the effects of sanctions, shifting economic burden onto the broader, politically disconnected public. By 2027, Iran will have approximately 10 million more people in poverty, a figure that could bring Iran’s overall poverty rate to 70 percent. Prolonging hardship for the Iranian public will not succeed in toppling Iran’s leaders or advancing U.S. objectives; the Iranian regime itself has proven adept at absorbing the costs of Western pressure, adapting its economy, and retaining nuclear leverage. America’s pressure-only policy only heightens the risk of a major Middle East war and thus should be discarded. The U.S. should instead reengage diplomatically with the Iranian regime toward the goal of stringent limits on Iranian nuclear capabilities in return for economic relief.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Regime Change, Sanctions, Nuclear Power, Economy, Domestic Politics, and JCPOA
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, and United States of America

313. How to Keep Resolution 2803 From Becoming a U.S.–Run Occupation

Author:
Carol Daniel-Kasbari
Publication Date:
12-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:
President Trump’s peace plan for Gaza — adopted by the U.N. Security Council as Resolution 2803 — risks becoming yet another U.S.–run occupation. Coming on the heels of U.N. findings that Israel has committed genocide in Gaza, the plan would place Washington at the center of a post-genocide mission. This brief lays out how the U.S. can avoid a quagmire by aligning implementation with genocide-prevention obligations, Palestinian self-determination, and a credible exit strategy. Resolution 2803 creates a U.S.–led Board of Peace as a transitional administration for Gaza, with a new international Stabilization Force, the ISF, under its umbrella, leaving Palestinian self-rule to a vague later “pathway.” This “interim” regime risks becoming “Oslo with helmets”: heavy on external control and light on rights. Without Palestinian co-ownership and a political horizon, such an arrangement is unlikely to succeed. It is more likely to fuel support for armed groups and to drag the U.S. into an indefinite security commitment it says it does not want. To avoid that outcome — and the resulting political blowback — this brief recommends that the U.S. use the tools it controls to reshape Resolution 2803 around three pillars: Post-genocide safeguards. Embed genocide-prevention and accountability into the mission’s mandate by requiring cooperation with the U.N. Commission of Inquiry and relevant international courts and by aligning any security assistance and arms transfers with prevention obligations. The U.S. cannot credibly send troops to protect Palestinians while continuing to arm the same campaign that devastated Gaza. Palestinian co-ownership. Allocate half of the Board of Peace’s votes to Palestinian representatives from national institutions and to Gaza-based municipal and civil society actors, and recognize the Palestinian executive committee as the core body for day-to-day governance. Any extension of the board and ISF beyond 2027 should require both a new Security Council vote and clear Palestinian consent. A rights-anchored transition and exit. Pair these institutional changes with a transition roadmap that goes beyond security indicators, including lifting movement and access restrictions, reopening crossings, rebuilding health and education systems, restoring due process, and creating civilian-protection mechanisms. Link this roadmap to halting settlement expansion and settler violence so Gaza’s transition is embedded in a broader shift away from permanent occupation. If President Trump ties his plan to enforceable benchmarks along these lines — and checks Israeli obstructionism rather than indulging it — the U.S. can help stabilize Gaza and secure a viable exit instead of inheriting an endless mission.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Genocide, United Nations, Occupation, and 2023 Gaza War
Political Geography:
Israel, Palestine, Gaza, and United States of America

314. The Economic Dimensions of a Better Iran Deal

Author:
Hadi Kahalzadeh
Publication Date:
06-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:
President Donald Trump can secure a new, better nuclear deal with Iran by removing the barriers that have prevented American companies from entering the Iranian market. This could be achieved through a phased approach that would not require immediately lifting primary sanctions. Doing so would help secure greater nuclear concessions from Iran, generate economic opportunities for American companies that would create an estimated 200,000 American jobs annually, and make a new agreement more durable by strengthening its political bases of support in both the United States and Iran. Decades of sanctions on Iran have failed to compel political capitulation. Instead, Iran has rationally developed a so-called “resistance economy” that evades sanctions, benefiting and empowering hard-liners with close connections to the government. In Washington, many misinterpret Tehran’s resistance and believe that sanctions have not worked because the pressure has not been great enough. But Tehran has held firm, not because sanctions have been too mild but because of a lack of clear and immediate benefits from disarmament. A U.S. policy that includes real economic incentives for compliance will change this equation, empowering more moderate elements of Iranian society and bringing economic benefits not only to the Iranian middle class but to the U.S. and the wider Persian Gulf region. President Trump should issue targeted Office of Foreign Assets Control general licenses, enabling the export of up to $25 billion in U.S. goods annually to Iran, primarily in aviation, agriculture, automotive production, and telecommunications. A deal should also license a five-year carve-out for American–owned foreign subsidiaries operating in Iran, enabling U.S. access to as much as $4 trillion in unrealized Iranian investment opportunities by 2040. Such a license would allow the United States to partner with Gulf regional allies to modernize Iran’s transport and logistics networks, thereby advancing broader regional development and cooperation. The prospect of losing such partnerships would be a powerful incentive for Iran to exercise military and political restraint. In parallel with the technical nuclear discussions, a dedicated economic dialogue could explore ways to keep Iran’s consumer market open to American companies in the near term and unlock investment opportunities for U.S. investors over time. One potential method in that vein would be the inclusion of a “snap-forward” mechanism, in which economic openings accelerate based on Iranian compliance and good behavior. Such a carrot offers the path toward a more robust and dynamic U.S.–Iran economic partnership built on trust. Incorporating economic incentives into a new U.S.–Iran nuclear agreement would benefit private sector constituencies in both countries, bolstering American jobs and industry while reintegrating Iran into the global economy. In the long term, such a multifaceted agreement could blaze a path toward peaceful coexistence with Iran.
Topic:
Economics, Treaties and Agreements, Sanctions, Negotiation, Nuclear Energy, and Foreign Policy
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East

315. A U.S. Peace Plan for Ukraine

Author:
George Beebe
Publication Date:
05-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:
In advancing a peace settlement to resolve the Russia–Ukraine War, Washington must prioritize a concrete and detailed settlement to end this catastrophic conflict along terms that harmonize the vital, long-term interests of Ukraine, Russia, Europe, and the United States. A ceasefire is unlikely, unless the outlines of such a settlement are reached beforehand. A peace settlement must address Ukrainian fears of future Russian aggression while simultaneously laying out a broader political framework that assuages Russia’s fears of strategic encirclement and international isolation. A successful settlement is possible along these lines: In exchange for the West and Ukraine’s acknowledgement that Ukraine will not be part of the NATO alliance, Russia accepts Ukraine’s eventual E.U. accession, contingent on the constitutional enshrinement of rights for the Russian minority in Ukraine and Ukraine’s postwar upholding of the democratic process. Russia accepts a Western–armed, trained, and maintained Ukrainian military force capable of deterring and defending against any new invasion (accompanied possibly by a ban on Ukraine’s possession of long-range missiles). In return, the United States should enter into talks with Russia on a new version of the New Strategic Arms Treaty, New START, as well as committing to a new version of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, INF. The United Nations mandates a comprehensive reconstruction fund for Ukraine using frozen Russian assets held by the European Union, including reconstruction in the Russian–occupied areas of Ukraine. Ukraine and Russia accept a ceasefire along the current territorial battlelines, establishing a de facto border in the four provinces of eastern Ukraine that will not be further changed by force or subversion. Once a broader political settlement has been established, Ukraine, Russia, Europe, and the U.S. accept a U.N. peacekeeping and monitoring force drawn from neutral Global South countries, to adjudicate a ceasefire line. The process of reaching a settlement will not be easy or quick and may require the exercise of U.S. leverage over Russia, Ukraine, and Europe. But such an accord could create security and stability for Ukraine and Europe more broadly, while also enabling U.S.–Russian detente and an eventual American military drawdown from Europe. Absent such a settlement, the war will continue to the detriment of Ukraine, placing its standing as a sovereign state — and its future integration within the European Union — in jeopardy.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Diplomacy, Sovereignty, Treaties and Agreements, European Union, Armed Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Ukraine, North America, and United States of America

316. From Punishment to Denial: Stabilizing Deterrence on the Korean Peninsula

Author:
James Park
Publication Date:
05-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:
This brief argues for a more flexible, proactive, and credible approach to the U.S.–South Korea alliance’s deterrence vis-à-vis North Korea. The current punishment strategy is provocative and likely to be ineffective. We argue for pivoting to a strategy of “deterrence by denial” in response to North Korean uses of force short of invasion and nuclear attack (so-called “gray zone” aggression). The alliance’s strategy of “deterrence by punishment” should only be used as a last resort to deter a North Korean invasion or nuclear attack, and South Korea should also roll back its preemptive strike posture. Deterrence by denial aims to minimize the success of an act of aggression, building up defense capabilities and overall military resilience. Such an approach offers a level of flexibility, proportionality, and predictability that is not possible with deterrence by punishment and its strict threat of massive retaliation. Aspects of denial in the U.S.–South Korea alliance would include enhancing Seoul’s basing infrastructure and missile defense, reshaping the alliance’s joint exercises program to emphasize defensive functions, and a retaliatory posture based on proportionality. To maximize stability in their deterrence relationship with North Korea, the United States and South Korea should also vigorously pursue diplomacy and arms control negotiations, based on realistic goals and expectations that drop the demand for immediate North Korean denuclearization. While it would be the ideal long-term policy outcome, denuclearization is unrealistic as a near-term goal. Negotiations should instead center on tension reduction and arms control, aimed at lowering escalation risks and limiting North Korean nuclear capabilities and use. In return for North Korea accepting limits on its nuclear program, the United States and South Korea may offer sanctions relief initially and then further economic and political inducements, pending progress in arms control. Overall, the U.S.–South Korea alliance would benefit greatly from the more diverse set of policy tools associated with deterrence by denial, enhancing the alliance’s proactivity, assuaging North Korea’s existential fears of regime destruction, and strengthening the deterrent’s overall credibility. Combined with successful arms control negotiations, this new approach to deterrence would create a more durable foundation for stable coexistence on the Korean Peninsula.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, North Korea, North America, and United States of America

317. Trump Could Get a Win with North Korea This Time, by Taking Lessons from His First Term

Author:
Stephen Costello
Publication Date:
05-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:
All indications are that the Trump administration will once again pursue direct talks with North Korea. In doing so, it should learn from the mistakes of the failed 2018–19 U.S.–North Korea negotiations and seize the opportunity for a transformative nuclear agreement with Pyongyang. During the previous negotiations, it appears that North Korea offered ending the production of new nuclear weapons in exchange for civilian sanctions relief. In part due to the participation of hard-liners such as John Bolton and Mike Pompeo, who were hostile to President Trump’s desire for a deal during his previous term, this offer was rejected and the talks failed. However, stopping the production of new fissile material, nuclear weapons, and long-range missiles would be highly beneficial to the United States and our allies and well worth ending nonmilitary sanctions. A similar deal should be pursued in new talks. Beyond the immediate benefits of ending the production of new weapons, such a deal could set up a diplomatic framework to address and diminish the North Korean nuclear arsenal over the long term. Building trust by concluding and adhering to an initial deal would be critical to any such effort. Adopted by the U.N. Security Council in 2016 and 2017, the current nonmilitary sanctions on North Korea amount to collective civilian punishment without any productive purpose. Rather than providing leverage, these sanctions have prevented diplomacy, intensifying Kim Jong Un’s intransigence and desire to further bolster his regime’s nuclear program. By lifting these nonmilitary sanctions, the Trump administration could chart a new path forward toward North Korean buy-in to the international nonproliferation regime, International Atomic Energy Agency inspections, and, possibly, the long-term goal of denuclearization. South Korea should be integrally involved from the planning stages to the deal’s signing and management. Such support will help to diffuse tensions with North Korea toward the long-term goal of peaceful coexistence on the Korean Peninsula. The United States should also seek Chinese backing of the deal, offering a credible guarantor of its implementation, while opening space for further U.S.–China nuclear diplomacy.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Treaties and Agreements, Negotiation, and Donald Trump
Political Geography:
Asia, North Korea, North America, and United States of America

318. Mediating Governance in Sinjar: Bridging the Public-Authority Gap

Author:
Khogir Wirya and Dlawer Ala'Aldeen
Publication Date:
10-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Middle East Research Institute (MERI)
Abstract:
More than a decade after the liberation of Sinjar from ISIS, the district remains engulfed in political paralysis, stalled recovery, and a protracted governance deficiency. Despite recurrent pledges and multiple locally and internationally backed interventions, neither the federal nor the provincial governments have been able to institute effective mechanisms of governance. The on-going administrative stalemate and obstructive security dynamics have led to a disconnect between the public and the authorities, undermined prospects for communal reconciliation, and generated structural impediments to a sustainable aid provision, recovery and economic development. Without decisive, depoliticized, and inclusive action, Sinjar risks remaining a fragmented, marginalized district mired in mistrust. In an attempt to develop practical solutions for bridging the citizen-authority gap and mediating governance, the Middle East Research Institute (MERI) conducted an extensive field study, including a comprehensive literature review, surveying 656 current residents of Sinjar and internally displaced persons, and interviewing 78 key informants. These were followed by 11 intra-community focus group discussions and two inter-community dialogue sessions, leading to the creation of a new platform for engaging Sinjaris and the provincial government of Nineveh.
Topic:
Security, Governance, Islamic State, Displacement, and Reconciliation
Political Geography:
Iraq, Middle East, and Sinjar

319. The Kosovo-Spain Bilateral Relationship: How to Improve the Relationship?

Author:
Yerai Dheur
Publication Date:
09-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Kosovar Centre for Security Studies (KCSS)
Abstract:
The unique challenge of Spain’s continued non-recognition is a significant hurdle for Kosovo on the path toward Euro-Atlantic integration. Madrid’s long-standing opposition to recognition, characterised by concerns about setting a precedent in Catalonia and the Basque Country, further complicates the situation. Despite the complex bilateral relationship, recent developments, including Kosovo’s visa liberalisation, progress in the Council of Europe, and the appointment of a new EU Special Representative, present opportunities for a promising way forward that can reshape historical attitudes and enhance practical cooperation. This brief, following the line of thought from Kosovo–Spain Relations: How to Move on in 2025, outlines several practical ideas on how Kosovo can engage with Spain in 2025 and beyond. The objective is to identify status-neutral avenues, people-to-people ties, and parliamentary initiatives that can normalise Kosovo as a European partner. While recognising that a sudden reversal of Spain’s stance on recognition is unlikely in the short term, these strategies, if implemented, hold the potential to significantly improve Kosovo-Spain relations.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, European Union, and Recognition
Political Geography:
Europe, Kosovo, Balkans, and Spain

320. The Cape Assurance Corridor: Turning Maritime Security into a Regional Export for Southern Africa

Author:
Erika van der Merwe
Publication Date:
10-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Good Governance Africa (GGA)
Abstract:
Red Sea insecurity has rerouted significant volumes of global trade around the Cape of Good Hope, shifting both demand and opportunity toward Southern Africa’s waters. The region can convert this diversion into a durable preference by offering an exportable public good in the form of assurance. This means delivering safe, predictable, and increasingly low‑carbon passage that insurers can price and operators can plan around. This brief proposes a SADC‑led Cape Corridor Assurance Framework that integrates existing regional centres with national Vessel Traffic Services (VTS) feeds to produce daily risk bulletins, incident metrics, and audited port KPIs in formats recognised by underwriters and Protection and Indemnity Clubs (P&I Clubs). A Clean‑Corridor Compliance Code with continuous automatic identification systems (AIS) for high‑risk calls, designated and monitored Ship-to-Ship (STS) zones, and beneficial‑ownership disclosures can help deter shadow‑fleets without penalising compliant traffic. Cable resilience should be treated as core corridor infrastructure through charted no-anchor/no-trawl areas, VTS integration, and pre-contracted rapid repair capabilities. Service reliability should be showcased through transparent KPI dashboards at Durban, Cape Town, and Ngqura, regularised offshore bunkering at Algoa Bay, and green-fuel bunkering at Saldanha and Walvis Bay, all under strict safety and environmental protocols. This package complements the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) by standardising essential security and regulatory practices, while also endeavouring to respect national sovereignty through a minimum‑standards approach. In a world of geopolitical detours, the most profitable route is the one whose risks are visible, managed, and insurable. With pragmatic governance and disciplined execution, Southern Africa can make the Cape Corridor that route.
Topic:
Exports, Trade, Resilience, Shipping, Supply Chains, Instability, and Maritime Security
Political Geography:
Africa, Iran, Middle East, South Africa, and United States of America