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Begin New Search Topic Sustainability Content Type Policy Brief

1. The Rise of “Watt’s Law” and Why Power Could Put a Ceiling on American Innovation

Author:
Maryam Cope
Publication Date:
02-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Abstract:
A foundational advantage of the U.S. digital economy is weakening. For decades, Moore’s Law and Dennard scaling delivered steady improvements in computing performance while keeping energy costs manageable and underpinning productivity growth, industrial competitiveness, and national security capabilities. AI workloads upend these assumptions. Modern AI systems depend on massive parallelism, continuous data movement, and sustained operation across large clusters, making energy utilization and availability more important than peak chip performance. This shift defines the emergence of “Watt’s Law.” Under Watt’s Law, AI capability scales with available power growth multiplied by system-wide innovation driven by full-stack optimization across hardware, software, networking, and operations. This can be measured by growth in tokens per joule of energy. Power is now the significant binding constraint on AI progress. National competitive advantage increasingly depends on who can most efficiently convert electricity into sustained, real-world AI output, rather than who builds the smallest transistors. The implications are strategic. Failure to adapt to a power-constrained scaling regime risks forfeiting a key source of productivity growth and long-term advantage in AI-enabled economic and national security capabilities. It also has implications for U.S. partnerships with energy-rich allies.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Cybersecurity, Innovation, Artificial Intelligence, and Sustainability
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

2. China’s Solar Industry Is in Upheaval—The Effects Will Be Global

Author:
Michael Davidson and Sandy Qian
Publication Date:
03-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Abstract:
Over the past few years, China’s solar industry has entered a period of intense upheaval. Price wars and margin compression have forced industry leaders—including Jinko Solar, Trina Solar, and JA Solar—to report significant losses. These firms, along with LONGi Green Energy and Tongwei—the industry’s top five—slashed their workforce by over 30 percent in 2024. The market is facing industry consolidation and exits not seen in over a decade, as over 40 smaller firms have filed for bankruptcy, been acquired, or exited the market. Chinese regulators are accelerating this process, which will have ripple effects across global solar markets. Several critical questions arise: Does this phase erode China’s leadership in solar, or entrench it further? Is it a window for others to close the gap, or a prelude to deeper market displacement? And when the current wave of capacity consolidation settles, what will the next global competitive order look like? The answer is already emerging. Rather than opening space for rivals to catch up, the current shocks are forging a more resilient Chinese solar core. By embedding deeper into global value chains and securing a technological lead, China is effectively reshaping the industry’s future trajectory to its own long-term advantage.
Topic:
Sustainability, Industry, Solar Power, and Energy
Political Geography:
China and Asia

3. Energy Infrastructure and the Defense Industrial Base

Author:
Joseph Majkut, Alexander Palmer, and Raj Sawhney
Publication Date:
03-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Abstract:
Can the energy infrastructure serving the U.S. defense industrial base sustain production under mobilization? This paper focuses on three scenarios for mobilization consistent with baseline production, defense buildup, and peer war. Using embodied energy methods, the research team estimates that war production rates would require 17.4 petajoules (PJ) of energy annually, a relatively small amount nationally, but one that would need to be concentrated at facilities in already stressed grid regions. Facilities for the defense-critical production of steel, aluminum, titanium, and semiconductors are clustered in regions already facing eroding reserve margins and surging data center demands. Natural gas deliverability constraints compound these risks, as key facilities depend on gas both as direct fuel and as the primary source of regional electricity generation. This paper recommends extending defense-critical electric infrastructure designations to industrial nodes, creating dedicated permitting and finance pathways to facilitate energy production, and integrating energy resilience into supply chain risk assessments.
Topic:
Climate Change, Energy Policy, Infrastructure, Geopolitics, Sustainability, and Defense Industry
Political Geography:
Global Focus

4. Defragmenting European Union climate policy

Author:
Michael Pahle, Darius Sultani, and Georg Zachmann
Publication Date:
02-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
There is broad agreement that the European Union’s post-2030 climate policy architecture – the framework of rules to reduce greenhouse gas emissions – needs to be simpler and more flexible, with market actors less constrained in how they mitigate emissions. However, simplification should not compromise the EU’s climate goals and changing the architecture is politically contentious. Ringfencing of established climate compliance mechanisms and any delay in containing the emissions of lagging sectors could result in even more fragmentation in an already-fragmented climate-policy architecture. The cost of maintaining this fragmentation will rise, making the system even more inefficient. Higher costs and limited control over emissions in some sectors will undermine the EU’s ability to credibly signal commitment to its climate target, undermining the confidence of investors and international partners. To avoid these risks, simplicity and flexibility must mean the application of a carbon price across all parts of the EU climate architecture, with prices converging gradually. This can be achieved by linking the different systems through exchange rates that guide convergence towards a common carbon price, with the EU emissions trading system as the central hub. Climate policy is most efficient when emissions reductions take place where they deliver the greatest climate benefit at lowest cost. Today’s fragmented climate architecture prevents the efficient allocation of abatement resources, such as clean energy. Firms increasingly have incentives – arbitrage opportunities – to shift mitigation activities between differently priced compliance systems, raising overall costs. As more sectors and international links are added to the EU’s climate architecture, these distortions will grow, requiring ever more intrusive and politicised regulation. Managed convergence of different climate policies should become a core design principle of the EU’s climate policy architecture. By predictably phasing out fragmentation, overly pervasive regulation and complexity can be avoided.
Topic:
Climate Change, Industrial Policy, European Union, Sustainability, Decarbonization, and Energy
Political Geography:
Europe

5. Risks for Europe of US dominance of global asset management

Author:
Dirk Schoenmaker
Publication Date:
04-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
Asset managers work on behalf of asset owners, such as pension funds and insurance companies, allocating their holdings of household or other savings. In Europe, the market share of United States asset managers is rising, while that of their European counterparts is declining. US asset managers may even be about to overtake European asset managers in Europe. However, there are differences between US and European asset managers, and these could play out in the context of the European Union’s savings and investment union plan. On environmental, social and governance (ESG) engagement, European asset managers remain active, while their US counterparts increasingly vote against social and environmental resolutions. This is counterproductive for Europe’s sustainable finance agenda. To preserve the efficiency and efficacy of the EU asset management market, three steps should be taken: 1) strengthen stewardship policies, 2) create a central supervisor and 3) enhance strategic autonomy. Stewardship policies should be tightened and asset managers should highlight how their ESG policies aligns with those of the asset owners for which they work. A major element of this tightening would be the requirement to publish a detailed record of voting on shareholder resolutions. Strong supervision by the European Securities and Markets Authority should ensure that US asset managers are appropriately supervised across the EU. Asset managers apply a hub-and-spoke model, operating from Dublin and Luxembourg. National supervisors cannot effectively oversee the Europe-wide operations, which may create blind spots. A successful savings and investment union needs strong European players to allocate European savings to European investments. The European Commission should act to counter a home bias towards US investments. When hiring asset managers, pension funds and insurers should evaluate not only the lowest cost in the short term, but also financial and ESG performance in the long term.
Topic:
Climate Change, Finance, Investment, Sustainability, Capital, and Banking
Political Geography:
Europe, North America, and United States of America

6. Green finance or financing green? Bridging the EU’s sustainable-finance and capital-market architectures

Author:
Rebecca Christie
Publication Date:
06-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
The European Union has not done a good job of integrating its green goals with its overall approach to finance. Sustainability disclosure and capital markets policy are too separate, even though they both operate in the same global environment. Projects that help the climate transition need money, meaning they need optimal market conditions as well as environmental credentials. Connecting market and green-finance policies would help. At their best, sustainable finance disclosures are used by companies for self-assessment, peer comparison and aligning business models with the needs of the green transition. This, in turn, can lead to innovation, jobs and growth, and more care for the natural environment. At their worst, these disclosures become compliance burdens, demanding tremendous resources to produce data that is little used. EU efforts to simplify sustainable finance rules have not reduced complexity or reconciled the EU’s departures from global sustainable finance standards. To make its sustainable finance policy more fit for purpose, the EU should prioritise the solving of technical challenges; look beyond green bonds to equities, venture capital and other asset classes; use guarantees and subsidies sparingly to incentivise investment and market tools such as securitisation; reduce the role of the EU taxonomy and simplify data collection; and pare back the role of so-called double materiality so that EU rules can be more compatible with global standards, such as those developed by the International Sustainability Standards Board.
Topic:
Finance, Investment, Sustainability, Banking, Green Deal, and Capital Markets
Political Geography:
Europe

7. Allocating international loss and damage finance through national climate funds: prospects for African LDCs

Author:
Mariya Aleksandrova, Washington Onyango Kanyangi, Assouhan Jonas Atchadé, Joanes Atela, and Charles Tonui
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS)
Abstract:
The new loss and damage funding framework under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) emphasises the importance of channelling support through national systems and mechanisms. This approach could prove particularly challenging for African least developed ountries (LDCs), which have been prioritised for support. These countries remain confronted with major challenges to access and utilise international climate finance, especially through direct access. National climate funds (NCFs) can have a potential role in delivering international loss and damage finance to African LDCs that is in line with their national priorities. NCFs can be defined as entities mandated to finance the implementation of national climate strategies and to manage and/or coordinate domestic and international sources of climate finance. NCFs can enhance the institutional capacities of countries by supporting the development of loss and damage strategies, facilitating access to international funding, aligning resource allocation with local priorities, and ensuring the effective tracking of loss and damage finance. This Policy Brief explores the role of NCFs in the evolving global loss and damage finance architecture with a focus on African LDCs. We examine the design features of five NCFs against criteria for assessing their relevance to support measures that address loss and damage. The studied NCFs are: the Benin National Fund for Environment and Climate, Ethiopia’s Climate-Resilient Green Economy Facility, Burkina Faso’s Intervention Fund for the Environment, the Mali Climate Fund and the Rwanda Green Climate Fund. Key policy messages • Despite that only a limited number of African LDCs have established NCFs, these demonstrate their potential to channel loss and damage funding, especially for environmental rehabilitation and climate-resilient recovery efforts. Particular strengths relate to their role in priority sectors for climate change adaptation and in relation to biodiversity loss, drought, land degradation and desertification. • Existing NCFs in African LDCs have inadequate mandates and capacities to manage the complex funding needed for loss and damage. An emerging issue is their presently limited role in linking climate and disaster risk finance. • The NCFs of African LDCs can be instrumental to promote coherence and complementarity with other funding sources at the national level. Countries must establish comprehensive legislative, policy and regulatory frameworks to define the institutional roles of NCFs in loss and damage response, supported by international funding to strengthen their institutional capacities.
Topic:
Climate Change, Development, Climate Finance, and Sustainability
Political Geography:
Africa

8. Not yet Trump-proof: an evaluation of the European Commission’s emerging policy platform

Author:
Heather Grabbe and Jeromin Zettelmeyer
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
The economic strategy being defined by the 2024-2029 European Commission seems to follow the prescriptions on innovation and single market reform, and the expansive approach to industrial policy, set out by Mario Draghi in his September 2024 report on European Union competitiveness, with two important differences. First, the Commission stops short of calling for World Trade Organisation-prohibited subsidies – this is welcome. Second, the Commission proposes a new state aid framework for national industrial policy rather than expansion of EU-level public investment funding. This runs the risk of weakening the single market and harming competition, with the unintended consequence of protecting incumbents and inhibiting structural change. In terms of specific policies, on defence, the Commission is right to face up to the challenge of defining an EU procurement mechanism that offers sufficient speed and cost advantages to justify large-scale funding. On economic security and international partnerships, the Commission is right to take a broader approach than a foreign economic policy focused only on supply chains. What is lacking is a much greater commitment to providing support for climate mitigation in developing countries. The second Trump presidency creates risks for the Commission strategy. President Trump has gone further than expected in threatening territorial expansion and with the speed, aggression and disregard for the rule of law with which he has started to implement his policies. These factors will complicate the EU-United States relationship. The best defence against both Trump and the competitive and security threats posed by China is to accelerate policies that address the EU’s structural weaknesses: raising productivity growth, defence capacity and economic security. Economic security, in turn, requires more resilient trade relationships, less financial dependence on the US and an improved standing with emerging market and developing economies. The EU should also seize the opportunity offered by the shift in US policy from subsidies to deregulation. While the EU should not race Trump to the bottom on environmental or financial deregulation, it should rapidly improve its own regulatory framework while building on its core strengths: human capital and the rule of law. Unlike tariff wars or discriminatory subsidies, a competition to provide a good business environment is not a zero-sum game.
Topic:
Security, Economics, Industrial Policy, Budget, European Union, Digital Economy, Trade Policy, Donald Trump, Sustainability, European Commission, and Energy
Political Geography:
Europe and United States of America

9. How to improve the European Union’s sustainable finance framework

Author:
Silvia Merler
Publication Date:
02-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
The European Union has sought to steer corporate behaviour to support its climate goals by adopting a large body of rules on sustainable investment, sustainability disclosures and sustainability labelling of financial products, underpinned by a taxonomy of activities considered sustainable. It is unclear, however, if this effort has had significant results. Examination of financial market data and metrics of investment flows towards green and sustainable investment shows up several weaknesses – both contingent and structural – in the EU sustainable finance framework, which could limit its effectiveness in aligning capital flows with climate objectives. The Sustainable Finance Disclosure Regulation (SFDR) is aimed at making the sustainability content of financial products more transparent but rests on a concept of ‘sustainable investment’ that is too broad and loosely defined. Meanwhile, the EU Taxonomy Regulation has not yet become established as the reference framework for corporate bond issuance or sustainable investing. The EU also lacks a coherent framework for transition finance – or investment that is not yet classified as sustainable but that represents progress to greater sustainability – despite this being the market segment to which the largest volumes of investment will need to flow in the short to medium run. Five adjustments would make the EU sustainable finance framework more effective at delivering the desired alignment of incentives. First, the taxonomy framework should be completed and clarified. Second, the SFDR definition of sustainable investment should be toughened. Third, the neutrality of the framework across capital market instruments, in particular debt versus equity, should be ensured. Fourth, a dedicated framework for transition finance should be developed. Finally, formal sustainable and transition labels for financial products should be introduced. This approach would make the sustainable finance framework more easily applicable to all kind of companies and all types of capital market instruments, regardless of whether they limit the use of proceeds, and it would be naturally extendable into a framework for transition finance and into a transparent sustainability labelling regime for financial products.
Topic:
Climate Change, European Union, Regulation, Finance, Macroeconomics, and Sustainability
Political Geography:
Europe

10. Building coalitions for climate transition and nature restoration

Author:
Jean Pisani-Ferry, Beatrice di Mauro, and Jeromin Zettelmeyer
Publication Date:
07-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Bruegel
Abstract:
Global climate and biodiversity outcomes will largely be determined in emerging and developing economies (EMDEs). We propose a four-pillar strategy to support climate and nature preservation in line with the economic interests of both developing and advanced countries. This would move beyond voluntary pledges to embed climate and nature objectives into the structures of trade, finance and industrial policy, creating a self-reinforcing system of cooperation and reducing the net costs of the green transition. Under Pillar 1, a coalition of advanced and developing countries would link tiered carbon pricing with a common carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM). Pillar 2 would create a climate-finance coalition to decarbonise the power sectors of developing countries. Pillar 3 would involve partnerships to develop clean energy-intensive industrial production stages in developing economies with rich renewables endowments; these would feed into the supply chains of the European Union and other energy-importing advanced economies. Pillar 4 would redesign markets to create scalable and credible mechanisms to fund carbon removals. Technology-based removals can be incentivised through the introduction of clean-up certificates into the EU emissions trading system, while nature-based removals would require improved market design centred on a new asset class: nature shares. The four pillars reinforce each other. A multi-country CBAM and carbon pricing coalition (Pillar 1) would reduce the cost of financing power sector decarbonisation (Pillar 2). Linking EMDE membership of the CBAM and carbon-pricing coalition to financial support for the decarbonisation of power sectors would also make it more attractive for EMDEs to adopt carbon prices. Decarbonisation of power sectors (Pillar 2) would be a precondition for developing clean, highly energy-intensive industry in renewables-rich EMDEs (Pillar 3). The Pillar 1 coalition should include the EU, China and as many other countries as possible. Advanced countries and China could underpin the Pillar 2 financier coalition. Pillar 3 would involve the EU and potentially other energy-poor advanced countries, along with EMDEs that are richly endowed with renewables. Pillar 4 would include the main custodians of the planet’s natural capital. Enabling these coalitions will require EU leadership.
Topic:
Climate Change, Economics, Industrial Policy, Trade, Sustainability, Decarbonization, and Green Transition
Political Geography:
Europe