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Begin New Search Topic Corruption Content Type Policy Brief

1. The Political Economy of Anti‐​bribery Enforcement

Author:
Lauren Cohen and Bo Li
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Cato Institute
Abstract:
A level playing field for firm competition is a fundamental requirement for any market to maximize its potential and achieve productive efficiency. When government favors a set of firms or individuals over others, distortions arise that reverberate throughout entire industries, affecting sales, production, innovation, and more. This is not to say that barriers to firms may not sometimes naturally arise, but if a finger is placed on the scale by government to allow certain firms to gain some unerodable advantage, this can have large implications on allocation and overall economic development.
Topic:
Corruption, Political Economy, Law Enforcement, Accountability, and Bribery
Political Geography:
Global Focus

2. Pay Day Loans and Backroom Empires: South Sudan’s Political Economy since 2018

Author:
Joshua Craze
Publication Date:
10-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Small Arms Survey
Abstract:
Though elections are now postulated for next year, South Sudan remains in crisis. Conflict continues to scar the country, and climatic shocks exacerbate already acute resource scarcity, leaving approximately 76 per cent of South Sudan’s population surviving on humanitarian assistance. The regime of South Sudanese President Salva Kiir survives by diverting revenues in three key areas—oil production, humanitarianism, and loans from international financial institutions—to the benefit of an elite class in Juba, but at the cost of the immiseration of the people of South Sudan. Pay Day Loans and Backroom Empires: South Sudan’s Political Economy since 2018—a Briefing Paper from the Small Arms Survey’s Human Security Baseline Assessment for Sudan and South Sudan (HSBA) project—analyses this predatory political economy in South Sudan, and charts a shift from the use of wages to reward loyal appointees to a more obscure system based on the dispensations of favours.
Topic:
Security, Corruption, Political Economy, Elections, Conflict, and Revenue
Political Geography:
Africa, Sudan, and South Sudan

3. Unfinished Business: Contract Transparency in the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative

Author:
Robert Pitman and Aubrey Menard
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Natural Resource Governance Institute
Abstract:
How are EITI-implementing countries faring with disclosure of oil, gas and mining contracts? The urgency of climate action and the complexity of the energy transition mean it has never been more important to be able to understand the deals made between companies and governments for oil, gas and minerals. For this reason, since 2021, implementing countries of the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) have been required to disclose the contracts between governments and extractive companies. This briefing by the Natural Resource Governance Institute (NRGI), Oxfam and Publish What You Pay (PWYP) surveys the contract disclosure practice of the 57 EITI-implementing countries to understand the extent of their contract disclosure practice. The briefing highlights trends, areas of insufficient disclosure and best practices. Readers can explore the data on a dedicated visual tool on the #disclosethedeal microsite.
Topic:
Corruption, Natural Resources, Accountability, Transparency, and Extractive Industries
Political Geography:
Global Focus

4. Bankrupting Iran’s Empire of Terror

Author:
Nate Sibley
Publication Date:
11-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
Hamas’s surprise attack on Israel has left thousands of innocent people dead, set the stage for a bloody and protracted conflict in Gaza, and precipitated a crisis that threatens to engulf the Middle East in a devastating new conflict. To prevent further escalation, the United States needs to act swiftly to intensify economic pressure on the Islamic Republic of Iran and dismantle its terrorist financing networks. Though Iran has denied any involvement, Hamas could not have planned an operation of this scale without critical support from its chief state sponsor. Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) has devoted enormous resources to building up proxy terrorist organizations in order to encircle Israel. According to a 2020 US government estimate, the IRGC provides as much as $700 million to Lebanese Hezbollah and $100 million to Hamas and other Palestinian groups each year. So far, this strategy appears to be working. Hezbollah, the IRGC’s most powerful terrorist partner, is poised to attack from the north, while other Iranian proxies threaten Israel from within Syria and elsewhere. Israel’s newly cordial relations with its Arab neighbors—including its nascent détente with Saudi Arabia—hang precariously in the balance. President Joe Biden’s immediate response to the attacks rightly focused on delivering Israel the political backing and military assistance that it urgently needs. But as the overseer of the global financial system, the United States can also deploy its unique capabilities to constrict the Islamic Republic’s revenues and shut down its global terrorist financing networks. Whether the United States succeeds in doing so will shape events far beyond the Middle East. This conflict is not just another flare-up in a long-troubled region. It reflects an ongoing global realignment wherein powerful adversaries test American strength and resolve with growing coordination and assertiveness. As Russia wages war in Ukraine and Beijing watches carefully, the stakes call for nothing less than a major US endeavor to bankrupt the Islamic Republic’s empire of terror once and for all.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Corruption, Terrorism, and Hamas
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Israel, and Palestine

5. Unresponsive and corrupt? Ugandan MPs hold key to how citizens perceive them

Author:
Matthias Krönke and Ronald Makanga Kakumba
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Afrobarometer
Abstract:
Uganda’s legislature is made up of 556 members of Parliament (MPs) who are meant to represent and serve their constituents and oversee the government’s actions. Since President Yoweri Museveni and the National Resistance Movement (NRM) party came to power in 1986 and appointed all members of Parliament, the country’s legislature has changed in several important ways (Kasfir & Twebaze, 2009). First, today all MPs are either directly elected via a first-past-the-post system or indirectly elected via special electoral colleges. Second, the number of parliamentarians has almost doubled over 25 years, from 295 in the 6th Parliament (1996-2001) to 556 in the current 11th Parliament (Inter-Parliamentary Union, 1996; Parliament of Uganda, 2022).1 This drastic increase can be attributed to the continued creation of new constituencies and the allocation of parliamentary seats for special-interest groups. Proponents of this development say it reflects citizens’ demands, but critics describe it as part of a political strategy to protect and grow the ruling party’s seat share in Parliament by increasing the number of constituencies in NRM strongholds (Nakatudde, 2020; Tumushabe & Gariyo, 2009). This debate has now entered a new phase with the recent ruling by the country’s Constitutional Court that Parliament and the Electoral Commission violated articles 51 and 63 of the Constitution by creating new constituencies that do not meet the population quota, based on data from the 2002 and 2014 census counts. The upshot of this ruling are proposals to downsize Uganda’s Parliament and redraw constituency boundaries (Barigaba, 2022). Third, the operating costs of the growing Parliament (MP and staff salaries, allowances, etc.) have increased drastically over the past two decades. Today Ugandan MPs’ salaries (35 million Uganda shillings, or about USD 9,700, per month) surpass those of most MPs elsewhere in Africa and in the European Union (BusinessTech, 2017; Olukya, 2021; Tumushabe & Gariyo, 2009). The cost of running Uganda’s 11th Parliament was expected to increase by more than 50 billion Ugandan shillings (USD 14.1 million), a substantial increase compared to the previous Parliament (Mufumba, 2021). Fourth, the share of MPs who return to Parliament after their first term in office continues to decrease. While about 50% of MPs did not return for a second term in the 6th (1996-2001) and 7th (2001-2006) Parliaments, this rate has increased to 53% (2006-2011), 55% (2011-2016), and 58% (2016-2021) in subsequent Parliaments. Most recently, of the 457 MPs in the 10th Parliament, 319 were not voted back to the 11th Parliament (2021-2026), while 31 did not contest or chose to run for other offices, and only 107 MPs returned (Kasfir & Twebaze, 2009; Forum for Women in Democracy, 2016; Independent, 2021). How do these changes affect 1) how citizens relate to their elected representatives and 2) how MPs address the needs of ordinary citizens? More broadly, are citizens being served by their MPs? To answer these questions, this policy paper begins by clarifying the foundations of the citizen-MP relationship and outlining the four key roles that MPs are generally expected to fulfil. The subsequent sections assess their performance in these roles against citizen expectations and other indicators. We find that Ugandans are becoming increasingly aware of their role in holding their MPs accountable. Most citizens are dissatisfied with how their MPs are doing their jobs, perceive them as corrupt, and say MPs don’t listen to constituents’ concerns. Residents of the Central region and Kampala are particularly critical of their MPs’ performance, probably due at least in part to high constituent-to-MP ratios in those areas. Citizens’ assessments of MP performance are associated with MPs’ perceived responsiveness and corruption as well as whether citizens have had contact with their MPs. In contrast, citizens’ demographic characteristics and views about democracy do not seem to drive their views of their elected representatives. There are two clear policy implications of these findings. First, at the institutional level, it is important to even out the citizen-to-MP ratios across the country. This is in line with the recent constitutional court ruling to base the creation of constituencies on census data. The second policy implication of our findings is that MPs have it in their own hands to change how citizens view their performance by improving on how they engage with them.
Topic:
Corruption, Politics, Governance, and Leadership
Political Geography:
Uganda and Africa

6. Corruption and Private Sector Investment in Ukraine’s Reconstruction

Author:
Nick Fenton and Andrew Lohsen
Publication Date:
11-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies
Abstract:
The aim of the bipartisan and international CSIS Ukraine Economic Reconstruction Commission is to produce a policy framework that will help attract private sector investments to support Ukraine’s future economic reconstruction. To support the commission, CSIS will convene a series of working groups to examine a range of issue-specific areas that are critical for reconstruction and modernization of the Ukrainian economy, including in agriculture, energy, and transportation and logistics, as well as addressing the impact of corruption on private sector investment. Ukraine experienced significant human and economic losses in the first six months of Russia’s unprovoked invasion. In July 2022, the Ukrainian government estimated the cost of recovery at $750 billion. That figure continues to grow due to ongoing missile strikes and artillery shelling, population displacement, and disruptions of exports. Given the scale of Ukraine’s losses, private sector investment will be critical to the country’s recovery and transformation. But concerns about corruption threaten the flow of much-needed funds. Ukraine has undertaken significant anti-corruption reforms in recent years, but it will need to show additional progress to maximize the potential for foreign investment.
Topic:
Corruption, Infrastructure, Investment, and Private Sector
Political Geography:
Europe and Ukraine

7. Barriers to Effective Whistleblowing in Botswana: Lessons from the Construction Industry

Author:
Marumo Omotoye
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Botswana Institute for Development Policy Analysis
Abstract:
Adopting Botswana’s construction industry as a case study, this Policy Brief examines key barriers to effective whistleblowing in Botswana. Data were drawn from 117 construction firms and interviews with regulators of this sector. Despite the enactment of the Whistleblowing Act 2016, the study finds the following key barriers to effective whistleblowing: (i) fear of retaliation or punishment, (ii) fear of job loss, (iii) absence of organisational whistleblowing policies, (iv) lack of incentive to report, (v) lack of education on whistleblowing, and (vi) insufficient action and follow-up on disclosures by authorities. From a policy perspective, there is a need to strengthen the existing legal protection offered to whistleblowers, their families and associates to ensure they are not subject to harm, retaliation or victimisation. There is also a need to increase levels of education and awareness on whistleblowing in general, and the Whistleblowing Act 2016 in particular.
Topic:
Corruption, Regulation, Whistle Blowing, and Construction
Political Geography:
Africa and Botswana

8. The Development Response to Kleptocracy and Strategic Corruption

Author:
Josh Rudolph
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
Kleptocracies do not stop at their own borders. The same actors, networks, tactics, and resources that they wield to prevent democracy and rule of law from sprouting at home are also repurposed for foreign aggression. While cronies, oligarchs, and lesser operatives do get rich in the process, “strategic corruption” is chiefly a geopolitical weapon directed by autocratic regimes to secretly undermine the sovereignty of other countries. The three most common manifestations of strategic corruption vary on a spectrum of how directly and boldly they violate sovereignty and subvert democratic processes. Starting with the most indirect and chronic form of strategic corruption, Russia and China invest “corrosive capital” throughout Eastern Europe and the Belt and Road Initiative, respectively. They use corrupt patronage networks and opaque business dealings to spread their kleptocratic model of authoritarian governance. Those corrupt investments are usually also supported by tactics of “malign influence,” like when a minister or politician receives bribes or economic threats until they censor their political speech, advance a foreign policy initiative, or otherwise subordinate the legitimate sovereign interests entrusted to them by their own people in favor of the interests of a foreign power. Finally, the most direct and acute form of strategic corruption involves financial methods of election interference and other tactics of corrupting democratic processes. Often funded with the proceeds of kleptocracy, election interference through covert political financing has become the bailiwick of Kremlin-directed oligarchs. Separate from those three manifestations of strategic corruption—corrosive capital, malign influence, and election interference—China and Russia try to hide their dirty money and malign activities by pressuring foreign journalists into silence through surveillance, thuggery, and lawsuits. Western foreign assistance has not yet offered a coherent response to kleptocracy and strategic corruption, but that is starting to change under the Biden administration. Building resilience to this transnational threat through foreign aid will require four new approaches that are more political and coordinated than traditional development assistance. First, aid should be informed by local political analysis. More important and less used than technical reviews of laws and institutions, political analysis should center anti-corruption efforts around known corrupt activity. That starts by asking sensitive questions about which individuals, institutions, and sectors are the most corrupt, how extensively their networks of wealth and power span, and which corrupt figures must be held accountable to thoroughly purge grand corruption. Second, aid should be responsive to political shifts, scaling up and down, respectively, in response to windows of opportunity for anti-corruption reform and times of backsliding toward kleptocracy. Third, aid responses to kleptocracy should be coordinated at the regional and global levels, similarly to how grand corruption operates across borders through transnational networks of actors and tools. Fourth, anti-corruption programming should be deeply integrated across the traditional sectors of assistance, particularly health, infrastructure, energy, climate, and security. Some of these new approaches are already being prioritized under the Biden administration’s new strategy to combat corruption, particularly coordinating across tools and sectors to fight transnational corruption. But operationalizing this mission will be no small endeavor, given that anti-corruption assistance is delivered through a notoriously technocratic and apolitical bureaucracy built during the Cold War to aid socioeconomic development in individual countries steadily over decades. But getting this right offers the key to defending democracies from autocratic aggression, showing how democracy can deliver, and even helping bring foreign policy and domestic politics into alignment for the first time in a generation.
Topic:
Corruption, Development, Finance, and Kleptocracy
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Eastern Europe, and Global Focus

9. Tunisia’s Secret Apparatus: Why Ennahda’s Deputy Head was detained?

Author:
FARAS
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:
Tunisian Ennahda party on December 31, 2021 announced that the government security forces, acting on orders from the Interior Minister Taoufik Charfeddine have detained the Deputy Head Noureddine Bhiri and former Interior Ministry official Fathi Al-Baladi, and put them under house arrest.
Topic:
Corruption, Domestic Politics, and Ennahda Party
Political Geography:
North Africa and Tunisia

10. Forging European Unity on China: The Case of Hungarian Dissent

Author:
Ties Dams
Publication Date:
04-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
EU Member states can be divided on China, even on issues such as human rights. Often singled out as an agent of division is the Hungarian government of prime minister Viktor Orbán. Hungarian dissent begs the question: how can the EU move forward on China given Hungary’s strategy of obstructive dissent? European cooperation ought not wait for unanimity, nor should it rely on value-politics: member states should play the power game to circumvent or break lingering impasses. Member States should support setting up a 27+1 Forum as the main platform for European China-policy, form a leading group tackling strategic corruption and corrosive capital, and initiative a track 1.5 dialogue on China with Germany and the Visegrád Countries.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Corruption, Human Rights, and European Union
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Asia, and Hungary