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3281. Implementing the Mop Barrier Assessment Methodology With the Zambia Police Service

Author:
Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance
Publication Date:
04-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance (DCAF)
Abstract:
In the context of the Canadian-led Elsie Initiative aiming to reduce barriers for uniformed women in UN Peace Operations, DCAF has developed the Measuring Opportunities for Women in Peace Operations (MOWIP) methodology, in partnership with Cornell University and research institutions in eight troop- and police contributing countries across the world. The MOWIP methodology aims to provide institutions with the evidence base necessary to design effective interventions which substantially increase the number of women who deploy. While it is currently being piloted in 7 other countries, the MOWIP methodology was successfully implemented in Zambia with the Zambia Police Service (ZPS) between May 2019 and March 2020, in partnership with the Southern African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (SACCORD). This resource highlights the key takeaways from the process of implementing the MOWIP methodology in Zambia along with good practices and lessons learned at each stage, including the preparation phase, the data collection phase, the data analysis phase and the validation phase. It aims to provide guidance to TPCCs or security institutions interested in implementing the MOWIP methodology themselves regarding the resources and time commitment required, and outlines the outcomes and benefits of undergoing the Barrier Assessment for the ZPS.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Police, and Models
Political Geography:
Africa and Zambia

3282. Impact of COVID-19 on Security Sector Governance

Author:
Dawn Lui
Publication Date:
05-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance (DCAF)
Abstract:
The unprecedented impact of COVID-19 on societies and their institutions has led to a series of extraordinary responses by governments around the world. COVID-19 has affected all dimensions of the security sector, from principles and values to cross-cutting issues, and from security providers to security overseers. The objective of this Briefing Note is to map the substantive impact of COVID-19 on security sector governance (SSG) in order to calibrate policy and operational responses, as well as to explore how this impact may be mitigated, while working towards the overarching goal of ensuring the provision of improved security for individuals, communities, and states.
Topic:
Security, Governance, Public Health, Pandemic, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Global Focus

3283. The Election Official’s Handbook: Six steps local officials can take to safeguard America’s election systems

Author:
David Levine
Publication Date:
02-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
Intelligence and law enforcement agencies warn that Russia, China, Iran, and other foreign actors will seek to interfere in the 2020 presidential election.1 Foreign actors are increasingly sophisticated at using cyber tools and social media to probe and penetrate electoral infrastructure, manipulate public opinion, and cast doubt on the integrity of the election process. On one hand, the United States is better prepared to address these threats now than during the 2016 presidential election. For example, after the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) designated election systems as critical infrastructure in 2017, it established the Elections Infrastructure Information Sharing and Analysis Center, which enabled states and localities to more easily share information about threats to elections. This mechanism has had the additional benefit of making DHS better at helping states manage risks, as well as distributing information from the federal government to the states about possible threats.2 On the other hand, in many states there are still vulnerabilities in election infrastructure that foreign actors can exploit. These vulnerabilities exist at almost every step of the election administration process, including registering voters, verifying their registration at polling places, securing the devices that capture and tally the vote, transmitting that data to a central location on election night, and executing an accurate recount.3 While states usually make decisions about the rules of elections (policymaking),4 localities are typically responsible for the “nuts and bolts” of running an election — such as finding polling places and recruiting poll workers.5 Local election officials also help preserve the integrity of America’s elections by protecting against hacks into voter rolls and local election websites and working closely with federal and state officials to ensure the security of their voting systems.6 As the February 3, 2020 Iowa Democratic caucuses demonstrated, such vulnerabilities are not merely theoretical. During the caucuses — which were administered by political party officials, not election officials — the new app that the Iowa Democratic Party planned to use to report its caucus results did not work. Many of the nearly 1,700 precinct chairs who were responsible for transmitting the results did not receive training on how to use the app, and a large number appear to have been unable to successfully download it.7 Revisions and updates to the app were made as late as two days before the caucuses, making it nearly impossible to vet and test adequately.8 Although the federal government recently agreed to allocate an additional $425 million in election administration and security funds to state election offices,9 federal resources will likely be insufficient to address all outstanding vulnerabilities before the 2020 presidential election. It is also unclear how much of this funding will be distributed to local elections officials in time for the 2020 presidential election. This handbook, therefore, provides a list of steps that local election officials can implement at relatively little cost to fortify their elections systems before the 2020 presidential election.
Topic:
Politics, Elections, and Foreign Interference
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Iran, North America, and United States of America

3284. Conceptualizing Foreign Interference in Europe

Author:
Kristine Berzina and Etienne Soula
Publication Date:
03-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
Europe has been at the forefront of confronting asymmetric attacks from foreign adversaries. Disinformation campaigns have been used against the European public since the Soviet era, and with the advent of social media platforms, they have become a regular phenomenon across the continent. Cyber-attacks have become a frequent occurrence too, particularly since 2007, when Russia conducted a campaign of cyber-attacks on Estonia.1 Even so, it was the 2016 U.S. presidential election that accelerated European measures against interference in democracies. National governments across Europe have launched holistic efforts to counter interference. In 2018, France announced the Paris Call for Trust and Security in Cyberspace, which calls for cooperation to “prevent malign interference by foreign actors.”2 Over one thousand national and local governments, civil society, and industry groups have signed on, and multi-stakeholder communities have formed to advance the principles laid out in the Paris Call. Sweden is applying the concept of “total defense” to educate and protect its population. Sweden’s Civil Contingencies Agency sent a booklet to all households in 2018 with guidelines on how citizens should protect themselves from false information and cyber-attacks as well as many other threats.3 Finland and Latvia are applying the same “total defense” strategy in their own political systems. Increasingly, European Union institutions are also turning their attention to interference. The newly elected European Parliament passed a resolution in October denouncing foreign electoral interference and disinformation in national and European democratic processes.4 And European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen has given her commissioners a mandate to protect democratic systems and institutions from “external interference.”5 Amid this burgeoning activity, however, one thing is missing. There is little consensus on what exactly “interference” is, and how the term “interference” is similar or different from other related concepts, such as “influence.” The lack of a common framing of “interference” across Europe can delay or complicate lawmakers’ initiatives and muddy civil society’s efforts to build awareness and rally opposition against incursions into democratic processes. Defining interference comes with risk. Policymakers can create a definition that is either too broad,6 which could inhibit the freedom of expression or put undue burdens on political participation, or one that is too narrow to cover certain forms of malign behavior in a quickly evolving field, inhibiting democracies from protecting themselves because an attack does not “fit” within said definition. Establishing a definition that merely catalogues commonly-used tactics (for example: cyber-attacks, disinformation, economic coercion, and malign finance) would also prove inadequate because any definition of interference should be flexible enough to capture new technologies and approaches. Moreover, a list of tactics fails to explain the underlying factors driving interference activities. To contribute to the definition-setting debate, this paper addresses why a definition could be helpful for countering interference, lays out the state of play in the EU on defining interference, provides a review of existing government and academic definitions related to interference, and discusses the concept of legality and interference. Finally, this paper suggests two core criteria to assist in the determination of whether any given activity constitutes interference: (i) intent (including the factors of timing, coordination of behavior, and scale of effects), and (ii) transparency. An act does not need to match both criteria to constitute interference, but they are certainly mutually reinforcing.
Topic:
European Union, Foreign Interference, and Cyberspace
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and United States of America

3285. Friends and Enemies: A Framework for Understanding Chinese Political Interference in Democratic Countries

Author:
Matt Schrader
Publication Date:
04-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
“For our friends, we produce fine wine. Jackals, we welcome with shotguns.” – Ambassador Gui Congyou, 2019 This was how a Chinese ambassador warned Sweden of potential consequences after Stockholm decided to honor a Swedish citizen imprisoned in China with a human rights prize. Ambassador Gui Congyou’s turn of phrase has a long history; it is the final line of a famous 1950s propaganda anthem written to eulogize China’s bloody contest with the United States on the Korean Peninsula.2 Gui’s statement would be easy to dismiss as the words of a single ambassador, but his statement is consistent with two patterns in the Chinese Communist Party’s interactions with the outside world.3 The first is China’s growing global assertiveness under Communist Party General Secretary Xi Jinping. Prior to Xi’s ascent there were signs that China’s leadership had concluded it was time to put aside Deng Xiaoping’s mantra that China should “hide its brilliance and bide its time.”4 But since Xi came to power in late 2012, party officials have more frequently noted that China is a large, powerful country, and that smaller, less powerful countries oppose its interests at their own risk.5 The second and more enduring theme is the party’s tendency to divide the world into friends and enemies. Inside China, the party’s friends are those who “uphold the leadership of the [Communist Party] and the socialist cause” through support for its policy agenda.6 Outside China, the party’s friends are “foreigners of influence and/or power who assist China’s interests.”7 The party’s enemies are those who publicly question how it chooses to exercise power. The party has operationalized this mindset by developing a sophisticated set of tools and a well-defined body of doctrine to attempt to maintain unchallenged power by “uniting friends” and “isolating enemies.”8 This divide-and-conquer strategy is predicated not only on rewarding friends for their support, but also on coercing the party’s enemies. Within China, coercive tactics include: extralegal detention, limits on public and private speech by individual citizens, control of all forms of media and key sectors of the economy, and cooption of elites by establishing personal and professional costs for opposing the party. This report describes how the party has increasingly employed many of these domestic tools to unite foreign friends and isolate foreign enemies.9 Ambassador Gui’s remarks are but one example in an expanding universe of cases. The threat of losing business in China means that foreign corporations are routinely pressed to censor themselves and their employees to avoid topics the party considers sensitive. Meanwhile, Chinese companies have built and sold the party’s tools of digital authoritarianism in South America, Africa, Asia, and elsewhere. Chinese diplomats have also tried to rally other countries in support of greater governmental control over the flow of digital information inside national borders. In Southeast Asia, party-state linked actors have sought to covertly alter the outcome of elections throughout Southeast Asia, combining cyberespionage prowess with the financial firepower of the PRC’s enormous policy banks.10 And the party has used the same vision of triumphant ethnic solidarity it pushes on its own population to justify its attempts to threaten, censor, and co-opt the Chinese diaspora. In so doing, the party hopes to influence democratic politicians and politics by controlling the external narrative presented of China.
Topic:
Politics, Democracy, Foreign Interference, and Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
Political Geography:
China and Asia

3286. Strong Yet Brittle: The Risks of Digital Authoritarianism

Author:
Katherine Mansted
Publication Date:
05-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
Authoritarian governments increasingly adopt technology-centric national strategies and methods of internal governance. They control their societies through digital censorship, propaganda, and surveillance, and use these same tools to manipulate foreign societies. Their leaders prioritize the development of cutting-edge technologies in pursuit of government efficiency and military and economic advantage. Some analysts view this turn to “digital authoritarianism” as an approach designed to make authoritarians more durable at home and powerful abroad. However, authoritarians adopt technology-centric strategies primarily due to their own insecurity. Digital authoritarianism is not so much a strategic choice, as it is a strategic necessity. In a globalized world, ideas and communications technologies are inherently threatening to authoritarian regimes, which must control both to ensure their survival. Authoritarians also increasingly depend on information technologies for economic growth and to build state capacity in areas where they have traditionally been at a comparative disadvantage to democracies. Ultimately, digital authoritarianism creates systemic risks for domestic governance and national security. In this sense, while digital authoritarianism has strengths, it will also become a regime’s Achilles’ Heel.
Topic:
Government, Science and Technology, Authoritarianism, Surveillance, and Digital Policy
Political Geography:
Global Focus

3287. Competitive Strategies for Democracy in the Age of AI

Author:
Andrew Imbrie
Publication Date:
06-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
In a 1972 paper for the United States Air Force Project at RAND, the late Andrew Marshall defined what he called a more “efficient, effective U.S. competitive role.”1 His theory of the case was straightforward: The United States needed to sustain a long-term, strategic competition with the Soviet Union; the nature of that competition was poorly specified, but could be shaped in ways favorable to enduring U.S. advantages; and the United States should therefore assess the balance of strategic forces, clarify its goals, and develop competitive strategies to match its strengths against Soviet weaknesses. The competition between the United States and China today is different from and far more complex than the U.S.-Soviet competition during the Cold War, notably in the levels of economic interdependence and the role of emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence. China, Russia, and other authoritarian powers seek to achieve strategic advantage through AI-enabled capabilities and systems.2 By one estimate, more than 100 countries purchase surveillance and censorship gear from China and Russia, receive training on these technologies, or simply imitate methods of surveillance and censorship that are designed to control public opinion.3 As the digital and physical environments become intertwined, authoritarian practices in one domain will increasingly encroach upon the other. At stake are the core values of liberty, equality, and justice that underpin free and open societies. The novel coronavirus pandemic will accelerate these trends. Increased U.S.-China tensions, cascading economic crises, and renewed debates over the resilience of supply chains and the future of digital surveillance are all characteristics of a world that demands global cooperation but sorely lacks it. The fault lines between liberal democracies and illiberal, authoritarian regimes are widening at a time of growing turbulence in the international system. Even before the virus, U.S.-China relations faced a heightened risk of conflict. The years ahead are likely to bring greater turmoil, with AI and other emerging technologies at the center of an extended, continuing strategic competition among the major powers. In the long-term contest between the forces of democracy and autocracy, the United States should apply Marshall’s counsel and develop more competitive strategies that play to its strengths. The right U.S. approach starts with its broad network of allies and partners. America has formed security guarantees with 52 countries in Europe, Asia, and Latin America, compared with Russia’s five (Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan) and China’s one (North Korea).4 The United States benefits from allies that share its values and produce strategic resources in AI, including computer and data science experts; private sectors that are innovative, dominant, and trend-setting; large and diverse pools data on which to train algorithms; governmental research and development (R&D) investments; diplomatic support for initiatives in AI safety and governance; and the clout needed to export norms and best practices internationally. In a world of globalized markets for AI talent and integrated supply chains, an alliance-centric strategy provides a competitive advantage over any single country that attempts to develop a robust AI ecosystem on its own. A competitive strategy in AI will require the United States and its allies to assess their comparative advantages; identify anomalies and patterns in the strategic choices of authoritarian competitors that are deeply rooted; and match relative strengths against specific areas of weakness.5 This paper focuses on the dynamics between the United States and China in AI. Based on an initial assessment of recent advances and long-term potential, it recommends that democratic nations sharpen their edge in five key areas: Hardware edge: exploit hardware chokepoints, leveraging the advantages that democratic nations have in the production of semiconductor manufacturing equipment and advanced AI chips. Data edge: develop common standards to share, pool, and store non-sensitive data sets around discrete projects, such as health intelligence and biosecurity, predictive maintenance, and maritime domain awareness; invest in privacy-preserving machine learning; and support research into new techniques for making personal data less relevant to AI systems, such as one-shot learning and advanced simulations. Talent edge: develop inter-allied human capital in AI, share best practices, and cultivate democratic networks of AI researchers through exchange programs, joint scholarships, and conference support, while ensuring research security among allies and partners. Innovation edge: harness the estimated two-thirds of global R&D that is conducted by democratic nations to foster collaboration in specific areas of promise, such as human-machine teaming methods and verification techniques for complex controls systems and AI-enabled, safety-critical infrastructure. Rule-setting edge: shape global norms and standards for AI, reflecting and supporting human rights and liberal values; create the conditions for a common AI market among democratic nations; and extend the benefits of AI to fragile democracies by establishing a multilateral digital infrastructure network.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Democracy, Artificial Intelligence, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
China and United States of America

3288. Masks Off: Chinese Coronavirus Assistance in Europe

Author:
Etienne Soula
Publication Date:
07-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
As the coronavirus crisis spread across Europe in March, several countries found themselves desperately short of masks, respirators, test kits, and even healthcare staff as they struggled to contain outbreaks. With the EU and the United States initially slow to respond, China stepped into the vacuum. This paper looks at prominent Chinese coronavirus-related donations to Europe between March 12 and April 20, 2020, as well as at the Chinese media coverage and narratives that accompanied them. The prominence of donations was assessed using open-source data on donations from the Chinese authorities or from Fortune 500 or similarly large Chinese companies to European national governments, sister cities, and individual clinics and institutions. Assistance came in many forms and included financial support for the procurement of personal protective equipment, the dispatch of Chinese doctors, free access to cloud-based coronavirus diagnostic tools, and donations of testing kits and ventilators. Three points emerge from this analysis. First, Chinese assistance stretched well beyond the high-profile cases of hard-hit Italy and Spain to countries large and small. During the five-weeks period studied, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and large Chinese companies made 70 prominent donations to 27 countries across Europe. The numbers and distribution of prominent donations of coronavirus-related assistance paint a picture of Beijing’s widespread “mask diplomacy” in which countries’ needs alone were not strictly reflected in the help they received. Coronavirus infection rates alone do not fully explain the variance in Chinese assistance, suggesting that alleviating the health crisis may have been only one of many purposes behind the CCP’s decisions. Second, the donations by Chinese authorities and companies coincided with China’s national and economic interests. China’s state apparatus at the state, province, and city levels made donations, but the majority of prominent ones were from the Chinese private sector and foundations connected to it. However, with the CCP exercising an ever-growing level of control over the private sector, the distinction between public and private donations is not clear-cut and Beijing typically trumpeted both as evidence of its generosity. The perception-shaping potential of the donations is likely to have been one of the main drivers behind Chinese coronavirus assistance in Europe. Finally, Chinese donations were accompanied by a sustained communications and diplomatic push aimed at a global audience. The vast majority of the coronavirus assistance to Europe was promoted via all available channels. On state media, embassy websites, and social-media platforms, the authorities used the Chinese donations to Europe to deliver the CCP’s story. The positive messaging was also a way to pivot discourse about the pandemic away from its own failures in the early months of the outbreak. In parallel to the “shared future for mankind” narratives promoted by embassies every time donated medical supplies arrived in Europe, the CCP also showed a harder edge during the pandemic, much to the irritation of many European countries. Furthermore, since the period covered by this paper, Beijing has been doubling down on its newly assertive public diplomacy in Europe and beyond.
Topic:
Pandemic, COVID-19, Health Crisis, and Foreign Assistance
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and Asia

3289. Looking Back to Go Forward: Strategic Mismanagement of Platform Technologies and the Race for the Future

Author:
Christopher Kirchhoff
Publication Date:
07-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
One morning in 2016, staffers from the National Security Council and the Office of the U.S. Chief Technology Officer boarded a black van outside the West Wing. They were on a field trip to the State Department led by U.S. CTO Megan Smith. Smith, a technology visionary and former Google vice president, once worked at General Magic, the Silicon Valley firm that in the early 1990s first brought together the component technologies of the smartphone. Apple later productized General Magic’s innovations in the 2007 release of the iPhone, which brought the power of computing and reach of the Internet into the palm of our hand, revolutionizing how we live and work and laying the foundation for industries of the future, including today’s “Internet of Things,” which by 2020 comprised 31 billion devices worldwide. The White House staffers Smith led on their field trip were on their way to visit the Global Engagement Center, or GEC, in State Department parlance, a new unit created to help fight the influence war against the Islamic State. While smartphones powered the American economy to new heights as the introduction of 4G became widespread, this same set of technologies was being used by ISIS to establish a modern-day caliphate across Syria and Iraq. Slick ISIS social media posts drew thousands of recruits into its ranks, leading the State Department to counterattack with its own campaign of online messaging. It was a digital war that was a part of a physical war, with the GEC as the nerve center of the United States’ response in the virtual domain. The GEC’s mission was to monitor social media worldwide and organize a U.S. information counter-offensive to push back against ISIS’s outlandish claims post by post, tweet by tweet, person by person, depriving the terrorist group of the myths it used to draw new adherents. It took all of ten minutes for the NSC-CTO group to realize the GEC would not be joining the pantheon of U.S. government technology success stories. Megan Smith quickly identified flaws in metrics the GEC used to track its social media engagement and was astonished to learn GEC’s central monitoring dashboard was not updated in real time, a core practice of any U.S. social media or internet firm. The State Department had broadcast its ambitions to bring the skill of Google, Facebook, and Twitter to bear in the fight against ISIS. Yet it never resourced the GEC on anything of the scale that would have been needed to achieve this mission. Then there were outdated privacy laws that did not permit the State Department to track public social media handles of U.S. citizens, the inability of the Department to contract with top vendors in technology, and an overall lack of relevant expertise on the GEC’s staff. The nation that invented the Internet, the smartphone, and social media seemed powerless in 2016 to mobilize these same tools within its own government against a barbaric adversary that had hijacked them for violent ends. Fifteen years after 9/11 kicked off a transformation of homeland and national security agencies to defeat Islamic terrorists, the State department was unable to leverage a U.S. platform technology to advance a top foreign policy objective. It was ultimately the U.S. bombing campaign and Kurdish paramilitaries that brought ISIS to heel, with GEC counter-narratives barely denting ISIS’s social media mobilization. As the GEC worked its way into a historical footnote, a far more consequential battle for platform technology was underway in the global adoption of 5G technology. By 2020, China had deployed 15 times the number of 5G base stations as the United States. Unlike the GEC, which was merely an illustration of the U.S. government’s inability to use a key platform technology for its own ends, the contest over 5G involved billions of dollars in a worldwide race for the future of the global telecommunications market. Though U.S. firms pioneered the development and deployment of 4G technologies, China is on track to capture dominant global market share in 5G hardware and applications. As former Google CEO Eric Schmidt notes, 5G stands to be the first “platform technology” race the United States will lose to China, creating a structural deficit in U.S. economic competitive- ness that in a worst-case scenario could tip overall innovation leadership globally in the set of future industries 5G will enable. While the causes of the 5G failure are many, the original sin is how the U.S. government allocates spectrum be- tween civilian and military uses. With few incentives to optimize allocation across the civilian spectrum managed by the Federal Communication Commission and the federal spectrum managed by the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA), U.S. technology companies were relegated to developing 5G on an inferior band in which signal travels a shorter distance. China and the rest of the world did not make this same mistake. As a result, both U.S. telcos and the U.S. military are on track to be left behind by the global adoption of mid-band spectrum as the dominant 5G wavelength. It was as if the government mandated Betamax in the VCR wars of the 1980s even as its experts knew VHS was the superior technology—an error of strategy that locked U.S. firms into second place before competition began in global markets.
Topic:
Science and Technology, 5G, and Mismanagement
Political Geography:
United States of America

3290. Five Authoritarian Pandemic Messaging Frames and How to Respond

Author:
Naďa Kovalčíková and Ariane Tabatabai
Publication Date:
08-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
As the coronavirus pandemic has spread around the world, authoritarian actors have engaged in robust information-manipulation campaigns. China—where the virus originated and spread due to the government’s initial cover up and mismanagement—became the champion of these efforts. Iran and, to a lesser extent, Russia, followed its lead, seeking to shift the global conversation from China’s and their own failures to confront the disease head on. They have also tried to place the blame to the United States and Europe, portraying these democracies’ responses as inadequate and highlighting their shortcomings. Their efforts have contributed to a coronavirus infodemic, which the World Health Organization has defined as “an over-abundance of information – some accurate and some not – that makes it hard for people to find trustworthy sources and reliable guidance when they need it.” This infodemic has fueled the ongoing public-health crisis by further undermining trust in democratic institutions, the independent press, and facts and data. The coronavirus infodemic is likely to continue to evolve, given that the fight against the pandemic is far from over, but its contours have already been drawn, making it possible to assess the information-manipulation efforts undertaken by malign actors during the last months. Understanding how and why they have engaged in information manipulation leads to an initial set of recommendations on how to contain the infodemic as well as how to prevent similar efforts that could stymie responses to future public-health pandemics. We identify five messaging frames used by China, Russia, and Iran in the first six months of the pandemic with implications for public health, democracy and governance, and transatlantic relations and offer recommendations to address them. Every crisis goes through several stages, and it is necessary to detect and monitor evolving tactics and frames used by malign actors in the globalizing information space early on. By doing so, democracies can ensure a more effective mitigation, robust preparedness, rapid response, and as painless a recovery as possible when facing public-health emergencies or potential economic, security, or environmental crises.
Topic:
Authoritarianism, Pandemic, COVID-19, and Misinformation
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, and United States of America