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1. What Happens If the United States Leaves the WTO?

Author:
James Bacchus
Publication Date:
06-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Cato Institute
Abstract:
Aresolution before Congress calls for US withdrawal from the World Trade Organization (WTO). Both international law and US law permit withdrawal. The case for withdrawal, however, is misguided and misinformed. Much of what is said and widely believed about the effects of WTO membership on the United States is simply untrue. In fact, American membership in the WTO has been for decades and remains today enormously beneficial economically to US businesses, workers, and consumers. Withdrawal by the United States from the WTO would result in the loss of many of these economic benefits, including those derived from decades of accumulated trade commitments made by the 165 other member countries on thousands of different US goods and services traded within the WTO legal framework; those resulting from the commercial shield of WTO rules forbidding trade discrimination against US exports; and those emanating from the availability to the United States of an impartial, binding, and enforceable system of WTO trade dispute settlement. Moreover, withdrawal by the United States would cede US leadership in the WTO to other leading trading countries, including the second-largest trading country in the world, China. Trade is a win-win economically for all WTO members. WTO membership maximizes the overall economic gains from engaging in trade. The United States should remain in the WTO and help lead it toward needed reforms that will make it more beneficial to all in the modern global economy of the 21st century.
Topic:
Economics, Geopolitics, Trade, and WTO
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

2. The New Development Bank’s Contribution to the Energy Transition Process in the BRICS Countries (2016-2023)

Author:
Maria Elena Rodriguez, Rafaela Mello Rodrigues de Sá, Octávio Henrique Alves Costa de Oliveira, and Renan Guimarães Canellas de Oliveira
Publication Date:
12-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
BRICS Policy Center
Abstract:
Considering the growing relevance of the Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) in the task of financing the global energy transition process, it is important to understand the efforts of these institutions to establish projects aimed at reducing carbon emissions in the most diverse sectors of the economy, and especially in the energy sector. This document looks specifically at the role that the New Development Bank (NDB) plays in this process, presenting an overview of its loan portfolio and targets in terms of contributions to the energy transition process. The NDB, also known as the BRICS Bank, stands out in its institutional strategies in the area of Clean Energy, one of its operational objectives, setting a target for the year 2026 of directing 40% of all its financing to projects aimed at climate change, including operations that contribute to the energy transition (NDB, 2022a, p. 28).
Topic:
Development, Banks, BRICS, Energy Transition, and Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs)
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Iran, Indonesia, India, South Africa, Brazil, Ethiopia, Egypt, and United Arab Emirates

3. Taking Stock of Brexit

Author:
Iain Begg
Publication Date:
01-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
LSE IDEAS
Abstract:
J ohn Curtice, the UK’s foremost polling expert, wrote recently that ‘politicians do not talk much about Brexit these days’ (Curtice, 2025). In Germany, too, Brexit has largely disappeared from view, according to a prominent journalist consulted in the preparation of this blog. Another expert, Anand Menon, told AP News on the fifth anniversary of the UK leaving the EU that Brexit had ‘changed our economy’, adding that ‘our politics has been changed quite fundamentally’ (Lawless, 2025). His view is that, in electoral politics, conventional political cleavages have been supplanted by ‘a new division around Brexit’ (Lawless, 2025). In much of the EU, the 2025 anniversary elicited many articles characterised by a combination of acknowledgment that Brexit had failed to deliver, resignation about the UK’s fate and a sense of growing disinterest. The Austrian newspaper Kourier summed up these sentiments: “Von skurril bis tragisch: Eine Bilanz nach fünf Jahren Brexit [From bizarre to tragic, a stocktake after five years of Brexit]” (Bauer, 2025). However, Brexit is a process, rather than a discrete event, and some of its effects are both contested and take time, and are often seen through ideological rather than analytic lenses. A useful way to assess its consequences is to distinguish between three key dimensions: economic, social and governance related. The overall economic effects of Brexit have mainly been negative on both sides of the English Channel, albeit uneven, although some critics regard the magnitudes as having been exaggerated.
Topic:
European Union, Economy, Brexit, and Domestic Politics
Political Geography:
United Kingdom and Europe

4. Energy Data Spaces and Market Power: a new challenge for data sovereignty and its governance

Author:
Emanuele Giovannetti
Publication Date:
01-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
LSE IDEAS
Abstract:
This paper examines how the digitalisation of energy markets, driven by smart meter data and Energy Data Spaces, is reshaping competition in retail electricity services. It analyses the implications for market power, consumer outcomes, and data sovereignty, highlighting the regulatory challenges posed by data-driven business models that operate across national boundaries.
Topic:
Markets, Governance, Regulation, Digitalization, and Energy
Political Geography:
Global Focus

5. Adapting Benin’s Battle with Violent Militant Groups

Author:
Anouar Boukhars
Publication Date:
01-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Africa Center for Strategic Studies
Abstract:
Persistent militant Islamist group attacks in the northern border regions of Benin have posed a growing security threat to the coastal West African region. Benin has made noteworthy institutional reforms to strengthen its defense and security forces. Yet, accelerated and refocused training is needed to translate this into more adaptive, operational capabilities to effectively counter the militant insurgency. Empowering local commanders, pairing enhanced force mobility with strike capability, and fusing interagency intelligence sharing are priority operational adaptations needed to sustain pressure on the insurgents. Effective counterinsurgency in northern Benin requires operationalizing a population-centric protection model and ethos embedded within the defense and security forces.
Topic:
Governance, Reform, Islamism, and Instability
Political Geography:
Africa and Benin

6. The means of prediction and the production function of AI

Author:
Maximilian Kasy
Publication Date:
02-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Economics for Inclusive Prosperity (EfIP)
Abstract:
The real AI governance challenge: Who gets to decide what AI systems optimize for? Current debates miss that AI conflicts are between different groups of people, not humans vs. machines. Power flows from control of AI inputs: Those who control the means of prediction (data, computing power, expertise, and energy) determine AI objectives. Current governance approaches fail: Individual privacy rights and market mechanisms can’t address AI’s collective harms and benefits. Democratic control is the solution: Give stakeholders affected by AI decisions a voice in setting AI objectives.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Governance, Regulation, Privacy, Artificial Intelligence, and Prediction
Political Geography:
Global Focus

7. How the EU can pursue strategic cooperation on secondary raw materials with the Western Balkans

Author:
Edoardo Righetti, Deniz Tekin, and Vasileios Rizos
Publication Date:
01-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS)
Abstract:
Europe’s green and digital transitions are increasing demand for critical raw materials (CRMs), just as geopolitical risks and trade tensions are reshaping global supply chains. In recent years, the EU has taken steps to secure and diversify supplies through building strategic partnerships with resource-rich countries, which also includes recovering CRMs from mine waste and tailings. The Western Balkans region stands out as a natural partner, given their already close integration with EU markets and transport networks, and their legacy of old industrial sites and mine tailings. Such a partnership could lead to several mutual benefits – for the EU, more resilient and circular CRM value chains which correspond with its strategic autonomy and sustainability objectives, and for the Western Balkans, by rehabilitating legacy sites and advancing green and circular policies tied to the Green Agenda and the enlargement framework. This CEPS Policy Brief dives into three priority areas for EU-Western Balkans cooperation on secondary raw materials that policymakers should pay more attention to.
Topic:
Regional Cooperation, European Union, Supply Chains, Green Transition, Digital Transition, and Critical Minerals
Political Geography:
Europe and Western Balkans

8. Restraint and Diplomacy in Arctic Policy: Cooperation Amid U.S.-Russia-China Tensions

Author:
Pavel Devyatkin
Publication Date:
01-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:
In recent years, the Arctic has become the site of both great-power cooperation and competition. While the 2025 Alaska summit between Presidents Putin and Trump reflected a thaw in U.S.–Russia relations, U.S. interest in acquiring Greenland has cast doubt on continued U.S. cooperation with both Russia and China in the region. This brief details how a combination of restraint and proactive diplomacy in the Arctic — built upon shared interests and a recognition of competitive coexistence — will best serve the United States. The second Trump administration has called for American Arctic dominance, viewing the region as an energy source and as an opportunity to monopolize resources and to establish its Western Hemisphere force posture. Russia views the Arctic through a similar lens of resources and sovereignty, as it ramps up its military presence while intensifying efforts to extract natural resources. China’s influence in the region has steadily increased, as it collaborates with Russia, while advancing scientific research, sustainable development, and multilateral climate cooperation. The United States has come to see increasing Russia–China collaboration in the Arctic as a threat to U.S. national interests. But rather than responding to this deepening relationship through unilateralism, the U.S. should recognize that competitive coexistence and trilateral cooperation are more beneficial. This approach avoids zero-sum confrontation and minimizes accidental escalation while maintaining U.S. force projection, maximizing resource extraction, and promoting scientific collaboration. Toward this end, this brief recommends that the Trump administration: Establish trilateral maritime safety and search-and-rescue, SAR, operations, a system that exchanges real-time information, conducts joint training exercises, and invests in port and coast guard infrastructure. Such cooperation would lower shipping costs, improve safety, and encourage economic development — goals shared by the United States, Russia, and China. Institutionalize direct, reliable U.S.–Russia–China communication channels, including a dedicated Arctic hotline for incident reporting and a security digital platform for real-time vessel tracking. Such transparency minimizes the chances of miscalculation, particularly with nuclear assets in the region. Revitalize the Arctic Council to enable communication among the three major powers, the eight Arctic states, and Indigenous representatives. Initiate a trilateral arms control framework, using reductions in Arctic military exercises as a springboard for broader arms control and security arrangements.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Strategic Competition, and Great Powers
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Asia, North America, Arctic, and United States of America

9. Prospects and Problems for Reinvigorating Superpower Nuclear Cooperation

Author:
Ariel Petrovics
Publication Date:
01-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:
A three-way nuclear arms race between the United States, China, and Russia looms — an escalation that would erode global nonproliferation and usher in an era of unchecked nuclear proliferation. This brief offers a path to preventing this destabilizing outcome through pragmatic nuclear cooperation — an approach that has strong historical precedent and accords with the strategic interests of all three nuclear superpowers. Superpower cooperation historically underpinned the global nuclear nonproliferation regime, but increasing great power competition erodes this entire system of international security. China and Russia have each modernized and expanded their nuclear programs and adopted more aggressive nuclear postures. The United States, in turn, has approved a nearly $2 trillion nuclear modernization program. This burgeoning arms race heightens risks of inadvertent escalation, as each of the superpowers become increasingly reliant on nuclear brinkmanship to hold off the growing capabilities of their adversaries. The deteriorating nuclear security environment places pressure on other states to similarly seek their own nuclear arsenals while weakening the nonproliferation tool kit that previously prevented these states from breaking out. As more armed states join the fray, they in turn multiply the number of potential nuclear flashpoints around the world. Reinvesting in superpower cooperation on nuclear security is not an idealistic bid for goodwill. Rather, halting unchecked competition is a pragmatic strategy that serves the interests of the United States, Russia, and China. It preserves a global nuclear system that has safeguarded the superpowers’ dominance for decades. Weakening it, on the other hand, undermines the international marketplace that has preserved U.S. dominance in private industry and innovation. Russia and China, in turn, risk a multifront nuclear competition, as proximate U.S. allies choose uncontrolled independent arsenals over existing security umbrellas. The superpowers can still step back from the abyss by reviving nuclear cooperation. Toward that objective, this brief recommends that the Trump administration: Accept Russia’s offer to extend New START for a year, paired with verification pathways and transparency measures. Reinvigorate existing direct lines of communication (i.e., hotline systems) with both Russia and China. Initiate trilateral nuclear discussions with Russia and China toward the goal of capping arsenals at parity on specific warheads and delivery systems.
Topic:
Security, International Cooperation, Nuclear Weapons, Nonproliferation, and Great Powers
Political Geography:
Russia, China, and United States of America

10. Understanding Global South Perspectives on Taiwan

Author:
Henrietta Levin and Hugh Grant-Chapman
Publication Date:
01-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Abstract:
To develop a better understanding of Global South perspectives on cross-Strait dynamics and Taiwan’s engagement with the developing world, the CSIS Freeman Chair in China Studies convened an international task force consisting of 20 leading scholars and practitioners from Latin America, Africa, the Middle East, South Asia, and Southeast Asia. Over the course of four workshops, task force members analyzed the increasing support that many Global South countries have offered for Beijing’s position on Taiwan, and how U.S. policy affects the position of Global South countries. They also considered opportunities for Taiwan to enhance its economic, diplomatic, and people-to-people engagement across the Global South. This brief summarizes the key takeaways from the task force’s deliberations.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, Global South, and Strategic Engagement
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, Asia, and Global South

11. Europe Needs an ASAP Program for Air Defense

Author:
Max Bergmann, Otto Svendsen, and Jonathan Burchell
Publication Date:
03-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Abstract:
Operation Epic Fury, the ongoing U.S.-Israeli military campaign against Iran, is consuming vast quantities of air defense interceptors—expensive munitions that were already in critically short supply before the operation was launched. European countries depend heavily on U.S.-produced air defense systems and munitions for their own defense and for protecting Ukraine. During the winter, Russian missiles and drones bombarded Ukrainian forces, as well as its cities and energy infrastructure, making air defense munitions vital to Ukraine’s survival. Europe now faces a looming crisis: The U.S.-made interceptors it needs, both for Ukraine today and for its own rearmament against Russia, may simply not be available. In response, European states should launch a crash program to rapidly expand production of European-made air defense systems and interceptors. Modeled on the European Union’s 2023 Act in Support of Ammunition Production (ASAP), a new “ASAP for Air Defense” would channel EU funds into European munitions and systems—such as the IRIS-T, SAMP/T, and NASAMS systems—to reduce dependence on U.S. suppliers for the medium-range and cruise missile defense systems where European alternatives exist.
Topic:
International Security, Geopolitics, Russia-Ukraine War, and Air Defense
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

12. Deepening Strategic Alignment: Priorities for the U.S.-Japan Alliance

Author:
Kristi Govella and Nicholas Szechenyi
Publication Date:
04-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Abstract:
With new leadership in both countries, Japan and the United States are facing an increasingly uncertain global environment. As Japan prepares to revise its core national strategy documents, it is a particularly important time for Tokyo and Washington to deepen their strategic alignment. Although bilateral cooperation continues to proceed relatively smoothly at the operational level, there is a pressing need to articulate a strategic vision to guide alliance priorities and facilitate effective implementation of common objectives.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Alliance, and Strategic Partnerships
Political Geography:
Japan, Asia, North America, and United States of America

13. Monitoring Demilitarised Zones in the Age of Uncrewed and AI Systems: Lessons from the Korean DMZ

Author:
Michael M. Bosack
Publication Date:
04-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP)
Abstract:
Demilitarised zones (DMZs) have demonstrated their utility in post-war peace processes. They separate forces, mitigating the risk of deliberate aggression or accidental incidents alike. However, the effective monitoring of DMZs can be challenging, because they tend to cover wide areas, sometimes with dangerous terrain replete with human-made and natural hazards. As such, parties responsible for monitoring DMZs rely on a passive posture where they simply respond to reported incidents, an active posture using personnel or technology wherever resources and the terrain will allow, or a combination of the two. With continued advances in uncrewed systems and artificial intelligence (AI), there are now ever-increasing calls for the employment of these technologies in DMZ monitoring functions. This is true of the Korean DMZ, a 240 km-long, 4 km-wide swathe of land that bifurcates the Korean Peninsula between the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (or North Korea) and the Republic of Korea (or South Korea). In this area, the South Korean government is seeking to enhance its monitoring capabilities by using uncrewed and AI-based systems. In theory, there are many benefits to this approach, but in practice, policymakers and practitioners must address five inter-related dilemmas to ensure that these technologies actually support peace implementation instead of contributing to unintended conflict and tension. The problems associated with these dilemmas are not insurmountable, but they require deliberate steps and conscious implementation to maximise the opportunities that modern technologies provide while mitigating their risks. The lessons from the Korean DMZ are applicable in any post-war demilitarized zone, including the one envisioned between Russia and Ukraine. This Policy Brief proceeds as follows. It first outlines the function of DMZs in post-war environments and the practical challenges associated with monitoring them. It then examines the potential advantages that uncrewed and AI-enabled systems offer in addressing these challenges. Next, it assesses the implications of five inter-related policy dilemmas – legal, moral, technological, practical, and security – that arise from introducing such systems into DMZ contexts. This analytical framework is then applied to the Korean DMZ as a contemporary case study. Finally, policy recommendations are advanced aimed at ensuring that the use of emerging technologies strengthens, rather than undermines, peace implementation and long-term stability in DMZs.
Topic:
Security, Science and Technology, Artificial Intelligence, Post-Conflict, and Demilitarized Zones (DMZs)
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

14. Managing the Transatlantic Relationship in the Absence of US Leadership: Understanding the Trump Administration’s National Security Strategy

Author:
Paul Fritch
Publication Date:
03-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP)
Abstract:
The Trump administration’s December 2025 National Security Strategy (NSS) represents a radical shift in US foreign policy, involving a move from global leadership of a rules-based international order to unabashed nationalism and regional hegemony. The new strategy no longer views the country’s sprawling network of alliances and partnerships and its ability to attract and integrate high-level talent from around the world as unique strengths, but rather as vulnerabilities to be mitigated. However, as jarring as these substantive changes are, the document’s structural changes and the irregular process that produced it may prove more significant in demonstrating just how sharply Washington is turning away from 80 years of bipartisan foreign policy consensus. The change is evident not just in the Trump administration’s policies, but – crucially – in the decision-making process that produces them. The new NSS is best understood as the formalisation of the administration’s abandonment of traditional policy coordination and strategic planning itself, an effort that has included the removal of senior career diplomats, military commanders, and intelligence officers; the systematic dismissal of senior judge advocates general and inspectors general; and the firing of many National Security Council (NSC) staff. The collective result of these steps, which find their natural culmination in the NSS and the National Defense Strategy (NDS) that followed in January 2026, is a policymaking process that is less informed by objective intelligence and analysis, less constrained by legal and policy advice or alliance consultation, and thus more subject to impulsiveness and ideological influence. Both of these developments – a new “America First” nationalism that eschews multilateral constraints and an erratic decision-making process that produces unpredictable and often impracticable outcomes – require a fundamental assessment by the country’s partners of their approach to the United States, both bilaterally and within established multilateral frameworks. This Policy Brief examines the practical implications of the 2025 NSS and the dramatically changed decision-making process it represents. For transatlantic allies and other middle powers, the central question is no longer whether US strategy has changed, but how to operate effectively in an environment of reduced predictability and diminished US strategic anchoring.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, National Security, Transatlantic Relations, and Donald Trump
Political Geography:
Europe, North America, and United States of America

15. The ramifications of aid cuts on refugee lives: case of the Differentiated Assistance (DA) model and the Shirika Plan in Kenya

Author:
Fred Ikanda and Michael Owiso
Publication Date:
01-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS)
Abstract:
International support has failed to keep pace with the growing numbers of refugees and internally displaced persons, thus creating a financing gap between their needs and available resources. The recent US withdrawal from funding development and humanitarian programs has only compounded this financing gap which has existed for more than a decade. In response to this, the international community – through Agenda 2030, the Grand Bargain, the 2016 New York Declaration, and the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF) – has advocated for a shift from seeing refugees as emergencies to integrating them into the host countries' developmental agenda. In Kenya, these policy proposals are most recently being implemented through the Shirika Plan, the Differentiated Assistance (DA) model, and development plans of refugee-hosting counties such as Turkana and Garissa. First, the Shirika Plan is a government-led initiative that was proclaimed in 2023 to realize the socio-economic inclusion of refugees within the local context in line with the progressive provisions of the Refugee Act of 2021. Implementation of this policy is yet to begin as it is pegged on elusive donor funding. Second, the DA model is led by the office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the World Food Program (WFP) and is aligned with the Shirika Plan. The preparatory activities for DA were undertaken throughout 2024 and implementation commenced in August 2025. DA seeks to increase refugee self-reliance through livelihood interventions and providing support based on the specific needs and capabilities of different refugee households as opposed to the previous blanket support that was based on refugee registration status. However, implementation has so far only focused on reducing aid, without corresponding investment in self-reliance measures. DA and the Shirika Plan are framed in government and international circles as solutions for addressing funding shortfalls and fostering refugee integration by supporting self-reliance. However, there has been little progress in enhancing refugee self-reliance. At the same time, aid cuts are implemented based on a needs-categorisation of refugee households that proceeds without adequate background information. The lack of alternative livelihoods has exacerbated vulnerabilities and has sparked protests in refugee camps. Emerging evidence points to negative coping mechanisms, including higher school drop-out rates; reported cases of youths joining criminal religious groups; increased conflicts at family level; and rising cases of women becoming sex workers. This Policy Brief highlights the emerging ramifications of implementing DA that is anchored in the provisions contained in the Shirika Plan. The Brief also goes further to suggest recommendations for action to the government of Kenya and the international community. Key policy messages: • There is a need to enhance synergy between UNHCR and the Kenyan government such that the state implements the Shirika Plan alongside DA without premising its implementation on donor aid. • UNHCR needs to obtain more extensive household economic data and involve refugees in deciding who is most vulnerable to more accurately disaggregate refugee households into appropriate categories. • The Kenyan government and international actors need to closely monitor and address potential negative implications of implementing DA and the Shirika Plan.
Topic:
Development, Refugees, Displacement, Donors, UNHCR, and Aid Cuts
Political Geography:
Kenya and Africa

16. Beyond projects: the role of development partners in institutionalizing renewable energy innovations: lessons from the Global South

Author:
Lea Elsässer, Harald Fuhr, Anna Fünfgeld, Markus Lederer, Aparajita Banerjee, and HyunAh Yi
Publication Date:
01-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS)
Abstract:
Renewable energy has seen rapid uptake, particularly in the Global South. Solar energy projects have boomed in recent years, but uptake by countries is uneven. Beyond geophysical conditions, technological innovation, market dynamics and donor-driven “lighthouse projects”, political institutionalization has played a critical role in decarbonization. In this policy brief, which is based on extensive research from Global South case studies, we argue that political institutionalization is key to determining whether and how innovative solar initiatives become stabilized, scaled up, and mainstreamed. Drawing on the research project Institutionalizing Low Carbon Development in the Global South (INLOCADE) and expert contributions from a follow-up IDOS workshop, this policy brief synthesizes comparative policy-relevant findings on how institutionalization unfolds in various emerging economies of the Global South, including Brazil, Bangladesh, Cambodia, India, Indonesia and South Africa. Key messages: • Political institutionalization – understood here as an enduring change of formal and informal rules and practices towards low-carbon development – ​​is essential for making renewable energy projects sustainable by embedding them in conducive, stable governance frameworks. Isolated, donor-driven initiatives are at risk of provoking resistance and backlash, and of fading away once external support ends. • Multiple pathways for institutionalization exist. State leadership, subnational action, alliances between development partners and communities, and crisis-driven coalitions can enable institutionalization under different conditions. Policies should be tailored to the institutional realities of each context rather than using one-size-fits-all models. Similarly, development partners should assess local realities and adapt their strategies accordingly. • Distributive justice and participation must be actively supported. Political institutionalization can lead to inequitable outcomes and reinforce exclusionary practices. Development partners should take a proactive role by aligning their interventions with inclusive and equitable approaches to ensure support for marginalized groups leads to socially just transitions, not just box-ticking. • Crises can be opportunities. Energy shortages and climate shocks can disrupt fossil-fuel lock-ins and open the door to innovation. Development partners need flexible instruments and strategies to help translate crisis-driven experiments into durable institutional change. • Development partners are catalytic, not deci-sive. They can accelerate change by providing finance, technical expertise, and legitimacy, especially when working with domestic actors beyond national governments. German and EU development cooperation should place greater emphasis on strengthening domestic institutional environments, including regulatory stability, administrative capacity, and actor coalitions that embed projects in lasting policy and organizational change. This helps ensure donor interventions contribute to sustained low-carbon transitions beyond initial project cycles.
Topic:
Development, Global South, Innovation, and Renewable Energy
Political Geography:
Bangladesh, Indonesia, India, South Africa, Brazil, and Cambodia

17. Building social cohesion through livelihood support in climate-related internal displacement settings: evidence from Zimbabwe and Mozambique

Author:
Tomy Ncube and Susan S. Ekoh
Publication Date:
01-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS)
Abstract:
Climate-related extreme weather events are increasingly displacing communities across Southern Africa, with negative implications for social cohesion, livelihoods, and community resilience. Understanding how displacement erodes social cohesion is important for developing strategies for restoring it. Evidence shows that livelihood support interventions, for example, cash‑based assistance, in-kind transfers (agricultural inputs) up to skills development programs, are a pathway for mending or strengthening social cohesion in displacement contexts. Yet, in some cases, they can further fragment it. This requires strategies under which such interventions can be deployed to positively shape social cohesion outcomes. This Policy Brief synthesizes insights from qualitative research conducted from 2023 to 2025 with displaced communities and host populations in Zimbabwe (Chimanimani and Tsholotsho districts) and Mozambique (Guara Guara, Grudja and Praia Nova). It examines how livelihood interventions can either rebuild or further fragment social cohesion, identifies critical factors driving cohesion outcomes, and provides evidence-based recommendations for national governments, humanitarian actors, and development co-operation actors working in climate-displacement contexts across Southern Africa. In Zimbabwe, vertical social cohesion in displacement contexts is eroded by a lack of designated policies on displacement, leading to poor socioeconomic outcomes for displaced individuals; ad hoc recovery and reconstruction efforts that undermine durable solutions and long-term recovery; and a lack of accountability infrastructure that undermines trust in the government. In Mozambique, the slow implementation and unequal distribution of recovery interventions undermine cooperation between communities and the institutions involved in post-disaster recovery efforts. This has led to large-scale returns of people to high-risk areas. Drawing insights from both case studies, we provide key recommendations and conditions for implementing livelihood support to achieve social cohesion in climate-related displacement contexts. Key policy messages • Livelihood interventions can lead to maladaptation if not supported by strong governance mechanisms including policy frameworks and institutional coordination in planning and implementation. • People-centred, area-based approaches to livelihood programming that account for pre-displacement livelihoods and support post-displacement transitions, while benefiting both displaced populations and host communities, should be adopted. One-size-fits-all interventions risk undermining economic recovery and social cohesion. • Horizontal and vertical social cohesion indicators should be embedded in livelihood programs from the outset to assess the social impacts before and after implementation. • Inclusive, participatory decision-making in the delivery of livelihood support programs should be mandated to prevent exclusionary practices that erode trust in institutions.
Topic:
Climate Change, Social Cohesion, Internal Displacement, Economic Recovery, and Livelihoods
Political Geography:
Africa, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe

18. Back to the future: the Pact for the Mediterranean and the miracle of Euro-Mediterranean integration

Author:
Mark Furness
Publication Date:
01-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS)
Abstract:
The European Union (EU) and southern Mediterranean partners launched the Pact for the Mediterranean in November 2025 to reset relations with the EU's “Southern Neighborhood” in an increasingly challenging regional context. The Pact comes 30 years after the 1995 Barcelona Process promised to foster economic – and to a lesser degree political – integration in the Mediterranean Basin. The Pact's declared objective is to “achieve deeper integration within the common Mediterranean space” (EC & HR, 2025). This policy brief discusses the Pact's prospects for achieving this goal, which previous efforts have failed to achieve. For long-time observers of Euro-Mediterranean relations, the Pact appears to be a “back to the future” approach. Its three substantive “pillars” (people, economies and security) echo the three “baskets” (political/security, economic and socio-cultural) of the original Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. Structurally, it relies on the same mix of differentiated bilateral agreements (now termed “comprehensive partnerships”) within a multilateral regional framework. The Pact's success depends on whether the EU and Mediterranean partner countries can resolve four core dilemmas that have long challenged their relations: • The “autocracy dilemma”: balancing the need to work with authoritarian governments with European interests in supporting democracy. • The “migration dilemma”: securing borders while respecting human rights. • The “rentierism dilemma”: finding solutions to immediate economic, social and environmental challenges while making necessary reforms to rentier political economies. • The “regionalism dilemma”: cutting bilateral deals while trying to build regional structures to address collective action problems. The term “pact” is normally used to describe an agreement between two partners, setting out agreed objectives and actions for both sides. The Pact for the Mediterranean is an EU policy framework that, at most, represents a tacit agreement with southern Mediterranean governments, without committing either side to policy changes or reforms that might have long-term implications. The Pact for the Mediterranean has potential to strengthen sectoral cooperation, for example on renewable energy, connectivity infrastructure and labor mobility. If accompanied by sufficient resources and mutual trust-building, this functional cooperation may create incentives for deeper integration. This, in turn, will still depend on whether the EU and southern Mediterranean governments can move beyond trans-actionalism and invest in partnerships between their societies: support for democratic movements and institutions, investment in public goods, protection of the natural environment and investment in collective regionalism. Thus far, there is little indication that the EU and southern Mediterranean governments will take advantage of this opportunity.
Topic:
Migration, Treaties and Agreements, European Union, Regional Integration, Autocracy, and Rentierism
Political Geography:
Europe and Mediterranean

19. Digital labor opportunities and (im)mobility: steps for making digital remote work a global possibility

Author:
Charles Martin-Shields
Publication Date:
01-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS)
Abstract:
This policy brief offers advice for making digital remote work a viable solution to fill labor gaps without requiring workers to physically relocate. From a technology standpoint, there is no reason someone who does computer-based work must physically relocate, assuming they have the required job skills and internet connectivity. The increased use of bilateral labor agreements (BLAs) between countries is evidence that there are major skills gaps and global competition for labor. Indeed, a BLA can serve as a “policy sandbox” where governments negotiate the legal and statutory terms of digital remote work. Digital remote work can be an especially useful solution when the country providing labor has a large pool of people who are willing to work and fill labor pool gaps in countries of employment, but for different legal or personal reasons cannot relocate across borders. This latter point is no small thing: there is a significant body of migration research showing that the majority of people are not interested in moving across borders – or in the case of many refugees are unable to do so. The reasons for this are myriad. Digital labor could be a workaround to meet basic labor demand and facilitate economic inclusion. The word “could” is critical because banking, social and health insurance, and taxation, all of which are components of legal employment, remain bordered. This policy brief will focus on a specific case from research on urban refugee livelihoods where the worker was able to work digitally in the US from Malaysia, while being subject to social security, taxation and insurance in the US The idiosyncrasies in this case help point to spaces for reforming social security, tax and insurance rules to reduce their “bordered-ness” and make digital work more systematically viable. Key policy messages: • To make digital remote work viable at scale, development cooperation agencies should play a key facilitator role, linking relevant authorities in the tax, social insurance and banking regulation sectors. This is especially important for refugees who often cannot move and who fall outside the protection of host country labor laws. These reforms could, for example, be built into BLAs. • Achieving inclusive economic development goals via digital employment would require that remote workers earn competitive salaries. Thus, there would need to be buy-in from the private sector regarding wage competitiveness for workers in different countries, as well as a role for unions and civil society in negotiating digital remote work policy. • While digital work can enable greater economic and labor participation for workers who cannot relocate for jobs, there are still sectors that require physical presence. Thus, digital remote work is not a replacement for immigration policy that facilitates safe and flexible migration for those people who do have to move.
Topic:
Development, Labor Issues, Employment, Remote Work, and Digital Employment
Political Geography:
Global Focus

20. Strengthening European development policy: the case for Team Europe 2.0

Author:
Svea Koch, Julian Bergmann, Benedikt Erforth, Christine Hackenesch, and Niels Keijzer
Publication Date:
01-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS)
Abstract:
The international order is undergoing profound change as rivalry among major powers realigns the global balance. This is also having an impact on European development policy. In many European Union (EU) member states, funding for official development assistance (ODA) is declining. At the same time, EU countries are reforming their development policies and increasingly channeling their remaining resources towards priorities that serve primarily their own interests. So far, these reforms have largely been defined bilaterally, whereas a political debate on the role, added value and joint objectives of EU development policy is largely absent. Yet, without strengthening European cooperation in development policy, Europe will not succeed in providing an adequate response to the current upheavals in global politics. In this policy brief, we argue that reform efforts in European development policy must strengthen co-operation and complementarity to respond effectively to the changed geopolitical landscape. Our analysis identifies four key policy areas where European actors are pursuing ongoing reforms and where development policy should make significant contributions: 1) promoting economic cooperation and private-sector engagement, 2) security policy, 3) managing and shaping migration and 4) human development including poverty reduction, particularly in least developed countries (LDCs). So far, a joint European strategic direction in these areas has been lacking. Negotiating these shared priorities requires a revitalization of the political dialogue between EU institutions and member states, as well as further development of the “Team Europe” approach. “Team Europe 2.0” would then have two functions: to strengthen substantive complementarity “internally” through an understanding of how the various actors individually contribute to jointly defined objectives; and “externally” by making visible what Europe stands for strategically. A key element of Team Europe 2.0 should be an improved substantive dialogue among member states and within issue-specific, informal groups co-facilitated by individual member states and the European Commission. Such “thematic champions” could initiate the development of joint strategies for larger, transformative initiatives. Improved political dialogue and coordination on substance in key areas of European development policy are prerequisites for a united and more strategic external presence of “Team Europe”, including in multilateral contexts.
Topic:
Development, Reform, European Union, Economic Cooperation, Human Development, Rivalry, and International Order
Political Geography:
Europe

21. Competencies to help shape a changing world: tracer study and future focus of the IDOS Postgraduate Program for Sustainability Cooperation

Author:
Simone Christ, Sven Grimm, Tülin Engin-Stock, and Isabella Schulz
Publication Date:
01-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS)
Abstract:
The Postgraduate Program for Sustainability Cooperation (PGP) at the German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS, formerly DIE) has been training young professionals for German and European international cooperation since 1965. How successful is the program in supporting its graduates in starting their career and in developing their competencies? And what direction should Germany take in the future in its training for professionals in the field of international cooperation? To mark its 60th anniversary, IDOS conducted a tracer study to systematically analyze how the program has benefited its some 1,000 graduates and to find some pointers on how it could be developed further. The study very clearly demonstrates the relevance of the postgraduate program and identification with the program over the past 60 years. The feedback confirms that the PGP considerably benefits participants' professional and personal development and that they would definitely recommend it for future generations. At the same time, the world is undergoing a period of radical upheaval. Fundamental changes can be seen above all in the general conditions for partnerships, the demands made of staff working in this sector and training for future experts and managers. Training programs such as the PGP must adapt to address these drastic changes. The quality of a training program is ultimately reflected in how well it promotes basic competencies that will still be useful under different conditions and that can help shape these changes. IDOS graduates were also asked about their views on changes in working in the international cooperation sector. The survey thus allows conclusions to be drawn on how training can be developed further: 1. Training should promote various competencies that can shape cooperation for sustainable development. Taking a partner-oriented approach to initiating and implementing changes in an increasingly complex world requires both specialist and systemic knowledge along with personal, social, networking and cooperation skills. 2. Training institutions should promote the capacity for cooperation through joint learning with international partners. This will foster understanding for other perspectives and will support the ongoing development of partnerships. 3. Post-colonial perspectives and a critical examination of power should already be taken into account during training and should be put into practice in concrete cooperation between organizations. IDOS graduates also believe that these aspects are becoming more important in international cooperation.
Topic:
Development, International Cooperation, Training, and Sustainable Development
Political Geography:
Global Focus

22. The 2026 oil crisis: an opportunity for Europe's energy transition

Author:
Valérie Plagnol
Publication Date:
04-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:
Seven weeks after the launch of the joint US-Israeli attacks against Iran on 28 February, the damage to regional production facilities and the virtual halt to maritime traffic in the Strait of Hormuz have triggered a rise in crude oil prices of nearly 60% for the WTI index and over 70% for Brent. Despite the two-week truce declared on 7 April, these increases have already had a painful impact on our economies. The duration of the tensions will, of course, determine the severity of the crisis, but the damage has already been done.
Topic:
Oil, Armed Conflict, Energy Crisis, and Energy Transition
Political Geography:
Europe, Iran, Israel, United States of America, and Strait of Hormuz

23. Japan’s Semiconductor Supply Chain Structure and Its Implications for South Korea

Author:
Gyu-Pan Kim
Publication Date:
04-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
Abstract:
As the competition for technological supremacy between the United States and China has intensified since the 2020s, the Japanese government is also staking its future on the “revival” of its semiconductor industry by strengthening its supply chain. Japan’s global market share in semiconductor products peaked at around 50% in the 1980s but has since fallen to around 10% in the 2020s. It is now maintaining its presence in the so-called legacy semiconductor sector, which includes power semiconductors, microcontrollers (MCUs), and CMOS image sensors. In the semiconductor manufacturing equipment and materials sector, which maintains a relatively high global market share, certain semiconductor materials—such as yellow phosphorus, helium, rare gases, and fluorite—are exposed to the risk of supply chain disruptions due to high import dependence on specific countries. This WEB paper analyzes the supply chain structure of Japan’s semiconductor industry and examines the government’s semiconductor industry policy from the perspective of strengthening supply chain resilience, with the aim of exploring future directions for cooperation between Japan and South Korea in the semiconductor industry. In the second section we analyze the input structure of Japan’s semiconductor industry using input-output analysis, while also assessing the import dependency of Japanese semiconductor products and materials to examine the supply chain structure of the industry. The third section provides an overview of the industrial policies the Japanese government has been pursuing since 2020 to revitalize the semiconductor industry, with a particular focus on the next-generation semiconductor project—the Rapidus 2-nanometer foundry. Section IV proposes a cooperation agenda between South Korea and Japan which involves: first, the sharing of supply chain information regarding export control, and joint procurement of semiconductor raw materials; and second, the joint development of semiconductor back-end packaging technologies and cooperation in the field of AI semiconductors.
Topic:
Industry, Supply Chains, and Semiconductors
Political Geography:
Japan and Asia

24. Global Demographic Structure and Korea's Productivity: Challenges and Opportunities

Author:
Sang-Ha Yoon
Publication Date:
01-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
Abstract:
The global economy is undergoing a profound transformation driven by low birth rates and aging populations. While this demographic shift is a global phenomenon, South Korea is experiencing it at an unprecedented speed. This change is not merely a social issue but a fundamental economic shock that alters the core engines of growth: labor and capital. As the working-age population shrinks, the contribution of labor to economic growth inevitably turns negative. Consequently, sustaining economic growth depends entirely on productivity. The central challenge for policymakers is no longer just how to expand the workforce, but how to reconfigure the economy to produce more with fewer people through innovation and efficiency. This report analyzes the impact of demographic changes on Korea's productivity, drawing lessons from Japan’s experience and utilizing economic simulations. It explores how aging affects investment incentives and why “intangible assets”—such as technology, software, and organizational know-how—are critical for Korea's economic survival. Furthermore, it highlights how global financial conditions can act as a buffer for Korea's open economy.
Topic:
Demographics, Economic Growth, Labor Market, and Productivity
Political Geography:
Japan, Asia, and South Korea

25. Pakistan’s Brain Drain or Brain Gain?

Author:
Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS)
Publication Date:
05-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS)
Abstract:
Pakistan’s migration story cannot be accurately understood through the simple binary of “brain drain” and “brain gain”. The evidence instead points to a more complex reality in which Pakistan continues to send large numbers of workers abroad, particularly to the labour markets of the Gulf, while also experiencing increasing outward mobility among students and highly skilled professionals. This produces a mixed set of outcomes for the country. On the one hand, migration generates substantial economic benefits through remittances and through the wider connections of the diaspora. On the other hand, it can impose serious costs in sectors where skilled workers are already in short supply and cannot be easily replaced. The central policy question, therefore, is not merely how many Pakistanis are leaving, but rather who is leaving, from which sectors, and whether Pakistan possesses the capacity to retain, replace, or later re-engage that talent. Current data indicate that highly skilled migrants still constitute a minority of total registered outflows; for this reason, claims of a universal elite exodus are often overstated. However, the increasing departure of skilled workers in critical sectors such as healthcare, together with the rise in student migration, points to genuine longterm risks to state capacity, service delivery, and the domestic return on educational investment. The causes of outward migration are largely structural in nature. Rapid labour force growth, high youth unemployment, widespread informality, inflation, poor job quality, insecurity, and terrorism all intensify the pressure to leave. Migration networks, study pathways, and household strategies supported by remittances then make emigration easier, more accessible, and more socially normalised. In this context, migration is functioning less as the product of a strong domestic opportunity structure and more as part of Pakistan’s wider model of economic survival. Remittances constitute the strongest argument in favour of “brain gain”, yet they should be treated as a conditional benefit rather than a full offset to the loss of human capital. They provide vital support to households and to the country’s foreign exchange position, but they do not automatically produce productive investment, export growth, innovation, or return migration. If dependence on remittances is poorly managed, it may deepen structural reliance and delay necessary reform. Policy should therefore avoid coercive attempts to prevent migration and should instead seek to reduce the pressures that make departure necessary in the first place. The priority ought to be to move from one-way emigration towards circular migration and genuine brain gain through the creation of better jobs at home, the upgrading of skills, the support of return and reintegration, the channelling of diaspora investment into productive sectors, and the strengthening of security and the rule of law. Success should be measured not only in terms of remittance volumes, but also by whether Pakistan improves domestic opportunity, retains key professionals, attracts returning expertise, and transforms migration from a mechanism of survival into a driver of long-term development.
Topic:
Migration, Brain Drain, and Labor Market
Political Geography:
Pakistan and South Asia

26. Pakistan's National Commission for Minorities Rights Act 2025

Author:
Zain Zaigham Khan
Publication Date:
02-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS)
Abstract:
Pakistan’s Constitution provides explicit safeguards for religious minorities; however, a persistent gap remains between formal guarantees and lived realities. This implementation deficit has left non-Muslim communities vulnerable to discrimination, violence, and unequal treatment. Over time, the disconnect became politically untenable, particularly following major incidents such as the September 2013 Peshawar church bombing and the Supreme Court’s landmark June 2014 judgment, which directed the state to establish durable institutional mechanisms for minority protection. Subsequent measures, including the May 2020 executive order–based commission under the Ministry of Religious Affairs, were widely criticised as inadequate due to limited authority, weak independence, and representational deficiencies, notably the exclusion of Ahmadi representatives. By 2024–25, sustained domestic civil society advocacy and increasing external scrutiny converged around the need for a statutory framework, generating the momentum that culminated in the enactment of the Minorities Protection Act. The Act’s principal institutional innovation is the creation of a permanent, statutory National Commission for Minorities’ Rights (NCMR), mandated to operate nationwide. The NCMR is tasked with monitoring constitutional safeguards, reviewing laws and policies for discriminatory effects, receiving complaints, and conducting inquiries supported by civil court–like powers to compel information and participation. It is further expected to convert findings into reform proposals and report on minority rights conditions through formal parliamentary oversight mechanisms. Nevertheless, the Act is subject to significant structural constraints. The NCMR lacks enforcement authority, cannot initiate prosecutions, and issues recommendations that are non-binding, rendering its effectiveness contingent on political will and institutional follow-through. Key implementation risks include politicization through appointments and resource allocation, inadequate or punitive budgeting, limited investigative capacity, and insufficient provincial reach. If these risks are not addressed, the commission risks functioning primarily as a documentation body rather than as an effective instrument for minority protection in practice.
Topic:
Religion, Minorities, Discrimination, Institutions, and Protection
Political Geography:
Pakistan and South Asia

27. Ecological Federalism: Ethical Frameworks for Domestic Climate Migration

Author:
Preston Ferraiuolo and Kate Voltz
Publication Date:
06-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Liechtenstein Institute on Self-Determination, Princeton University
Abstract:
Moving from international climate migration to domestic climate migration within the United States, this brief argues that intensifying climate risks will increasingly motivate internal relocation. It develops a framework of ecological federalism that calls for institutionalized resettlement systems, support for communities to migrate together where possible, and protections for original residents in receiving communities.
Topic:
Climate Change, Migration, Resettlement, and Ecological Federalism
Political Geography:
Global Focus

28. Where is AI in GDP statistics? Subtitle Filling the measurement gap

Author:
Anton Korinek
Publication Date:
05-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE)
Abstract:
Quality-adjusted AI production in the United States grew at over 2,000 percent per year in 2024 and 2025, driven by three compounding forces: expanding data-center capacity, hardware efficiency gains, and—the largest of the three—algorithmic progress. Treating the AI sector as a coherent economic entity yields preliminary estimates of nominal AI GDP at approximately $250 billion in 2025, growing at roughly 2,600 percent per year in quality-adjusted real terms. National economic statistics accounts were not designed to track this kind of activity. Statistics agencies should begin developing AI-focused satellite accounts now, before the measurement gap becomes a policy gap. Body The AI economy in the United States has been growing at an unprecedented rate, but this extraordinary growth is largely invisible in conventional GDP statistics. The authors propose developing an “AI GDP” framework to better measure AI’s growing role in the economy.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Economic Growth, Artificial Intelligence, and Productivity
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

29. Taking geopolitically motivated US swap lines too far would harm the dollar and Fed independence

Author:
Adnan Mazarei and Maurice Obstfeld
Publication Date:
06-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE)
Abstract:
Over the past century, the United States has provided dollar liquidity abroad through both the US Treasury and the Federal Reserve, but the appropriate mode of liquidity injection depends on the economic, financial, and geopolitical contexts. The Treasury is the more appropriate lending conduit when geopolitical concerns dominate, while Fed dollar provision should primarily be targeted toward global stability objectives and be more insulated from short-term foreign policy motives. Up to now, political abuses of these foreign lending channels have been constrained to some degree by laws, norms, and intergovernmental understandings, but adherence can no longer be assumed, so more formal guardrails are needed.
Topic:
Financial Crisis, Federal Reserve, Geopolitics, and Central Bank
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

30. Strengthening Project Vault: The US plan to stockpile critical minerals

Author:
Cullen S. Hendrix
Publication Date:
05-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE)
Abstract:
The United States depends heavily on imported critical minerals, including rare earth elements, needed for semiconductors, renewable energy, AI expansion, and defense systems. Because supply disruptions could seriously harm the economy and national security, the US government has launched Project Vault, a $12 billion public-private program to stockpile emergency supplies of critical minerals. Funded by a $10 billion EXIM Bank loan and $2 billion in private capital, the project is aimed at reducing reliance on foreign suppliers, particularly China, and protecting American—and eventually allied-country—manufacturers from shortages. Project Vault’s design, however, raises important questions about its durability and day-to-day operations.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Commodities, Artificial Intelligence, and Supply Chains
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

31. Climate Governance Through a Justice Lens in Bangladesh

Author:
International Centre for Climate Change and Development (ICCCAD)
Publication Date:
04-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Climate Change and Development (ICCCAD)
Abstract:
This policy brief draws lessons from the Governance for Climate Resilience (G4CR) initiative in coastal Bangladesh , showing that nature-based solutions work best when combined with inclusive governance and locally led adaptation. Evidence from Munshiganj Union, Shyamnagar highlights how restoring canals as climate-resilience commons can improve freshwater access, support agriculture, revive ecosystems, and strengthen community resilience while addressing unequal power dynamics and elite capture of resources.
Topic:
Climate Change, Justice, Resilience, and Climate Governance
Political Geography:
Bangladesh and South Asia

32. From alignment to action: Building a durable US-Argentina critical minerals partnership

Author:
Reed Blakemore, Alexis Harmon, and Ignacio Albe
Publication Date:
04-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
For decades, Argentina has been viewed as a mining opportunity that never quite materialized. Now, Argentina’s mining sector is evolving from a speculative frontier to an active, contested space—one where the United States has a clear opportunity. Both countries are confronting different sides of the same challenge. Argentina must translate its mineral wealth into sustained investment and economic growth, while the United States must secure reliable external sources of the materials its economy increasingly depends on. Where these needs intersect, a strategic opportunity is emerging. This report examines Argentina at an inflection point. After decades of policy volatility and stalled development, recent reforms under President Javier Milei, including the Incentive Regime for Large Investments (RIGI), are beginning to shift investor sentiment. At the same time, Argentina has signaled clear interest in deepening ties with the United States, including through a new bilateral framework that prioritizes critical minerals cooperation. Yet this opportunity is not guaranteed. Infrastructure gaps, energy constraints, and complex provincial dynamics continue to shape project development. Meanwhile, ownership structures and supply chain relationships for lithium and copper are being set now in ways that will influence market alignment for decades. Against this backdrop, Argentina is a critical test case for US economic engagement in regional mineral supply chains. This report outlines how coordinated deployment of US policy and financing tools can help unlock investment while supporting Argentina’s development priorities, including infrastructure expansion and greater local value creation. Ultimately, the case for deeper US–Argentina cooperation is grounded in mutual benefit. For Argentina, it offers a pathway to convert mineral wealth into durable growth. For the United States, it provides access to essential inputs, expanded commercial opportunities, and a chance to demonstrate that its long-term partnerships can deliver.
Topic:
Bilateral Relations, Partnerships, Economic Growth, Mining, Energy, and Critical Minerals
Political Geography:
Argentina, South America, North America, and United States of America

33. Standardizing carbon accounting worldwide with a single, robust, cost-effective system

Author:
Vincent Aussilloux, Yann Coatanlem, and Karthik Ramanna
Publication Date:
02-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
Developed economies aren’t just underinvesting in the climate transition—they are missing the mark by an order of magnitude. Because green financing is often characterized as underperforming, the capital they do deploy rarely reaches the projects or regions where it’s needed most. But decarbonization doesn’t have to be a synonym for “high risk.” The key to unlocking high-impact, high-return investment lies in better risk management. Measuring a project’s carbon footprint with greater accuracy will mitigate the guesswork that keeps capital on the sidelines. The authors advocate for the Climate Club, an intergovernmental decarbonization forum, to select a single, robust, and cost-effective method for computing products’ carbon footprint. The framework would provide the rigor required to significantly scale climate finance and drive energy security.
Topic:
Climate Change, Climate Finance, Carbon Emissions, Decarbonization, Energy, Energy Transition, and Energy Markets
Political Geography:
Global Focus and United States of America

34. A US strategy for energy competition with China in emerging markets

Author:
Steven Burns
Publication Date:
04-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
Emerging economies are set to drive the largest share of energy demand growth over the next two decades, making them a central arena for competition over influence in the future of global energy systems. China has positioned itself as the dominant partner for energy and infrastructure development across the Global South, in part by pairing state-backed finance with turnkey project delivery, which allows Chinese firms to shape technical standards and financing norms while securing long-term positions in future procurement and service markets. The United States can compete more effectively by organizing its financing, project development, and technical capabilities into a coherent offer that is closer to the speed and simplicity of competing models, while preserving the transparency and predictability on which partners rely.
Topic:
Markets, Governance, Strategic Competition, Energy, and Energy Markets
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

35. Necessary Neighbors: Poland and Ukraine Must Stabilize Their Strained Partnership

Author:
Yuliia Korotia
Publication Date:
01-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
Since the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022, Polish-Ukrainian relations have moved from a phase of exceptional solidarity to one of mounting tension and deepening structural strain. What initially seemed to be a long-term strategic partnership grounded in shared security interests has evolved into a more fragmented and fragile, at times almost hostile, relationship. This shift, visible across political, economic, and social dimensions, risks undermining not only bilateral cooperation but also the broader foundations of regional stability at a moment of ongoing war, strategic uncertainty in Europe, and a potentially antagonistic transatlantic relationship. If Poland and Ukraine fail to adopt a more realistic, constructive, and mutually attentive approach to the partnership, their cooperation will weaken in ways that directly affect military logistics, EU cohesion, regional resilience, and resistance to hybrid threats. Understanding how the relationship has changed, and what deeper dynamics are driving this, is essential for assessing the risks ahead and identifying pathways to improve the relationship.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, European Union, Russia-Ukraine War, and Strategic Partnerships
Political Geography:
Europe, Ukraine, and Poland

36. Lost in Definition: How Confusion over Agentic AI Risks Undermining U.S. Governance Frameworks

Author:
Yasir Atalan, Ian Reynolds, and Benjamin Jensen
Publication Date:
01-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Abstract:
“Agentic AI” is an umbrella term that covers a wide range of systems from basic chat assistants to complex autonomous workflows. This ambiguity risks undermining U.S. governance frameworks and creating procurement vulnerabilities that expose organizations to mismatched capabilities and unaccounted risks. If the same vague word is applied to a helpful chatbot and a combat-ready swarm, the United States could accidentally deploy a system with the power to start an operation before that system understands the context or risks involved. The danger is not that the AI lacks intelligence, but that it lacks judgment; a system might be smart enough to execute a task perfectly yet fail to realize that a sudden change in the local situation makes that task a catastrophic mistake. This is particularly critical in national security environments where decisionmaking stakes are high. There is a need for clearer context charts for AI workflows so that commanders know exactly which tasks a machine can handle alone and exactly which who is responsible if the machine makes a mistake. The U.S. government must establish a relational, capability-based taxonomy that specifies where systems sit in workflows, what authorities they exercise, and how accountability is distributed. This approach shifts acquisition and oversight from a narrow focus on technical features to understanding broad organizational impact and ensuring evaluation matches real operational risk.
Topic:
Governance, Cybersecurity, Geopolitics, Artificial Intelligence, Economic Security, and Defense Spending
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

37. The Rise of “Watt’s Law” and Why Power Could Put a Ceiling on American Innovation

Author:
Maryam Cope
Publication Date:
02-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Abstract:
A foundational advantage of the U.S. digital economy is weakening. For decades, Moore’s Law and Dennard scaling delivered steady improvements in computing performance while keeping energy costs manageable and underpinning productivity growth, industrial competitiveness, and national security capabilities. AI workloads upend these assumptions. Modern AI systems depend on massive parallelism, continuous data movement, and sustained operation across large clusters, making energy utilization and availability more important than peak chip performance. This shift defines the emergence of “Watt’s Law.” Under Watt’s Law, AI capability scales with available power growth multiplied by system-wide innovation driven by full-stack optimization across hardware, software, networking, and operations. This can be measured by growth in tokens per joule of energy. Power is now the significant binding constraint on AI progress. National competitive advantage increasingly depends on who can most efficiently convert electricity into sustained, real-world AI output, rather than who builds the smallest transistors. The implications are strategic. Failure to adapt to a power-constrained scaling regime risks forfeiting a key source of productivity growth and long-term advantage in AI-enabled economic and national security capabilities. It also has implications for U.S. partnerships with energy-rich allies.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Cybersecurity, Innovation, Artificial Intelligence, and Sustainability
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

38. China’s Solar Industry Is in Upheaval—The Effects Will Be Global

Author:
Michael Davidson and Sandy Qian
Publication Date:
03-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Abstract:
Over the past few years, China’s solar industry has entered a period of intense upheaval. Price wars and margin compression have forced industry leaders—including Jinko Solar, Trina Solar, and JA Solar—to report significant losses. These firms, along with LONGi Green Energy and Tongwei—the industry’s top five—slashed their workforce by over 30 percent in 2024. The market is facing industry consolidation and exits not seen in over a decade, as over 40 smaller firms have filed for bankruptcy, been acquired, or exited the market. Chinese regulators are accelerating this process, which will have ripple effects across global solar markets. Several critical questions arise: Does this phase erode China’s leadership in solar, or entrench it further? Is it a window for others to close the gap, or a prelude to deeper market displacement? And when the current wave of capacity consolidation settles, what will the next global competitive order look like? The answer is already emerging. Rather than opening space for rivals to catch up, the current shocks are forging a more resilient Chinese solar core. By embedding deeper into global value chains and securing a technological lead, China is effectively reshaping the industry’s future trajectory to its own long-term advantage.
Topic:
Sustainability, Industry, Solar Power, and Energy
Political Geography:
China and Asia

39. Practical H-1B Reforms to Serve U.S. Economic Interests

Author:
Philip Luck and Thibault Denamiel
Publication Date:
02-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Abstract:
In its first year, the second Trump administration has implemented substantial changes to the H-1B immigration program. Some of these changes will create significant economic harm; others have the potential to improve efficiency and support industrial policy goals, with further adjustments. In September 2025, the administration announced a $100,000 fee on new petitions for H-1B visas outside of the United States, a likely prohibitive increase in costs for many firms seeking to hire skilled immigrant labor. In parallel, the administration released a final rule last December to increase the visa lottery system’s allocation efficiency. The administration’s lottery reform would benefit from additional changes to better distribute the economic dividends of skilled immigration to underserved geographies and priority sectors. Such policy changes are critically important to U.S. competitiveness, given the program’s track record of success in attracting global talent and driving economic growth. To strengthen the United States’ technological advantage, innovation ecosystem, and economic prosperity, policymakers should look to expand the H-1B program and reform its incentives while limiting costly new barriers to its use.
Topic:
Reform, Innovation, Economic Security, Immigration Policy, and H-1B Visa
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

40. Energy Infrastructure and the Defense Industrial Base

Author:
Joseph Majkut, Alexander Palmer, and Raj Sawhney
Publication Date:
03-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Abstract:
Can the energy infrastructure serving the U.S. defense industrial base sustain production under mobilization? This paper focuses on three scenarios for mobilization consistent with baseline production, defense buildup, and peer war. Using embodied energy methods, the research team estimates that war production rates would require 17.4 petajoules (PJ) of energy annually, a relatively small amount nationally, but one that would need to be concentrated at facilities in already stressed grid regions. Facilities for the defense-critical production of steel, aluminum, titanium, and semiconductors are clustered in regions already facing eroding reserve margins and surging data center demands. Natural gas deliverability constraints compound these risks, as key facilities depend on gas both as direct fuel and as the primary source of regional electricity generation. This paper recommends extending defense-critical electric infrastructure designations to industrial nodes, creating dedicated permitting and finance pathways to facilitate energy production, and integrating energy resilience into supply chain risk assessments.
Topic:
Climate Change, Energy Policy, Infrastructure, Geopolitics, Sustainability, and Defense Industry
Political Geography:
Global Focus

41. Russia’s Grinding War in Ukraine: Massive Losses and Tiny Gains for a Declining Power

Author:
Seth G. Jones and Riley McCabe
Publication Date:
01-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Abstract:
Despite claims of battlefield momentum in Ukraine, the data shows that Russia is paying an extraordinary price for minimal gains and is in decline as a major power. Since February 2022, Russian forces have suffered nearly 1.2 million casualties, more losses than any major power in any war since World War II. At current rates, combined Russian and Ukrainian casualties could reach 2 million by the spring of 2026. After seizing the initiative in 2024, Russian forces have advanced at an average rate of between 15 and 70 meters per day in their most prominent offensives, slower than almost any major offensive campaign in any war in the last century. Meanwhile, Russia’s war economy is under mounting strain, with manufacturing declining, slowing growth of 0.6 percent in 2025, and no globally competitive technology firms to help drive long-term productivity.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Economics, Intelligence, Science and Technology, Armed Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

42. Trump’s New Nuclear Architecture for Modernization and Arms Control

Author:
Heather Williams and Nicholas Adamopoulos
Publication Date:
03-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Abstract:
Expanding upon the National Defense Strategy (NDS), Under Secretary of State for Arms Control Thomas DiNanno recently announced a new nuclear architecture “that addresses the threats of today, not those of a bygone era,” including nonstrategic nuclear weapons (NSNWs) and China’s growing nuclear arsenal. Facing this increasingly volatile security environment, the United States under the Trump administration must simultaneously modernize its nuclear arsenal and pursue arms control and risk reduction measures. To deter adversaries and manage escalation especially in theater conflicts, the United States may need to diversify and expand its nuclear arsenal, including by investing in nuclear-capable standoff weapons. Following this new architecture, the administration should also continue to work toward arms control agreements with both China and Russia, including risk reduction measures, such as a Presidential Nuclear Summit.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Deterrence, Modernization, and Donald Trump
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

43. The Agency of Middle Powers in a Fragmented and Polarised World

Author:
Thomas Greminger
Publication Date:
01-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP)
Abstract:
The international system is entering a period of intensified fragmentation and geopolitical polarisation. Competition among China, Russia, and the United States is reshaping the global order and redefining spheres of influence. These dynamics create both challenges and opportunities for middle powers, which must navigate contested spaces where alignment with one great power can generate tensions with others. Middle powers face a delicate balance: they seek to preserve their autonomy, influence multilateral institutions and maintain credibility in international networks, and their choices whether to align with a particular great power, hedge their international relationship bets, or engage in principled diplomacy can either stabilise fragmented regions or amplify systemic competition. Yet debates about the future of the international order tend to focus on great powers and institutional reform, leaving the behaviour of middle powers under-explored. This Policy Brief examines how middle powers can exercise strategic autonomy and influence in a fragmented world. It emphasises behaviour, relational positioning, and policy choices rather than material capacity alone by analysing how middle powers balance principles with pragmatism; manage geography and alignment; and engage in bridge-building, coalition-building, and mediation. It then assesses their capacity to stabilise regional and global orders, support multilateralism, and enhance systemic resilience.
Topic:
Geopolitics, Multilateralism, Strategic Competition, Polarization, and Middle Powers
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Asia, Global Focus, and United States of America

44. Predicting protest participation: Insights from the year before Kenya’s 2024 anti-tax demonstrations

Author:
Daniel Iberi and Kamal Yakubu
Publication Date:
02-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Afrobarometer
Abstract:
Protests – often described as “unconventional” or “non-institutional” forms of political participation (Barnes & Kaase, 1979; Hooghe & Marien, 2013) – have increased markedly across Africa since 2010, a trend sometimes referred to as the continent’s “third wave of protests” (Mueller, 2018; Najimdeen, 2024). Protests such as South Africa’s #RhodesMustFall (2015) and #FeesMustFall (2016), Zimbabwe’s #ThisFlag protests (2016), Nigeria’s #EndSARS demonstrations (2020), and Madagascar’s 2025 demonstrations that toppled President Andry Rajoelina illustrate both the breadth and political significance of this wave (Fihlani, 2019; Lawal, 2024; Princewill, 2025). In Kenya, patterns of protest participation have evolved considerably over the past two decades. While the country has experienced repeated episodes of mass protest – most notably around contested elections in 2007, 2013, and 2017 – the character of protest activity has shifted, with recent protests increasingly centred on economic grievances, cost-of-living pressures, and perceptions of fiscal injustice rather than electoral disputes.
Topic:
Economics, Protests, Tax Systems, and Vulnerability
Political Geography:
Kenya and Africa

45. Democracy and its discontented: What drives demand for democracy in South Africa?

Author:
Rehan Visser
Publication Date:
04-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Afrobarometer
Abstract:
Support for democracy rests on a range of foundations. Citizens may value democracy intrinsically, as the most legitimate form of rule regardless of outcomes, or instrumentally, as a system judged by its capacity to deliver material well-being, security, and effective governance. Understanding which of these logics predominates is central to assessing the resilience of democratic regimes. In the early years after the end of White-minority rule, South Africans were more likely than their continental peers to evaluate democracy in material terms, valuing it for what it could deliver rather than for its inherent virtues. Attitudes were closely tied to assessments of government performance and expectations of improvements in quality of life (Bratton & Mattes, 2001). As the regime matured, delivery of political goods entered the equation (Mattes, 2012). A generation after apartheid’s end, it is worth returning to this question: Is demand for democracy in South Africa still performance-driven?
Topic:
Government, Governance, Democracy, and Resilience
Political Geography:
Africa and South Africa

46. Pressure points: Africa’s health systems amid global aid contraction

Author:
Joseph Asunka, Boniface Dulani, and Kamal Yakubu
Publication Date:
04-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Afrobarometer
Abstract:
Since the COVID-19 pandemic, African governments have been compelled to reassess how best to protect hard-won public health gains while ensuring equitable and reliable care. These reassessments are taking place against a background of shifting geopolitical alignments, tightening fiscal space, and growing public expectations of quality public services. This reckoning intensified in 2025 with the disbanding of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the cancellation of major foreign-funded health programmes, effectively dismantling one of the pillars of Africa’s health-support architecture.
Topic:
Health, Foreign Aid, Social Services, Public Health, USAID, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Africa, North America, and United States of America

47. Global development policy and the New World Disorder: the Trump Administration's delivery of a high-voltage shockwave to multilateral norms, institutional commitments and long-standing principles

Author:
Stephan Klingebiel and Andy Sumner
Publication Date:
01-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS)
Abstract:
Global development policy is a particularly revealing field in which the Trump administration combines crude transactionalism with a high level of ideological commitment, namely an authoritarian libertarianism oriented toward elite interests. This is coupled with, at times, a chaotic absence of tactical or strategic coherence. With Trump's return to the White House in January 2025, a significant phase in international affairs, including global development policy, began. This policy brief traces the evolution of the US approach to development cooperation and exposes how Trump's approach represents an overtly aggressive assault, delivering a high voltage shockwave to global sustainable development policy, undermining multilateral norms, institutional commitments and long-standing principles of international solidarity. The United States (US) has played a decisive role in the conception and evolution of global development policy since the mid-20th century. From the establishment of the post-Second World War order onward, the US shaped the normative, political and organizational foundations of development cooperation, often setting agendas, defining standards, and providing leadership and personnel for key multilateral institutions. Early reconstruction efforts such as the Marshall Plan and the establishment of the World Bank embedded development within a broader framework of power politics, positioning aid as both a tool of reconstruction and geopolitical influence. Since January 2025, US development cooperation has undergone a dramatic rupture. The administration rapidly withdrew from multilateral institutions, cut budgets, and de facto dissolved USAID, transferring residual functions to the State Department. This shift was accompanied by conspiracy narratives and an explicit rejection of multilateral norms, marking a sharp departure from previous Republican and Democratic approaches alike. The brief conceptualises this shift as the emergence of a “New Washington Dissensus”: a model of transactional, nationalist development cooperation that treats aid as an instrument of power rather than a global public good. Under this paradigm, development engagement is ideologically conditional, hostile to climate and equity agendas, oriented toward migration control, and explicitly transactional. The Trump administration's National Security Strategy (December 2025) is consistent with this in the sense that it frames an “America First” approach that narrows US priorities to “core, vital national interests” and places strong emphasis on Western Hemisphere pre-eminence via a stated “Trump Corollary” to the Monroe Doctrine. For global development, foreign assistance and development finance are thus instruments of strategic competition and commercial diplomacy. US agencies are mobilized to back US commercial positioning. The consequences are dramatic and systemic. The US retreat has destabilized the global development architecture and intensified geopolitical fragmentation. For many countries in the Global South, this represents a watershed moment, creating both new room for maneuver and new dependencies as states pursue multi-alignment strategies amid intensifying great-power rivalry. At the same time, humanitarian impacts are severe. Overall, the brief concludes that development policy has entered a new phase, which is narrower, more instrumental and overtly geopolitical,and is reshaping not only US engagement but the future of global development policy itself.
Topic:
Development, Multilateralism, Institutions, Norms, and Donald Trump
Political Geography:
Global Focus and United States of America

48. Making global benefits pay: the World Bank reform to support global public goods

Author:
Jakob Schwab
Publication Date:
01-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS)
Abstract:
Global public goods (GPGs) are goods that are produced locally but have global effects. GPGs are essential for securing global development. The climate and biodiversity crises, pandemics, as well as fragility, conflict and violence are threatening livelihoods and well-being around the world, and addressing them would have enormous positive economic and social effects. However, the cross-border externalities involved are not being fully taken into account by countries, and hence these GPGs are still underprovided compared with what would be globally optimal. One year ago, the World Bank launched the Framework for Financial Incentives (FFI) to strengthen the support of GPGs in its operations. This novel instrument encourages countries to implement investment projects and policies that have positive spillovers to other countries by offering targeted financial incentives. As a core element of the World Bank's Evolution reform, the FFI reflects the recognition that relatively modest investments in client countries can generate substantial global benefits – for other developing and emerging economies as well as for the Bank's shareholder countries. Its challenges lie in incorporating the non-financial aspects of GPGs and the multi-faceted motivations to provide them in bankable operations. This policy brief discusses the relevance of GPGs for development and presents the World Bank's approach to supporting their provision in client countries through the FFI. The key takeaways are: • GPGs are not all those that are commonly shared or agreed upon as goals but are defined by the specific problem structure that the involved cross-border externalities entail. • Investment in GPGs can generate substantial benefits – not only for developing and emerging economies, but also for high-income countries that make up the World Bank's largest shareholders. Consequently, both out of enlightened self-interest and as a cost-effective way to advance global sustainable development at a time when international development budgets are undergoing significant reductions, shareholder countries should increase their contributions to the FFI. This applies in particular to those provided to the Livable Planet Fund, which provides the essential grant financing for countries' GPG-related projects. • To retain and strengthen confidence among stakeholders, the FFI must deploy its resources efficiently. This implies offering grants only when projects' overall domestic benefits are insufficient to motivate countries to provide GPGs on their own, and extending loans instead when client countries have sufficient self-interest to ensure repayment. The assessment of costs and benefits is complex, but it should improve with experience and become increasingly standardized. To signal its effectiveness, the FFI should pursue full transparency in its allocation decisions and undertake systematic impact assessments.
Topic:
Development, World Bank, Reform, and Public Goods
Political Geography:
Global Focus

49. The decline of French agriculture in Europe

Author:
Bernard Bourget
Publication Date:
02-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:
The farmers' protests of the winter 2025-2026 are an amplified replica of those of two years ago, mainly in France, due in particular to competition between, on the one hand, the FNSEA[1] (Fédération nationale des syndicats d’exploitants agricoles) and the Young Farmers, and on the other hand, the very aggressive Coordination Rurale and the Confédération Paysanne. These protests focused on two issues: - The management of the contagious nodular dermatitis (CND) crisis, more specifically the opposition to the slaughter of all infected herds, even though this radical method has proven effective in Savoie and Haute-Savoie, where it has eradicated the disease. - The free trade agreement between the European Union and the four MERCOSUR countries (Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, and Paraguay), which is currently awaiting approval. It is also the expression of a deep unease among French farmers, who have faced a series of difficulties in recent years that have not been experienced with the same intensity by their counterparts in other Member States. The causes of these difficulties therefore need to be analyzed. In Jean-Luc Demarty’s opinion[2], the main cause is the loss of competitiveness of French agriculture on the European market, which is reflected in an increase in agricultural income in France of only 17% between 2010 and 2024, well below the European average (77%) and that of Spain (79%), Poland (86%) or Italy (170%). The reasons why the agri-food trade balance of France has collapsed must also be examined. It was only positive of 200 Million euros in 2025. In recent years, French agriculture has had to grapple with health, climate and economic crises. The health crises have affected cattle (epizootic haemorrhagic disease and contagious nodular dermatosis), sheep (bluetongue) and poultry farms (avian influenza), while pig farms are still threatened by African swine fever. Climate change is having a severe impact on French agriculture, with successive droughts, floods and spring frosts. While health and climate crises also affect agriculture in other Member States, it is in the area of foreign trade that French agriculture is clearly hardest hit, particularly by moves by China and the United States to target wines and spirits, the leading export item for the French agri-food industry. The cereal sector, which is the second largest agri-food export item, is suffering from competition from the Black Sea countries and, above all, from Russia's offensive for wheat on African markets. The Algerian market was thus lost in 2025 in the context of that country's dispute with France, while the price of wheat is currently below $200 per tonne, (below the average production cost for French farmers), and the European Commission wants to tax imports of nitrogen fertilisers from Russia and Belarus as part of the carbon border adjustment mechanism.
Topic:
Agriculture, Climate Change, European Union, Protests, Free Trade, and Health Crisis
Political Geography:
Europe and France

50. Hybrid threats: from geopolitics to internal security

Author:
Jean Mafart
Publication Date:
01-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:
Although the concept of hybrid threats is now widely accepted despite its rather vague nature, there remains a blind spot in European discussions and strategic thinking: the phenomenon is still rarely addressed from the perspective of internal security policy. It has long been recognised that hybrid threats – whether cyberattacks, arson, disinformation, interference in electoral processes or the exploitation of migration flows – can strike within our borders. The European Union acknowledged this: the Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) committees regularly address the issue and the Commission gives it considerable attention in its internal security strategy of April 2025. In fact, it is mainly on the basis of hybrid threats that the document justifies the proposal to double the staff of Europol. However, the emergence of these threats in the internal security policies of the EU and its Member States raises important questions, both in terms of principles and operations, most of which remain unanswered. It is instructive to browse through the wealth of analytical and policy papers available on hybrid threats: the geopolitical dimension of the phenomenon still predominates, and while authors sometimes address the resilience of European states and societies, there is almost nothing to be found on how to respond to these threats in the context of internal security policy or on the necessary adaptation of the instruments of this policy. In other words, it is as if the concept of hybrid threats, which originally concerned defence and foreign policy circles, had forcefully found its way into European internal security policy and had not yet been fully assimilated into the internal sphere. If we add to this the fact that European internal security policy itself remains little known despite the considerable proportions it has taken on in recent decades, the current state of strategic thinking is not conducive to the consolidation of a strategy to deal with hybrid threats in their internal dimension. However, a strategy of this kind would be very useful, following the example of what has long existed within NATO and the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) for the external dimension: does the issue of hybrid threats, now referred to in every context but without a coherent approach, risk leading European internal security policy astray, diverting it from its primary purpose ? and how can the competences of the Union, its Member States and other actors be harmoniously combined when hybrid threats blur the line between internal and external security, or even between national security – which is in principle the remit of the Member States – and the competences of the Union?
Topic:
Security, NATO, European Union, Geopolitics, and Hybrid Threats
Political Geography:
Europe