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1. What Happens If the United States Leaves the WTO?

Author:
James Bacchus
Publication Date:
06-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Cato Institute
Abstract:
Aresolution before Congress calls for US withdrawal from the World Trade Organization (WTO). Both international law and US law permit withdrawal. The case for withdrawal, however, is misguided and misinformed. Much of what is said and widely believed about the effects of WTO membership on the United States is simply untrue. In fact, American membership in the WTO has been for decades and remains today enormously beneficial economically to US businesses, workers, and consumers. Withdrawal by the United States from the WTO would result in the loss of many of these economic benefits, including those derived from decades of accumulated trade commitments made by the 165 other member countries on thousands of different US goods and services traded within the WTO legal framework; those resulting from the commercial shield of WTO rules forbidding trade discrimination against US exports; and those emanating from the availability to the United States of an impartial, binding, and enforceable system of WTO trade dispute settlement. Moreover, withdrawal by the United States would cede US leadership in the WTO to other leading trading countries, including the second-largest trading country in the world, China. Trade is a win-win economically for all WTO members. WTO membership maximizes the overall economic gains from engaging in trade. The United States should remain in the WTO and help lead it toward needed reforms that will make it more beneficial to all in the modern global economy of the 21st century.
Topic:
Economics, Geopolitics, Trade, and WTO
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

2. The New Development Bank’s Contribution to the Energy Transition Process in the BRICS Countries (2016-2023)

Author:
Maria Elena Rodriguez, Rafaela Mello Rodrigues de Sá, Octávio Henrique Alves Costa de Oliveira, and Renan Guimarães Canellas de Oliveira
Publication Date:
12-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
BRICS Policy Center
Abstract:
Considering the growing relevance of the Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs) in the task of financing the global energy transition process, it is important to understand the efforts of these institutions to establish projects aimed at reducing carbon emissions in the most diverse sectors of the economy, and especially in the energy sector. This document looks specifically at the role that the New Development Bank (NDB) plays in this process, presenting an overview of its loan portfolio and targets in terms of contributions to the energy transition process. The NDB, also known as the BRICS Bank, stands out in its institutional strategies in the area of Clean Energy, one of its operational objectives, setting a target for the year 2026 of directing 40% of all its financing to projects aimed at climate change, including operations that contribute to the energy transition (NDB, 2022a, p. 28).
Topic:
Development, Banks, BRICS, Energy Transition, and Multilateral Development Banks (MDBs)
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Iran, Indonesia, India, South Africa, Brazil, Ethiopia, Egypt, and United Arab Emirates

3. Taking Stock of Brexit

Author:
Iain Begg
Publication Date:
01-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
LSE IDEAS
Abstract:
J ohn Curtice, the UK’s foremost polling expert, wrote recently that ‘politicians do not talk much about Brexit these days’ (Curtice, 2025). In Germany, too, Brexit has largely disappeared from view, according to a prominent journalist consulted in the preparation of this blog. Another expert, Anand Menon, told AP News on the fifth anniversary of the UK leaving the EU that Brexit had ‘changed our economy’, adding that ‘our politics has been changed quite fundamentally’ (Lawless, 2025). His view is that, in electoral politics, conventional political cleavages have been supplanted by ‘a new division around Brexit’ (Lawless, 2025). In much of the EU, the 2025 anniversary elicited many articles characterised by a combination of acknowledgment that Brexit had failed to deliver, resignation about the UK’s fate and a sense of growing disinterest. The Austrian newspaper Kourier summed up these sentiments: “Von skurril bis tragisch: Eine Bilanz nach fünf Jahren Brexit [From bizarre to tragic, a stocktake after five years of Brexit]” (Bauer, 2025). However, Brexit is a process, rather than a discrete event, and some of its effects are both contested and take time, and are often seen through ideological rather than analytic lenses. A useful way to assess its consequences is to distinguish between three key dimensions: economic, social and governance related. The overall economic effects of Brexit have mainly been negative on both sides of the English Channel, albeit uneven, although some critics regard the magnitudes as having been exaggerated.
Topic:
European Union, Economy, Brexit, and Domestic Politics
Political Geography:
United Kingdom and Europe

4. Energy Data Spaces and Market Power: a new challenge for data sovereignty and its governance

Author:
Emanuele Giovannetti
Publication Date:
01-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
LSE IDEAS
Abstract:
This paper examines how the digitalisation of energy markets, driven by smart meter data and Energy Data Spaces, is reshaping competition in retail electricity services. It analyses the implications for market power, consumer outcomes, and data sovereignty, highlighting the regulatory challenges posed by data-driven business models that operate across national boundaries.
Topic:
Markets, Governance, Regulation, Digitalization, and Energy
Political Geography:
Global Focus

5. Adapting Benin’s Battle with Violent Militant Groups

Author:
Anouar Boukhars
Publication Date:
01-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Africa Center for Strategic Studies
Abstract:
Persistent militant Islamist group attacks in the northern border regions of Benin have posed a growing security threat to the coastal West African region. Benin has made noteworthy institutional reforms to strengthen its defense and security forces. Yet, accelerated and refocused training is needed to translate this into more adaptive, operational capabilities to effectively counter the militant insurgency. Empowering local commanders, pairing enhanced force mobility with strike capability, and fusing interagency intelligence sharing are priority operational adaptations needed to sustain pressure on the insurgents. Effective counterinsurgency in northern Benin requires operationalizing a population-centric protection model and ethos embedded within the defense and security forces.
Topic:
Governance, Reform, Islamism, and Instability
Political Geography:
Africa and Benin

6. The means of prediction and the production function of AI

Author:
Maximilian Kasy
Publication Date:
02-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Economics for Inclusive Prosperity (EfIP)
Abstract:
The real AI governance challenge: Who gets to decide what AI systems optimize for? Current debates miss that AI conflicts are between different groups of people, not humans vs. machines. Power flows from control of AI inputs: Those who control the means of prediction (data, computing power, expertise, and energy) determine AI objectives. Current governance approaches fail: Individual privacy rights and market mechanisms can’t address AI’s collective harms and benefits. Democratic control is the solution: Give stakeholders affected by AI decisions a voice in setting AI objectives.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Governance, Regulation, Privacy, Artificial Intelligence, and Prediction
Political Geography:
Global Focus

7. How the EU can pursue strategic cooperation on secondary raw materials with the Western Balkans

Author:
Edoardo Righetti, Deniz Tekin, and Vasileios Rizos
Publication Date:
01-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS)
Abstract:
Europe’s green and digital transitions are increasing demand for critical raw materials (CRMs), just as geopolitical risks and trade tensions are reshaping global supply chains. In recent years, the EU has taken steps to secure and diversify supplies through building strategic partnerships with resource-rich countries, which also includes recovering CRMs from mine waste and tailings. The Western Balkans region stands out as a natural partner, given their already close integration with EU markets and transport networks, and their legacy of old industrial sites and mine tailings. Such a partnership could lead to several mutual benefits – for the EU, more resilient and circular CRM value chains which correspond with its strategic autonomy and sustainability objectives, and for the Western Balkans, by rehabilitating legacy sites and advancing green and circular policies tied to the Green Agenda and the enlargement framework. This CEPS Policy Brief dives into three priority areas for EU-Western Balkans cooperation on secondary raw materials that policymakers should pay more attention to.
Topic:
Regional Cooperation, European Union, Supply Chains, Green Transition, Digital Transition, and Critical Minerals
Political Geography:
Europe and Western Balkans

8. Restraint and Diplomacy in Arctic Policy: Cooperation Amid U.S.-Russia-China Tensions

Author:
Pavel Devyatkin
Publication Date:
01-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:
In recent years, the Arctic has become the site of both great-power cooperation and competition. While the 2025 Alaska summit between Presidents Putin and Trump reflected a thaw in U.S.–Russia relations, U.S. interest in acquiring Greenland has cast doubt on continued U.S. cooperation with both Russia and China in the region. This brief details how a combination of restraint and proactive diplomacy in the Arctic — built upon shared interests and a recognition of competitive coexistence — will best serve the United States. The second Trump administration has called for American Arctic dominance, viewing the region as an energy source and as an opportunity to monopolize resources and to establish its Western Hemisphere force posture. Russia views the Arctic through a similar lens of resources and sovereignty, as it ramps up its military presence while intensifying efforts to extract natural resources. China’s influence in the region has steadily increased, as it collaborates with Russia, while advancing scientific research, sustainable development, and multilateral climate cooperation. The United States has come to see increasing Russia–China collaboration in the Arctic as a threat to U.S. national interests. But rather than responding to this deepening relationship through unilateralism, the U.S. should recognize that competitive coexistence and trilateral cooperation are more beneficial. This approach avoids zero-sum confrontation and minimizes accidental escalation while maintaining U.S. force projection, maximizing resource extraction, and promoting scientific collaboration. Toward this end, this brief recommends that the Trump administration: Establish trilateral maritime safety and search-and-rescue, SAR, operations, a system that exchanges real-time information, conducts joint training exercises, and invests in port and coast guard infrastructure. Such cooperation would lower shipping costs, improve safety, and encourage economic development — goals shared by the United States, Russia, and China. Institutionalize direct, reliable U.S.–Russia–China communication channels, including a dedicated Arctic hotline for incident reporting and a security digital platform for real-time vessel tracking. Such transparency minimizes the chances of miscalculation, particularly with nuclear assets in the region. Revitalize the Arctic Council to enable communication among the three major powers, the eight Arctic states, and Indigenous representatives. Initiate a trilateral arms control framework, using reductions in Arctic military exercises as a springboard for broader arms control and security arrangements.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, International Cooperation, Strategic Competition, and Great Powers
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Asia, North America, Arctic, and United States of America

9. Prospects and Problems for Reinvigorating Superpower Nuclear Cooperation

Author:
Ariel Petrovics
Publication Date:
01-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:
A three-way nuclear arms race between the United States, China, and Russia looms — an escalation that would erode global nonproliferation and usher in an era of unchecked nuclear proliferation. This brief offers a path to preventing this destabilizing outcome through pragmatic nuclear cooperation — an approach that has strong historical precedent and accords with the strategic interests of all three nuclear superpowers. Superpower cooperation historically underpinned the global nuclear nonproliferation regime, but increasing great power competition erodes this entire system of international security. China and Russia have each modernized and expanded their nuclear programs and adopted more aggressive nuclear postures. The United States, in turn, has approved a nearly $2 trillion nuclear modernization program. This burgeoning arms race heightens risks of inadvertent escalation, as each of the superpowers become increasingly reliant on nuclear brinkmanship to hold off the growing capabilities of their adversaries. The deteriorating nuclear security environment places pressure on other states to similarly seek their own nuclear arsenals while weakening the nonproliferation tool kit that previously prevented these states from breaking out. As more armed states join the fray, they in turn multiply the number of potential nuclear flashpoints around the world. Reinvesting in superpower cooperation on nuclear security is not an idealistic bid for goodwill. Rather, halting unchecked competition is a pragmatic strategy that serves the interests of the United States, Russia, and China. It preserves a global nuclear system that has safeguarded the superpowers’ dominance for decades. Weakening it, on the other hand, undermines the international marketplace that has preserved U.S. dominance in private industry and innovation. Russia and China, in turn, risk a multifront nuclear competition, as proximate U.S. allies choose uncontrolled independent arsenals over existing security umbrellas. The superpowers can still step back from the abyss by reviving nuclear cooperation. Toward that objective, this brief recommends that the Trump administration: Accept Russia’s offer to extend New START for a year, paired with verification pathways and transparency measures. Reinvigorate existing direct lines of communication (i.e., hotline systems) with both Russia and China. Initiate trilateral nuclear discussions with Russia and China toward the goal of capping arsenals at parity on specific warheads and delivery systems.
Topic:
Security, International Cooperation, Nuclear Weapons, Nonproliferation, and Great Powers
Political Geography:
Russia, China, and United States of America

10. Understanding Global South Perspectives on Taiwan

Author:
Henrietta Levin and Hugh Grant-Chapman
Publication Date:
01-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Abstract:
To develop a better understanding of Global South perspectives on cross-Strait dynamics and Taiwan’s engagement with the developing world, the CSIS Freeman Chair in China Studies convened an international task force consisting of 20 leading scholars and practitioners from Latin America, Africa, the Middle East, South Asia, and Southeast Asia. Over the course of four workshops, task force members analyzed the increasing support that many Global South countries have offered for Beijing’s position on Taiwan, and how U.S. policy affects the position of Global South countries. They also considered opportunities for Taiwan to enhance its economic, diplomatic, and people-to-people engagement across the Global South. This brief summarizes the key takeaways from the task force’s deliberations.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Geopolitics, Global South, and Strategic Engagement
Political Geography:
China, Taiwan, Asia, and Global South

11. Europe Needs an ASAP Program for Air Defense

Author:
Max Bergmann, Otto Svendsen, and Jonathan Burchell
Publication Date:
03-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Abstract:
Operation Epic Fury, the ongoing U.S.-Israeli military campaign against Iran, is consuming vast quantities of air defense interceptors—expensive munitions that were already in critically short supply before the operation was launched. European countries depend heavily on U.S.-produced air defense systems and munitions for their own defense and for protecting Ukraine. During the winter, Russian missiles and drones bombarded Ukrainian forces, as well as its cities and energy infrastructure, making air defense munitions vital to Ukraine’s survival. Europe now faces a looming crisis: The U.S.-made interceptors it needs, both for Ukraine today and for its own rearmament against Russia, may simply not be available. In response, European states should launch a crash program to rapidly expand production of European-made air defense systems and interceptors. Modeled on the European Union’s 2023 Act in Support of Ammunition Production (ASAP), a new “ASAP for Air Defense” would channel EU funds into European munitions and systems—such as the IRIS-T, SAMP/T, and NASAMS systems—to reduce dependence on U.S. suppliers for the medium-range and cruise missile defense systems where European alternatives exist.
Topic:
International Security, Geopolitics, Russia-Ukraine War, and Air Defense
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

12. Deepening Strategic Alignment: Priorities for the U.S.-Japan Alliance

Author:
Kristi Govella and Nicholas Szechenyi
Publication Date:
04-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Abstract:
With new leadership in both countries, Japan and the United States are facing an increasingly uncertain global environment. As Japan prepares to revise its core national strategy documents, it is a particularly important time for Tokyo and Washington to deepen their strategic alignment. Although bilateral cooperation continues to proceed relatively smoothly at the operational level, there is a pressing need to articulate a strategic vision to guide alliance priorities and facilitate effective implementation of common objectives.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, Alliance, and Strategic Partnerships
Political Geography:
Japan, Asia, North America, and United States of America

13. Monitoring Demilitarised Zones in the Age of Uncrewed and AI Systems: Lessons from the Korean DMZ

Author:
Michael M. Bosack
Publication Date:
04-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP)
Abstract:
Demilitarised zones (DMZs) have demonstrated their utility in post-war peace processes. They separate forces, mitigating the risk of deliberate aggression or accidental incidents alike. However, the effective monitoring of DMZs can be challenging, because they tend to cover wide areas, sometimes with dangerous terrain replete with human-made and natural hazards. As such, parties responsible for monitoring DMZs rely on a passive posture where they simply respond to reported incidents, an active posture using personnel or technology wherever resources and the terrain will allow, or a combination of the two. With continued advances in uncrewed systems and artificial intelligence (AI), there are now ever-increasing calls for the employment of these technologies in DMZ monitoring functions. This is true of the Korean DMZ, a 240 km-long, 4 km-wide swathe of land that bifurcates the Korean Peninsula between the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (or North Korea) and the Republic of Korea (or South Korea). In this area, the South Korean government is seeking to enhance its monitoring capabilities by using uncrewed and AI-based systems. In theory, there are many benefits to this approach, but in practice, policymakers and practitioners must address five inter-related dilemmas to ensure that these technologies actually support peace implementation instead of contributing to unintended conflict and tension. The problems associated with these dilemmas are not insurmountable, but they require deliberate steps and conscious implementation to maximise the opportunities that modern technologies provide while mitigating their risks. The lessons from the Korean DMZ are applicable in any post-war demilitarized zone, including the one envisioned between Russia and Ukraine. This Policy Brief proceeds as follows. It first outlines the function of DMZs in post-war environments and the practical challenges associated with monitoring them. It then examines the potential advantages that uncrewed and AI-enabled systems offer in addressing these challenges. Next, it assesses the implications of five inter-related policy dilemmas – legal, moral, technological, practical, and security – that arise from introducing such systems into DMZ contexts. This analytical framework is then applied to the Korean DMZ as a contemporary case study. Finally, policy recommendations are advanced aimed at ensuring that the use of emerging technologies strengthens, rather than undermines, peace implementation and long-term stability in DMZs.
Topic:
Security, Science and Technology, Artificial Intelligence, Post-Conflict, and Demilitarized Zones (DMZs)
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, and North Korea

14. Managing the Transatlantic Relationship in the Absence of US Leadership: Understanding the Trump Administration’s National Security Strategy

Author:
Paul Fritch
Publication Date:
03-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP)
Abstract:
The Trump administration’s December 2025 National Security Strategy (NSS) represents a radical shift in US foreign policy, involving a move from global leadership of a rules-based international order to unabashed nationalism and regional hegemony. The new strategy no longer views the country’s sprawling network of alliances and partnerships and its ability to attract and integrate high-level talent from around the world as unique strengths, but rather as vulnerabilities to be mitigated. However, as jarring as these substantive changes are, the document’s structural changes and the irregular process that produced it may prove more significant in demonstrating just how sharply Washington is turning away from 80 years of bipartisan foreign policy consensus. The change is evident not just in the Trump administration’s policies, but – crucially – in the decision-making process that produces them. The new NSS is best understood as the formalisation of the administration’s abandonment of traditional policy coordination and strategic planning itself, an effort that has included the removal of senior career diplomats, military commanders, and intelligence officers; the systematic dismissal of senior judge advocates general and inspectors general; and the firing of many National Security Council (NSC) staff. The collective result of these steps, which find their natural culmination in the NSS and the National Defense Strategy (NDS) that followed in January 2026, is a policymaking process that is less informed by objective intelligence and analysis, less constrained by legal and policy advice or alliance consultation, and thus more subject to impulsiveness and ideological influence. Both of these developments – a new “America First” nationalism that eschews multilateral constraints and an erratic decision-making process that produces unpredictable and often impracticable outcomes – require a fundamental assessment by the country’s partners of their approach to the United States, both bilaterally and within established multilateral frameworks. This Policy Brief examines the practical implications of the 2025 NSS and the dramatically changed decision-making process it represents. For transatlantic allies and other middle powers, the central question is no longer whether US strategy has changed, but how to operate effectively in an environment of reduced predictability and diminished US strategic anchoring.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, National Security, Transatlantic Relations, and Donald Trump
Political Geography:
Europe, North America, and United States of America

15. The ramifications of aid cuts on refugee lives: case of the Differentiated Assistance (DA) model and the Shirika Plan in Kenya

Author:
Fred Ikanda and Michael Owiso
Publication Date:
01-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS)
Abstract:
International support has failed to keep pace with the growing numbers of refugees and internally displaced persons, thus creating a financing gap between their needs and available resources. The recent US withdrawal from funding development and humanitarian programs has only compounded this financing gap which has existed for more than a decade. In response to this, the international community – through Agenda 2030, the Grand Bargain, the 2016 New York Declaration, and the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF) – has advocated for a shift from seeing refugees as emergencies to integrating them into the host countries' developmental agenda. In Kenya, these policy proposals are most recently being implemented through the Shirika Plan, the Differentiated Assistance (DA) model, and development plans of refugee-hosting counties such as Turkana and Garissa. First, the Shirika Plan is a government-led initiative that was proclaimed in 2023 to realize the socio-economic inclusion of refugees within the local context in line with the progressive provisions of the Refugee Act of 2021. Implementation of this policy is yet to begin as it is pegged on elusive donor funding. Second, the DA model is led by the office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the World Food Program (WFP) and is aligned with the Shirika Plan. The preparatory activities for DA were undertaken throughout 2024 and implementation commenced in August 2025. DA seeks to increase refugee self-reliance through livelihood interventions and providing support based on the specific needs and capabilities of different refugee households as opposed to the previous blanket support that was based on refugee registration status. However, implementation has so far only focused on reducing aid, without corresponding investment in self-reliance measures. DA and the Shirika Plan are framed in government and international circles as solutions for addressing funding shortfalls and fostering refugee integration by supporting self-reliance. However, there has been little progress in enhancing refugee self-reliance. At the same time, aid cuts are implemented based on a needs-categorisation of refugee households that proceeds without adequate background information. The lack of alternative livelihoods has exacerbated vulnerabilities and has sparked protests in refugee camps. Emerging evidence points to negative coping mechanisms, including higher school drop-out rates; reported cases of youths joining criminal religious groups; increased conflicts at family level; and rising cases of women becoming sex workers. This Policy Brief highlights the emerging ramifications of implementing DA that is anchored in the provisions contained in the Shirika Plan. The Brief also goes further to suggest recommendations for action to the government of Kenya and the international community. Key policy messages: • There is a need to enhance synergy between UNHCR and the Kenyan government such that the state implements the Shirika Plan alongside DA without premising its implementation on donor aid. • UNHCR needs to obtain more extensive household economic data and involve refugees in deciding who is most vulnerable to more accurately disaggregate refugee households into appropriate categories. • The Kenyan government and international actors need to closely monitor and address potential negative implications of implementing DA and the Shirika Plan.
Topic:
Development, Refugees, Displacement, Donors, UNHCR, and Aid Cuts
Political Geography:
Kenya and Africa

16. Beyond projects: the role of development partners in institutionalizing renewable energy innovations: lessons from the Global South

Author:
Lea Elsässer, Harald Fuhr, Anna Fünfgeld, Markus Lederer, Aparajita Banerjee, and HyunAh Yi
Publication Date:
01-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS)
Abstract:
Renewable energy has seen rapid uptake, particularly in the Global South. Solar energy projects have boomed in recent years, but uptake by countries is uneven. Beyond geophysical conditions, technological innovation, market dynamics and donor-driven “lighthouse projects”, political institutionalization has played a critical role in decarbonization. In this policy brief, which is based on extensive research from Global South case studies, we argue that political institutionalization is key to determining whether and how innovative solar initiatives become stabilized, scaled up, and mainstreamed. Drawing on the research project Institutionalizing Low Carbon Development in the Global South (INLOCADE) and expert contributions from a follow-up IDOS workshop, this policy brief synthesizes comparative policy-relevant findings on how institutionalization unfolds in various emerging economies of the Global South, including Brazil, Bangladesh, Cambodia, India, Indonesia and South Africa. Key messages: • Political institutionalization – understood here as an enduring change of formal and informal rules and practices towards low-carbon development – ​​is essential for making renewable energy projects sustainable by embedding them in conducive, stable governance frameworks. Isolated, donor-driven initiatives are at risk of provoking resistance and backlash, and of fading away once external support ends. • Multiple pathways for institutionalization exist. State leadership, subnational action, alliances between development partners and communities, and crisis-driven coalitions can enable institutionalization under different conditions. Policies should be tailored to the institutional realities of each context rather than using one-size-fits-all models. Similarly, development partners should assess local realities and adapt their strategies accordingly. • Distributive justice and participation must be actively supported. Political institutionalization can lead to inequitable outcomes and reinforce exclusionary practices. Development partners should take a proactive role by aligning their interventions with inclusive and equitable approaches to ensure support for marginalized groups leads to socially just transitions, not just box-ticking. • Crises can be opportunities. Energy shortages and climate shocks can disrupt fossil-fuel lock-ins and open the door to innovation. Development partners need flexible instruments and strategies to help translate crisis-driven experiments into durable institutional change. • Development partners are catalytic, not deci-sive. They can accelerate change by providing finance, technical expertise, and legitimacy, especially when working with domestic actors beyond national governments. German and EU development cooperation should place greater emphasis on strengthening domestic institutional environments, including regulatory stability, administrative capacity, and actor coalitions that embed projects in lasting policy and organizational change. This helps ensure donor interventions contribute to sustained low-carbon transitions beyond initial project cycles.
Topic:
Development, Global South, Innovation, and Renewable Energy
Political Geography:
Bangladesh, Indonesia, India, South Africa, Brazil, and Cambodia

17. Building social cohesion through livelihood support in climate-related internal displacement settings: evidence from Zimbabwe and Mozambique

Author:
Tomy Ncube and Susan S. Ekoh
Publication Date:
01-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS)
Abstract:
Climate-related extreme weather events are increasingly displacing communities across Southern Africa, with negative implications for social cohesion, livelihoods, and community resilience. Understanding how displacement erodes social cohesion is important for developing strategies for restoring it. Evidence shows that livelihood support interventions, for example, cash‑based assistance, in-kind transfers (agricultural inputs) up to skills development programs, are a pathway for mending or strengthening social cohesion in displacement contexts. Yet, in some cases, they can further fragment it. This requires strategies under which such interventions can be deployed to positively shape social cohesion outcomes. This Policy Brief synthesizes insights from qualitative research conducted from 2023 to 2025 with displaced communities and host populations in Zimbabwe (Chimanimani and Tsholotsho districts) and Mozambique (Guara Guara, Grudja and Praia Nova). It examines how livelihood interventions can either rebuild or further fragment social cohesion, identifies critical factors driving cohesion outcomes, and provides evidence-based recommendations for national governments, humanitarian actors, and development co-operation actors working in climate-displacement contexts across Southern Africa. In Zimbabwe, vertical social cohesion in displacement contexts is eroded by a lack of designated policies on displacement, leading to poor socioeconomic outcomes for displaced individuals; ad hoc recovery and reconstruction efforts that undermine durable solutions and long-term recovery; and a lack of accountability infrastructure that undermines trust in the government. In Mozambique, the slow implementation and unequal distribution of recovery interventions undermine cooperation between communities and the institutions involved in post-disaster recovery efforts. This has led to large-scale returns of people to high-risk areas. Drawing insights from both case studies, we provide key recommendations and conditions for implementing livelihood support to achieve social cohesion in climate-related displacement contexts. Key policy messages • Livelihood interventions can lead to maladaptation if not supported by strong governance mechanisms including policy frameworks and institutional coordination in planning and implementation. • People-centred, area-based approaches to livelihood programming that account for pre-displacement livelihoods and support post-displacement transitions, while benefiting both displaced populations and host communities, should be adopted. One-size-fits-all interventions risk undermining economic recovery and social cohesion. • Horizontal and vertical social cohesion indicators should be embedded in livelihood programs from the outset to assess the social impacts before and after implementation. • Inclusive, participatory decision-making in the delivery of livelihood support programs should be mandated to prevent exclusionary practices that erode trust in institutions.
Topic:
Climate Change, Social Cohesion, Internal Displacement, Economic Recovery, and Livelihoods
Political Geography:
Africa, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe

18. Back to the future: the Pact for the Mediterranean and the miracle of Euro-Mediterranean integration

Author:
Mark Furness
Publication Date:
01-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS)
Abstract:
The European Union (EU) and southern Mediterranean partners launched the Pact for the Mediterranean in November 2025 to reset relations with the EU's “Southern Neighborhood” in an increasingly challenging regional context. The Pact comes 30 years after the 1995 Barcelona Process promised to foster economic – and to a lesser degree political – integration in the Mediterranean Basin. The Pact's declared objective is to “achieve deeper integration within the common Mediterranean space” (EC & HR, 2025). This policy brief discusses the Pact's prospects for achieving this goal, which previous efforts have failed to achieve. For long-time observers of Euro-Mediterranean relations, the Pact appears to be a “back to the future” approach. Its three substantive “pillars” (people, economies and security) echo the three “baskets” (political/security, economic and socio-cultural) of the original Euro-Mediterranean Partnership. Structurally, it relies on the same mix of differentiated bilateral agreements (now termed “comprehensive partnerships”) within a multilateral regional framework. The Pact's success depends on whether the EU and Mediterranean partner countries can resolve four core dilemmas that have long challenged their relations: • The “autocracy dilemma”: balancing the need to work with authoritarian governments with European interests in supporting democracy. • The “migration dilemma”: securing borders while respecting human rights. • The “rentierism dilemma”: finding solutions to immediate economic, social and environmental challenges while making necessary reforms to rentier political economies. • The “regionalism dilemma”: cutting bilateral deals while trying to build regional structures to address collective action problems. The term “pact” is normally used to describe an agreement between two partners, setting out agreed objectives and actions for both sides. The Pact for the Mediterranean is an EU policy framework that, at most, represents a tacit agreement with southern Mediterranean governments, without committing either side to policy changes or reforms that might have long-term implications. The Pact for the Mediterranean has potential to strengthen sectoral cooperation, for example on renewable energy, connectivity infrastructure and labor mobility. If accompanied by sufficient resources and mutual trust-building, this functional cooperation may create incentives for deeper integration. This, in turn, will still depend on whether the EU and southern Mediterranean governments can move beyond trans-actionalism and invest in partnerships between their societies: support for democratic movements and institutions, investment in public goods, protection of the natural environment and investment in collective regionalism. Thus far, there is little indication that the EU and southern Mediterranean governments will take advantage of this opportunity.
Topic:
Migration, Treaties and Agreements, European Union, Regional Integration, Autocracy, and Rentierism
Political Geography:
Europe and Mediterranean

19. Digital labor opportunities and (im)mobility: steps for making digital remote work a global possibility

Author:
Charles Martin-Shields
Publication Date:
01-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS)
Abstract:
This policy brief offers advice for making digital remote work a viable solution to fill labor gaps without requiring workers to physically relocate. From a technology standpoint, there is no reason someone who does computer-based work must physically relocate, assuming they have the required job skills and internet connectivity. The increased use of bilateral labor agreements (BLAs) between countries is evidence that there are major skills gaps and global competition for labor. Indeed, a BLA can serve as a “policy sandbox” where governments negotiate the legal and statutory terms of digital remote work. Digital remote work can be an especially useful solution when the country providing labor has a large pool of people who are willing to work and fill labor pool gaps in countries of employment, but for different legal or personal reasons cannot relocate across borders. This latter point is no small thing: there is a significant body of migration research showing that the majority of people are not interested in moving across borders – or in the case of many refugees are unable to do so. The reasons for this are myriad. Digital labor could be a workaround to meet basic labor demand and facilitate economic inclusion. The word “could” is critical because banking, social and health insurance, and taxation, all of which are components of legal employment, remain bordered. This policy brief will focus on a specific case from research on urban refugee livelihoods where the worker was able to work digitally in the US from Malaysia, while being subject to social security, taxation and insurance in the US The idiosyncrasies in this case help point to spaces for reforming social security, tax and insurance rules to reduce their “bordered-ness” and make digital work more systematically viable. Key policy messages: • To make digital remote work viable at scale, development cooperation agencies should play a key facilitator role, linking relevant authorities in the tax, social insurance and banking regulation sectors. This is especially important for refugees who often cannot move and who fall outside the protection of host country labor laws. These reforms could, for example, be built into BLAs. • Achieving inclusive economic development goals via digital employment would require that remote workers earn competitive salaries. Thus, there would need to be buy-in from the private sector regarding wage competitiveness for workers in different countries, as well as a role for unions and civil society in negotiating digital remote work policy. • While digital work can enable greater economic and labor participation for workers who cannot relocate for jobs, there are still sectors that require physical presence. Thus, digital remote work is not a replacement for immigration policy that facilitates safe and flexible migration for those people who do have to move.
Topic:
Development, Labor Issues, Employment, Remote Work, and Digital Employment
Political Geography:
Global Focus

20. Strengthening European development policy: the case for Team Europe 2.0

Author:
Svea Koch, Julian Bergmann, Benedikt Erforth, Christine Hackenesch, and Niels Keijzer
Publication Date:
01-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS)
Abstract:
The international order is undergoing profound change as rivalry among major powers realigns the global balance. This is also having an impact on European development policy. In many European Union (EU) member states, funding for official development assistance (ODA) is declining. At the same time, EU countries are reforming their development policies and increasingly channeling their remaining resources towards priorities that serve primarily their own interests. So far, these reforms have largely been defined bilaterally, whereas a political debate on the role, added value and joint objectives of EU development policy is largely absent. Yet, without strengthening European cooperation in development policy, Europe will not succeed in providing an adequate response to the current upheavals in global politics. In this policy brief, we argue that reform efforts in European development policy must strengthen co-operation and complementarity to respond effectively to the changed geopolitical landscape. Our analysis identifies four key policy areas where European actors are pursuing ongoing reforms and where development policy should make significant contributions: 1) promoting economic cooperation and private-sector engagement, 2) security policy, 3) managing and shaping migration and 4) human development including poverty reduction, particularly in least developed countries (LDCs). So far, a joint European strategic direction in these areas has been lacking. Negotiating these shared priorities requires a revitalization of the political dialogue between EU institutions and member states, as well as further development of the “Team Europe” approach. “Team Europe 2.0” would then have two functions: to strengthen substantive complementarity “internally” through an understanding of how the various actors individually contribute to jointly defined objectives; and “externally” by making visible what Europe stands for strategically. A key element of Team Europe 2.0 should be an improved substantive dialogue among member states and within issue-specific, informal groups co-facilitated by individual member states and the European Commission. Such “thematic champions” could initiate the development of joint strategies for larger, transformative initiatives. Improved political dialogue and coordination on substance in key areas of European development policy are prerequisites for a united and more strategic external presence of “Team Europe”, including in multilateral contexts.
Topic:
Development, Reform, European Union, Economic Cooperation, Human Development, Rivalry, and International Order
Political Geography:
Europe

21. Competencies to help shape a changing world: tracer study and future focus of the IDOS Postgraduate Program for Sustainability Cooperation

Author:
Simone Christ, Sven Grimm, Tülin Engin-Stock, and Isabella Schulz
Publication Date:
01-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS)
Abstract:
The Postgraduate Program for Sustainability Cooperation (PGP) at the German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS, formerly DIE) has been training young professionals for German and European international cooperation since 1965. How successful is the program in supporting its graduates in starting their career and in developing their competencies? And what direction should Germany take in the future in its training for professionals in the field of international cooperation? To mark its 60th anniversary, IDOS conducted a tracer study to systematically analyze how the program has benefited its some 1,000 graduates and to find some pointers on how it could be developed further. The study very clearly demonstrates the relevance of the postgraduate program and identification with the program over the past 60 years. The feedback confirms that the PGP considerably benefits participants' professional and personal development and that they would definitely recommend it for future generations. At the same time, the world is undergoing a period of radical upheaval. Fundamental changes can be seen above all in the general conditions for partnerships, the demands made of staff working in this sector and training for future experts and managers. Training programs such as the PGP must adapt to address these drastic changes. The quality of a training program is ultimately reflected in how well it promotes basic competencies that will still be useful under different conditions and that can help shape these changes. IDOS graduates were also asked about their views on changes in working in the international cooperation sector. The survey thus allows conclusions to be drawn on how training can be developed further: 1. Training should promote various competencies that can shape cooperation for sustainable development. Taking a partner-oriented approach to initiating and implementing changes in an increasingly complex world requires both specialist and systemic knowledge along with personal, social, networking and cooperation skills. 2. Training institutions should promote the capacity for cooperation through joint learning with international partners. This will foster understanding for other perspectives and will support the ongoing development of partnerships. 3. Post-colonial perspectives and a critical examination of power should already be taken into account during training and should be put into practice in concrete cooperation between organizations. IDOS graduates also believe that these aspects are becoming more important in international cooperation.
Topic:
Development, International Cooperation, Training, and Sustainable Development
Political Geography:
Global Focus

22. The 2026 oil crisis: an opportunity for Europe's energy transition

Author:
Valérie Plagnol
Publication Date:
04-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:
Seven weeks after the launch of the joint US-Israeli attacks against Iran on 28 February, the damage to regional production facilities and the virtual halt to maritime traffic in the Strait of Hormuz have triggered a rise in crude oil prices of nearly 60% for the WTI index and over 70% for Brent. Despite the two-week truce declared on 7 April, these increases have already had a painful impact on our economies. The duration of the tensions will, of course, determine the severity of the crisis, but the damage has already been done.
Topic:
Oil, Armed Conflict, Energy Crisis, and Energy Transition
Political Geography:
Europe, Iran, Israel, United States of America, and Strait of Hormuz

23. Japan’s Semiconductor Supply Chain Structure and Its Implications for South Korea

Author:
Gyu-Pan Kim
Publication Date:
04-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
Abstract:
As the competition for technological supremacy between the United States and China has intensified since the 2020s, the Japanese government is also staking its future on the “revival” of its semiconductor industry by strengthening its supply chain. Japan’s global market share in semiconductor products peaked at around 50% in the 1980s but has since fallen to around 10% in the 2020s. It is now maintaining its presence in the so-called legacy semiconductor sector, which includes power semiconductors, microcontrollers (MCUs), and CMOS image sensors. In the semiconductor manufacturing equipment and materials sector, which maintains a relatively high global market share, certain semiconductor materials—such as yellow phosphorus, helium, rare gases, and fluorite—are exposed to the risk of supply chain disruptions due to high import dependence on specific countries. This WEB paper analyzes the supply chain structure of Japan’s semiconductor industry and examines the government’s semiconductor industry policy from the perspective of strengthening supply chain resilience, with the aim of exploring future directions for cooperation between Japan and South Korea in the semiconductor industry. In the second section we analyze the input structure of Japan’s semiconductor industry using input-output analysis, while also assessing the import dependency of Japanese semiconductor products and materials to examine the supply chain structure of the industry. The third section provides an overview of the industrial policies the Japanese government has been pursuing since 2020 to revitalize the semiconductor industry, with a particular focus on the next-generation semiconductor project—the Rapidus 2-nanometer foundry. Section IV proposes a cooperation agenda between South Korea and Japan which involves: first, the sharing of supply chain information regarding export control, and joint procurement of semiconductor raw materials; and second, the joint development of semiconductor back-end packaging technologies and cooperation in the field of AI semiconductors.
Topic:
Industry, Supply Chains, and Semiconductors
Political Geography:
Japan and Asia

24. Global Demographic Structure and Korea's Productivity: Challenges and Opportunities

Author:
Sang-Ha Yoon
Publication Date:
01-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
Abstract:
The global economy is undergoing a profound transformation driven by low birth rates and aging populations. While this demographic shift is a global phenomenon, South Korea is experiencing it at an unprecedented speed. This change is not merely a social issue but a fundamental economic shock that alters the core engines of growth: labor and capital. As the working-age population shrinks, the contribution of labor to economic growth inevitably turns negative. Consequently, sustaining economic growth depends entirely on productivity. The central challenge for policymakers is no longer just how to expand the workforce, but how to reconfigure the economy to produce more with fewer people through innovation and efficiency. This report analyzes the impact of demographic changes on Korea's productivity, drawing lessons from Japan’s experience and utilizing economic simulations. It explores how aging affects investment incentives and why “intangible assets”—such as technology, software, and organizational know-how—are critical for Korea's economic survival. Furthermore, it highlights how global financial conditions can act as a buffer for Korea's open economy.
Topic:
Demographics, Economic Growth, Labor Market, and Productivity
Political Geography:
Japan, Asia, and South Korea

25. Pakistan’s Brain Drain or Brain Gain?

Author:
Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS)
Publication Date:
05-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS)
Abstract:
Pakistan’s migration story cannot be accurately understood through the simple binary of “brain drain” and “brain gain”. The evidence instead points to a more complex reality in which Pakistan continues to send large numbers of workers abroad, particularly to the labour markets of the Gulf, while also experiencing increasing outward mobility among students and highly skilled professionals. This produces a mixed set of outcomes for the country. On the one hand, migration generates substantial economic benefits through remittances and through the wider connections of the diaspora. On the other hand, it can impose serious costs in sectors where skilled workers are already in short supply and cannot be easily replaced. The central policy question, therefore, is not merely how many Pakistanis are leaving, but rather who is leaving, from which sectors, and whether Pakistan possesses the capacity to retain, replace, or later re-engage that talent. Current data indicate that highly skilled migrants still constitute a minority of total registered outflows; for this reason, claims of a universal elite exodus are often overstated. However, the increasing departure of skilled workers in critical sectors such as healthcare, together with the rise in student migration, points to genuine longterm risks to state capacity, service delivery, and the domestic return on educational investment. The causes of outward migration are largely structural in nature. Rapid labour force growth, high youth unemployment, widespread informality, inflation, poor job quality, insecurity, and terrorism all intensify the pressure to leave. Migration networks, study pathways, and household strategies supported by remittances then make emigration easier, more accessible, and more socially normalised. In this context, migration is functioning less as the product of a strong domestic opportunity structure and more as part of Pakistan’s wider model of economic survival. Remittances constitute the strongest argument in favour of “brain gain”, yet they should be treated as a conditional benefit rather than a full offset to the loss of human capital. They provide vital support to households and to the country’s foreign exchange position, but they do not automatically produce productive investment, export growth, innovation, or return migration. If dependence on remittances is poorly managed, it may deepen structural reliance and delay necessary reform. Policy should therefore avoid coercive attempts to prevent migration and should instead seek to reduce the pressures that make departure necessary in the first place. The priority ought to be to move from one-way emigration towards circular migration and genuine brain gain through the creation of better jobs at home, the upgrading of skills, the support of return and reintegration, the channelling of diaspora investment into productive sectors, and the strengthening of security and the rule of law. Success should be measured not only in terms of remittance volumes, but also by whether Pakistan improves domestic opportunity, retains key professionals, attracts returning expertise, and transforms migration from a mechanism of survival into a driver of long-term development.
Topic:
Migration, Brain Drain, and Labor Market
Political Geography:
Pakistan and South Asia

26. Pakistan's National Commission for Minorities Rights Act 2025

Author:
Zain Zaigham Khan
Publication Date:
02-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Pak Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS)
Abstract:
Pakistan’s Constitution provides explicit safeguards for religious minorities; however, a persistent gap remains between formal guarantees and lived realities. This implementation deficit has left non-Muslim communities vulnerable to discrimination, violence, and unequal treatment. Over time, the disconnect became politically untenable, particularly following major incidents such as the September 2013 Peshawar church bombing and the Supreme Court’s landmark June 2014 judgment, which directed the state to establish durable institutional mechanisms for minority protection. Subsequent measures, including the May 2020 executive order–based commission under the Ministry of Religious Affairs, were widely criticised as inadequate due to limited authority, weak independence, and representational deficiencies, notably the exclusion of Ahmadi representatives. By 2024–25, sustained domestic civil society advocacy and increasing external scrutiny converged around the need for a statutory framework, generating the momentum that culminated in the enactment of the Minorities Protection Act. The Act’s principal institutional innovation is the creation of a permanent, statutory National Commission for Minorities’ Rights (NCMR), mandated to operate nationwide. The NCMR is tasked with monitoring constitutional safeguards, reviewing laws and policies for discriminatory effects, receiving complaints, and conducting inquiries supported by civil court–like powers to compel information and participation. It is further expected to convert findings into reform proposals and report on minority rights conditions through formal parliamentary oversight mechanisms. Nevertheless, the Act is subject to significant structural constraints. The NCMR lacks enforcement authority, cannot initiate prosecutions, and issues recommendations that are non-binding, rendering its effectiveness contingent on political will and institutional follow-through. Key implementation risks include politicization through appointments and resource allocation, inadequate or punitive budgeting, limited investigative capacity, and insufficient provincial reach. If these risks are not addressed, the commission risks functioning primarily as a documentation body rather than as an effective instrument for minority protection in practice.
Topic:
Religion, Minorities, Discrimination, Institutions, and Protection
Political Geography:
Pakistan and South Asia

27. Ecological Federalism: Ethical Frameworks for Domestic Climate Migration

Author:
Preston Ferraiuolo and Kate Voltz
Publication Date:
06-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Liechtenstein Institute on Self-Determination, Princeton University
Abstract:
Moving from international climate migration to domestic climate migration within the United States, this brief argues that intensifying climate risks will increasingly motivate internal relocation. It develops a framework of ecological federalism that calls for institutionalized resettlement systems, support for communities to migrate together where possible, and protections for original residents in receiving communities.
Topic:
Climate Change, Migration, Resettlement, and Ecological Federalism
Political Geography:
Global Focus

28. Where is AI in GDP statistics? Subtitle Filling the measurement gap

Author:
Anton Korinek
Publication Date:
05-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE)
Abstract:
Quality-adjusted AI production in the United States grew at over 2,000 percent per year in 2024 and 2025, driven by three compounding forces: expanding data-center capacity, hardware efficiency gains, and—the largest of the three—algorithmic progress. Treating the AI sector as a coherent economic entity yields preliminary estimates of nominal AI GDP at approximately $250 billion in 2025, growing at roughly 2,600 percent per year in quality-adjusted real terms. National economic statistics accounts were not designed to track this kind of activity. Statistics agencies should begin developing AI-focused satellite accounts now, before the measurement gap becomes a policy gap. Body The AI economy in the United States has been growing at an unprecedented rate, but this extraordinary growth is largely invisible in conventional GDP statistics. The authors propose developing an “AI GDP” framework to better measure AI’s growing role in the economy.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Economic Growth, Artificial Intelligence, and Productivity
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

29. Taking geopolitically motivated US swap lines too far would harm the dollar and Fed independence

Author:
Adnan Mazarei and Maurice Obstfeld
Publication Date:
06-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE)
Abstract:
Over the past century, the United States has provided dollar liquidity abroad through both the US Treasury and the Federal Reserve, but the appropriate mode of liquidity injection depends on the economic, financial, and geopolitical contexts. The Treasury is the more appropriate lending conduit when geopolitical concerns dominate, while Fed dollar provision should primarily be targeted toward global stability objectives and be more insulated from short-term foreign policy motives. Up to now, political abuses of these foreign lending channels have been constrained to some degree by laws, norms, and intergovernmental understandings, but adherence can no longer be assumed, so more formal guardrails are needed.
Topic:
Financial Crisis, Federal Reserve, Geopolitics, and Central Bank
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

30. Strengthening Project Vault: The US plan to stockpile critical minerals

Author:
Cullen S. Hendrix
Publication Date:
05-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE)
Abstract:
The United States depends heavily on imported critical minerals, including rare earth elements, needed for semiconductors, renewable energy, AI expansion, and defense systems. Because supply disruptions could seriously harm the economy and national security, the US government has launched Project Vault, a $12 billion public-private program to stockpile emergency supplies of critical minerals. Funded by a $10 billion EXIM Bank loan and $2 billion in private capital, the project is aimed at reducing reliance on foreign suppliers, particularly China, and protecting American—and eventually allied-country—manufacturers from shortages. Project Vault’s design, however, raises important questions about its durability and day-to-day operations.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Commodities, Artificial Intelligence, and Supply Chains
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

31. Climate Governance Through a Justice Lens in Bangladesh

Author:
International Centre for Climate Change and Development (ICCCAD)
Publication Date:
04-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Centre for Climate Change and Development (ICCCAD)
Abstract:
This policy brief draws lessons from the Governance for Climate Resilience (G4CR) initiative in coastal Bangladesh , showing that nature-based solutions work best when combined with inclusive governance and locally led adaptation. Evidence from Munshiganj Union, Shyamnagar highlights how restoring canals as climate-resilience commons can improve freshwater access, support agriculture, revive ecosystems, and strengthen community resilience while addressing unequal power dynamics and elite capture of resources.
Topic:
Climate Change, Justice, Resilience, and Climate Governance
Political Geography:
Bangladesh and South Asia

32. From alignment to action: Building a durable US-Argentina critical minerals partnership

Author:
Reed Blakemore, Alexis Harmon, and Ignacio Albe
Publication Date:
04-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
For decades, Argentina has been viewed as a mining opportunity that never quite materialized. Now, Argentina’s mining sector is evolving from a speculative frontier to an active, contested space—one where the United States has a clear opportunity. Both countries are confronting different sides of the same challenge. Argentina must translate its mineral wealth into sustained investment and economic growth, while the United States must secure reliable external sources of the materials its economy increasingly depends on. Where these needs intersect, a strategic opportunity is emerging. This report examines Argentina at an inflection point. After decades of policy volatility and stalled development, recent reforms under President Javier Milei, including the Incentive Regime for Large Investments (RIGI), are beginning to shift investor sentiment. At the same time, Argentina has signaled clear interest in deepening ties with the United States, including through a new bilateral framework that prioritizes critical minerals cooperation. Yet this opportunity is not guaranteed. Infrastructure gaps, energy constraints, and complex provincial dynamics continue to shape project development. Meanwhile, ownership structures and supply chain relationships for lithium and copper are being set now in ways that will influence market alignment for decades. Against this backdrop, Argentina is a critical test case for US economic engagement in regional mineral supply chains. This report outlines how coordinated deployment of US policy and financing tools can help unlock investment while supporting Argentina’s development priorities, including infrastructure expansion and greater local value creation. Ultimately, the case for deeper US–Argentina cooperation is grounded in mutual benefit. For Argentina, it offers a pathway to convert mineral wealth into durable growth. For the United States, it provides access to essential inputs, expanded commercial opportunities, and a chance to demonstrate that its long-term partnerships can deliver.
Topic:
Bilateral Relations, Partnerships, Economic Growth, Mining, Energy, and Critical Minerals
Political Geography:
Argentina, South America, North America, and United States of America

33. Standardizing carbon accounting worldwide with a single, robust, cost-effective system

Author:
Vincent Aussilloux, Yann Coatanlem, and Karthik Ramanna
Publication Date:
02-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
Developed economies aren’t just underinvesting in the climate transition—they are missing the mark by an order of magnitude. Because green financing is often characterized as underperforming, the capital they do deploy rarely reaches the projects or regions where it’s needed most. But decarbonization doesn’t have to be a synonym for “high risk.” The key to unlocking high-impact, high-return investment lies in better risk management. Measuring a project’s carbon footprint with greater accuracy will mitigate the guesswork that keeps capital on the sidelines. The authors advocate for the Climate Club, an intergovernmental decarbonization forum, to select a single, robust, and cost-effective method for computing products’ carbon footprint. The framework would provide the rigor required to significantly scale climate finance and drive energy security.
Topic:
Climate Change, Climate Finance, Carbon Emissions, Decarbonization, Energy, Energy Transition, and Energy Markets
Political Geography:
Global Focus and United States of America

34. A US strategy for energy competition with China in emerging markets

Author:
Steven Burns
Publication Date:
04-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
Emerging economies are set to drive the largest share of energy demand growth over the next two decades, making them a central arena for competition over influence in the future of global energy systems. China has positioned itself as the dominant partner for energy and infrastructure development across the Global South, in part by pairing state-backed finance with turnkey project delivery, which allows Chinese firms to shape technical standards and financing norms while securing long-term positions in future procurement and service markets. The United States can compete more effectively by organizing its financing, project development, and technical capabilities into a coherent offer that is closer to the speed and simplicity of competing models, while preserving the transparency and predictability on which partners rely.
Topic:
Markets, Governance, Strategic Competition, Energy, and Energy Markets
Political Geography:
China, Asia, North America, and United States of America

35. Necessary Neighbors: Poland and Ukraine Must Stabilize Their Strained Partnership

Author:
Yuliia Korotia
Publication Date:
01-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
Since the beginning of Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022, Polish-Ukrainian relations have moved from a phase of exceptional solidarity to one of mounting tension and deepening structural strain. What initially seemed to be a long-term strategic partnership grounded in shared security interests has evolved into a more fragmented and fragile, at times almost hostile, relationship. This shift, visible across political, economic, and social dimensions, risks undermining not only bilateral cooperation but also the broader foundations of regional stability at a moment of ongoing war, strategic uncertainty in Europe, and a potentially antagonistic transatlantic relationship. If Poland and Ukraine fail to adopt a more realistic, constructive, and mutually attentive approach to the partnership, their cooperation will weaken in ways that directly affect military logistics, EU cohesion, regional resilience, and resistance to hybrid threats. Understanding how the relationship has changed, and what deeper dynamics are driving this, is essential for assessing the risks ahead and identifying pathways to improve the relationship.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Bilateral Relations, European Union, Russia-Ukraine War, and Strategic Partnerships
Political Geography:
Europe, Ukraine, and Poland

36. Lost in Definition: How Confusion over Agentic AI Risks Undermining U.S. Governance Frameworks

Author:
Yasir Atalan, Ian Reynolds, and Benjamin Jensen
Publication Date:
01-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Abstract:
“Agentic AI” is an umbrella term that covers a wide range of systems from basic chat assistants to complex autonomous workflows. This ambiguity risks undermining U.S. governance frameworks and creating procurement vulnerabilities that expose organizations to mismatched capabilities and unaccounted risks. If the same vague word is applied to a helpful chatbot and a combat-ready swarm, the United States could accidentally deploy a system with the power to start an operation before that system understands the context or risks involved. The danger is not that the AI lacks intelligence, but that it lacks judgment; a system might be smart enough to execute a task perfectly yet fail to realize that a sudden change in the local situation makes that task a catastrophic mistake. This is particularly critical in national security environments where decisionmaking stakes are high. There is a need for clearer context charts for AI workflows so that commanders know exactly which tasks a machine can handle alone and exactly which who is responsible if the machine makes a mistake. The U.S. government must establish a relational, capability-based taxonomy that specifies where systems sit in workflows, what authorities they exercise, and how accountability is distributed. This approach shifts acquisition and oversight from a narrow focus on technical features to understanding broad organizational impact and ensuring evaluation matches real operational risk.
Topic:
Governance, Cybersecurity, Geopolitics, Artificial Intelligence, Economic Security, and Defense Spending
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

37. The Rise of “Watt’s Law” and Why Power Could Put a Ceiling on American Innovation

Author:
Maryam Cope
Publication Date:
02-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Abstract:
A foundational advantage of the U.S. digital economy is weakening. For decades, Moore’s Law and Dennard scaling delivered steady improvements in computing performance while keeping energy costs manageable and underpinning productivity growth, industrial competitiveness, and national security capabilities. AI workloads upend these assumptions. Modern AI systems depend on massive parallelism, continuous data movement, and sustained operation across large clusters, making energy utilization and availability more important than peak chip performance. This shift defines the emergence of “Watt’s Law.” Under Watt’s Law, AI capability scales with available power growth multiplied by system-wide innovation driven by full-stack optimization across hardware, software, networking, and operations. This can be measured by growth in tokens per joule of energy. Power is now the significant binding constraint on AI progress. National competitive advantage increasingly depends on who can most efficiently convert electricity into sustained, real-world AI output, rather than who builds the smallest transistors. The implications are strategic. Failure to adapt to a power-constrained scaling regime risks forfeiting a key source of productivity growth and long-term advantage in AI-enabled economic and national security capabilities. It also has implications for U.S. partnerships with energy-rich allies.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Cybersecurity, Innovation, Artificial Intelligence, and Sustainability
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

38. China’s Solar Industry Is in Upheaval—The Effects Will Be Global

Author:
Michael Davidson and Sandy Qian
Publication Date:
03-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Abstract:
Over the past few years, China’s solar industry has entered a period of intense upheaval. Price wars and margin compression have forced industry leaders—including Jinko Solar, Trina Solar, and JA Solar—to report significant losses. These firms, along with LONGi Green Energy and Tongwei—the industry’s top five—slashed their workforce by over 30 percent in 2024. The market is facing industry consolidation and exits not seen in over a decade, as over 40 smaller firms have filed for bankruptcy, been acquired, or exited the market. Chinese regulators are accelerating this process, which will have ripple effects across global solar markets. Several critical questions arise: Does this phase erode China’s leadership in solar, or entrench it further? Is it a window for others to close the gap, or a prelude to deeper market displacement? And when the current wave of capacity consolidation settles, what will the next global competitive order look like? The answer is already emerging. Rather than opening space for rivals to catch up, the current shocks are forging a more resilient Chinese solar core. By embedding deeper into global value chains and securing a technological lead, China is effectively reshaping the industry’s future trajectory to its own long-term advantage.
Topic:
Sustainability, Industry, Solar Power, and Energy
Political Geography:
China and Asia

39. Practical H-1B Reforms to Serve U.S. Economic Interests

Author:
Philip Luck and Thibault Denamiel
Publication Date:
02-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Abstract:
In its first year, the second Trump administration has implemented substantial changes to the H-1B immigration program. Some of these changes will create significant economic harm; others have the potential to improve efficiency and support industrial policy goals, with further adjustments. In September 2025, the administration announced a $100,000 fee on new petitions for H-1B visas outside of the United States, a likely prohibitive increase in costs for many firms seeking to hire skilled immigrant labor. In parallel, the administration released a final rule last December to increase the visa lottery system’s allocation efficiency. The administration’s lottery reform would benefit from additional changes to better distribute the economic dividends of skilled immigration to underserved geographies and priority sectors. Such policy changes are critically important to U.S. competitiveness, given the program’s track record of success in attracting global talent and driving economic growth. To strengthen the United States’ technological advantage, innovation ecosystem, and economic prosperity, policymakers should look to expand the H-1B program and reform its incentives while limiting costly new barriers to its use.
Topic:
Reform, Innovation, Economic Security, Immigration Policy, and H-1B Visa
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

40. Energy Infrastructure and the Defense Industrial Base

Author:
Joseph Majkut, Alexander Palmer, and Raj Sawhney
Publication Date:
03-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Abstract:
Can the energy infrastructure serving the U.S. defense industrial base sustain production under mobilization? This paper focuses on three scenarios for mobilization consistent with baseline production, defense buildup, and peer war. Using embodied energy methods, the research team estimates that war production rates would require 17.4 petajoules (PJ) of energy annually, a relatively small amount nationally, but one that would need to be concentrated at facilities in already stressed grid regions. Facilities for the defense-critical production of steel, aluminum, titanium, and semiconductors are clustered in regions already facing eroding reserve margins and surging data center demands. Natural gas deliverability constraints compound these risks, as key facilities depend on gas both as direct fuel and as the primary source of regional electricity generation. This paper recommends extending defense-critical electric infrastructure designations to industrial nodes, creating dedicated permitting and finance pathways to facilitate energy production, and integrating energy resilience into supply chain risk assessments.
Topic:
Climate Change, Energy Policy, Infrastructure, Geopolitics, Sustainability, and Defense Industry
Political Geography:
Global Focus

41. Russia’s Grinding War in Ukraine: Massive Losses and Tiny Gains for a Declining Power

Author:
Seth G. Jones and Riley McCabe
Publication Date:
01-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Abstract:
Despite claims of battlefield momentum in Ukraine, the data shows that Russia is paying an extraordinary price for minimal gains and is in decline as a major power. Since February 2022, Russian forces have suffered nearly 1.2 million casualties, more losses than any major power in any war since World War II. At current rates, combined Russian and Ukrainian casualties could reach 2 million by the spring of 2026. After seizing the initiative in 2024, Russian forces have advanced at an average rate of between 15 and 70 meters per day in their most prominent offensives, slower than almost any major offensive campaign in any war in the last century. Meanwhile, Russia’s war economy is under mounting strain, with manufacturing declining, slowing growth of 0.6 percent in 2025, and no globally competitive technology firms to help drive long-term productivity.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Economics, Intelligence, Science and Technology, Armed Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

42. Trump’s New Nuclear Architecture for Modernization and Arms Control

Author:
Heather Williams and Nicholas Adamopoulos
Publication Date:
03-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
Abstract:
Expanding upon the National Defense Strategy (NDS), Under Secretary of State for Arms Control Thomas DiNanno recently announced a new nuclear architecture “that addresses the threats of today, not those of a bygone era,” including nonstrategic nuclear weapons (NSNWs) and China’s growing nuclear arsenal. Facing this increasingly volatile security environment, the United States under the Trump administration must simultaneously modernize its nuclear arsenal and pursue arms control and risk reduction measures. To deter adversaries and manage escalation especially in theater conflicts, the United States may need to diversify and expand its nuclear arsenal, including by investing in nuclear-capable standoff weapons. Following this new architecture, the administration should also continue to work toward arms control agreements with both China and Russia, including risk reduction measures, such as a Presidential Nuclear Summit.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Deterrence, Modernization, and Donald Trump
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

43. The Agency of Middle Powers in a Fragmented and Polarised World

Author:
Thomas Greminger
Publication Date:
01-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP)
Abstract:
The international system is entering a period of intensified fragmentation and geopolitical polarisation. Competition among China, Russia, and the United States is reshaping the global order and redefining spheres of influence. These dynamics create both challenges and opportunities for middle powers, which must navigate contested spaces where alignment with one great power can generate tensions with others. Middle powers face a delicate balance: they seek to preserve their autonomy, influence multilateral institutions and maintain credibility in international networks, and their choices whether to align with a particular great power, hedge their international relationship bets, or engage in principled diplomacy can either stabilise fragmented regions or amplify systemic competition. Yet debates about the future of the international order tend to focus on great powers and institutional reform, leaving the behaviour of middle powers under-explored. This Policy Brief examines how middle powers can exercise strategic autonomy and influence in a fragmented world. It emphasises behaviour, relational positioning, and policy choices rather than material capacity alone by analysing how middle powers balance principles with pragmatism; manage geography and alignment; and engage in bridge-building, coalition-building, and mediation. It then assesses their capacity to stabilise regional and global orders, support multilateralism, and enhance systemic resilience.
Topic:
Geopolitics, Multilateralism, Strategic Competition, Polarization, and Middle Powers
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Asia, Global Focus, and United States of America

44. Predicting protest participation: Insights from the year before Kenya’s 2024 anti-tax demonstrations

Author:
Daniel Iberi and Kamal Yakubu
Publication Date:
02-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Afrobarometer
Abstract:
Protests – often described as “unconventional” or “non-institutional” forms of political participation (Barnes & Kaase, 1979; Hooghe & Marien, 2013) – have increased markedly across Africa since 2010, a trend sometimes referred to as the continent’s “third wave of protests” (Mueller, 2018; Najimdeen, 2024). Protests such as South Africa’s #RhodesMustFall (2015) and #FeesMustFall (2016), Zimbabwe’s #ThisFlag protests (2016), Nigeria’s #EndSARS demonstrations (2020), and Madagascar’s 2025 demonstrations that toppled President Andry Rajoelina illustrate both the breadth and political significance of this wave (Fihlani, 2019; Lawal, 2024; Princewill, 2025). In Kenya, patterns of protest participation have evolved considerably over the past two decades. While the country has experienced repeated episodes of mass protest – most notably around contested elections in 2007, 2013, and 2017 – the character of protest activity has shifted, with recent protests increasingly centred on economic grievances, cost-of-living pressures, and perceptions of fiscal injustice rather than electoral disputes.
Topic:
Economics, Protests, Tax Systems, and Vulnerability
Political Geography:
Kenya and Africa

45. Democracy and its discontented: What drives demand for democracy in South Africa?

Author:
Rehan Visser
Publication Date:
04-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Afrobarometer
Abstract:
Support for democracy rests on a range of foundations. Citizens may value democracy intrinsically, as the most legitimate form of rule regardless of outcomes, or instrumentally, as a system judged by its capacity to deliver material well-being, security, and effective governance. Understanding which of these logics predominates is central to assessing the resilience of democratic regimes. In the early years after the end of White-minority rule, South Africans were more likely than their continental peers to evaluate democracy in material terms, valuing it for what it could deliver rather than for its inherent virtues. Attitudes were closely tied to assessments of government performance and expectations of improvements in quality of life (Bratton & Mattes, 2001). As the regime matured, delivery of political goods entered the equation (Mattes, 2012). A generation after apartheid’s end, it is worth returning to this question: Is demand for democracy in South Africa still performance-driven?
Topic:
Government, Governance, Democracy, and Resilience
Political Geography:
Africa and South Africa

46. Pressure points: Africa’s health systems amid global aid contraction

Author:
Joseph Asunka, Boniface Dulani, and Kamal Yakubu
Publication Date:
04-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Afrobarometer
Abstract:
Since the COVID-19 pandemic, African governments have been compelled to reassess how best to protect hard-won public health gains while ensuring equitable and reliable care. These reassessments are taking place against a background of shifting geopolitical alignments, tightening fiscal space, and growing public expectations of quality public services. This reckoning intensified in 2025 with the disbanding of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the cancellation of major foreign-funded health programmes, effectively dismantling one of the pillars of Africa’s health-support architecture.
Topic:
Health, Foreign Aid, Social Services, Public Health, USAID, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Africa, North America, and United States of America

47. Global development policy and the New World Disorder: the Trump Administration's delivery of a high-voltage shockwave to multilateral norms, institutional commitments and long-standing principles

Author:
Stephan Klingebiel and Andy Sumner
Publication Date:
01-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS)
Abstract:
Global development policy is a particularly revealing field in which the Trump administration combines crude transactionalism with a high level of ideological commitment, namely an authoritarian libertarianism oriented toward elite interests. This is coupled with, at times, a chaotic absence of tactical or strategic coherence. With Trump's return to the White House in January 2025, a significant phase in international affairs, including global development policy, began. This policy brief traces the evolution of the US approach to development cooperation and exposes how Trump's approach represents an overtly aggressive assault, delivering a high voltage shockwave to global sustainable development policy, undermining multilateral norms, institutional commitments and long-standing principles of international solidarity. The United States (US) has played a decisive role in the conception and evolution of global development policy since the mid-20th century. From the establishment of the post-Second World War order onward, the US shaped the normative, political and organizational foundations of development cooperation, often setting agendas, defining standards, and providing leadership and personnel for key multilateral institutions. Early reconstruction efforts such as the Marshall Plan and the establishment of the World Bank embedded development within a broader framework of power politics, positioning aid as both a tool of reconstruction and geopolitical influence. Since January 2025, US development cooperation has undergone a dramatic rupture. The administration rapidly withdrew from multilateral institutions, cut budgets, and de facto dissolved USAID, transferring residual functions to the State Department. This shift was accompanied by conspiracy narratives and an explicit rejection of multilateral norms, marking a sharp departure from previous Republican and Democratic approaches alike. The brief conceptualises this shift as the emergence of a “New Washington Dissensus”: a model of transactional, nationalist development cooperation that treats aid as an instrument of power rather than a global public good. Under this paradigm, development engagement is ideologically conditional, hostile to climate and equity agendas, oriented toward migration control, and explicitly transactional. The Trump administration's National Security Strategy (December 2025) is consistent with this in the sense that it frames an “America First” approach that narrows US priorities to “core, vital national interests” and places strong emphasis on Western Hemisphere pre-eminence via a stated “Trump Corollary” to the Monroe Doctrine. For global development, foreign assistance and development finance are thus instruments of strategic competition and commercial diplomacy. US agencies are mobilized to back US commercial positioning. The consequences are dramatic and systemic. The US retreat has destabilized the global development architecture and intensified geopolitical fragmentation. For many countries in the Global South, this represents a watershed moment, creating both new room for maneuver and new dependencies as states pursue multi-alignment strategies amid intensifying great-power rivalry. At the same time, humanitarian impacts are severe. Overall, the brief concludes that development policy has entered a new phase, which is narrower, more instrumental and overtly geopolitical,and is reshaping not only US engagement but the future of global development policy itself.
Topic:
Development, Multilateralism, Institutions, Norms, and Donald Trump
Political Geography:
Global Focus and United States of America

48. Making global benefits pay: the World Bank reform to support global public goods

Author:
Jakob Schwab
Publication Date:
01-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Institute of Development and Sustainability (IDOS)
Abstract:
Global public goods (GPGs) are goods that are produced locally but have global effects. GPGs are essential for securing global development. The climate and biodiversity crises, pandemics, as well as fragility, conflict and violence are threatening livelihoods and well-being around the world, and addressing them would have enormous positive economic and social effects. However, the cross-border externalities involved are not being fully taken into account by countries, and hence these GPGs are still underprovided compared with what would be globally optimal. One year ago, the World Bank launched the Framework for Financial Incentives (FFI) to strengthen the support of GPGs in its operations. This novel instrument encourages countries to implement investment projects and policies that have positive spillovers to other countries by offering targeted financial incentives. As a core element of the World Bank's Evolution reform, the FFI reflects the recognition that relatively modest investments in client countries can generate substantial global benefits – for other developing and emerging economies as well as for the Bank's shareholder countries. Its challenges lie in incorporating the non-financial aspects of GPGs and the multi-faceted motivations to provide them in bankable operations. This policy brief discusses the relevance of GPGs for development and presents the World Bank's approach to supporting their provision in client countries through the FFI. The key takeaways are: • GPGs are not all those that are commonly shared or agreed upon as goals but are defined by the specific problem structure that the involved cross-border externalities entail. • Investment in GPGs can generate substantial benefits – not only for developing and emerging economies, but also for high-income countries that make up the World Bank's largest shareholders. Consequently, both out of enlightened self-interest and as a cost-effective way to advance global sustainable development at a time when international development budgets are undergoing significant reductions, shareholder countries should increase their contributions to the FFI. This applies in particular to those provided to the Livable Planet Fund, which provides the essential grant financing for countries' GPG-related projects. • To retain and strengthen confidence among stakeholders, the FFI must deploy its resources efficiently. This implies offering grants only when projects' overall domestic benefits are insufficient to motivate countries to provide GPGs on their own, and extending loans instead when client countries have sufficient self-interest to ensure repayment. The assessment of costs and benefits is complex, but it should improve with experience and become increasingly standardized. To signal its effectiveness, the FFI should pursue full transparency in its allocation decisions and undertake systematic impact assessments.
Topic:
Development, World Bank, Reform, and Public Goods
Political Geography:
Global Focus

49. The decline of French agriculture in Europe

Author:
Bernard Bourget
Publication Date:
02-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:
The farmers' protests of the winter 2025-2026 are an amplified replica of those of two years ago, mainly in France, due in particular to competition between, on the one hand, the FNSEA[1] (Fédération nationale des syndicats d’exploitants agricoles) and the Young Farmers, and on the other hand, the very aggressive Coordination Rurale and the Confédération Paysanne. These protests focused on two issues: - The management of the contagious nodular dermatitis (CND) crisis, more specifically the opposition to the slaughter of all infected herds, even though this radical method has proven effective in Savoie and Haute-Savoie, where it has eradicated the disease. - The free trade agreement between the European Union and the four MERCOSUR countries (Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, and Paraguay), which is currently awaiting approval. It is also the expression of a deep unease among French farmers, who have faced a series of difficulties in recent years that have not been experienced with the same intensity by their counterparts in other Member States. The causes of these difficulties therefore need to be analyzed. In Jean-Luc Demarty’s opinion[2], the main cause is the loss of competitiveness of French agriculture on the European market, which is reflected in an increase in agricultural income in France of only 17% between 2010 and 2024, well below the European average (77%) and that of Spain (79%), Poland (86%) or Italy (170%). The reasons why the agri-food trade balance of France has collapsed must also be examined. It was only positive of 200 Million euros in 2025. In recent years, French agriculture has had to grapple with health, climate and economic crises. The health crises have affected cattle (epizootic haemorrhagic disease and contagious nodular dermatosis), sheep (bluetongue) and poultry farms (avian influenza), while pig farms are still threatened by African swine fever. Climate change is having a severe impact on French agriculture, with successive droughts, floods and spring frosts. While health and climate crises also affect agriculture in other Member States, it is in the area of foreign trade that French agriculture is clearly hardest hit, particularly by moves by China and the United States to target wines and spirits, the leading export item for the French agri-food industry. The cereal sector, which is the second largest agri-food export item, is suffering from competition from the Black Sea countries and, above all, from Russia's offensive for wheat on African markets. The Algerian market was thus lost in 2025 in the context of that country's dispute with France, while the price of wheat is currently below $200 per tonne, (below the average production cost for French farmers), and the European Commission wants to tax imports of nitrogen fertilisers from Russia and Belarus as part of the carbon border adjustment mechanism.
Topic:
Agriculture, Climate Change, European Union, Protests, Free Trade, and Health Crisis
Political Geography:
Europe and France

50. Hybrid threats: from geopolitics to internal security

Author:
Jean Mafart
Publication Date:
01-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:
Although the concept of hybrid threats is now widely accepted despite its rather vague nature, there remains a blind spot in European discussions and strategic thinking: the phenomenon is still rarely addressed from the perspective of internal security policy. It has long been recognised that hybrid threats – whether cyberattacks, arson, disinformation, interference in electoral processes or the exploitation of migration flows – can strike within our borders. The European Union acknowledged this: the Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) committees regularly address the issue and the Commission gives it considerable attention in its internal security strategy of April 2025. In fact, it is mainly on the basis of hybrid threats that the document justifies the proposal to double the staff of Europol. However, the emergence of these threats in the internal security policies of the EU and its Member States raises important questions, both in terms of principles and operations, most of which remain unanswered. It is instructive to browse through the wealth of analytical and policy papers available on hybrid threats: the geopolitical dimension of the phenomenon still predominates, and while authors sometimes address the resilience of European states and societies, there is almost nothing to be found on how to respond to these threats in the context of internal security policy or on the necessary adaptation of the instruments of this policy. In other words, it is as if the concept of hybrid threats, which originally concerned defence and foreign policy circles, had forcefully found its way into European internal security policy and had not yet been fully assimilated into the internal sphere. If we add to this the fact that European internal security policy itself remains little known despite the considerable proportions it has taken on in recent decades, the current state of strategic thinking is not conducive to the consolidation of a strategy to deal with hybrid threats in their internal dimension. However, a strategy of this kind would be very useful, following the example of what has long existed within NATO and the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) for the external dimension: does the issue of hybrid threats, now referred to in every context but without a coherent approach, risk leading European internal security policy astray, diverting it from its primary purpose ? and how can the competences of the Union, its Member States and other actors be harmoniously combined when hybrid threats blur the line between internal and external security, or even between national security – which is in principle the remit of the Member States – and the competences of the Union?
Topic:
Security, NATO, European Union, Geopolitics, and Hybrid Threats
Political Geography:
Europe

51. From a set of values to a normative framework: the European Union, world champion of women's rights

Author:
Helen Levy and Juliette Bachschmidt
Publication Date:
03-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:
In 2026, Europe is set to become an even stronger bastion for women's rights. A pioneer on the world stage, the European Union is translating its values into a set of guarantees to ensure the best possible situation for women. Behind certain regulations lies a political project with a new ambition: to transform the ethical values that form the very foundations of the European project into a tangible reality. In this area, European standards, which are always the result of discussions and compromises between the co-legislators – the Parliament and the Council – are proving to be a driving force for progress where decades of recommendations and good intentions have failed. The world order is being disrupted by Donald Trump's return to the White House and the rise to power of leaders who are far from committed to the cause of women and who are challenging the progress made over the last century in terms of gender equality. Against this backdrop, the European Union is seeking to uphold its core values by charting a new course based on its normative power. And so, in 2026, gender equality in Europe is set to take on a new dimension, no longer just an ideal to which everyone should aspire, but a legal obligation backed by performance requirements and, failing that, sanctions. Although imperfect, the European Union remains a bastion for women's rights. As we approach the celebration of Women's Rights Day on 8 March, the European Union can take pride in some of the steps forward it has made on behalf of women, particularly in the areas of economic empowerment, political participation and leadership, health and well-being, education and skills development.
Topic:
European Union, Women, Ethics, and Gender Equality
Political Geography:
Europe

52. EU-India Renewed Strategic Partnership and Its Significance in the Shifting Global Landscape

Author:
Karine de Vergeron
Publication Date:
04-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:
The current mandate of President Trump is radically altering the close and longstanding ties that had been forged between India and the United States over the past years as America is now moving towards a more isolationist policy. It is striking to note that the US National Defence Strategy, released last January, puts the protection of the U.S. homeland and its Western Hemisphere before confronting adversaries such as Beijing or Moscow. India is not even mentioned. This new American geostrategic priority represents a major change from former US Democrat and Republican administrations, including President Donald Trump’s first term, which had made the deterrence of China and thus, close cooperation with India, a core component of U.S. efforts. In this context of geopolitical volatility and fragmentation, the new rapprochement between India and the EU is crucially deemed to strengthen stability within the international system.
Topic:
Bilateral Relations, European Union, Geopolitics, Donald Trump, and Strategic Partnerships
Political Geography:
Europe and India

53. Hungary as a Trailblazer: the Rise of Illiberal Democracy and its Discontents

Author:
Péter Magyar
Publication Date:
03-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:
In the fast-changing political landscape of Europe, Hungary has set a controversial example of a new style of governance[1]. Viktor Orbán’s Hungary is often seen as the pioneer of illiberal democracy, rejecting liberal democratic norms in favour of centralizing power, manipulating narratives, and eroding the checks and balances of the state. Orbán’s rise and methods have had a profound impact on the political trajectories of other European nations, influencing populist leaders from Poland to Serbia, but also from France to the Netherlands. Yet, Hungary’s transformation and its broader implications for the future of European politics remain largely misunderstood by many in the West.
Topic:
Governance, Populism, Illiberal Democracy, Viktor Orbán, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
Europe and Hungary

54. Skilled immigration and the competitiveness of the European Union: attractiveness and policy options

Author:
Olena Oliinyk
Publication Date:
02-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:
Migration today remains one of the most complex and politically sensitive issues on the European agenda. It encompasses a wide range of processes: from irregular migrants and forced displacement caused by wars and climate crises to the mobility of students, entrepreneurs, and skilled professionals. This multidimensional nature explains why regulating migration flows within the European Union remains an exceptionally complex task that requires balancing humanitarian obligations, the controls of external borders and migratory flows, as well as labour market needs.
Topic:
Immigration, European Union, Labor Market, Migration Policy, and Skilled Migration
Political Geography:
Europe

55. Labor Market Imbalances and Immigration Policies

Author:
Young-ook Jang
Publication Date:
01-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
Abstract:
Korea now faces rapid demographic decline due to ultra‑low fertility and accelerated aging. According to Statistics Korea, the population peaked at 51.75 million in 2024 and is projected to fall below 40 million by 2065. This demographic contraction is expected to intensify labor market imbalances. Several studies project widening labor shortages over the next 5–10 years. The Korea Employment Information Service (2025) suggests that the labor force will decline from 2030 and approximately 820,000 more workers will be needed to fill the labor demand by 2033. The Korea Labor Institute (2024, 2025) also estimated that a shortage of 2.98 million workers (2024–2028) will expand to 6.18 million (2025–2033). The degree of labor shortages varies by sectors and regions. ICT services, healthcare and welfare, logistics, hospitality, and agriculture are the sectors that are exposed to the highest risk of labor shortages. Some provinces are already experiencing difficulties in hiring qualified workers due to declining population. Apart from the demographic change, labor market imbalance is intensified by structural changes due to geopolitical and technological factors. Geopolitical factors—including strategic competition between the United States and China, the COVID-19 pandemic, and the Russia–Ukraine war—have heightened global supply chain instability, prompting major economies to strengthen domestic and regional competitiveness in key advanced industries such as artificial intelligence, biotechnology, semiconductors, and secondary batteries. This, combined with the decline in the economically active population across advanced economies, has exacerbated labor shortages in strategic high-tech sectors. In response, major countries are actively implementing policies to attract highly skilled foreign talent, which puts pressure on the supply of talent in Korea. Labor shortages increase production costs, reduce corporate profitability, heighten inflationary pressures, and undermine potential economic growth. Attracting more foreign labor in both skilled and unskilled occupations is increasingly being considered as a potential response to labor market imbalances, particularly labor shortages. However, several challenges remain to be addressed. These include intensifying competition among advanced economies to attract talent, conflict between free-market principles and existing (often rigid) visa regimes, and the wide-ranging economic, social, cultural, and political consequences of immigration. Resolving labor market imbalances is essential to sustaining long-term growth potential. Although foreign workers cannot fully offset aggregate labor shortages, they may be able to alleviate supply constraints in specific industries and skill categories. Promotion of labor mobility can be a plausible option as long as it is accompanied by policy measures to minimize associated side effects. Jang et al. (2025) conducted two empirical analyses to estimate the effect of immigration on the labor market imbalances. First, the study examines the impact of the free labor movement in the EU on labor market imbalances. The EU is an early adopter of immigration and a supranational entity operating one of the most advanced and proactive immigration regimes. In particular, examining the effects of the EU’s flexible and inclusive immigration policies can provide meaningful policy implications for Korea. Second, the report analyzes Korea’s Employment Permit System (EPS) to assess the extent to which domestic policy measures have contributed to alleviating labor shortages. Noting the expansion of the EPS—a low-skilled labor inflow mechanism—during the post–COVID-19 recovery phase, the study quantitatively evaluates how effectively this policy has mitigated labor shortages across regions. This brief will summarize the key methods and results of those analyses and derive policy implications from them.
Topic:
Demographics, Immigration, Economy, and Labor Market
Political Geography:
Asia and South Korea

56. Outward FDI and Hollowing-out: Towards the Strategic Reallocation of Korean Industries

Author:
Nam Seok Kim
Publication Date:
02-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
Abstract:
Following a prolonged period of negotiations under the “reciprocal tariff” regime, Korea, similar to other major exporters like the European Union and Japan, secured reduced tariff rates conditional upon committing to large-scale local investments in the United States. The U.S. administration has consistently placed the reconstruction of American manufacturing and domestic job creation at the top of its policy agenda. This commitment is so steadfast that Washington recently hinted at the possibility of re-imposing higher tariffs, citing Korea’s lukewarm implementation of the agreed-upon investment pledges. Crucially, this surge in investment is not merely a political concession but reflects a fundamental restructuring of global value chains. As geopolitical uncertainties intensify, Korean firms are pivoting from a traditional strategy of cost minimization to one of risk minimization. By establishing production bases directly within the United States, these companies aim to insulate themselves from future trade barriers and secure stable access to their most critical market, effectively decoupling their supply chains from geopolitical flashpoints. The scale of capital Korea has pledged to invest locally in the U.S. is staggering, potentially large enough to induce fundamental shifts in the valuation of the Korean won. The bilateral agreement encompasses a monumental package: USD 200 billion in direct cash investments and USD 150 billion in shipbuilding cooperation. These plans are rapidly materializing, evidenced by the U.S. government’s recent release of “America’s Maritime Action Plan,” which explicitly designates Korea as a key partner in rebuilding U.S. naval and commercial maritime capabilities. Beyond the maritime sector, this investment wave spans across Korea’s core strategic industries, including semiconductors, electric vehicle batteries, and advanced electronics. Major Korean conglomerates are rapidly breaking ground on large-scale manufacturing facilities across key U.S. states. This broad-based migration of manufacturing capacity signifies a deep integration of Korea’s industrial ecosystem with the U.S. supply chain, moving far beyond simple assembly operations to include high-value-added production processes. It is unprecedented for Korea to execute outward FDI (OFDI) of this magnitude based on a bilateral government agreement. Consequently, this unparalleled volume of capital outflow has sparked intense debate and varied projections among economists regarding its potential impact on the domestic economy.
Topic:
Foreign Direct Investment, Tariffs, Exports, Industry, and Semiconductors
Political Geography:
Asia, South Korea, and United States of America

57. Korea’s Critical Minerals Agreements: From MOUs, To Three Strategic Pillars

Author:
Wonseok Choi
Publication Date:
02-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
Abstract:
Korea’s push for critical minerals security is anchored in a broader economic security agenda that treats upstream inputs as strategic dependencies for high-tech industries (notably semiconductors and secondary batteries). In 2023, the government introduced a national strategy to secure a reliable supply of critical minerals with an explicit target of reducing Korea’s heavy reliance on imports from a small set of supplier countries—from around 80% to 50% by 2030. This strategy operationalizes “critical minerals” through a two-tier classification: 33 critical minerals selected for economic security management, and 10 strategic critical minerals designated for intensive management to stabilize supply chains for key industries. The strategy combines market intelligence and buffer capacity. It includes plans to develop a global minerals supply map and an early-warning system for supply risks, while strengthening public stockpiling—raising the coverage target to 100 days (from 54 days) for critical minerals. In parallel, Korea has sought to expand international cooperation and diversify supply sources through plurilateral platforms and bilateral arrangements, positioning diplomacy (including MOUs) as a complement to domestic preparedness. Korea has yet to establish a dedicated, legally binding instrument for critical minerals supply chain stabilization comparable to the U.S.–Japan Critical Minerals Agreement. While it maintains cooperation through existing FTAs (e.g., with Australia, Colombia, Indonesia) and various non-binding MOUs with major producers since 2021, these mechanisms are primarily declaratory or facilitative, lacking enforceable rules on investment protection and export restrictions essential for robust supply chain security. Building on these foundations, Korea’s external cooperation toolkit needs to evolve gradually from an “MOU-centered” approach toward enforceable critical minerals (or minerals) agreements. In particular, supply chain stabilization requires an agreement architecture that links core obligations to meaningful implementation and, where appropriate, dispute settlement, so as to mitigate supply chain uncertainties originating from partner countries. This brief therefore proposes three priority pillars for Korea’s next-stage minerals arrangements: (i) disciplines on export restrictive measures (potentially anchored in the goods chapter), (ii) investment and investor protection provisions (through an investment chapter or equivalent safeguards), and (iii) facilitation of workforce mobility—especially the timely movement of technical personnel essential for supply chain cooperation and project implementation.
Topic:
Markets, Treaties and Agreements, Economic Cooperation, Economic Security, and Critical Minerals
Political Geography:
Asia and South Korea

58. The Structural Transformation of U.S. Foreign Economic Policy and Its Economic Effects

Author:
Gusang Kang
Publication Date:
03-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
Abstract:
Over the past decade, U.S. foreign economic policy has undergone a structural transformation that extends beyond partisan political cycles. What initially appeared to be a temporary shift toward protectionism under the first Trump administration has consolidated into a broader orientation centered on economic security, strategic competition with China, and domestic industrial revitalization. The renegotiation of the existing trade agreements, withdrawal from multilateral frameworks, and imposition of Section 232 and Section 301 tariffs marked a clear departure from the liberal trade order that had characterized U.S. policy for decades. Rather than reversing this trajectory, the Biden administration utilized core tariff measures and expanded industrial policy through the CHIPS and Science Act and the Inflation Reduction Act, reinforcing a production-centered strategy aimed at reshaping global supply chains. At the core of this transformation lies a reconfiguration of incentives governing global capital allocation and trade patterns. The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (TCJA) fundamentally restructured the U.S. international tax regime through provisions such as GILTI, FDII, and BEAT while lowering the statutory corporate tax rate, thereby altering firms’ location and investment decisions. At the same time, Section 301 tariffs sought to change relative prices in global value chains, reduce U.S. dependence on China, and induce supply chain realignment. Together, these measures illustrate how U.S. foreign economic policy increasingly integrates trade, tax, and industrial instruments into a coherent framework of economic statecraft. Against this backdrop, this report empirically evaluates the economic effects of these policy instruments. It examines how the TCJA affected U.S. outward and inward foreign direct investment and how Section 301 tariffs influenced trade flows at the product level, particularly with respect to trade diversion involving Korea. By employing panel regression and event-study methodologies, the study aims to identify causal impacts and dynamic adjustment patterns. The findings provide evidence that recent U.S. foreign economic policy has produced measurable structural effects on global investment and trade flows, offering important implications for Korea’s strategic economic positioning.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Economy, Global Value Chains, and Structural Transformation
Political Geography:
China, Asia, South Korea, North America, and United States of America

59. Korea in the Global Innovation Network: Navigating Technological Interdependence

Author:
Jongduk Kim
Publication Date:
03-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
Abstract:
As U.S.–China competition intensifies, rivalry is also sharpening within the global knowledge system. This raises a central question: how does deepening U.S.–China tension reshape the global innovation network (GIN)—the cross-border web through which knowledge is created, shared, and recombined? Governments worldwide have long emphasized the strategic importance of science, technology, and knowledge. Yet science and technology policy has often been approached primarily as a domestic agenda. In today’s global economic environment—marked by heightened strategic competition—this perspective is increasingly incomplete. The key issues are not only how much a country invests in innovation, but also how its position within global knowledge networks is changing, how geopolitical frictions affect knowledge flows, and what strategic direction policy should take in response. This study therefore focuses on the cross-country and cross-industry structure of technology and innovation. Traditional policy approaches have tended to prioritize expanding total R&D spending. However, innovation cannot be generated by the R&D efforts of a single country, industry, or firm alone. A defining feature of innovation—often underappreciated in policy debate—is its networked and cumulative nature: advances in one sector shape the trajectory of innovation in others, often with long-run effects. Semiconductor progress, for example, does not remain within the semiconductor industry; it underpins innovation in telecommunications, computing, and automobiles. Conversely, knowledge developed in these downstream industries feeds back into semiconductor advances. These interactions occur not only within national borders but also across them, as knowledge diffuses through multiple channels linking countries and sectors. Accordingly, effective R&D allocation and innovation strategy require explicit attention to international and intersectoral “network effects.” Against this backdrop, this World Economic Brief traces how Korea and other major economies—including the United States, China, Japan, and Europe—have evolved within the global innovation network over 2000–2020. Using this network perspective, we examine (i) changing patterns of interdependence and (ii) shifts in countries’ relative positions across key technologies.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Innovation, Strategic Competition, Research and Development, and Interdependence
Political Geography:
Asia and South Korea

60. China's Overseas Production-Supply Bases: Network Structure and Implications

Author:
Jihyun Jung
Publication Date:
03-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
Abstract:
Global supply chains are undergoing structural change as the prolonged U.S.–China strategic rivalry, the normalization of geopolitical risks, and post pandemic disruptions shift the organizing principle from efficiency to stability, resilience, security, and trust. Major economies such as the United States, EU, and Japan have responded by strengthening policies for supply chain diversification, friend shoring, and strategic management of critical minerals and advanced industries. In response to these environmental changes, China is also strengthening the strategic nature of its overseas economic activities. Whereas Chinese companies' overseas expansion previously focused on market expansion or resource acquisition, it has recently shifted to a structural network expansion strategy aimed at responding to the restructuring of global supply chains. Specifically, China is expanding its global economic network by simultaneously establishing overseas production bases, supply bases, and infrastructure/logistics networks through a combined approach involving Outward Foreign Direct Investment (OFDI), overseas contracting projects, and trade activities. This strategy goes beyond merely relocating production bases overseas. China is pursuing a multi-layered strategy: strengthening global market access through overseas production bases, establishing supply bases to secure critical minerals and intermediate goods, and solidifying long-term economic footholds through infrastructure and industrial park development. This can be understood as China's strategic response to maintain its economic influence and enhance industrial competitiveness amid the global supply chain restructuring. Therefore, China's overseas expansion should be analyzed not merely as a phenomenon of increased investment, but as a process of restructuring global production and supply networks. This report approaches China's overseas economic activities from this perspective, understanding them as a strategy for building production and supply networks, and systematically classifies China’s overseas bases into three functional types and identifies core hub countries through standardized indicator analysis.
Topic:
Markets, Economy, Strategic Competition, Supply Chains, and Production
Political Geography:
China and Asia

61. China’s Growth in Transition: Structural Shifts and Medium- to Long-term Prospects

Author:
Jiyoung Moon
Publication Date:
04-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
Abstract:
Since the initiation of its reform and opening-up period, China’s economy has experienced continuous high-speed growth despite multiple cycles of expansion and contraction. While China’s economic growth rate steadily declined after peaking at 14.2% in 2007, this deceleration has been stable and predictable, consistently exceeding the Chinese government’s target rate. Recently, however, China’s economic growth trajectory has reached a critical new turning point. Both external uncertainties—including intensifying U.S.-China strategic competition, persistent geopolitical tensions, and global supply-chain fragmentation—and internal downward pressures, such as delayed real-estate recovery, local government debt issues, and rising youth unemployment, have exposed the limits of the old economic growth structure and fueled the “Peak China” narrative. Nevertheless, predictions of a sharp economic decline remain tentative. The Chinese government is actively deploying various policy efforts to create a new phase of economic growth. Major economic strategies—such as the “dual circulation strategy,” “new quality productive forces,” “consumption-led economic growth,” and “Chinese-style modernization”—along with strong policy incentives, appear well-directed toward addressing the core challenges of the economic slowdown. Given that Korea maintains deeply interconnected cooperative relationships with China across multiple sectors, a careful examination of China’s economic growth prospects and the recalibration of bilateral cooperation directions is more important than ever. This report comprehensively analyzes the structural changes in China’s economy from supply-side-side perspectives, utilizes rigorous econometric modeling to forecast medium- to long-term growth and derives strategic implications for Korea’s economy.
Topic:
International Cooperation, Reform, Economy, and Economic Growth
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and South Korea

62. Global Trends in High Debt Levels and Their Macroeconomic Implications

Author:
Hongseok Choi
Publication Date:
01-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Korea Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP)
Abstract:
In response to the unprecedented crisis triggered by the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020, governments and central banks around the world injected massive fiscal stimulus and liquidity support. These bold policy measures succeeded in averting the worst recession, but, as a consequence, the world is now facing historically high levels of debt. According to the Institute of International Finance, global debt surpassed USD 324 trillion in the first quarter of 2025—roughly three times the size of global GDP and “[a level unseen] since the Napoleonic Wars.” Moreover, global debt increased by USD 7.5 trillion during the same quarter, more than four times the quarterly average increase of USD 1.7 trillion since late 2022, indicating that the global debt problem has worsened rather than eased after the pandemic. Against this backdrop, Choi et al. (2025) reassessed the structure of the post-pandemic high-debt environment, analyzed vulnerabilities across advanced economies, emerging markets, and Korea, and derived policy implications for proactive responses. The purpose of this report is to present their key findings.
Topic:
Debt, Macroeconomics, COVID-19, Banking, and Economic Crisis
Political Geography:
Global Focus

63. Advancing Responsible AI Across NATO: Innovation and Interoperability

Author:
Ryan Jay Atkinson
Publication Date:
04-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI)
Abstract:
NATO’s first AI strategy from 2021 outlines six guiding principles: lawfulness, responsibility and accountability, explainability and traceability, reliability, governability, and bias mitigation. Together, these principles form the ethical and operational baseline guiding how NATO and its members design, deploy and govern AI in defence contexts. But the world of AI has evolved drastically since 2021. The 2024 strategy was more about practical applications, emphasizing cooperation of non-traditional defence suppliers for AI research and development with industry, academia and national defence agencies. NATO’s evolving AI strategy is part of larger initiatives toward rapid technological adaptation, innovating AI among other priority areas, including autonomous systems, with programs that support responsible AI operationalization scaling rapidly to meet the growing need for fast action on responsible AI use. Allies foster responsible AI developments that benefit from alignment with these NATO strategies and programs, building innovation clusters that are interoperable and interdisciplinary across domains.
Topic:
NATO, National Security, Geopolitics, Innovation, and Artificial Intelligence
Political Geography:
Global Focus

64. Seizing the Watershed Moment: Africa’s AI Strategy

Author:
Priya Vithani
Publication Date:
02-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI)
Abstract:
The narrative of digital sovereignty in Africa took centre stage over the course of 2024–2025, falling against the backdrop of a sizeable investment gap in the African artificial intelligence (AI) economy. While demand for investment and funding is stronger than ever, the days of traditional and transactional avenues of investment are long gone, with African-led design instead taking preference. The expected shift of major global AI and policy gatherings from the Global South to Europe and North America in 2026 threatens to stall the momentum gained by the African continent on global AI governance and policy making. Greater coordination between country-led, regional and global efforts is needed to protect the emerging African consensus on data and AI. The upcoming India AI Impact Summit in February 2026 presents a milestone to bridge the African AI consensus and global AI priorities, as well as reinforce and advance South-South collaboration on AI policy.
Topic:
Economy, Artificial Intelligence, Digital Sovereignty, and Digital Rights
Political Geography:
Africa

65. The Fourth Path: Middle-Income Countries and Prosocial AI

Author:
Cornelia C. Walther
Publication Date:
03-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Centre for International Governance Innovation (CIGI)
Abstract:
Middle-income countries, home to 75 percent of the global population, have an opportunity to pioneer a prosocial approach to regulating artificial intelligence (AI). Cornelia C. Walther argues that prosocial AI — systems tailored, trained, tested and targeted to advance human well-being and planetary health — offers a framework for these countries to take a fourth path to AI policy that avoids the pitfalls of the three current models and aligns technological development with sustainable and equitable outcomes, embedding these values from the design phase onward. This fourth path demands regional cooperation among middle-income countries to share information on AI policy experiments and their outcomes; build collective capacity; and demonstrate that prosocial innovation can drive both economic competitiveness and human development.
Topic:
Human Rights, Science and Technology, Artificial Intelligence, and Middle-Income Countries
Political Geography:
Global Focus

66. Non-Violent Parenting and Faith: Reclaiming sacred teachings for child dignity, protection, and flourishing

Author:
Selina Palm and Noor ur Rehman
Publication Date:
04-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Sexual Violence Research Initiative (SVRI)
Abstract:
This Dialogue Brief, the second in a series co-produced by SVRI’s Working Group on Faith & Violence against Children of the Faith & GBV Community of Practice, draws on practice-based insights from participants in the Working Group’s 12-week educational course, Faith and Helping Children Thrive without Violence, on non-violent parenting. Authored by Dr Selina Palm and Mr Noor ur Rehman, the brief reflects on the importance of engaging in conversations with four groups: survivors, families, theological experts, and gender experts. It recommends four key shifts for faith to become a positive resource, not a roadblock, in the shared task of addressing violent discipline and supporting non-violent parenting.
Topic:
Religion, Children, and Parenting
Political Geography:
Global Focus

67. The Ethics of Externalization in the United Kingdom, Denmark and Australia: Third-Country Resettlement and Refugee Rights

Author:
Noah Eshaghpour-Silberman, Cooper Austen, Aidan Gouley, and Alexa Marsh
Publication Date:
06-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Liechtenstein Institute on Self-Determination, Princeton University
Abstract:
Across the Global North, governments are experimenting with “externalization” policies that relocate elements of border control, asylum processing, or long-term protection beyond their territory. Focusing on the United Kingdom, Denmark, and Australia, this brief argues that third-country processing or resettlement can be justified only under demanding, independently verified conditions concerning state capacity, rule of law, non-refoulement, legal protection, and genuine integration in the receiving country.
Topic:
Border Control, Refugees, Resettlement, Asylum, and Externalization
Political Geography:
United Kingdom, Denmark, and Australia

68. Partnership or Pressure: The Australia-Nauru Relationship

Author:
Alayshja Bable, TJ Eyerman, Willem Maniago, Justin Tim, Danielle Williams, and Laura Zhang
Publication Date:
06-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Liechtenstein Institute on Self-Determination, Princeton University
Abstract:
Australia’s September 2025 agreement with Nauru to transfer members of the “NZYQ cohort” marked a consequential shift in Australian migration policy after the High Court’s 2023 ruling against indefinite immigration detention where there is no real prospect of removal. The brief develops an ethical framework for evaluating such arrangements, focusing on voluntariness, due process, proportionality, safety and dignity, social unity, shared responsibility, and accountability.
Topic:
Bilateral Relations, Asylum, Migration Policy, and Immigration Detention
Political Geography:
Australia and Nauru

69. A More Transparent Alternative: Re-evaluating Canada’s Alternatives to Detention (ATD) Model

Author:
Amna Cesic, Elaine Gao, Aidan Moes, and Vaishnavi Murthy
Publication Date:
06-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Liechtenstein Institute on Self-Determination, Princeton University
Abstract:
Canada’s Alternatives to Detention system is intended to make immigration detention a last resort by releasing individuals into community supervision or electronic monitoring. This brief argues that ATD can blur the boundary between carceral and community spaces and proposes reforms to improve transparency, accountability, oversight, and access to less restrictive forms of support.
Topic:
Immigration, Detention, Monitoring, and Migration Policy
Political Geography:
Canada and North America

70. Anchoring Ukraine’s postwar recovery with a US-Ukraine free trade agreement

Author:
Robert Z. Lawrence
Publication Date:
03-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE)
Abstract:
An FTA with the United States would help Ukraine achieve stronger investor protections, regulatory transparency, and anticorruption and dispute settlement mechanisms that anchor private investment needed to support reconstruction and sustain long-term growth. For the United States, Ukraine offers a strategically valuable production platform: a large, skilled workforce; a legacy industrial base; and significant reserves of critical minerals, metals, and agricultural inputs needed for energy transition, defense, and supply chain resilience. Passage of a US-Ukraine FTA in Congress could be controversial because it would bundle together some of the most contentious issues in US trade politics—agriculture, investor protection, government procurement, digital rules, and market access—into one high-salience vote. Policymakers could start by advancing more limited agreements as precursors to a comprehensive FTA. Accession to the European Union will be the core of Ukraine’s reconstruction strategy, implying that a US-Ukraine FTA should be designed to complement, rather than compete with, EU integration. Body Ukraine’s reconstruction is often framed as a financing challenge, but the bigger challenge is institutional: Ukraine must credibly reassure domestic and foreign investors that market-oriented rules, transparent regulation, private property protection, and contract enforcement will prevail and that its territorial integrity will be secure. A free trade agreement with the United States can help Ukraine provide this assurance.
Topic:
Economic Growth, Trade Policy, Russia-Ukraine War, and Free Trade Agreements
Political Geography:
Europe, Ukraine, North America, and United States of America

71. The European Union and the war in Ukraine: More money, but not more Europe

Author:
Jacob Funk Kirkegaard
Publication Date:
01-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE)
Abstract:
Despite the increasingly direct military threat from Russia and a weakening US commitment to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the European Union’s 27 member states have proven unwilling to harness their union to provide a common defense. Instead, EU members have responded individually, based on their own national interests and circumstances, such as their geographic proximity to Russia and levels of government debt. Failure to act collectively represents a wasted opportunity with potentially far-reaching and negative implications for the prospects of any further meaningful EU institutional integration. This Policy Brief analyzes the drivers of rearmament, especially military aid to Ukraine, and the ways in which such aid is increasingly being provided by different “coalitions of the willing” consisting of subsets of EU members and other countries, working with the Ukrainian military industrial sector. Kirkegaard argues that this approach will likely reduce the European Union to a peripheral role in providing for the continent’s military defense and national security. Instead, the European Union’s principal role will be that of a financier, limited to providing financial support for Ukraine, increasing sanctions pressure on Russia, overseeing Kyiv’s accession to the European Union, and trying to carve out a coordinating role in EU defense-related research and development. Rather than the European Union as a single institution, subsets of EU members together with nonmembers will drive European rearmament and the establishment of a largely independent long-term military deterrent to Russia.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, NATO, European Union, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

72. The America First investment pledges: How are they structured and are they realistic?

Author:
Gregory Auclair and Adnan Mazarei
Publication Date:
01-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE)
Abstract:
In pursuit of President Donald J. Trump's "America First" agenda, the administration has pressured allies and partners to invest in US industrial and infrastructure projects. The White House has announced commitments by the European Union, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, several Gulf Cooperation Council countries, and others, to import specific amounts of goods and services from the United States and to make sizable investments on US soil. These agreements resulted from a more coercive US foreign policy than in the past. Because the administration is helping select the targets of foreign investment, it is embarking on a major expansion of US industrial policy—one paid for by allied countries. This Policy Brief shows that much about investment pledges, worth more than $5 trillion, remains unclear or aspirational.
Topic:
Politics, Foreign Direct Investment, Trade Policy, and America First
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

73. The COVID era inflation surge: Causes, consequences, and policy lessons

Author:
Karen Dynan and David Wilcox
Publication Date:
01-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE)
Abstract:
The COVID era inflation surge was shaped by an unusual confluence of shocks and policy responses. It nonetheless raises enduring questions about the interaction of demand, supply, expectations, and policy frameworks that decision-makers are likely to confront again. In this Policy Brief, Dynan and Wilcox distill lessons from a broad body of work produced as part of the Peterson Institute for International Economics' Understanding the COVID Era Inflation project, which brought together an extensive group of experts to examine the different facets of the inflation surge. Dynan and Wilcox synthesize the group's insights to recount the origin of the surge, evaluate the key causes and consequences, discuss the limits and strengths of policy tools, and offer lessons for policymakers to deal with future undesirable increases in inflation.
Topic:
Monetary Policy, Economy, Inflation, Fiscal Policy, COVID-19, Labor Market, and Supply Chains
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

74. Can Trump keep his tariffs if the Supreme Court invalidates them?

Author:
Alan Wm. Wolff
Publication Date:
02-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE)
Abstract:
The Trump administration’s trade team has vowed to employ alternative legal strategies to keep its high tariff wall in place if the Supreme Court invalidates President Trump’s sweeping “reciprocal tariffs” by striking down his use of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) to impose them. Wolff reviews the four possible tariff statutes that could be invoked— Sections 122, 338, 301, and 232—but they have major limitations. Each is either narrow, temporary, or specific, compared with IEEPA, and cannot be used to recreate Trump’s across-the-board tariff wall.
Topic:
Politics, Supreme Court, Tariffs, Trade Policy, and Protectionism
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

75. Israel-Kurd Relations in the Middle East Post-October 7

Author:
Uri Zaki
Publication Date:
01-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Mitvim: The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies
Abstract:
This policy paper examines the relationship between Israel and the Kurdish nation against the backdrop of the dramatic changes in the Middle East since the events of October 7, 2023. The collapse of the old order in Syria, developments in the Turkish arena, and the deepening confrontation between Israel and Iran have created a new regional reality in which the Kurds – a nation of 40 million dispersed across Syria, Turkey, Iraq, and Iran – have become a significant actor in shaping the regional balance of power. This paper is based on in-depth discussions with senior Kurdish officials and opinion leaders from the four major territories populated by Kurds, and seeks to diverge from an approach that views the Kurds as an assemblage of disparate communities. Consistently emerging from these discussions is the perception of the Kurds as a single nation despite the political and legal differences between their various concentrations, and the expectation of Israel to adopt an overarching long-term policy, tailored to the various Kurdish arenas. From Israel’s perspective, its relations with the Kurds should be considered an independent component of its regional policy rather than a by-product of its confrontations with other regional actors. In the Syrian arena, the continued existence of effective Kurdish autonomy serves Israel’s interests of decentralization, containment of Turkish influence, and protection of minorities. In the Turkish arena, the Kurd issue is intertwined with efforts to deal with a hostile Hamas-supporting regime, while in Iran, the Kurds constitute a unique opposition with potential for domestic action. This paper was completed shortly before the recent events in northeastern Syria, which included aggressive military actions against Kurd autonomy by the al-Sharaa regime, which threaten the community’s very existence. These developments underscore the fragility of the arrangements in the Syrian arena and reinforce the need for an Israeli strategy vis a vis the Kurds. The English transaltion of the original Hebrew memo, is published in the midst of the war between the US & Israel and Iran. In which the Kurds, again, might play a crucial role. This paper proposes a series of actionable recommendations for a proactive Israeli policy based on diplomatic and security tools and on soft-power civilian, academic, and cultural tools, grounded in an understanding that the question is not whether Israel will be forced to take a stand on the Kurdish issue, but how it should do so in an informed, strategic manner. Read here
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Kurds, Regional Politics, October 7, 2023 Gaza War, and 2026 Iran War
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and Kurdistan

76. IMEC 2.0: A New Regional Vision After the Gaza War

Author:
Gedaliah Afterman
Publication Date:
02-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Mitvim: The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies
Abstract:
The India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) was launched as a transport and connectivity initiative linking India, the Gulf, and Europe. That logic remains relevant, but the post-Gaza regional environment demands a broader and more resilient design. Political constraints have tightened, Israel’s room for manoeuvre has narrowed, and regional cooperation is increasingly shaped by risk management rather than visibility. In this context, IMEC cannot function effectively as a linear corridor alone. This paper argues for reframing IMEC as a networked regional architecture, IMEC 2.0, that integrates physical infrastructure with digital systems, energy transition, economic stabilisation, and diplomatic coordination. This approach reflects current regional realities more accurately, allows cooperation to advance unevenly and in sequence, and reduces political exposure without stalling momentum. For Israel, IMEC 2.0 offers a way to re-anchor itself in the region through practical contribution leading to political normalisation. The paper assesses the post-Gaza regional landscape, maps the constraints and opportunities facing Israel, and outlines how a networked IMEC can support regional integration, stabilisation, and long-term economic resilience. It argues that the central risk for Israel is not only exclusion by design, but marginalisation through delay. Early positioning, including credible action on the Palestinian front within emerging regional architectures, will determine whether Israel helps shape the systems that define regional connectivity or is forced to adapt to them later.
Topic:
2023 Gaza War, India–Middle East–Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), Diplomacy, and Connectivity
Political Geography:
Middle East, India, Israel, Palestine, and Gaza

77. From the Global Friction and Intra-‘West’ Fracture, Through the Multi-front (Gaza) War to the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

Author:
Maya Sion-Tzidkiyahu
Publication Date:
02-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Mitvim: The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies
Abstract:
This paper analyzes how the October 7 attack and the ensuing multi-front and Gaza war reshaped the region within the broader context of global power competition, inducing intra-Western fractures. While the war strengthened Israel’s regional military position and weakened Iran and its proxies, it simultaneously eroded Israel’s legitimacy in much of the West. Yet it also generated an East–West divide in Europe between states viewing Israel more as a security asset and those treating it as a normative liability. Despite intensified polarization across Western societies, the Global South, and the Middle East, international support for the two-state solution has not declined. On the contrary, it has consolidated into a broad Euro-Arab diplomatic alignment that frames the two-state formula as the only acceptable resolution framework. Ultimately, the interaction between global friction, regional war, and domestic polarization reinforces—not weakens—the international consensus around two states as the sole viable pathway forward. The paper shows that the war produced a paradox: military developments shifted the regional balance toward Israel and the US, yet political dynamics increased pressure for conflict resolution.
Topic:
Polarization, Palestinians, Regional Politics, October 7, and 2023 Gaza War
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and Gaza

78. Is there still a Path for an International Security Force in Gaza

Author:
Jacob Stoil
Publication Date:
03-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Mitvim: The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies
Abstract:
The US twenty-point peace plan that marked the end of Gaza War created an opportunity to break the political stalemate in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and advance major moves. Yet, progress on some of the most critical areas of security and stability is proceeding slowly. There has been some progress like the return of all the hostages, alive and dead, and the establishment of the National Committee for Administration of Gaza (NCAG), and the partial opening of Rafah crossing with the return of an EU assistance mission. However, in today’s reality, absent a concerted effort, the chance for a broader, more immediate and meaningful change in Gaza that could lead to a broader diplomatic initiative is gradually receding. As a result, the danger is that the “yellow line” will become the new border and that the situation in Gaza where the IDF controls over fifty percent of the Strip while Hamas continues to rule over the majority of the Gazan population, will continue. This would leave the population dependent on basic humanitarian aid and exploited by a reconstituting Hamas looking forward to another war while Israel attempts a return to a strategy of conflict management. At the center of the UN resolution was the creation of an International Stabilization Force (ISF) for Gaza whose role it was to oversee the disarmament and demilitarization of the territory and create the security environment to allow for reconstruction and an alternative Palestinian Government. Such a force would need to be both robust and capable with a mandate to disarm and demilitarize the territory, protect reconstruction and governance efforts, and in possession of the authorities to complete the mission against any opposition. At this point, it looks increasingly less likely the ISF, if it deploys, will resemble this ideal, and in the meantime, Hamas is entrenching its power, repositioning it capabilities, and rearming. This begs the question as to whether there is still a way for an ISF and therefore the Twenty Point Peace Plan to succeed. While all hope may not be lost without a robust ISF, the path to success will be narrow and rely instead upon an indirect approach.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, International Security, Reconstruction, Hamas, and 2023 Gaza War
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and Gaza

79. Reconstruction as a Lever for Political Change: How reconstruction tools can strengthen Palestinian governance in Gaza and serve as a positive model for the West Bank

Author:
Noa Shusterman Dvir
Publication Date:
04-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Mitvim: The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies
Abstract:
The reconstruction process of the Gaza Strip, whose cost is estimated at approximately $70 billion, is not limited to a purely humanitarian response but constitutes a strategic decision point for building a governing alternative to Hamas, which may reshape the entire Palestinian arena. At the center of this move stands the technocratic committee (NCAG), operating under the authority of the “Board of Peace” defined in the 20-Point Plan and approved by UN Security Council Resolution 2803, whose purpose is to stabilize governance in Gaza while creating a horizon for a future transfer of authority to a reformed Palestinian Authority and connecting the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. While the committee’s potential success may positively affect the entire Palestinian arena and regional dynamics, at the geopolitical level the committee is expected to face a range of challenges, including: • Tension with the Palestinian Authority, which is in a “strategic trap” – the committee’s success may highlight Ramallah’s lack of relevance, while its failure will prevent the Authority’s future return to Gaza; • Israeli control over crossings and the security space (the “yellow line”) creates territorial ambiguity that complicates the establishment of independent Palestinian sovereignty and delays the flow of international resources; • Hamas will seek to replicate the “Hezbollah model,” in which it maintains its military strength under the cover of civilian calm. The reconstruction process should serve as a tool to weaken Hamas’s power centers by creating economic and diplomatic dependence of the population on the West and Gulf states, while attempting to transform Gaza from a “resistance enclave” that threatens Israel into a functioning political entity integrated into the vision of regional stability. This document analyzes the expected scenarios in the Gaza Strip and the anticipated challenges for the technocratic committee’s activity and proposes principles for action and concrete and immediate recommendations for the technocratic committee and the international community.
Topic:
Governance, Reconstruction, Rehabilitation, Post-Conflict, and 2023 Gaza War
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, Palestine, Gaza, and West Bank

80. Gaza Reconstruction: Risks, Opportunities, and Israel’s Role

Author:
Arnon Houri-Yafin
Publication Date:
04-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Mitvim: The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies
Abstract:
As part of the Trump administration’s “20-Point Plan,” the international community is preparing for a large-scale reconstruction of the Gaza Strip. For Israel, this process presents a multidimensional strategic opportunity: pushing Hamas out of power in favor of more moderate forces, promoting processes of moderation within the population, and deepening Israel’s integration into the regional axis (with the backing of the United States and Gulf states). Even if a moderate alternative to Hamas does not emerge, successful reconstruction could serve as a temporary incentive for stability in the Strip. At the same time, the process carries a significant risk: the diversion of reconstruction resources toward Hamas’s renewed military buildup. To realize the opportunity while mitigating the risk, Israel must employ a diverse toolbox that includes monitoring, the threat of halting reconstruction, and partnership. Monitoring prevents rearmament; the threat of halting aid provides internal Gazan legitimacy for excluding Hamas; and partnership serves as a driver of moderation. While each of these tools is critical, their combination creates internal tensions. This paper focuses on the early years and recommends emphasizing different tools across different sectors. In the construction sector, which involves large volumes of resources that may be diverted to Hamas, the paper recommends a strict version of monitoring policy. In sectors traditionally managed by civil society organizations, such as education, it recommends partnership. After several years – particularly if a moderate government gains public legitimacy in Gaza – the focus can shift toward trust-building and partnership within state institutions as part of a broader political process.
Topic:
Reconstruction, Institutions, Post-Conflict, Trust-building, and 2023 Gaza War
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and Gaza

81. Normalization Through Strength? A Dual Israeli–Saudi Examination of Power, Perception, and the Limits of Military-Centric

Author:
Eitan Ishai
Publication Date:
04-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Mitvim: The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies
Abstract:
This paper examines the concept of “normalization through strength” through a dual Israeli-Saudi lens, arguing that military power alone cannot generate sustainable regional integration. Tracing the rise of this framework within Israeli strategic thinking – especially after the Abraham Accords and following October 7 – the paper shows how Israeli leaders and much of the public came to believe that demonstrations of force could substitute for diplomacy and political compromise. Juxtaposing this with the Saudi perspective, which prioritizes stability, predictability, territorial integrity, and political legitimacy, the paper demonstrates how the same Israeli actions interpreted domestically as deterrence were perceived in Riyadh as destabilizing and risky. Focusing on the Israeli-Saudi case, it argues that “normalization through strength” failed not because Israel lacked power, but because power was decoupled from restraint, diplomacy, and credible political horizons – most notably regarding the Palestinian issue. The paper concludes that future normalization depends less on raw strength than on reliability: the ability to embed military capability within a coherent diplomatic strategy grounded in restraint, accountability, and regional stability.
Topic:
Diplomacy, Bilateral Relations, Normalization, and Regional Politics
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and Saudi Arabia

82. Community Involvement as the Foundation of Post-Conflict Gaza Reconstruction

Author:
Liel Maghen
Publication Date:
04-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Mitvim: The Israeli Institute for Regional Foreign Policies
Abstract:
This paper argues that the reconstruction of Gaza cannot succeed without Palestinian agency, rights, and meaningful participation. Drawing on comparative experience and field based insights, it shows how externally driven models tend to reproduce dependency and fragility rather than support long term recovery. It emphasizes the need to anchor reconstruction at the neighborhood level, develop participatory planning mechanisms, and address housing, land, and governance issues early in the process. It also highlights the importance of linking humanitarian action with political frameworks and rethinking transitional spaces as foundations for community life. Ultimately, reconstruction is not only about rebuilding infrastructure, but about restoring the social and institutional fabric of society. Its success will depend on whether Gazans are able to shape their own recovery from the outset.
Topic:
Governance, Reconstruction, Recovery, Post-Conflict, and 2023 Gaza War
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and Gaza

83. Europe’s Digital Markets Act Under Review: Ways to Make it More Pragmatic, Proportional, and Predictable

Author:
Andrea Dugo, Fredrik Erixon, and Dyuti Pandya
Publication Date:
04-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:
The Digital Markets Act (DMA) marked a major shift in EU competition and regulatory policy, moving from an effects-based and ex-post approach to a prescriptive, ex-ante regulatory framework. While the DMA rested on some clear observations about competition in platforms markets, the Act also came with some conceptual ambiguities and structural flaws. They could have been addressed in the implementation and enforcement of the DMA but, unfortunately, these processes have exacerbated rather than moderated the problems. In this Policy Brief, we argue that there is now a new opportunity to improve enforcement practices and make the DMA more pragmatic, proportional, and predictable. The central argument is that there is a growing gap between the DMA’s stated goals, its enforcement, and real-world effects. While some targeted interventions in the DMA implementation improved competition and specific user experiences somewhat, it is difficult to find any evidence supporting the proposition that the DMA has meaningfully reshaped competitive dynamics in digital markets. However, business compliance costs have increased significantly – and, importantly, not just for so-called gatekeepers. DMA enforcement is now also generating tensions with other EU regulatory frameworks, particularly in the areas of data protection, cybersecurity, intellectual property rights, and consumer protection. A key concern is that enforcement has gradually expanded the DMA beyond its original scope. Enforcement actions and regulatory discussions now seem to extend into areas such as cloud computing and generative AI, often without clear evidence that these sectors exhibit the same structural competition problems that motivated the DMA. Perhaps the expansion is motivated, perhaps it is not. It is difficult to make a judgement when the European Commission do not present material evidence supporting their enforcement actions. The risk is that expansion weakens the coherence and legitimacy of the framework in the absence of transparent analysis and robust evidentiary standards. DMA enforcement also presents structural challenges. Its reliance on predefined obligations and broad legal concepts – such as “gatekeeper” status or “interoperability” – grants significant discretion to regulators while limiting the role of effects-based analysis. In practice, this has led to increasing regulatory uncertainty and, increasingly, a shift from regulating conduct to influencing product design, pricing structures, and platform architecture. Enforcement dynamics further complicate the picture. Parallel investigations by national authorities, combined with overlapping EU legal frameworks, have created a layered system of governance in which the same conduct may be assessed under multiple regimes. This risks duplication, inconsistent outcomes, and fragmentation of the Single Market – precisely the outcomes that the DMA was intended to prevent. The enforcement of interoperability obligations illustrates these tensions particularly clearly. Originally conceived as a tool to lower entry barriers, interoperability is increasingly applied as a prescriptive design requirement, often without sufficient regard for differences across platforms or for legitimate concerns related to privacy and security. In some cases, these obligations may even weaken existing competitive dynamics, while introducing new technical and regulatory risks. More broadly, the DMA increasingly reflects a shift in EU regulatory philosophy, from prohibiting harmful conduct to prescribing how digital systems should operate. When combined with other prescriptive regimes, this approach creates unavoidable trade-offs between competition, security, and privacy objectives. This Policy Brief argues that better enforcement approaches could improve the DMA’s chances of achieving its objectives. Enhancing enforcement approaches require a recalibration of methods and instruments towards greater predictability, better proportionality, and more evidence-based decision-making. To this end, five key recommendations are proposed: Clarify the DMA’s core objectives to prevent enforcement drift. Strengthen evidentiary standards for enforcement actions. Apply interoperability obligations in a proportionate and context-sensitive manner. Improve coordination with adjacent regulatory frameworks. Ensure that any enforcement expansion is grounded in clear competition-based evidence. In sum, for the DMA to improve competition and user experience – and not damage them and Europe’s security and digital capabilities – it needs better enforcement and alignment with the original purpose of supporting competitive, innovative, and user-oriented digital markets.
Topic:
Governance, European Union, Institutions, Artificial Intelligence, Data, Digital Policy, Emerging Technology, Digital Markets Act (DMA), and Single Market
Political Geography:
Europe

84. Europe’s Frontier Countries: The EU’s Geopolitical Test

Author:
Tengiz Pkhaladze
Publication Date:
03-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:
Europe’s European neighbours have become the arena in which the European Union’s geopolitical credibility is being tested in real time. From Ukraine and Moldova to the Western Balkans, Belarus and the wider Black Sea region, developments along the EU’s immediate periphery now shape Europe’s own security environment more directly than at any point since the end of the Cold War. These frontier countries are no longer a buffer or a preparatory space for gradual integration; they are the place where power is contested, deterrence is measured, and Europe’s ability to act under pressure is exposed. This policy brief argues that the EU enters this geopolitical test with a widening gap between ambition and readiness. Over the past two years, Brussels has adopted an increasingly geopolitical vocabulary and launched a series of important initiatives from the White Paper on European Defence and the Readiness 2030 agenda to ReArm Europe, military mobility efforts, a new Black Sea strategy, and the European Political Community (EPC) initiative. Taken together, these steps acknowledge that Europe faces a harsher strategic environment. Yet they have not resolved the core problem: the EU still struggles to convert political declarations, financial resources and regulatory power into timely, coherent geopolitical action. Institutional fragmentation, slow decision-making and unresolved dependencies continue to limit Europe’s ability to shape outcomes in its own neighbourhood. The EU’s European neighbours function in this paper not as case studies, but as stress-tests. They reveal how the EU performs when confronted with fast-moving crises, security risks and external competition. Military mobility offers the most tangible example: despite repeated reports and funding commitments, cross-border movement of forces and equipment remains constrained by legal, infrastructural and political obstacles that are incompatible with Europe’s security rhetoric. Similarly, the Black Sea strategy signals growing awareness of regional importance, yet avoids hard choices about deterrence, escalation management and the division of labour between the EU and NATO. These internal challenges are now compounded by an external shock. The United States’ evolving strategic priorities underline that European assumptions about transatlantic leadership and alignment can no longer be taken for granted. This does not signal a US withdrawal from Europe, but it does expose how dependent the EU remains on external actors for security outcomes in regions it defines as vital to its own stability. The central conclusion of this brief is deliberately uncomfortable: Europe’s frontier countries are not testing the EU’s intentions, but its capacity to act as a geopolitical actor. The question facing the Union is no longer whether it wants to be more strategic, but whether it is willing to address the political, institutional and practical constraints that prevent it from doing so. If the EU cannot adapt its posture in the regions closest to it, its broader ambitions from strategic autonomy to global influence will remain aspirational.
Topic:
Security, Globalization, Governance, European Union, Institutions, Trade, and Single Market
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Eurasia, Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus, and Western Balkans

85. Reigniting Productivity: A New Growth Model for the Asia-Pacific

Author:
Hosuk Lee-Makiyama and Badri Narayanan Gopalakrishnan
Publication Date:
05-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:
The Asia-Pacific region is reaching the limits of the scale-based and China-driven growth model, as manufacturing specialisation and global value-chain integration now deliver diminishing returns. Data regressions (and testing over 120 socio-economic variables) show productivity drivers have inverted: Exports correlate negatively with productivity, while imports – especially services – provide the strongest productivity gains, showing that openness to innovation and services remains the key lever for economic growth. Moreover, connectivity dividends are exhausted. Productivity does not depend on more internet users, but on the uptake of business technology, such as cloud, AI, and enterprise software. Also, inward FDI (i.e., investments by foreign multinationals) expands the local availability of support services essential for organisational efficiency that also becomes available to domestic SMEs. However, these productivity contributions remain uneven due to regulatory fragmentation and country-specific compliance costs. Taken together, many businesses in the region, and SMEs in particular, face technological and organisational capability constraints rather than just infrastructure gaps (i.e., access to roads, ports, or broadband). The Asia-Pacific region needs a capability-driven growth model, enabled by investment diversification, services integration, and reducing the fixed costs of technology adoption that hinder SME growth. These remedies are distinct from those prescribed for Europe in the Draghi report, which emphasise scale, reindustrialisation, and state investments. Recommended actions are: Re-anchor openness by liberalising and deregulating business and digital services, advancing mutual recognition via plurilateral services and investment arrangements. Mobilise capital for technology adoption through FDIs, easing borrowing mandates for IT and software, and treating digital capability as a factor of production. Reduce regulatory uncertainty by maintaining stable legal regimes, enabling modular voluntary (“opt-in”) frameworks for data and cloud services firms, g., regionally recognised certification schemes for personal data, trusted cloud, and AI developer designations, with deeper convergence across APEC, CPTPP, and ASEAN. Unlock SME scaling by reforming corporate taxation that encourages formalisation of the grey economy, simplifying cross-border rules, and ensuring access to computational infrastructure such as cloud and AI tools. In the long term, exploit demographic asymmetries in the region via skills-based migration, higher-age worker retention, and expanding female labour-force participation.
Topic:
Foreign Direct Investment, Regulation, Economic Growth, Industry, Productivity, and Micro-Small-Medium Enterprises (MSMEs)
Political Geography:
Asia-Pacific

86. From Factories to Ideas: The New Map of Global Power

Author:
Erik van der Marel
Publication Date:
03-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:
Globalisation is not collapsing but transforming. Rather than retreating, global economic integration is shifting from a system organised around physical goods and factories to one increasingly driven by intangible assets such as data, services, intellectual property, and knowledge-intensive collaboration. Intangible flows are reshaping how integration occurs. Unlike goods trade, these flows are largely weightless, collaborative, scale at near-zero marginal cost, and are far less constrained by physical distance, weakening the traditional link between geography and economic exchange. Distance has been redefined from geographic to geopolitical. In the intangible economy, cross-border exchange depends less on how far countries are apart and more on political trust, security alignment, and institutional compatibility, including shared norms around governance, data, and the rule of law. Economic power is reorganising around “idea blocs.” Because intangible assets are harder to protect than goods, firms and investors increasingly concentrate collaboration among politically aligned countries with strong institutions, producing new groupings that surpass geography and reshape global alliances. This shift demands a new framework for understanding globalisation. Existing models cantered on supply chains and production networks cannot explain current patterns of integration, power, and cooperation; globalisation must instead be understood through the political economy of intangibles, institutions, and trust.
Topic:
Globalization, Intellectual Property/Copyright, Services, Innovation, and Trade
Political Geography:
Global Focus

87. Audiovisual Services: A Neglected Area of EU Competitiveness

Author:
Hannes Berggren
Publication Date:
04-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:
Audiovisual services are a fast-growing part of EU services trade and constitute an area of EU competitiveness. Between 2006 and 2023, EU exports in audiovisual services rose by 271 per cent, making the EU one of the world’s largest exporters in the field. Unlike other digitally delivered services such as telecommunications or computer services, audiovisual services remain largely excluded from trade liberalisation at both multilateral and bilateral levels. Rooted in cultural protection policies and the EU’s Audiovisual Media Services Directive, the exclusion of a big category of trade limits market access for EU firms and weakens the EU’s hand in trade negotiations. Recent measures, such as Canada’s levy on foreign streaming services, is a “canary in the coal mine”: if the EU continues to carve out audiovisual services from trade agreements, other countries may take similar actions against EU economic interests. To boost its growing digital competitiveness, the EU should take a more constructive approach and discard its long-standing opposition to include cultural services in trade agreements. The review in 2026 of the EU’s audiovisual regulation is an opportunity to change domestic policy, enabling Europe to make trade commitments in audiovisual services. A more liberal approach would strengthen the EU’s position in digital trade and expand market opportunities for EU companies.
Topic:
European Union, Services, Trade, Industry, Digital Policy, Economic Competition, and Audiovisual Services
Political Geography:
Europe

88. The WhatsApp World Order: Learning to Live with the New Global Political Economy

Author:
David Henig
Publication Date:
06-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:
An inter-connectivity and technology revolution transformed the world over the last 30 years – with AI being the latest instalment. Multiple, interlocking, instant networks now cover the world like an ever-expanding changing set of WhatsApp groups, affecting all countries and governments. Today’s trade is responsive, resilient, diverse, and above all global as a result. Modern globalisation has in turn proved resistant to the many claims of its demise. Yet clearly this is not creating a happy world. Politics has not kept pace with the changes. National control, stability, optimism and trust are as a result particularly in short supply. At a macro level, challenger economies – most notably China – are engaged in mutual suspicion with the former hegemons EU and US, not helped by issues around subsidies and access to markets. All the major powers are undermining existing global rules while simultaneously suggesting an impossible retreat into self-sufficient manufacturing as they seek to come to terms with today’s economy. They are not helped by political debate that largely misunderstands the moment. Meanwhile corporate concentration in global markets has entrenched dominant private actors who navigate diverse regulations but can undermine competitiveness and governments. Political turmoil is enhanced by demographic shifts to ageing populations, social media, and citizen dislocation in the face of intense societal change and financial insecurity. Government failure to deal with challenges they are wrongly assumed to have created is too often simply leading to a search for scapegoats. Matters may even get worse given that the major powers have weaponised trade to a degree in recent years. Many urge them to intensify planning for economic warfare. This is turning dependencies from an inevitable by-product of greater product availability to a dangerous weakness. Such approaches threaten peace and prosperity, reflecting frustration that public demand for control in an inter-connected world cannot be met. Better approaches need to be found, that start with accepting today’s technology-enabled world including a strong China and other emerging economies. Governments must recognise that adaptive institutions will be more effective than trying to second-guess complex supply chains or put in place extensive new national rule-sets, particularly given their diverse public policy objectives. They must then protect where they must, prioritise where they can including for national security, and guide the public through their choices based on the best information that they have. For Europe in particular, long-standing respect for and implementation of rules that balance societal interests is more important than protecting all old industries. Internationally, agreements among friendly countries can be helpful but will not be sufficient. What is required is all countries accepting and enhancing core trade principles which were specifically designed to prevent a 1930s style global descent into mutual suspicion. WTO rules should be modernised to reflect today’s inter-dependencies and the dangers of weaponisation, rebalancing commitments on the basis of a broad definition of reciprocity, and avoiding of concentration of supply when countries grow. This though can only happen satisfactorily when the largest powers understand the need to discipline their own behaviours. Challenges such as dealing with dominant companies and scarce raw materials will never be easily resolved. Improvements will require international cooperation similarly based on trust, and should draw upon global networks of expertise that have developed as another result of today’s inter-connected world. Economies do adjust to new circumstances. Governments must therefore stop decrying resilience as an easy but incorrect way to be seen doing something, and focus instead on rebuilding economies and societies that adjust to today’s emerging inter-connected global order.
Topic:
Globalization, European Union, Trade, Artificial Intelligence, and Connectivity
Political Geography:
China, Europe, Asia, and United States of America

89. The Copyright Trap

Author:
Oscar Guinea, Dyuti Pandya, and Vanika Sharma
Publication Date:
05-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:
The current debate on EU copyright law and AI training must move beyond the creative sector to include the wider European economy. While the rights of creators are legitimate and must be protected, the rules governing data use for AI models have far-reaching economic consequences. At its core, this is a debate about Europe’s economic competitiveness and its ability to reverse the technological stagnation identified in the Draghi report. The EU’s current approach to AI is marked by a profound policy paradox that helps explain why its private AI sector is lagging behind the US and China. While the EU invests billions of euros in public funds to build world-class supercomputing and AI-related infrastructure, its restrictive digital regulations constrain the data needed for its private AI economy to flourish. These regulatory restrictions deprive European start-ups of essential inputs such as data, undermining the development and deployment of AI in the EU. EU policymakers must carefully weigh the economic trade-offs of making copyright law more restrictive. The European creative industries are undeniably significant, generating €202 billion in value added. However, the combined value added of the rest of the economy is far larger. To offset just a 1 per cent reduction in value added across data-intensive sectors such as ICT, financial services, automotive, pharmaceuticals and chemicals the creative industries would need to increase output by more than 9 per cent. The EU cannot subsidise its way out of a self-imposed data scarcity problem. Instead, policymakers should preserve the current copyright framework as a genuine asset for AI development and work towards making data an abundant economic resource. Such an approach would not only support a thriving domestic AI economy capable of developing the models that will power and transform Europe’s industrial and service sectors, but also contribute to achieving the strategic autonomy sought by EU policymakers. This brief sets out six targeted policy recommendations to achieve these objectives: Treat the Text and Data Mining (TDM) exception as a strategic asset: the EU should recognise the TDM exception as central to its technological competitiveness and strategic autonomy. Policymakers should subject any proposals that would narrow this exception to a mandatory economic impact assessment. Contain the opt-out mechanism: expanding it risks rendering the TDM framework unworkable. The EU should resist broadening the categories of content subject to opt-out and maintain the requirement for affirmative, machine-readable reservations of rights. Stabilise the legal framework: to reduce regulatory uncertainty, the EU should avoid further legislative changes to the TDM framework. The EU’s digital rulebook is already undergoing significant change. Recently adopted digital regulations should be allowed to reach operational maturity before new compliance obligations are introduced, and efforts to simplify EU digital rules should be implemented before any changes to EU copyright law are considered. Exercise caution on top-down licensing: policymakers should reject statutory mandatory licensing regimes for AI training data, which disproportionately harm start-ups. The EU should allow private markets to develop licensing solutions, intervening only where clear market failures emerge. Reframe the policy problem: the debate surrounding generative AI is fundamentally about market competition and economic displacement, rather than copyright infringement. Policy responses should therefore focus on market adaptation rather than expanding copyright protection. Learn from innovation-first jurisdictions: the EU should draw lessons from countries such as Singapore and Japan which implement broad, technologically neutral exceptions for computational data analysis and actively attract AI investment by treating data as a vital economic endowment.
Topic:
Intellectual Property/Copyright, European Union, Economy, and Artificial Intelligence
Political Geography:
Europe

90. The Rise of Collective Actions and the Risk to Portugal’s Economy

Author:
Fredrik Erixon, Oscar Guinea, Dyuti Pandya, and Vanika Sharma
Publication Date:
05-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:
Over the past decade, Portugal has systematically transformed its economy, moving away from traditional sectors to build a tech-intensive knowledge economy. This deliberate strategy relies on regulatory stability and predictability to attract high-value Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). However, a fundamental tension has now emerged that threatens this progress: Portugal has rapidly become a highly attractive jurisdiction for collective actions. This report examines how the country’s emergence as a major European hub for mass litigation fundamentally contradicts its economic ambitions and jeopardises its digital transition. This surge in mass litigation is facilitated by a unique, claimant-friendly procedural framework that currently ranks as the second most open regime in the EU. As a result, Portugal has experienced one of the fastest growth rates in case volume across Europe. For a ‘catch-up innovator’ that is still building its technological resilience, this rapid expansion of legal risk is particularly dangerous, as it directly deters the foreign capital required to sustain its economic trajectory. This permissive legal environment could be significantly amplified. The revised EU Product Liability Directive (PLD) acts as a powerful multiplier within Portugal’s expanding litigation ecosystem. By explicitly bringing software, digital services, and AI systems under the scope of strict liability and lowering evidentiary barriers, the PLD concentrates new, highly unpredictable legal risks squarely on the digital economy. The empirical analysis in this report quantifies the scale and direction of this threat, revealing four critical findings: Sectoral Targeting: Mass litigation in Portugal is not evenly distributed; it disproportionately hits the strategic sectors that are the engines of the country’s growth. Between 2018 and 2025, the Information and Communication Technology (ICT) sector faced the highest volume of collective actions (29 per cent of all cases), followed closely by manufacturing (26 per cent). This litigation directly targets the primary providers of FDI in Portugal. Impact on GDP: The aggregate cost of private enforcement through collective actions could impose a heavy drag on national output. Scenario analysis estimates that the absolute economic impact of this litigation burden could reach between EUR 640 million and EUR 1.93 billion, representing up to 0.63 per cent of Portugal’s GDP. Impact on Innovation: Excessive litigation distorts and depresses research and development. The chilling effect on innovation is highly quantifiable: the projected decline in market capitalisation for Portugal’s top R&D investors, resulting from heightened litigation risk, is estimated at between EUR 63 million and EUR 188 million. The Decoupling from Harm: The surge in litigation is a supply-side phenomenon driven by financial incentives, rather than a demand-side response to product malfunction. The data shows a clear decoupling from actual consumer harm, evidenced by consistently low product-safety alerts and consumer confidence levels that remain above the EU average. As a ‘catch-up innovator’, Portugal remains highly sensitive to regulatory shocks. The fear of aggressive mass litigation could act as a significant deterrent to the foreign capital required to sustain its economic trajectory. This unpredictable liability environment risks unravelling Portugal’s digital transition and chilling future investment. The careful implementation of the PLD – which must be designed to avoid acting as an amplifier for collective actions – is an imperative for Portugal’s continued economic development and competitiveness.
Topic:
European Union, Economy, Knowledge Economy, and Mass Litigation
Political Geography:
Europe and Portugal

91. Time is Money: The Cost of Delaying the Ratification of the EU-Mercosur Trade Agreement

Author:
Fredrik Erixon, Oscar Guinea, Philipp Lamprecht, and Elena Sisto
Publication Date:
01-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:
Between 2021 and 2025, the EU sacrificed €183bn in exports and €291bn in gross domestic product due to its failure to ratify the EU-Mercosur Agreement. These figures represent the net present value of economic activity that would have materialised had the agreement been implemented as originally scheduled in 2021. This accumulated nominal GDP loss, which reflects not only foregone exports but also unrealised gains from improved access to inputs and diversified supply chains, corresponds to approximately 1.6 per cent of the EU’s total economic output and is equivalent to roughly two years of nominal European economic growth at the rates observed in 2023 and 2024. Should ratification continue to be deferred through 2026, the cumulative toll will continue to grow. Total foregone exports would reach €216bn, while lost GDP would climb to €344bn. To place this in perspective, the cumulative export loss would exceed the total annual trade of goods between the EU and Switzerland, the EU’s fourth-largest trading partner. Every additional month of delay during 2026 amounts to €4.4bn in foregone GDP and €3bn in missing exports. The economic burden of delay is concentrated in economic sectors where the EU maintains a competitive advantage. Transport equipment faces the most severe impact, with a shortfall of €94bn in exports over the six-year delay scenario. Machinery and equipment constitute the second-largest loss category at €23.8bn, followed by chemicals at €21.2bn, iron and steel and agri-food at €12.6bn each, and pharmaceuticals at €11.5bn. These sectors are precisely those that drive European economic dynamism. Pharmaceuticals and chemicals rank among the top five manufacturing sectors for labour productivity, while transport equipment and machinery sit in the top ten. For transport equipment, chemicals, and iron and steel, the six-year delay represents lost sales equivalent to more than two years of each sector’s annual research and development budget. The services sector has also experienced substantial forgone gains, with a five-year delay translating into €3bn in lost service exports, concentrated in trade and logistics (€1.9bn), communications (€0.6bn), and financial services (€0.4bn). The costs of delayed ratification fall across every EU member state. Germany has had the largest absolute loss at €71bn, equivalent to 1.7 per cent of GDP, incurred during a period when the economy contracted. France experienced €38bn in foregone exports (approximately one year of nominal economic growth), while Italy lost €29bn (roughly 1.6 years of growth). Spain, Belgium, the Netherlands, Sweden, Portugal, and Austria also had substantial absolute losses. While smaller, export-oriented economies have lower absolute losses, their relative exposure is significant: Portugal, Hungary, Belgium, Finland, and Sweden experienced losses exceeding 1 per cent of national GDP. The cost of delaying the EU-Mercosur Agreement goes beyond sale losses. Faced with policy uncertainty, European firms are diverting capital and establishing supply chains that will not return to Mercosur, surrendering market share to China and eroding Europe’s influence in the region. Crucially, the delay is also detrimental to strengthening the EU’s economic resilience. By delaying the ratification of the agreement, the EU is losing preferential access to Mercosur’s vast critical raw materials. Ultimately, Europe’s hesitation prolongs its dependence on Chinese supply chains for these essential inputs. The opportunity cost of continued delay substantially exceeds any remaining policy concerns. The political framing of delay as a cost-free option that allows for additional deliberation is inaccurate and counterproductive. The costs of postponement are real, measurable, and growing. For European policymakers, the imperative is clear: ratifying the EU-Mercosur Agreement is not merely a trade policy decision but an essential step toward strengthening Europe’s economic growth, competitiveness, and economic resilience.
Topic:
Treaties and Agreements, European Union, Institutions, Trade, Mercosur, and Single Market
Political Geography:
Europe

92. Cloud Resilience and Security: Why Exit, Portability, and Lifecycle Design Matter

Author:
Matthias Bauer and Dyuti Pandya
Publication Date:
02-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:
The future of computing points to cloud services remaining deeply embedded across sectors. As cloud technologies converge with edge networks and connected devices, resilience and security are no longer secondary technical issues but central policy concerns. This paper shows that resilience is strengthened not by isolation or localisation mandates, but by preserving architectural choice, interoperability, and competitive multi-cloud options across the lifecycle. Many of the decisive factors that affect resilience occur at onboarding – how a cloud provider, tools, licences, and security controls are selected and integrated – and whether workloads and safeguards can in practice be reconfigured, substituted, or exited during disruption. Across business, standards, cybersecurity, and competition communities, resilience is understood as a structural property of architecture, governance, and contractual control. The key test is whether organisations retain credible choices at every stage of the cloud journey, from migration to multi-cloud to exit. Concentration becomes a risk only when portability and switching are restricted in practice. The analysis shows that ending restrictive licensing and contractual practices are the most effective policy lever for strengthening resilience. Licensing determines what can be deployed at onboarding and whether workloads can be duplicated, migrated, or recovered under stress. Restrictions on licence mobility, discriminatory pricing, licensing practices that require re-purchase upon migration or dual-running, and limits on redundancy transform scale into dependency on a single cloud vendor. By contrast, prescriptive technical regulation to try and address cloud reliability carries higher risk. Cloud architectures and security ecosystems are complex and evolve rapidly, and even specialist engineers rarely have full visibility across dependency chains. Software equivalence should become a functional requirement, ensuring comparable performance, security, and service levels across cloud environments, rather than a requirement to use the same architecture or interfaces. In practice, this means that cloud and software vendors should not offer degraded functionality, security updates, or support conditions when their products run on third-party clouds compared to their own infrastructure. Mandating technical designs or standardised interfaces, by contrast, risks reducing architectural diversity and increasing correlated failure risks. Resilience is therefore best supported through proportionate, technology-neutral policy focused on preserving lifecycle multi-cloud choice rather than redesigning infrastructure. Competition also has a constructive role when it targets practices that restrict lifecycle choice rather than focusing narrowly on market shares. Enforcement against discriminatory licensing, tying practices, and artificial switching barriers aligns competition objectives with operational resilience and critical infrastructure protection. The Digital Markets Act (DMA) could contribute positively where it removes contractual barriers to switching and choice and interoperability. By contrast, applying platform-style technical obligations indiscriminately to cloud services risks weakening specialised environments, narrowing security tool choice, and reducing practical exit options. The paper also cautions against equating resilience with technological or geographic sovereignty. Empirical evidence shows that even services marketed as “sovereign” typically rely on globally integrated cloud components. Resilience is strengthened not by isolation or localisation mandates, but by preserving architectural choice, interoperability, and competitive multi-cloud options across the lifecycle.
Topic:
European Union, Cybersecurity, Cloud Computing, and Digital Markets Act (DMA)
Political Geography:
Europe

93. More Than Just Chips: What Europe Can Learn from Taiwan’s Industrial Strategy

Author:
Andrea Dugo and Dyuti Pandya
Publication Date:
01-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE)
Abstract:
Taiwan is widely regarded as the global epicentre of semiconductor manufacturing. The island accounts for well over half of all global chip foundry manufacturing and nearly all of advanced chip output. At the heart of this system stands the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC), which alone contributes 8.9 per cent of national GDP and dominates the world’s leading-edge logic foundry market. Yet framing Taiwan’s economic success as a TSMC story risks oversimplifying both its growth model and the policy lessons it offers. Taiwan’s competitiveness is best understood not as the product of semiconductors alone, but as the outcome of a broader industrial ecosystem. Taiwan had already reached advanced-economy income levels in the late 1990s, when chips still accounted for only a modest share of national output. Importantly, growth remains broad-based, with substantial contributions still coming from the wider industrial economy. The semiconductor sector’s decisive contribution has not been to “create” Taiwan’s prosperity, but to accelerate its transformation into a technological frontrunner. Counterfactual estimates suggest that without chips, Taiwan would remain a high-income economy – but it would lose much of its current convergence momentum with the world’s innovation leaders. Taiwan’s economic model is defined by its intense focus on innovation. The island ranks third globally in R&D expenditure as a share of GDP, with roughly 4 per cent of output devoted to R&D. Crucially, around 86 per cent of this spending is performed by firms rather than the public sector, ensuring that innovation remains closely tied to production capability and market demand. R&D investment is heavily weighted towards experimental development, which turns research into final prototypes and commercial products. Even excluding chips, Taiwan’s business R&D intensity would remain higher than that of 19 of the EU’s 27 Member States. This success has been engineered through deliberate, long-term statecraft that evolved from “state-led creation” to “state-enabled upgrading.” In earlier decades, institutions such as the Industrial Technology Research Institute (ITRI) helped Taiwan acquire and adapt foreign technologies, train engineers, and build pre-commercial capabilities. But Taiwan avoided locking itself into permanent state ownership and subsidy dependence: firms incubated in public settings were progressively spun off and pushed towards market validation, including the creation of global champions such as TSMC. From the 1990s onwards, Taiwan’s industrial strategy increasingly prioritised horizontal support measures rather than heavy-handed state intervention. The Taiwanese model consolidated around five reinforcing policy levers: (1) a state role focused on enabling private R&D rather than substituting for it; (2) sustained investment in human capital; (3) science park clustering; (4) deep integration into global trade and value chains; and (5) diversification and spillovers into adjacent high-tech sectors. For European policymakers, Taiwan’s experience suggests that subsidies alone do not constitute an industrial strategy. Instead, the central lesson is ecosystem-building: policies that connect research to scaling, talent to industrial capability, and innovation to globally competitive production. Ultimately, Taiwan offers a model of how public policy can shape innovation capacity and competitiveness without displacing private-sector dynamism.
Topic:
Industrial Policy, European Union, Manufacturing, Semiconductors, and Research and Development
Political Geography:
Europe, Taiwan, and Asia

94. Transitional Justice and Institutional Reconstruction of the Gaza Strip Post-War: A Policy Vision for Preserving Civil Peace and Restoring the Justice System under UN Security Council Resolution 2803

Author:
Islam Atallah
Publication Date:
06-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Pal-Think For Strategic Studies
Abstract:
In the aftermath of the war on the Gaza Strip, and amid the widespread collapse of institutional, judicial, and security structures, including the destruction of courts, prosecution offices, and law enforcement facilities, as well as the loss of large numbers of official files and records, this paper presents a policy discussion on the need for a transitional approach to rebuilding the justice system and preserving civil peace in Gaza. The paper examines the impact of institutional collapse on society, including the expansion of the judicial and security vacuum, the accumulation of cases and disputes, and the growing reliance on reconciliation committees, community committees, and tribal mechanisms as emergency tools for addressing daily conflicts in the absence of formal institutions. It also highlights the risks associated with these mechanisms becoming permanent and unregulated alternatives, and the legal, institutional, and social challenges this may pose to rights protection and community trust. The paper analyzes several policy alternatives for rebuilding the justice sector in Gaza, including the centralized restoration of the formal system, the institutionalization of tribal and community structures, and linking justice to reconstruction and spatial justice. It concludes by emphasizing the importance of adopting a hybrid transitional justice model that balances the urgent need to fill the judicial and security vacuum with the necessity of preserving constitutional principles and human rights, through an organized framework that integrates formal justice institutions, community-based mechanisms, digital documentation, and institutional reform. The paper stresses that rebuilding Gaza’s justice system should not be viewed solely as a legal or administrative matter, but as a fundamental condition for preserving civil peace, restoring trust between citizens and institutions, and preventing daily disputes, property claims, and rights-related conflicts from becoming additional drivers of social fragmentation in the post-war phase.
Topic:
Reconstruction, Transitional Justice, Armed Conflict, 2023 Gaza War, and Civil Peace
Political Geography:
Middle East, Israel, Palestine, and Gaza

95. Conditions for the Emergence of New Political Parties in Palestine After the War: From the Representational Vacuum to the Reconstitution of the Political Field

Author:
Pal-Think for Strategic Studies Research and Studies Unit
Publication Date:
05-2026
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Pal-Think For Strategic Studies
Abstract:
This paper argues that the emergence of new Palestinian parties after the war does not depend solely on opening party registration or holding elections, but on building a comprehensive political pathway: a guaranteeing law, public freedoms, a gradual electoral track, a clear civilian framework for party organization, financial independence, and a social base encompassing Gaza, the West Bank, Jerusalem, and the diaspora. The paper addresses the conflation of parties with electoral lists, initiatives, and armed groups, and reads the Deir al-Balah local elections as a dual signal: the possibility of the ballot box returning even in a devastated environment, and the limits of trust when politics unfolds amid displacement and service collapse. The paper also expands the scenario analysis of possible pathways for new party formation, from internal reform to youth and civic parties, the transformation of independent initiatives, and municipal pathways. It concludes with four focused recommendations to make the new party an accountable institution rather than another name on a crisis-ridden map.
Topic:
Elections, Political Parties, Post-Conflict, and 2023 Gaza War
Political Geography:
Middle East, Gaza, and West Bank

96. What Does It Mean for Agencies to Be Effective in a Changing Development Landscape?

Author:
Rachael Calleja, Sara Casadevall Bellés, and Beata Cichocka
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for Global Development (CGD)
Abstract:
For official bilateral development agencies, the realities of providing effective development cooperation are increasingly complex, as competing demands and changing international and domestic contexts are raising fundamental questions around what it means to be an effective agency. This paper explores the concept of agency effectiveness to demonstrate why agencies – and their leadership – should consider how their structures and processes interact with the changing landscape as part of their efforts to remain relevant and resilient. To do so, we consider how the current challenges facing agencies – including the need to respond to climate change, global instability, and changing domestic political environments – affect why agencies act, what they do, and how they do it. We then explore dominant understandings of agency effectiveness, which provide a lens for thinking about what it may mean for agencies to be effective in the years ahead. Overall, we suggest that the challenges facing development agencies in the changing landscape raise key issues for agencies to consider, particularly around what they prioritise, how they are structured, and the capabilities or ways of working needed to respond to complex demands. While there is unlikely to be a single approach for agencies looking to adapt to changing contexts, considering the implications of new – and future – pressures for the work of development agencies will be a necessary first step towards supporting their resilience and relevance in the years ahead.
Topic:
Development, Humanitarian Aid, and Economic Development
Political Geography:
Global Focus

97. Aligning International Banking Regulation with the SDGs

Author:
Liliana Rojas-Suarez
Publication Date:
02-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for Global Development (CGD)
Abstract:
Basel III—the international standard for banking regulation—has strengthened global financial stability but has also led to unintended consequences that may hinder progress toward key Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). This paper examines how Basel III’s regulatory framework may restrict bank lending to SMEs (impacting SDG 10) and constrain infrastructure finance (impacting SDG 8). Addressing these challenges requires refining risk assessment methodologies while preserving Basel III’s core objective: accurate risk evaluation. For SMEs, tailoring risk weights using local credit registry data can better reflect economic conditions in emerging markets. For infrastructure, recognizing it as a distinct asset class and leveraging credit risk mitigation tools could improve financing. Greater engagement from multilateral institutions, particularly the World Bank, is essential to advancing these solutions while maintaining financial stability.
Topic:
Regulation, Financial Stability, Banking, and Sustainable Development
Political Geography:
Global Focus

98. Planned Relocation of Climate-Vulnerable Communities: Preparing Multilateral Development Banks

Author:
Steven Goldfinch and Samuel Huckstep
Publication Date:
02-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for Global Development (CGD)
Abstract:
Planned relocation of highly climate-vulnerable communities is becoming increasingly necessary as climate shocks become more frequent and intense. It is also becoming more feasible as modelling of future scenarios improves and adaptation limits become clearer. Despite this, many governments are underprepared for planning and implementing planned relocation projects. In the absence of an intergovernmentally agreed framework or set of principles on planned relocation, development finance, and specifically climate finance, is not well positioned to respond to this emerging demand from countries. This is heightened by a widespread absence of coherent domestic policies, and by institutional gaps in international assistance. Multilateral development banks, in particular, could be well-placed to fill this gap. They have extensive experience in undertaking relocation projects, including in contexts of climate adaptation. Multilateral development banks will increasingly field borrower country demand for both technical and financial assistance. They are, however, not yet prepared to meet this demand, nor are countries adequately equipped to make applications for support. This paper outlines emerging public policy regarding planned relocation, draws from existing standards on development-forced displacement and resettlement, and explores entry points for development financiers in providing technical assistance and finance. The paper proposes recommendations to multilateral development banks and the global climate funds on engaging in this emerging area.
Topic:
Climate Change, Development, Refugees, Displacement, Resettlement, and Banking
Political Geography:
Global Focus

99. Current Dynamics in Syria and the Way Forward

Author:
Khogir Wirya
Publication Date:
01-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Middle East Research Institute (MERI)
Abstract:
Recent events in Syria represent a turning point in the history of the Middle East, where internal dynamics are intertwined with regional and international ones. Syria is not just a theater for local conflicts, but has become an arena for competition between major powers, which directly affects the nature of possible solutions. Within this complex landscape, the Kurdish issue stands out as one of the most sensitive and urgent priorities, with its reciprocal impact on the other components of the Syrian conflict and the country’s future.
Topic:
Political stability, Syrian War, and Kurds
Political Geography:
Middle East and Syria

100. The Unraveling of Iran’s Regional Strategy

Author:
Yaakov Amidror
Publication Date:
03-2025
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security (JISS)
Abstract:
Hezbollah’s decline, Syria’s collapse and Iran’s strategic failures have reshaped the region. No new threats can be allowed to emerge
Topic:
Hezbollah, Proxy Groups, Regional Politics, and Regional Security
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, Lebanon, and Syria