Content Type: Policy Brief / Publication Year: within 5 Years and within 10 Years / Topic: Military Affairs

1. Russian aggression and the European Arctic: Avoiding the trap of Arctic exceptionalism

Author:: Harri Mikkola, Samu Paukkunen, and Pekka Toveri
Publication Date:: 04-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: In its efforts to limit the Western defence posture in the Arctic, Russia has successfully exploited the “High North, low tension” mantra and the notion of the Arctic as an exceptional region of peace and cooperation. At the same time, Russia has managed to build its position of relative strength in the Arctic through systematically developing its military capabilities. To create a threat of escalation, Russia has also used offensive military exercises and disruptive hybrid operations against the Western Arctic states in the region. Arctic economic resources and military assets continue to play an essential role for Russia in pursuing its strategic goals, and for its ability to carry out acts of aggression. Through regional cooperative practices, the West has unintentionally facilitated this capacity. The West has limited its military activity in the Arctic to mitigate tensions. This has been a one-sided effort. The Western Arctic states should thus focus on building comprehensive deterrence in the region.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Military Affairs, and Deterrence
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Arctic

2. The Next Generation of Iranian Ballistic Missiles: Technical Advances, Strategic Objectives, and Potential Western Responses

Author:: Farzin Nadimi
Publication Date:: 07-2023
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:: On May 25, 2023, Iran’s minister of defense, Gen. Mohammad Reza Qaraei Ashtiani, unveiled the so-called fourth generation of the Khoramshahr liquid-fuel ballistic missile—aka Kheibar—amid heightened tensions with Israel and the West regarding Tehran’s nuclear program and renewed talk of preventive strikes against Iran’s key nuclear sites. Ashtiani spoke at the Hakimiyeh Aerospace Industries Organization complex, east of Tehran, against a backdrop with the new missile and a large model of Jerusalem’s Dome of the Rock. The name Kheibar comes from a fortified oasis settlement north of Medina, Saudi Arabia, inhabited by Jewish tribes before the Islamic era. In AD 628, the Jews there were defeated by Muslim armies led by Ali ibn Abi Talib, who has become a legendary figure in Shia Islam. The message to Israel implicit in the Kheibar announcement was therefore unmistakable. The Khoramshahr is Iran’s most advanced liquid-fuel ballistic missile and probably the first using storable liquid fuel, with its first version having been introduced at a military parade on September 22, 2017. The missile is believed to have much in common technically with the North Korean Hwasong-10—itself based on the retired Russian R-27 submarine-launched ballistic missile. Iran is thought to have received several Hwasong-10 missiles from North Korea in 2005 for reverse engineering purposes. The Khoramshahr is also Iran’s first departure from the Russian Scud and scaled Scud-generation propulsion systems.
Topic:: Security, Nuclear Weapons, Military Affairs, and Deterrence
Political Geography:: Iran and Middle East

3. EU Defense After Ukraine: A New Capabilities Agenda

Author:: Tony Lawrence and Louis Pernotte
Publication Date:: 10-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: International Centre for Defence and Security - ICDS
Abstract:: Russia’s illegal war in Ukraine has had profound impact on European and transatlantic security organisations. NATO has taken steps to strengthen its own deterrence and defence posture but, recognising the risk that the war may become or be portrayed as a NATO-Russia conflict, has carefully avoided a direct institutional response. The EU Member States have, by contrast, acted collectively against Russia, notably in implementing robust EU-wide sanctions and in using EU instruments to finance the delivery of lethal weapons to Ukraine. Through these actions, the EU has gone some way towards strengthening its geopolitical posture as envisaged in its most recent strategy document, the Strategic Compass. In this short series of briefs, we examine some aspects of the EU’s response to Russia’s war in Ukraine. The second considers the EU’s longer-term efforts to enhance European military capabilities through initiatives adopted and proposed in the light of the war.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Military Affairs, European Union, Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Europe, and Ukraine

4. THE DAY AFTER: Anticipating trouble in the event of a US withdrawal from Syria

Author:: Jomana Qaddour
Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Atlantic Council
Abstract:: With approximately nine hundred troops in northeastern and southeastern Syria, the United States ostensibly aims to prevent the reemergence of the Islamic State group (IS). The withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan, initiated by the Trump administration and completed by the Biden administration, was followed by the rapid collapse of the pro-Western government of Afghanistan and its replacement by the Taliban. This has led to questions about what will happen if and when US forces withdraw from northeastern Syria. A new issue brief by Atlantic Council’s Senior Fellow Jomana Qaddour examines the social, political, and economic implications and the challenges to US presence in Syria. While the US military presence remains limited in number, this report also underscores how aggregate US influence is much more potent than a force number of nine hundred suggests. US troop presence has enhanced counterterrorism operations, obstructed IS and Iranian smuggling routes, and facilitated humanitarian aid and economic benefits to a population in Syria that would be languishing under even more dire conditions. It can be argued that it has also limited local violence and halted a resurgence of public IS activities. According to the most recent Syria policy review, US presence is limited to the goal of counterterrorism operations, which implies that it is a conditions-based, not calendar-based deployment. Those conditions should include local Syrian forces that can reasonably deny IS a safe haven from which to plot terrorist attacks against the United States and its allies. It is well known that the Assad regime is not likely to provide the necessary capability to assure the United States and its allies that it can prevent IS’s return. In reality, there is little room to positively read the reassertion of Syrian government control over northeastern Syria; and withdrawal from Syria would be a serious gamble for US national security concerns in Syria and the region.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Armed Forces, Military Affairs, Islamic State, and Syrian War
Political Geography:: Middle East, Syria, and United States of America

5. Are Gender Inclusive Militaries Better at Integrating Disruptive Technologies?

Author:: Shira Eini Pindyck
Publication Date:: 05-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC)
Abstract:: Recent advances in big data and analytics, cyber security, automation, and artificial intelligence can make critical contributions to the demonstration of power on the international stage. New technologies not only offer militaries the ability to conduct operations with greater effectiveness but also reduce the potential human cost of operations. In an increasingly digitized world, organizations that do not adopt and leverage these advances can become inefficient and even fall by the wayside. Yet, despite the immense promise of emerging technologies, many organizations struggle to integrate and utilize them. This is true in both the military and business sectors. For business organizations, a failure to adopt and use novel technologies may threaten profits and even their survival. For militaries, where soldiers’ lives are on the line, the consequences can be even more severe. Why is the integration of new technologies often so difficult? This policy brief highlights an important and overlooked reason, namely how gender policy can affect resistance to organizational change. Gender policy reform requires organizations to invest resources in the recruitment and retainment of an inclusive workforce, and therefore demands that organizations be flexible and resilient. Flexibility and resilience are also required to integrate disruptive innovations. Rather than trying to chain a new technology to old systems of ascension and reward, organizations that want to advance technologically must rethink their incentive systems and work hard to restructure entrenched hierarchies.
Topic:: Defense Policy, National Security, Science and Technology, International Security, Military Affairs, Innovation, and Geoeconomics
Political Geography:: Global Focus

6. War in Ukraine enters its second month: serious implications and far-reaching changes

Author:: Al Jazeera Center for Studies
Publication Date:: 03-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Al Jazeera Center for Studies
Abstract:: The Russian invasion of Ukraine in its second month witnessed several developments, including the failure of the Russian forces to achieve a quick and decisive military victory and the Russian leadership's reduction of its primary objectives.
Topic:: Military Affairs, Armed Conflict, and Russia-Ukraine War
Political Geography:: Russia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe

7. Back to barracks: Building democracy after the military coup in Sudan

Author:: Amgad Fareid Eltayeb
Publication Date:: 11-2022
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:: The protest movement that toppled dictator Omar al-Bashir in 2019 promised a first in post-independence Sudan: democratic government. Although a historic opportunity for Sudan, real democracy threatened Sudanese political and military elites. Regimes formed through agreement between these elites constitute the one constant throughout Sudan’s post-independence period. The gap between the political elites and the protest movement helped the military coup in 2021 entrench their position. Violence, repression, and unrest are widespread – and splits in the broader military camp threaten to spill over into civil war. These splits also precipitate Sudan being drawn into regional conflicts such as in Ethiopia and Chad. The international community and European states have failed to find a viable political pathway to end the coup because they are too focused on working with elites. They need to grasp that both military and civilian elites are responsible for failing to open politics to the people of Sudan. The EU and member states should support pro-democracy actors in Sudan and press for a new political pathway centred on them.
Topic:: Military Affairs, European Union, Democracy, and Coup
Political Geography:: Africa and Sudan

8. Building a Strong and Independent Iraq: Policy Guidance for the Biden Administration

Author:: Abram N. Shulsky
Publication Date:: 01-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Hudson Institute
Abstract:: Formulating US policy toward Iraq can be a fraught matter, given all the debate and disagreement concerning the actions that brought us to the current situation. However, our policy must be formulated in light of it, regardless of views about our past actions. Policy formulation should begin with the realization that Iran has gained a predominant political and military influence in Iraq. Despite efforts of past PM Adel Abdul Mahdi and current PM Mustafa al-Kadhimi, many of the militias comprising the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) still answer to Iran, not the Iraqi government. Iran exerts widespread influence throughout the political class. Economically, Iraq remains dependent on Iran for energy;1 religious tourism from Iran to the holy sites in Karbala and Najaf is an important source of revenue; and Iran has flooded markets with cheap food and consumer goods. Although Iraqi oil production has rebounded, the economy remains relatively moribund and the level of basic public services is poor. (That Iraq flares off its natural gas at the same time it is importing it from Iran to produce electricity2 highlights the economic disfunction.) Popular discontent boiled over in 2019, leading to widespread protests. The protests took on an anti-Iranian aspect, and Iran-aligned PMF units attacked the protestors.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Agriculture, Economics, Government, Politics, and Military Affairs
Political Geography:: Iraq, Middle East, and United States of America

9. Waves of ambition: Russia’s military build-up in Crimea and the Black Sea

Author:: Gustav Gressel
Publication Date:: 09-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:: Russia’s capacity to carry out large-scale military operations against Black Sea states allows it to coerce and extort them. Reducing the predictability of such operations is the first step towards deterring them, because Moscow carefully weighs their risks. Western countries should increase their militaries’ interoperability with Black Sea states’ armed forces and improve the infrastructure they use to deploy reinforcements in the region. This would allow them to react to Russian military escalation in kind and thereby increase the risks for Moscow. With Ukraine and Georgia engaged in land wars against Russia, the vulnerabilities of Ukrainian and Georgian airspace and territorial waters have received relatively little attention. Western states could begin to address these vulnerabilities by establishing an international naval presence in the Black Sea. This would counter Russia’s attempts to deny other nations free use of the sea, and could help mitigate long-standing rivalries between allied states in the region. These efforts to enhance Black Sea states’ security will depend on improvements in other areas, particularly the security of government communications, counter-intelligence, the rule of law, and the fight against corruption.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, NATO, Military Affairs, European Union, and Conflict
Political Geography:: Russia, Eurasia, Turkey, Crimea, and Black Sea

10. Limited Repercussions: Implications of the Emergence of Afghan-US Armored Vehicles in Tehran

Author:: FARAS
Publication Date:: 09-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:: On Wednesday, September 1, Afghan media published pictures of a number of US Humvee tanks and military vehicles affiliated with the Afghan government, transported by an Iranian army truck from Afghanistan to Iran. This came in conjunction with the publication of pictures of US-made armored vehicles in Iran on another Afghan Telegram channel. The vehicles were in the possession of the dissolved Afghan government.
Topic:: Security, Military Affairs, Media, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, Iran, South Asia, and United States of America

11. Drawdown: Improving U.S. and Global Security Through Military Base Closures Abroad

Author:: David Vine, Patterson Deppen, and Leah Bolger
Publication Date:: 09-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:: Despite the withdrawal of U.S. military bases and troops from Afghanistan, the United States continues to maintain around 750 military bases abroad in 80 foreign countries and colonies (territories). These bases are costly in a number of ways: financially, politically, socially, and environmentally. U.S. bases in foreign lands often raise geopolitical tensions, support undemocratic regimes, and serve as a recruiting tool for militant groups opposed to the U.S. presence and the governments its presence bolsters. In other cases, foreign bases are being used and have made it easier for the United States to launch and execute disastrous wars, including those in Afghanistan, Iraq, Yemen, Somalia, and Libya. Across the political spectrum and even within the U.S. military there is growing recognition that many overseas bases should have been closed decades ago, but bureaucratic inertia and misguided political interests have kept them open. Amid an ongoing “Global Posture Review,” the Biden administration has a historic opportunity to close hundreds of unnecessary military bases abroad and improve national and international security in the process. The Pentagon, since Fiscal Year 2018, has failed to publish its previously annual list of U.S. bases abroad. As far as we know, this brief presents the fullest public accounting of U.S. bases and military outposts worldwide. The lists and map included in this report illustrate the many problems associated with these overseas bases, offering a tool that can help policymakers plan urgently needed base closures. Fast facts on overseas U.S. military outposts • There are approximately 750 U.S. military base sites abroad in 80 foreign countries and colonies. • The United States has nearly three times as many bases abroad (750) as U.S. embassies, consulates, and missions worldwide (276). • While there are approximately half as many installations as at the Cold War’s end, U.S. bases have spread to twice as many countries and colonies (from 40 to 80) in the same time, with large concentrations of facilities in the Middle East, East Asia, parts of Europe, and Africa. • The United States has at least three times as many overseas bases as all other countries combined. • U.S. bases abroad cost taxpayers an estimated $55 billion annually. • Construction of military infrastructure abroad has cost taxpayers at least $70 billion since 2000, and could total well over $100 billion. • Bases abroad have helped the United States launch wars and other combat operations in at least 25 countries since 2001. • U.S. installations are found in at least 38 non-democratic countries and colonies.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Military Affairs, and Military Bases
Political Geography:: Global Focus and United States of America

12. China and the Persian Gulf in the Aftermath of a U.S. Withdrawal

Author:: Steven Simon
Publication Date:: 09-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:: • Given longstanding U.S. economic ties to the Arab Gulf states, the withdrawal of the U.S. military would not mean the United States is departing from the region. Even if it did signify that, however, China would be unlikely to fill the vacuum. A U.S. decision to maintain a military presence in the region should therefore not be based on fear of a strategic vacuum that China will fill to America’s disadvantage. • The United States should leverage China’s interest in stable cross–Gulf relations by working in tandem with Beijing to encourage dialogue and confidence-building measures. • The United States should monitor Chinese military deployments to the Indian Ocean and work with Gulf partners to set limits on China’s military use of air and naval bases. This would serve as a confidence-building measure and ensure that the Gulf does not become an arena for competition amid heightened Sino–American tensions.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, International Trade and Finance, Military Affairs, and Strategic Engagement
Political Geography:: China, Middle East, Persian Gulf, and United States of America

13. America’s “Forever War” and the End of the Washington-led Unipolar World

Author:: Darren Spinck
Publication Date:: 10-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Institute for Development and International Relations (IRMO)
Abstract:: America’s retreat from Afghanistan culminated in the country falling back into control of the Taliban, the very group that provided safe- haven for al-Qaeda prior to the September 11, 2001 attacks. America suffered immeasurable pain and costs from this jihadist attack on US soil, made possible by intelligence failures, evolved for the “Global War on Terror.” Twenty years later, Washington still has not learned from pre-9/11 mistakes. Prior to America’s complete withdrawal from Afghanistan, US intelligence was unable to convince the White House of the Afghan government’s fragility and the Taliban’s intentions. Radical Islamists in Afghanistan capitalized on policymaking which did not recognize the emerging Islamist threat towards America. Al-Qaeda’s September 11 tactical victory begat a series of foreign policy blunders in Afghanistan as strategies missteps again, celebrating another victory over America when the Taliban flag rose over the Afghan presidential palace on September 11, 2021.
Topic:: Military Strategy, Military Affairs, Leadership, and Civil-Military Relations
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, Iraq, Middle East, North America, and United States of America

14. Toward an Inclusive Security Arrangement in the Persian Gulf

Author:: Trita Parsi
Publication Date:: 01-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:: • Abandon dominance. For many of the United States’ security partners, even a dysfunctional Pax Americana is preferable to the compromises that a security architecture would inevitably entail. The preconditions for creating a successful security architecture can emerge only if the United States begins a military withdrawal from the Persian Gulf and credibly signals it no longer seeks to sustain hegemony. • Encourage regional dialogue, but let the region lead. The incoming Biden administration’s hint that it will seek an inclusive security dialogue in the Persian Gulf is a welcome first step toward shifting the burden of security to the regional states themselves. For such an effort to be successful, the United States should play a supporting role while urging regional states to take the lead. • Include other major powers. The regional dialogue should include the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council and major Asian powers with a strong interest in stability in the Persian Gulf. Including them can help dilute Washington’s and Beijing’s roles while protecting the region from inter–Asian rivalries in the future.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, National Security, United Nations, Military Strategy, Hegemony, Military Affairs, and Grand Strategy
Political Geography:: United States, Iran, and Persian Gulf

15. The Dominance Dilemma: The American Approach to NATO and its Future

Author:: Joshua R. Itzkowitz Shifrinson
Publication Date:: 01-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:: Despite the Biden administration’s push to revitalize U.S. alliances, U.S. relations with NATO are due for a reset. The United States should incentivize European members of NATO to take on additional responsibilities for their defense. Encouraging the European allies to take initiative will help the United States focus on its other domestic and international priorities and may facilitate improving relations with Russia. This approach will also prove attractive to European states concerned about the future direction of U.S. foreign policy. Recalibrating the U.S. role in Europe would conform with the United States’ post–World War II efforts to stabilize European security — and stand as the fruit of Washington’s success in this regard.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, NATO, International Security, Military Strategy, Military Affairs, and Alliance
Political Geography:: United States, Europe, and Global Focus

16. Responsible Statecraft Requires Remaking America’s Foreign Relations Tool Kit

Author:: Gordon Adams
Publication Date:: 02-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:: To meet today’s foreign policy challenges, the United States needs to end its overreliance on military superiority and intervention and instead put creative and persistent diplomacy in the lead to promote locally owned solutions to national, bilateral, and regional security issues and to address global challenges not amenable to military force. This rebalancing will not succeed if civilian statecraft is dysfunctional and unprepared. More funding and more diplomats will not solve this problem. What is needed is fundamental reform of structures, processes, and personnel practices, particularly at the State Department. These include strategic planning, resource planning, institutional integration, clear authority over security assistance programs, and moving away from nation-building and toward conflict prevention. Far-reaching changes in the way diplomats are recruited, trained, and promoted are also required. Without such changes, there is substantial risk that our diplomatic tools will be ineffective, resulting in even greater militarization of U.S. foreign policy when diplomacy fails.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Regional Cooperation, International Security, Bilateral Relations, Military Affairs, Grand Strategy, Alliance, and Statecraft
Political Geography:: United States

17. Limited Rapprochement: Prospects for Turkish-Israeli Convergence of Interests

Author:: FARAS
Publication Date:: 08-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:: Turkey’s endeavor to improve its relations with Israel were evidenced in its recent official contacts with Israel. Most recently, on July 12, 2021, Israeli President Issac Herzog and Turksih President Recep Tayyib Erdogan held a phone call, followed by official contacts between ministers and officials from both countries. The contacts are perceived as a Turkish attempt to overcome years of strained relations between the two countries.
Topic:: International Relations, Military Affairs, Economy, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:: Turkey, Middle East, and Israel

18. Moscow's Central Role: Have the Rules of Engagement Changed in Syria after the recent Israeli Strikes?

Author:: FARAS
Publication Date:: 08-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:: On July 19, 22 and 25, Israel carried out three strikes in less than one week using surface-to-air missiles against Syria. These strikes are considered the first of their kind executed by the new Israeli "Bennett-Lapid" government. Although this type of strikes is not novel, the Russian reaction to it was different this time. The Russian Ministry of Defense engaged in the scene for the first time, sending indirect messages to Israel. This made analysts refer to a possible shift in the rules of engagement in Syria. The understandings between Moscow and Tel Aviv were based on Moscow turning a blind eye to Israeli fighters launching airstrikes in Syria against Iranian targets, in return for Israel not targeting Syrian regime forces or Russian forces, which provide direct support to the Syrian army against the armed opposition. The Russian position reflected a clear desire to weaken the Iranian military presence in Syria, particularly with the escalation of rivalry between Moscow and Tehran over economic and military influence there.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Armed Forces, Military Affairs, and Economy
Political Geography:: Russia, Iran, Middle East, Israel, and Syria

19. A Spiraling Crisis: The different scenarios of Ethiopia’s civil war amid Tigray’s military advancement

Author:: FARAS
Publication Date:: 08-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:: Over the past nine months, Ethiopia has been reeling under a civil war that broke out between the federal government and the Tigray People's Liberation Front (TPLF). The conflict, however, saw two important developments, with the first being that the war has spilled over the region’s border into Amhara and Afar. The second development is that Addis Ababa refused to allow corridors via Sudan for humanitarian aid bound for Tigray Region. Addis Ababa took this stand despite the United Nation’s warning that 400,000 people are left on the verge of famine in the beleaguered region and that 90 per cent of the population need lifesaving food aid.
Topic:: Security, Civil War, Military Affairs, Crisis Management, and Humanitarian Crisis
Political Geography:: Africa, Ethiopia, and Tigray

20. Pragmatic Adaptation: American Surrender and Regional Acceptance After Taliban’s Takeover of Afghanistan

Author:: FARAS
Publication Date:: 08-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:: Ousted Afghan president Ashraf Ghani left Afghanistan on August 15th when the Taliban reached the outskirts of the capital Kabul. At the time, a source close to Taliban stressed that the two sides reached an agreement whereby Ghani should step down and hand over power to a transitional administration. While the United States and the European Union might well consider the use of sanctions as a weapon against the Taliban, if the movement does not live up to its commitment not to target US and European citizens leaving Afghanistan, it should be noted that most of Afghanistan’s neighbors expected the collapse of the Afghan government – although not this fast- and even began to open up to the Taliban. Irreversible US Withdrawal The United States defended its decision to pull out of Afghanistan rebuffing criticism both at home and abroad. It reiterated that kept forces in Afghanistan twice as long as the Soviets. The US Secretary of State Antony Blinken said remaining in Afghanistan is “simply not in the national interest.” He added that the US succeeded in the mission of reducing attacks on its soil and interests. The US withdrawal will leave wide repercussions both regionally and internationally.
Topic:: Military Affairs, Taliban, European Union, Refugees, Humanitarian Crisis, Adaptation, and Pragmatism
Political Geography:: Pakistan, Afghanistan, Russia, Iran, South Asia, Turkey, India, and United States of America

21. Curtailing Tehran: Breaking down the validation of Israeli conjectures if Damascus is constraining Iranian military activities

Author:: FARAS
Publication Date:: 07-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Future for Advanced Research and Studies (FARAS)
Abstract:: The Israeli ‘Walla’ news website published a report that Syrian President Bashar al-Assad has reorganized the deployment of military forces in Syria, and has restricted the movement of Iranian forces internally in order to prevent internal frictions and achieve peace and stability. Walla deems the change in Damascus’s stance towards Iran to be in response to the political, economic and military pressures implored on the former. The website has also indicated that the Iranian presence in Syria has also weakened for other reasons, including the continuous Israeli and US pressures on Iranian presence there. While there were no sources confirming such notions, considering the policies of regional and international powers’ concerning the Syrian crisis, there might be some truth to this notion, pushing Damascus to embrace such tactics.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Military Affairs, Political stability, and Peace
Political Geography:: Iran, Middle East, Israel, and Syria

22. ‘A careful foot can step anywhere’: The UAE and China in the Horn of Africa: Implications for EU engagement

Author:: Jos Meester and Guido Lanfranchi
Publication Date:: 06-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:: Over the last decade, the UAE and China have vastly expanded their economic, political and military footprint in the Horn of Africa, and their actions now have the potential to shape developments in the region. Room for cooperation between Abu Dhabi and Beijing exists on issues such as maritime security, regional stability, and economic development. Moreover, the two countries’ interaction could lead to improvements in the Horn’s underdeveloped infrastructure by triggering a race to investment. Yet, development and stability in the region might suffer if the strategic interests of external players take precedence over local ones, or if local elites (mis)use external support for narrow domestic political calculations. The EU and its member states have high stakes in the Horn’s stability. To optimise their engagement, European policymakers should be aware of the implications of the Emirati and Chinese presence, and they should strive to improve cooperation among the wide range of external players active in the Horn.
Topic:: Economics, International Cooperation, Politics, Military Affairs, Economic Development, and Economic Stability
Political Geography:: Africa, China, Asia, and Horn of Africa

23. Turkey’s interventions in its near abroad: The case of Libya

Author:: Engin Yüksel
Publication Date:: 09-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:: The strategic objectives of the Turkish military intervention in Libya in 2019–2020 in favour of the Government of National Accord (GNA) were geopolitical (establishing an entry point into Africa in addition to Somalia), geo-economical (related to gas exploration in the Mediterranean) and commercial (facilitating repayment of outstanding business debts and enabling future profits). The deeper drivers of Ankara’s intervention include a mix of more assertive nationalism based on a hegemonic conception of Turkey’s ‘near abroad’, a perceived need to counter the military campaign of the Libyan National Army (LNA)’s to conquer Tripolitania, and Turkey’s exclusion from Mediterranean gas politics. Ankara’s intervention and its institutionalisation proved effective in counterbalancing the LNA and its international backers – chiefly Russia and the UAE, but also France and Egypt – and produced a more stable political situation in the process. While Turkey has achieved its short- to medium-term objectives and is likely to retain a substantial permanent military, commercial and political presence in Libya, it also created tensions with the EU and US as well as antagonizing the LNA’s international backers. In brief, an improvement in Turkey’s geostrategic position might have come at the cost of its regional strategic relations.
Topic:: Politics, Military Affairs, Geopolitics, Military Intervention, and Regional Power
Political Geography:: Turkey, Middle East, and Libya

24. Rethinking U.S. Efforts on Counterterrorism: Toward a Sustainable Plan Two Decades After 9/11

Author:: Matthew Levitt
Publication Date:: 03-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:: In the sixth in a series of TRANSITION 2021 memos examining the Middle East and North Africa, Matthew Levitt reimagines the U.S. counterterrorism enterprise with a view to its long-term sustainability. Since the September 11 attacks, Washington has poured funding into a largely military-led response to terrorism, but today both Democrats and Republicans stress the need to end “forever” wars, focus limited resources on protecting the homeland, and lean more on foreign partners to address terrorism in their neighborhoods. Yet any shift in posture must seek a maximum return on the twenty-year U.S. investment in counterterrorism while also keeping up with terrorists’ exploitation of new technologies, from drones to encrypted communication to social media. This will require finding areas of policy overlap between counterterrorism and Great Power competition, and disentangling U.S. counterterrorism budgets from the military budgets on which they have been grafted over the past two decades. More broadly, the author explains, “convincing partners to share more of the counterterrorism burden will require that Washington repair its damaged credibility and demonstrate the staying power to meet its alliance commitments.” In the coming weeks, TRANSITION 2021 memos by Washington Institute experts will address the broad array of issues facing the Biden-Harris administration in the Middle East. These range from thematic issues, such as the region’s strategic position in the context of Great Power competition and how to most effectively elevate human rights and democracy in Middle East policy, to more discrete topics, from Arab-Israel peace diplomacy to Red Sea security to challenges and opportunities in northwest Africa. Taken as a whole, this series of memos will present a comprehensive approach for advancing U.S. interests in security and peace in this vital but volatile region.
Topic:: Security, Military Affairs, Counter-terrorism, Military Spending, and 9/11
Political Geography:: North America and United States of America

25. Beyond May 1: The Future of U.S. Engagement in Afghanistan

Author:: Adam Weinstein
Publication Date:: 04-2021
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:: October 2021 will mark the 20th anniversary of the U.S. war in Afghanistan. The United States currently finds itself at an inflection point, as it determines whether to withdraw its remaining troops by May 1, as required by a 2020 agreement with the Taliban, or to remain militarily involved in the conflict. The Biden administration should take the following steps to best support a negotiated settlement to end the war, while also bringing U.S. troops home.
Topic:: Conflict Resolution, War, Military Affairs, Taliban, Peace, and Troop Deployment
Political Geography:: Afghanistan

26. Hollow Promises: The Risks of Military Integration in Western Equatoria

Author:: Flora McCrone
Publication Date:: 06-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Small Arms Survey
Abstract:: In 2018, the Government of the Republic of South Sudan (GoSS), the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-in-Opposition (SPLM-IO), and the South Sudan Opposition Alliance (SSOA) signed the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS). As part of the transitional security arrangements within the R-ARCSS framework, all warring parties agreed to assemble combatants in designated cantonment sites to facilitate their training, and later, integration into a new ‘unity’ army or other national security services. A Briefing Paper from the Small Arms Survey’s Human Security Baseline Assessment for Sudan and South Sudan (HSBA) project examines the process of cantonment and the challenges in operationalizing the Agreement. Hollow Promises: The Risks of Military Integration in Western Equatoria describes the transitional security arrangements of the R-ARCSS and the scope of force sizes to be cantoned. It follows with a case study of Western Equatoria’s Arrow Boys, demonstrating how their involvement exposes some of the fault-lines within the broader integration process. The Briefing Paper finds that the implementation of the R-ARCSS is leading to deteriorating local security, community cohesion, and stability.
Topic:: Security, Treaties and Agreements, Military Affairs, and Political stability
Political Geography:: Africa and South Sudan

27. Considering the "Zero Option"

Author:: Mike Sweeney
Publication Date:: 03-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Defense Priorities
Abstract:: The strategic importance of the Middle East has declined, but Washington has so far inadequately adjusted. Diversification of energy sources and reduction in external threats to the region make the Middle East less important to U.S. interests.
Topic:: Cold War, Military Strategy, and Military Affairs
Political Geography:: United States and Middle East

28. Iranian Succession and the Impact of Soleimani’s Death

Author:: Mehdi Khalaji
Publication Date:: 01-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:: The general’s peerless domestic stature would have served a crucial mediatory role during the eventual transition to Khamenei’s successor, so his death brings significant uncertainty to that process. Following the assassination of Qasem Soleimani, much attention has been focused on the foreign operations conducted by the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps-Qods Force. Yet his organization also played a major role at home, one whose future is now unclear. In particular, Soleimani himself was well positioned to be a unifying, steadying figure once Iran faced the challenge of determining a successor to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.
Topic:: Politics, Military Affairs, Authoritarianism, and Qassem Soleimani
Political Geography:: Iraq, Iran, Middle East, and United States of America

29. Establishing a Response Ratio for Iranian and Proxy Attacks

Author:: Michael Knights
Publication Date:: 02-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:: Enhancing deterrence and protecting Americans in Iraq and Syria requires a more formalized system for rationing out retaliatory strikes at the proper intensity, time, and place. When U.S. airstrikes targeted Kataib Hezbollah militia personnel and senior Iranian military figures on December 29 and January 3, they were releasing long-pent-up retaliation for a range of provocations by Iraqi militias. Yet while these powerful blows may have injected some caution into enemy calculations, such deterrence is likely to be a wasting asset. The most proximal trigger for the strikes—the killing of an American civilian contractor during Kataib Hezbollah’s December 27 rocket attack on the K-1 base in Kirkuk—was just one in a series of increasingly risky militia operations against U.S. facilities. Only good fortune has prevented more Americans from dying in attacks conducted since then, including January 8 (when Iranian ballistic missiles struck the U.S. portion of al-Asad Air Base, causing more than a hundred nonlethal traumatic brain injuries), January 26 (mortar strike on the dining hall at the U.S. embassy in Baghdad), January 31 (rockets fired at the U.S. site at Qayyarah West), February 10 (explosive device thrown at a U.S. logistical convoy south of Baghdad), and February 13 (rocket attack on U.S. site at Kirkuk). The United States has seemingly communicated to Tehran that it will strike Iraqi militias and Iranian targets if any Americans are killed, but this redline has opened up a dangerous gray zone in which Iran and its proxies are emboldened to continue their nonlethal attacks. Besides the fact that such high-risk attacks are destined to result in more American deaths at some point, they will also produce many more injuries if permitted to continue, as seen in the January 8 strike. More broadly, they will limit U.S. freedom of movement in Iraq and Syria, undermining the point of being there in the first place. This situation is unacceptable—the United States needs a way to deter such behavior even when attacks fall short of killing Americans. When faced with similar challenges in past decades, the U.S. military established reckoning systems that matched the punishment to the crime, with useful levels of predictability, proportionality, and accountability.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Military Affairs, Assassination, and No-Fly Zones
Political Geography:: Iraq, Iran, Middle East, Syria, and United States of America

30. Who Is Esmail Qaani, the New Chief Commander of Iran’s Qods Force?

Author:: Ali Alfoneh
Publication Date:: 01-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:: Given the IRGC’s recent restructuring, the Qods Force will likely see more continuity than change under Qaani, though his bureaucratic background is a far cry from Soleimani’s brand of charismatic, risky leadership. On January 3, Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei appointed Brig. Gen. Esmail Qaani as chief commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force, just hours after his predecessor, Qasem Soleimani, was killed by a U.S. drone strike. The new commander’s background and military activities are not nearly as well known as Soleimani’s, so taking a closer look at them can help determine whether and how the IRGC’s main extraterritorial branch might change under his leadership.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Military Affairs, Qassem Soleimani, and Assassination
Political Geography:: Iran and Middle East

31. Use it or Lose it: Corporate Over-Planning in the Air Force

Author:: Ross Fetterly
Publication Date:: 01-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Canadian Global Affairs Institute (CGAI)
Abstract:: The Canadian government allocates funds to departments through the annual federal budgetary process. With a Department of National Defence (DND) budget in the fiscal year 2019-20 of close to $22 billion,2 and expenditures spread out across a broad range of very different and distinct activities, expending the full allocation can be a significant challenge. While federal departments are permitted some carry-forward of eligible lapsing funds from one fiscal year to the next, in fiscal year 2018-19 the amount designated was up to five per cent of the operating budgets in their Main Estimates.3 With the federal government projecting significant budgetary deficits in the coming years, restricting or eliminating carry-forward of funding may be limited or eliminated to reduce deficits. Past practice within the department has been for the Investment Resource Management Committee (IRMC), chaired by the deputy minister, to decide on funding allocations of the carry-forward, based on departmental corporate priorities. While from an institutional perspective that aligns funding with optimal funding requirements, the consequence to organizations such as the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) is that only a limited amount of lapsed funding may be allocated the following fiscal year. Thus, the air force has a significant incentive regarding its budget: to “use it or lose it”.4 RCAF corporate over-planning (COP) is a principal in-year strategy to maximize the use of allocated financial resources. Yet, at the operational and tactical level, the concept and application of in-year over-planning is not sufficiently understood. This paper will frame over-planning within the context of the RCAF and then recommend strategies to integrate over-planning into the air force culture. Corporate over-planning is essentially a means toward an end; specifically, that of maximizing output given by defined resource allocation. The paper will first consider defence planning approaches and budget allocations, and then consider the strategic environment within which the organization operates. The third section will emphasize the need for change in how the RCAF manages financial resources, followed by a section on adapting to change. The fifth section will review the concept of over-planning. That will be followed by a discussion of RCAF institutional corporate over-planning. The seventh section will consider budgeting as communication and how this supports maintenance of a common operating picture within the RCAF on over-planning. The final section will focus on RCAF corporate over-planning by discussing the structural unexpended rate, applying an absorption rate in operations and maintenance activities, and planning investment opportunities.
Topic:: Government, Armed Forces, Military Affairs, and Budget
Political Geography:: Canada and North America

32. North Korea's Nuclear and Missile Programs

Author:: Stephan Haggard and Tai Ming Cheung
Publication Date:: 07-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC)
Abstract:: The international community has consistently underestimated North Korean nuclear and missile capabilities. How has an economically impoverished, technologically backward, and internationally isolated state been able to establish robust and increasingly competent nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs? Has the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) achieved this on its own, as it proudly claims? Or has it been predominantly reliant on foreign sources and if so, to whom and in what ways? This brief synthesizes what we know about the development of North Korean nuclear and missile capabilities, which together makes up the country’s strategic weapons complex. These industries have made rapid and concerted progress up the global innovation ladder over the past few decades. Indeed, this highly secretive apparatus is probably the most innovative, dynamic, technologically advanced, and privileged segment of the North Korean economy. The barriers to dismantling North Korea’s nuclear program are substantial, and ultimately depend on strategic choices in Pyongyang. Will the DPRK continue to focus on developing the next generation of strategic weapons as negotiations stall out, or will they shift resources to other economic activities? Nuclear negotiations must consider the deeper implications of the sprawling nuclear and missile industrial complex: how to bring greater transparency to this infrastructure and assure it is rolled back.
Topic:: Nuclear Weapons, Military Affairs, Weapons, and Innovation
Political Geography:: Asia and North Korea

33. A New Direction: A Foreign Policy Playbook on Military Restraint for the Biden Team

Publication Date:: 12-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:: Two decades of endless war and a bloated Pentagon budget that has proven useless in preventing Covid–19 deaths, now 270,000 and counting, are a jarring reminder that America’s foreign policy is thoroughly broken: It actually makes America and Americans less safe. Successive administrations have deployed the military in a costly, counterproductive, and indiscriminate manner, normalizing war and treating armed dominance as an end in itself. In consequence, the foreign policies of the United States are detached from any defensible conception of U.S. interests and from a decent respect for the rights and dignity of humankind. Marginal adjustments to the current approach will prove insufficient. A deeper rethinking of American foreign policy is warranted. This must be an undertaking that puts the well-being of the American people ahead of ambitions to dominate the globe. President-elect Joe Biden appears to recognize the need for a serious reorientation. His just-named national security advisor, Jake Sullivan, recently said that Biden has tasked his foreign policy team with “reimagining our national security for the unprecedented combination of crises we face at home and abroad,” including pandemics and the climate crisis. Moreover, Sullivan said that American foreign policy has to be judged by a basic question: Does it “make life better, easier, and safer” for Americans at home? Our foreign policy, in Sullivan’s words, has to deliver for American families.
Topic:: International Relations, Foreign Policy, National Security, Military Affairs, Grand Strategy, and Joe Biden
Political Geography:: Global Focus

34. Policy Papers by Women of Color: Top Issues in Peace, Security, Conflict Transformation, and Foreign Policy

Author:: Bonnie Jenkins
Publication Date:: 03-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Women of Color Advancing Peace, Security and Conflict Transformation (WCAPS)
Abstract:: Women of Color Advancing Peace, Security, and Conflict Transformation (WCAPS) is happy to publish its First Edition of “Policy Papers By Women of Color” on issues of peace, security, conflict transformation, and foreign policy. The topics in this first publication of policy papers examine several issues that are within the areas of expertise of our members, some having a clear focus on issues of equity that we, as an organization, believe should be a part of all matters of peace and security. Topics in this edition range from religion to food and water security, from cybersecurity and emerging technologies to weapons of mass destruction, and from redefining national security to female military leadership.
Topic:: Security, Foreign Policy, Gender Issues, Military Affairs, Women, Peace, Girls, and Women of Color
Political Geography:: Global Focus

35. War on the virus: Military responses to COVID-19

Author:: Adam Moe Fejerskov and Johannes Lang
Publication Date:: 12-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:: Countries across the globe have mobilised security forces to counter COVID-19, but such militarised pandemic responses threaten the security of civilians and pose challenges to democracy. Main findings: When governments articulate the COVID-19 response as a ‘war’, they effectively turn a global public health crisis into an issue of national security. Granting armed forces a leading role in pandemic responses may challenge the legitimacy of other public institutions and of the armed forces themselves. The urgency of involving armed forces in COVID-19 responses means that mechanisms of audit, accountability and democratic oversight are not always upheld.
Topic:: Security, Military Affairs, Democracy, and COVID-19
Political Geography:: Global Focus

36. The pandemic and the military: towards total defence?

Author:: Antonio Missiroli and Michael Ruhle
Publication Date:: 11-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: NATO Defense College
Abstract:: The COVID-19 pandemic, which broke out in December 2019 in the Chinese city of Wuhan and quickly spread across the globe, will have a lasting impact on worldwide economic, political and strategic developments. Some observers question whether the different approaches by nations to the pandemic may benefit or hinder global economic competition. Others worry that some states may exploit the pandemic as a pretext to curtail individual freedoms. Still others note the emergence of an outright "battle of narratives" on the origins of the virus and the correct approach to bringing it under control, adding fuel to an already lingering "systemic" contest.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Military Affairs, Pandemic, and COVID-19
Political Geography:: Asia and Global Focus

37. Russian approaches to military technology. The Northern dimension

Author:: Jakub M. Godzimirski
Publication Date:: 04-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: This policy brief presents the main findings of a project on Russian approaches to technological challenges, and the implications for security developments in the High North. It begins by examining the Russian debate on the technological challenges identified as posing a threat to national security by the country’s policymakers. Next, it explores how these challenges have been dealt with by Russia in the post-2014 context, paying special attention to developments in the field of military technology and how President Putin has taken advantage of these to address questions of strategic balance. Finally, the brief sets out the strategic implications for Norway, as NATO’s representative in this northern corner and Russia’s direct neighbour.
Topic:: Development, Military Affairs, and Vladimir Putin
Political Geography:: Russia and Norway

38. Kosovo’s NATO future: How to Square the Circle?

Author:: Visar Xhambazi
Publication Date:: 12-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:: This policy brief examines how ties between Kosovo and NATO can be strengthened. The fact that Serbia and four NATO member states do not recognize Kosovo’s independence, has hampered further integration into international organisations. The authors delineate possible political and military steps that Kosovo could take in the short and medium term, in order to prepare itself as a credible future partner. The Kosovo-Serbia Dialogue is the ultimate challenge for Kosovo in the long term and until a deal is reached, NATO integration is unlikely. Pristina has to be aware of the military-political equation, where every major military change could have political repercussions. Nonetheless, Kosovo can already commit to necessary reforms of its democratic system. Kosovo should also try to create ways of strengthening ties to the Alliance under the current circumstances, by for instance explicitly asking to establish a political dialogue. Vice versa, NATO could consider deepening cooperation within the ‘enhanced cooperation framework’. Through this interaction, the Alliance could aid Kosovo in reforming its political system, which would create a smoother path for Kosovo’s future integration aspirations.
Topic:: NATO, Politics, and Military Affairs
Political Geography:: Eastern Europe, Kosovo, and Serbia

39. The Erdogan Doctrine: Turkey’s regional strategy

Author:: Al Jazeera Center for Studies
Publication Date:: 10-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Al Jazeera Center for Studies
Abstract:: Turkey’s involvement in various conflicts is a reflection of the Erdogan Doctrine that was formed by internal transformations that have led to the creation of a sophisticated military industry and a prosperous economy and shifted its view of its external role as an independent regional power.
Topic:: Military Affairs, Economy, Conflict, Erdogan, and Regional Power
Political Geography:: Turkey and Middle East

40. Taking Back the Neighborhood: The IRGC Provincial Guard's Mission to Re-Islamize Iran

Author:: Saeid Golkar
Publication Date:: 06-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:: In 2008, the IRGC established a new branch that remains little known or studied today: the Provincial Guard. Operating in all of Iran's thirty-one provinces plus Tehran city, the IRGC-PG carries out the regime's revolutionary aims at the local level, inculcating conservative religious values, shaping educational curricula, and even sponsoring sports activities. It also delivers military might and security through its Imam Hussein infantry battalions and anti-riot Imam Ali battalions. This pathbreaking Policy Note, written by expert Saeid Golkar, casts the Provincial Guard as a rising actor in Iran's national narrative. If Tehran has its way, the organization will succeed in finally enshrining Iran as an "Islamic society." But domestic precedent suggests this bid will meet more than a little resistance, especially given a regime dealing with economic weakness, a coronavirus pandemic, and a restive, increasingly secularist public emboldened by last year's mass protests.
Topic:: Islam, Military Affairs, and Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corp (IRGC)
Political Geography:: Iran and Middle East

41. Mediterranean Sea: a paradigm of contemporary conflicts

Author:: Admiral Jean Casabianca
Publication Date:: 06-2020
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Robert Schuman Foundation (RSF)
Abstract:: Looking back at my military career, during which I sailed and battled above and below so many oceans, I am struck by the duality of the Mediterranean Sea. It is indeed for me as well a familiar environment as an area of perpetual uncertainty, which contributed to define me as a man, a sailor and a military leader. Predicators say that the Mediterranean, stage of the first major clashes between civilizations, will not be anymore the international centre of gravity and that the Pacific Ocean will take over this role. It remains however a major hub for the interactions of key strategic competitors.
Topic:: Security, Defense Policy, Military Affairs, and Conflict
Political Geography:: Mediterranean

42. Enough Toxic Militarism

Author:: Nikhil Pal Singh
Publication Date:: 12-2019
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft
Abstract:: I teach college students at New York University’s campus on Washington Square in Manhattan and in its prison program in upstate New York. My students have never lived in a time when the United States was not at war. Growing up after the Vietnam War, when the United States had converted to an all-volunteer military, the great majority of my N.Y.U. students have not served in uniform, although the military is more likely to be a stop on the itinerary, or part of family experience, for those who end up in prison. For most of them, the wars in which U.S. soldiers and support personnel have been engaged on three continents for the past two decades retain a hazy, distant, and amorphous character; this perception is also typical now among civilian noncombatants. That the consequences of war-fighting remain seemingly remote ironically reinforces war as a natural and unchanging backdrop to social life in the United States today. We are overdue for a major cost accounting and reappraisal of these permanent wars.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Military Strategy, Military Affairs, Domestic Politics, and Military Intervention
Political Geography:: United States

43. End U.S. Military Support for the Saudi-Led War in Yemen

Author:: Enea Gjoza and Benjamin H. Friedman
Publication Date:: 01-2019
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Defense Priorities
Abstract:: The Yemeni Civil War is in its fourth year, and Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and their allies are not close to a victory over the Houthi rebels.
Topic:: Conflict Resolution, Conflict Prevention, Defense Policy, Military Strategy, Military Affairs, Military Spending, Military Intervention, and Peace
Political Geography:: United States, Middle East, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and North Africa

44. Disentangling from Syria's Civil War

Author:: Benjamin H. Friedman and Justin Logan
Publication Date:: 05-2019
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Defense Priorities
Abstract:: The United States intervened in Syria’s civil war in two ways: (1) anti-Assad efforts—through aid to rebels to help foster regime change and with airpower, troops and support to a militia—and (2) anti-ISIS efforts—through aid to the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) to destroy the Islamic State’s territorial caliphate. The first mission was an ill-considered failure, the second a success.
Topic:: Conflict Resolution, Civil War, Military Strategy, Peacekeeping, Military Affairs, Military Intervention, and Peace
Political Geography:: Russia, United States, Iran, and Syria

45. Exiting Afghanistan: Ending America's Longest War

Author:: Benjamin H. Friedman
Publication Date:: 08-2019
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Defense Priorities
Abstract:: The war in Afghanistan—now America’s longest at nearly 18 years—quickly achieved its initial aims: (1) to destroy the Al-Qaeda terrorist organization and (2) to punish the Taliban government that gave it haven. However, Washington extended the mission to a long and futile effort of building up the Afghan state to defeat the subsequent Taliban insurgency.
Topic:: Conflict Resolution, War, Military Strategy, Peacekeeping, Military Affairs, and Military Intervention
Political Geography:: Afghanistan, United States, Middle East, and Asia

46. India’s Space Program - International Competition and Evolution

Author:: Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan
Publication Date:: 12-2019
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:: India’s space program has grown and evolved significantly in the last five decades. The program originally focused on developing space assets that provided direct developmental benefits, for example telecommunications and remote sensing satellites that helped both in improving communication facilities and giving direct assistance to India’s farmers. But over time, India has shifted a part of its focus towards space exploration and other high-profile missions that do not have as clear a developmental purpose as earlier. This includes, for example, India’s Mars and Moon exploratory missions. Overall, India has been fairly successful in these efforts and its space program has become a comprehensive one that includes not only a robust launch capacity and very large remote sensing satellite systems, but also a very well rounded scientific and deep space exploratory program.
Topic:: Science and Technology, Military Affairs, Weapons, and Space
Political Geography:: Pakistan, China, South Asia, and India

47. Russia’s Militia Groups and their Use at Home and Abroad

Publication Date:: 04-2019
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:: What makes the militia milieu so unique and important for understanding today’s Russia is that it finds itself at the intersection of state institutions, patronage mechanisms, criminal structures, and grassroots illiberal activism. Abroad, the Kremlin plays through it one of its major “hybrid warfare” cards, outsourcing activities traditionally conducted by intelligence entities and allowing for plausible deniability. The militia realm thus seems destined to play a growing role in Russia’s law-enforcement, military and intelligence culture both at home and abroad. Marlene Laruelle is Research Professor and Associate Director of the Institute for European, Russian and Eurasian Studies (IERES) at the George Washington University (Washington DC) and Co-Director of PONARS-Eurasia. She has been Associate Research Fellow at Ifri’s Russia/NIS Center since January 2019.
Topic:: Security, Nationalism, Military Affairs, and Ideology
Political Geography:: Russia and Eurasia

48. Signposts for an Islamic State Comeback in Iraq

Author:: Michael Knights
Publication Date:: 10-2019
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:: Despite the damage wrought by the U.S. withdrawal from Syria, the main drivers of Islamic State resurgence in Iraq can still be restrained by local U.S. engagement, which is now even more vital than before. The gross uncertainty surrounding the future of counterterrorism operations in northeast Syria is raising understandable fears of an Islamic State comeback in Iraq. After all, the IS resurgence of 2011-2014 was partially driven by the chaotic war conditions in Syria, and suppressing the group there will be extremely challenging in the coming months amid U.S. withdrawal and Turkish invasion. Another resurgence in Iraq is hardly inevitable, however—the country is subject to different internal drivers, and the United States is still well-positioned to lead international support of Baghdad’s counterterrorism efforts. Yet Washington will need to stay engaged and urgently address new problems if it hopes to prevent another disastrous insurgency.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Military Affairs, Counter-terrorism, and Islamic State
Political Geography:: Iraq, Middle East, Syria, and United States of America

49. The Islamic State in Syria After the U.S. Withdrawal

Author:: Aaron Y. Zelin
Publication Date:: 10-2019
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:: Recent U.S. decisions have seemingly ignored the degree to which the group is continuing its insurgent attacks and reorganizing its supporters inside increasingly vulnerable detention facilities. In contrast to President Trump’s statements over the past half-year, the Islamic State has yet to be defeated outright. True, the group is nowhere near as capable as it was in 2015, but it is steadily rebuilding its capacities and attempting to break thousands of its supporters out of detainment. The vacuum created by the U.S. withdrawal and Turkish invasion will create more space for those efforts, while compounding the original problem of states being unwilling to deal with their citizens who joined IS and remain in Syria. To avoid becoming known as the administration that allowed IS to reemerge and, perhaps, conduct mass-casualty attacks in Europe or elsewhere, President Trump and his cabinet should take urgent action to salvage and mobilize their surviving ties with Washington’s longtime partner against IS, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF).
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Military Affairs, Violent Extremism, and Islamic State
Political Geography:: Iraq, Middle East, Syria, and United States of America

50. Turkey Pivots to Tripoli: Implications for Libya’s Civil War and U.S. Policy

Author:: Soner Cagaptay and Ben Fishman
Publication Date:: 12-2019
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:: Facing pressure from General Haftar and his foreign military backers, the Tripoli government has welcomed the helping hand extended by Ankara, whose own lack of regional options has drawn it into the middle of another conflict. On December 10, Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdogan announced that he was willing to deploy troops in Libya if the UN-backed Government of National Accord in Tripoli requested it. He reiterated the offer during a December 15 meeting with GNA prime minister Fayez al-Sarraj in Ankara—a visit that arose after Gen. Khalifa Haftar, who heads the self-styled Libyan National Army (LNA) and seeks to replace the GNA, renewed his push to take Tripoli by force. Meanwhile, Turkey signed two controversial agreements with Tripoli over the past month: a memorandum of understanding on providing the GNA with arms, training, and military personnel, formally ratified by Tripoli earlier today; and a November 28 maritime agreement delineating exclusive economic zones in the Mediterranean waters separating the two countries. The latter move drew protests from Greece and Egypt and was condemned “unequivocally” by the European Council. These and other developments indicate Libya’s emerging status as a focal point of Ankara’s foreign policy, which seemingly regards the country as an arena for Turkish proxy competition with rivals old (Greece) and new (Egypt and the United Arab Emirates). At the same time, Libya’s GNA has become increasingly dependent on Ankara for military reasons—namely, a lack of other allies willing to provide arms capable of countering the LNA’s Emiratisupplied drones, and the arrival of Russian mercenaries who have added new technology and precision to Haftar’s war against Tripoli. Unless Washington invests more diplomatic energy and fully backs the German-led initiative to implement a ceasefire and return to peace negotiations, the proxy war in Libya will only escalate. In that scenario, Turkey and Russia—not the United States or its European partners—could be become the arbiters of Libya’s future.
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Civil War, Military Affairs, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:: Turkey, Middle East, Libya, North Africa, and United States of America

51. Kurdish Reactions to Their Abandonment in Syria

Author:: Bilal Wahab
Publication Date:: 10-2019
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:: The U.S. withdrawal of troops from northeast Syria has placed Kurdish fighters in a near-impossible situation, while alarming Kurdish communities in other countries, but Washington can still take steps to mitigate the damage. On October 21, footage of Kurdish civilians heckling withdrawing U.S. troops in both Iraq and Syria offered a rare and disturbing sight. This scene was facilitated by President Trump’s October 6 decision to unilaterally withdraw U.S. forces from Syria, in effect paving the way for the Turkish military to cross the Syrian border three days later and attack the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). Thereafter, a safe haven quickly became a war zone. According to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 180,000 people have now been forced from their homes. James Jeffrey, the U.S. administration’s envoy to Syria, told Congress on October 22 that the fighting has resulted in hundreds of SDF deaths, a likely war crime by a pro-Turkish militia, and the escape from prison of more than a hundred Islamic State (IS) fighters. The U.S. action has unsurprisingly left the Syrian Kurds feeling abandoned and exposed against the militarily superior Turkish army and its Arab militias. On a deeper level, America appears to have entirely lost Kurdish sympathy and trust, while at the same time failing to either deter or appease Turkey. Rather than ameliorate matters, President Trump has poured salt on the wound. He responded to backlash against his policy by claiming the Kurds were “no angels” and that they had failed to contribute to the Allied cause in World War II, while characterizing their Syrian military campaign as a fight over “long-bloodstained sand.”
Topic:: Foreign Policy, Public Opinion, Military Affairs, and Conflict
Political Geography:: Iraq, Turkey, Middle East, Syria, United States of America, and Rojava

52. Defence Procurement Canada: Opportunities and Constraints

Author:: Jeff Collins
Publication Date:: 12-2019
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Canadian Global Affairs Institute (CGAI)
Abstract:: Substantive defence issues rarely make national political campaign platforms. However, in the 2019 federal election, reforming the defence procurement bureaucracy to overcome delays became a highlight for not one but two of the country’s main political parties. To “ensure that priority projects are progressing on time and on budget”, the Conservatives called for the creation of a defence procurement secretariat within the Privy Council Office, akin to a model used by the Robert Borden government in the First World War. The winning Liberal party went further and promised to create a separate defence procurement agency, called Defence Procurement Canada (DPC). As of this writing, details remain sparse, but as with the Conservatives, the ostensible purpose of such a reform is to ensure that “Canada’s biggest and most complex defence procurement projects are delivered on time and with greater transparency …” Considering that the government’s own defence white paper, 2017’s Strong, Secure, Engaged (SSE) found that 70 per cent of all defence procurement projects were not delivered on time, the existing bureaucratic process warrants a serious look. In fact, a substantial shake-up of the Canadian defence procurement bureaucracy has not taken place since the last separate procurement organization, the Department of Defence Production (DDP), was abolished in 1969. Arguments for altering the bureaucratic architecture of Canadian defence procurement have ebbed and flowed since the mid-2000s, when the first of successive governments began acquisition plans for replacing decades-old fleets of equipment, including CF-18 jets, Protecteur-class auxiliary oiler replenishment ships, Halifax-class frigates and Iroquois-class destroyers. With much publicized delays in these and other major Crown projects (MCPs), reform advocates have drawn attention to Canada’s multi-departmental procurement process as a source of frustration. Unique among allies, Canada relies principally upon three departments – National Defence (DND), Public Services and Procurement Canada (PSPC) and Innovation, Science and Economic Development (ISED) – for acquiring MCPs. Other countries typically rely on one of three approaches to acquiring material for their armed forces: procurement by individual armed services (United States); centralized government organizations (United Kingdom) or independent civilian corporations (Sweden). Although it is not clear whether the Liberal proposal is a new department (akin to the DDP), a Crown corporation or an agency under the DND’s auspices, any restructuring of the defence procurement system will not be easy. No matter what shape it takes, any new organization must deal with rearranging a complex set of institutional realities based on decades’ worth of statutes, policy frameworks and human resources allocations. Political realties still apply, too. Any new organization must contend with Canadian procurement politics, including the impact of new governments, differing priorities, regionalism and purchasing patterns.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Politics, Military Affairs, Weapons, and Military Spending
Political Geography:: Canada and North America

53. Assessing Progress on Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament: 2016-2019 Report Card

Author:: Alicia Sanders-Zakre and Kelsey Davenport
Publication Date:: 07-2019
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Arms Control Association
Abstract:: This new report is the fourth in a series that assesses the extent to which 11 key states are fulfilling, promoting, or undermining 10 standards identified as critical elements of the nonproliferation and disarmament regime. Collectively, states fared worse on the majority of criteria when compared with the prior edition covering the 2013–2016 period.
Topic:: Arms Control and Proliferation, International Cooperation, Nuclear Weapons, Military Affairs, Nonproliferation, and Denuclearization
Political Geography:: Global Focus

54. El Ejército Nacional en la implementación de la Política Nacional de Consolidación y Reconstrucción Territorial (2012-2016)

Author:: Mateo Rubiano Giraldo
Publication Date:: 10-2019
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Centro Interdisciplinario de Estudios sobre Desarrollo (CIDER), Universidad de los Andes
Abstract:: Esta investigación analiza el rol del Ejército Nacional en la implementación de la Política Nacional de Consolidación y Reconstrucción Territorial (PNCRT) durante el periodo 2012-2016. Para este fin, se realizaron entrevistas a los directores regionales del Grupo Asesor del Comandante (GAC), quienes, a través de esta unidad militar creada por el Ministerio de Defensa, ejecutaron acciones enfocadas a ganar el apoyo de la población en territorios constantemente afectados por el accionar de los grupos armados al margen de la ley. Se plantea que, pese al aparente éxito de las acciones realizadas por el Ejército, existieron brechas entre lo planteado por la teoría contrainsurgente y la puesta en marcha de la estrategia militar, principalmente por inconvenientes relacionados con colaboración efectiva entre instituciones estatales, problemas organizacionales del Ejército, dificultad en ganarse “corazones y mentes” de la población, y divergencias entre oficiales frente al papel del desarrollo en la implementación de la PNCRT.
Topic:: Military Affairs and Economic Development
Political Geography:: Colombia

55. Not smart enough: The poverty of European military thinking on artificial intelligence

Author:: Ulrike Franke
Publication Date:: 12-2019
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:: There is currently too little European thinking about what artificial intelligence means for the military. AI experts tend to overlook Europe, focusing on the US and China. But AI will play an important role for Europe’s defence capabilities, and its funding and development decisions will influence the future of military AI. France and Germany stand at opposite ends of the AI spectrum in Europe: France considers AI a part of geopolitical competition and shows clear interest in military AI, while Germany sees AI only as an economic and societal issue. The new European Commission’s stated goal of achieving “European technological sovereignty” should lead it to include engagement on the topic of military AI, and help EU member states harmonise their approaches. Failing to coordinate properly in this area could threaten future European defence cooperation, including PESCO and the European Defence Fund.
Topic:: Development, Military Affairs, and Artificial Intelligence
Political Geography:: China, Europe, France, Germany, and United States of America

56. Russian Private Military Companies: Continuity and Evolution of the Model

Author:: Anna Borshchevskaya
Publication Date:: 12-2019
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:: Russian private military companies or contractors (PMCs) have received much attention in recent years, but the Russian state has a long history in utilizing such groups. Under Vladimir Putin, however, this model is growing, evolving, and expanding. This study reviews the history of semi-state military forces in Russia and explains the unique way the Russian state utilizes PMCs, which is different from how Western governments utilize private contractors. An important aspect of PMCs is that they are officially illegal under Russian law. The study then traces the rise of the PMC model under Putin. It notes that while plausible deniability is a major reason for Moscow to utilize PMCs, it is also linked to other considerations, such as internal rivalries within the Russian government and other domestic reasons. Competition with the West drives the Kremlin’s use of PMCs. Paradoxically, the Russian PMC model demonstrates both state strength and weakness. The study reviews PMCs activities in Ukraine, Syria, and Africa, examines who joins these groups and under what circumstances, and concludes with policy recommendations.
Topic:: Non State Actors, Military Affairs, Private Sector, and Mercenaries
Political Geography:: Russia and Eurasia

57. India's New Nuclear Thinking: Counterforce, Crises, and Consequences

Author:: Christopher Clary and Vipin Narang
Publication Date:: 05-2019
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:: Bottom Lines Counterforce incentives. Pakistan’s threats of nuclear first use have given India incentives to develop disarming capabilities that might neutralize Pakistan’s nuclear capabilities in a future conflict. The goal of such a shift would be to allow New Delhi to recapture the space it believed it had lost for conventional retaliation, without fear of nuclear use from Pakistan and without having to engage in tit-for-tat nuclear warfighting. Expanding options without doctrinal change. This risk of first-strike instability may force India to consider circumstances under which it could use nuclear weapons preemptively, posing a challenge to its long-standing “no first use” (NFU) declaration. Senior former officials have argued that preemption may be consistent with India’s NFU policy, meaning that Indian nuclear strategy may be changing even without any public revisions to its declaratory doctrine. Growing but still insufficient capabilities. India has dramatically expanded the number of precise nuclear-armed and conventional weapons that it possesses that can strike deep into Pakistan, along with the necessary systems and infrastructure to find and destroy Pakistani nuclear systems and intercept any forces it may miss with missile defenses. Nevertheless, it is far from achieving the ability to execute counterforce strikes against Pakistani nuclear targets, but even the mere pursuit of such options creates both an arms race on the Indian subcontinent as well as dangerous incentives to strike first in a crisis.
Topic:: International Security, Military Affairs, and Nuclear Power
Political Geography:: South Asia and India

58. Military Offensive Cyber-Capabilities: Small-State Perspectives

Author:: Lilly Pijnenburg Muller
Publication Date:: 01-2019
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:: This Policy Brief provides an overview of the military cyber-defence strategies and capabilities of Norway and of the Netherlands. Comparison of the two different approaches offers insights into their differing tactics and future policy directions. The Brief contributes with a small-state perspective on this malleable and constantly changing field, nuancing the hitherto US-centred debate on the utility and need for deterrence and defence in cyberspace.
Topic:: Defense Policy, Military Affairs, Cybersecurity, and Deterrence
Political Geography:: Norway, Netherlands, and United States of America

59. Pushing Back on Iran in Syria (Part 1): Beyond the ‘Boots’

Author:: Dana Stroul and Hanin Ghaddar
Publication Date:: 01-2019
Content Type:: Policy Brief
Institution:: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:: Apart from its military intervention, Tehran has pursued a wide range of economic and social tactics for increasing its sway in Syria, but Washington can still push back with targeted assistance, innovative sanctions, and strategic messaging. This PolicyWatch is the first in a two-part series on how to counter Iran’s expanding activities in Syria amid talk of U.S. military withdrawal. Part 2 will discuss the array of Iranian-backed armed groups currently operating there
Topic:: International Affairs and Military Affairs
Political Geography:: Global Focus

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COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS