Search

Begin New Search Topic Arms Control and Proliferation Content Type Policy Brief Publication Year within 10 Years

1. Is the Pursuit of Nukes Driven by Leaders or Systems?

Author:
So Yeon (Ellen) Park
Publication Date:
06-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC)
Abstract:
Nuclear weapons are widely regarded as one of the most lethal aspects of military arsenals ever created. As such, international relations and security experts have long been concerned about their proliferation. To prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, both policymakers and academic researchers have focused on what are commonly thought to be the primary drivers of proliferation: security concerns and domestic politics and economies. This brief examines another important driver: the role of national leaders themselves. Based on a study of 1,400 leaders in office between 1945 and 2000, author Ellen Park shows that leader personality and experience drive decisions about whether—or not—to pursue nuclear weapons, a finding that holds true across countries (rather than being limited to a few unique cases). Put simply, the pursuit of nuclear weapons is systematically influenced by certain attributes of leaders, such as college major, socioeconomic background, and military and international experience. To predict when and where the spread of nuclear and other emerging technologies will emerge next, policymakers should promote interdisciplinary dialogue to cultivate leader profiles and expand their use.
Topic:
Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, and Leadership
Political Geography:
Global Focus

2. America’s Response after Russian Suspension of New START

Author:
Rebeccah L. Heinrichs and Marshall Billingslea
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
This week’s news that Russia will suspend participation in the New START nuclear treaty follows the State Department’s January announcement that Russia is in breach of New START and its obligation to allow inspection activities on its territory. Since the Cold War, the United States has led efforts to promote nuclear non-proliferation and to create a transparent and stable dynamic between Moscow and Washington regarding our nuclear weapons forces. But the Russians have repeatedly demonstrated a willingness to violate the terms of our agreements. While the United States has sought to decrease our reliance on nuclear weapons in our military strategies, Russia has gone the other way. Russia is developing, testing, and fielding new delivery systems within traditional categories like road-mobile and silo-based intercontinental ballistic missiles. But it has also developed novel systems like nuclear-capable hypersonic glide vehicles that raise questions about their intent. And its large arsenal of non-strategic nuclear weapons remains outside the bounds of any treaty. As we’ve seen in Ukraine, Russia uses the threat of nuclear employment to coerce nations in wars of aggression that Russia has chosen. Moscow appears to have lowered the nuclear threshold. The best path for peace is for the United States to maintain credible deterrence options. This provides incentives for our adversaries to engage in diplomacy.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Deterrence, Military, and New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START)
Political Geography:
Russia, North America, and United States of America

3. Nuclear energy and proliferation in Turkey’s Asian Politics

Author:
Eliza Gheorghe
Publication Date:
01-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP)
Abstract:
The share of nuclear power in Asia’s electricity generating capacity has grown significantly over the last two decades. China is one of the dominant players in Asia, developing a robust nuclear power program. In the Middle East, Iran and the United Arab Emirates have introduced nuclear power into the region, with Turkey planning to follow in their footsteps in 2023. The adoption of nuclear power spurs concerns about the proliferation of nuclear weapons and nuclear latency. Some countries use their civilian nuclear programs to develop a robust infrastructure that allows them to acquire nuclear weapons in a relatively short period of time. Such dynamics are likely to have a destabilizing effect on international affairs in the Middle East and Asia. The current international situation makes it unlikely that the nuclear non-proliferation regime will become stronger in the near future. The war in Ukraine has demonstrated the need for a new generation of negative security assurances and collective defense that protects countries from nuclear blackmail.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Politics, Electricity, and Nuclear Energy
Political Geography:
Turkey, Middle East, and Asia

4. Iran’s Nuclear Endgame Warrants a Change in U.S. Strategy

Author:
Michael Singh
Publication Date:
02-2023
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
Abstract:
Recently, inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency discovered that Iran had enriched uranium to a level just shy of what is generally considered weapons grade. Like many findings before it, this revelation underscores the need for a new U.S. and European policy toward Iran. The two most important and immediate steps in that process are clear by this point: Washington and its partners need to move on from any remaining plans they might have to resurrect the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), namely by activating that accord’s “snapback” mechanism; and governments must heighten their efforts to deter Iran through credible threats of military force.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, and JCPOA
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, and United States of America

5. Arms racing under nuclear tripolarity: Evidence for an action-reaction cycle?

Author:
Matthew Kroenig
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
Conventional wisdom suggests that the world is approaching a tripolar arms race among the United States, Russia, and China. As Russia attempts to dramatically revise the post-Cold War security environment in Europe, China is expected to increase its nuclear arsenal to at least 1,500 warheads by 2035. In 2021, the then-commander of US Strategic Command, Admiral Richard, laid out the challenge of nuclear tripolarity before Congress testifying that: “for the first time in our history, the nation is on a trajectory to face two nuclear-capable, strategic peer adversaries at the same time.” In this issue brief, the Scowcroft Center’s Matthew Kroenig challenges the evidence for action-reaction arms races in the post-Cold War period but warns we may be facing one in this new tripolar nuclear environment.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Missile Defense, Deterrence, and Multipolarity
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, North America, and United States of America

6. Adapting the Missile Technology Control Regime for Current and Future Challenges

Author:
Kolja Brockmann, Mark Bromley, and Lauriane Héau
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
Abstract:
The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) is a cornerstone of the non-proliferation architecture for missiles and other uncrewed aerial vehicles. However, geopolitical and technical developments and operational challenges threaten the regime’s effectiveness and create a need for reform in several areas. The MTCR partners should develop a clear strategy for determining if and how to expand MTCR membership. To increase the number of adherents, partners should pursue reinforced outreach and expand and promote the benefits offered. By improving the transparency of its procedures and deliberations, the regime can make them more understandable for non-partners. The partners can also improve the MTCR’s legitimacy by emphasizing that it provides public goods and helps states to meet their international obligations. The regime can also address the challenges of emerging technologies by focusing on technical deliberations and sharing information and good practices. Through all this, the MTCR must ensure its continued functioning in the face of geopolitical tensions and armed conflict between partners.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Science and Technology, Geopolitics, and Weapons
Political Geography:
Global Focus

7. Preparing for the Final Collapse of the Soviet Union and the Dissolution of the Russian Federation

Author:
Luke Coffey
Publication Date:
12-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Hudson Institute
Abstract:
The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the resignation of Mikhail Gorbachev as president of the Soviet Union in 1991 marked the start of the USSR’s collapse—but not the collapse itself. While the USSR ceased to exist as a legal entity after 1991, the collapse of the USSR is still happening today. The two Chechen Wars, Russia’s invasion of Georgia in 2008, Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014, the on-and-off border skirmishes between Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, and the 2020 Second Karabakh War between Armenia and Azerbaijan are just a few examples showing that the Soviet Union is still collapsing today. However, future historians will likely describe Russia's February 2022 invasion of Ukraine as the most consequential moment, if not the final moment, of the Soviet Union’s collapse. When the war in Ukraine will end is unknown, but it will likely mark the dissolution of the Russian Federation (the legal successor of the Soviet Union) as it is known today. Russia has undeniably suffered a major blow to its economy, devastation to its military capability, and degradation of its influence in regions where it once had clout. The borders of the Russian Federation will likely not look the same on a map in 10 or 20 years as they do now. As the final collapse of the Soviet Union plays out and as the Russian Federation faces the possibility of dissolving, policymakers need to start planning for the new geopolitical reality on the Eurasian landmass. The goal of this policy memo is not to advocate for regime change in Russia—this will be a matter for the Russian people. Nor does this paper predict exactly how Russia and the broader Eurasian region will emerge after the final collapse of the Soviet Union and the dissolution of the Russian Federation. Instead, it establishes realistic goals for Western policymakers, outlines assumptions on which these goals are based, and highlights the questions that decision-makers should ask now to better prepare for the future.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, and History
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Eurasia

8. Chinese Nuclear Force Modernization and Doctrinal Change

Author:
Nicola Leveringhaus
Publication Date:
08-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Institut français des relations internationales (IFRI)
Abstract:
Dating back to the first test in 1964, the Chinese nuclear force modernization process is motivated by other nuclear powers’ modernization across the years, mostly from the United States and the Soviet Union, but also by domestic factors such as economic debates and tensions in the scientific community. China Nuclear Force Modernization and Doctrinal Change Download 0.63 Mo At first, technical difficulties and a greater investment in conventional forces prevented the development of a ‘lean and effective arsenal’. However, the end of the Cold War and better economic conditions allowed China to improve its weapons toward a greater duality and mobility, thus reflecting the first tensions between the Chinese no-first-use doctrine and its growing technical capabilities and ambitions. Nowadays, the Chinese nuclear arsenal is bigger than ever, ranking third in size amongst nuclear global powers and with an estimated 1,000 warheads in 2030. The weapons’ efficiency is also reportedly higher, aiming at a fully functioning triad. Furthermore, doctrinal debates are still ongoing, with potential consequences on arms control and risk management.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Nonproliferation, Deterrence, and Modernization
Political Geography:
China and United States of America

9. Enhancing the Protection of Civilians through Conventional Arms Control

Author:
Damian Lilly and Barbara Morais Figueiredo
Publication Date:
01-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Peace Institute
Abstract:
Conventional arms control and disarmament efforts have historically been framed as a humanitarian cause to limit human suffering. However, activities with an arms control component have only featured to a limited extent within the protection of civilians (POC) mandates of United Nations peace operations. Both issues feature on the agenda of the UN Security Council, which mandates missions, but the linkages between the two have not been well explored at the policy, strategic, and operational levels. Produced in conjunction with the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, this brief provides an analysis of the actual, and potential, contribution of conventional arms control and related activities to POC within the context of UN peace operations—both peacekeeping operations and special political missions. There has been limited research conducted on this topic, and it has been addressed in only a cursory manner in relevant policies, guidelines, and strategies. This paper therefore attempts to demonstrate the existing linkages between these two mandated tasks, as well as to pinpoint some of the barriers and challenges to why arms control has not featured more fully within the POC efforts of missions. It then identifies relevant entry points based on concrete examples of how arms control-related activities can be better leveraged by UN peace operations to ensure the more effective protection of civilians.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Civilians, UN Security Council, and Protection
Political Geography:
Global Focus

10. Extracting Evidence: Opportunities and Obstacles in Assessing the Gendered Impacts of Diverted Ammunition

Author:
Emile LeBrun, André Desmarais, Kheira Djouhri, and Nicolas Florquin
Publication Date:
05-2022
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Small Arms Survey
Abstract:
Ammunition diverted from legal to illicit markets is a central concern in small arms control, but its impact is understudied. A new Briefing Paper from the Small Arms Survey and the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs explores how authorities can go about better monitoring the role it plays in violent crime. Extracting Evidence: Opportunities and Obstacles in Assessing the Gendered Impacts of Diverted Ammunition unpacks the challenges involved in trying to assess the true costs of ammunition diverted from official stockpiles. The study describes contextual background, notes the limitations of ammunition profiling research to date, and presents findings from a pilot case study on ammunition profiling in Kosovo* as well as insights from ammunition marking policy in Brazil. It finds that authorities struggle to identify what materiel among seized ammunition has been diverted from official stockpiles, which in turn prevents the ability to truly assess the impact it has on men, women, boys, and girls. The study identifies measures for overcoming such monitoring challenges, including special marking practices for state-destined ammunition, headstamp data collection guidelines, and information sharing protocols between relevant agencies for ammunition recovered from crime scenes.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Crime, Trafficking, Gender, and Ammunition
Political Geography:
Europe and Kosovo

11. Pugwash Note on Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone

Author:
Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs
Abstract:
Denuclearization of Korean Peninsula is one of the most important security issues that the countries in the region, including the US, will face. Given the ongoing development of nuclear and missile programs in Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) and increasing tensions between nuclear weapon countries (US, Russia and China) in the region, it is critically important to reduce risk of nuclear war in the region and to find a way to resolve a current deadlock in negotiations between DPRK and the US for denuclearization of Korean Peninsula. This paper proposes a comprehensive approach to peace and stability in the region as well as a phased denuclearization of Korean Peninsula and eventually establishing Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (NWFZ) in the region
Topic:
Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, Conflict, and Denuclearization
Political Geography:
Japan, China, Asia, South Korea, North Korea, and Korean Peninsula

12. Pugwash Note on Nuclear Arms Control and Disarmament

Author:
Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs
Abstract:
In early 2021 there is every reason to say that the global arms control and disarmament process, despite earlier achievements, has reached a critical point. The complete or de facto demise of key arms control treaties (such as the ABM Treaty, the CFE Treaty, and the INF Treaty) has left a vacuum in the arms control architecture, thus triggering new challenges for crises and global stability. The Open Skies Treaty is facing an existential threat. The Chemical Weapons Convention is also in a difficult situation, particularly in relation to the Syrian problem and the alleged poisoning of certain Russian personalities. The CTBT, concluded 25 years ago, is shamefully not yet in force. The only existing arms control treaty between the US and Russia is now New START, which was due to expire on 5 February 2021 since its renewal had proved to be impossible under the Trump Administration. But now it is well-known that the prospects for this treaty are much better (see below). The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is also under serious threat. And this is not only just because of the poor situation with respect to the implementation of Article VI which requires “each of the parties to pursue negotiations in good faith on measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control”. There are also some unresolved crisis situations: a very important one is around the Iranian nuclear deal (JCPOA), and more generally about the issue of the creation of a zone free of weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East (see On the Iran Nuclear Agreement and Middle East Security, December 2020). Moreover, there is the very critical situation on the Korean Peninsula and the problem of creating a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Northeast Asia (see Note on Northeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone, January 2021). On the other hand, imminent extension of the New START Treaty will be a very positive signal, including for the NPT Review Conference. Pugwash also welcomes very much the entry into force of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons on 22 January 2021 (see Pugwash Note on the Entry into Force of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, 21 January 2021). But it is also clear that, for some time to come, it will have to exist without any of the states which possess nuclear weapons (or even those that host American nuclear weapons), and more generally probably without any state allied to a nuclear-weapon state. This situation could generate another line of tension within the NPT. As a result, the NPT Review Conference, now rescheduled for August 2021, will be very relevant and care should be exercised in order to avoid concerning results.
Topic:
Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, and Denuclearization
Political Geography:
Global Focus

13. A Gender Framework for Arms Control and Disarmament

Author:
Chantal de Jonge Oudraat and Jana Wattenberg
Publication Date:
05-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Women In International Security (WIIS)
Abstract:
I n recent years, gender has come up in arms control and disarmament deliberations. Ireland, for example, submitted working papers on gender to preparatory committee meetings of the Nuclear Non-ProliferationTreaty (NPT) Review Conferences. The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) emphasizes that nuclear weapons use affects men and women differently and calls for equal representation in disarmament negotiations. However, such references to gender are so far the exception rather than the rule in arms control and disarmament talks. We argue that a systematic inclusion of gender perspectives advances arms control and disarmament deliberations and negotiations in four main ways. First, a gender lens calls attention to the human and gendered consequences of the development and use of weapons. Second, it exposes arms control and disarmament agreements that lack gender provisions. Third, a gender lens highlights the absence of diversity in arms control and disarmament communities.3 Fourth, gender perspectives help reveal hierarchical power structures and encourage critical reflections on the legitimacy of established processes and agreements. In sum, the inclusion of a gender perspective produces more humane, effective, legitimate and sustainable agreements.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Gender Issues, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, International Security, Women, Disarmament, and Nonproliferation
Political Geography:
Global Focus

14. Reinforcing the Global Norm Against Chemical Weapons Use

Author:
Julia Masterson
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Arms Control Association
Abstract:
In recent years, the global norm against chemical weapons use has eroded, and it is critical that responsible states take action to reinforce it. Systematic violations of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the malign use of chemical agents have continued for nearly a decade without adequate accountability. These incidents risk growing in severity and becoming more widespread for as long as the issue remains unaddressed. Reinforcing the norm against chemical weapons use necessitates a unified global effort to utilize all CWC provisions and to strengthen the consequences that violators face under the treaty and in accordance with international law.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, International Law, Weapons, Norms, and Chemical Weapons
Political Geography:
Global Focus

15. Nuclear Challenges for the New U.S. Presidential Administration: The First 100 Days and Beyond

Author:
Kelsey Davenport, Daryl G. Kimball, and Kingston Reif
Publication Date:
01-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Arms Control Association
Abstract:
Upon taking office, the new presidential administration of Joseph Biden will confront a dizzying array of major challenges, not the least of which are related to the risks posed by the world’s most dangerous weapons. Tensions between the world’s nuclear-armed states are rising; the risk of nuclear use is growing; billions of dollars are being spent to replace and upgrade nuclear weapons; and key agreements that have kept nuclear competition in check are gone or are in serious jeopardy. The situation has been complicated by the neglect and poor policy choices of President Donald Trump and his administration. Over the past four years the Trump administration made nearly every nuclear policy challenge facing the United States worse. Fortunately, Biden has a long and distinguished track record when it comes to dealing with nuclear weapons-related security issues. Unlike his predecessor, Biden possesses a strong personal commitment to effective nuclear arms control, nonproliferation, and disarmament that dates back to his early days in the Senate and continued through his last days as vice-president under President Barack Obama. In this analysis we have outlined what we believe to be the five most important sets of nuclear weapons policy challenges and decisions that the new Biden administration will need to address in its first 100 days and beyond, along with recommendations for effectively dealing with each of these policy challenges: Reviving and Advancing the Nuclear Arms Control Enterprise Reducing U.S. Nuclear Weapons Excess Stabilizing the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action Jump-starting Denuclearization and Peace Diplomacy with North Korea Restoring U.S. Leadership on Multilateral Nonproliferation and Disarmament If pursued, these actions and decisions would make the United States and the world safer from the threats posed by nuclear weapons. These initial steps would also put the administration in a better position to pursue more lasting and far-reaching nuclear risk reduction and elimination initiatives over the next four years.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, Peace, Denuclearization, and Joe Biden
Political Geography:
United States and Global Focus

16. Is Arms Control Over?

Author:
Andrew Reddie
Publication Date:
04-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC)
Abstract:
In February 2021, the Biden administration announced that it would exercise Article XIV of the New START Treaty—extending the last remaining bilateral arms control agreement between the United States and Russia for five years. The announcement came against the backdrop of a rapidly evolving arms control landscape. The collapse of the INF (Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces) Treaty and the U.S. withdrawal from the Open Skies Treaty have led many to suggest that the existing arms control regime might be close to its end. Complicating matters are growing calls for emerging military technologies like cyber and artificial intelligence to be regulated by arms control agreements.2 These developments beg several questions for both policymakers and academics: Why does arms control matter today? What are the near-term challenges to the existing arms control regime? And what are the possible paths forward for arms control?
Topic:
Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, International Security, and Deterrence
Political Geography:
United States of America

17. Still Not There: Global Violent Deaths Scenarios, 2019–30

Author:
Gergely Hideg and Anna Alvazzi del Frate
Publication Date:
02-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Small Arms Survey
Abstract:
The year 2018 was characterized by a decrease in lethal violence in several of the world’s hotspots, primarily due to a significant de-escalation of the armed conflicts in Iraq, Myanmar, South Sudan, and Syria. The homicide rate also decreased marginally due to population growth outpacing the nominal increase in killings between 2017 and 2018. These two trends jointly resulted in a modest positive change in the rate of violent deaths globally in 2018 which, at 7.8 violent deaths per 100,000 population, is at its lowest since 2012. Still Not There: Global Violent Deaths Scenarios, 2019–30, a Briefing Paper by the Survey’s Security Assessment in North Africa (SANA) project provides an updated trend analysis of global violent deaths and develops global-level scenarios for the years leading to 2030. Based on 2018 figures from the Small Arms Survey’s Global Violent Deaths (GVD) database, the paper also includes a specific analysis of developments in Northern Africa and the five nations of the G5 Sahel region. It finds that under a business-as-usual scenario, Northern Africa’s violent death rate would remain relatively stable by 2030. By contrast, under the same scenario, the fatality rate in the G5 Sahel region would increase significantly.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Conflict, Violence, and Death
Political Geography:
Africa, Iraq, Syria, Myanmar, and South Sudan

18. Additive Manufacturing for Missiles and Other Uncrewed Delivery Systems: Challenges for the Missile Technology Control Regime

Author:
Kolja Brockmann
Publication Date:
10-2021
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
Abstract:
Additive manufacturing (AM) has become an attractive production technology for the aerospace sector, particularly in the area of missiles, space launch vehicles and uncrewed aerial vehicles (UAVs). Modern AM techniques—often referred to as 3D printing—create objects from feedstock materials such as metallic powders by building them up from the first to the last layer in an iterative process of depositing and fusing layers of material. AM is being used to produce a growing range of components for missiles and UAVs. AM has been recognized to pose a growing proliferation threat and a challenge to existing export controls. The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) has been discussing AM since at least 2013 and seeks to update and harmonize the export controls of the participating states to mitigate the risks posed by AM and ensure the effectiveness of export controls. The export controls prescribed by the MTCR and some of the other regimes already create controls on AM. However, many of these controls are based on overlaps rather than control list items that cover AM by design and may not ensure adequate coverage. This report provides a short introduction to modern AM techniques and describes a range of specific applications of AM in missiles and other delivery systems. It discusses the proliferation risks posed by AM and the engineering and organizational considerations that have to be weighed against the technical capabilities of AM. It analyses the application of export controls to AM, primarily under the MTCR, by discussing controls on AM production equipment; feedstock materials; transfers of technology and technical assistance; and catch-all controls. The report concludes by outlining key measures through which the MTCR could strengthen its efforts to address AM and the proliferation risks and challenges to export controls it poses.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Science and Technology, Arms Trade, and Disarmament
Political Geography:
Global Focus

19. Pugwash Note on the Iran Nuclear Agreement and Middle Eastern Security

Author:
Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs
Abstract:
This is a very short note addressing the issue of the Iran nuclear agreement and pointing out some key issues that are relevant to enhancing Middle Eastern security.
Topic:
Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, Conflict, Peace, and Denuclearization
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East

20. Gender Counts: Assessing Global Armed Violence Datasets for Gender Relevance

Author:
Anna Alvazzi del Frate, Gergely Hideg, and Emile LeBrun
Publication Date:
03-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Small Arms Survey
Abstract:
Sound and timely gender-relevant data is key for adequately and comprehensively addressing armed violence. Global databases have the potential to highlight relevant gendered dynamics, but currently lack crucial information related to the sex and gender of victims as well as the context of the violent events monitored. Gender Counts: Assessing Global Armed Violence Datasets, a Briefing Paper from the Small Arms Survey, highlights these knowledge gaps and indicates ways towards filling them. Reviewing global, regional, and national datasets on lethal violence—including on homicides, and conflict-related fatalities—the study finds that gender relevance of the available data across the board is still low. However, recent developments in the 'Data Revolution' connected to efforts to implement the 2030 Agenda have demonstrated that it is possible to move in the direction of better data on the gendered dimensions of violence. Increasing political support and civil society commitments have started producing more gender-relevant data for a range of related lethal violence, small arms, and gender indicators. The study therefore sees room for optimism, and data for gender analyses will likely be more inclusive and gender-relevant in the near future.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Gender Issues, Violence, and Survey
Political Geography:
Global Focus

21. Conflict and Cooperation: Transitions in Modern Ethiopian-Sudanese Relations

Author:
John Young
Publication Date:
05-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Small Arms Survey
Abstract:
The Nile River bears considerably on inter-state relations among the countries through which it flows; with struggles over control of its waters driving the political undercurrents of the region. Ethiopia and Sudan exemplify such relations, shaped as much by the ebb and flow of the Nile as the rise and fall of the regimes that have governed them. This Briefing Paper by the Small Arms Survey’s Human Security Baseline Assessment for Sudan and South Sudan (HSBA) project analyzes this relationship and its place in a politically dynamic and evolving region. Conflict and Cooperation: Transitions in Modern Ethiopian–Sudanese Relations finds that the cold war both shaped and was itself shaped by the conflicts within and between the two countries. Following the end of the cold war, relations considerably improved under President Omar al-Bashir in Sudan and Prime Minister Meles Zenawi in Ethiopia. However, the recent emergence of new governments in both countries does not guarantee a cordial relationship in the future as on-going political reforms, internal threats, and external influences from powerful states weigh heavily on both countries.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, International Cooperation, Bilateral Relations, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Africa, Sudan, and Ethiopia

22. Covert Carriers: Evolving Methods and Techniques of North Korean Sanctions Evasion

Author:
Hugh Griffiths and Matt Schroeder
Publication Date:
09-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Small Arms Survey
Abstract:
For more than a decade the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), in defiance of UN sanctions, has found ways to systematically smuggle arms and other illicit goods in and out of the country. This Briefing Paper from the Small Arms Survey provides a detailed overview of how the DPRK evades sanctions by employing its diplomatic resources and exploiting key loopholes relating to transport, logistics, and proliferation finance. Covert Carriers: Evolving Methods and Techniques of North Korean Sanctions Evasion emphasizes the importance for UN member states, logistics companies, and global banks to adequately screen and monitor North Korean activities and transactions. The study also highlights how new information-sharing mechanisms would strengthen the ability of states, private industry, and the UN Panel of Experts to better detect ongoing North Korean violations and dismantle existing sanctions evasion networks.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Sanctions, and Trafficking
Political Geography:
Asia and North Korea

23. Tri-border Transit: Trafficking and Smuggling in the Burkina Faso–Côte d’Ivoire–Mali Region

Author:
Roberto Sollazzo and Matthias Nowak
Publication Date:
10-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Small Arms Survey
Abstract:
The tri-border area between Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, and Mali has long been an important zone of commerce for West Africa, and a key transit route for the trade flowing between the Gulf of Guinea, the Sahara, Sahel, and Mediterranean. In recent years, however, smuggling and trafficking has risen in the subregion because of the growing demand for illicit goods and firearms. This demand is fueled by communities’ need for self-defense due to banditry and the increased presence of jihadist groups; needs of traditional hunters and non-state security providers; and the ecosystem around artisanal and small-scale gold mining in which criminals seek weapons to target the miners who in turn equip themselves with firearms for protection against attacks. These dynamics heighten the risk of insecurity and instability. Tri-border Transit: Trafficking and Smuggling in the Burkina Faso–Côte d’Ivoire–Mali Region, by the Survey's Security Assessment in North Africa (SANA) project, takes a detailed look at the actors enabling smuggling and arms trafficking in the region, identifies the drivers of this traffic, and analyzes the impacts on local communities. The paper finds that there are three key trafficking axes in the area and that states are largely unable to control their borders and prevent these activities. The study also shows that illicit firearms are often trafficked together with other smuggled goods such as gold or drugs, using the ant trade method.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Weapons, Political stability, Trafficking, and Smuggling
Political Geography:
Africa, Mali, Côte d'Ivoire, and Burkina Faso

24. Assessing Progress on Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament: 2016-2019 Report Card

Author:
Alicia Sanders-Zakre and Kelsey Davenport
Publication Date:
07-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Arms Control Association
Abstract:
This new report is the fourth in a series that assesses the extent to which 11 key states are fulfilling, promoting, or undermining 10 standards identified as critical elements of the nonproliferation and disarmament regime. Collectively, states fared worse on the majority of criteria when compared with the prior edition covering the 2013–2016 period.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, International Cooperation, Nuclear Weapons, Military Affairs, Nonproliferation, and Denuclearization
Political Geography:
Global Focus

25. German Leadership in Arms Control: Three Pillars to Achieve More Realism

Author:
Christian Mölling and Torben Schütz
Publication Date:
06-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP)
Abstract:
Arms control is traditionally at the core of Germany’s cooperative security approach. It is therefore a natural leader for a new Western arms control policy. But Germany must overcome the Cold War approach that no longer suits today’s security environment. A new approach should build on three pillars: security, military, and alliance realism. While such a change entails risk and uncertainty for German decision-makers, the price of upholding existing outdated arms control architectures is already higher.
Topic:
Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, Military Strategy, European Union, and Alliance
Political Geography:
Europe and Germany

26. Renewed Arms Race, the NPT, and the New Start Treaty After the End of the INF Treaty

Author:
Elif Beyza Karaalioğlu
Publication Date:
06-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Global Political Trends Center (GPoT)
Abstract:
The U.S. decision to withdraw from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty left world observing about what might happen next. Indeed, the demise of the INF Treaty points out to an uncertainty on arms control and it brings new questions regarding international security. In the light of recent developments on the INF Treaty, this study attempts to make an analysis on the possible impacts of the end of the INF Treaty on international security. This study argues that the collapse of the INF Treaty raise concerns for renewed arms race and the withdrawal from the INF Treaty inevitably brings other treaties such as the NPT and the New START into close consideration.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Treaties and Agreements, and Nuclear Power
Political Geography:
Russia, North America, Global Focus, and United States of America

27. U.S. Claims of Illegal Russian Nuclear Testing: Myths, Realities, and Next Steps

Author:
Daryl G. Kimball
Publication Date:
08-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Arms Control Association
Abstract:
I n prepared remarks delivered at the Hudson Institute May 29, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), Lt. Gen. Robert Ashley, Jr., charged that “Russia probably is not adhering to its nuclear testing moratorium in a manner consistent with the ‘zero-yield’ standard outlined in the 1996 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).” Russia has vigorously denied the allegation. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov called the accusation “a crude provocation” and pointed to the United States’ failure to ratify the CTBT. On June 12, Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov said, “we are acting in full and absolute accordance with the treaty ratified by Moscow and in full accordance with our unilateral moratorium on nuclear tests.” The DIA director’s remarks, and a subsequent June 13 statement on the subject, are quite clearly part of an effort by Trump administration hardliners to suggest that Russia is conducting nuclear tests to improve its arsenal, and that the United States must be free of any constraints on its own nuclear weapons development effort, and, indirectly, to try to undermine the CTBT itself—a treaty the Trump administration has already said it will not ratify. The challenges posed by the new U.S. allegations are significant and they demand a proactive plan of action by “friends of the CTBT” governments for a number of reasons.
Topic:
International Relations, Arms Control and Proliferation, and Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, North America, and United States of America

28. Preventing Diversion: Comparing ATT and African Measures for Importing States

Author:
Paul Holtom and Benjamin Jongleux
Publication Date:
08-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Small Arms Survey
Abstract:
The diversion of conventional arms from licit to illicit entities can occur at any stage of the arms transfer chain. Preventing diversion therefore requires varied measures that effectively tackle the issue along the chain. The Arms Trade Treaty Working Group on Effective Treaty Implementation (WGETI) compiled a paper on such prevention measures, which relied heavily on the experiences of major exporting states. Several African sub-regional instruments contain measures to prevent and detect diversion for states that are not major exporters. This Small Arms Survey Briefing Paper compares diversion prevention measures for importing states as identified in the WGETI paper and African sub-regional measures. It finds that the African instruments lack articles on post-delivery cooperation with the exporting state, compliance with assurances on re-export or retransfer, in addition to measures to address identified cases of diversion. However, it also finds that these instruments contain prevention measures that are not in the WGETI paper, including provisions on modes of transport and official entry points. Incorporating experiences from ATT states parties from Africa can help inform discussions on the role of importing states to prevent diversion.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Regulation, Trafficking, and Trade
Political Geography:
Africa

29. Arms Monitoring in Guinea: A Survey of National Forensic Services

Author:
André Desmarais
Publication Date:
09-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Small Arms Survey
Abstract:
Forensic science institutions have a key role to play—not only in criminal investigations, but also in the broader fight against illicit arms proliferation. However, their ability to play this role depends on their capacities, which are not well understood. A Briefing Paper (originally published in French) on the forensic services in Guinea aims to fill this gap. Building on previous case studies on forensic services in Chad, Mauritania, and Niger, Arms Monitoring in Guinea: A Survey of National Forensic Services by ballistics specialist André Desmarais—co-published by INTERPOL and the Small Arms Survey’s Security Assessment in North Africa (SANA) project—examines capabilities, limitations, and needs of Guinea’s forensic services. It finds that information on calibres, models, and ammunition types of seized weapons is limited, and that the country lacks a central firearms database. Based on this analysis, the study provides tailored suggestions for areas of improvement, as a way to support Guinea in significantly reducing illicit arms flows.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Crime, and Forensic Science
Political Geography:
Africa, Chad, Guinea, Mauritania, and Niger

30. The West Africa–Sahel Connection: Mapping Cross-border Arms Trafficking

Author:
Fiona Mangan and Matthias Nowak
Publication Date:
12-2019
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Small Arms Survey
Abstract:
This Briefing Paper from the Small Arms Survey maps cross-border arms trafficking in West Africa and the Sahel through case studies on Niger, Mali, Guinea-Bissau, and the two tri-border areas of Burkina Faso–Côte d’Ivoire–Mali, and Ghana–Côte d’Ivoire–Burkina Faso. The study reveals that highly organized trafficking networks move sizable arms quantities across large areas of land north of the Niger River. Arms trafficking south of the river is more characterized by lower-level arms flows and local intermediaries engaging in so-called ‘ant trade’. Actors range from long-established criminals, corrupt officials, and organized trafficking rings, to tribal networks and low-level transporters. Based on field research, The West Africa–Sahel Connection: Mapping Cross-border Arms Trafficking analyzes the links between illicit arms trafficking and other forms of trafficking and organized crime in the region. The study also looks into the impacts of such arms trafficking as well as the responses to it.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Trafficking, and Organized Crime
Political Geography:
Africa, West Africa, and Sahel

31. Rising Tensions Between Policy Brief the West and Russia: What Role For Arms Control?

Author:
Peter van Ham
Publication Date:
12-2018
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations
Abstract:
Today, political relations between the West and Russia have entered a new mini-Ice Age, existing arms control arrangements are either dysfunctional or simply not used, and both sides are improving their military readiness. The obvious question that needs to be raised is whether, and if so how, these escalating tensions can be contained, or even reduced? This Policy Brief offers insight into the most pressing concerns, focusing on areas and issues where matters could escalate fastest. It asks what role can still be foreseen for arms control and concludes with a call for transatlantic unity and a stronger role for NATO to counter Russia’s military and geopolitical gambit. It suggests that the classic two-pronged “Harmel approach” (based on deterrence and détente) should be restored. This includes a mix of US-Russian high summitry and the revitalisation of the NATO-Russia Council as part of a broad and far-reaching (military) risk reduction process.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, European Union, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and Eurasia

32. Revitalizing Diplomatic Efforts to Advance CTBT Entry Into Force

Author:
Daryl G. Kimball
Publication Date:
04-2018
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Arms Control Association
Abstract:
More than two decades after the opening for signature of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), the treaty has near universal support and has established a global norm against nuclear test explosions. The nuclear testing taboo impedes the development of new and more advanced nuclear warhead designs, which helps prevent dangerous nuclear competition, and maintain international security. Although the CTBT has created a norm against testing and a robust technical organization responsible for the operation and maintenance of a highly sensitive global nuclear test monitoring system, the treaty has not entered into force due to the failure of eight key states, including the United States and China, to ratify. The CTBT is and will continue to be an essential pillar in the global nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament enterprise. Moving closer to the goal of the CTBT’s formal entry into force is the task of every CTBT state party, every nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) state-party, every state that supports the new Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, and any other state that considers itself a “responsible” nuclear actor. But in order to realize the full potential of the treaty and to close the door on testing, friends of the CTBT will need to rejuvenate and update their efforts to achieve its entry into force and reinforce the taboo against nuclear testing.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, and Nonproliferation
Political Geography:
Global Focus

33. The Future of the ICBM Force: Should the Least Valuable Leg of the Triad Be Replaced?

Author:
Ryan Snyder
Publication Date:
03-2018
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Arms Control Association
Abstract:
Perhaps the most controversial aspect of the plan to overhaul the nation’s nuclear arsenal is the replacement program for the intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) force, the land-based leg of the nuclear triad that also includes submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and heavy bombers. The current deployed fleet of 400 silo-based Minuteman III ICBMs are distributed across three bases touching five states and are expected to be removed from service by the U.S. Air Force in the mid-2030s. A follow-on ICBM system–known as the Ground-Based Strategic Deterrent (GBSD)–is scheduled to replace the Minuteman IIIs (and their supporting infrastructure) on a one-for-one basis between 2028 and 2035. Many have questioned the need for this program, including former Secretary of Defense William Perry, who has argued for eliminating all ICBMs. The latest independent Pentagon acquisition cost estimate to design and build the ICBM replacement ranges from $85 to over $140 billion (in then-year dollars), while the cost to operate and sustain the weapons system over its expected 50-year service life is projected at roughly $150 billion. This ICBM recapitalization cost is but one piece of a larger plan to sustain and upgrade the nuclear arsenal over the next thirty years, with the total price tag projected to exceed $1.2 trillion (in 2017 dollars). Separate modernization programs planned for U.S. conventional forces will require additional outlays. These upgrades will necessitate either a significant and prolonged increase in defense spending, which is unlikely to be forthcoming, or a reallocation of resources within the defense budget. Hard choices will likely be required among competing programs. The Trump administration’s Nuclear Posture Review published in February endorses replacing and upgrading the current Minuteman III force with the GBSD program. It will be up to Congress to assess the program’s cost-effectiveness and evaluate alternatives. This paper will examine this issue in several stages: first, by considering whether ICBMs are needed to hedge against threats to the strategic submarines; second, by discussing their possible benefits and risks as a warhead “sponge”; third, by examining whether ICBMs possess necessary capabilities absent from other legs of the triad; and last, by considering the stability implications of developing a new ICBM with enhanced capabilities. Finally, the paper evaluates alternative options to the costly GBSD program of record.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Military Affairs, Missile Defense, and Donald Trump
Political Geography:
United States and Global Focus

34. U.S.-Russian Arms Control At Risk: An Assessment and Path Forward

Author:
Maggie Tennis
Publication Date:
01-2018
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Arms Control Association
Abstract:
In March 2017, Gen. Paul Selva, the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told the House Armed Services Committee (HASC) that Russia had deployed a ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM) violating the “spirit and intent” of the 1987 Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. Selva warned the committee that Russia is “modernizing its strategic nuclear triad and developing new nonstrategic nuclear weapons.” His testimony illustrates the new normal of U.S.-Russian relations, wherein historic nuclear cooperation is profoundly at risk. Russia’s alleged INF Treaty violation has soured already strained relations between the world’s largest nuclear powers. Yet, the United States and Russia continue to share a common interest in ensuring nuclear stability worldwide. Together, the countries possess over 90 percent of the planet’s roughly 15,000 nuclear weapons. This power carries a responsibility to rejuvenate cooperative initiatives that reduce nuclear risks dating back to the depths of the Cold War. To effectively evaluate the opportunities and challenges involved in that objective, U.S. policymakers must understand Russia’s current nuclear force policy and strategy. This policy paper examines Moscow’s nuclear doctrine, capabilities and modernization efforts, the status of U.S.-Russian arms control treaties, and the primary obstacles to cooperation. It concludes by offering a set of recommendations for both mitigating threats to strategic stability and resuming a productive U.S.-Russian arms control dialogue.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Cold War, International Law, Nuclear Weapons, Military Affairs, Nuclear Power, and INF Treaty
Political Geography:
Russia and United States

35. Empowering Congress on Nuclear Security: Blueprints for a New Generation

Author:
Jack Brosnan, Andrew Semmel, Nathan Sermonis, and Kingston Reif
Publication Date:
07-2018
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Arms Control Association
Abstract:
The global nuclear security enterprise is at a critical crossroads. While the worldwide use of nuclear and radioactive materials has grown, the issue of nuclear security has all but faded from the U.S. national conversation. As these materials become more widespread, they will be vulnerable to criminal and terrorist organizations without sufficient security efforts. This report reveals a concerning loss of congressional leadership and interest in critical efforts to prevent nuclear terrorism. While the threat grows more complex, U.S. funding, oversight, and international cooperation to secure nuclear and radiological materials has diminished. By analyzing historic bipartisan initiatives and current congressional staff attitudes on nuclear security, this report offers an important blueprint to revitalize U.S. leadership through Capitol Hill. Providing recommended action items and effective strategies for engaging Congress, the report is a useful tool for both policymakers and educators.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Government, National Security, and Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:
United States

36. Capital of Militias: Tripoli's Armed Groups Capture the Libyan State

Author:
Wolfram Lacher
Publication Date:
06-2018
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Small Arms Survey
Abstract:
Since the arrival of the UN-backed Government of National Accord (GNA) in Tripoli in March 2016, four large local militias have gradually divided up the capital between themselves. Though nominally loyal to the government, they now exert a degree of influence over state institutions and resources that is unprecedented in post-Qaddafi Libya. This Paper examines the rise of a militia cartel in Tripoli, and concludes that the situation is untenable, as it risks provoking a major new conflict over Tripoli fought by those who have been excluded from access to the state and impedes efforts to establish a meaningful unity government
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, International Security, and International Affairs
Political Geography:
Libya

37. A Responsible Approach to North Korea

Author:
Kelly Magsamen, Melanie Hart, Michael Fuchs, and Vikram Singh
Publication Date:
11-2017
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for American Progress - CAP
Abstract:
Kim Jong Un’s reckless and illegal nuclear and missile programs pose a serious and growing threat to U.S. national security and the security of U.S. allies. His refusal to abide by U.N. Security Council resolutions has rallied the world against him. Unfortunately, President Donald Trump is bucking this international consensus with his reckless and contradictory statements. This dynamic is both dangerous and counterproductive; it increases the risk of miscalculation on the Korean Peninsula and squanders an opportunity to press North Korea back into a diplomatic process. There are no perfect solutions to the challenge North Korea poses. The country has made rapid progress on nuclear weapons that it deems critical to its survival. Yet the United States has deterred and contained North Korea for decades, preventing another devastating war on the peninsula. To prevent war and get back to diplomacy aimed at addressing North Korea’s threats, the United States needs a more responsible approach: aggressive diplomacy with a strong team; active U.S. efforts to reassure allies of America’s commitment to their security and to smart deterrence of North Korea; and concrete steps to isolate North Korea from the global economy. This policy approach could reduce the chances of unintended conflict, protect U.S. national security interests, and open a pathway to curb North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, Military Strategy, and Denuclearization
Political Geography:
China, Asia, South Korea, North Korea, North America, and United States of America

38. Aligning Unevenly: India and the United States

Author:
Dinshaw Mistry
Publication Date:
01-2016
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
East-West Center
Abstract:
In the early and mid-2000s, US policymakers anticipated India becoming one of America's top global partners. Have New Delhi's policies on key strategic issues actually aligned strongly with US objectives, as would be typical of close partners? An analysis of twelve prominent issues in US-India relations indicates that New Delhi's policies mostly converged moderately, rather than to a high extent, with US objectives. Specifically, the alignment between New Delhi's policies and US objectives was high or moderate-to-high on three issues—UN peacekeeping, nonproliferation export controls, and arms sales. It was moderate or low-to-moderate on six issues—China, Iran, Afghanistan, Indian Ocean security, Pakistan, and bilateral defense cooperation. And it was low or negligible on three issues—nuclear reactor contracts for US firms, nuclear arms control, and the war in Iraq. To be sure, despite the low or negligible convergence, New Delhi did not take an anti-US position on these issues. Four factors explain why New Delhi's policies aligned unevenly with US objectives across the issues: India's strategic interests (that diverged from US interests on some issues); domestic political and economic barriers (that prevented greater convergence between India's policies and US objectives); incentives and disincentives (that induced New Delhi to better align with US objectives); and certain case-specific factors. This analysis suggests that, rather than expecting India to become a close ally, US policymakers should consider it a friendly strategic partner whose policies would align, on the average, moderately with US strategic interests.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Political Economy, and Peacekeeping
Political Geography:
India and Asia

39. The Complex and Increasingly Dangerous Nuclear Weapons Geometry of Asia

Author:
Greg Thielmann and David C. Logan
Publication Date:
07-2016
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Arms Control Association
Abstract:
While much of the world’s attention is focused on efforts to halt the nuclear and missile tests of North Korea, the nuclear arsenals and ambitions of India, Pakistan, and China also pose significant dangers and deserve more attention. The complicated nuclear weapons geometry of Asia extends from the subcontinent to the other side of the world. While Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal is designed to counter India’s conventional and nuclear forces, New Delhi measures its own nuclear weapons program against that of China. Beijing, in turn, judges the adequacy of its nuclear arsenal against the threat it perceives from the United States’ strategic offensive and defensive capabilities. And in its efforts to mitigate the ballistic missile threat from North Korea, the United States and its allies in the region are expanding their strategic and theater missile defense capabilities. In order to fully understand how the pace and direction of nuclear proliferation can be influenced, the interconnections of these countries must be considered, along with the kinds of nuclear weapons they have at their disposal.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, and Nonproliferation
Political Geography:
Asia

40. Resuming Negotiations with North Korea

Author:
Elizabeth Philipp
Publication Date:
06-2016
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Arms Control Association
Abstract:
The window of opportunity to prevent North Korea from fielding nuclear-armed ballistic missiles is closing. Diplomatic engagement with North Korea has been scant in recent years. In response to Pyongyang’s nuclear and missile tests, the United States and other countries, through actions of the United Nations Security Council and independent policies, have adopted an approach of increasing political and economic isolation. Yet, during this time, Pyongyang has improved its nuclear weapons capability quantitatively and qualitatively. The next presidential administration must prioritize reviewing and renewing Washington’s diplomatic approach to North Korea. With each successive nuclear and missile test, North Korea advances its knowledge and consolidates its capability. History has shown that it is far easier to convince North Korea to negotiate away a military capability it does not yet possess. Washington’s stated primary concern is a North Korean nuclear-armed intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). Pyongyang will achieve this capability if it is not reined in through a diplomatic agreement or understanding. Once Pyongyang achieves this status, the security balance in Asia will be disrupted and U.S. diplomats will be hard-pressed to convince North Korea to abandon the capability.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, Nuclear Weapons, United Nations, Military Affairs, and Nonproliferation
Political Geography:
United States and North Korea

41. North Korea’s Nuclear Threat: How to Halt Its Slow but Steady Advance

Author:
Greg Thielmann
Publication Date:
02-2016
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Arms Control Association
Abstract:
In the first five weeks of 2016, North Korea twice defied UN Security Council resolutions designed to stem its pursuit of nuclear weapons. On January 6, it conducted its fourth underground nuclear test; on February 7, it launched a satellite into space for the second time. These two events provided a vivid reminder that North Korea continues to make progress mastering the technology needed for developing long-range ballistic missiles and arming them with nuclear warheads. U.S. leaders have long sought to formulate and implement policies that would secure a denuclearized Korean peninsula, but these efforts have not been successful. U.S. political commentary on North Korea vacillates between taking at face value the regime’s exaggerated claims of technological prowess and reducing its leadership to cartoonish stereotypes. A clearer understanding of North Korea’s motives and the current status of its nuclear and missile programs can lead to a more realistic strategy for enhancing U.S. security. That strategy would involve using enhanced sanctions as leverage for achieving a halt in North Korea’s nuclear and missile testing and production of fissile material, but this can only happen through negotiations.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, United Nations, International Security, Military Affairs, and Nonproliferation
Political Geography:
United States and North Korea

42. Iran Nuclear Policy Brief: An Effective, Verifiable Nuclear Deal With Iran

Author:
Kelsey Davenport and Daryl G. Kimball
Publication Date:
07-2015
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Arms Control Association
Abstract:
The P5+1 (China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States) have finalized a comprehensive nuclear agreement with Iran that will verifiably block Iran's pathways to nuclear weapons development--the uranium-enrichment route and the plutonium-separation route--and guard against a clandestine weapons program. We assess that the final agreement will be a net-plus for nonproliferation and will enhance U.S. and regional security. This two-page Iran Nuclear Policy Brief examines the key provisions and benefits of a comprehensive nuclear deal with Iran.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, Nuclear Power, and Uranium
Political Geography:
United States and Iran

43. Understanding the North Korean Nuclear Threat

Publication Date:
05-2015
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Arms Control Association
Abstract:
As the 2015 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference continues in New York, the international community's failure to halt the spread of nuclear weapons to North Korea looms large. Unlike the four of the world's nine nuclear-weapon states that have shown some progress in reducing their nuclear arsenals, North Korea is working hard to expand its arsenal and make it more credible. Unlike six of the nine, which have either ratified the 1996 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty or maintained a testing moratorium since the treaty was concluded, North Korea has conducted three underground nuclear tests, the only state to do so during the last 17 years. Unlike the three nuclear-weapon states that never became parties to the NPT, North Korea signed the treaty, declared it was withdrawing, later pledged to denuclearize, and then reneged on its commitment. The North's nuclear program today is out of control and accelerating, damaging both the NPT and international stability. Addressing this grim reality begins with an objective assessment of North Korea's actual nuclear capabilities and an acknowledgment that the Obama administration's "strategic patience" approach is not working. Washington and Beijing must step up their efforts to revive the six-party process with the near-term goal of freezing Pyongyang's nuclear and missile programs, taking care to manage potential spoilers, Russia and the U.S. Congress.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, International Security, Political stability, Nonproliferation, Denuclearization, and Nuclear Energy
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, and North Korea

44. Why China Won't Abandon Its Nuclear Strategy of Assured Retaliation

Author:
Fiona S. Cunningham and M. Taylor Fravel
Publication Date:
12-2015
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
Whether China will abandon its long-standing nuclear strategy of assured retaliation for a first-use posture will be a critical factor in U.S.-China strategic stability. In recent years, the United States has been developing strategic capabilities such as missile defenses and conventional long-range strike capabilities that could reduce the effectiveness of China's deterrent. Writings by Chinese strategists and analysts, however, indicate that China is unlikely to abandon its current nuclear strategy.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Weapons of Mass Destruction, Military Strategy, and Bilateral Relations
Political Geography:
United States, China, and East Asia

45. Nuclear Cruise Missiles: Asset or Liability?

Author:
Greg Thielmann
Publication Date:
03-2015
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Arms Control Association
Abstract:
The future of U.S. and Russian nuclear cruise missiles is at an inflection point. Russia's alleged testing of a ground-launched cruise missile has jeopardized not only the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, but other bilateral nuclear agreements as well, adding further strain to the U.S.-Russian relationship. The U.S. allegation and Moscow's three counter charges should be resolved with the help of the treaty's Special Verification Commission, which was explicitly designed to deal with compliance issues. But the two countries need to take a broader look at nuclear cruise missiles. New strategic cruise missiles are part of an unaffordable drive by Washington and Moscow to simultaneously modernize all three legs of their strategic arsenals. Given the increasingly marginal role that nuclear cruise missiles play in ensuring a U.S.-Russian balance and their destabilizing impact when deployed by emerging nuclear powers such as Pakistan, it is time to consider doing away with them entirely.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, and Missile Defense
Political Geography:
Russia, Eurasia, North America, and United States of America

46. Japan's New Security Policy: Breaking Away from the Post–War Regime?

Author:
Bart Gaens
Publication Date:
02-2014
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs
Abstract:
China is challenging the regional balance of power in East Asia through a military buildup and an increasingly assertive foreign policy. The US is forced to find the right balance between cooperating with China while benefiting from its economic rise, and countering China's regional reach by carrying out its self-declared "pivot" to Asia in spite of domestic and budgetary constraints. With just over one year in office, Japan's Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has received wide domestic support for his ambitious plans to revive Japan's economy through his threefold policy of Abenomics. At the same time, however, he has implemented a number of significant policies in the defence and security sphere. In response to China's military rise, the Abe administration increased and recalibrated the defence budget. Furthermore, in order to reinforce the alliance with the US, the government approved the creation of a US-style National Security Council, passed a Secrecy Bill, and aims to reverse Japan's self-imposed ban on exercising the right to collective self-defence. Under the banner of "proactive pacifism", the Abe cabinet is seizing the momentum caused by the changing regional power dynamics in order to edge closer towards "breaking away from the postwar regime". A proposed revision of Japan's constitution, unchanged since 1947, symbolizes the ruling Liberal Democratic Party's (LDP) objective to bring about a more autonomous role for Japan both in the security alliance with the US and as an international actor.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, Economics, and International Trade and Finance
Political Geography:
Japan, China, and Asia

47. Japan's new approach to national security

Author:
Elena Atanassova-Cornelis
Publication Date:
01-2014
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:
December 2013 marked an important turning point in Japan's evolving security and defence policies. While the debate about Japan's so-called security 'normalisation' has been going on now for more than a decade, by releasing three national security-related documents the conservative government led by Shinzo Abe since 2012 has dissipated any doubts that may still linger regarding the 'why, what and how' of Japan's national security.
Topic:
Defense Policy and Arms Control and Proliferation
Political Geography:
Japan and East Asia

48. Reintegrating Armed Groups in Afghanistan: Lessons from the Past

Author:
Deedee Derksen
Publication Date:
03-2014
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
United States Institute of Peace
Abstract:
A piecemeal approach to disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) in Afghanistan, with four DDR programs since 2001 each targeting specific groups, has yielded limited results, mostly due to an extremely adverse political environment. Comprehensive DDR is unlikely to work without a settlement that includes all armed groups. The success of such a deal would in turn hinge on the successful reintegration of commanders and fighters. Sequencing DDR in the conventional way may not work; reintegration might better precede disarmament.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Security, Arms Control and Proliferation, and Insurgency
Political Geography:
Afghanistan

49. Handle with care: crowd-sourcing and non-proliferation

Author:
Christian Dietrich
Publication Date:
03-2014
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:
States do not spread weapons of mass destruction - people do. It takes individual proliferators, collaborators, and the acquiescence of bystanders for sensitive materials to change hands illicitly. Yet, the rigid national and international means deployed to counter proliferation are juxtaposed with the limitless amounts of information people produce in our digitally connected world.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, International Cooperation, Nuclear Weapons, Science and Technology, and Terrorism

50. From Black Boots to Desert Boots: The All-Volunteer Army Experiment Continues

Author:
Leonard Wong
Publication Date:
05-2014
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Foreign Policy Research Institute
Abstract:
In 1970, the President's Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force delivered its report to the President of the United States, Richard Nixon. In the report, better known as the Gates Commission due to the leadership of former Secretary of Defense Thomas Gates, the members of the Commission stated, "We unanimously believe that the nation's interests will be better served by an all-volunteer force, supported by an effective stand-by draft." They added, "We have satisfied ourselves that a volunteer force will not jeopardize national security, and we believe it will have a beneficial effect on the military as well as the rest of our society." In June of 1973, after years of debate, the statutory authority for the draft expired and the all-volunteer force became a reality.
Topic:
Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, and Governance
Political Geography:
United States

51. Toward a Lasting Ceasefire in Gaza

Publication Date:
10-2014
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Crisis Group
Abstract:
More than seven weeks after the most devastating war yet waged in Gaza, its underlying causes remain unresolved. Hamas did not achieve an end to Gaza's closure; Israel did not attain the demilitarisation of the Strip or Hamas. The Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) remains unrepresentative and its credibility continues to fade. Fatah's popularity has sunk while Hamas's has increased to levels unseen since its 2006 electoral victory. Small steps toward reconciliation between Hamas and the PLO have been taken, but they are very distant from the end goal of a unified, representative Palestinian leadership. But in reconciliation lies the only hope of achieving a sustainable ceasefire and, more broadly, of bringing Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank under one authority.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Political Violence, Arms Control and Proliferation, War, and Peacekeeping
Political Geography:
Middle East and Palestine

52. TSG IntelBrief: Economic Drivers of an Iran Nuclear Deal

Publication Date:
11-2014
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Soufan Group
Abstract:
There are clear and compelling economic imperatives for Iran to accept a nuclear agreement with the P5+1 (U.S., Britain, France, Russia, China, and Germany) by a November 24 deadline. The Iranian public has chafed under comprehensive sanctions since 2010 and expect President Hassan Rouhani to deliver a nuclear agreement that enables the economy to recover and grow. U.S. and other P5+1 officials stress the economic opportunities for Iran that will result, including the eventual re-opening of Iran's oil and gas sector to foreign investment. Major international firms are poised to re-enter the Iranian market in the event of a nuclear deal, although firms will initially be cautious due to lingering uncertainty.
Topic:
Conflict Prevention, Arms Control and Proliferation, Islam, Nuclear Weapons, Treaties and Agreements, and Nuclear Power
Political Geography:
Russia, China, and Middle East

53. TSG IntelBrief: Iran Nuclear Talks Intersect Regional Events

Publication Date:
10-2014
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Soufan Group
Abstract:
Iran is attempting to link greater cooperation against the so-called Islamic State (IS) organization to concessions by the P5+1 (US, UK, France, Russia, China, and Germany) in negotiations on Iran's nuclear program Iran and the P5+1 remain far apart on the core issue of Iran's uranium enrichment program, increasing the likelihood that the talks will be extended beyond the current deadline of November 24 Iran requires a nuclear deal to satisfy public expectations and to increase its influence on regional events, including the US-led effort against IS A key Iranian goal is to dissuade the coalition from expanding the anti-IS campaign to include destabilizing the Assad regime in Syria.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation and Diplomacy
Political Geography:
Russia, United States, China, United Kingdom, Iran, Middle East, France, Germany, and Syria

54. Changing the Channel: Cultivating Security Cooperation in Northeast Asia

Author:
Alex Brouse and Dustin McDonald
Publication Date:
11-2014
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Centre for International Governance Innovation
Abstract:
High tensions in Northeast Asia are cause for considerable alarm. Of particular concern for the maintenance of global security are the disputes over Senkaku/Diaoyu and Dokdo/Takeshima islands. Strong grievances rooted in history and rising nationalistic sentiment in China, South Korea and Japan have made the positions of the respective parties currently irreconcilable. The tension surrounding the issue of territorial control, particularly between China and Japan, has the potential to spark a military confrontation. Due to a lack of empathy and the propensity to overestimate threats from neighbours, the region is especially volatile. Public commitments by US President Barack Obama in support of the US-Japan Mutual Security Treaty could ensure that any military confrontation between China and Japan might quickly escalate and draw the United States into direct conflict with China. In order to improve empathy, a concerted effort must be made to change the channel and work on issues where interests do align. Nowhere do the interests of China, South Korea, Japan and the United States align more than on the issue of North Korean denuclearization. By working together on an issue of mutual concern, these four countries can counter the rapid erosion of trust. By cultivating a cooperative attitude, tensions can be lowered, increasing the prospects for peaceful management of current acute disputes.
Topic:
Conflict Prevention, Arms Control and Proliferation, Diplomacy, and Peacekeeping
Political Geography:
United States, Japan, China, and South Korea

55. Possible Frameworks for Verification of a WMD/DVs Free Zone in the Middle East - The Nuclear Dimension

Author:
Olli Heinonen
Publication Date:
08-2014
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University
Abstract:
The Resolution on the Middle East adopted without vote at the 1995 Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review and Extension Conference calling for the establishment of a zone in the Middle East free of nuclear weapons, and all other weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their delivery vehicles (DVs), was reaffirmed by the 2000 and 2010 NPT Review Conferences. The 2010 Conference mandated the Secretary- General of the United Nations and the co-sponsors of the 1995 Resolution, in consultation with the states of the region, to convene a conference in 2012, to be attended by all states of the Middle East. The mandate was the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear and all other weapons of mass destruction, on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at by the states of the region, and with the full support and engagement of the nuclear-weapon states. The anticipated 2012 Conference was mandated to take the 1995 Resolution as its terms of reference.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, Weapons of Mass Destruction, and International Security
Political Geography:
Middle East

56. After Ukraine – NATO should stay vigilant on the Middle East

Author:
Jakob Aarøe Jørgensen
Publication Date:
06-2014
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
Leading up to the NATO Summit in September, the crisis in Ukraine has vindicated some NATO members' fears of Russia. This could cause NATO to revert to a narrow focus on Article 5 defense. Yet, other issues still pose threats and NATO should remain vigilant towards security challenges from the Middle East.
Topic:
Security, NATO, Arms Control and Proliferation, and Nuclear Weapons
Political Geography:
Russia, Ukraine, and Middle East

57. After Ukraine – NATO should stay vigilant on the Middle East

Author:
Jakob Aroe Jorgensen and Adam Gardner
Publication Date:
06-2014
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
Threats emanating from the Middle East still pose serious security challenges to NATO, though some see the crisis in Ukraine as the most serious security challenge yet to the alliance in the post-Cold War era. NATO must remain vigilant towards these threats, not allowing the crisis in Ukraine to eclipse all other contingencies.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, NATO, Arms Control and Proliferation, Sovereignty, and Territorial Disputes
Political Geography:
Ukraine and Middle East

58. Ten Ideas for Smarter NATO Missile Defense

Author:
Patrick O'Reilly
Publication Date:
01-2014
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
NATO leaders have cited missile defense as an example of applying the principles of the Smart Defense initiative endorsed at the 2012 NATO Summit to enhance collective defense at minimum cost. As ballistic missiles continue to proliferate and become more accessible to both state and nonstate actors, it is important to foster global partnerships to pursue NATO's missile defense mission and protect North American and European interests. NATO should consider opportunities to further apply the principles of Smart Defense now to reduce future costs of deterring and countering missile proliferation.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, NATO, and Arms Control and Proliferation
Political Geography:
Europe, Middle East, Asia, and North America

59. Why Nuclear Deterrence Still Matters to NATO

Author:
Walter B. Slocombe and Matthew Kroenig
Publication Date:
08-2014
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Atlantic Council
Abstract:
NATO's Strategic Concept (SC), adopted at the Lisbon Summit in November 2010, includes a number of propositions that define NATO's nuclear policy. Most fundamentally, NATO's most important strategy document declares that "[d]eterrence, based on an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional capabilities, remains a core element of" the Alliance's "overall strategy."
Topic:
Defense Policy, NATO, Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, and International Security

60. Governing Uranium and Nuclear Supply Chains: Why Private Engagement is Needed

Publication Date:
11-2014
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
The expansion of uranium mining into states of weak governance calls for new forms of regulation from private and public actors. Companies along the nuclear supply chain can strengthen the global nuclear regulatory regime through engagement, material stewardship, and traceability approaches.
Topic:
Conflict Prevention, Arms Control and Proliferation, Markets, Nuclear Weapons, Natural Resources, and Nuclear Power

61. Transforming armed non-state actors Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration

Publication Date:
11-2014
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
It is necessary to rethink the assumptions and theory of change of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) programs in current situations of armed violence.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Security, Political Violence, Arms Control and Proliferation, Development, War, and Armed Struggle

62. Prioritising European Defence Cooperation: The next step for the common security and defence policy

Publication Date:
11-2014
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS)
Abstract:
The European council's decisions on the common Security and Defence policy (CSDP) in December 2013 and the process that now follows should be used by EU member states as a means to progressively empower the CSDP within a short-term future.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Arms Control and Proliferation, and Regional Cooperation
Political Geography:
Europe

63. Breaking Down Iran’s Breakout Capacity

Author:
Greg Thielmann
Publication Date:
09-2014
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Arms Control Association
Abstract:
As efforts intensify to bring the Iran nuclear negotiations to a successful conclusion by November 24, the issue of breakout continues to occupy center stage. Setting limits on Iran’s nuclear program to dissuade the leaders in Tehran from breaking out of the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and possibly building nuclear weapons is a central objective of the P5+1 powers (China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States). Consideration of the effect of agreed limits on the time it would take Iran to build nuclear weapons is, therefore, a necessary step in formulating the P5+1 negotiating position, but is not sufficient for navigating the appropriate course toward a comprehensive agreement. Relying on the narrow definition of the term “breakout”—obtaining enough weapons-grade uranium gas for one bomb—does not fully capture the path that would have to be traveled. It is also necessary to consider “effective breakout”—the time needed to build a credible nuclear arsenal—in order to ensure that the proper balance between verification and limitations can be achieved.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, and Treaties and Agreements
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East

64. A Win-Win Formula for Defining Iran's Uranium-Enrichment Capacity

Author:
Kelsey Davenport and Daryl G. Kimball
Publication Date:
08-2014
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Arms Control Association
Abstract:
As negotiators prepare to resume talks over Iran's nuclear program, they face a formidable task: to bridge the remaining gaps and reach a comprehensive nuclear deal by November 24. Perhaps the most difficult issue Iran and the P5+1 (China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States) must resolve is how to define the size and scope of Iran's uranium enrichment program. To achieve a win-win outcome the two sides must develop a creative, technically sound formula that increases the time it would take for Iran to enrich uranium to weapons grade, while still providing Tehran with a modest program that allows domestic production of enriched uranium to contribute to fueling future civilian reactors and allows research and development to advance centrifuge technology. In collaboration with the International Crisis Group, the Arms Control Association has developed a proposal to define Iran's uranium enrichment program in a manner that meets the fundamental concerns of both Tehran and the P5+1. The proposal is the product of feedback from a number of technical and political experts. While this may not be "the solution" to the enrichment puzzle, the proposal offers constructive options for the negotiators to consider.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, and Uranium
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East

65. Iran Nuclear Brief: Iranian Missiles and the Comprehensive Nuclear Deal

Author:
Greg Thielmann
Publication Date:
05-2014
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Arms Control Association
Abstract:
The international community has been acutely concerned for many years about Iran's increasing capacity to produce material for nuclear weapons. With sufficient fissile material and a warhead design, Iran could use its existing ballistic missiles to pose a credible nuclear threat throughout the region. Consequently, after repeatedly directing Iran to suspend uranium enrichment, the UN Security Council decided in 2010 that Iran also had to halt all activities related to ballistic missiles capable of delivering nuclear weapons. Now that serious negotiations are under way to curtail Iran's ability to dash for a bomb, seeking ballistic missile limits as part of a comprehensive nuclear deal would be unwise. Getting adequate and verifiable constraints on Iran's nuclear program remains the highest priority. The best way to address Iran's potential to exploit nuclear-capable missiles is to ensure that Iran's nuclear program is sufficiently limited and transparent. To also demand severe limits on conventional weapons that Iran regards as vital to its self-defense would jeopardize the negotiations' key objective.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Nuclear Weapons, and Treaties and Agreements
Political Geography:
Iran and Middle East