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Begin New Search Content Type Policy Brief Publication Year within 10 Years Publication Year within 5 Years

3501. Taming the US trade deficit: A dollar policy for balanced growth

Author:
Joseph E. Gagnon
Publication Date:
11-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE)
Abstract:
President Donald Trump launched a trade war to eliminate the longstanding US trade deficit. But the trade deficit has only grown on his watch because tariffs were the wrong policy choice. Trade deficits are not always a bad thing, but a wealthy country like the United States should not run a perpetual deficit. Decades of US trade deficits have piled up debt that makes future generations of Americans less well off, as they must pay interest and dividends to foreigners. Cheap imports and the decline in exports have also contributed to the loss of a significant number of US manufacturing jobs. The main cause of the deficit is a secular overvaluation of the dollar, driven by excessive financial flows into dollar assets from foreign official and private investors. Although Trump’s policies have failed, achieving balanced trade is not a hopeless quest. President-elect Joseph Biden should direct his Treasury secretary to pursue a more sensible dollar policy that can tame the deficit without violating any international norms or rules.
Topic:
Economic Growth, Currency, and Trade Deficit
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

3502. Using purchasing power parities to compare countries: Strengths and shortcomings

Author:
Patrick Honohan
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE)
Abstract:
Good international economic policy requires good comparative data on national economic performance. In May 2020, the World Bank published the latest comprehensive update of purchasing power parities (PPPs), as part of the International Comparison Program. Produced for 176 countries, these PPPs are used to convert data (especially GDP and other quantities based on national income accounts) from national currencies to a common basis in a way that is meaningful for economic analysis. PPP-adjusted data are essential because the distortions caused by sharp exchange rate movements are significant, especially for times of macroeconomic turbulence. The newly released PPP data contain fewer surprises than those published in previous updates and are an invaluable tool, but Honohan explains why PPPs should be used with caution and an understanding of their limitations. Apart from removing distortions caused by market exchange rate movements, PPPs remove the impact of other factors affecting relative prices, especially productivity differences, which Honohan argues should not be removed if one wishes to compare the overall economic size or strength of a country or region. Adjusting for productivity, he finds that the United States retains its position as the world’s largest economy for the time being, and the European Union (even without the United Kingdom) is just ahead of China.
Topic:
World Bank, Economic Growth, Currency, Data, and Productivity
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and United States of America

3503. China's Financial Opening Accelerates

Author:
Nicholas R. Lardy and Tianlei Huang
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Peterson Institute for International Economics (PIIE)
Abstract:
Despite predictions by some observers that the United States and China are headed for a “decoupling,” China’s integration into global financial markets is accelerating. Regulatory reform has opened China’s financial market to many US and other foreign financial institutions. Foreign ownership of onshore Chinese stocks and bonds is growing rapidly and is likely to continue to expand in 2021. And inbound foreign direct investment (FDI) is on track to hit a new record in 2020. This integration is very asymmetric, however. China retains relatively tight control over both outbound direct investment and outflows of portfolio capital. US efforts to roll back the trend of deepening financial integration by threatening to delist Chinese companies traded on US markets and prohibiting any US investment in 35 Chinese companies that the Department of Defense alleges to be linked to the Chinese military appear to be largely symbolic.
Topic:
Financial Markets, Investment, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
China, Asia, and United States of America

3504. The Twentieth Anniversary of UNSCR 1325: What’s next in the era of COVID-19?

Author:
Helen Scanlon, Pravina Makan-Lakha, and Molly Hamilton
Publication Date:
11-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD)
Abstract:
The year 2020 marked two milestones for women’s rights and the Women, Peace and Security (WPS) agenda: the 25th anniversary of the Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, as well as the 20th anniversary of the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 (UNSCR 1325). Both of these international commitments stressed the importance of advancing women’s rights, particularly in relation to their participation efforts to achieve peace and security. However, the COVID-19 pandemic derailed existing plans to mark these achievements. Instead of allowing the pandemic to further disrupt the strides that have been made to advance women’s human rights over the last two decades, it is critical that peace and security activists reframe the circumstances created by the pandemic as an opportunity to secure meaningful change. Within this context, this Policy and Practice Brief (PPB) will critique the progress made in the WPS’ agenda since the adoption of UNSCR 1325 and provide African perspectives on what should be prioritised over the next 20 years.
Topic:
Conflict Resolution, Security, Women, Peace, COVID-19, and WPS
Political Geography:
Africa

3505. Policy implications of empirically estimated fiscal multipliers for South Africa

Author:
Johannes Hermanus Kemp and Hylton Hollander
Publication Date:
07-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
United Nations University
Abstract:
Despite the frequent use of fiscal policy for stabilization purposes, there remains significant uncertainty regarding the impact of fiscal policy decisions on macroeconomic outcomes. This impact is quantified by calculating fiscal multipliers. A fiscal multiplier measures the impact of government’s tax and spending decisions on economic output.
Topic:
Macroeconomics, Fiscal Policy, and Financial Stability
Political Geography:
Africa and South Africa

3506. Designing inclusive public finance policies in developing countries: Five key issues and solutions

Author:
Jukka Pirttilä and Finn Tarp
Publication Date:
07-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
United Nations University
Abstract:
Taxation, and public sector matters more generally, are high on the agenda for the international development community. This is clearly reflected in the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). SDG17 stipulates the need for improving domestic resource mobilization directly, and most of the other SDGs cannot be achieved without adequate tax and spending policies.
Topic:
Developing World, Sustainable Development Goals, Tax Systems, Public Spending, and Inclusion
Political Geography:
Global Focus

3507. Mining for change How can natural resources support inclusive growth in Africa

Author:
John Page and Finn Tarp
Publication Date:
11-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
United Nations University
Abstract:
For a growing number of countries in Africa the discovery of natural resources is a great opportunity, but one accompanied by considerable risks. There is an extensive literature linking natural resource dependence to poor economic performance. One cause is that resource-abundant economies tend to have economic and export structures that are highly concentrated on only few export products. Most of Africa’s resource-rich economies experienced increases in export concentration during the first decade of the twenty-first century.
Topic:
Industrial Policy, Natural Resources, Economic Growth, Mining, and Inclusion
Political Geography:
Africa

3508. Migration governance in the Global South

Author:
Rachel M. Gisselquist and Finn Tarp
Publication Date:
09-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
United Nations University
Abstract:
Building knowledge about migration governance and policy in the Global South is a priority for research and policy. Migration is a defining feature of our time and one closely linked with processes of economic and political development. Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) target 10.7 prioritizes the facilitation of ‘orderly, safe, and responsible migration and mobility of people, including through the implementation of planned and well-managed migration policies’. What exactly constitutes ‘well-managed’ migration policies remains a point of some discussion.
Topic:
Development, Migration, Governance, and Sustainable Development Goals
Political Geography:
Global South

3509. North Korea's Nuclear and Missile Programs

Author:
Stephan Haggard and Tai Ming Cheung
Publication Date:
07-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation (IGCC)
Abstract:
The international community has consistently underestimated North Korean nuclear and missile capabilities. How has an economically impoverished, technologically backward, and internationally isolated state been able to establish robust and increasingly competent nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs? Has the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) achieved this on its own, as it proudly claims? Or has it been predominantly reliant on foreign sources and if so, to whom and in what ways? This brief synthesizes what we know about the development of North Korean nuclear and missile capabilities, which together makes up the country’s strategic weapons complex. These industries have made rapid and concerted progress up the global innovation ladder over the past few decades. Indeed, this highly secretive apparatus is probably the most innovative, dynamic, technologically advanced, and privileged segment of the North Korean economy. The barriers to dismantling North Korea’s nuclear program are substantial, and ultimately depend on strategic choices in Pyongyang. Will the DPRK continue to focus on developing the next generation of strategic weapons as negotiations stall out, or will they shift resources to other economic activities? Nuclear negotiations must consider the deeper implications of the sprawling nuclear and missile industrial complex: how to bring greater transparency to this infrastructure and assure it is rolled back.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Military Affairs, Weapons, and Innovation
Political Geography:
Asia and North Korea

3510. Localizing the 2030 Agenda in West Africa: Building on What Works

Author:
Jimena Leiva Roesch and Masooma Rahmaty
Publication Date:
07-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Peace Institute (IPI)
Abstract:
Despite advancement in some areas, countries around the world are still not on track to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The transformation needed to achieve these goals depends on innovation and initiatives that build on existing capacities and fit the needs of local contexts, yet the 2030 Agenda remains largely unknown at the local level. Therefore, a key avenue for progress is to move the focus below the national level to the subnational level, including cities and communities. Toward this end, together with partners including the UN Trust Fund for Human Security and the Government of The Gambia, the International Peace Institute hosted a forum in Banjul on “Localizing the 2030 Agenda: Building on What Works” in October 2019. This forum provided a platform for learning and sharing among a diverse group of stakeholders, including government officials from both the national and municipal levels, UN resident coordinators, and civil society representatives. Drawing on the discussions at the forum, this report highlights the path some West African countries have taken toward developing locally-led strategies for implementing the 2030 Agenda. It focuses in particular on four key factors for these strategies: ownership across all levels of society; decentralization; coordination, integration, and alignment; and mobilization of resources to support implementation at the local level.
Topic:
Regional Cooperation, Sustainable Development Goals, Regional Integration, and Peace
Political Geography:
Africa and West Africa

3511. Implementing the UN Management Reform: Progress and Implications for Peace Operations

Author:
Wolfgang Weiszegger
Publication Date:
07-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Peace Institute (IPI)
Abstract:
In September 2017, UN Secretary-General António Guterres proposed a new management paradigm to enable the UN to confront global challenges and remain relevant in a fast-changing world. The new management paradigm would bring decision making closer to the point of delivery, empower managers, increase accountability and transparency, reduce duplicative structures and overlapping mandates, increase support for the field, and reform the planning and budgeting processes. Eighteen months after the management reform came into effect, this paper examines the implementation of the reform and its impact on peace operations from the perspective of both UN headquarters and the field. The paper highlights the current state of the reform, identifies good practices, flags areas for possible improvement or attention, and offers forward-looking recommendations for UN headquarters, mission leaders and managers in the field, global or regional support offices, member states, and staff at large. While the reform is still a work in progress, it has continued to gain momentum, and implementation has become more systematic. Nonetheless, the paper concludes that greater effort must be made to get input from personnel in peace operations to ensure that the reform responds to their needs and constraints. More work is also needed to fully realize the potential of the management reform and ensure that it aligns with parallel reforms underway in the UN peace and security architecture and development system.
Topic:
United Nations, Peacekeeping, Reform, and Accountability
Political Geography:
Global Focus

3512. The Peacebuilding Commission and Climate-Related Security Risks: A More Favourable Political Environment?

Author:
Jake Sherman and Florian Krampe
Publication Date:
09-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Peace Institute (IPI)
Abstract:
Climate change and the associated climate-related security risks increase instability and have significant adverse effects on peacebuilding. Within the UN, however, there is a lack of consensus on which organs are most appropriate to respond to climate-related security risks. Most of the bodies addressing climate change do not address its intersection with peace and security, while many member states have concerns about the role of the UN Security Council on climate change. In this context, the UN Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) seems well placed to complement and advance discussions on climate-related security risks in other UN bodies, including the Security Council. This paper—a joint publication of IPI and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)—aims to identify areas and ways in which the PBC is preventing and mitigating climate-related security risks and to map the political positions of PBC members on this topic. It also looks at opportunities for the PBC to strengthen its engagement on climate-related security issues. The paper identifies a number of attributes that uniquely position the PBC as a forum for states to seek international support for addressing climate-related security challenges: it emphasizes national ownership, has a mandate to work across the three pillars of the UN, brings together a wide range of UN organs, and convenes relevant stakeholders from within and outside the UN system. The paper concludes that a gradual but steady approach to addressing climate-related security risks in the PBC is likely to encourage more countries to seek its support on these issues.
Topic:
Security, Climate Change, United Nations, and Peace
Political Geography:
Global Focus

3513. Beyond 2020: Exploring the Potential for a Strong UN-AU Peacebuilding Partnership

Author:
Priyal Singh and Daniel Forti
Publication Date:
09-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Peace Institute (IPI)
Abstract:
Effective and sustainable multilateral peace and security initiatives in Africa depend on a strong partnership between the United Nations and the African Union. While their strategic partnership has grown since 2017, collective peacebuilding efforts still lag behind cooperation in other areas. Different institutional mandates, policy frameworks, and operational practices have led them to carve out distinct roles in the multilateral peacebuilding space, often impeding closer cooperation. This report—a joint publication of IPI and the Institute for Security Studies (ISS)—analyzes the UN and AU’s approaches to peacebuilding and identifies opportunities for a more robust and effective peacebuilding partnership. These include aligning their political strategies, fostering cooperation between the AU Peace and Security Council (AUPSC) and the UN Peacebuilding Commission (UNPBC), reconciling differences in their peacebuilding approaches, securing sustainable financing, and capitalizing on emergent peacebuilding approaches. The paper concludes with recommendations for UN and AU member states and officials: UN and AU member states should build consensus around shared peacebuilding concerns, better institutionalize the working relationship between the AUPSC and the UN Africa Group, and strengthen implementation of the recommendations from the 2018 meeting between the AUPSC and UNPBC. UN and AU officials should include peacebuilding and development personnel in annual engagements on peace and security, explore opportunities for joint analysis and planning for peacebuilding activities, and share more analysis and expertise at the working level.
Topic:
Regional Cooperation, United Nations, Peace, and African Union
Political Geography:
Africa

3514. Woman First, Soldier Second: Taboos and Stigmas Facing Military Women in UN Peace Operations

Author:
Lotte Vermeij
Publication Date:
10-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Peace Institute (IPI)
Abstract:
Despite efforts to increase the participation of women uniformed peacekeepers, military women continue to face taboos and stigmas that are barriers to their inclusion and successful deployment. These range from gender stereotypes that cause military women to face more scrutiny than their male counterparts to difficulties speaking up about discriminatory and sexualized behavior, including racism, sexual harassment, and assault. Being confronted with persistent taboos and stigmas can have far-reaching consequences for military women before, during, and after deployment. This paper, which is based on interviews with 142 military women from fifty-three countries, assesses the taboos and stigmas facing military women at three levels: (1) at the individual and community levels; (2) within their national defense structures; and (3) during deployment to UN peace operations. It also looks at the strategies women use to mitigate these taboos and stigmas and the formal and informal support structures they turn to. The paper concludes with recommendations for national defense structures and the UN: For national defense structures, it recommends improving standards of behavior and accountability, educating men and women on taboos and stigmas, recruiting and retaining more women, proactively reaching out to and selecting women for deployment to peace operations, providing women the support they need, and designing equipment that better suits women’s needs. For the UN Department of Peace Operations, it recommends strengthening narratives on the importance of female peacekeepers, ensuring that all peacekeepers respect UN values, developing mission-specific gender strategies and plans, engaging more firmly with troop-contributing countries, making recruitment and selection processes more gender-sensitive, holding personnel accountable for discriminatory and sexualized behavior, and establishing in-mission support systems.
Topic:
Security, United Nations, Peacekeeping, Women, and Peace
Political Geography:
Global Focus

3515. UN Reform and Mission Planning: Too Great Expectations?

Author:
Marc Jacquand
Publication Date:
11-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Peace Institute (IPI)
Abstract:
Since 2017, the UN system has undergone a historic process of reform at several levels and across many entities. Several of these reforms have either directly aimed at improving the planning of UN missions or included elements that have a significant bearing on mission planning. As the focus shifts from designing to implementing these reforms, it is possible to begin reflecting on whether these aims have been met. This paper takes stock of the various strands of UN reform and explores their impact on the planning of UN missions, drawing on the experiences of four missions that have recently started or transitioned. In addition to the peace and security, management, and development system reforms, it looks at the impact of several other recent initiatives. These include the launch of a series of independent strategic reviews of peace operations, the reinvigorated use of the secretary-general’s transition planning directives, the rollout of the Comprehensive Performance Assessment System, and the establishment of the Executive Committee. The paper concludes by recommending that the UN consider: Tying together the strands of reform related to planning to prevent fragmentation; Making increased and better use of peace and security management mechanisms at the initial stages of planning to ensure that UN leaders have a unified tone and vision; More formally and transparently involving the Security Council in strategic reviews; Clarifying and strengthening the role of all relevant departments and the shared regional divisions in the mission budget process; Repositioning DPO’s planning cell in the Office of Shared Services to move toward a shared planning capacity; and Incentivizing lateral movement of personnel across departments and entities to broaden their perspectives.
Topic:
United Nations, Peacekeeping, Reform, and Transparency
Political Geography:
Global Focus

3516. Community Engagement in UN Peacekeeping Operations: A People-Centered Approach to Protecting Civilians

Author:
Harley Henigson
Publication Date:
11-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Peace Institute (IPI)
Abstract:
As the practice of the protection of civilians (POC) has evolved in peacekeeping missions, the UN has increasingly focused on “people-centered” approaches. As a result, community engagement has emerged as a core component of POC efforts. By engaging with communities, missions can build trust, gather information, and build a protective environment, ultimately improving their ability to protect civilians. This paper examines the positive implications and impact of this increased focus on community engagement, as well as the challenges and risks it can pose for communities and missions. It analyzes the community engagement activities of the military, police, and civilian components of the UN missions in the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mali, and South Sudan. The paper concludes with recommendations for these four missions, the UN Secretariat, and UN member states on the Security Council: UN member states should continue to refine the language on community engagement in peacekeeping mandates. The UN Secretariat should develop more in-depth modules on community engagement in relevant training materials. Relevant UN stakeholders should explore how missions’ military personnel can improve their community engagement. The UN Secretariat and missions should optimize their use of community liaison assistants. The UN Department of Peace Operations should continue to explore where the unarmed civilian protection methodology could complement community engagement by UN missions.
Topic:
United Nations, Peacekeeping, Civilians, and Community Engagement
Political Geography:
Global Focus

3517. Parallel Tracks or Connected Pieces?: UN Peace Operations, Local Mediation, and Peace Processes

Author:
Arthur Boutellis, Delphine Mechoulan, and Marie-Joelle Zahar
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Peace Institute (IPI)
Abstract:
Track-1 mediation processes have increasingly struggled to deliver comprehensive peace agreements that address fragmented conflict dynamics and include local communities’ needs. As a result, local mediation has increasingly been a focus for the UN, including for UN peace operations. UN peace operations can play an important role in supporting local mediation initiatives, whether these initiatives are separate from, complementary to, or integrated into national processes. This paper considers how local mediation fits into the broader political strategies of UN peace operations. Building on a series of country case studies published by IPI and the UN Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs’ Mediation Support Unit, it provides preliminary answers to whether, when, where, and how the UN can engage in local mediation efforts. It explores what capacities the UN would need to increase its engagement in local mediation, what role it can play, and how it could better configure itself and engage in partnerships. While this paper does not advocate for UN peace operations to engage more or less in local mediation processes, it concludes that missions ought to assess whether, when, and how short-term investments in local mediation can contribute to longer-term, sustainable conflict resolution. In each case, they should tailor their role based on informed strategic decisions and appropriate partnerships and as part of a broader effort to strengthen and foster greater coherence in national peace processes.
Topic:
United Nations, Peacekeeping, and Mediation
Political Geography:
Global Focus

3518. Mental Health in UN Peace Operations: Addressing Stress, Trauma, and PTSD among Field Personnel

Author:
Namie Di Razza
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Peace Institute (IPI)
Abstract:
The challenging environments where many contemporary UN peace operations are deployed can take a toll on the mental health of both uniformed and civilian personnel. This has led to increased attention to questions around mental health in peace operations, and in 2018, the UN made mental health and well-being a system-wide priority. Yet two years later, much remains to be done to improve mental health in UN missions. This paper looks at the prevalence of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and other mental health issues among the military, police, and civilian personnel of UN peace operations. It analyzes the types of stressors and psychological factors affecting personnel in the field, explores the political and institutional challenges to instilling change, and reviews the UN’s response to the mental healthcare needs of field personnel. It concludes with recommendations for the UN to ensure its duty of care for field personnel: Raising the profile of mental health in UN peace operations: The Secretariat and member states should shed light on the difficult conditions facing peacekeeping personnel and better assess the prevalence of mental health issues among staff; strive to reduce the stigma associated with mental health; and come to a clear understanding of their roles and responsibilities in supporting mental health needs. Providing more pre-deployment support: There is a need to train and sensitize personnel on how to recognize mental health issues, symptoms, and coping mechanisms. Preparedness and pre-deployment training on PTSD, trauma, and mental health should be based on minimum standards so that all contingents are equally prepared and equipped. Strengthening support during deployment: Both the Secretariat and member states should uphold their duty of care for personnel in missions, including by fostering a culture of care, offering adequate psychosocial support, and improving human resources arrangements. Continuing to provide support post-deployment: The UN and member states should recognize that their duty of care does not end after field personnel return from deployment. They should continue following up with former personnel to ensure they are receiving the psychosocial support they need through dedicated structures and resources.
Topic:
United Nations, Peacekeeping, Trauma, Mental Health, PTSD, and Stress
Political Geography:
Global Focus

3519. UN Peacekeeping Operations and Pastoralism-Related Insecurity: Adopting a Coordinated Approach for the Sahel

Author:
Gabriel Delsol
Publication Date:
07-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Peace Institute (IPI)
Abstract:
In recent years, pastoralism has increasingly become associated with violent conflict. In the Sahel, pastoralism-related insecurity is directly linked to macro-level conflict dynamics in contexts with UN peacekeeping missions, including Mali, the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Darfur, Abyei, and South Sudan. However, the UN system has been slow to adopt a coordinated response to this phenomenon. This issue brief provides a preliminary overview of peacekeeping missions’ efforts to mitigate growing pastoralism-related insecurity in their areas of operation. It analyzes six missions that are active within or near the Sahel region. After framing pastoralism-related security, it explores how the Security Council has addressed this issue in mission mandates. It then looks at how missions have tried to address pastoralism-related insecurity and how they can leverage partnerships with other actors as part of a multi-stakeholder approach. The paper concludes that while peacekeeping missions are not the primary means for addressing the multidimensional drivers of pastoralism-related insecurity, they can help mitigate risks, including through political and logistical support to other actors. Together with these partners, peacekeeping missions should leverage their comparative advantages to help address pastoralism-related insecurity in the Sahel.
Topic:
Security, United Nations, Peacekeeping, and Pastoralism
Political Geography:
Africa and Sahel

3520. Gender Trainings in International Peace and Security: Toward a More Effective Approach

Author:
Sarah-Myriam Martin-Brûlé, Stefanie Von Hlatky, Savita Pawnday, and Marie-Joelle Zahar
Publication Date:
07-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Peace Institute (IPI)
Abstract:
As more and more states and organizations adopt a gendered approach to international policy, trainings on how to conduct gender-based analysis and integrate gender perspectives into policies and programming have proliferated. But despite this increase in gender trainings, it remains unclear how effective they have been due to challenges related to their design, delivery, targeting, and evaluation. After mapping the ecosystem of gender trainings in the realm of international peace and security, this issue brief unpacks each of these challenges. It concludes with a set of recommendations for improving gender trainings, suggesting that those designing gender trainings should consider the following: Conducting a preliminary needs assessment to adapt trainings to their audience; Soliciting feedback at every stage of the training, including “live” feedback during the training; Grounding training in local contexts and providing evidence to back up claims; and, Generating self-reflection by both participants and trainers during evaluations.
Topic:
Security, Gender Issues, United Nations, Women, and Peace
Political Geography:
Global Focus

3521. Peacebuilding during a Pandemic: Keeping the Focus on Women’s Inclusion

Author:
Masooma Rahmaty and Jasmine Jaghab
Publication Date:
09-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Peace Institute (IPI)
Abstract:
This year was expected to be an opportunity to assess the past twenty years of progress on the women, peace, and security (WPS) agenda. Instead, it has been upended by the COVID-19 pandemic, which has dominated the international community’s attention and put recent gains for WPS at risk. One of the areas most at risk is the participation of women in peacebuilding efforts and peace processes, which is already a part of the WPS agenda where progress has been limited. This paper looks into what actions states and international actors can take to ensure women’s participation in peacebuilding and peace processes during the pandemic. It draws on two virtual meetings—one at the ministerial level and one at the ambassadorial level—convened in partnership with the government of Sweden. Based on these meetings, the paper identifies five key factors that could help the UN and its member states keep the focus on women peacebuilders during the pandemic: State leadership on WPS in multilateral fora: In the face of the pandemic, it is critical for UN member states to defend recent gains made in implementing the WPS agenda in multilateral fora, especially the Security Council. Women’s participation in formal peace processes: While the pandemic has made it even more difficult for many women to participate in formal peace processes, the normalization of virtual convenings could be an opportunity to bring more women to the table. Protection and security of women peacebuilders: The UN and its member states have a role to play in providing women peacebuilders both physical protection and international legitimacy and recognition. Financing for women peacebuilders: The pandemic has made funding even more of a challenge for women peacebuilders. Donors should recognize the important role of women’s organizations in the pandemic response and recovery when deciding how to allocate funding. Data-driven responses: There is a need for a coordinated, risk-sensitive approach to data collection to ensure that the COVID-19 response reflects an understanding of how the pandemic affects women.
Topic:
Security, Women, Peace, COVID-19, and Inclusion
Political Geography:
Global Focus

3522. Bouncing Back from Rock Bottom: A New Era for the UN Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations?

Author:
Lisa Sharland
Publication Date:
10-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
International Peace Institute (IPI)
Abstract:
The 2020 report of the UN Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations (C-34) marked the culmination of nearly a decade of efforts to improve the committee’s working methods and deliver a more relevant report. Because the report was restructured around the eight thematic priorities of the Action for Peacekeeping (A4P) initiative, it also helped translate the initiative’s Declaration of Shared Commitments into practice. This was an especially noteworthy achievement considering that the committee had failed to reach consensus on a report just one year prior. This paper explores previous efforts to reform the C-34 and the process of agreeing to reform the working methods and report structure in 2019. It also assesses the contribution of the report’s revised structure and substance to ongoing efforts to support and advance peacekeeping reform. It concludes with lessons that could guide other UN reform initiatives: timing and circumstances matter, there must be an appetite for reform, those leading the reform process must listen and be impartial arbiters, and delegations must be patient and have realistic expectations.
Topic:
United Nations, Peacekeeping, and Reform
Political Geography:
Global Focus

3523. An Analysis Of The Legislation About Business Creation In Cameroon

Author:
Ulrich D’POLA KAMDEM and Dr. Louis-Marie Kakdeu
Publication Date:
08-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Nkafu Policy Institute
Abstract:
Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (SMEs) represent the main driver of economic growth both in developing and emerging economies. Statistics from the World Bank show that in emerging economies, 40% of the national income (Gross Domestic Product – GDP) and 60% of total employment are attributed to formal SMEs. In developing economies, Cameroon included, SMEs have the potential to contribute more to the GDP and the level of employment. But they face several obstacles that prevent them from flourishing. Among these obstacles, legislation is among the main barriers to business creation. This article, therefore, analyses the contribution of legal aspects to business creation in Cameroon. Our analysis focuses on the following aspects: the legal framework, the documents required to open a business, and the regulatory and fiscal repression.
Topic:
Economics, Labor Issues, Employment, and Business
Political Geography:
Cameroon

3524. Harnessing Public Accountability in the Public Service for Better Governance in Cameroon

Author:
Tazoacha Francis
Publication Date:
11-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Nkafu Policy Institute
Abstract:
The failure of governance in Cameroon is a result of the acute lack of public accountability. Public administration is a major preoccupation in all contemporary democracies in the world today, even though there are disparities in the benchmarks, means, and agents of such culpability based on the nature of the polity ranging from traditional to modern, conservative to liberal, capitalist to socialist [1]. Public accountability is the major concern of contemporary democratic governance in every society today. Democratic consensus will remain abstract if those in leadership cannot be held responsible by the community for their deeds and oversights, for their judgments, their policies, and their expectancies. Therefore, there is a dire need in every public office be it government or private to make sure that this exercise is carried out in order to make checks and balances in these services for effective management of resources, proper accountability, and sustainable development.
Topic:
Economics, Governance, Accountability, and Public Sector
Political Geography:
Cameroon

3525. Armed Conflict and COVID 19: the Ramifications on the Educational Sector in the NW/SW Regions of Cameroon

Author:
Tazoacha Francis
Publication Date:
11-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Nkafu Policy Institute
Abstract:
In late 2016, the social and political forces in the now restive South West and North West (NW/SW) regions of Cameroon erupted as a crisis and quickly mutated into a human disaster with a rising human and property destruction that has been going on unabated. The impact of this lingers given that disasters, be they natural or anthropogenic have always had immense ramifications on human lives in the area they occur and even beyond. The NW/SW regions have unfortunately become the theatre of such a ravaging disaster since four years ago triggered by accumulated layers of grievances meted on the consciousness of the Anglophone population in these regions of the country in tandem with marginalization particularly in the educational and legal systems by the Francophone-dominated government which led to widespread protests in September and October 2017. The conflict escalated from a peaceful demonstration that was met with a heavy crackdown from the government security forces. This has resulted in the majority of schools in these two regions to be shot down because of security reasons. This situation has further been worsened with the emergence of the coronavirus (COVID 19) pandemic that was first identified in Cameroon in February 2020 [1]. The COVID 19 situation in Cameroon has been evolving rapidly, with dozens of new cases reported each day. Adding to the current challenges of the armed conflict, the COVID 19 put the educational sector in Cameroon to a halt in March 2020 with far-reaching ramifications on the lives of the children of school-going ages, especially in the war-torn area.
Topic:
Security, Education, War, Children, Pandemic, COVID-19, and Armed Conflict
Political Geography:
Cameroon

3526. What Tax Policy In Cameroon After 2020?

Author:
William Hermann ARREY
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Nkafu Policy Institute
Abstract:
The COVID-19 pandemic has imposed unprecedented negative consequences on the Cameroonian economy. To reduce the spread of the virus, the government imposed a range of measures such as social distancing and border closures to protect its citizens. While the social costs leave little to be desired, the pandemic equally took a toll on a majority of sectors across the economy, impacting wages, consumer spending, and profitability for businesses. This fiscal policy letter analyzes the amended budget, delving into aspects related to the Covid-19 pandemic, as well as the structural factors that could determine the viability and sustainability of public finances in the coming decades. The first article looks at the implications of the pandemic for domestic revenue tax mobilization with the aim of improving the personal income and non-oil tax in the business sector. It recommends that the government consolidates public sector spending, reduces taxes on businesses in the non-oil sector, and suspend tax payments on businesses as the pandemic abates.
Topic:
Economics, Tax Systems, Fiscal Policy, Consumerism, and Wage Growth
Political Geography:
Cameroon

3527. Flattening the Pandemic and Recession Curves

Author:
Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas
Publication Date:
03-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Economics for Inclusive Prosperity (EfIP)
Abstract:
In the short run, the capacity of any country’s health system is finite (capacity of Intensive Care Units, number of hospital beds, number of skilled health professionals, ventilators….). This puts an upper bound on the number of patients that can be properly treated, at any given point in time and is represented by the flat line in the Figure. Unchecked, and given what we know of the transmission rate of the coronavirus, the pandemic would quickly overwhelm any health system, leaving many infected patients with deteriorating pulmonary conditions without any treatment. The fatality rate would surge. The threat is almost beyond comprehension. With a 2% case fatality rate baseline for overwhelmed health systems, and 50% of the world population infected, 1% of the world population -76 million people- would die. This scenario corresponds to the red curve in Figure 1. The part of the curve above the capacity of the health care system faces a sharply higher mortality risk (shaded red area).
Topic:
Economics, International Political Economy, Health Care Policy, Economic Growth, Macroeconomics, Pandemic, COVID-19, and Global Health
Political Geography:
United States

3528. Coronavirus and Managing Your Organization’s Response

Author:
Anton Korinek
Publication Date:
03-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
The Nkafu Policy Institute
Abstract:
Organizations around the world are working through how to respond to the novel coronavirus, posing one of the greatest challenges to leaders in a long time. Do they restrict travel? Doing so would have substantial financial implication, make months of preparation worthless and lower the morale of many stakeholders who enjoy travel. However, travel is what brought the coronavirus to the country in the first place — and what continues to spread it to new communities within the country. What about instituting remote work procedures? In-person meetings and events may be a critical part of an organization’s activities and an important part of the value it offers. Perhaps there are no known cases of the virus in a given community. However, once it does gain a foothold, social distancing is the only way to slow the spread. Carriers of the virus may unwittingly spread it for days before symptoms manifest themselves. Above all, one of the greatest challenges is to balance an organization’s economic concerns with the question of what is ethically the best course of action.
Topic:
Economics, International Political Economy, Pandemic, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
United States and Global Focus

3529. Born Out of Necessity: A Debt Standstill for COVID-19

Author:
Patrick Bolton, Lee Buchheit, Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas, Mitu Gulati, Chang-Tai Hsieh, Ugo Panizza, and Beatrice Weder di Mauro
Publication Date:
04-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Economics for Inclusive Prosperity (EfIP)
Abstract:
Rich and poor countries alike are facing an unprecedented economic crisis as they attempt to contain the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. A downturn of this magnitude can cause tremendous long-term damage, with critical economic linkages between employees, businesses, and banks at risk of disappearing forever. Scores of firms will close permanently unless urgent action is taken. The threat is even more significant for emerging economies, where the economic costs of social distancing are likely to be higher, and where vulnerable small and medium sized enterprises with low cash reserves account for a much larger share of the economy than in rich countries, which can rely on extensive social and economic safety nets. Poor countries, moreover, have far more precarious health-care systems. The funds required to support vulnerable workers and businesses, and to care for COVID-19 patients, could be as high as 10% of their GDP. As a comparison, in the US the rescue measures passed in the last month alone account for at least 10% of GDP, and are likely to increase even more. A number of European countries have commited loans, equity injections and guarantees up to 35% of GDP. The COVID-19 crisis has led to a sudden collapse in capital flows to emerging and developing countries. According to estimates by the Institute of International Finance, non-resident portfolio outflows from emerging market countries amounted to nearly $100 billion over a period of 45 days starting in late February 2020. For comparison, in the three months that followed the explosion of the 2008 global financial crisis, outflows were less than $20 billion.
Topic:
Debt, Economics, International Political Economy, GDP, Business, Macroeconomics, Pandemic, COVID-19, and Credit
Political Geography:
Global Focus

3530. In Defense of Alternatives to Pollution Pricing

Author:
Garth Heutel
Publication Date:
05-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Economics for Inclusive Prosperity (EfIP)
Abstract:
2020 marks the 100th anniversary of the publication of economist Arthur Cecil Pigou’s The Economics of Welfare. This book is widely recognized as introducing the concept of Pigouvian welfare economics, that is, of using the basic tools of neoclassical economics to study how to improve the functioning of the economy and people’s lives. While Pigou’s analysis touched on many topics in the economy, the part of Pigouvian welfare economics most remembered today by environmental economists (and perhaps by anyone who has taken an introductory microeconomics course) is his theory of externalities. Pigou argued that externalities, like pollution or congestion, create market failures, but that they can be cost-effectively remedied using taxes or subsidies. These price policies have come to be known as Pigouvian pricing, or Pigouvian taxes or subsidies. If there is one common lesson argued by most environmental economists today regarding the design of environmental policy, it is: the best way to correct the market failure caused by pollution is Pigouvian pricing. According to this argument, a price should be levied on pollution equal to the value of the damages it causes to society. The price can be directly applied via a pollution tax, or indirectly via a cap-and-trade system where the permit price becomes the Pigouvian price on pollution. If the price is correct, then the most efficient outcome will be realized, and it will be achieved at the lowest possible cost to society. A corollary is that environmental policies other than price policies, for example technology mandates or performance standards (what economists often call “command-and-control” policies), are inferior and should not be used.
Topic:
Economics, Environment, Natural Resources, Regulation, Macroeconomics, Microeconomics, Pollution, and Price
Political Geography:
Global Focus

3531. Racial Inequality

Author:
Lisa D. Cook and Trevon Logan
Publication Date:
06-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Economics for Inclusive Prosperity (EfIP)
Abstract:
The origins of American capitalism in the institutions of slavery continues to cast a long shadow. As the economist William Darity Jr. has written, the dead hand of history weighs heavily on us because the dead hand of history remains fitfully alive. Contemporary racial inequality can be thought of as the product of a long historical process with at least two reinforcing sets of policies. The first would be policies governing the spatial distribution of the black population. The second would be policies that had a disparate impact on black individuals because of their locations. Understanding current black-white gaps in income, wealth and education require understanding the complex relationship between regional inequality, race and policies at the local, state, and national levels. In this article, we outline the ways that the spatial distribution of the black population has evolved over time and the ways that spatial distribution has interacted with policy to, at times, reduce and exacerbate levels of inequality. Recognizing the ways that past policies explicitly stymied black economic mobility and how current policies have explicitly or inadvertently done the same provides a basis for understanding how to craft future policies to reduce racial inequalities. Furthermore, recognizing the interconnection of discrimination and the spatial distribution of the black population is important for understanding certain components of regional and spatial inequality. The difference in location within regions makes it inevitable that policies that differentially affect urban and rural areas will have disparate effects by race. A recent example of this is the proposed Medicaid work requirement in Michigan. The original version of Michigan Senate Bill 897 exempted individuals from this work requirement conditional on residing in a county with an unemployment rate above 8.5 percent. The spatial distribution of the white and black populations of Michigan meant that this exemption would have racially disparate impacts; given that poor white individuals disproportionately live in rural areas and black individuals live in urban areas, the higher unemployment rates in rural counties would disproportionately exempt white Medicaid recipients from the work requirement within the bill. Although—after considerable negative press—the exemption was dropped from the final version of the work requirement bill, this incident reveals the complex interplay between policy, inequality across space, and inequality between races. Even if a policy like the unemployment rate exemption in the Michigan bill is crafted without discriminatory intent, it can nonetheless increase racial inequality. In the following sections we explore the how policy has shaped the geographic and economic mobility of the black population over the past century and a half, drawing from the large literatures on regional inequality and racial discrimination that have all too often been treated in isolation from one another.
Topic:
Economics, Race, Capitalism, Inequality, Slavery, Macroeconomics, Reparations, Racism, and Systemic Racism
Political Geography:
United States

3532. Why, When, and How to Teach the Fundamentals of Inequality in Principles

Author:
Can Erbil and Geoffrey Sanzenbacher
Publication Date:
08-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Economics for Inclusive Prosperity (EfIP)
Abstract:
The continued rise of economic inequality in the U.S. has been on the radar of economists and policymakers for the last few years. New initiatives and platforms like EfIP (Economics for Inclusive Prosperity) have emerged, where economists work on creating fresh and useful policy ideas to promote more “inclusive” models of generating prosperity. Yet, students still face a lot of confusion, “noise,” and disagreement when it comes to the topic of inequality.[1] Especially in the age of easy access to information online, students not fully literate in economics struggle to sift through the literature and separate rigorous scientifically based research from opinion pieces. This article discusses a way to introduce some recent trends in U.S. inequality to students, and then delve into a specific topic (e.g., racial inequality) in a two-lecture module at the end of an introductory economics course. After all, it is not that the students are not interested in this topic. But, left alone, many of them become confused. Students do not make distinctions between different broad types of inequalities, such as income inequality, wealth inequality, or inequality of opportunity. They do not understand differences in the underlying causes of inequality, which vary depending on whether the topic is inequality across educational groups, gender-based groups, or racial/ethnic groups. And, they make basic mistakes in reading articles or viewing data, such as mixing-up correlation with causation or looking at graphs with different scales. Fortunately, introductory economics courses have a chance to reach students early in their careers, and correct many of these deficiencies. Indeed, recent events in the US compel us to cover inequality and its consequences in our introductory classes. The economic impact of the COVID-19 epidemic falls significantly more on minorities, women, people with lower income levels and people of color.[2] And, the disparities in poverty and opportunity rates between black and non-black populations is at the root of racial discrimination which re-ignited the BLM movement.[3] Indeed, economic inequality is also related to other disciplines in Social Sciences, such as Sociology, Political Science and even Liberal Arts courses such as History and English. However, Economics faculty are well-equipped to cover the empirical outcomes and the underlying economic models – and lay out their strengths as well as short-comings. Given that teaching about economic inequality is an important task, this article will first discuss when it makes sense to teach it. The article will then spend the majority of its time providing some tips for covering the material, as well as some suggested assignments.
Topic:
Economics, Education, Inequality, Economic Inequality, Macroeconomics, and Models
Political Geography:
United States

3533. An Equity Imperative: How the Workforce System Can Advance Workplace Health and Safety During and After the Pandemic

Author:
Amanda Newman
Publication Date:
06-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Aspen Institute
Abstract:
Every worker deserves a job with healthy and safe working conditions. The outbreak of the novel coronavirus, however, has demonstrated that for far too many people this is not the reality. The pandemic has created a new set of workplace hazards, forcing many people looking for work to make difficult choices between providing for their families and protecting their health and the health of their loved ones. As businesses reopen, more people are reentering jobs that pose risks. And these risks are not distributed equally. Due to factors rooted in structural racism, Black, Indigenous, and workers of color performing critical services during the pandemic are both more likely to experience the health consequences of the virus and to be concentrated in jobs with greater exposure. Serving as intermediaries between workers and employers, workforce development professionals have a crucial role to play in strengthening workplace health and safety during and after the pandemic. In the early months of the crisis, Economic Opportunities Program staff spoke with workforce development leaders across the country as they strengthened existing strategies and considered new approaches to help workers protect themselves on the job. Professionals on the front lines of connecting people to work – from caseworkers to job developers to program directors – can learn from their approaches to inform their own strategies. In this brief, we highlight key ideas for how the workforce development system can promote workplace health and safety during the pandemic. It is important to note that workforce professionals are themselves navigating a crisis, responding to historic unemployment and serving the public as resources rapidly decline. This brief also includes ideas for public and philanthropic funders who seek to support the workforce development field to advance workplace health and safety.
Topic:
Labor Issues, Employment, Work Culture, Job Creation, and Labor Market
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

3534. How Governors and Mayors Can Support Schools So Schools Can Support Students

Author:
Education and Society Program
Publication Date:
07-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Aspen Institute
Abstract:
Schools are getting plenty of advice regarding reopening. What schools aren’t getting is enough material support to meet the needs of students and families. There is a growing recognition that reopening schools is vital for students’ well-being and academic learning, as well as parents’ well-being and their ability to resume anything approaching normal work routines. Whatever the mode of instruction next year — in-person, online, a hybrid approach — school systems urgently need more support to access the resources their students and families need so educators can do their essential work. As the needs of children and families continue to grow and compound — through the pandemic, the economic upheaval, and the racism and racial reckoning gripping the country — addressing health and well-being are essential foundations for learning.
Topic:
Development, Education, Public Health, Pandemic, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

3535. Stress Test: People, Technology, and the Safety Net In Response To Covid-19

Author:
Justin King and Financial Security Program
Publication Date:
08-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Aspen Institute
Abstract:
COVID-19 jolted the American economy — and it caused at least 30 million Americans to lose their jobs or have their working hours curtailed by April. The speed and volume of those suddenly un- and under-employed has been unprecedented, and it has resulted in a remarkable amount of stress on the nation’s social safety net. SNAP and other safety net supports administered by state governments struggle to meet the needs of millions of people. Some state online applications systems are so poorly designed that applicants remain stuck trying to access support weeks and months after beginning the application process. What can state human service administrators and policymakers do to build accessible intake and application systems? How should we re-design the safety net? Read the brief to better understand how to create a safety net that is people-centered, tech-enabled, and aligned with private benefit systems.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Welfare, Public Health, Pandemic, COVID-19, and Safety Net
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

3536. Creating an Accountability Framework that Serves the Global Fragility Act’s Mission

Author:
Susanna Campbell, Dan Hoing, and Sarah Rose
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for Global Development (CGD)
Abstract:
In the final days of 2019, Congress passed the Global Fragility Act, an ambitious bill that aims to im- prove how the US government approaches stabilizing conflict-affected states and preventing the es- calation of violence in other fragile contexts. Introduced by a coalition of lawmakers from both sides of the aisle in the House and Senate—led by House Foreign Affairs Committee Chair Eliot Engel (D- NY) and Senator Chris Coons (D-DE)—a version of the legislation was passed by the House this spring and boasted 26 cosponsors in the Senate. The Global Fragility Act’s final passage, as part of a large FY2020 spending bill, is a testament to bipartisan commitment and cooperation. The Global Fragility Act asks the State Department to create—jointly with USAID, the Department of Defense, and other agencies—a coordinated, coherent strategy to help prevent violence in fragile states and stabilize conflict-affected areas. As overseers of the taxpayer funds that will be used to implement the act, Congress also included several provisions to hold these agencies to account for achieving results. Accountability for results is important, especially when overseers are far removed from implementation. But how accountability is structured matters quite a bit. When accountability frameworks revolve largely around tight controls and reporting against targets, their good intentions can backfire and contribute to ineffective programming, especially in fragile states. To ensure that the Global Fragility Act’s accountability requirements support rather than undermine the act’s laudable goals, the monitoring, evaluation, and learning processes that accompany the act’s implementation must accomplish two linked but fundamentally distinct things. They must be able to satisfy Washington-based overseers’ reporting needs while also providing projects the space needed for locally informed adaptive management and learning (or continuous adjustment aimed at achiev- ing transformative aims in a dynamic context), which is associated with better outcomes in fragile states. The Global Fragility Act offers an opportunity to rethink the tools through which aid agencies pursue accountability. This note explains how tight controls and target-oriented reporting can nega- tively affect outcomes in fragile states and offers some initial recommendations for creating a stron- ger, outcome-oriented accountability framework.
Topic:
Foreign Aid, Leadership, Fragile States, Legislation, and Accountability
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

3537. A Post-Brexit Trade Policy for Development and a More Integrated Africa

Author:
Kimberly Ann Elliott
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for Global Development (CGD)
Abstract:
The United Kingdom will confirm its departure from the European Union on 31st January 2020. As part of its independent trade policy, the government has committed to improve access to UK mar- kets for the poorest countries. This note sets out three ways it can do so: expanding duty-free market access while avoiding piecemeal trade agreements that undermine Africa’s own trade integration ef- forts; using an alternative framework for those trade agreements it does negotiate with developing countries; and supporting a “back-to-basics” multilateral negotiation at the World Trade Organiza- tion that could help to rebuild confidence in that institution and thus protect the interests of small and vulnerable countries. After a brief review of the background and context, it sets out specific pro- posals in each of these areas.
Topic:
Development, International Cooperation, International Trade and Finance, European Union, and Brexit
Political Geography:
Africa, United Kingdom, and Europe

3538. From Principles to Practice: Strengthening Accountability for Gender Equality in International Development

Author:
Megan O'Donnell
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for Global Development (CGD)
Abstract:
Existing accountability mechanisms focused on global gender equality are largely retrospective in nature. Where mechanisms do probe at governments’ commitments to future progress, they often lack accompanying incentive structures (“carrots and sticks”) to encourage ambition. Countries re- port their progress implementing the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women and the Beijing Platform for Action, participate in annual Commission on the Status of Women sessions, and touch on gender equality as part of voluntary national review reporting for the Sustainable Development Goals. Although these processes, among others, provide an opportu- nity for country reflection and for civil society engagement, they do not mandate that governments establish and adhere to forward-looking, specific commitments detailing how they aim to promote gender equality. The absence of future commitments makes it difficult for civil society actors to hold governments to account according to well-defined metrics. At the same time, governments and women’s rights advo- cates worldwide are increasingly discussing and adopting “feminist foreign policies” and “gender-re- sponsive budgeting.” There is a need to clearly define with robust and transparent metrics what these terms mean and how to hold countries who claim to be “feminist” and “gender-responsive” account- able for ambitious progress, while also encouraging other countries to increasingly prioritize gender equality.
Topic:
Development, Gender Issues, Inequality, Feminism, and Equality
Political Geography:
Global Focus

3539. Managing Better: What All of Us Can Do to Encourage Aid Success

Author:
Dan Hoing
Publication Date:
02-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Center for Global Development (CGD)
Abstract:
Management by way of top-down controls and targets sometimes gets in the way of aid donors’ aims, undermining project success. These unhelpful controls often stem from a need to account for performance; legislatures or executive boards induce agencies to exercise tight process controls and orient projects towards what is measurable and reportable. My 2018 book, Navigation by Judgment, presents quantitative empirics from a database of 14,000 projects and qualitative evidence from eight case studies in support of this claim. I wrote the book in part because I imagined it would be useful to show aid agencies and authorizers empirics that demonstrated the problem—that the first step to change was recognition. But after talking about my book at aid agencies and authorizers, I am confident that while my 2018 diagnosis was right, my theory of change was all wrong.
Topic:
Leadership, Business, Accountability, Transparency, and Management
Political Geography:
Global Focus

3540. Exploring India's Strategic Futures

Author:
Arzan Tarapore
Publication Date:
09-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center
Abstract:
The method of major/minor trends developed in this report suggests that the roots of apparently surprising future behavior can be found in a close reading of a target state’s history. Using this method, the report outlines three unlikely but plausible alternative futures of India as a strategic actor. The first scenario envisions India as a Hindu-nationalist revisionist power hostile to Pakistan but accommodating of China; in the second, it is a militarily risk-acceptant state that provokes dangerous crises with China; and in the third scenario, India is a staunch competitor to China that achieves some success through partnerships with other U.S. rivals like Russia and Iran. These scenarios are designed not to predict the future but to sensitize U.S. policymakers to possible strategic disruptions. They also serve to highlight risks and tensions in current policy.
Topic:
International Cooperation, Nationalism, Religion, Military Strategy, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Pakistan, China, India, Asia, North America, and United States of America

3541. Implementing the Mop Barrier Assessment Methodology With the Zambia Police Service

Author:
Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance
Publication Date:
04-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance (DCAF)
Abstract:
In the context of the Canadian-led Elsie Initiative aiming to reduce barriers for uniformed women in UN Peace Operations, DCAF has developed the Measuring Opportunities for Women in Peace Operations (MOWIP) methodology, in partnership with Cornell University and research institutions in eight troop- and police contributing countries across the world. The MOWIP methodology aims to provide institutions with the evidence base necessary to design effective interventions which substantially increase the number of women who deploy. While it is currently being piloted in 7 other countries, the MOWIP methodology was successfully implemented in Zambia with the Zambia Police Service (ZPS) between May 2019 and March 2020, in partnership with the Southern African Centre for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (SACCORD). This resource highlights the key takeaways from the process of implementing the MOWIP methodology in Zambia along with good practices and lessons learned at each stage, including the preparation phase, the data collection phase, the data analysis phase and the validation phase. It aims to provide guidance to TPCCs or security institutions interested in implementing the MOWIP methodology themselves regarding the resources and time commitment required, and outlines the outcomes and benefits of undergoing the Barrier Assessment for the ZPS.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Police, and Models
Political Geography:
Africa and Zambia

3542. Impact of COVID-19 on Security Sector Governance

Author:
Dawn Lui
Publication Date:
05-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance (DCAF)
Abstract:
The unprecedented impact of COVID-19 on societies and their institutions has led to a series of extraordinary responses by governments around the world. COVID-19 has affected all dimensions of the security sector, from principles and values to cross-cutting issues, and from security providers to security overseers. The objective of this Briefing Note is to map the substantive impact of COVID-19 on security sector governance (SSG) in order to calibrate policy and operational responses, as well as to explore how this impact may be mitigated, while working towards the overarching goal of ensuring the provision of improved security for individuals, communities, and states.
Topic:
Security, Governance, Public Health, Pandemic, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Global Focus

3543. The Election Official’s Handbook: Six steps local officials can take to safeguard America’s election systems

Author:
David Levine
Publication Date:
02-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
Intelligence and law enforcement agencies warn that Russia, China, Iran, and other foreign actors will seek to interfere in the 2020 presidential election.1 Foreign actors are increasingly sophisticated at using cyber tools and social media to probe and penetrate electoral infrastructure, manipulate public opinion, and cast doubt on the integrity of the election process. On one hand, the United States is better prepared to address these threats now than during the 2016 presidential election. For example, after the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) designated election systems as critical infrastructure in 2017, it established the Elections Infrastructure Information Sharing and Analysis Center, which enabled states and localities to more easily share information about threats to elections. This mechanism has had the additional benefit of making DHS better at helping states manage risks, as well as distributing information from the federal government to the states about possible threats.2 On the other hand, in many states there are still vulnerabilities in election infrastructure that foreign actors can exploit. These vulnerabilities exist at almost every step of the election administration process, including registering voters, verifying their registration at polling places, securing the devices that capture and tally the vote, transmitting that data to a central location on election night, and executing an accurate recount.3 While states usually make decisions about the rules of elections (policymaking),4 localities are typically responsible for the “nuts and bolts” of running an election — such as finding polling places and recruiting poll workers.5 Local election officials also help preserve the integrity of America’s elections by protecting against hacks into voter rolls and local election websites and working closely with federal and state officials to ensure the security of their voting systems.6 As the February 3, 2020 Iowa Democratic caucuses demonstrated, such vulnerabilities are not merely theoretical. During the caucuses — which were administered by political party officials, not election officials — the new app that the Iowa Democratic Party planned to use to report its caucus results did not work. Many of the nearly 1,700 precinct chairs who were responsible for transmitting the results did not receive training on how to use the app, and a large number appear to have been unable to successfully download it.7 Revisions and updates to the app were made as late as two days before the caucuses, making it nearly impossible to vet and test adequately.8 Although the federal government recently agreed to allocate an additional $425 million in election administration and security funds to state election offices,9 federal resources will likely be insufficient to address all outstanding vulnerabilities before the 2020 presidential election. It is also unclear how much of this funding will be distributed to local elections officials in time for the 2020 presidential election. This handbook, therefore, provides a list of steps that local election officials can implement at relatively little cost to fortify their elections systems before the 2020 presidential election.
Topic:
Politics, Elections, and Foreign Interference
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Iran, North America, and United States of America

3544. Conceptualizing Foreign Interference in Europe

Author:
Kristine Berzina and Etienne Soula
Publication Date:
03-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
Europe has been at the forefront of confronting asymmetric attacks from foreign adversaries. Disinformation campaigns have been used against the European public since the Soviet era, and with the advent of social media platforms, they have become a regular phenomenon across the continent. Cyber-attacks have become a frequent occurrence too, particularly since 2007, when Russia conducted a campaign of cyber-attacks on Estonia.1 Even so, it was the 2016 U.S. presidential election that accelerated European measures against interference in democracies. National governments across Europe have launched holistic efforts to counter interference. In 2018, France announced the Paris Call for Trust and Security in Cyberspace, which calls for cooperation to “prevent malign interference by foreign actors.”2 Over one thousand national and local governments, civil society, and industry groups have signed on, and multi-stakeholder communities have formed to advance the principles laid out in the Paris Call. Sweden is applying the concept of “total defense” to educate and protect its population. Sweden’s Civil Contingencies Agency sent a booklet to all households in 2018 with guidelines on how citizens should protect themselves from false information and cyber-attacks as well as many other threats.3 Finland and Latvia are applying the same “total defense” strategy in their own political systems. Increasingly, European Union institutions are also turning their attention to interference. The newly elected European Parliament passed a resolution in October denouncing foreign electoral interference and disinformation in national and European democratic processes.4 And European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen has given her commissioners a mandate to protect democratic systems and institutions from “external interference.”5 Amid this burgeoning activity, however, one thing is missing. There is little consensus on what exactly “interference” is, and how the term “interference” is similar or different from other related concepts, such as “influence.” The lack of a common framing of “interference” across Europe can delay or complicate lawmakers’ initiatives and muddy civil society’s efforts to build awareness and rally opposition against incursions into democratic processes. Defining interference comes with risk. Policymakers can create a definition that is either too broad,6 which could inhibit the freedom of expression or put undue burdens on political participation, or one that is too narrow to cover certain forms of malign behavior in a quickly evolving field, inhibiting democracies from protecting themselves because an attack does not “fit” within said definition. Establishing a definition that merely catalogues commonly-used tactics (for example: cyber-attacks, disinformation, economic coercion, and malign finance) would also prove inadequate because any definition of interference should be flexible enough to capture new technologies and approaches. Moreover, a list of tactics fails to explain the underlying factors driving interference activities. To contribute to the definition-setting debate, this paper addresses why a definition could be helpful for countering interference, lays out the state of play in the EU on defining interference, provides a review of existing government and academic definitions related to interference, and discusses the concept of legality and interference. Finally, this paper suggests two core criteria to assist in the determination of whether any given activity constitutes interference: (i) intent (including the factors of timing, coordination of behavior, and scale of effects), and (ii) transparency. An act does not need to match both criteria to constitute interference, but they are certainly mutually reinforcing.
Topic:
European Union, Foreign Interference, and Cyberspace
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, and United States of America

3545. Friends and Enemies: A Framework for Understanding Chinese Political Interference in Democratic Countries

Author:
Matt Schrader
Publication Date:
04-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
“For our friends, we produce fine wine. Jackals, we welcome with shotguns.” – Ambassador Gui Congyou, 2019 This was how a Chinese ambassador warned Sweden of potential consequences after Stockholm decided to honor a Swedish citizen imprisoned in China with a human rights prize. Ambassador Gui Congyou’s turn of phrase has a long history; it is the final line of a famous 1950s propaganda anthem written to eulogize China’s bloody contest with the United States on the Korean Peninsula.2 Gui’s statement would be easy to dismiss as the words of a single ambassador, but his statement is consistent with two patterns in the Chinese Communist Party’s interactions with the outside world.3 The first is China’s growing global assertiveness under Communist Party General Secretary Xi Jinping. Prior to Xi’s ascent there were signs that China’s leadership had concluded it was time to put aside Deng Xiaoping’s mantra that China should “hide its brilliance and bide its time.”4 But since Xi came to power in late 2012, party officials have more frequently noted that China is a large, powerful country, and that smaller, less powerful countries oppose its interests at their own risk.5 The second and more enduring theme is the party’s tendency to divide the world into friends and enemies. Inside China, the party’s friends are those who “uphold the leadership of the [Communist Party] and the socialist cause” through support for its policy agenda.6 Outside China, the party’s friends are “foreigners of influence and/or power who assist China’s interests.”7 The party’s enemies are those who publicly question how it chooses to exercise power. The party has operationalized this mindset by developing a sophisticated set of tools and a well-defined body of doctrine to attempt to maintain unchallenged power by “uniting friends” and “isolating enemies.”8 This divide-and-conquer strategy is predicated not only on rewarding friends for their support, but also on coercing the party’s enemies. Within China, coercive tactics include: extralegal detention, limits on public and private speech by individual citizens, control of all forms of media and key sectors of the economy, and cooption of elites by establishing personal and professional costs for opposing the party. This report describes how the party has increasingly employed many of these domestic tools to unite foreign friends and isolate foreign enemies.9 Ambassador Gui’s remarks are but one example in an expanding universe of cases. The threat of losing business in China means that foreign corporations are routinely pressed to censor themselves and their employees to avoid topics the party considers sensitive. Meanwhile, Chinese companies have built and sold the party’s tools of digital authoritarianism in South America, Africa, Asia, and elsewhere. Chinese diplomats have also tried to rally other countries in support of greater governmental control over the flow of digital information inside national borders. In Southeast Asia, party-state linked actors have sought to covertly alter the outcome of elections throughout Southeast Asia, combining cyberespionage prowess with the financial firepower of the PRC’s enormous policy banks.10 And the party has used the same vision of triumphant ethnic solidarity it pushes on its own population to justify its attempts to threaten, censor, and co-opt the Chinese diaspora. In so doing, the party hopes to influence democratic politicians and politics by controlling the external narrative presented of China.
Topic:
Politics, Democracy, Foreign Interference, and Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
Political Geography:
China and Asia

3546. Strong Yet Brittle: The Risks of Digital Authoritarianism

Author:
Katherine Mansted
Publication Date:
05-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
Authoritarian governments increasingly adopt technology-centric national strategies and methods of internal governance. They control their societies through digital censorship, propaganda, and surveillance, and use these same tools to manipulate foreign societies. Their leaders prioritize the development of cutting-edge technologies in pursuit of government efficiency and military and economic advantage. Some analysts view this turn to “digital authoritarianism” as an approach designed to make authoritarians more durable at home and powerful abroad. However, authoritarians adopt technology-centric strategies primarily due to their own insecurity. Digital authoritarianism is not so much a strategic choice, as it is a strategic necessity. In a globalized world, ideas and communications technologies are inherently threatening to authoritarian regimes, which must control both to ensure their survival. Authoritarians also increasingly depend on information technologies for economic growth and to build state capacity in areas where they have traditionally been at a comparative disadvantage to democracies. Ultimately, digital authoritarianism creates systemic risks for domestic governance and national security. In this sense, while digital authoritarianism has strengths, it will also become a regime’s Achilles’ Heel.
Topic:
Government, Science and Technology, Authoritarianism, Surveillance, and Digital Policy
Political Geography:
Global Focus

3547. Competitive Strategies for Democracy in the Age of AI

Author:
Andrew Imbrie
Publication Date:
06-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
In a 1972 paper for the United States Air Force Project at RAND, the late Andrew Marshall defined what he called a more “efficient, effective U.S. competitive role.”1 His theory of the case was straightforward: The United States needed to sustain a long-term, strategic competition with the Soviet Union; the nature of that competition was poorly specified, but could be shaped in ways favorable to enduring U.S. advantages; and the United States should therefore assess the balance of strategic forces, clarify its goals, and develop competitive strategies to match its strengths against Soviet weaknesses. The competition between the United States and China today is different from and far more complex than the U.S.-Soviet competition during the Cold War, notably in the levels of economic interdependence and the role of emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence. China, Russia, and other authoritarian powers seek to achieve strategic advantage through AI-enabled capabilities and systems.2 By one estimate, more than 100 countries purchase surveillance and censorship gear from China and Russia, receive training on these technologies, or simply imitate methods of surveillance and censorship that are designed to control public opinion.3 As the digital and physical environments become intertwined, authoritarian practices in one domain will increasingly encroach upon the other. At stake are the core values of liberty, equality, and justice that underpin free and open societies. The novel coronavirus pandemic will accelerate these trends. Increased U.S.-China tensions, cascading economic crises, and renewed debates over the resilience of supply chains and the future of digital surveillance are all characteristics of a world that demands global cooperation but sorely lacks it. The fault lines between liberal democracies and illiberal, authoritarian regimes are widening at a time of growing turbulence in the international system. Even before the virus, U.S.-China relations faced a heightened risk of conflict. The years ahead are likely to bring greater turmoil, with AI and other emerging technologies at the center of an extended, continuing strategic competition among the major powers. In the long-term contest between the forces of democracy and autocracy, the United States should apply Marshall’s counsel and develop more competitive strategies that play to its strengths. The right U.S. approach starts with its broad network of allies and partners. America has formed security guarantees with 52 countries in Europe, Asia, and Latin America, compared with Russia’s five (Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan) and China’s one (North Korea).4 The United States benefits from allies that share its values and produce strategic resources in AI, including computer and data science experts; private sectors that are innovative, dominant, and trend-setting; large and diverse pools data on which to train algorithms; governmental research and development (R&D) investments; diplomatic support for initiatives in AI safety and governance; and the clout needed to export norms and best practices internationally. In a world of globalized markets for AI talent and integrated supply chains, an alliance-centric strategy provides a competitive advantage over any single country that attempts to develop a robust AI ecosystem on its own. A competitive strategy in AI will require the United States and its allies to assess their comparative advantages; identify anomalies and patterns in the strategic choices of authoritarian competitors that are deeply rooted; and match relative strengths against specific areas of weakness.5 This paper focuses on the dynamics between the United States and China in AI. Based on an initial assessment of recent advances and long-term potential, it recommends that democratic nations sharpen their edge in five key areas: Hardware edge: exploit hardware chokepoints, leveraging the advantages that democratic nations have in the production of semiconductor manufacturing equipment and advanced AI chips. Data edge: develop common standards to share, pool, and store non-sensitive data sets around discrete projects, such as health intelligence and biosecurity, predictive maintenance, and maritime domain awareness; invest in privacy-preserving machine learning; and support research into new techniques for making personal data less relevant to AI systems, such as one-shot learning and advanced simulations. Talent edge: develop inter-allied human capital in AI, share best practices, and cultivate democratic networks of AI researchers through exchange programs, joint scholarships, and conference support, while ensuring research security among allies and partners. Innovation edge: harness the estimated two-thirds of global R&D that is conducted by democratic nations to foster collaboration in specific areas of promise, such as human-machine teaming methods and verification techniques for complex controls systems and AI-enabled, safety-critical infrastructure. Rule-setting edge: shape global norms and standards for AI, reflecting and supporting human rights and liberal values; create the conditions for a common AI market among democratic nations; and extend the benefits of AI to fragile democracies by establishing a multilateral digital infrastructure network.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Democracy, Artificial Intelligence, and Strategic Competition
Political Geography:
China and United States of America

3548. Masks Off: Chinese Coronavirus Assistance in Europe

Author:
Etienne Soula
Publication Date:
07-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
As the coronavirus crisis spread across Europe in March, several countries found themselves desperately short of masks, respirators, test kits, and even healthcare staff as they struggled to contain outbreaks. With the EU and the United States initially slow to respond, China stepped into the vacuum. This paper looks at prominent Chinese coronavirus-related donations to Europe between March 12 and April 20, 2020, as well as at the Chinese media coverage and narratives that accompanied them. The prominence of donations was assessed using open-source data on donations from the Chinese authorities or from Fortune 500 or similarly large Chinese companies to European national governments, sister cities, and individual clinics and institutions. Assistance came in many forms and included financial support for the procurement of personal protective equipment, the dispatch of Chinese doctors, free access to cloud-based coronavirus diagnostic tools, and donations of testing kits and ventilators. Three points emerge from this analysis. First, Chinese assistance stretched well beyond the high-profile cases of hard-hit Italy and Spain to countries large and small. During the five-weeks period studied, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and large Chinese companies made 70 prominent donations to 27 countries across Europe. The numbers and distribution of prominent donations of coronavirus-related assistance paint a picture of Beijing’s widespread “mask diplomacy” in which countries’ needs alone were not strictly reflected in the help they received. Coronavirus infection rates alone do not fully explain the variance in Chinese assistance, suggesting that alleviating the health crisis may have been only one of many purposes behind the CCP’s decisions. Second, the donations by Chinese authorities and companies coincided with China’s national and economic interests. China’s state apparatus at the state, province, and city levels made donations, but the majority of prominent ones were from the Chinese private sector and foundations connected to it. However, with the CCP exercising an ever-growing level of control over the private sector, the distinction between public and private donations is not clear-cut and Beijing typically trumpeted both as evidence of its generosity. The perception-shaping potential of the donations is likely to have been one of the main drivers behind Chinese coronavirus assistance in Europe. Finally, Chinese donations were accompanied by a sustained communications and diplomatic push aimed at a global audience. The vast majority of the coronavirus assistance to Europe was promoted via all available channels. On state media, embassy websites, and social-media platforms, the authorities used the Chinese donations to Europe to deliver the CCP’s story. The positive messaging was also a way to pivot discourse about the pandemic away from its own failures in the early months of the outbreak. In parallel to the “shared future for mankind” narratives promoted by embassies every time donated medical supplies arrived in Europe, the CCP also showed a harder edge during the pandemic, much to the irritation of many European countries. Furthermore, since the period covered by this paper, Beijing has been doubling down on its newly assertive public diplomacy in Europe and beyond.
Topic:
Pandemic, COVID-19, Health Crisis, and Foreign Assistance
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and Asia

3549. Looking Back to Go Forward: Strategic Mismanagement of Platform Technologies and the Race for the Future

Author:
Christopher Kirchhoff
Publication Date:
07-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
One morning in 2016, staffers from the National Security Council and the Office of the U.S. Chief Technology Officer boarded a black van outside the West Wing. They were on a field trip to the State Department led by U.S. CTO Megan Smith. Smith, a technology visionary and former Google vice president, once worked at General Magic, the Silicon Valley firm that in the early 1990s first brought together the component technologies of the smartphone. Apple later productized General Magic’s innovations in the 2007 release of the iPhone, which brought the power of computing and reach of the Internet into the palm of our hand, revolutionizing how we live and work and laying the foundation for industries of the future, including today’s “Internet of Things,” which by 2020 comprised 31 billion devices worldwide. The White House staffers Smith led on their field trip were on their way to visit the Global Engagement Center, or GEC, in State Department parlance, a new unit created to help fight the influence war against the Islamic State. While smartphones powered the American economy to new heights as the introduction of 4G became widespread, this same set of technologies was being used by ISIS to establish a modern-day caliphate across Syria and Iraq. Slick ISIS social media posts drew thousands of recruits into its ranks, leading the State Department to counterattack with its own campaign of online messaging. It was a digital war that was a part of a physical war, with the GEC as the nerve center of the United States’ response in the virtual domain. The GEC’s mission was to monitor social media worldwide and organize a U.S. information counter-offensive to push back against ISIS’s outlandish claims post by post, tweet by tweet, person by person, depriving the terrorist group of the myths it used to draw new adherents. It took all of ten minutes for the NSC-CTO group to realize the GEC would not be joining the pantheon of U.S. government technology success stories. Megan Smith quickly identified flaws in metrics the GEC used to track its social media engagement and was astonished to learn GEC’s central monitoring dashboard was not updated in real time, a core practice of any U.S. social media or internet firm. The State Department had broadcast its ambitions to bring the skill of Google, Facebook, and Twitter to bear in the fight against ISIS. Yet it never resourced the GEC on anything of the scale that would have been needed to achieve this mission. Then there were outdated privacy laws that did not permit the State Department to track public social media handles of U.S. citizens, the inability of the Department to contract with top vendors in technology, and an overall lack of relevant expertise on the GEC’s staff. The nation that invented the Internet, the smartphone, and social media seemed powerless in 2016 to mobilize these same tools within its own government against a barbaric adversary that had hijacked them for violent ends. Fifteen years after 9/11 kicked off a transformation of homeland and national security agencies to defeat Islamic terrorists, the State department was unable to leverage a U.S. platform technology to advance a top foreign policy objective. It was ultimately the U.S. bombing campaign and Kurdish paramilitaries that brought ISIS to heel, with GEC counter-narratives barely denting ISIS’s social media mobilization. As the GEC worked its way into a historical footnote, a far more consequential battle for platform technology was underway in the global adoption of 5G technology. By 2020, China had deployed 15 times the number of 5G base stations as the United States. Unlike the GEC, which was merely an illustration of the U.S. government’s inability to use a key platform technology for its own ends, the contest over 5G involved billions of dollars in a worldwide race for the future of the global telecommunications market. Though U.S. firms pioneered the development and deployment of 4G technologies, China is on track to capture dominant global market share in 5G hardware and applications. As former Google CEO Eric Schmidt notes, 5G stands to be the first “platform technology” race the United States will lose to China, creating a structural deficit in U.S. economic competitive- ness that in a worst-case scenario could tip overall innovation leadership globally in the set of future industries 5G will enable. While the causes of the 5G failure are many, the original sin is how the U.S. government allocates spectrum be- tween civilian and military uses. With few incentives to optimize allocation across the civilian spectrum managed by the Federal Communication Commission and the federal spectrum managed by the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA), U.S. technology companies were relegated to developing 5G on an inferior band in which signal travels a shorter distance. China and the rest of the world did not make this same mistake. As a result, both U.S. telcos and the U.S. military are on track to be left behind by the global adoption of mid-band spectrum as the dominant 5G wavelength. It was as if the government mandated Betamax in the VCR wars of the 1980s even as its experts knew VHS was the superior technology—an error of strategy that locked U.S. firms into second place before competition began in global markets.
Topic:
Science and Technology, 5G, and Mismanagement
Political Geography:
United States of America

3550. Five Authoritarian Pandemic Messaging Frames and How to Respond

Author:
Naďa Kovalčíková and Ariane Tabatabai
Publication Date:
08-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
As the coronavirus pandemic has spread around the world, authoritarian actors have engaged in robust information-manipulation campaigns. China—where the virus originated and spread due to the government’s initial cover up and mismanagement—became the champion of these efforts. Iran and, to a lesser extent, Russia, followed its lead, seeking to shift the global conversation from China’s and their own failures to confront the disease head on. They have also tried to place the blame to the United States and Europe, portraying these democracies’ responses as inadequate and highlighting their shortcomings. Their efforts have contributed to a coronavirus infodemic, which the World Health Organization has defined as “an over-abundance of information – some accurate and some not – that makes it hard for people to find trustworthy sources and reliable guidance when they need it.” This infodemic has fueled the ongoing public-health crisis by further undermining trust in democratic institutions, the independent press, and facts and data. The coronavirus infodemic is likely to continue to evolve, given that the fight against the pandemic is far from over, but its contours have already been drawn, making it possible to assess the information-manipulation efforts undertaken by malign actors during the last months. Understanding how and why they have engaged in information manipulation leads to an initial set of recommendations on how to contain the infodemic as well as how to prevent similar efforts that could stymie responses to future public-health pandemics. We identify five messaging frames used by China, Russia, and Iran in the first six months of the pandemic with implications for public health, democracy and governance, and transatlantic relations and offer recommendations to address them. Every crisis goes through several stages, and it is necessary to detect and monitor evolving tactics and frames used by malign actors in the globalizing information space early on. By doing so, democracies can ensure a more effective mitigation, robust preparedness, rapid response, and as painless a recovery as possible when facing public-health emergencies or potential economic, security, or environmental crises.
Topic:
Authoritarianism, Pandemic, COVID-19, and Misinformation
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, and United States of America

3551. Covert Foreign Money: Financial Loopholes Exploited by Authoritarians to Fund Political Interference in Democracies

Author:
Josh Rudolph and Thomas Morley
Publication Date:
08-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
In addition to more widely studied tools like cyberattacks and disinformation, authoritarian regimes such as Russia and China have spent more than $300 million interfering in democratic processes more than 100 times spanning 33 countries over the past decade. The frequency of these financial attacks has accelerated aggressively from two or three annually before 2014 to 15 to 30 in each year since 2016. We call this tool of foreign interference “malign finance,” defined as “the funding of foreign political parties, candidates, campaigns, well-connected elites, or politically influential groups, often through non-transparent structures designed to obfuscate ties to a nation state or its proxies.” A typical case involves a regime-connected operative funneling $1 million to a favored political party, although buying influence in a major national election costs more like $3 million to $15 million. Rather than start our analysis by focusing on any given policy area, we review open-source reporting in 16 languages to identify malign finance cases credibly attributed to foreign governments. Finding that approximately 83 percent of the activity was enabled by legal loopholes, we catalogue the resulting caseload into the seven most exploited policy gaps. Broader than just money flowing through straw donors, shell companies, non-profits, and other conduits, malign finance includes a range of support mechanisms innovated by authoritarian regimes to interfere in democracies, from intangible gifts to media assistance. As such, policy strategies to address these vulnerabilities are not limited to campaign finance reforms, but also include greater transparency requirements around media funding, corporate ownership, campaign contacts with foreign powers, and other issues. In addition to identifying loopholes, our case study informs the scope of our recommended policy solutions, which are meant close off channels for foreign financial interference without infringing upon the speech rights of domestic political spenders or jeopardizing bipartisan support. Each of our recommendations balances these trade-offs differently based on empirical, legal, political, and administrative considerations vetted in consultation with more than 90 current and former executive branch officials, Congressional staffers from both parties, constitutional law scholars, and civil society experts. This report is organized around each of the seven U.S. legal loopholes that need to be closed, starting with the most urgent priorities, plus an eighth chapter on the need for stronger governmental coordination.
Topic:
Authoritarianism, Democracy, Finance, Foreign Interference, and Dark Money
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, and United States of America

3552. Iran’s Authoritarian Playbook: The Tactics, Doctrine, and Objectives behind Iran’s Influence Operations

Author:
Ariane Tabatabai
Publication Date:
09-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
According to a 2013 indictment by the U.S. Department of Justice, hackers backed by a foreign power gained access to the controls of the Bowman Avenue Dam, a small dam in the New York City suburb of Rye, New York. Cyberattacks on infrastructure have long been a concern in the United States: Russia has targeted the U.S. power grid and other critical infrastructure in the past—at times successfully.1 Hackers backed by the People’s Republic of China have targeted U.S. utilities companies.2 However, neither of these strategic adversaries was behind this bold foray into U.S. suburbia: the culprit, according to the indictment, was the Islamic Republic of Iran.3 Over the past decade, Iran has emerged as an important national security challenge for the United States. A novel part of the regime’s effort—facilitated by the advent of the information age and new technology—is its development of a playbook and toolkit designed to undermine the United States at home just as, in the eyes of Tehran, Washington does in Iran. This makes the current Iranian challenge more subtle and nuanced than has been the case for most of the Islamic Republic’s existence. Iran has gradually expanded its capabilities to compete against the United States for influence within the region, and it is now also taking this competition into the United States and even Europe. One hundred days before the 2020 U.S. elections, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence put a fine point on this threat when National Counterintelligence and Security Center Director William Evanina released a statement noting that, “at this time, we’re primarily concerned with China, Russia and Iran,” who are all looking to “use influence measures in social and traditional media in an effort to sway U.S. voters’ preferences and perspectives, to shift U.S. policies, to increase discord and to undermine confidence in our democratic process.”4 The statement characterized the Iranian threat as follows: “Iran seeks to undermine U.S. democratic institutions and divide the country in advance of the elections. Iran’s efforts center around online influence, such as spreading disinformation on social media and recirculating anti-U.S. content.”5 The Islamic Republic’s authoritarian toolkit is unlikely to become as sophisticated as that of China or Russia in the near-term. After all, Iran’s economy is in shambles, its capacity restrained, and the model of society and governance it tries to offer profoundly limited in its appeal. And even the flagship tool used by Iran to interfere in democracies, namely its online influence operations, continues to suffer from such basic shortcomings as misspelled names, the repeated use of the same tactics and techniques, and a lack of proper research into the target and familiarity with its behavior.6 However, a perceived existential threat posed by the United States, an inability to match the conventional capabilities of the United States and its allies, and a strong desire to compete with the same, have encouraged Iran to double down on efforts to develop a set of asymmetric tools allowing it to overcome its shortcomings. In this sense, Iran is not dissimilar to Russia. “Authoritarian learning” (including partnerships with both Beijing and Moscow) has likely helped Tehran to overcome challenges and to develop its toolkit quickly and effectively. The result is that Iran is becoming a significant authoritarian actor challenging democracy in the United States and Europe. Tehran’s influence operations span traditional and digital media. The regime has built a sprawling web of traditional media outlets, as well as networks of accounts on all major social media platforms (even as it bans and limits access to these websites at home), allowing it to reach millions of users abroad. The content Iran creates, distributes, and amplifies is multilingual and seeks to adapt to democracies’ social, cultural, and political contexts—with fairly mixed results. Among the objectives of Iran’s information manipulation efforts are sowing tensions in democracies, dividing democratic nations internally and from each other, and alleging hypocrisy in democratic states’ foreign policies, undermining democratization in Iran and elsewhere. Iranian hackers routinely target U.S. persons, academic institutions, companies, non-profit organizations, and government agencies and departments. And Iran’s illicit finance schemes are considerable; although, they are currently focused on sanctions evasion and support of information operations, rather than used as a standalone vector to undermine democracies. Some of these tools and the tactics used by Iran are similar to those employed by both Russia and China—and both Beijing and Moscow have lent Tehran a hand in developing some of its capabilities,7 particularly in the realm of information manipulation. Iranian, Russian, and Chinese state media and associated social media accounts echo and amplify each other’s messaging. But there are also some differences in how Tehran deploys these tactics. This is in part due to differences in the political culture and structure of the country, the Islamic Republic’s own ideology and worldview, and the country’s status in the international system. Another significant set of differences arises from Iran’s shortcomings vis-à-vis both its adversaries (including the United States) and its authoritarian partners in Russia and China. For example, Russia and China can leverage their vast nuclear arsenal and enormous economic weight, respectively, to compete directly with the United States. Iran is ill-equipped to compete with the United States in either of those domains and, as such, sees this set of tools and efforts to undermine democracy as a means to elevate its level of competition rather than an end in itself. Hence, Tehran’s toolkit is more limited than those of Beijing or Moscow, leading the Islamic Republic to be more deliberate and selective in the programs it develops and, perhaps, more forceful in how it deploys them. As a result, though Iran’s growing efforts to undermine democracy should not be ignored and should be addressed adequately, for now, the Islamic Republic remains a lesser threat than China and Russia. This report tries to make sense of these activities and provide a framework for understanding Iran’s intentions and capabilities. It provides one of the first comprehensive discussions of Iran’s authoritarian toolkit, doctrine, and objectives. It must be noted that unlike other key Iranian initiatives—such as its nuclear program, missile activities, support for non-state actors, and regional interventions—Iran’s authoritarian toolkit remains scarcely studied in the academic literature. Understanding Tehran’s objectives in undermining democracy and the means it leverages to do so is important for a few reasons. First, Iranian activities over the past few years have shown that the regime is increasingly active in this space. And as Iran’s objectives and the tools it employs are different from those of other key malign actors, understanding their strengths and weaknesses and developing specific responses to them is a worthy exercise. Second, authoritarians learn from each other, and observing the Iranian case allows us to better identify the trends and comprehend the ways in which less powerful malign actors (as opposed to Russia and China, for example) may engage in similar activities designed to undermine democracy.
Topic:
Authoritarianism, Elections, Cybersecurity, Foreign Interference, Cyberspace, and Influence
Political Geography:
Iran, Middle East, and Global Focus

3553. Prospects for European and U.S. Policy toward Iran

Author:
Ariane Tabatabai and Edgar P. Tam
Publication Date:
09-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
President Donald Trump’s views on Iran have centered on dismantling the landmark nuclear deal known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which was agreed in 2015. He made it clear early on that he believed he could negotiate a better deal with Iran that would not compromise the interests of the United States as much and that would also address far more issues of concern to its partners in the Middle East. However, to date the Trump administration has not come any closer to achieving this goal. Instead, the United States and Iran have come close to war. Although European countries share objectives on Iran with the United States—for instance, limiting Iran’s ballistic-missile activities and seeking its return to compliance with its nuclear commitments under the JCPOA—they disagree strongly with President Trump’s approach to achieving these. His approach has made Washington the proverbial bull in a china shop for U.S allies in Europe, forcing them to put on hold long-desired objectives such as expanding economic ties with Iran and bringing it closer into a community of responsible stakeholders. Therefore, the result of the U.S. presidential election will have a significant impact on Europe’s relations with the United States when it comes to dealing with Iran. There are several ways in which a Trump reelection could affect Europe’s calculations. A second Trump administration that maintains a hard-line policy toward Iran would lead Europe to double down on encouraging Iran to negotiate by offering incentives as a demonstration of its good faith to Washington. Alternatively, no longer having to think about his reelection, Trump may pursue a less hard-line approach to secure negotiations, thus solidifying his presidential legacy. Germany and France in particular might seek additional leverage to temper and perhaps even counter Trump’s hard-line Iran policy to limit what they view as the damage caused by his administration. For its part, the United Kingdom may align more with the United States, causing a rupture in European unity. However, a “hybrid” scenario is most likely, in which Europe would continue its attempts to be perceived as independent while seeking a greater role in leading a quiet international effort to get Iran back in compliance with the JCPOA and at the negotiating table. If Joe Biden becomes president, he would return the United States to the JCPOA if Iran returned to compliance—which Europe also wants—while trying to negotiate additional commitments from Tehran on other areas of concern, such as missile testing and U.S. hostages. If this plan is complicated by the Trump administration’s pursuit of a unilateral sanctions snapback before it leaves office, however, a Biden administration may find itself facing a scenario in which there is no JCPOA to rejoin. This could be further complicated by a withdrawal by Iran from the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, which it has threatened to do. Even if there is a change in U.S. administration, European countries would still have to overcome differences among themselves on many aspects of Iran policy. A post-Brexit Europe may see the United Kingdom more aligned with U.S. objectives than European ones and acting more as an occasional “+1” to a remaining E2 of France and Germany. European countries also disagree on how to approach Iran’s malign activities, such as terrorism—with Germany having outlawed all of Hezbollah’s activities while the United Kingdom, France, and other European countries distinguish between the organization’s ostensibly political arm and its militant wing. These intra-European divisions, despite the European Union trying to establish a united front, make it easier for Iran’s propaganda efforts to sow division among European countries and in the transatlantic relationship.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Elections, and JCPOA
Political Geography:
Europe, Iran, and United States of America

3554. October Surprise: Simulating a Foreign Interference Crisis on the Eve of the 2020 Election

Author:
Nathan Kohlenberg
Publication Date:
10-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
The United States, like many other democracies, faces concerted and sophisticated operations aimed at disrupting, delegitimizing, and in some cases altering the outcomes of its elections. While foreign interference operations are not bound by election cycles, elections constitute a unique window of increased vulnerability. To better understand how well U.S. institutions have adapted since the 2016 election, the Alliance for Securing Democracy conducted a table-top exercise to assess potential gaps in policies and practices by government, social media platforms, and campaigns. The exercise also considered the options, challenges, and trade-offs that politicians, policymakers, and corporate officers might face in the days leading up to the 2020 election. The exercise was conducted virtually in July 2020 with a bipartisan group of 14 experts representing senior government, political organizing, and technology industry leaders. The results were clear: information sharing stalled, lines of communication were lacking, and distrust was rampant. Parochial interests and the mitigation of personal and organizational risk often took priority over national interests. Meanwhile, many leaders struggled to gather the information they needed to commit to a course of action. Although a simulation can never capture the complexity of the systems and relationships it aims to approximate, this exercise underscores that there is work to be done to improve resilience in all three sectors analyzed: the U.S. government, professional politics, and the technology sector. Many shortcomings were immediately apparent to the experts who participated, while others became evident in the after-action analysis. Working with the participants and other experts on election interference, we have summarized in this report a number of lessons learned from the exercise in order to spotlight recent progress and remaining challenges. Our simulation strongly suggested that current policies and structures are insufficient to facilitate the cooperation between stakeholders that would be necessary to mitigate a sophisticated information operation targeting the election. In particular, our participants concluded that response mechanisms remained troublingly dependent on the personal integrity of decisionmakers in Washington and Silicon Valley, and current government and social media policies are insufficiently precise and unambiguous to provide clear guidance in many situations, especially as relate to privacy and First Amendment concerns. Nevertheless, the particular course of the exercise and approaches taken by the participants also shed light on what can be done to build greater responsiveness into the range of public and private institutions responsible for ensuring the integrity of our elections.
Topic:
National Security, Politics, Elections, and Foreign Interference
Political Geography:
United States of America

3555. Leaks, Lies, and Altered Tape: Russia’s Maturing Information Manipulation Playbook

Author:
Jessica Brandt and Amber Frankland
Publication Date:
10-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
In 2016 the Russian government and its proxies interfered in the U.S. presidential election in a “sweeping and systematic” fashion. Thanks to multiple bipartisan investigations and the work of researchers and journalists, rich detail about that operation—and the tools Russia’s disinformation agents used to execute it—are available to the public. In 2020 Americans are again preparing to elect a president. As the U.S. intelligence community assessed, and FBI Director Christopher Wray confirmed in recent testimony before Congress, Russia is conducting a “very active” interference campaign. Since 2016, Russia’s interference activity in the United States, and elsewhere around the world, has not abated. That’s because elections are a flashpoint for Russian information operations, but not the start or endpoint of this activity, which targets a broad range of polarizing or contentious political events. Over the past four years, the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) the Russian government and its proxies use to manipulate information and carry out deceptive campaigns have matured. These include: Co-opting authentic domestic voices and institutions, often by co-locating trolls within a target population, renting social media accounts of local actors, entrapping local leaders in “interviews” with purported journalists, recruiting real activists to foment protests, or mimicking or appropriating the names of local groups; Exploiting the anticipation of manipulation to claim that manipulation has occurred, often through false flag operations, or the amplification of homegrown conspiracy theories; Practicing tailored influence, by working through micro-influencers and in closed groups; Exploiting the full information ecosystem to launder a narrative, by seeding it with authentic domestic actors, deploying quasi-transparent Russian-supported media properties, and exploiting data voids. Broadly speaking, we are witnessing a marked shift toward harder to detect, more targeted information operations that cover greater swaths of the information ecosystem, likely carried out by Russian military intelligence. That is a very different challenge than the one policymakers faced in 2016, when the threat was not yet fully comprehended, and in 2018, when the threat appeared to be largely driven by Internet Research Agency (IRA) trolls. While it is important to glean lessons from those experiences, it is also important that policymakers not overlearn them, and in doing so, miss the consequential changes to Russia’s information manipulation strategy that are now underway. These changes are occurring partly to evade increasingly sophisticated detection capabilities and policies on the part of social media platforms. But they are also occurring for a more fundamental reason: the Russian government and its proxies do not need to rely on large quantities of troll farm content to upend U.S. domestic politics with corrosive narratives that undermine trust in democratic institutions and belief in the existence of truth itself. The fire is already raging—it needs only a nudge here or there to be redirected to good effect. This paper is not meant to be a taxonomy of Russian TTPs generally, but to highlight evolving trends with relevance to policymakers. It is an effort to help stakeholders of all types—journalists, regulators, and researchers—look beyond individual campaigns to see the full picture of Russian activity as it is changing and to anticipate what might be to come.
Topic:
Elections, Disinformation, Foreign Interference, and Leaks
Political Geography:
Russia and Eurasia

3556. A Future Internet for Democracies: Contesting China’s Push for Dominance in 5G, 6G, and the Internet of Everything

Author:
Lindsay Gorman
Publication Date:
10-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
The United States and its democratic allies are engaged in a contest for the soul of the Future Internet. Conceived as a beacon of free expression with the power to tear down communication barriers across free and unfree societies alike, the Internet today faces significant challenges to its status as the world’s ultimate connector. In creating connectivity and space for democratic speech, it has also enabled new means of authoritarian control and the suppression of human rights through censorship and surveillance. As tensions between democracies and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) heat up over Internet technologies, the prospect of a dichotomous Internet comes more sharply into focus: a democratic Internet where information flows freely and an authoritarian Internet where it is tightly controlled—separated not by an Iron Curtain, but a Silicon one. The Future Internet is deeply enmeshed in the dawning information contest between autocracies and democracies. It is the base layer—the foundation—on which communication takes place and the entry point into narrative and societal influence. How the next generation of Internet technologies are created, defined, governed, and ultimately used will have an outsized impact on this information contest—and the larger geopolitical contest—between democracy and authoritarianism. China’s growing presence in the global telecommunications market—and the threat that reality poses to the United States and its allies—has catalyzed both national security and economic policy interest in fifth-generation cellular network infrastructure (5G). Like 2G, 3G, and 4G before it, the next generation of mobile connectivity promises a step-change in Internet capability and a societal transformation—through the explosion of connected devices across cities, vehicles, factories, and homes. The nascent data-fueled economy 5G Internet will spawn represents a new playing field for nation-state competition in both commercial innovation and systems of governance alike. In this new economy, United States leadership is not assured. China has made a targeted push to lead the world in the emerging technologies of the future—built on future networks and extending to the applications their data will enable: from artificial intelligence (AI) and autonomous cars to smart grids and advanced manufacturing. Chinese telecommunications giant Huawei has by some measures provided the most technical contributions to the 5G standard and last year filed more patents in Europe than any other company. Heavy state subsidies provided by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) have increased the competitiveness of Chinese firms in critical technology industries abroad. As the Pentagon’s Innovation Board bluntly put it: “The country that owns 5G will own many of these innovations and set the standards for the rest of the world … That country is currently not likely to be the United States.”
Topic:
Science and Technology, Democracy, Internet, and 5G
Political Geography:
China and Asia

3557. Linking Values and Strategy: How Democracies Can Offset Autocratic Advances

Author:
Jessica Brandt, Zack Cooper, Bradley Hanlon, and Laura Rosenberger
Publication Date:
10-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
The United States and other liberal democracies face a persistent asymmetric threat from authoritarian challengers who aim to reshape the global order in their favor. Illiberal regimes use a wide range of tools across the political, economic, technological, and information domains to undermine democratic institutions and alliances, prevent criticism of their own regimes and governance systems, and establish norms and standards favorable to autocratic rule. In the case of digital information technology, these efforts go beyond shaping norms to controlling the infrastructure that transmits information itself. To date, democracies have been slow to adapt to this contest, allowing autocrats to seize the initiative by taking advantage of the openness of liberal systems. Fortunately, the United States can regain the initiative in this emerging competition with authoritarianism—if it addresses its vulnerabilities, leverages its strategic advantages, and reframes the contest on its own terms. The United States faces an array of domestic challenges—political polarization, inequality and racism, erosion of traditional media, a growing tech-government divide, flawed and porous political influence systems, and impaired economic competitiveness—that threaten to undermine the United States’ competitive strengths. Autocrats can leverage these cleavages and constraints in the short-term, but in the long-term democratic characteristics confer tremendous strategic advantages. The United States’ advantages include a vibrant civil society, dynamic and competitive economy, innovative private sector, and robust network of alliances. Leveraging these strengths requires a national strategy to offset autocratic advances by seizing on the advantages of open systems, building resilience into democratic institutions, and exploiting the brittleness of authoritarian regimes. This Task Force report outlines the logic and contours of such a national strategy across four overlapping non-military domains.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, National Security, Authoritarianism, and Democracy
Political Geography:
North America, Global Focus, and United States of America

3558. 5G Security: The New Energy Security

Author:
Kristine Berzina
Publication Date:
11-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
Europe is on the cusp of a crucial technological and political transformation. This year, most EU member states will need to finalize plans for building 5G networks, which will overhaul the way their economies function. Only a handful of companies around the globe can provide the equipment needed for a 5G system—China’s Huawei and Europe’s Ericsson and Nokia are leaders. Europe’s telecommunications operators have focused on economic questions such as cost and timing in selecting suppliers, but strategic and geopolitical concerns are no less important, as are the concerns of Europe’s allies. The United States has banned Huawei from much of its infrastructure over security concerns, and in July, the United Kingdom reversed course and banned the installation of new Huawei parts from its 5G networks starting in 2021 and requiring the removal of existing equipment by 2027. The EU’s member states are in the process of making critical decisions of their own, and the stakes are high. Europe is at risk of locking itself into new technological and strategic dependencies with an authoritarian state: China. Europe has deep and painful experience with dependence on an authoritarian superpower, just in a different sector and with a different power. The commodity in question is old-fashioned natural gas, and the country is Russia. Western European countries entered into long-term energy ties with Russia through the construction of natural gas pipelines in the 1970s over vehement objections by successive U.S. administrations.1 To this day, Russia is the largest supplier of natural gas to Europe,2 and the decision to power European industry on Russian gas continues to eat away at European and transatlantic solidarity. Germany’s ongoing support for Russian natural gas projects, such as the Nord Stream pipelines, ignores the energy security worries of Germany’s EU neighbors3 and is subjecting European companies to U.S. sanctions.4 Over the past several decades, the natural gas relationship between Russia and Germany, in particular, has grown into a vector for Russia’s influence in Europe’s strongest economy. Former German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder became the chairman of the board of the first Nord Stream pipeline, which was conceived of during his chancellorship, and then drew further financial benefits from the Russian energy sector in his roles as chairman of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline and of Rosneft, Russia’s massive state-owned oil company.5 Having a former head of government accept money from Russian state-owned companies, and then advocate in favor of government policies friendly to Russia, is an example of how the economic relationship with Russia can corrupt and coopt the political establishment. It has taken the European Union nearly four decades and significant funds to put in place a regulatory framework and infrastructure that offset the energy security risks inherent in the reliance on Russia’s natural gas. Critical capabilities now in place include the ability to pump gas from west to east, EU oversight of member states’ bilateral natural gas supply contracts with Russia, and the unbundling of monolithic companies to allow for greater competition and third-party access to major infrastructure.6 And the system is still imperfect. While it is unlikely that EU citizens will be left freezing in January because of a natural gas supply cut-off, the distrust that pipelines foment between EU member states continues to poison European ties. Moreover, getting here required various worst-case scenarios to occur—supply disruptions and Russian military aggression on the European continent—before the EU took significant action. In 2006 and 2009, Russia cut off natural gas supplies because of disputes with Ukraine that literally left Europeans in the cold during the dead of winter.7 These incidents launched real regulatory efforts to increase the security of energy flows.8 But even then, it took Russia’s invasion of Crimea in 2014 for the EU to delve into the bigger geopolitical questions of energy security and launch a European Energy Union.9 The Energy Union has fixed critical vulnerabilities but still was not able to stop plans to build new pipelines to Russia. The EU does not have forty years to steel itself against the risk of China’s technology and economic coercion. The digital economy is faster-moving and will be more fundamental to the transformation of Europe’s economy in the coming decades than energy trade with Russia has been so far. It may be more important for Europe to protect itself against the strategic vulnerabilities that can come from technological dependency on China than it was for Europe to get the gas question right, and Europe will have less time to do it. This paper explains what 5G technology is, assesses where the EU stands on telecoms infrastructure and 5G policymaking, compares the risks of Europe’s dependence on Russia for natural gas with the risks of dependence on China for 5G, and offers policy solutions and recommendations for Europe to reduce its vulnerability.
Topic:
Security, Energy Policy, Science and Technology, European Union, and 5G
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and United States of America

3559. Treasury’s War on Corruption: A U.S. Treasury Department Strategy to Fight Kleptocracy and Root Dirty Money Out of the U.S. Financial System

Author:
Josh Rudolph
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMFUS)
Abstract:
The incoming Biden administration has signaled through speeches, articles, and interviews that one of its top policy priorities will be combating corruption and kleptocracy.1 With Russia and China’s increasing usage of strategic corruption and malign finance as geopolitical weapons, and with publics around the world—including in the United States—angry about economic inequality and perceived corruption at home, anti-corruption offers a unique opportunity to unify U.S. foreign and domestic policy. Diplomats and lawmakers agree that cracking down on corruption may be the most viable way to restore American leadership by meeting demands for accountability from citizens all over the world.2 Corruption will be the topic of a dedicated special session of the UN General Assembly in June.3 The issue should get support from leaders at a G7 summit in the U.K. around the same time.4 Fighting corruption will also be one of the three areas for new country commitments at the Summit for Democracy that President-elect Joe Biden plans to host during his first year in office.5 At that summit, the U.S. commitment will be a “presidential policy directive that establishes combating corruption as a core national security interest and democratic responsibility.”6 Making this U.S. and international anti-corruption campaign a lasting success will require more than words. In the months ahead, while the administration’s top leadership and the nation’s public health and economic experts are focused on ending the pandemic and rebuilding the economy, the U.S. national security and financial enforcement community should get to work laying the groundwork for a raft of powerful anti-corruption executive actions to be announced in time for the Summit for Democracy. Concurrently, U.S. diplomats should leverage those plans to insist that countries attending the summit make similarly hard commitments, setting a high bar for admission.7 Regulatory rulemaking by the U.S. Treasury Department could usher in several landmark reforms that have been recommended for many years by financial enforcers, multilateral standard-setting bodies, and anti-corruption watchdogs. This policy opportunity is possible because the reforms never overcame opposition by special interests during the period before corruption became a leading national security threat roughly five years ago, and then they were generally not prioritized by the Trump administration. The most potent achievable action available would be for Treasury to set rules requiring several types of professional service providers that enable corruption to institute anti-money laundering controls whereby they would have to identify their ultimate customers and start alerting Treasury of suspicious activity, as is required of U.S. banks.8 Of the industries enabling corruption by helping wealthy clients hide money, ten could be regulated immediately by revoking regulatory exemptions to the Bank Secrecy Act, including real estate agents, private equity and hedge funds, sellers of yachts and airplanes, and seven other types of exempted financial institutions.9 Other key enablers would require new regulatory determinations with strong legal and political backing, such as lawyers, accountants, company formation agents, and art dealers. Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), which administers the Bank Secrecy Act, must write stringent regulations to implement the newly mandated beneficial ownership registry, resisting pressure by special interests to water it down. Treasury should also leverage concerns about the recently leaked “FinCEN Files” to work with Congress on a major investment in FinCEN, potentially on the scale of the seven-fold jump in budgetary resources needed by Treasury to implement recent reforms to the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS).10 Treasury should publish its first-ever National Corruption Risk Assessment about the financial networks of kleptocracies and oligarchs, reviewing case studies and methods to assess vulnerabilities and risk. Treasury should create a cross-border payments database and make financial institutions scrutinize politicians’ accounts more closely. Treasury should continue supporting two policy initiatives that have developed strongly to pressure kleptocracies in the past couple years by internationalizing Global Magnitsky sanctions and collaborating with the International Monetary Fund on corruption engagement. The U.S. Treasury Department is uniquely positioned to roll out these and other policy, regulatory, enforcement, and diplomatic actions in the fight against corruption, because it is the only part of the U.S. government with a foothold in each area of domestic and international finance that will be key to rooting dirty money out of the global financial system and applying pressure on kleptocrats and their oligarch proxies. Many of Treasury’s most highly developed capabilities have grown out of past fights against top national security threats, such as terrorist financing. The two months following the September 11 attacks witnessed one of the most energetic and well-coordinated performances in Treasury Department history. With Treasury not yet organized and coordinated around anti-corruption, achieving anything like past feats would require Treasury to start by establishing a small team devoted exclusively to this new mission. Specifically, the Treasury Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence (TFI) should appoint a counselor dedicated to developing and advancing anti-corruption initiatives, from expanding the coverage of the U.S. anti-money laundering regime to prioritizing the threats of strategic corruption and malign finance across Treasury’s policy, intelligence, and enforcement efforts. Some of these projects could bear fruit in 2021, while others need longer-term development of capabilities to find kleptocrats’ money hiding within the financial system and prepare policy options to confiscate, sanction, or reveal it. The TFI anti-corruption counselor, who should be designated as early as possible in the administration, should have a staff of two and a mandate to coordinate with and leverage resources across the four principal TFI offices, while also cooperating with Treasury’s Office of International Affairs. And while the White House National Security Council should lead the overall fight against kleptocracy and corruption, the TFI anti-corruption counselor should serve as Treasury’s senior working-level point of contact for collaboration between Treasury and the rest of the U.S. government, as well as with international partners, civil society, and Congress. Combating corruption and kleptocracy will be one of the top priorities of the Biden administration, and Treasury has the resources to start delivering major results quickly. But to do so it must coordinate throughout the Treasury Department and with external partners to roll out big executive actions in 2021.
Topic:
Corruption, Finance, and Kleptocracy
Political Geography:
Russia, China, and United States of America

3560. Compounded Crisis in Belarus: Drivers, Dynamics, and Possible Outcomes?

Author:
Pal Dunay and Graeme P. Herd
Publication Date:
10-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies
Abstract:
Until 2014, Belarus had embraced its Soviet legacy identity. After the Russian annexation of Crimea and its subsequent support for the separatists in Donetsk and Luhansk, elite discourse in Minsk favored a geopolitical shift away from Moscow and emphasized Belarus’ independent statehood and strategic autonomy. Elites tolerated and even co-opted a more nationalist agenda (including re-interpretations of history and the increased visiblity of nationalist symbols) and a clearer delineation emerged between pro-Russian and pro-Ukrainian public groups in Belarus, inspired also in part by the Ukrainian reform process, though this was not clearly reflected in institutional politics. Belarusian national identity lacks the deeper anti-Russian sentiment inhrerent in that of Ukraine. Russia responded by enhancing its profile in Belarus through increased Russkiy Mir and Rossotrunichestvo activities to positively shape public opinion, even as it distanced itself from Lukashenka. In the last few years, Russia more publicly challenged Lukashenka to make good on his pledges by signing and implementing the thirty-one roadmaps for Union State integration. The Wagner debacle of July 29 further strained relations, not least as President Alyksandr Lukashenka instrumentalized the arrests to suggest that Russia was the greatest threat to Belarusian sovereignty and only he could defend its statehood. The current political crisis can also be attributed to a number of accumulating internal proximate factors, which eroded support for an incumbent president seeking a sixth five-year term after twenty-six years in power: the mismanagement of COVID-19 responses; a lost economic decade in which recovery shackled the IT sector and entrepreneurship and initiated the 2017 “parasite tax” protests; the rise of “autocrat fatigue”; a generational change with those under forty years old not identifying with Lukashenka’s Soviet era models and mentality; and a generalized resistance to the idea that the election could be rigged as usual. The existing social contract was at breaking point.
Topic:
Nationalism, Conflict, Pandemic, COVID-19, and Political Crisis
Political Geography:
Europe and Belarus

3561. The Butterfly Effect: Why does Eastern Europe matter to Japan?

Author:
Daisiuke Kitade
Publication Date:
05-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:
Long gone are the days when Eastern Europe was Russia’s exclusive backyard. The last decade has witnessed the rapid expansion of political and economic ties between powers from the Middle East and Asia and East European states. While much of the analysis on the rise of these powers is usually focused on China and its One Belt One Road march across the post-Soviet world, the role of other Asian powers remains underexplored. Whereas China’s penetration of the region has been in the spotlight, Japan’s charm offensive to rekindle diplomatic, political and economic ties with Eastern Europe has tended to be overlooked. In the last five years, Japan has opened three new embassies in the region (in Armenia, Belarus and Moldova), Japan’s prime minster has paid the first official visit to Ukraine in the history of bilateral relations between the two countries and the Japanese foreign minister travelled to all three South Caucasus republics. More recently, in the midst of the Covid-19 pandemic Japan pledged to provide the flu drug Avigan to Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine free of charge. All this raises the question why, despite such a great geographical distance, Eastern Europe matters to Japan? The aim of this Brief is threefold. Firstly, to outline the place of Eastern Europe in Japan’s foreign policy and shed light on the drivers shaping Tokyo’s approach. Secondly, to assess Japan’s economic presence as well as the amount of development aid it has provided to East European states. Thirdly, to reveal similarities between Japan’s and the EU’s strategies in this region and ultimately, to identify areas of cooperative synergy.
Topic:
Security, Development, Geopolitics, Investment, Trade, and Development Aid
Political Geography:
Russia, Japan, and Asia

3562. From Bad To Worse? The Impact(s) of Covid-19 On Conflict Dynamics

Author:
Katariina Mustasilta
Publication Date:
06-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:
In December 2019, when the novel strain of coronavirus first hit the headlines, 12 countries in the world were experiencing organised violence on an extensive scale, with more than 100 incidents of violence and attacks against civilians recorded in that month. To most of these countries, the virus seemed a distant threat at the time. Yet, a few months and over 7 million recorded Covid-19 cases later, it has evolved from a distant threat to a stark reality. The global crisis – which has unleashed an emergency in the world’s public health, political, and economic systems simultaneously – has subjected even the most stable societies to unprecedented disruption. In conflict-affected countries, i.e. countries with ongoing conflicts or a high risk of relapse into conflict, and countries emerging from conflicts, the pandemic has added another layer on top of often multiple existing layers of crisis. Against the backdrop of expert warnings over the particular vulnerabilities of conflict-affected countries to Covid-19, this Brief analyses key emerging dynamics and repercussions in conflict-affected countries in general, and in five countries in particular: Colombia, Libya, Sudan, Ukraine and Yemen. The focus here is especially on conflicts and countries previously covered by our Conflict Series, so as to build on already accumulated analysis. The Brief identifies three main ways in which the global crisis impacts conflict-affected countries. First, the pandemic itself risks exacerbating inequalities and further burdening already vulnerable groups within conflict-affected societies. Second, local and external conflict parties are quick to capitalise on various opportunities arising from the policy responses to the crisis which also complicate peace and crisis management efforts. Third, the economic fallout puts severe strain on already weak state institutions and undermines governance outcomes (thus increasing the risk of conflict). Of these three dimensions, the policy responses and distraction created by the pandemic have thus far had the most significant repercussions for conflict dynamics, unfortunately often for the worse. The global scale of the crisis and its continuing evolution complicate efforts to seize momentum for peace and set the pandemic apart from previous catastrophic/disruptive events, such as the tsunami in 2004, that in some cases led to a positive shift in local conflict dynamics. The Brief is structured as follows: the main text analyses the emerging trends catalysed by the pandemic crisis in conflict-affected contexts, while the case study boxes discuss the unfolding processes in specific countries. The last section discusses the policy options for preventing further escalatory repercussions.
Topic:
War, Inequality, Conflict, Crisis Management, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Russia, Middle East, Asia, South America, North Africa, North America, and Africa

3563. Deciphering China in the Middle East

Author:
Erzsébet N. Rózsa
Publication Date:
06-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:
It is commonly perceived that the engagement of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in the Middle East is driven primarily by economic interests, and that it prefers to steer clear of the conflicts in the region as much as possible. Its landmark ‘Belt and Road Initiative’ (BRI), launched in 2013 as a global infrastructure development strategy, contributes to this perception. This notion, however, overlooks the larger context of China’s engagement, both historical and contemporary. China’s new activism in the Middle East reflects the evolution of Chinese foreign policy thinking, in line with the country’s rise as an economic superpower. Its original choice of partners in the region was influenced by ideological considerations and a shared anti-colonial and anti-imperialist narrative. But its transformation into an economic powerhouse has inevitably altered its priorities and influence in the Middle East. Its economic penetration of the region is reflected in the set of cooperation agreements that it has concluded with the regional states as well as in subregional cooperation formats, e. g. the China-Arab State Cooperation Forum. The PRC’s increasing engagement in the Middle East may well be driven by its need for resources to fuel its economic growth; however, there is inevitably a political dimension too, due not only to the fact that China has a seat on the UN Security Council (UNSC) and seeks to project the image of a ‘responsible’ superpower but also because of the need to protect its investments and commercial interests in the region. China’s growing influence in the Middle East may generally be positively received, or even welcomed; however, the countries of the region have very different perspectives and often conflicting interests in the way they relate to the PRC. This Brief analyses these perspectives taking into account China’s recent initiatives in the region at a time of growing rivalry between the US and China.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Infrastructure, Partnerships, Geopolitics, Soft Power, and Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)
Political Geography:
China, Middle East, Asia, and North Africa

3564. Under Pressure: Can Belarus resist Russian coercion?

Author:
Anaïs Marin
Publication Date:
07-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:
Belarus is traditionally considered to be Russia’s closest ally, and their alliance is a cornerstone of post-Soviet integration projects, both military (the Collective Security Treaty Organisation - CSTO) and economic (the Eurasian Economic Union - EAEU). But bilateral relations have entered a different and more conflictual phase. The paradigm shift started in 2014, when Belarus invoked its constitutional neutrality pledge to refuse to side with Russia in its ongoing conflict with Ukraine and the West. Playing this card allowed President Lukashenka to appear as a security guarantor both in the eyes of Belarusians and the West. Irritated by such autonomy, Moscow indicated that it now wants more for its money. Russia is no longer ready to subsidise the Belarusian economy in exchange for its neighbour’s fleeting geopolitical loyalty. In linking, in 2018, the resumption of economic privileges to ‘deeper’ political integration within the Union State that the two countries nominally established 20 years ago, Russia stepped up the pressure. Yet Vladimir Putin made Belarus an offer he knew Aliaksandr Lukashenka would refuse: the Belarusian president had repeatedly stated that Belarus’s sovereignty was ‘not for sale’. Given its dependence on Russia and current economic hardships, Belarus might not be able to resist Moscow’s ‘coercion to integrate’, however. Its capacity to uphold its sovereignty is being challenged from outside, while Lukashenka’s regime survival is under stress from within: in the wake of the 9 August presidential election, unprecedented opposition forces emerged which the Belarusian regime started cracking down on.1 Should repression intensify, leading the West to reintroduce sanctions, Minsk’s efforts of the past years towards normalising relations with Brussels and Washington would come to nothing. Yet renewed (self-)isolation of Belarus is exactly what Russia needs to reach its strategic goal of keeping Belarus in its orbit, and extract more concessions from its fragile leadership. This presents the EU with a dilemma it knows all too well: how can it support Belarus’s efforts to preserve its independence, without increasing the resilience of Lukashenka’s authoritarian regime or making Russia more assertive?
Topic:
European Union, Partnerships, Geopolitics, and Alliance
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Eurasia, and Belarus

3565. Uncharted Territory? Towards a common threat analysis and a Strategic Compass for EU security and defence

Author:
Daniel Fiott
Publication Date:
07-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:
Words have meaning. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen took up her mandate calling for a ‘geopolitical Commission’ and Josep Borrell, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-President of the European Commission (HR/VP), echoed this by stating that the EU needs to ‘learn the language of power’. Reflecting the current geopolitical turbulence facing Europe, the EU’s rhetorical shift could split opinion – at the very least, the choice of language is open to interpretation. It could be argued that the word ‘geopolitics’ sits uneasily alongside terms such as ‘multilateralism’, especially when one considers the historical connotations of geopolitics. The implication is that visions of peace and international cooperation cannot simultaneously sit alongside ideas such as the military control of the ‘heartland’ or mastery of the seas – to put it differently, if the EU is Monnet, can it ever survive in the world of Mackinder or Mahan? EU member states would react to this statement in different ways and this is one among many reasons why it is so difficult to form a ‘common strategic culture’ in Europe. Behind the EU’s mosaic of various national strategic cultures lie profound differences between geopolitical interests and strategic histories. As the 2017 French Defence and National Security Strategic Review observes, ‘[g]eography and history remain important factors in the manner in which European states rank threats and risks, and more generally, in the diversity of their strategic cultures.’ Despite the direction offered by the EU Global Strategy, there is as yet no common approach to how member state governments understand threats to the EU’s security. Defining ‘threats’ is not an easy task and it has split security scholars. Nevertheless, member states have stressed the need for a strategic reflection on security and defence based on ‘a shared assessment of threats and challenges.’ This echoes the EU Global Strategy, which stated that ‘European security hinges on better and shared assessments of internal and external threats and challenges.’
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Defense Policy, European Union, and Strategic Planning
Political Geography:
Europe and Global Focus

3566. The EU's Chemical Weapons Sanctions Regime: Upholding a taboo under attack

Author:
Clara Portela and Erica Moret
Publication Date:
07-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:
Marking a worrying turn for international policymakers, the use of chemical weapons has increased in recent years in spite of the robust disarmament regime seeking to curb their use. In October 2018, the EU adopted a sanctions regime against the proliferation and use of chemical weapons. The 2018 sanctions regime constitutes the EU’s first coercive instrument against chemical weapons. Even though the EU had previously employed sanctions to halt nuclear proliferation, in accordance with its 2003 Strategy against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), it had never applied sanctions to chemical weapons activities. Also, previous EU non-proliferation sanctions had taken place against the background of a pre-existing mandate agreed by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). Both Pyongyang and Tehran had been under UN sanctions before Brussels enacted its own restrictions. By contrast, the EU sanctions regime against chemical weapons is not based on a UNSC mandate. Finally, the sanctions regime takes the form of a ‘horizontal’ or thematic list, in contrast to classical sanctions regimes that address specific country crises. The chemical weapons sanctions regime was only the second thematic sanctions regime ever adopted by the EU after the UNSC-inspired 2001 terrorism list. It was the first in a series of EU autonomous horizontal regimes adopted in close sequence: a sanctions regime against cyberattacks was agreed in 2019, and another against human rights violations is currently under preparation. The sanctions regime against chemical weapons is also exceptional in that it originated in the European Council, rather than in a working group of the Council of the European Union. When the sanctions regime was first adopted, it was accompanied by a blacklist addressing two vastly different uses of chemical weapons: it combined three individuals and one entity involved in chemical attacks on civilians in the Syrian war with the two suspects in the assassination attempt on a former Russian military intelligence officer and his daughter in Salisbury in the United Kingdom. A second round of designations in January 2019 followed a similar pattern. What accounts for this unusual combination of targets? What compelled the EU to agree on this novel form of sanctions regime? And what objectives is the EU pursuing with it? The present Brief situates the EU sanctions regime in the context of the recent attacks in Syria and the UK and international efforts employed to limit the proliferation and use of chemical arsenals. It then explores why sanctions are emerging as a supplementary policy tool in tackling this shifting security challenge. A fourth section analyses the implications for the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), before the final section concludes with recommendations for further action.
Topic:
Governance, Sanctions, European Union, Disarmament, and Chemical Weapons
Political Geography:
Russia, Middle East, and North Africa

3567. Stand by Me! The Sino-Russian Normative Partnership in Action

Author:
Alice Ekman, Sinikukka Saari, and Stanislav Secrieru
Publication Date:
08-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:
It has become commonplace to describe the relationship between China and Russia as ‘a marriage of convenience’,1 in particular in the aftermath of the annexation of Crimea in 2014. However, this popular metaphor hides very different – even contradictory – interpretations of the nature and future of the relationship. Perhaps depending on one’s take on arranged marriages, the deepening relationship between these two states is seen as ‘stable and successful’2 and ‘durable’,3 or on the contrary, as a ‘mere’ convenient arrangement doomed to be a temporary solution.4 It seems that fuzzy and often misunderstood marriage allegories bring more confusion than clarity to understanding and explaining complex relations between states. Shared norms and worldview would certainly indicate a steady and long-term arrangement whatever the marriage metaphor used. The Sino-Russian partnership is dense and multidimensional, and it is rooted in shared norms. International norms – the standard of expected state behaviour – reflect the underlying values of the global system, and underpin international cooperation in the political, economic and security-related fields.Sino-Russian normative cooperation aims at redefining and re-interpreting existing international norms in a way that reflects their shared principles, worldviews and threat perceptions – ‘like-mindedness’ as Chinese official communication refers to it.5 Both China and Russia share a conviction that today's international order is unfairly dominated by the US and the West, and that the current international norms and their interpretation reflect Western values that should not be considered universal. They are both convinced that these need to be changed, and that the time is ripe for this. For Beijing and Moscow, a post-Western era of global governance looms on the horizon. This shared reading of the present and predilection for such a future global order has been translated into dynamically evolving normative cooperation between the partners at multilateral level. Two other important and shared convictions are, first, that neither party represents a threat to the other regime’s survival (and even has an interest in supporting the other regime) and, second, that the West would like to see the regime in both China and Russia challenged (and under the right circumstances is ready to contribute to this). The shared worldview and threat perception help to smooth out the differences between the two countries: when their interpretations differ, they show mutual self-restraint and acquiesce rather than go against each other in the name of national interest. This Brief examines the normative dimension of Sino-Russian cooperation – i.e. how the two countries advance their understanding of international rules and norms together in the international arena. It studies how the two countries advance their understanding of appropriate state behaviour internationally in three areas: human rights, non-intervention and cyber-governance. All three issues are united by a common thread – states’ sovereignty – a robust version of which both vigorously defend. As a result, in these three areas, their cooperation is particularly strong and proactive.
Topic:
Bilateral Relations, European Union, Partnerships, Geopolitics, and Norms
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Eurasia, and Asia

3568. Unboxing the Future: Finding the futures hidden in plain sight

Author:
Joshua Polchar
Publication Date:
08-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:
To make policy is to think about the future – usually trying to shape it for the better. In policy, as much as any part of our lives, our thinking is strongly influenced by our perception of time, yet paradoxically this perception of time is usually unconscious and unquestioned.1 Policy experts and decision-makers are futures thinkers whether they realise it or not. Yet like all humans, they tend to rely largely on a set of familiar modes of thinking when it comes to preparing for the future – modes of thinking that are instinctive, intuitive or institutionalised. No one way of thinking about the future is necessarily better than another, but all of them are limited, and leave some things unchallenged or implicit. As a result, sticking to only one approach means missing potentially valuable insights that could be gained by using other perspectives. Of course there is no guarantee that learning these lessons will result in perfect preparedness for what lies ahead, but if there is great potential in ‘out-of-the-box thinking’, then it helps to better understand and challenge what is boxing our thinking in. This Brief, and the strategic foresight approaches it outlines, are therefore not intended to introduce thinking about the future where it was absent, but rather to challenge, discipline, and guide the futures thinking already taking place. It will take the reader through five of the ways in which relying only on conventional ways of thinking about the future may be keeping them from seeing a lot more. It will seek to answer the question: how can the discipline of strategic foresight make a positive contribution to the field of foreign policy? This Brief is not an instruction manual or how-to guide on methodologies of strategic foresight. Less still is it able to help the reader to better predict the future, or make the right call on what to prepare for. Instead it intends to show how thinking differently about the future can help to increase our awareness and knowledge in the present and what it means in terms of the decisions we make.
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Strategic Planning, and Future
Political Geography:
Global Focus

3569. Sahel Climate Conflicts? When (fighting) climate change fuels terrorism

Author:
Luca Raineri
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:
Levels of armed violence in the Sahel are skyrocketing. Conflict metrics show that the region is caught in a spiral of insecurity.1 Communal violence and jihadist insurgencies have significantly undermined local states’ grip over large parts of their territories, particularly in the three-border area straddling Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger. Amidst the proliferation of non-state armed groups, attacks by terrorist groups linked to al-Qaeda or the Islamic State networks have risen sharply since 2015. Policy and media discourses suggest that soaring terrorist violence is linked to, if not driven by, climatic and environmental factors. In the Sahelian context – the argument goes – in a region characterised by environmental degradation and sustained population growth, climate change has the potential to exacerbate competition over dwindling resources, fuelling conflict escalation and radicalisation. This narrative draws on global discourses about resource conflicts and climate wars, and contributes to shaping security and development policies targeting the Sahel. Climate change mitigation and environmental protection measures are thus seen as structural preconditions to tackle the root causes of the Sahel’s insecurity and rising (jihadist) violence. The idea that terrorism and climate change are somehow connected is a seductive one. It offers international donors the opportunity to kill two birds with one stone by addressing jointly what are arguably the most pressing issues facing the international community, thereby overcoming political divides. And it provides local governments with a narrative that depoliticises conflicts and downplays their own responsibilities. However, such simplistic Malthusian arguments that connect terrorism in the Sahel to climatic and environmental factors do not stand up to empirical scrutiny. Whether and how natural resources are associated with conflicts’ onsets and dynamics, and to what extent climate change has the potential to exacerbate these trends, are questions that remain highly contested. Just as much as with other issue-areas of climate change, there is no shortage of unsubstantiated misconceptions about climate and conflict, and environment and security more broadly. This Conflict Series Brief sets out to illustrate that misconceived environmental security policymaking, especially when based on rhetorical shortcuts that overlook and contradict the most recent evidence, is not only ineffective, but can have radically adverse impacts. Even if well-intentioned, climate change mitigation and environmental protection measures based on false premises may result in conflict exacerbation, rather than resolution: a situation that violent jihadist entrepreneurs exploit. To this end, the Brief scrutinises three programmes rolled out in the Sahel to fight desertification, prevent food crises, and preserve wildlife which have ended up contributing to the encroachment of terrorist groups in the region. The lessons learnt from these cases helps highlight the policy implications for existing and future efforts to fight violent extremism and promote sustainable development sponsored by the Sahel’s international partners, including the EU.
Topic:
Climate Change, Environment, Violent Extremism, Al Qaeda, Islamic State, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Africa, Mali, Sahel, Niger, and Burkina Faso

3570. Sovereignty Over Supply? The EU’s ability to manage critical dependences while engaging with the world

Author:
Daniel Fiott and Vassilis Theodosopoulos
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:
Fears about the EU’s trade, resource and technology dependences have only grown since the outbreak of the pandemic, even though US-China trade disputes and the rolling out of 5G have played a significant role, too. Some analysts have pointed to the beginning of a ‘decoupling’ of certain supply chains away from China, and, while evidence suggests that some ‘reshoring’ has taken place since at least 2011, there are debates about whether the production of certain technologies should be relocated back to Europe after decades of de-industrialisation. Decoupling and/or reshoring are a reaction to geopolitically risky dependences, with the fear being that certain products, technologies or raw materials will be unavailable during times of crisis or that a reliance on third-party supplies will limit political freedom. In the digital age – where data dominates – there are also concerns that dependences may lead among other things to espionage or a curtailment of personal rights and freedoms. Despite the fact that decoupling is unfeasible, save perhaps for in very specific critical technology domains, the threat perception surrounding critical supplies has given rise to a different vocabulary and EU communiques and strategies are today replete with references to ‘technological sovereignty’, ‘open strategic autonomy’ and ‘digital sovereignty’. Yet, in conjunction with this rhetoric has come a raft of new policy initiatives. In February 2020, the European Commission released a bundle of strategies on data, Artificial Intelligence (AI) and the digital future, which stressed the importance of reducing technological dependences in strategic areas. This is why the Commission is to invest €8 billion in supercomputing and help leverage €20 billion per year for AI. In March, a new ‘Industrial Strategy for Europe’ was published that stated that critical raw materials are ‘crucial for markets such as e-mobility, batteries, renewable energies, pharmaceuticals, aerospace, defence and digital applications’. It will be much harder for the EU to develop supercomputers and batteries without secure supplies of raw materials. To this end, on 3 September a ‘Commission Action Plan on Critical Raw Materials’ was released along with an updated List of Critical Raw Materials and a foresight study looking at strategic technologies and dependent sectors over the 2030-2050 horizon. This bundle of initiatives has made the case for the EU to diversify resource supplies, especially in an era of digitalisation that demands increasing amounts of strategic resources found outside of the Union’s territory.
Topic:
Climate Change, Science and Technology, Sovereignty, European Union, Geopolitics, Supply, and Supply Chains
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and United States of America

3571. Revitalising the NPT: Preparing the EU for the tenth RevCon

Author:
Clara Portela
Publication Date:
01-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:
Almost 20 years ago, an early assessment of the role of the EU in the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons concluded that it performed better at addressing the arms control agenda in multilateral fora than at resolving proliferation crises.1 The reasons for this seemed straightforward: a composite actor like the EU can coordinate better in a multilateral setting, where it is able to rely on ample preparation time, than in the context of international crises that often arise unexpectedly. A decade after that initial assessment, the situation was the opposite. In 2015, France, Germany and the UK – the E3 – assisted by successive EU High Representatives, secured a deal with Iran after years of painstaking talks alongside the US, China and Russia, putting the EU on the map as a non-proliferation actor. However, in the Review Conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) that took place in the same year, the EU appeared divided in a session that eventually failed to agree a final document.2 How can this evolution be explained – and ideally improved – with a view to the upcoming Review Conference (RevCon) of the NPT in April-May 2020? The present Brief outlines the record of the EU in this context, highlighting the difficulties encountered in the 2015 edition, and identifying the stakes for the EU in the forthcoming RevCon as well as a possible way forward.
Topic:
Nuclear Weapons, Regional Cooperation, Treaties and Agreements, European Union, Nonproliferation, and Multilateralism
Political Geography:
Europe

3572. Devil in the Detail: Local versus regional approaches to peace in Donbas

Author:
Karen Madoian
Publication Date:
02-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:
Following the Euromaidan protests and the annexation of Crimea in 2014, Ukraine has witnessed continued violence in the east of the country, with approximately 13,000 people killed, including more than 3,300 civilians, and as many as 30,000 wounded. After a period of stalled negotiations, 2019 brought new momentum to the peace process: Ukraine’s new president, Volodymyr Zelensky, and his political party ‘Servant of the People’ won an unprecedented majority in the 2019 elections, gaining full control over the executive and legislative branches of power with more than 70% of all votes cast across the country. One of the instrumental factors for President Zelensky’s victory was his promise to end the war in Donbas. To this end, he agreed to revive negotiations in the Normandy Format (between France, Germany, Russia and Ukraine) and reactivated direct communication channels with the Kremlin. The president’s message regarding reconciliation with the separatist, Russia-backed ‘People’s Republics’ of Donetsk and Luhansk appears to resonate with the majority of Ukrainians: more than 50% of citizens believe that Kyiv should negotiate a peace deal with separatist leaders and more than 70% support the Ukrainian president’s engagement in direct dialogue with Russia.
Topic:
Civil Society, Regional Cooperation, War, Conflict, and Decentralization
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Eurasia, and Ukraine

3573. Digital Divide? Transatlantic defence cooperation on Artificial Intelligence

Author:
Simona R. Soare
Publication Date:
03-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:
Emerging technologies, including Artificial Intelligence (AI), quantum computing, big data, 5G and biotechnology are paving the way towards defence modernisation in a growing number of states, particularly in the US, Russia and China. While AI technologies and their impact have been on the radar of European governments, there has been little scrutiny in Europe of how the evolving US approach to AI affects European defence and the broader transatlantic partnership. At the heart of the US defence modernisation programme is the Artificial Intelligence Strategy unveiled by the Department of Defense (DOD) in 2019. What implications does this have for Europe and for transatlantic cooperation? In examining this question this Brief finds that cooperation with the US on the digital modernisation of defence remains a strategic necessity for Europe, but a mix of new and pre-existing dynamics in the relationship risks the emergence of a transatlantic digital divide. The Brief is structured in three parts. The first part explores the key tenets of the DOD AI Strategy. The second part examines challenges to the adoption of AI technologies in the US, many of which are shared by European partners. The third part of the Brief explores the implications of the DOD AI Strategy for European security.
Topic:
Defense Policy, International Cooperation, Partnerships, Artificial Intelligence, and Transatlantic Relations
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, and United States of America

3574. Digitalising Defence: Protecting Europe in the age of quantum computing and the cloud

Author:
Daniel Fiott
Publication Date:
03-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:
Any discussion about the digitalisation of defence is hampered by the imprecision of associated terms and words. ‘Cyber’, ‘the cloud’, ‘Internet of Things’ (IoT), ‘block chain’ and ‘quantum computing’ are widely used but their exact meaning or application can be quite fuzzy. The truth is that we may be intellectually ill-equipped to understand the full intricacies and implications of digitalisation, even if the economic rationale for digitalisation is clear. In fact, some estimates show that the digitalisation of products and services could add more than €110 billion to industrial revenue in Europe over a relatively short time frame of five years, so it is easy to see why the economic rationale for greater digitalisation is so powerful. Yet digitalisation is clearly not just about economics and the geopolitical ramifications of a proliferation of digital technologies is becoming a mainstay of international politics today. The assumption is that the competition to control new technologies (both hardware and associated software and algorithms), and the willingness to use them to gain an advantage over other states, underlines the growing importance of ‘digital power’. It is for this reason that the European Commission has stated that it is imperative for the EU to establish ‘technological sovereignty’ in areas of key strategic importance such as defence, space, mobile networks (5G and 6G) and quantum computing.
Topic:
Security, Defense Policy, Science and Technology, European Union, and Quantum Computers
Political Geography:
Europe

3575. A Blacklist is (Almost) Born: Building a resilient EU human rights sanctions regime

Author:
Clara Portela
Publication Date:
03-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:
In December 2018, the Council of the European Union initiated discussions about the creation of a new sanctions regime designed to address gross human rights violations, following a proposal from the Netherlands. So far, the EU only operates three thematic sanctions regimes: those targeting terrorism, cyberattacks and chemical weapons attacks. Unlike classical sanctions packages addressing crises in specific countries, such as Guinea or Venezuela, horizontal sanctions regimes apply to individuals and entities considered to have committed severe human rights abuses. Once approved, the planned blacklist is set to become the EU’s fourth horizontal sanctions regime, enlarging its vast body of autonomous sanctions regimes, i.e. restrictions adopted in the absence of a United Nations Security Council (UNSC) mandate. Over a year after the initial Dutch proposal was tabled, the sanctions regime is still under discussion, which contrasts with the rapid adoption of previous thematic regimes. On first inspection, the slow pace of preparations is puzzling: the vast majority of EU sanctions regimes were traditionally imposed in response to human rights breaches.3 Most EU autonomous sanctions regimes currently in force cite human rights violations as the rationale for their adoption. Indeed, the emphasis on human rights as a key motivation for the imposition of sanctions sets EU autonomous sanctions apart from the practice of other international sanctions senders like the United Nations (UN).4 Given that the promotion of human rights is a centrepiece of EU foreign policy, consensus among member states in support of such a regime should be forthcoming. If human rights breaches constitute the dominant motivation for the imposition of EU autonomous sanctions, what is holding up the approval of the prospective regime? Designing a horizontal sanctions regime in the EU is a much harder task than meets the eye. The present Brief aims to unravel the challenges that make it difficult for this regime to take shape, and suggests ways in which the obstacles identified may be surmounted or, at the very least, mitigated.
Topic:
Human Rights, Sanctions, European Union, and Transnational Actors
Political Geography:
Europe and Global Focus

3576. Russia's Forays into Sub-Saharan Africa: Do you want to be my friend, again?

Author:
Giovanni Faleg and Stanislav Secrieru
Publication Date:
03-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:
In 1977, the Soviet Union’s leadership was in a jubilant mood as Ethiopia had just switched sides to the socialist camp. By the time of this event, the Kremlin had been conducting a renewed offensive on the continent for several years, propping up socialist regimes and ‘liberation movements’ in Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, Rhodesia (later Zimbabwe) and South Africa. Yet contrary to warnings that the Soviets might eventually ‘swallow’ all of sub-Saharan Africa, by 1990 the offensive had fizzled out: ideologically and financially broken, Moscow cut military aid, suspended credit lines, wound down diplomatic representations, closed cultural centres and ultimately withdrew political support. When rebel forces advanced towards Addis Ababa in 1991, Moscow stood idly by as the Derg regime – its former poster child – disintegrated. Over the course of the next two decades, post-Soviet Russia showed little interest in the sub-continent and only in the late 2010s did the Kremlin once again display the ambition to play a greater geopolitical role: sub-Saharan Africa remerged in Russian political discourse and trade and diplomatic traffic picked up. Simultaneously, Moscow revived alumni associations of Africans who studied in the Soviet Union and launched initiatives to lure more students to Russia. The Wagner Group – a military enterprise connected to the Russian state – also expanded its radius of action south of the Sahara. But what is driving Moscow’s renewed activism? How different it is from its previous diplomatic thrusts? Can a coherent strategy be discerned behind this push? Finally, how is sub-Saharan Africa reacting to Russia’s overtures and what does it mean for the EU?
Topic:
Foreign Policy, Diplomacy, and Geopolitics
Political Geography:
Africa, Russia, Eurasia, and Sub-Saharan Africa

3577. Cyber Conflict Uncoded: The EU and conflict prevention in cyberspace

Author:
Patryk Pawlak, Eneken Tikk, and Mika Kerttunen
Publication Date:
04-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:
When the Supreme Leader of Iran promised revenge in response to the killing of General Suleimani in January 2020, the possibility of offensive cyber operations against US targets was suggested. Eventually, Iran resorted to a more conventional response, launching missiles against US military bases in Iraq. However, this episode points to a shift in our understanding of what conflict means. In January 2019, the French Minister of Armed Forces, Florence Parly, stated that “cyber warfare has begun and France must be ready to fight it” as she announced the new French Military Cyber Strategy. In a similar vein, the UK Chief of the Defence Staff, General Sir Nick Carter, announced in September 2019 that Britain is “at war every day” due to constant cyber-attacks from Russia and elsewhere and warned that with the evolving character of warfare, the distinction between peace and war no longer exists in the modern world. The proliferation of Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs), both the expansion of usage and the increased availability of harmful means, has brought about new ways of power projection. Political and economic contestation between states now involves targeted cyber-attacks against other countries’ utilities, financial networks, election infrastructure and governance systems. Cyber-attacks – a deliberate use of malicious software for exploiting or altering computer code, data or logic to cause harm – offer new methods to target internet infrastructure, telecommunications networks, information systems, as well as computers and computer systems. Such activities might have the objective of destroying or affecting the proper functioning of these systems with adverse effects for their users – whether states, companies, public service providers or individuals. As a result, power projection does not have to involve tanks or missiles; nor does it have to result in direct death and destruction comparable to armed conflict. Confrontation is, however, a constant in states’ ambitions, attitudes and capabilities, blurring the line between war and peace. This Conflict Series Brief examines the current practices and future possibilities of preventive action in relation to conflict in cyberspace. When categorising state uses of ICTs as a form of conflict, attention should be paid to three considerations. First, hostile uses of ICTs rarely occur outside of a pre-existing or broader politico-military dispute. Second, a malicious state use of ICTs can lead to an escalation in pre-existing adversarial relations. Third, the use of cyber capabilities in a conflict situation often includes the targeting of civilian infrastructure and therefore has wide-ranging implications for the proper functioning of societies. Against this background, this Brief argues that the use of malicious cyber tools for power projection can and must be prevented.
Topic:
European Union, Cybersecurity, Conflict, Transnational Actors, and Information Technology
Political Geography:
Europe

3578. Beyond Yemen's Militiadoms: Restarting from local agency

Author:
Eleanore Ardemagni
Publication Date:
04-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:
The crisis in Yemen epitomises the complexity of contemporary intra-state conflicts: rather than a simple, binary war, the situation is characterised by various layers of conflict with multiple state, hybrid, non-state actors and foreign state powers playing active roles. Analysts and policymakers need to be aware of this complexity in order to grasp the drivers and implications of this war, and identify possible avenues for conflict resolution. Yemen matters a lot for the strategic interests of the EU: its Western waters are the southern frontier of the Mediterranean Sea. But Yemen has also become an arena of strategic competition for the Gulf and Middle Eastern state powers, who have constructed or taken over control of ports, military bases and airports along its coasts and islands as a springboard for projection in the Western Indian Ocean. Finally, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), established in 2009 and based in Yemen, remains one of the most entrenched and resilient jihadi networks in terms of local ties and political adaptability. This Conflict Series Brief analyses the intertwined layers of conflict in Yemen and their implications for war resolution efforts. The local-foreign nexus between Yemini and external actors needs to be disentangled to separate domestic drivers and the regional and/or sectarian dimensions of the conflict. Competing ‘militiadoms’ are on the rise, thus transforming the traditional Yemeni pattern of hybrid security governance into a multiple security governance scenario. The Brief examines the Yemeni crisis in all its complexity, focusing on existing and emerging dynamics. Interference by foreign state powers is both a cause and a consequence of the protracted conflict, while the potential for peace must be sought at local level. This approach will help to identify strategies for mitigating and possibly resolving the crisis.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Development, Conflict, and Decentralization
Political Geography:
Middle East and Yemen

3579. Arctic Stress Test: Great power competition and Euro-Atlantic defence in the High North

Author:
Simona R. Soare
Publication Date:
04-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:
The Arctic is again becoming a region of strategic focus. For three decades after the Cold War, when the region was at the centre of great power competition, successful cooperation transformed the Arctic into a ‘low tension’ zone and consolidated the perception of ‘Arctic exceptionalism’, the sense that the region is uniquely cooperative and immune from broader geopolitical tensions. For the eight Arctic states that comprise the Arctic Council – Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Sweden, Russia and the US – there has been hope that regional dynamics can be insulated from global geopolitical shifts. However, two phenomena are challenging the notion of Arctic exceptionalism and testing the limits of regional governance. First, climate change is accelerating the melting of polar ice at a historically unprecedented pace. Ever larger swathes of the Arctic are becoming accessible, and with them the region’s untapped natural resources, raising the prospect of increased human activity. Second, great power competition between the US, Russia and China in and for the Arctic is intensifying, changing regional power dynamics and exposing the region to ‘spillover’ effects from competition in Europe and the Indo-Pacific. These changes are accentuated by the erosion of the rules-based international order which underpins Arctic governance, the dismantling of the arms control regime, and the rapid proliferation of advanced military capabilities. Physical presence and ownership of infrastructure are becoming vectors of influence, as evidenced by President Trump’s offer to ‘buy Greenland.’ Meanwhile, Russian bombers regularly approach European and North American airspace and Russian submarines are increasingly present in the Norwegian and North Seas, constantly probing the agility of Euro-Atlantic defences. The growing Chinese presence in the region creates economic and financial dependencies. Consequently, what happens in the Arctic affects more than just regional actors. What does great power competition for access to and control of the Arctic mean for Euro-Atlantic security? In answering this question, this Brief argues that the Arctic will be a strategic stress test for European defence and for the transatlantic bond. The paper is structured in three parts. The first part outlines the security challenges and the drivers of geopolitical change in the Arctic. The second part examines the features of great power competition in this region and the implications for European and transatlantic defence. The final section of the Brief offers policy considerations for European and transatlantic decision-makers on how to mitigate the negative consequences of these regional dynamics.
Topic:
European Union, Geopolitics, Strategic Competition, and Power
Political Geography:
Russia, Europe, Arctic, and United States of America

3580. Towards Urban Decoupling? China’s smart city ambitions at the time of Covid-19

Author:
Alice Ekman and Cristina de Esperanza Picardo
Publication Date:
05-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:
The term ‘smart city’ relates to the use of technology to improve urban infrastructure and services, from energy grids to systems for transport/mobility and parking, and includes water treatment, waste management and security aspects, among others. China has made the smart city part of its national development strategy: the concept was endorsed by President Xi Jinping at a national urbanisation convention in 2015, and later explicitly mentioned in the 13th Five-Year Plan (2016-2020), adopted in March 2016. Since then, the central government has massively encouraged the development of smart cities across Chinese national territory – claiming in January 2019 to have a total of 500 “smart city pilot projects ready or under construction”. It has also urged technology companies to become leaders at a global level, and to reach out to foreign cities in support of their own smart city development. China often promotes its smart cities through existing bilateral and regional frameworks (such as the China-ASEAN Summit or the China-Central Asia Cooperation Forum) and in particular under the banner of the ‘Belt & Road Initiative’ (BRI), as well as its derivative, the ‘Digital Silk Road’, which are attracting a significant number of countries. If China is today investing in the smart city industry in a comprehensive way, including mobility and ecological aspects, it first and foremost developed a strong focus on and expertise in the public security dimension. In fact, China’s definition of smart city was initially assimilated to ‘safe city’ and the development of surveillance networks for the state security authorities. It is mainly, but not exclusively, this ‘safe’ dimension of smart cities that a host of Chinese companies are offering to foreign countries and cities – and the one that will be analysed in this Brief. How is China adjusting its safe city ambitions domestically and internationally during the Covid-19 crisis? And what are the challenges raised by China’s recent safe city developments? This Brief identifies two main types: a normative challenge and a geopolitical one. Both of them will potentially lead to an ‘urban decoupling’, with the development of diverging types of cities and urban governance models in the future.
Topic:
Science and Technology, Governance, Geopolitics, Cities, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
China and Asia

3581. Who's First Wins? International crisis response to Covid-19

Author:
Florence Gaub and Lotje Boswinkel
Publication Date:
05-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Union Institute for Security Studies
Abstract:
The Covid-19 pandemic appears to be not just a test for healthcare systems around the world, but an international contest for which country has the best political system. As the People’s Daily, the official mouthpiece of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), boasted in an article published in early March, “China’s battle against the epidemic showed that the CCP, as China’s ruling party, is by far the political party with the strongest governance capability in human history.”1 It pointed the finger at Europe for “acting too little and too late, and largely failing to stem the tide”.2 Slow response time, high rates of transmission, and a general unwillingness to impose restrictive emergency measures were ascribed to the inherent deficiencies of open democratic, liberal systems, making them appear unfit to deal with health crises or indeed for governance generally. In this Brief, we put this hypothesis to the test: did democracies really respond less swiftly than authoritarian systems – and if the determining factor is not the political system, what are the key elements in crisis response?
Topic:
Transnational Actors, Crisis Management, COVID-19, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Global Focus

3582. Gender Counts: Assessing Global Armed Violence Datasets for Gender Relevance

Author:
Anna Alvazzi del Frate, Gergely Hideg, and Emile LeBrun
Publication Date:
03-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Small Arms Survey
Abstract:
Sound and timely gender-relevant data is key for adequately and comprehensively addressing armed violence. Global databases have the potential to highlight relevant gendered dynamics, but currently lack crucial information related to the sex and gender of victims as well as the context of the violent events monitored. Gender Counts: Assessing Global Armed Violence Datasets, a Briefing Paper from the Small Arms Survey, highlights these knowledge gaps and indicates ways towards filling them. Reviewing global, regional, and national datasets on lethal violence—including on homicides, and conflict-related fatalities—the study finds that gender relevance of the available data across the board is still low. However, recent developments in the 'Data Revolution' connected to efforts to implement the 2030 Agenda have demonstrated that it is possible to move in the direction of better data on the gendered dimensions of violence. Increasing political support and civil society commitments have started producing more gender-relevant data for a range of related lethal violence, small arms, and gender indicators. The study therefore sees room for optimism, and data for gender analyses will likely be more inclusive and gender-relevant in the near future.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Gender Issues, Violence, and Survey
Political Geography:
Global Focus

3583. Conflict and Cooperation: Transitions in Modern Ethiopian-Sudanese Relations

Author:
John Young
Publication Date:
05-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Small Arms Survey
Abstract:
The Nile River bears considerably on inter-state relations among the countries through which it flows; with struggles over control of its waters driving the political undercurrents of the region. Ethiopia and Sudan exemplify such relations, shaped as much by the ebb and flow of the Nile as the rise and fall of the regimes that have governed them. This Briefing Paper by the Small Arms Survey’s Human Security Baseline Assessment for Sudan and South Sudan (HSBA) project analyzes this relationship and its place in a politically dynamic and evolving region. Conflict and Cooperation: Transitions in Modern Ethiopian–Sudanese Relations finds that the cold war both shaped and was itself shaped by the conflicts within and between the two countries. Following the end of the cold war, relations considerably improved under President Omar al-Bashir in Sudan and Prime Minister Meles Zenawi in Ethiopia. However, the recent emergence of new governments in both countries does not guarantee a cordial relationship in the future as on-going political reforms, internal threats, and external influences from powerful states weigh heavily on both countries.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, International Cooperation, Bilateral Relations, and Conflict
Political Geography:
Africa, Sudan, and Ethiopia

3584. A Missing Mandate? Casualty Recording in UN Peace Operations

Author:
Hana Salama
Publication Date:
06-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Small Arms Survey
Abstract:
UN peace operations are uniquely positioned—and mandated—to collect and monitor data on conflict-related casualties. Through the collection and analysis of this type of data, UN missions can both improve the effectiveness of peace operations and assist the international effort among UN Member States to achieve progress towards Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 16—particularly Indicator 16.1.2 on conflict-related deaths. This Briefing Paper by the Small Arms Survey’s Security Assessment in North Africa (SANA) and Human Security Baseline Assessment in Sudan and South Sudan (HSBA) projects examines the current capacity of UN peace operations as data providers. A Missing Mandate? Casualty Recording in UN Peace Operations reviews current practices of data collection in UN operational settings and provides case studies through three UN peace operations in the DRC, Mali, and South Sudan. The paper, authored by casualty recording expert Hana Salama, concludes that UN missions already do much of the work required but lack the effectual mandate, resources, and coordination to ensure that the information is useful for the purpose of the SDGs.
Topic:
Security, United Nations, Peacekeeping, Sustainable Development Goals, Conflict, Peace, and Human Security
Political Geography:
Africa, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mali, and South Sudan

3585. Hollow Promises: The Risks of Military Integration in Western Equatoria

Author:
Flora McCrone
Publication Date:
06-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Small Arms Survey
Abstract:
In 2018, the Government of the Republic of South Sudan (GoSS), the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-in-Opposition (SPLM-IO), and the South Sudan Opposition Alliance (SSOA) signed the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan (R-ARCSS). As part of the transitional security arrangements within the R-ARCSS framework, all warring parties agreed to assemble combatants in designated cantonment sites to facilitate their training, and later, integration into a new ‘unity’ army or other national security services. A Briefing Paper from the Small Arms Survey’s Human Security Baseline Assessment for Sudan and South Sudan (HSBA) project examines the process of cantonment and the challenges in operationalizing the Agreement. Hollow Promises: The Risks of Military Integration in Western Equatoria describes the transitional security arrangements of the R-ARCSS and the scope of force sizes to be cantoned. It follows with a case study of Western Equatoria’s Arrow Boys, demonstrating how their involvement exposes some of the fault-lines within the broader integration process. The Briefing Paper finds that the implementation of the R-ARCSS is leading to deteriorating local security, community cohesion, and stability.
Topic:
Security, Treaties and Agreements, Military Affairs, and Political stability
Political Geography:
Africa and South Sudan

3586. Covert Carriers: Evolving Methods and Techniques of North Korean Sanctions Evasion

Author:
Hugh Griffiths and Matt Schroeder
Publication Date:
09-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Small Arms Survey
Abstract:
For more than a decade the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), in defiance of UN sanctions, has found ways to systematically smuggle arms and other illicit goods in and out of the country. This Briefing Paper from the Small Arms Survey provides a detailed overview of how the DPRK evades sanctions by employing its diplomatic resources and exploiting key loopholes relating to transport, logistics, and proliferation finance. Covert Carriers: Evolving Methods and Techniques of North Korean Sanctions Evasion emphasizes the importance for UN member states, logistics companies, and global banks to adequately screen and monitor North Korean activities and transactions. The study also highlights how new information-sharing mechanisms would strengthen the ability of states, private industry, and the UN Panel of Experts to better detect ongoing North Korean violations and dismantle existing sanctions evasion networks.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Sanctions, and Trafficking
Political Geography:
Asia and North Korea

3587. Tri-border Transit: Trafficking and Smuggling in the Burkina Faso–Côte d’Ivoire–Mali Region

Author:
Roberto Sollazzo and Matthias Nowak
Publication Date:
10-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Small Arms Survey
Abstract:
The tri-border area between Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, and Mali has long been an important zone of commerce for West Africa, and a key transit route for the trade flowing between the Gulf of Guinea, the Sahara, Sahel, and Mediterranean. In recent years, however, smuggling and trafficking has risen in the subregion because of the growing demand for illicit goods and firearms. This demand is fueled by communities’ need for self-defense due to banditry and the increased presence of jihadist groups; needs of traditional hunters and non-state security providers; and the ecosystem around artisanal and small-scale gold mining in which criminals seek weapons to target the miners who in turn equip themselves with firearms for protection against attacks. These dynamics heighten the risk of insecurity and instability. Tri-border Transit: Trafficking and Smuggling in the Burkina Faso–Côte d’Ivoire–Mali Region, by the Survey's Security Assessment in North Africa (SANA) project, takes a detailed look at the actors enabling smuggling and arms trafficking in the region, identifies the drivers of this traffic, and analyzes the impacts on local communities. The paper finds that there are three key trafficking axes in the area and that states are largely unable to control their borders and prevent these activities. The study also shows that illicit firearms are often trafficked together with other smuggled goods such as gold or drugs, using the ant trade method.
Topic:
Arms Control and Proliferation, Weapons, Political stability, Trafficking, and Smuggling
Political Geography:
Africa, Mali, Côte d'Ivoire, and Burkina Faso

3588. President Joe Biden and the restoration of US global leadership: Turning the tide?

Author:
Ville Sinkkonen, Charly Salonius-Pasternak, Bart Gaens, and Niklas Helwig
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:
Te election of Joe Biden as president and Kamala Har- ris as vice president of the United States has generally been welcomed across the world. Allies and partners are relieved that they will again be treated with respect as common issues are addressed, while having been re- minded that they too must ‘step up’ and not only rely on the United States. Even adversaries and competitors acknowledge that it is preferable for the north star of US foreign policy to be something other than impul- sive unpredictability. Based on Joe Biden’s worldview, the world will see a return to more traditional foreign policy precepts. Tis is refected in Biden’s choice of individuals for senior security policy positions in his administration. While the United States is a global power, each ad- ministration addresses the more enduring national interests in diferent ways. In the coming years, key issues to address include, frst, global challenges such as climate change and pandemics; second, strength- ening the transatlantic relationship and global coop- eration between democratic states more broadly; and third, reinforcing the US relationship with various Asian allies and partners, and managing competition with China. From a Nordic perspective, the Biden ad- ministration is expected to continue the cooperative agenda regarding regional security (bolstering defence cooperation and deterring against Russian encroach- ment) carried over from the Obama and Trump admin- istrations, while more robustly addressing global issues such as climate change.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, Climate Change, International Cooperation, Hegemony, Leadership, and Transition
Political Geography:
North America and United States of America

3589. China’s policy towards Belarus and Ukraine: A limited challenge to Sino-Russian relations

Author:
Ryhor Nizhnikau and Marcin Kaczmarski
Publication Date:
12-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA)
Abstract:
China traditionally pursued a pragmatic foreign poli- cy in the post-Soviet region, which was never seen as a priority in Beijing. It primarily based its policies on economic engagement with the local elite, who sought sources of politically unconditional loans and invest- ment, as well as the possibility to hedge their foreign policies vis-à-vis other regional powers. A growing economic presence promoted Chinese core interests in the region without challenging Russia’s political pre-eminence in the region and jeopardizing Rus- sia-China relations. However, in recent years, two factors have afect- ed the status quo and have led to greater engagement in the region by China. First, the region became an important part of China’s Silk Road Economic Belt, and Belarus and/or Ukraine became a transport hub between China and the EU. Second, Russia’s policies turned more assertive towards its neighbourhood, whereas the EU’s Eastern Neighbourhood policies lost steam after the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine confict in 2014. Te new regional environment and domestic instabilities duly increased the importance of China for local elites. This Briefing Paper overviews the evolution of China’s cooperation with Belarus and Ukraine since 2013. One of the results has been a growing contrast in Chinese relations with Belarus and Ukraine. While China-Ukraine relations were driven by economic co- operation and a tremendous growth in bilateral trade, their political relations stagnated. China-Belarus rela- tions, on the other hand, have increasingly prioritized enhanced political and defence cooperation, despite consistent attempts by the Belarusian side to build up a Chinese economic presence in the country. Te paper argues that China deliberately opts to steer clear of power competition in the region and chooses to recognize both Russian special interests in the region and countries’ own foreign policy choices, be they integration with the EU or Russia. In Belarus and Ukraine, Beijing seems to exercise self-restraint in its policy, taking Russia’s interests into consider- ation. However, its growing presence in economic and cultural spheres as well as local elites’ increasing interest in engaging China in manoeuvring in the EU-Russia confict creates a window of opportunity for Beijing to apply its increasing economic and po- litical resources for political ends in the long-term perspective.
Topic:
Security, Foreign Policy, International Cooperation, Regionalism, and Strategic Interests
Political Geography:
Russia, China, Europe, Asia, and Belarus

3590. Consumer Expenditure Inequality in Botswana

Author:
Lillian Mookodi
Publication Date:
10-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
Botswana Institute for Development Policy Analysis
Abstract:
For over three decades, Botswana has achieved a fast growing economy, with an annual growth in real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) averaging 10.9 percent in the period 1981- 90, faster even than the East Asian Tigers or China (Good and Hughes, 2002). Between 2000 and 2001 financial year, Botswana’s economy recorded higher growth rates of 9.1 percent, an increase from 8.1 percent recorded between 1999 and 2000, which was mainly attributed to the growth in the mining sector (BIDPA Briefing, 2002). To emphasise on the desire to continue growing, Botswana has adopted Vision 2036, and other development strategies and policies to improve the implementation of interventions tackling unsatisfactory social indicators. Botswana has also subscribed to both continental and international frameworks, such as the Africa Agenda 2063 and United Nations (UN) Millennium Declaration and its Eight Millennium Development Goals, and further signed up for the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) of 2030. Regardless of the afore-mentioned positive growth, and immense efforts, the country has not achieved the desirable results it sought with regard to some of the social indicators, such as employment, unemployment, inequality and poverty.
Topic:
Economics, International Political Economy, Poverty, Labor Issues, Inequality, Demand, Unemployment, and Consumerism
Political Geography:
Africa and Botswana

3591. Burundi’s Institutional Landscape after the 2020 Elections

Author:
Stef Vandeginste
Publication Date:
04-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
Burundi’s forthcoming elections mark the next stage in the implementation of the Constitution of 7 June 2018. Four key institutional innovations, situated mostly at the level of the executive branch, will take effect after the elections. Contrary to the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement of August 2000 and the Constitution of 18 March 2005, the 2018 Constitution no longer requires the establishment of a coalition government. While re- introducing a prime minister, the new constitution also enhances presidential powers. Furthermore, the 2018 Constitution has an immediate and longer-term impact on the use of ethnic quotas
Topic:
Elections, Constitution, Leadership, Ethnicity, and Institutions
Political Geography:
Africa and Burundi

3592. Context matters – Why Africa should Tailor its own Measures to fight COVID-19

Author:
Nina Wilen
Publication Date:
04-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
African governments have been faster than most of their European counterparts in imposing measures to deal with the COVID-19 outbreak despite dealing with numerous other challenges. However, context matters, and for Africa, the political and socioeconomic consequences of the lockdown measures may cause more havoc than the actual virus. This brief identifies political, economic and social risks related to coronavirus responses in Africa and emphasises the disproportionate burden carried by women. It argues that localised measures, which include dialogue, transparency and flexibility, may be the only realistic way forward, while underlining the need for wealthier states to provide generous aid packages, debt cancellations and continued investments, in spite of current challenges, in order for Africa to pull through yet another challenge.
Topic:
Regional Cooperation, Governance, Public Health, Pandemic, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Africa

3593. The End of ‘Business as Usual’? COVID-19 and the European Green Deal

Author:
Francesca Colli
Publication Date:
05-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
The COVID-19 pandemic has had a clear and drastic effect on our daily lives and political priorities. But what implications does it have for the EU’s climate action and the Von der Leyen Commission’s flagship policy, the European Green Deal? The crisis may be a ‘make or break’ moment for the EU to act on climate change through its recovery plan.
Topic:
Climate Change, Environment, International Cooperation, Green Technology, Public Health, Pandemic, COVID-19, and Green Deal
Political Geography:
Europe

3594. COVID-19 and the Climate – Energy Nexus

Author:
Mathieu Blondeel
Publication Date:
05-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
Analysing the COVID-19 pandemic’s impact on the climate-energy nexus, raises three important questions. First, what does this global health and economic crisis mean for the future of fossil fuels, particularly oil? Because of the drop in economic activity, greenhouse gas emissions have plummeted, but how can we ensure a structural decline that is aligned with the Paris Agreement? Third, how can we embed the ideas of a “just transition” within the broader post- pandemic “green recovery”? This policy brief offers a glimpse of the direction away from fossil fuels that our global energy system must take to govern the post- pandemic world
Topic:
Climate Change, Environment, Public Health, Pandemic, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Europe

3595. Going the Extra Mile for the 2020 Elections in the Central African Republic

Author:
Peter Knoope, Stephen Buchanan-Clarke, and Valerie Arnould
Publication Date:
05-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
The upcoming 2020 presidential election in the Central African Republic (CAR) has the potential to derail the implementation of the 2019 Khartoum Peace Agreement and bring about a return to widespread conflict. This calls for immediate and collaborative action to be taken by those national, regional, and international actors working for peace in the country. This policy brief aims to outline some of the key risks posed by the upcoming elections and provide recommendations to mitigate their potential to negatively impact on ongoing peace and reconciliation efforts.
Topic:
Security, Elections, Peace, Voting, and Reconciliation
Political Geography:
Africa and Central African Republic

3596. Remolding China’s ‘Empty’ Belt and Road Initiative: An Opportunity for the EU

Author:
Jasper Roctus
Publication Date:
06-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
China’s controversial Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has been subject to ample scrutiny since its inception in 2013. Practical results could be said to be severely lacking in contrast to the project’s ambitious plans. Chinese engagement abroad has irrefutably intensified since Xi Jinping assumed power in 2012, but whether this can be classified as the fruits of BRI remains unclear. China, in fact, is developing BRI on the go. That gives the EU an opportunity to engage with BRI and remold it into a more desirable form. Because China increasingly sees Europe as BRI’s “final destination”, the EU has a lot more leverage than it commonly assumes.
Topic:
International Trade and Finance, Infrastructure, Hegemony, European Union, and Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)
Political Geography:
China, Europe, and Asia

3597. No Pain, No Gain: Taking PESCO to the Gym

Author:
Tania Latici
Publication Date:
09-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
It is fair to assume that at least one out of three readers of this paper have at some point in their life accepted to join a group of friends to do regular sporting activities together. While this idea sounds great in principle (we become fitter while building our friendships), when the day comes, only a few of those who committed actually show up. Excuses abound: more important commitments; too busy; jealous friends who were not invited in the first place. This is why a much more effective method of keeping commitments is through peer- pressure: having a designated buddy keeping tabs on you, making sure you show up and help you do the work. Vice versa, you are responsible for helping and motivating another friend, until the square is circled. So, what does Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) have to do with becoming fitter? Everything.
Topic:
Security, International Cooperation, European Union, Public Health, Pandemic, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Europe

3598. Rethinking EU institutions’ rules of procedure after COVID-19

Author:
Benjamin Bodson
Publication Date:
07-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
Up to now, little attention has been paid to how EU institutions adapted their internal functioning to cope with the confinement measures. This policy brief offers an early overview and assessment of these internal arrangements. Their analysis is of utmost importance for democratic reasons, notably accountability. From ensuring security and publicity of virtual meetings to finding valid methods for adopting acts, challenges posed to EU institutions were enormous. Five out of the seven institutions were not ready for operational changes. This paper shows that although a great variety of rules do exist, many need to be adapted, modernised or created. The upcoming Conference on the Future of Europe might constitute a timely opportunity to this end.
Topic:
International Cooperation, European Union, Institutions, Pandemic, and COVID-19
Political Geography:
Europe

3599. What can the EU expect from the new Belgian government?

Author:
Benjamin Bodson
Publication Date:
10-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
EGMONT - The Royal Institute for International Relations
Abstract:
The political agreement 2 that made the new Belgian federal government possible mentions Europe nearly 130 times in an intentional emphasis. The fact that new prime minister Alexander de Croo presented his government’s programme in the European Parliament – the very heart of the Brussels universe – constitutes an almost subliminal message in line with the content of the agreement: his government desires to be resolutely pro-European.
Topic:
Regional Cooperation, Governance, European Union, Leadership, Regionalism, and European Parliament
Political Geography:
Europe and Belgium

3600. A new transatlantic bargain: An action plan for transformation, not restoration

Author:
Julien Barnes-Dacey, Susi Dennison, Anthony Dworkin, Ellie Geranmayeh, Mark Leonard, Theodore Murphy, Janka Oertel, Nicu Popescu, and Tara Varma
Publication Date:
11-2020
Content Type:
Policy Brief
Institution:
European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR)
Abstract:
The election of Joe Biden marks a new era in the transatlantic relationship – in upholding the liberal international order, America wants a Europe that is a sovereign partner, not a helpless dependent. Washington will look to the EU to support the US lead in the Indo-Pacific vis-à-vis China, while also wanting Europe to take more responsibility for security and stability in eastern Europe, the Middle East, and Africa. In exchange, the EU and member states should propose a new transatlantic bargain that encompasses cross-cutting global issues such as health policy, trade, security, climate change, and the defence of democracy. The Trump years galvanised Europeans’ efforts to strengthen their own sovereignty; they now need to agree concrete offers they can make to the new administration. This will require nothing less than a fundamental change in mindset for Europeans, who will have to suppress any hankerings for the old order and decide how they will help build it anew.
Topic:
Security, Climate Change, Human Rights, International Cooperation, European Union, Trade, and Transatlantic Relations
Political Geography:
Europe and United States of America